

THE AGE OF DEMOCRATISM
(1970-1991)

Volume XII
of
AN ESSAY IN UNIVERSAL HISTORY
From an Orthodox Christian Point of View

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No one can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other, or else he will be loyal to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and Mammon.
Matthew 6.24.

The Orthodox do not expect the other Christians to be converted to Orthodoxy in its historic and cultural reality of the past and the present and to become members of the Orthodox Church.

The “Orthodox” delegates at the WCC General Assembly in Nairobi (1975).

The violence wrought by the sexual revolution is incalculable: 50 million dead babies, countless broken homes, and generations of grown-ups who can't grow up.
Photius Avant.

Civilizations die from suicide, not by murder.
Arnold J. Toynbee.

Losing you is not a loss, and keeping you is no specific gain.
Slogan in a concentration camp of “Democratic Kampuchea”.

It is time, it is the twelfth hour, for certain of our ecclesiastical representatives to stop being exclusively slaves of nationalism and politics, no matter what and whose, and become high priests and priests of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church.
Fr. Justin Popovich.

Human nature is full of riddles and contradictions...one of these riddles is: how is it that people who have been crushed by the sheer weight of slavery and cast to the bottom of the pit can nevertheless find the strength to rise up and free themselves, first in spirit and then in body; while those who soar unhampered over the peaks of freedom suddenly lose the taste for freedom, lose the will to defend it, and, hopelessly confused and lost, almost begin to crave slavery?
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.

We placed too much hope in political and social reforms, only to discover that we were being deprived of our most precious possession: our spiritual life.
Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

The world needs oil. The world does not need America.
Ayatollah Khomeini.

We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.
US President George H.W. Bush.

The average person might well be no happier today than in 1800. We can choose our spouses, friends and neighbours, but they can choose to leave us. With the individual wielding unprecedented power to decide her own path in life, we find it ever harder to make commitments. We thus live in an increasingly lonely world of unravelling commitments and families.
Yuval Noah Harari (2014).

People have moved away from 'religion' as something anchored in organized worship and systematic beliefs within an institution, to a self-made 'spirituality' outside formal structures, which is based on experience, has no doctrine and makes no claim to philosophical coherence.

Clifford Longley.

Shall we say: 'Since it is lawful for an archbishop together with his associates to do as he pleases, let him be for the duration of his archbishopric a new Evangelist, another Apostle, a different Law-giver?' Certainly not. For we have an injunction from the Apostle himself: If anyone preaches a doctrine, or urges you to do something against what you have received, against what is prescribed by the canons of the catholic and local synods held at various times, he is not to be received, or to be reckoned among the number of the faithful.

St. Theodore the Studite, Epistle 24, 94-101.

A Communist economy never existed, nor will there ever be one: all it could establish was a perverted or disguised capitalist economy, good enough to maintain a gang of cute political parasites.

Olavo de Carvalho (2008).

The most extravagant idea that can arise in a politician's head is to believe that it is enough for a people to invade a foreign country to make it adopt their laws and constitution. No one loves armed missionaries.

Maximilien Robespierre.

The total failure of Marxism... and the dramatic break-up of the Soviet Union are only the precursors to the collapse of Western liberalism, the main current of modernity. Far from being the alternative to Marxism and the reigning ideology at the end of history, liberalism will be the next domino to fall...

Takeshi Umehara.

We want even the sceptics to say: Yes, the Bolsheviks can do anything. Yes, the truth is on their side.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev (1987).

[Communism's] fatal dilemma [is that] its economic success can only be purchased at the cost of political stability, while its political stability can only be sustained at the cost of economic failure.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Failure (1989).

The communists have been hurled at the Church like a crazy dog. Their Soviet emblem - the hammer and sickle - corresponds to their mission. With the hammer they beat people over the head, and with the sickle they mow down the churches. But then the Masons will remove the communists and take control of Russia...

St. Theodore (Rafanovsky) of Belorussia (+1975).

If you go through all the structures and features of this emerging European monster you will notice that it more and more resembles the Soviet Union.
Vladimir Bukovsky.

This dream of absolute, universal equality is amazing, terrifying, inhuman. And the moment it captures people's minds, the result is mountains of corpses and rivers of blood.
Vladimir Bukovsky.

Monarchies conform best to human nature, and therefore constitute the most durable form of state.
Gianbattista Vico.

Russia will be regenerated only when in the soul of Russian man there again appears an altar for God and a throne for the Tsar.
Ivan Alexandrovich Ilyin (+1954).

The cherished aim of Christianity is the realization and confirmation, amidst the sphere of the earthly, the temporal and the human, of the Kingdom of heaven, the eternal Kingdom of God. This is what the prophets wonderfully foretold of old; this is what the Forerunner of Christ announced beforehand; this is what the Saviour and His apostles preached to the villages and towns and throughout the whole world. To attain through the kingdom of men the aims of the Kingdom of God, to realize in the life of the state and by means of statehood the tasks of Christianity – the religion of love, of peace, of redemption; to promote by means of statehood the moral principles of Christianity; to turn the Kingdom of God into the end, and the kingdom of man into the means, to unite them in one, like soul and body - that is the ideal and the covenants, these are our hidden strivings and hopes! The God-crowned tsar enters into a sacred and mystical union with his people at his anointing by the Holy Spirit. They as it were merge together into one powerful, spiritual and moral union, like the ideal Christian family, without any division in thought, allowing no lack of trust, no other relations except those of mutual love, devotion, self-denial and care.

Holy New Martyr John Vostorgov (+1018).

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INTRODUCTION

This book is the twelfth volume in my series entitled *An Essay in Universal History*. It covers the period from the crisis in capitalism in the early 1970s to the Fall of the Soviet Communism in 1989-91. By the end of the period the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals and beyond confessed its adherence to the principles of democracy, free trade and human rights; democratic capitalism had triumphed over its only rival. Therefore this volume is called *The Age of Democratism*. Democratization continued to spread in the following age. But the dogma had reached its peak in prestige and popularity by the end of the period covered in this book.

It is not surprising that others should have hailed the triumph of democracy in 1991 as “The End of History” in the sense of the final stage in the evolution of statehood. However, I shall argue that this is not so for the following main reasons: (1) the internal contradictions within the theory of democratism, (2) the survival of clearly despotic tendencies in the two major regional hegemonies of the European Union and China (incipient in the former, already full-blown in the latter), (3) and the revival, almost immediately, of nationalism in Yugoslavia and Russia...

This book describes how the USA prevailed through two dramatic reversals in the history of the Cold War: first a serious recession in the western world, together with the success of several communist revolutions in Asia and Africa, followed, in the 1980s, by a recovery of capitalism under Reagan and Thatcher and the implosion of Soviet (but not Chinese or North Korean or Cuban) communism under Gorbachev.

In this period that we also see the rapid growth of certain seeds sown in the previous Age of Americanism, that portended the destruction of democracy from within: Cultural Marxism (the Frankfurt School), Neo-Liberalism (the Chicago School) and Inter-Faith Ecumenism (the World Council of Churches). Again, we see the essentially socialist dream of globalization, entailing one world government, which, already well advanced in the previous age, continued to make further gigantic strides... China, meanwhile, effected an extraordinary transformation from impoverished communism to very rapid growth on the model of the East Asian “tiger” economies – but without surrendering its despotic and communist political structure and ideology. In the coming decades the Chinese would develop this “Capitalist Despotism” or “Commercial Communism” into the most powerful state in the world after the United States, with clear ambitions to occupy the number one spot and become the new global hegemon. Only the continuing rivalry between the former “brothers in communism”, Russia and China, had the potential to stop China on its path to world domination – and that only in the context of a war to end all wars, Armageddon itself...

*

In view of the greatly increased secularization, mammonization and sheer *barbarization* of life in the second half of the twentieth century, it may seem paradoxical that I continue to devote almost as much space as in earlier volumes to religion in general and in particular to what I believe to be the true religion, Orthodox Christianity. After all, it may be objected, the situation has changed radically since the Age of Faith (volume 1), when all men were religious and religious questions and disputes were at the centre of life. In the Ages of Humanism and Rationalism (volumes 3 and 4), this was still the case, even if secularist tendencies were gaining in strength. But by the Ages of Nationalism, Liberalism, Socialism and Imperialism (volumes 5-8) secular religions of one kind or another were already more important to most men than any of the traditional religions, at any rate in the West. And by the Ages of Atheism and Fascism (volumes 9 and 10), we have entered what has been called, not inappropriately, the “post-Christian” age, when most people have not even heard of, let alone taken any interest in, the religious issues discussed in this series of books.

However, a universal history *from an Orthodox Christian point of view* must concentrate its attention first and foremost on the workings of Divine Providence as the key to the understanding of history. After all, just because most people do not believe in Him does not mean that God does not cease to work in and through history: on the contrary, it is precisely because so many do not believe that He intervenes more and more powerfully to chastise and warn unbelieving men, trying to draw them back to the right path. Such a vision entails both trying to discern how His justice and mercy are working in the great secular revolutions and wars that affect the lives of hundreds of millions of people, and examining the upheavals in that far smaller segment of mankind that constitutes God’s instrument of salvation on earth, the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church.

Even if the True Church contracts to a tiny dot, as it did in the twentieth century, and even if it appears to earthly reasoning to be on the edge of extinction now, it still remains the only engine of true renewal available for all the tribes of the earth. Moreover, tiny and apparently insignificant though it may be, it is the key to the understanding of the vast historical process. For everything in God’s dominion over history is *for the sake of* the Church and for the salvation of His elect *through* the Church.

Through the prayers of our Holy Fathers, Lord Jesus Christ, have mercy on us!

I. CAPITALISM WAVERS (1970-1979)

1. THE NIXON SHOCK AND THE GLOBAL MINOTAUR

“The peak post-war year for the American economy,” writes Paul Johnson, “relative to the rest of the world, was 1968, when American industrial production was more than one-third (34 per cent) of the world total. It was also the climax of the American global paramouncy, the year of Lyndon Johnson’s agony [over Vietnam], the point at which the combined burden of foreign and domestic spending became too great to bear. Thereafter all was decadence. And with America’s relative economic decline came a progressive softening of the dollar as a reserve currency. This inevitably undermined the Bretton Woods arrangements. From the late 1960s Washington ceased to control the world currency system. To some extent it ceased to control its own currency since the quantity of unrepatriated dollars – what de Gaulle stigmatised as ‘America’s export of her own inflation’ – now reached catastrophic proportions. The age of the dollar was over. The age of the Eurodollar dawned.

“As long ago as 1949 the Communist Chinese, fearing America might block the dollars they earned, decided to keep their dollars outside the US in a Soviet Paris bank. Its cable address was ‘Eurobank’ – hence the term Eurodollar. America first went into deficit in 1958, and thereafter the flow of dollars into Europe increased steadily. A British financier, Sir George Bolton, of the Bank of London and South America, now grasped the idea that here, for the first time, was a currency growing up outside national supervision, an expatriate currency capable of providing colossal amounts of credit. He made London the centre of the new Eurodollar system. The Eurodollar market tripled in 1959 alone; doubled again in 1960. Attempts by Kennedy to break it up by controls merely boosted its attractiveness. Similar measures by European governments were equally counter-productive. It was a good example of the way in which the market defies the suppressive puritanism of governments and world agencies. As Walter Wriston of New York’s Citibank put it, the Eurocurrency was ‘fathered by controls’. It was, in fact, a kind of black market world financial system. Freed of government interference, it was able to make the maximum use of the new electronic communications devices which became available in the 1960s and 1970s. To quote Wriston again: ‘Mankind now has a completely integrated international financial and information marketplace, capable of moving money and ideas to any place on the planet within minutes.’

“But of course the Eurodollar market, the product of American inflation, was itself highly inflationary. It reproduced some of the worst features of the 1920s New York money market, especially in international loans. It increased the volatile nature of borrowing, thus creating ‘dollars’ which did not exist. All the world’s major banks came into the market, and formed syndicates to handle loans to governments on a scale never before imagined. Eurobonds and Eurocredits were invented. The first Eurodollar syndicated loan was to the Shah’s Iran in 1969. It was for \$80 million. Italy got a \$200 million loan later that year. Soon up to two hundred banks joined syndicates, and the size and number of loans, and the speed at which they were packaged, grew dramatically. The billion-dollar loan became routine. Commercial banks replaced wealthy Western governments and

development aid as the chief source of finance for the Third World. In 1967, commercial banks accounted for only 12 per cent of external public debt in the world. By the end of 1975 they passed the 50 per cent mark at a trot.

“As the banks took over the international monetary system, the supervisory role of Washington collapsed. In 1971 the Nixon administration lost or abandoned control of what was happening. Two years later, in March 1973, Nixon cut the link between gold and dollars...”¹

*

This momentous development was also linked with inflation...

“At the end of World War II,” writes Mark Blyth, “the United States and its allies decided that sustained mass unemployment was an existential threat to capitalism and had to be avoided at all costs. In response, governments everywhere targeted full employment as the master policy variable – trying to get to, and sustain, an unemployment rate of roughly four percent. The problem with doing so, over time, is that targeting any variable long enough undermines the value of the variable itself – a phenomenon known as Goodhart’s law.

“Long before Goodhart, an economist named Michal Kalecki had already worked this out. Back in 1943, he argued that once you target and sustain full employment over time, it basically becomes costless for labor to move from job to job. Wages in such a world will have to continually rise to hold onto labor, and the only way business can accommodate that is to push up prices. This mechanism, cost-push inflation, where wages and prices chase each other up, emerged in the 1970s and coincided with the end of the Bretton Woods regime and the subsequent oil shocks to produce high inflation in the rich countries of the West in the 1970s. In short, the system undermined itself, as both Goodhart and Kalecki predicted. As countries tried harder and harder to target full employment, the more inflation shot up while profits fell. The 1970s became a kind of “debtor’s paradise.” As inflation rose, debts fell in real terms, and labor’s share of national income rose to an all-time high, while corporate profits remained low and were pummelled by inflation. Unions were powerful and inequality plummeted.

“But if it was a great time to be a debtor, it was a lousy time to be a creditor. Inflation acts as a tax on the returns on investment and lending. Unsurprisingly in response, employers and creditors mobilized and funded a market-friendly revolution where the goal of full employment was jettisoned for a new target – price stability, aka inflation – to restore the value of debt and discipline labor through unemployment. And it worked. The new order was called neoliberalism.

“Over the next thirty years the world was transformed from a debtor’s paradise into a creditor’s paradise where capital’s share of national income rose

¹ Johnson, *Modern Times*, New York: HarperPerennial, 2001, pp. 663-664.

to an all-time high as labor's share fell as wages stagnated. Productivity rose, but the returns all went to capital. Unions were crushed while labor's ability to push up wages collapsed due to the twin shocks of restrictive legislation and the globalization of production. Parliaments in turn were reduced to tweet-generating talking shops as central banks and policy technocrats wrested control of the economy away from those elected to govern."²

*

A deeper explanation of the economic revolution that took place at this time comes from Yanis Varoufakis, the Greek finance minister in 2015, who explains how the financial pressures created in the 1960s by the Vietnam War, on the one hand, and Lyndon Johnson's educational and anti-poverty programmes, on the other, threatened to undermine the solvency of the USA and therefore of the whole world. This led to an economic revolution that replaced the "Global Plan" of the first post-war decades with the "Global Minotaur" of the post-1971 era:-

"Ho Chi Minh's stubborn refusal to lose the Vietnam War, and Lyndon Johnson's almost manic commitment to do anything to win it, were crucial not only in creating a new capitalist region in the Far East, but also in derailing the Global Plan. The escalation of the financial costs of that war was to be a key factor in the Plan's demise.

"Setting aside the appalling human suffering, the war cost the US government around \$113 billion and the US economy another \$220 billion. Real US corporate profits declined by 17 per cent, while, in the period 1965-70, the war-induced increases in average prices forced the real average income of American blue-collar workers to fall by about 2 per cent. The war took its toll not only ethically and politically, as a whole generation of American youngsters were marked by fear and loathing of Vietnam, but also in terms of tangible loss of working-class income, which fuelled social tensions. Arguably, President Johnson's Great Society social programmes were largely aimed at relieving these strains.

"As the combined costs of the Vietnam War and the Great Society began to mount, the government was forced to generate mountains of US government debt. By the end of the 1960s, many governments began to worry that their own positions (which were interlocked with the dollar in the context of the Bretton Woods system), were being undermined. By early 1971, liabilities exceeded \$70 billion, while the US government possessed only \$12 billion of gold with which to back them up.

"The increasing quantity of dollars was flooding world markets, giving rise to inflationary pressures in places like France and Britain. European governments were forced to increase the volume of their own currencies in order to keep their exchange rate constant against the dollar, as was stipulated by the Bretton Woods

² Blyth, "Global Trumpism", *Foreign Affairs*, November 15, 2016.

system. This is the basis for the European charge against the United States that, by pursuing the Vietnam War, it was exporting inflation to the rest of the world.

“Beyond mere inflationary concerns, the Europeans and the Japanese feared that the build-up of dollars, against the background of a constant US gold stock, might spark a run on the dollar, which might then force the United States to drop its standing commitment to swapping an ounce of gold for \$35, in which case their stored dollars would lose their value, eating into their national ‘savings’.

“The flaw in the Global Plan was intimately connected to what Valéry d’Estaing, President de Gaulle’s finance minister at the time, called the dollar’s ‘exorbitant privilege’: the United States’ unique privilege to print money at will without any global institutionalized constraints. De Gaulle and other European allies (plus various governments of oil-producing countries whose oil exports were denominated in dollars) accused the United States of building its imperial reach on borrowed money that undermined their countries’ prospects. What they failed to add was that the whole point of the Global Plan was that it should revolve around a surplus-generating United States. When America turned into a deficit nation, the Global Plan could not avoid going into a vicious tailspin.

“On 29 November 1967, the British government devalued the pound sterling by 14 per cent, well outside the Bretton Woods 1 per cent limit, triggering a crisis and forcing the United States government to use up to 20 per cent of its entire gold reserves to defend the \$35 per ounce of gold peg. On 16 March 1968, representatives of the central banks of the seven nations that were later to form the G7 met to hammer out a compromise. They came to a curious agreement which, on the one hand, retained the official peg of \$35 an ounce while, on the other hand, leaving room for speculators to trade gold at market prices.

“In 1970 President Richard Nixon appointed Paul Volcker as under-secretary of the treasury for international monetary affairs. His brief was to report to the National Security Council, headed by Henry Kissinger, who was to become a most influential secretary of state in 1973. In May 1971, the taskforce headed by Volcker at the US Treasury presented Kissinger with a contingency plan, which toyed with the idea of ‘suspension of gold convertibility’. It is now clear that, on both sides of the Atlantic, policy makers were jostling for position, anticipating a major change in the Global Plan.

“In August 1971, the French government decided to make a very public statement of its annoyance over US policy: President Georges Pompidou ordered a destroyer to sail to New Jersey to redeem US dollars for gold held at Fort Knox, as was his right under Bretton Woods! A few days later, the British government of Edward Heath issued a similar request (though without employing the British Navy), demanding gold equivalent to £4 billion held by the Bank of England. Poor, luckless Pompidou and Heath: they had rushed in where angels fear to tread!

“President Nixon was absolutely livid. Four days later, on 15 August 1971, he announced the effective end of Bretton Woods: the dollar would no longer be convertible to gold. Thus, the Global Plan unravelled.

“Soon after, Nixon dispatched his secretary of the treasury (a no-nonsense Texan called John Connally) to Europe with a sharp message. According to what Connally told reporters, what he said to the Europeans was mild and affable: ‘We told them that we were here as a nation that had given much of our resources and our material resources and otherwise to the world to the point where frankly we were now running a deficit and have been for twenty years and it had drained our reserves and drained our resources to the point where we could no longer do it and frankly we were in trouble and we were coming to our friends to ask for help as they have so many times in the past come to us to ask for help when they were in trouble. That is in essence what we told them.’

“His real message is still ringing in European ears: *It’s our currency but it’s your problem!* What Connally meant was that, as the dollar was the *reserve currency* (i.e. the only truly global means of exchange), the end of Bretton Woods was not America’s problem. The Global Plan was, of course, designed and implemented to be in the interests of the United States. But once the pressures on it (caused by Vietnam and internal US tensions that required an increase in domestic government spending) became such that the system reached breaking point, the greatest losers would not be the United States, but Europe and Japan – the two economic zones that had benefited most from the Global Plan.

“It was not a message either the Europeans or Japan wanted to hear. Lacking an alternative to the dollar, they knew that their economies would hit a major bump as soon as the dollar started devaluing. Not only would their dollar assets lose value, but their exports would also become dearer. The only alternative was for them to devalue their currencies, too, but that would then cause their energy costs to skyrocket (given that oil was denominated in dollars). In short, Japan and the Europeans found themselves between a rock and a hard place.

“Toward the end of 1971, in December, Presidents Nixon and Pompidou met in the Azores. Pompidou, eating humble pie over his destroyer antics, pleaded with Nixon to reconstitute the Bretton Woods system, on the basis of fresh fixed exchange rates that would reflect the new ‘realities’. Nixon was unmoved. The Global Plan was dead and buried, and a new unruly beast, the *Global Minotaur*, was to fill its place.

“Once the fixed exchange rates of the Bretton Woods system collapsed, all prices and rates broke loose. Gold was the first: it jumped from \$35 to \$38 per ounce, then \$42, and then off it floated into the ether. By May 1973 it was trading at more than \$90, and before the decade was out, in 1979, it had reached a fabulous \$455 per ounce – a twelvefold increase in less than a decade.

“Meanwhile, within two years of Nixon’s bold August 1971 move, the dollar had lost 30 per cent of its value against the Deutschmark and 20 per cent against

the yen and the franc. Oil producers suddenly found that their black gold, when denominated in yellow gold, was worth a fraction of what it used to be. Members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which regulated the price of oil through agreed cutbacks on aggregate oil output, were soon clamouring for coordinated action (i.e. reductions in production) to boost the black liquid's gold value.

“At the time of Nixon's announcement, the price of oil was less than \$3 a barrel. In 1973, with the Yom Kippur War between Israel and its Arab neighbours apace, the price jumped to between \$8 and \$9, thereafter hovering in the \$12 to \$15 range until 1979. In 1979 a new upward surge began that saw oil trade above \$30 well into the 1980s. And it was not just the price of oil that scaled unprecedented heights. All primary commodities shot up in price simultaneously: bauxite (165 per cent), lead (170 per cent), tin (220 per cent) and silver (1065 per cent) are just a few examples. In short, the termination of the Global Plan signalled a mighty rise in the costs of production across the world. Inflation soared, as did unemployment – a rare combination of stagnation with inflation that came to known as *stagflation*.

“... Why did the United States not oppose with any degree of real commitment the large increases in oil prices? The simple reason is that, just as the Nixon administration did not mourn the end of Bretton Woods, neither did it care to prevent OPEC from pushing the price of oil higher. For these hikes were not inconsistent with the administration's very own plans for a substantial increase in the global prices of energy and primary commodities! Indeed, the Saudis have consistently claimed that Henry Kissinger, keener to manage the flow of petrodollars to America than to prevent the rise in energy prices, was encouraging them all the way to push the price of oil up by a factor of between two and four. So long as oil sales were denominated in dollars, the US administration had no quarrel with the oil price increases.

“Recalling that the new aim was to find ways of financing the US twin deficits without cutting US government spending, or increasing taxes, or reducing US world dominance, American policy makers understood that they had a simple task: to entice the rest of the world to finance the USA's deficits. But this meant a redistribution of global surpluses in favour of the United States and at the expense of the two economic zones it had built around Germany and Japan. There were two prerequisites for the planned reversal of global capital flows, which would see the world's capital stream into Wall Street for the purpose of financing the expanding US twin deficits: (a) improved competitiveness of US firms in relation to their German and Japanese competitors, and (b) interest rates that attracted large capital flows into the United States.

“The first prerequisite could be achieved in one of two ways: either by boosting productivity in the United States or by boosting the relative unit costs of the competition. For good measure, the US administration decided to aim for *both*. Labour costs were squeezed with enthusiasm and, at the same time, oil prices were ‘encouraged’ to rise. The drop in US labour costs not only boosted the

competitiveness of American companies, but also acted as a magnet for foreign capital that was searching for profitable ventures. Meanwhile, as oil prices rose, every part of the capitalist world was adversely affected. However, Japan and Western Europe (largely lacking their own oil) were burdened much more than the United States.

“Meanwhile, the rise in oil prices led to mountainous rents piling up in bank accounts from Saudi Arabia to Indonesia, as well as huge receipts for US oil companies. All these petro-dollars soon found their way to Wall Street’s hospitable bosom. The Fed’s interest rate policy was to prove particularly helpful in this respect.

“Turning to the second prerequisite, money (or nominal) interest rates jumped from 6 per cent, where the Global Plan’s final years had left them in 1971, to 6.44 per cent in 1973 and to 7.83 per cent the following year. By 1979, President Carter’s administration had begun to attack US inflation with panache. It appointed Paul Volcker as Fed chairman, with instructions to deal decisively with inflation. His first move was to push average interest rates to 11 per cent.

“In June 1981, Volcker raised interest rates to a lofty 20 per cent, and then again to 21.5 per cent. While his brutal monetary policy did tame inflation (pushing it from 13.5 per cent in 1981 to 3.2 per cent two years later), its harmful effects on employment and capital accumulation were profound, both domestically and internationally. Nevertheless, the two prerequisites had been met even before Ronald Reagan settled in properly at the White House.

“A new phase thus began. The United States could now run an increasing trade deficit with impunity, while the new Reagan administration could also finance its hugely expanded defence budget and its gigantic tax cuts for the richest Americans. The 1980s ideology of supply-side economics, the fabled trickle-down effect, the reckless tax cuts, the dominance of greed as a form of virtue, etc. – all these were just manifestations of America’s new ‘exorbitant privilege’: the opportunity to expand its twin deficits almost without limit, courtesy of the capital inflows from the rest of the world. American hegemony had taken a new turn. The reign of the Global Minotaur had dawned.”³

“The more US deficits grew, the greater the global Minotaur’s appetite for Europe and Asia’s capital. Its truly global significance was due to its role in recycling financial capital (profits, savings, surplus money) through the international circuits that Wall Street had established. It kept the gleaming German factories busy. It gobbled up everything produced in Japan and later in China. And, to complete the circle, the foreign (or American) owners of these distant factories sent their profits, their cash, to Wall Street – a modern tribute to the global Minotaur.

³ Varoufakis, *The Global Minotaur*, London: Zed Books, 2013, pp. 92-99.

“What the bankers do when a tsunami of capital comes their way daily? When billions of dollars, net, run through their fingers every morning of each week? They find ways to make it breed. Throughout the 1980s, the 1990s and all the way to 2008 Wall Street took in the daily influx of foreign capital and on its back built mountains of derivative trades, which in time acquired the properties of private money. Financialization, as we now call this process, was the critical by-product of maintaining and enhancing US dominance on the back of increasing trade imbalances and in the interest of financing America’s ever-expanding twin deficits. It began as froth on top of the system of profits flowing from Germany and Japan to Wall Street, once Volcker’s controlled disintegration of the world economy took effect. But soon the froth took over, usurping the underlying stream of actual values, turning finance into the driver and industry into its servant.

“Just like its mythological predecessor, the global Minotaur kept the world economy going. Until, that is, in 2008 the pyramids of private money built upon the Minotaur’s feeding frenzy caved in under their own impossible weight. Europe’s monetary system, born in 1978, was to suffer a terminal blow. America was to feel its impact too, but it was Europe’s weakest link, Greece, that was flattened...”⁴

⁴ Varoufakis, *And the Weak Suffer What They Must?*, London: Vintage, 2013, pp. 89-90.

2. NIXON IN CHINA

1970 marks approximately the half-way mark in the Cold War, which was “cold” only in terms of direct relations between the two superpowers, and in the “First” and “Second” worlds; in the “Third World”, where the war was fought between the superpowers’ proxies, it was becoming increasingly “hot”. Eisenhower’s policy of “containing” the Communist threat globally was clearly failing; the war in Vietnam was the clearest evidence of that, and the following decade would see one “domino” after another fall to the Communists. Between the super-powers themselves, the horrific prospect of “MAD”, mutually assured destruction, prevented military conflict. Nevertheless, technological innovation never ceases, and the Soviets’ sending a man into space showed that they were catching up in that sphere and might soon have the capacity to launch inter-continental missiles that would neutralize the Americans’ offensive capacity. Moreover, if the Americans had renounced actually winning the war and conquering the enemy as a war aim, the Soviets had by no means done so...

J.G. Nyquist describes the evolution of American Cold War strategy as follows:-

“Eisenhower: ‘Massive Retaliation’, meaning we will destroy our enemy if he gives us cause.

“Kennedy Response: ‘Flexible Response’, meaning we are unsure what we will do.

“Nixon: ‘Strategic Parity’, meaning it is perfectly okay if the Russians outnumber us in strategic weaponry because that will make them feel safer and prevent a war.”⁵

It is easy to see the flaw in Nixon’s reasoning: the true communist revolutionary does not flinch from war against the capitalists, even if it destroys the world. In post-Stalinist Russia, revolutionary fervour had cooled somewhat; Khrushchev had backed down over Cuba (to the intense frustration of Castro), and by 1970 the country was already into the epoch of Brezhnevian “stagnation”. Both sides, it seems, were playing for a draw.

But it was a different matter in Mao’s China, where the communist leaders despised Khrushchevian backsliding and “revisionism”, and already had proved themselves quite capable of killing tens of millions of their own people in the Cultural Revolution just so as to keep the revolutionary fires burning. Mao was not deterred by the American nuclear deterrent. He said: “The atom bomb is a paper tiger... We are against overestimating the strength of the enemy... We are the opposite of the political parties of the bourgeoisie. They are afraid to speak of the extinction of classes, state power and parties. We, on the other contrary,

⁵ Nyquist, *Origins of the Fourth World War*, Chula Vista, Co.: Black Forest Press, 1999, 86.

declare openly that we are striving hard to create the very conditions which will bring about their extinction.”⁶

And the Americans already knew, to their cost, that for the sake of victory the Vietnamese were prepared to undergo losses and destruction that no capitalist country would have tolerated... For this reason alone, it was not irrational to expect that the Communists with their greater motivation and endurance would win the Cold War in the long run. But perhaps the Chinese rather than the Soviet communists... History had already demonstrated that morale, discipline and an intense desire for victory can prevail against an enemy that is richer and more advanced technologically. Thus, the poorer but more disciplined and highly motivated Spartans prevailed in the end over the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War. And the Vietnamese prevailed over the Americans...

In the end, of course, the Americans prevailed – or rather, the Soviets destroyed themselves, as we shall see. They regard this victory as the fruit of the superiority of Americanism – democracy, capitalism and human rights – over Sovietism. We shall analyze this assertion in the conclusion of this book...

Mao did not mellow as he grew older... “In the early 1970s,” writes Fareed Zakaria, “before Nixon’s opening to China, Beijing was the world’s greatest rogue regime. Mao Zedong was obsessed with the idea that he was at the helm of a revolutionary movement that would destroy the Western capitalist world. There was no measure too extreme for the cause – not even nuclear apocalypse. ‘If the worst came to the worst and half of mankind died,’ Mao explained in a speech in Moscow in 1957, ‘the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist.’ Mao’s China funded and fomented anti-Western insurgencies, guerrilla movements, and ideological movements around the world, from Latin America to Southeast Asia. By one estimate, Beijing spent between \$170 million and \$220 million from 1964 to 1985 in Africa alone, training 20,000 fighters from at least 19 countries.”⁷

External aggression was accompanied by internal unrest. “As the 1970s began,” writes Maria Chang, “China seemed beset by external and internal crises. Domestic politics took a bizarre turn in 1971 when it was revealed that Mao’s designated heir, Lin Biao, had perished in a plane crash in Outer Mongolia after twice attempting to assassinate the Chairman himself.”⁸ At the same time, the Soviet Union was threatening to use its most ‘modern and devastating weapons’... and target specific nuclear strikes against China. Mao’s foreign policies had created a threat environment that jeopardized the very continuity of the People’s Republic. Clearly, China’s foreign posture required reassessment...

⁶ K Pan (ed.), *Mao Tse-Tung and Lin Piao*, New York, 1972, pp. 233, 4.

⁷ Zakaria, “The New China Scare”, *Foreign Affairs*, December 6, 2019.

⁸ This may not be the true explanation. See Rana Mitter, “Why did Mao’s Successor Flee China?” *BBC History Magazine*, June, 2002, p. 34. (V.M.)

“That reassessment was undertaken under the direction of Zhou Enlai [who had been a rival to Mao in the early years of the CCP]. The Manichaeian notion that the world was divided into a capitalist and a socialist camp gave way to a conviction that reality was complex, where socialist China could be threatened by socialist Russia in league with socialist Vietnam. Suggestions began to be bruited that appeals be made to the capitalist powers for capital, technology transfers, and security assistance. Finally, Beijing announced that it no longer considered the United States to be China’s ‘number one enemy’. With that, China’s rapprochement with the West began – a process that spanned Mao’s remaining years, culminating in the normalization of relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China on January 1, 1979.”⁹

However, whether this “reassessment” was genuine, rather than a change of tactics designed to deceive the West, is open to question... More genuine, and more shameful, in that it represented a rapprochement of the lesser evil to the greater evil, was the United States’ rapprochement with China...

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By his undermining of the Bretton Woods system, Nixon had undermined the foundations of global capitalism. Now he, the Cold War warrior and ally of McCarthyism, came to undermine the foundations of global anti-communism. It began with a legitimate attempt to divide and rule the two leading communist powers. Nixon and his crafty Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were quick to exploit the Sino-Soviet quarrel, using the tactic of “divide and rule”. After the clash on the Ussuri river in March, 1969, writes Stone, “Moscow asked Nixon to condemn the Chinese nuclear tests; there were hints at a nuclear strike to destroy the Chinese ‘facilities’; and the Chinese were refusing the Russians the right to fly supplies to Vietnam or to use their airfields. The Chinese needed America against Russia. There was room, here, for clevercleverness, and in April 1971 the world was surprised when an American table tennis team went to Peking. It was even more taken aback a year later, when Nixon followed, on 21 February 1972...”¹⁰

Détente between the US and China was no less important than that taking place between the US and the USSR. The latter was expressed mainly in open arms-control agreements and some loans from western banks to the Soviets. In the Chinese-American negotiations, however, everything was conducted in secret; neither side wanted to appear too eager to get together with the other. After all, Nixon had built his political career since the time of McCarthy on his anti-Communism, while Mao could not afford not to appear anti-American. In the event, both sides – but especially the United States – made unprecedented concessions they would not have dreamed of only a few years before.

Kissinger himself pointed out the importance of these events. “While I was on the way to China on the so-called secret trip in July 1971, [Nixon], addressing an

⁹ Chang, *Return of the Dragon*, Oxford: Westview Press, 2001, p. 148.

¹⁰ Stone, *The Atlantic and its Enemies*, London: Penguin, 2011, p. 236.

audience in Kansas City,... argued that 'Chinese domestic travail' – that is, the Cultural Revolution – should not confer 'any sense of satisfaction that it will always be that way. Because when we see the Chinese as people – and I have seen them all over the world... - they are creative, they are productive, they are one of the most capable people in the world. And 800 million Chinese are going to be, inevitably, an enormous economic power, with all that that means in terms of what they could be in other areas if they move in that direction.'

"These phrases, commonplace today, were revolutionary at that time. Because they were delivered extemporaneously – and I was out of communication with Washington – it was Zhou En-lai who brought them to my attention as I started the first dialogue with Beijing in more than twenty years. Nixon, inveterate anti-Communist, had decided that the imperatives of geopolitical equilibrium overrode the demands of ideological purity – as, fortuitously, had his counterparts in China..."¹¹

The Chinese-American détente followed the pattern observed that in all negotiations between the Capitalist West and the Communist East at least until the Reagan-Gorbachev summits, of the West conceding more than it gained. As Jung Chang and Jon Halliday write, "Mao's change of mind [about relations with America] changed his fortunes. The invitation [to the American table-tennis team], the first ever from Red China to an American group, caused a sensation. The fact that it was a sports team helped capture the world's imagination. Chou En-lai switched on his charm, and his totalitarian regime's meticulously orchestrated theatre, to produce what Kissinger called 'a dazzling welcome' for the ping-pong team. Glowing and fascinated reports littered the American and major Western press day after day. Mao the old newspaperman had hit exactly the right button. 'Nixon', wrote one commentator, 'was truly amazed at how the story jumped off the sports pages and onto the front page.' With one move, Mao had created the climate in which a visit to China would be a political asset for Nixon in the run-up to the 1972 presidential election.

"'Nixon was excited to the point of euphoria,' Kissinger wrote, and now wanted to skip the emissary state lest it take the glow off his own journey. By the end of May it was settled, in secret, that Nixon was going.

"Mao had not only got Nixon, he had managed to conceal that this had been his objective. Nixon was coming thinking that he was the keener of the two. So when Kissinger made his first, secret, visit in July 1971 to pave the way for the president, he bore many and weighty gifts, and asked for nothing in return. The most startling offer concerned Taiwan, to which the US was bound by a mutual defence treaty. Nixon offered to abandon Washington's old ally, promising to accord full diplomatic recognition to Peking by January 1975, provided he was re-elected in 1972.

¹¹ Kissinger, *World Order*, London: Penguin, 2015, pp. 304-305.

“Nixon was accepting Peking’s position wholesale and cutting Taiwan loose. By the end of the trip Chou was talking as if pocketing Taiwan was a matter of course. It was only at this point that Kissinger made a feeble gesture: ‘We hope very much that the Taiwan issue will be solved peacefully.’ But he did not press Chou for a promise not to use force.

“As part of the recognition package, Nixon offered to get Peking into the UN straight away: ‘you could get the China seat now’, Kissinger told Chou when proposing the behind-the-scenes fix, adding that ‘the President wanted me to discuss this matter with you before we adopted a position.’

“And there was more, including an offer to tell the Chinese everything about America’s dealings with Russia. Kissinger: ‘Specially, I am prepared to give you any information you may wish to know regarding any bilateral negotiations we are having with the Soviet Union on such issues as SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]. A few months later Kissinger told the Chinese: ‘we tell you about our conversations with the Soviets; we do not tell the Soviets about our conversations with you’...

“Kissinger also made two huge commitments on Indochina: to pull out all US forces, mentioning a twelve-month deadline; and to abandon the South Vietnamese regime, promising to withdraw ‘unilaterally’ even if there were no negotiations – and that US troops would not return. ‘After a peace is made,’ said Kissinger, ‘we will be 10,000 miles away, and [Hanoi] will still be there.’ Kissinger even made a promise that ‘most, if not all, American troops’ would be out of *Korea* before the end of Nixon’s next term, without even trying to extract any guarantee that Mao would not support another Communist invasion of South Korea.

“Mao was being given a lot, and on a platter. Kissinger specifically said that he was not asking China to stop giving aid to Vietnam, and Mao was not even requested to soften his bellicose anti-American tone, either in the world at large or during the meetings. The minutes show that Chou was hectoring (‘you should answer that question... you must answer that question’), and constantly referring to ‘your oppression, your subversion, and your intervention’. He in effect suggested that Nixon must make more and more concessions for the privilege of coming to China, and being allowed to recognise Peking. Kissinger did not ask for reciprocal concessions. Chou’s outlandish claim that China was not ‘aggressive’ – ‘because of our new [Communist] system, no less – went unchallenged. And Chou’s reference to American ‘cruelties’ in Vietnam earned no reproof about Mao’s cruelties in China. On a different occasion, when North Vietnam’s negotiator had obliquely criticized the Nixon administration, Kissinger had shot back: ‘You are the representative of one of the most tyrannical governments on this planet...’ Now, Kissinger described Chou’s presentation as ‘very moving’.

“When Mao heard the report of the first day’s talks, his ego soared, and he remarked to his top diplomats that America was ‘changing from monkey to man, not quite man yet, the tail is still there... but it is no longer a monkey, it’s a

chimpanzee, and its tail is not very long.' 'American should start its life anew,' he proclaimed, expanding on his Darwinian approach, viewing America as a slowly evolving lower primate. 'This is evolution!' Chou, for his part, compared Nixon to a loose woman 'tarting herself up and offering herself at the door'. It was now, during this first Kissinger visit, that Mao drew the conclusion that Nixon could be manipulated, and that Peking could get a lot out of America without having to modify its tyranny, or its anti-American ranting..."¹²

The taunts were deserved. America had betrayed all its Far Eastern allies for a mess of Chinese pottage. And not only the Far Eastern allies. "The demands of ideological purity" were overridden to such an extent that, as Robert Service writes, "Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger went so far as to indicate Washington's willingness to share with Moscow a condominium over Europe."¹³ So America's allies in both Europe and Asia were betrayed, and the overall winner, unquestionably, was Mao...

The undignified and hypocritical grovelling of the world's most powerful nation and supposed first champion of human rights before one of the most evil and murderous regimes in history when it was facing no mortal threat itself, was worthy of scorn and boded badly for the future of Capitalism, which in the coming decade suffered a series of defeats at the hands of the Communists.

"Immediately after Kissinger's secret visit," continue Chang and Halliday, "it was announced that Nixon had been invited to China and had accepted. Kissinger returned to Peking in October 1971 to prepare for the president's visit. His second trip coincided with the annual UN voted on China's seat, which Taiwan held, and the public presence in Peking of the president's top adviser turned the tide. On 25 October, Peking displaced Taipei in the UN, giving Mao a seat, and a veto, on the Security Council.

"This was just over a month after the flight and death of Lin Biao. The news that there had been a plot to kill him had left Mao in a state of deep depression. Taiwan's defeat and Nixon's coming visit lifted his spirits immeasurably. Laughing broadly and joking, he talked for nearly three hours in full flow to his top diplomats. Looking at the UN vote, he declared that: 'Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, Canada, Italy - they have all become Red Guards....'

"Before China's delegates left for the UN, Mao made a point of reminding them that they must continue to treat the USA as Public Enemy no. 1, and fiercely denounce it 'by name, an absolute must'. He wanted to make his debut on the world stage as the anti-American champion, using the UN as a new platform.

¹² Chang and Halliday, *Mao. The Unknown Story*, London: Jonathan Cape, 2005, pp. 603-605.

¹³ Service, *Kremlin Winter*, London: Picador, 2019, p. 146.

"Nine days before Nixon was scheduled to arrive in China on 21 February 1972, Mao passed out, and came very close to death. The prospect of Nixon's imminent arrival helped to restore him..."¹⁴

And indeed, it could be argued that America's support for China brought the evil dragon back from the dead...

"During the relatively brief 65-minute meeting (the only one between Nixon and Mao on this trip), Mao parried every attempt to engage him in serious issues. This was not because he had been ill, but because he did not want to leave a record of his positions in the hands of the Americans. Nothing must damage his claim to be the global anti-American leader. He had invited Nixon to Peking to promote that claim, not to waive it. So when Nixon proposed discussing 'current issues like Taiwan, Vietnam and Korea', Mao acted as if he were above such lesser chores. 'These questions are not questions to be discussed in my place,' he said, conveying an impression of lofty detachment. 'They should be discussed with the Premier,' adding that: 'All those troublesome problems I don't want to get into very much.' Then he cut the Americans short by saying: 'As a suggestion, may I suggest you do a little less briefing?' When Nixon persisted in talking about 'common ground' and building a 'world structure', Mao ignored him, turned to Chou to ask what it was, and said: 'Haven't we talked enough now?'

"Mao was especially careful not to pay Nixon any compliments, while Nixon and Kissinger both flattered Mao fulsomely. Nixon told Mao: 'The Chairman's writings moved a nation and have changed the world.' Mao returned no thanks, and made only one, condescending comment on Nixon: 'Your book, *Six Crises*, is not a bad book.'...

"Mao clearly felt he could push Nixon quite far. At the end of the visit there was to be a joint communiqué. Mao dictated one in which he could denounce America. 'Aren't they talking peace, security... and what not?' he said to Chou. 'We will do the opposite and talk revolution, talk liberating the oppressed nations and people all over the world...' So the communiqué took the form of each side stating its own position. The Chinese used their space for a tirade against America (though not by name). The American side did not say one word critical of Mao's regime, going no further than a vague and much qualified platitude about supporting 'individual freedom'."¹⁵

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But in a world turned truly upside down, while the powerful Americans grovelled to the starving Chinese who so feared a Soviet invasion, the Chinese themselves were vulnerable to some of their lowly satraps – like Albania...

¹⁴ Chang and Halliday, op. cit., pp. 605-606.

¹⁵ Chang and Halliday, op. cit., pp. 605-606.

“Mao caught a lot of flak from his old allies. The fiercest came from Albania, which mattered to Mao because it was the only East European regime he had detached from Russia’s orbit. Albania’s dictator, Hoxha, penned Mao a nineteen-page letter expressing his fury over what he called ‘this shitty business’. Actually, Hoxha cunningly used rhetoric to extract colossal amounts of extra aid, basically saying: You are consorting with the enemy, but you can buy our silence for more money. Mao paid up.

“The biggest problem was Vietnam, which counted far more than Albania internationally. The Vietnamese were worried that Mao was trying to use them as a bargaining chip with the US. [They needn’t have worried: the Americans had given everything to the Chinese already.] When Chou went to Hanoi immediately after Kissinger’s first visit, to explain Peking’s move, he got an earful from North Vietnam’s leader. ‘Vietnam is our country.’ Le Duan protested; ‘you have no right to discuss the question of Vietnam with the United States.’... Mao tried to salvage some influence by pouring in even more aid, which rose to unprecedented levels from 1971, peaking in 1974.

“All these bribes to keep old allies quiet meant a tighter squeeze on the Chinese population. Nor did its extra burdens stop there. As more and more countries recognized Peking in the wake of Nixon’s visit, the number of states to which China sent aid jumped from 31 prior to 1970 to 66. On tiny and immeasurably more prosperous Malta (pop. *c.* 300,000), Mao lavished no less than \$25 million in April 1972. Its prime minister, Dom Mintoff, returned from China sporting a Mao badge.

“Mao often had to pay over the odds to buy himself back into favour with states he had earlier tried to subvert. One former target, President Mobutu of Zaire, told us how generously he was funded by Mao, who – unlike the IMF and the World Bank – let him defer loans indefinitely, or repay them in worthless Zairean currency. In the years 1971-5, foreign aid took up a staggering average of 5.88 per cent of China’s entire expenditure, peaking at 6.92 per cent in 1973 – by far the highest percentage in the world, and at least seventy times the US level.

“While Mao dished out money and food, and built expensive underground railway systems, shipyards and infrastructure for countries far richer than China, most of the 900 million Chinese hovered just above survival levels. In many areas, peasants recall that the hungriest years after the Great Famine of 1958-61 were those from 1973 to Mao’s death in 1976 – the years immediately after Nixon’s visit.

“Nixon had often been credited with opening the door to China. Inasmuch as a number of Western statesmen and businessmen, plus some press and tourists, were able to enter China, he did increase the Western presence in China. But he did not open the door *of* – much less *from* – China, and the increased Western presence did not have any appreciable impact on Chinese society while Mao was alive. Mao made sure that for the vast majority of the population, China remained a tightly sealed prison. The only people who benefited at all from the rapprochement were a small elite. Some of these were allowed to see relatives

from abroad – under heavy supervision. And a tiny number could lay hands on the half-dozen or so contemporary Western books translated in classified editions, one of which was Nixon's own *Six Crises*. From 1973 some foreign-language students were sent abroad, but the very few who were lucky enough to be allowed out had to be politically ultra-reliable, and lived and worked under the closest surveillance, forbidden even to step out of their residence unescorted.

"The population as a whole remained rigidly quarantined from the few foreigners allowed into China, who were subject to rigorous control. Any unauthorized conversation with them could bring catastrophe to the locals involved. The lengths to which the regime would go were extraordinary. For Nixon's one-day visit to Shanghai, which coincided with Chinese New Year, the traditional occasion for family reunions (like Christmas), thousands of rusticated youths who were visiting their families were expelled back to their villages of exile, as a precaution against the extremely remote possibility of any of them trying to complain to the president.

"The real beneficiaries of Nixon's visit were Mao himself, and his regime. For his own electoral ends, Nixon de-demonised Mao for mainstream opinion in the West. Briefing White House staff on his return, Nixon spoke of the 'dedication' of Mao's cynical coterie, whom Kissinger called 'a group of monks... who... kept their revolutionary purity'. Nixon's men asserted, falsely, that 'under Mao the lives of the Chinese masses have been greatly improved'. Nixon's favourite evangelist, Billy Graham, lauded Mao's virtues to British businessmen. Kissinger suggested that Mao's callous crew would 'challenge us in a moral way'. The result was an image of Mao a whole lot further from the truth than the one that Nixon himself had helped purvey as a fierce anti-Communist in the 1950s.

"Mao became not merely a credible international figure, but one with incomparable allure..."¹⁶

"Nixon's visit also opened up for Mao the possibility of laying his hands on American nuclear weapons.

"Obtaining nuclear secrets had always been central to Mao's American policy. 'The only objective of these relations,' he told the North Korean dictator Kim, 'is to obtain developed technology.' Mao knew that he could only achieve his goal if America considered him an ally...

"In June 1973 Brezhnev warned Nixon and Kissinger that (as Kissinger paraphrased it to China's liaison): 'if military arrangements were made between the US and the PRC, this would have the most serious consequences and would lead the Soviets to take drastic measures.' This conversation with Brezhnev, which concerned US national security, was promptly related to Mao's envoy, who was present at the Western White House during Nixon's talks with Brezhnev, but not to America's allies – or to the US government itself. 'We have told no one in

¹⁶ Chang and Halliday, op. cit., pp. 607-609.

our government of this conversation,' Kissinger confided to Mao's envoy. 'It must be kept totally secret.'

"One ostensible purpose of Nixon's journey to Peking had been to lessen the danger of war with Russia. Thanks to Mao, this danger had if anything increased..."¹⁷

But the West was still deluded about China. "Not until 1976," writes Jean-François Revel, "did the West learn that Mao's Great Leap Forward caused massive death... and that the Cultural Revolution was precisely the explosion of bloody barbarity Mao had sought. But in 1976, the revelation came too late to expunge from Western minds the image formed in 1960-75 of a 'progressive' China, a model of an allegedly non-Stalinist breed of communism, a champion of development to be imitated by the whole Third World. Maoist ideology largely helped create the political climate in those years, the attitudes and sensibilities of the time, the fanatical criticism of capitalism prevailing then – even though working class living standards in the capitalist world had never before climbed so high. The showdown among the ruling bureaucracy in Peking after Mao's death left Western Maoists peering into a vast, black hole full of wretchedness and stupidity where they had thought to see a brilliant El Dorado, but this did not efface the past ravages wrought by the Chinese illusion. For fifteen years, a lie on a global scale had again distorted public debate, falsified thinking on the fate of humanity by faking the basis of discussion with non-existent 'facts': the supposed success of China's socialist economy and the false legend of a highly civilized Chinese communism..."¹⁸

¹⁷ Chang and Halliday, *op. cit.*, pp. 610, 613.

¹⁸ Revel, *How Democracies Perish*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985, pp. 168-169.

3. THE ARAB/ISRAELI WARS AND THE OIL CRISIS

As we have seen, the failure of the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956 led to an increase in Arab power in relation to the West. The most forceful Arab leader was President Nasser of Egypt. On 16 May 1967 Cairo radio announced: "This is our chance, Arabs, to deal Israel a mortal blow of annihilation." On 27 May Nasser said: "Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel." Again, President Arel of Iraq said on 31 May: "Our goal is clear: to wipe Israel off the map." And on 1 June Ahmed Shukary, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, declared: "The Jews of Palestine will have to leave. Any of the old Jewish Palestine population who survive may stay, but it is my impression that none of them will survive."¹⁹

An important new player in the region was the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Created in 1960, it "was designed to co-ordinate the release of oil supplies on the open market. The aim was to allow the founder members – Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Venezuela – to combine their interests and boost their income by controlling supply, and therefore controlling prices. It was the logical next step for resource-rich countries which had an eye on wresting power from the western corporations while receiving political and financial backing from western governments.

"OPEC effectively marked a deliberate attempt to curtail the influence of the west, whose interests in providing cheap and plentiful fuel for its domestic markets were distinctly different to those of the countries that were rich in deposits of oil and gas, and who were keen for the revenues they brought in to be as high as possible. Unlikely as it seems, OPEC was the spiritual protégé of an already unlikely cast of characters made up of defiant leaders like Mossadegh, the popular demagogue Nasser, the hardliner Qasim and increasingly anti-western figures in Iran typified by the Ayatollah Khomeini. All were linked by their concerted attempts to detach their states from overpowering outside attention. OPEC was not a political movement; but aligning a range of countries and enabling them to act with a single voice was a key step in the process of transforming political power away from Europe and the US to local governments."²⁰

Another of the consequences of the failure of the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, as Burleigh writes, was that "France threw its influence behind Israel, equipping it in 1957 with its Dimona nuclear reactor, which it would use to produce an arsenal of atomic bombs it pretends it does not possess. In Arab eyes Israel would be indelibly identified with Western imperialism – a latter-day crusader state – and Nasser's mere survival was construed as a victory, which became a wider impediment to political realism in the Middle East."²¹

¹⁹ Johnson, *Modern Times*, p. 666.

²⁰ Peter Frankopan, *The Silk Roads*, London: Bloomsbury, 2015, pp. 435-436.

²¹ Burleigh, *op. cit.*, p. 311.

Realism returned to the Arab world only after the Six-Day War between the Israeli Defence Force, on the one hand, and the armies of four Arab nations – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait, supported by Algeria and Libya, – on the other. This was one of the most spectacular triumphs in the history of warfare. It started when Israel, alarmed by the annihilatory threats and by “the concentration on her border of armies outnumbering her own by three to one, heavily armed with modern Soviet material, launched a preventive war on 4 June, beginning with strikes against Egyptian sea power. It lasted six days and was wholly successful. The Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian forces were routed, and in Egypt’s case humiliated. Sinai and the West Bank were occupied. The Syrian Golan Heights, which made possible the bombardment of the Israeli settlements in Upper Galilee, were stormed. Above all, Old Jerusalem, including the Wailing Wall and the Holy Places, the great prize which had eluded Israel in 1948, was now brought into the new state.”²²

The Middle East now became one of the battlefields of the Cold War. For the Americans became the patrons of the Israelis, while Nasser turned to the Soviets for help, as did the Syrians...

As Alexander Shulman writes: “Nasser often approached the leadership of the USSR requesting that they send Soviet armies to save his country. In December, 1969 Nasser made a secret visit to Moscow for a personal meeting with L. Brezhnev.

“Nasser besought Brezhnev to send to Egypt regular Soviet forces with for air defence and aviation. At a session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the USSR together with the commanders of the Armed Forces it was decided to satisfy his request...

“The operation to create a group of Soviet armies for Egypt composed of 32,000 military personnel received the name ‘Kavkaz’. It was led by Marshal P.F. Batitsky. In the first days of March, 1970 the armies with their military hardware set off from the port of Nikolaev in an atmosphere of complete secrecy. The men were dressed in civil clothing and had no documents of any kind. A very strict command was given to shoot without hesitation anyone who ‘tried to jump overboard’.

“In July, 1970 the Israeli Armed Forces engaged in battle with Soviet airmen over Suez. In the course of the battle five Soviet MIGs were downed... Undismayed, the Soviets became even more committed to helping their Arab allies...”²³

It was the threat of Soviet control of the Middle East oil-fields that brought the Americans into the conflict. The threat was not so much to the Americans

²² Johnson, op. cit., p. 666.

²³ Shulman, “Boj nad Suetsem” (Battle over Suez), *Russkaia Planeta* (Russian Planet), June 14, 2013.

themselves, who had their own oil reserves, as to their allies in Western Europe and Japan, who were totally dependent on Middle East oil and would collapse if they were deprived of it.²⁴ It followed that the Americans' only real ally in the region, Israel, had to be defended at all costs.

After Nasser's death in 1970, the Egyptians turned against their patrons, the Soviets, whose military advisors were expelled and air bases closed down in 1972. But "Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan were delighted to be awarded soft loans to buy Soviet weapons and to have highly qualified advisers and technicians dispatched from Moscow to build installations that might prove useful to their wider strategic ambitions. These included the deep-water port at Umm Qasr on the Persian Gulf, but also six military airfields in Iraq, which US intelligence quickly realized could be useful 'to support a Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean'."²⁵

Under the cruel regime of Assad Bashar and his sons Soviet influence has remained dominant in Syria to the present day.

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As a direct result of the oil crisis, during the seventies most of the world was becoming significantly poorer, which was a very sharp contrast with the golden years of the previous quarter of a century. Only the oil-producing countries really thrived. Of the two super-powers, the Soviet Union did reasonably well because "the oil crisis of 1973 had just quadrupled the international market value of the gigantic new deposits of oil and natural gas which had been discovered in the USSR since the middle 1960s..."²⁶ The United States did considerably worse: between 1973 and 1975 the American economy contracted by 6 per cent. The situation was not improved by weak political leadership under the Republican Ford and the Democrat Carter.

It was the same story in Europe. "Between 1950 and 1973 average annual growth rates had been 4.7 per cent in both Western and Eastern Europe and as high as 6.3 per cent in the underdeveloped economies of Southern Europe, belatedly starting to catch up. In the twenty years that followed the oil crisis growth rates were more than halved, dropping to 3.1 per cent in Southern Europe, 2.2 per cent in Western Europe, and even becoming negative, at -0.4 per cent in Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, Norway, Ireland (another backward country catching up), Italy, Austria and West Germany had the best growth rates, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland the worst..."²⁷

According to the communist economist Eric Hobsbawm, the economic decline actually lasted into the 1990s: "The problems which had dominated the critique

²⁴ However, because of the low price of oil, American imports of it increased from 10 per cent in 1960 to 28 per cent in 1968 to 36 per cent in 1973 (Johnson, *op cit.*, p. 665).

²⁵ Frankopan, *op. cit.*, p. 439.

²⁶ Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes*, London: Abacus, 1994, p. 244.

²⁷ Ian Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster. Europe 1950-2017*, London: Penguin, 2019, p. 284.

of capitalism before the war, and which the Golden Age had largely eliminated for a generation – ‘poverty, mass unemployment, squalor, instability’ – reappeared after 1973. Growth was, once again, interrupted by severe slumps, as distinct from ‘minor recessions’, in 1974-75, 1980-82 and at the end of the 1980s. Unemployment in Western Europe rose from an average of 1.5 per cent in the 1960s to 4.2 per cent in the 1970s. At the peak of the boom in the late 1980s it averaged 9.2 per cent in the European Community, in 1993, 11 per cent. Half of the unemployed (1986-87) had been out of work for more than a year, one third for more than two years. Since the potential working population was no longer being swelled, as in the Golden Age, by the flood of growing post-war babies, and since young people, in good times and bad, tended to have much higher unemployment ratios than older workers, one would have expected permanent unemployment to shrink, if anything...”²⁸

The Third World countries “found themselves worse off at the end of the 1970s than they were when the decade opened, the first such reversal in modern times. At such low levels, such a direct fall in incomes meant malnutrition and related epidemics. The number of Africans and Asians who died in consequence of Arab oil policy in the decade after 1973 must be calculated in tens of millions.

“The world as a whole experienced a decline in wealth since the loss of output was worth twice the extra funds transferred to the oil-producing countries. For the industrialized countries, the result was a form of economic malady which Keynesianism had not envisaged: stagflation. From a 5.2 per cent rate of growth with 4.1 per cent average price rises, the world moved in 1974-5 to nil or minus growth with 10-12 per cent average price increases a year. This was high inflation. The price revolution, with the oil jump at its heart, spanned the years 1972-6. It was by far the most destructive economic event since 1945. It acted as a fierce brake on the energy-intensive sectors responsible for the prolonged expansion in the American, West European and Japanese economies, producing abrupt declines in output and unemployment on a scale unknown since the 1930s. By the early 1980s, the number of unemployed in America and West Europe was 25 million.

“... In London the property boom foundered, dragging down some glittering companies. The *Financial Times* index, 543 in March 1972, fell to 146 at the beginning of 1975, with shares worth less, in real terms, than at the depths of the war in 1940...”²⁹

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The states of the Middle East played off the superpowers against each other, trying to make themselves independent of both.

²⁸ Hobsbawm, pp. 403-406.

²⁹ Johnson, *Modern Times*, pp. 669-670.

“Oil was the fuel behind much of this movement to escape from the overbearing influence of outside powers, setting off a chain reaction that had profound long-term implications. The catalyst for a new round of change was a coup led by an ambitious young Libyan army officer who had been described as ‘cheerful, hard-working and conscientious’ by the British army course instructor who supervised his training in the UK. Mu’ammarr Gaddafi was certainly resourceful. At the start of 1970, shortly after seizing power, he demanded a dramatic rise in the revenues of Libyan oil – which at that time was responsible for 30 per cent of Europe’s total supply. ‘Brothers,’ he had proclaimed to his countrymen, ‘the revolution cannot let the Libyan people be poor while they own colossal oil wealth. ‘There are people living in huts and tents while the foreigner lives in palaces. Other countries put men on the moon, Gaddafi went on: the Libyans are exploited to the extent that they have no electricity or water.

“The oil companies screamed with outrage at the new regime’s insistence on being paid a fair price for the oil; but they soon complied after it had been made clear that nationalization was not an option – but that it might be. The fact that the Libyan leader could force a renegotiation was not lost on others: within weeks, OPEC was pushing to raise the contribution made to its members by western oil companies, threatening to reduce production to force agreement. It was, in the words of one Shell executive, the moment when the ‘avalanche’ began.

“The results were spectacular. The price of oil quadrupled over the course of three years, putting immense strain on the economies of Europe and the US, where demand and consumption levels galloped ever onwards. In the meantime, the oil-producing countries were flooded by unprecedented flows of cash. The countries in the centre of Asia and the Persian Gulf had seen their returns steadily improve almost as soon as the Knox D’Arcy concession [in Persia] struck oil as agreements were slowly but surely renegotiated in the decades that followed with better and better terms. But what happened in the 1970s was a shift of seismic proportions. In 1972-3 alone, Iran’s oil revenues rose thirty-fold. In neighbouring Iraq, the rise was no less spectacular, going up fifty times between 1972 and 1980 from \$175 million to \$26 million.

“It was all very well complaining about the ‘extent of dependence by western industrial countries upon oil as a source of energy’, as one senior American official did in a report prepared for the State Department in 1973. But there was an inevitability about the transfer of power – and money – to the countries straddling the spine of Asia; and there was an inevitability too about the strengthening of sinews of the Islamic world that followed as ambitions were magnified.

“The most dramatic expression of this came with a renewed effort to dislodge the totemic symbol of outside influence in the Middle East as a whole: Israel. In October 1973, Syrian and Egyptian forces launched Operation Badr, named after the battle that had opened the way to securing control of the holy city of Mecca in the time of the Prophet Muhammed. The assault caught not only Israeli defences by surprise, but the superpowers as well...

"The impact of the conflict shook the globe. In the US, the military alert level was raised to DEFCON 3, indicating that the risk of a nuclear launch was considered to be imminent – and higher than at any point since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. In the Soviet Union, the focus was on containing the situation. Pressure was put on Egypt's President Sadat behind the scenes to agree a ceasefire, while the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko – a consummate political survivor – personally pressed President Nixon and his newly appointed Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, to act jointly to prevent a 'real conflagration' that might easily lead to war spreading.

"The real significance of the Yom Kippur War, so named because the attack began on the Jewish holy day, lay not in the attempts by Washington and Moscow to work together, nor even in the spectacular results which saw one of the great military reversals in history as Israel went from being within hours of extinction to shattering the invading forces and advancing on Damascus and Cairo. In fact, what was remarkable was the way the Arabic-speaking world acted together – as a caliphate in all but name. The ringleaders were the Saudis, the masters of Mecca, who not only talked openly about using oil as a weapon but actually did so. Production was cut back, which, combined with political uncertainty, led to price rises: costs per barrel tripled almost overnight..."³⁰

As Niall Ferguson writes, "there did not need to be a specifically *Soviet* control of Middle Eastern oil for both the United States and its allies to suffer acute economic pain. Arab control might suffice.. Up until 1972 the United States had succeeded in squaring the circle of its support for Israel and its support for the Saudi king, who loathed Zionism as deeply as he loathed communism. In 1973, however, the Saudis backed the Egyptian assault on Israel not with soldiers but with a 70 percent increase in oil prices and a rolling embargo that cut supplies of oil to supporters of Israel by 5 percent per month. When the Americans more than doubled their aid to Israel, the Saudis imposed a total embargo on exports to the United States."³¹

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The Six-Day War of 1967 vastly increased the power and self-confidence of Israel. But the jubilation, though understandable, was misplaced. There was no real peace, but a "War of Attrition" on the Suez Canal, dogfights with Syrian planes over the Golan Heights and Damascus, There had been talk of "land for peace", but nothing came of it. Now, however, after the Yom Kippur War, the Israelis returned Sinai to Egypt, and in 2005 they withdrew from Gaza.

But now Israel was a multi-ethnic state with a considerable subject Arab population, especially in the West Bank, which created new security concerns for Israel as the Arab states refusal to recognize or negotiate with it hardened.

³⁰ Frankopan, *op. cit.*, pp. 442-444.

³¹ Ferguson, *Colossus*, London: Allen Lane, 2004, p. 116.

Moreover, in spite of repeated defeats on the battlefield, the Arabs remain as implacably hostile as ever today, when there are some 800,000 Israeli settlers living illegally in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and a new threat of nuclear annihilation by Iran has appeared. Permanent peace seems further away than ever.

In the long run, therefore, in view of this unremitting hostility from the Islamic nations and the rapid growth in the population of the Arabs both within and outside Israel, Israel's military victories may yet be seen as Pyrrhic in the extreme...³²

Two historical events continue to poison the relationship between the Arabs and the Jews: the Holocaust in the early 1940s and the expulsion of the Palestinians from their homeland in the late 1940s. The Israeli pianist Daniel Barenboim points out: "During the time following Israel's foundation as a state, the Holocaust was hardly present in public discourse; on the individual level it was understandably avoided by the survivors because of the pain it brought back, while the new generation wanted to dissociate itself at all costs from the image of the Jew as a victim. Therefore, both those who had experienced the Holocaust and those who fortunately only knew about it considered a discussion of the subject uncomfortable. The majority of young Israelis in the 1950s were concerned with creating an ideal society in which Zionism walked hand in hand with Socialism (the kibbutz being a clear example)..."

"The capture of Adolf Eichmann in Argentina in 1961 and the trial that followed in Jerusalem were not simply the process of bringing a criminal to justice – and what a criminal at that, having been one of the primary advocates and perpetrators of the 'final solution' – it was also a necessary educational experience for the young generation in Israel precisely because the Holocaust had not been a topic of great urgency for many years. It was the first time that the young population of Israel had been confronted with the full horror of the Holocaust. While it renewed the pain and suffering of the survivors, it also enabled them to open their hearts to the next generation... The terrible and constant presence of the trial made it impossible to continue to circumvent the subject..."³³

However, a necessary educational experience has turned into a pseudo-justification of continued injustice against the Arabs both within and outside Israel. Thus to the terrible Palestinian refugee problem created by the Israeli victory in 1948 was added the Israeli annexation of the Arab territories conquered in the Six-Day War of 1967. If the Israelis had learned the true lessons of the Holocaust and shown generosity and strategic foresight in 1967 by returning the conquered territories of the West Bank and Gaza immediately, some reciprocal movement on the part of the Arabs could have been elicited. Instead, the Arab position hardened; they knew that their higher birth-rates meant that, however

³² "The Six-Day War", *The Week*, May 20, 2017, p. 11.

³³ Barenboim, *Everything is Connected: The Power of Music*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2008, pp. 124-125.

many battles the Israelis won, they could never win the war. And so they refused to admit Israel's legitimate security concerns and resorted to terrorist tactics, the killing of innocent civilians.

"With the passage of time," writes Barenboim, "the hardening of the Palestinian position on cultural, social and political issues makes their demands more difficult for Israel to accept. What would have been an act of generosity soon after the Six Day War in 1967, such as the return of occupied territories, will today, now that the necessity of doing so is internationally recognized, inevitably be construed as an unavoidable act of weakness on Israel's part. The fact that the whole Arab world was not willing to negotiate from a position of weakness should have inspired Israel to develop creative propositions rather than to solidify its unyielding attitude. I believe, however, that Israel has not yet been able to understand rationally its strength or weakness in the conflict and has consequently vacillated from one extreme to the other. The residue of having been persecuted and victimized throughout history may be an element that keeps it from objectively measuring its strength as a state."³⁴

In spite of Barenboim's admirable determination to be fair to both Arabs and Israelis (demonstrated practically in his foundation of the East-Western Divan orchestra, composed of both Jewish and Arab musicians), his Jewishness here shows through in an ignorance of Jewish history. For Jews have by no means "been persecuted and victimized throughout history" – or at any rate, not without reasons. As we have seen in previous volumes, they have persecuted Christians whenever they have been in a position of power to do so, which has been part of the reason why they themselves have been feared and persecuted when the balance of power has shifted...

This excuses neither Christian nor Muslim anti-Semitism; but it shows that the roots of the Jewish problem go back much further in history than is commonly recognized. Although it is no longer politically correct to assert this, they go back right back to the day when, in front of the Roman procurator Pontius Pilate and the semi-Arab usurper Herod, the Jews called for the crucifixion of their true King, Jesus Christ, crying: "We have no king but Caesar... His blood be on us and on our children"...

³⁴ Barenboim, op. cit., p. 107.

4. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MALAISE

The success of the British empire in the nineteenth century, and then of its successor, the American empire in the twentieth, was founded upon four virtues that constituted the foundations of the civic societies of the Anglo-American states: the integrity of marriage, industriousness, religiosity, and good neighbourliness. On this point the American Founding Fathers in the 1780s, Alexis de Tocqueville in the 1830s and modern political scientists like Charles Murray are unanimous.³⁵ There was a fundamental flaw in this quartet: religiosity was deemed not to depend on true faith but on a vague belief in God that was characteristic of Deism and Freemasonry rather than True Christianity; and consequently the aim of life was really seen as “the pursuit of happiness” in this life rather than salvation for the next. Nevertheless, the observance of these virtues by the majority of the population, and their confident promulgation around the world by the elite, guaranteed an astonishing dominance – but a peaceful dominance – of Anglo-American culture in the counsels of western civilization – until, that is, the period 1960-2000, when the English-speaking nations experienced a dramatic collapse in these values, especially in the white working class. By the 1970s the consequences of this collapse – which may have been triggered by such external events as the Vietnam War and the oil crisis, but were not caused by them – are already clearly visible in the United States and Britain.

Thus in the United States, “politics fell into paralysis,” writes Norman Stone, “and foreign policy for a time became mouthings. Congress was now cutting the powers of the presidency. In November 1973, even before he fell, Nixon had faced a Resolution preventing him from sending troops overseas for any length of time if Congress did not formally give support, and the Jackson-Vanik amendment of 1973-74 put an obstacle in the way of his policies towards the Soviet Union, by cancelling favourable trade arrangements if Moscow did not cease harassing Jewish would-be emigrants. In July-August 1974 Congress again paralysed US handling of another strategic headache, on Cyprus, where first Greeks and then Turks had intervened. Both were in NATO, and each had treaty rights to invoke; Cyprus mattered because there were British bases there, and the island was on the very edge of the Middle East. One set of Greeks attacked another set of Greeks, and there was a Turkish minority with paper rights, which the Turkish army then invoked, occupying a third of the island. The enraged Greek lobby intervened, against the advice of Kissinger, who felt that it was giving up the chance of a long-term solution in order to vent short-term steam, a judgement proven correct. That autumn Congress restricted the CIA, and in 1975 frustrated any positive policy towards Angola, where a civil war killed off a fifth of the population. Endless new committees in both Houses now supervised aspects of foreign affairs, and the old congressional committees which had been notorious for insider dealings, with long-term chairmen who knew which levers to pull, were replaced by an allegedly open system in which nothing worked at all. The staff monitoring the White House rose to 3,000.

³⁵ Murray, *Coming Apart*, New York: Crown Forum, 2012.

"The seventies were a period when the formula of fifties America appeared to be failing, and there was a symbol of this. The very capital of capitalism was in trouble... The crisis of 1973 wrecked the city's finances, as stock exchange dealings fell, whereas welfare costs remained fixed. New York City was only narrowly saved from collapse in 1974, though [Mayor] Lindsay himself had by then given up, and in the later 1970s ordinary city services often came apart – snow not shifted; in 1977 a power failure that lasted for almost thirty hours, during which there was a great deal of looting. As was said, the cheerful city of *Breakfast at Tiffany's* turned into the bleak battleground of *Midnight Cowboy*. Around this time, too, came a further extraordinary flouting of ancient rules: the release of mental patients onto the streets, as asylums were closed. Progressive-minded specialists had urged this, and New York acquired a sort of black-humour chorus to its problems. And so any American big city had the horrible sight of mentally ill people roaming the streets and combing through the rubbish. Much of this went back to sixties best-sellers, whether Michel Foucault's *Madness and Civilization* (1965) or Thomas Szasz's book of 1961, *The Myth of Mental Illness*, and it was the judges who ruled that this had something to do with human rights. The overall sense of these works – Laing's the best known – was to the effect that madness was, in this world, a sane response, and there was something to be said for this view. Much the same happened as regards crime. Progressive-minded criminologists had been arguing quite successfully for non-use of prison, but crime rates doubled in the 1960s whereas the numbers in prison actually fell, from 210,000 to 195,000 (by 1990 they had risen again, to one million), in accordance with modish behaviourist ideas, and in the later 1970s, although there were 40 million serious crimes every year, only 142,000 criminals were imprisoned. The National Rifle Association membership grew from 600,000 in 1964 to 2 million in 1981. If the police and the courts could not defend Americans, what else were they supposed to do?

"Contempt for ordinary Americans also showed in the interpretation of the desegregation laws. The worst cases happened over school segregation. Boston schools that served poor districts were dictated to by judges who unashamedly sent their own children to private schools. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 had expressly stated that there would be no enforced bussing of children from one district to another to keep racial quotas. But the Office of Education in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare issued regulations in defiance of this. The argument was that if there were not sufficient white children, then segregation must be occurring. The courts backed this in 1972. Almost no-one wanted the bussing, but it went ahead, with riots and mayhem, and there was a move out of town, and a rise in private-school enrolment (from one-ninth to one-eighth). In the north-east racial isolation became worse than before – 67 per cent of black pupils were in black-majority schools in 1968 and 80 per cent in 1980 (more than even in 1954). There were horrible stories at South Boston High, where black children were exempted from fire drills out of fear for their safety if they left the building...

“Where was American democracy? Law was passed by an apparent ‘Iron Triangle’ of lobbyists, bureaucrats and tiny subcommittees. The Democrats (now essentially enrolled from the north-east) reformed the House in such a way as to remove the old men from committee chairmanships, as from October 1974, when one of them became involved in a sex scandal involving a whore. The old system had been able to deliver votes, for instance for the Marshall Plan, but it could also be used to stop left-Democrat aims because experienced chairmen knew how to do it. A San Francisco congressman, Phil Burton – he supported Pol Pot in Cambodia, in 1976 – was backed by labour, but the result with many now open committees, was that lobbyists flourished, and the small print of enormous legislative documents contained provisions to satisfy them, quite often unnoticed by scrutineers. It became impossible to get the budget in on time, and there had to be endless ‘Continuing Resolutions’ which simply enabled the government to go on spending as before: in 1974, \$30 bn more; between 1974 and 1980 spending (beyond defence) rose from \$174 bn to \$444 bn.

“It was not surprising that so many Americans felt hostile to the whole process, and a radical, Christopher Lasch, wrote powerfully as to how a bureaucracy-dominating elite had taken power from people to run their own lives. He particularly despised the endless fuss made about cigarette-smoking – it started with a ban in Arizona, in 1973, on smoking in public buildings – but this was a frivolous period, the landmarks down. What Leszek Kołakowski called the politics of infantilism went ahead. Alvin Toffler pronounced in 1970 that the future would amount to endless leisure. For some, it did. In 1970, 1.5 million drew a disability pension, but 3 million in 1980; one tenth of the nation’s families were headed by a single woman, living on welfare. Paul Ehrlich in 1968 looked at *The Population Bomb* and asserted that there would be famine in the 1970s, and thought that pets should be killed, to save resources. One man made his name in the seventies with the claim that there would be a new Ice Age, and made his name again twenty years later with a further claim that global warming would mean apocalyptic floods. The wilder shores of the sexual revolution were explored, Niall Ferguson remarking that the only people who wanted to join the army were women, and the only people who wanted to get married were gays. Feminism, a cause that went back to hesitant beginnings under Kennedy, was vigorously promoted through the courts, and quotes for ‘positive discrimination’ were allowed – although Congress had never voted for this. Equality was applied, with many absurdities resulting (Edward Luttwak got himself off guest lists when he pointed out that heavy military lorries, driven by women, might crash because the driver’s legs were not strong enough for the controls). In Ohio women were at last ‘allowed’ to lift weights heavier than 25 pounds; in February 1972 the ghastly little word ‘Ms’ was allowed in government documents; women were ‘allowed’ to enter sports teams’ locker rooms; in New York women were permitted to become firemen; and in 1978 women were allowed to serve on naval vessels, ten of the first fifty-five becoming pregnant. Here was America at its witches-of-Salem weirdest.”³⁶

³⁶ Stone, *The Atlantic and its Enemies*, London: Penguin, 2011, pp. 299-300, 301-304.

Britain, too, was going through a severe crisis of confidence. “After a national dock strike in July 1970, the Heath Government declared a national State of Emergency (the first of three), but then it paid off the dockers. Despite the Trade and Industry Minister John Davies assuring the Conservative Party Conference that, ‘I will not bolster or bail out companies where I can see no end to the process of propping them up’ in October 1970, the very next month, £48 million of taxpayers’ money was given to Rolls-Royce Ltd to offset losses. In December, in the depths of mid-winter, the power workers started a work-to-rule for a 25% pay increase. Christmas lights were blacked out and there was even a run on candles. Later Heath’s Government nationalised the aero-engine and marine division of Rolls-Royce, the first such action since Clement Attlee twenty-two years previously; meanwhile, top income-tax rates were at 75 pence in the pound and British Rail went on work-to-rule for a 16% pay claim.

“The worst act of appeasement... came in 1972 when the Heath Government performed a spectacular and comprehensive U-turn on all its major industrial policies, ditching every commitment it had made only two years earlier in its election manifesto. Yet this *volte face* was swallowed by a Conservative Party that could not bear confrontation. All its promise of tax cuts, free-market reforms, immigration controls, law-and-order measures and legislation to control the trade unions were abandoned overnight in an act of mass funk...”³⁷

“The overall Atlantic crisis,” continues Stone, “was displayed at its worst in England, where the entire civilization had – with a Dutch contribution – started.” Britain was by now a second-class power. However, she was still America’s only dependable ally, and so not unimportant.

“Her worldwide troubles in 1947 had led to the creation of an Atlantic system; now, her domestic ones revealed its central weaknesses. The great British economist John Maynard Keynes had somehow lent his name to the Pursuit of Happiness: he could reconcile welfare with progress. Government waved its wand, the poor had money transferred to them from the rich, spenders were encouraged rather than savers, the economy grew accordingly, and unemployment was kept low. ‘Keynesianism’, though no-one could quite pin down the Master, reigned, and dissident economists were unfashionable, or even slightly ridiculous. Their chief argument against Keynesianism was that it would promote inflation: if governments overtaxed then money would go abroad, and an overhang of paper money would translate into higher prices; in the end, when workers, through trade unions, wanted higher wages to defend themselves against a rising of basic prices, then they would expect inflation in the future, and want even higher wages. That would in turn add to the paper money and to the inflation. There were a few bright sparks who suggested that there was a relationship between the amount of paper money and pyramids of credit on one

³⁷ Andrew Roberts, *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples since 1900*, London: Penguin, 2014, pp. 489-90.

side, and rising prices on the other. This was called 'monetarism'. Such bright sparks were not fashionable. In the sixties, the Keynesians made the running, had the answers, were constantly in the newspapers and on television, and then, in the seventies, ran into very choppy waters.

"The oil crisis had its worst effects here, and the quadrupling of energy prices pushed England into a trouble that called in question the whole post-war order. Strikes in the seventies meant that the average worker was not working for nearly a fortnight every year ('average' is not the right word: large unions alone were involved, and not all of them) whereas in the fifties the figure had been three days. The Prime Minister, Edward Heath, who had the face of a large and angry baby, would harangue the nation on a television that was switched off after 10 p.m. In 1974 he launched an election distinguished by the abstention of 2 million of his natural supporters, lost, and was replaced by a man who pandered to the unions. The Stock Exchange sank to a pitiful level and banks went under. The country was about one-third as well-off as Germany, and in parts of the North there were areas that even resembled Communist Poland. In 1970 a rising figure in the political media of London, Ferdinand Mount, remembered that, from the capital, 'the main railway line to the north passed through great swathes of devastation – industrial wastelands with rows of roofless workshops – the roofs had been removed in order to avoid taxes.' Why had this decline come about, in a country which, after the war, had been the second greatest exporter in the world? It was partly that the pound had become a very strong currency, and latterly because there was oil in the North Sea, but the fall of exports was really to do with 'poor quality, late delivery, trade union restrictions, timid and defeatist management'. In fact Keynes himself, towards the end of the war, had bitterly hoped that the Germans would still have enough bombing power to obliterate some of the worst-managed industries. As things were, obliteration happened painfully a generation later...

"Intelligent people did not need statistics to learn about the decline of the country; they only needed to take the boat train to France. By this time, British problems seemed to be falling into a vicious circle, of inflation, of problems with the pound, of problems with the balance of payments, of problems regarding unions and management alike. In 1971 unemployment began to rise, reaching not far from one million, while at the same time inflation stood at 9 per cent – not what was supposed to happen. Heath saw the answer in three directions. After a few weeks of pretending that he would 'free' the market, he was soon (February 1972) into the business of subsidizing collapsing industries, and then imposing controls on wages and prices (November: 'U Turn'). But he would make up for this. First of all would be government spending. Then would come attempts to deal with the union problem, whether by agreement, or by law. Finally, there was 'Europe': the magic that had worked in France and Germany would work in England as well.

"The first two tacks ran into headwinds. Money was splashed around, interest rates were reduced from 7 to 5 per cent, and bank lending was less controlled; taxation was cut by £500m and post-war credits were repaid. At the same time

public works were undertaken, particularly in the north – famously, an elaborate concrete bridge with hardly any traffic on it. There was an explosion of bank lending - £1.32bn in 1970, £1.8bn in 1971 and almost £7bn by 1973. Another expansionary budget followed in 1972, with tax cuts of £1.2bn. In 1972 the floating of the pound allowed inflows from abroad, and new credit-giving institutions were allowed to emerge, offering and taking loans in conditions no longer subject to the controls of the past. For a time, this seemed to work. Unemployment did indeed fall to 500,000, but this was classic fool's gold. The 'fringe banks' for time did well out of property prices, which had a dangerously more important role in England than elsewhere, and unlovely concrete spread and spread and spread.

"But then came the oil shock. Even food prices trebled by 1974 as against 1971, and the bubble burst in November 1973, when the minimum lending rate was pushed up to 13 per cent while public spending was cut back by £12bn. One of the new banks could not obtain credit, and the other banks had to set up a 'lifeboat'. It was not enough. The Bank of England itself had to move in, in the winter of 1974-5, and a well-connected bucket shop concern, Slater Walker Securities, had to be rescued in 1975. The Stock Exchange collapsed. Heath's effort to spend his way through the strange 'stagflation' had thus come to grief, and inflation by 1976 reached 25 per cent.

"In this dismal tale came a damp squib: since the later 1950s the importance of the European recovery had been plain for all to see. Germany boomed, and so, despite 1968, did France. Italy was also picking herself up in a remarkable way, and by 1970 any Englishman could see for himself how far his country was lagging behind. By 1960 British governments appreciated that their might-have-been alternative, the former imperial lands and some of the smaller European countries such as Finland and Austria, did not give them quite the same weight as would membership of the European Economic Community. Besides, the Americans were very keen to have Great Britain as a member, for the obvious reason that she could act as an Atlantic bridge for them, in a hostile view, to walk upon. The British tried in 1962-3 and were told 'no' rudely and in public by de Gaulle, who wanted to build up Europe as a sort of 'third force'. He did it again in 1967. After his resignation, and after the shock of 1968, there were more realistic French governments and de Gaulle's successor, Pompidou, could see, with the shocks of the world's financial system in the early seventies, and the American disaster in Vietnam, that the Atlantic system needed buttressing. On the British side the various mishaps of that period caused a good part of opinion to wish that, like Italy, England could be governed by foreign-made rules, since the domestic ones were so demonstrably not working. Besides, on both sides of the political divide, senior politicians believed in big government, erecting concrete blocks of some hideousness in celebration of it. The Europe of Brussels did much the same... In 1972-3 the Heath government pushed British membership, and did so in some desperation. It signed away British fishing rights, condemning picturesque fishing villages to decline as floating fishing factories vacuumed the fish out of the sea. It also had to accept the Common Agricultural Policy, which put up food costs for the poor by £25 per week, and deprived former colonial territories of an appropriate market, all the while getting the ordinary taxpayer to

pay. Still, 'Britain in Europe' appeared to be the only way out of the troubles of the Heath-Wilson period, and in 1975 a referendum confirmed British membership. Italians had constantly voted with enthusiasm for not being governed by Italians. Now the British did the same. Heath had not quite unwittingly done that service to the cause he most believed in. But Europe offered no immediate relief, quite the contrary..."³⁸

In the second half of the seventies the situation went from bad to worse. In February, 1974 a Labour government under Harold Wilson came to power. It was even less able to tame the militant unions than the Conservatives had been. As inflation climbed and the public debt rose, a Prices and Incomes Policy (a very socialist kind of measure) was imposed. Then a sterling crisis broke out. In 1976 Wilson resigned, Callaghan took his place and the IMF was called in – a deep humiliation for the nation.

"In 1976-7 the world economy did pick up, as the oil-shock money was recycled back to the industrial and exporting countries (which grew overall at 5 per cent). But the British economy was by now too fragile to gain much more than a respite, and inflation still ran high – 25 per cent in 1975, 16 per cent in 1976 and in 1977 (earnings keeping apace until 1977). As the pound was now a petrol currency, it naturally rose; keeping it down meant selling it, and that made for inflationary pressures, compounded by the inrush of Arab money. Still, there was a respite, unemployment not much above a million, and inflation down below 8 per cent in 1978. The respite did not last long.

"Seventies England finally fell apart over an absurd wrangle about Scotland. The vagaries of the electoral system had made the government dependent upon a few Scottish Nationalists. Theirs was a cause not worth discussion: careerist soft-profession mediocrities with no sense of their own country's considerable history. They had to be placated, and a referendum was staged as to independence. It failed, and, without the votes of the few Nationalists, the Labour government collapsed. It did so as the economic strategy also collapsed: the comic arithmetic of the pay policy anyway fell apart because in far-away Teheran the Shah lost his Peacock Throne, and in the ensuing panic oil prices doubled. Iran was the second-largest oil producer, and revolution there affected 5 million barrels per day. Production was suspended for ten weeks after 27 December 1978, and then recovered only to 2 million. By June 1979 the price of Saudi Light Crude had risen from \$12.98 to \$35.40, and there was a very harsh winter in the USA and Europe; the spot price affected marginal, non-contracted oil, and some crude-oil prices – Nigeria's for instance – even reached \$40 per barrel. In Britain, with inflation rising, the barriers broke. The TUC wanted 22 per cent, not the 5 per cent they were supposed to accept, and various strikes began in the winter of 1978-9. Callaghan, who himself said that if he were younger he would emigrate, confessed that there was a strange new tide a-flowing, and he was right.

³⁸ Stone, *op. cit.*, pp. 309, 310-311, 322-324.

"By this time, the government's policies were spreading havoc. The headmaster of an infants' school in a small Berkshire town wrote to parents whose children usually had school dinners that they would have to go home because of a strike. He added: 'we cannot allow you to provide packed meals instead, as this could be regarded as a form of strike breaking.' The heart of the whole wretched problem was expounded by a valiant economist of the Right, Walter Ellis, who said that if at Oxford in 1965 the question had been asked as to whether an absence of growth, inflation, unemployment and a balance of payments crisis could coexist, the answer would have been yes, but only in an underdeveloped country. The Bank of England noted in 1975-6 that the real return on investment was now zero. By then taxation of salaries had reached 83 per cent and on interest or dividends, 98 per cent. The government was in no condition to face trouble from the unions again, and there was more panic; the City refused to buy government stock, mistrusting it; interest rates rose above 10 per cent again, to 14 per cent by May 1979, when the next election happened. The annual debt - 'public sector borrowing requirement' - almost doubled, to some £10bn, but even then some effort had to be made to control public sector wages at a time when the government was taking three fifths of the entire national income for itself. In the summer of 1978 the unions rebelled against the system, the Ford workers leading the way, and by the winter there were surreal strikes, including dustmen and even body-buriers. But England, messy as it was, was not without creativity, or even tissue regeneration. There was to be a reaction against all of this. Edward Heath had been dismissed as leader of the Conservative Party, to his own and his supporters' great surprise. Margaret Thatcher replaced him, to his disbelief. She meant business, at last..."³⁹

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As a result of the general decline of the West, the masses began to abandon the institutional churches, and Christianity continued the steep decline that had begun in the "Swinging Sixties". In the vacuum thus created, Eastern philosophies began to become fashionable, and there arose a variety of cults including the New Age philosophy. "New Age," writes Peter Watson, "has been described as a smorgasbord of spiritual substitutes for Christianity. It is essentially an astrological idea, the basic belief being that sometime in the 1970s we passed from the astrological age of Pisces, the fish, into the age of Aquarius, the water-bearer. The age of Pisces stretched back to the beginning of Christianity and took in the Renaissance, the Reformation and the rise of humanism. It was the age of authority, when Judeo-Christianity was dominant and controlled man's thinking. The age of Aquarius, beginning around the turn of the twenty-first century, would herald a new spirit, leading to 'consciousness expansion', to man's wholeness. The New Age consistently teaches that a personal god does not exist. It is intended to fill the post-Christian spiritual vacuum."⁴⁰

³⁹ Stone, *op. cit.*, pp. 327-329.

⁴⁰ Watson, *The Age of Atheists*, London: Simon & Schuster, 2014, p. 500.

Morals also declined sharply. According to a joint commission of the National Association of State Boards of Education and the American Medical Association set up in 1990, "at least three million teenage girls became pregnant in 1989. The suicide rate for teens has doubled since 1968 and teenage arrests are up three thousand percent since 1950. Of high school seniors, nearly forty percent admitted to recent drunkenness, and the leading causes of teenage death are alcohol-related."⁴¹ "Free love", abortion and drug-consumption became normal - and the traditional institutions of society seemed incapable of holding the line against them. Particularly significant was the legalization of homosexuality. In 1973 the American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Some psychiatrists who fiercely opposed this circulated a petition calling for a vote on the issue by the Association's membership. That vote was held in 1974, and the Board's decision was ratified.⁴²

As Hobsbawm writes, "The world was now tacitly assumed to consist of several billion beings defined by their pursuit of individual desire, including desires hitherto prohibited or frowned on, but now permitted - not because they had now become morally acceptable but because so many egos had them. Thus until the 1990s official liberalization stopped short of legalizing drugs. These continued to be prohibited with varying degrees of severity and a high degree of inefficacy. For from the later 1960s an enormous market for cocaine developed with great rapidity, primarily among the prosperous middle classes of North America and, a little later, Western Europe. This, like the somewhat earlier and more plebeian growth in the market for heroin (also primarily North American) turned crime for the first time into genuinely big business.

"The cultural revolution of the later twentieth century can thus best be understood as the triumph of the individual over society, or rather, the breaking of the threads which in the past had woven human beings into social textures. For such textures had consisted not only of the actual relations between human beings and their forms of organization but also of the general models of such relations and the expected patterns of people's behaviour towards each other; their roles were prescribed, though not always written. Hence the often traumatic insecurity when older conventions of behaviour were either overturned or lost their rationale, or the incomprehension between those who felt this loss and those too young to have known anything but anomie society...

"Over most of the world the old social textures and conventions, though undermined by a quarter of a century of unparalleled social and economic transformation, were strained, but not yet in disintegration. This was fortunate for most of humanity, especially the poor, since the network of kin, community and neighbourhood was essential to economic survival and especially to success in a changing world. In much of the Third World it functioned as a combination of information service, labour exchange, a pool of labour and capital, a savings

⁴¹ J.R. Nyquist, *Origins of the Fourth World War*, Chula Vista, Co.: Black Forest Press, 1999, p. 112.

⁴² http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/rainbow/html/facts_mental_health.html.

mechanism and a social security system. Indeed, without cohesive families the economic successes of some parts of the world – e.g. the Far East – are difficult to explain.

“In the more traditional societies the strains would show chiefly inasmuch as the triumph of the business economy undermined the legitimacy of the hitherto accepted social order based on inequality, both because aspirations became more egalitarian and because the functional justifications of inequality were eroded. Thus the wealth and profligacy of Indian rajahs (like the known immunity to taxation of the British family’s royal wealth, which was not challenged until the 1990s), had not been envied or resented by their subjects, as a neighbour’s might have been. They belonged to, and were marks of, their special role in the social – perhaps even in the cosmic – order, which in some sense was believed to maintain, stabilize and certainly to symbolize, their realm. In a somewhat different mode, the considerable privileges and luxuries of Japanese business tycoons were less unacceptable, so long as they were seen not as individually appropriated wealth, but essentially as adjuncts to their official positions in the economy, rather like the luxuries of British cabinet ministers – limousines, official residences, etc. – which are withdrawn within hours of their ceasing to occupy the post to which they are attached. The actual distribution of incomes in Japan, as we know, was considerably less unequal than in Western business societies. Yet anyone who observed the Japanese situation in the 1980s, even from afar, could hardly avoid the impression that during this boom decade the sheer accumulation of personal wealth and its public display made the contrast between the conditions under which the ordinary Japanese lived at home – so much more modestly than their Western homologues – and the condition of the Japanese rich far more visible. Perhaps for the first time they were no longer sufficiently protected by what had been seen as the legitimate privileges that go with service to state and society.

“In the West, the decades of social revolution had created far greater havoc. The extremes of such breakdown are more easily visible in the public ideological discourse of the occidental *fin de siècle*, especially in the kind of public statements which, while laying no claim to analytical depth, were formulated in terms of widely held beliefs. One thinks of the argument, at one time common in some feminist circles, that women’s domestic work should be calculated (and, where necessary, paid) at a market rate, or the justification of abortion reform in terms of an abstract and unlimited ‘right to choose’ of the individual (woman). The pervasive influence of neo-classical economics, which in Western societies increasingly took the place of theology, and (via the cultural hegemony of the USA) the influence of the ultra-individualist American jurisprudence, encouraged such rhetoric. It found political expression in the British premier Margaret Thatcher’s: ‘There is no society, only individuals.’

“Yet, whatever the excesses of theory, practice was often equally extreme. Sometime in the 1970s, social reformers in the Anglo-Saxon countries, rightly shocked (as enquirers periodically were) by the effects of institutionalization on the mentally ill or impaired, successfully campaigned to have as many of them as

possible let out of confinement 'to be cared for in the community'. But in the cities of the West there no longer was a community to care for them. There was no kin. Nobody knew them. There were only streets of cities like New York filled with homeless beggars with plastic bags who gestured and talked to themselves. If they were lucky or unlucky (it depended on the point of view) they eventually moved from the hospitals that had expelled them to the jails which, in the USA, became the main receptacle of the social problems of American society, especially its black part. In 1991 15 per cent of what was proportionately the largest prison population in the world – 426 prisoners per 100,000 population – were said to be mentally ill.

"The institutions most severely undermined by the new moral individualism were the traditional family and traditional organized churches in the West, which collapsed dramatically in the last third of the century. The cement that had held the communities of Roman Catholics together crumbled with astonishing speed. In the course of the 1960s attendance at Mass in Quebec (Canada) fell from 80 to 20 per cent and the traditionally high French-Canadian birth-rate fell below the Canadian average. Women's liberation, or more precisely women's demand for birth-control, including abortion and the right to divorce, drove perhaps the deepest wedge between the Church and what had in the nineteenth century become the basic stock of the faithful, as became increasingly evident in notoriously Catholic countries like Ireland and the Pope's own Italy, and even – after the fall of communism – in Poland. Vocations for the priesthood and other forms of religious life fell steeply, as did the willingness to live lives of celibacy, real or official. In short,... the Church's moral authority over the faithful disappeared into the black hole that opened between its rules of life and morality and the reality of late-twentieth-century behaviour. Western Churches with a less compelling hold over their members, including even some of the older Protestant sects, declined even more steeply.

"The material consequences of the loosening of traditional family ties were perhaps even more serious. For, as we have seen, the family was not only what it had always been, a device for reproducing itself, but also a device for social cooperation. As such it had been essential for maintaining both the agrarian and the early industrial economies, the local and the global. This was partly because no adequate *impersonal* capitalist business structure had been developed before the concentration of capital and the rise of big business began to generate the modern corporate organization at the end of the nineteenth century, that 'visible hand' which was to supplement Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' of the market. But an even stronger reason was that the market by itself makes no provision for that central element in any system of private profit-seeking, namely trust, or, its legal equivalent, the performance of contracts. This required either state power (as the seventeenth-century political theorists of individualism knew well) or the ties of kin or community. Thus international trading, banking and finance, fields of sometimes physically remote activities, large rewards and great insecurity, had been most successfully conducted by kin-related bodies of entrepreneurs, preferably from groups with special religious solidarities like Jews, Quakers, or Huguenots. Indeed, even in the late twentieth century, such links were still

indispensable in criminal business, which was not only against the law but outside its protection. In a situation where nothing else guaranteed contracts, only kin and the threat of death could do so. The most successful Calabrian *mafia* families therefore consisted of a substantial group of brothers.

“Yet just these non-economic group bonds and solidarities were now being undermined, as were the moral systems that went with them. These had also been older than modern bourgeois industrial society, but they had also been adapted to form an essential part of it. The old moral vocabulary of rights and duties, mutual obligations, sin and virtue, sacrifice, conscience, rewards and penalties, could no longer be translated into the new language of desired gratification. Once such practices and institutions were no longer accepted as part of a way of ordering society that linked people to each other and ensured social cooperation and reproduction, most of their capacity to structure human social life vanished. They were reduced simply to expressions of individuals’ preferences, and claims that the law should recognize the supremacy of preferences. Uncertainty and unpredictability impended. Compass needles no longer had a North, maps became useless. This is what became increasingly evident in the most developed countries from the 1960s on. It found ideological expression in a variety of theories, which tried to sidestep the problem of judgement and values altogether, or rather to reduce them to the single denominator of the unrestricted freedom of the individual.

“Initially, of course, the advantages of wholesale social liberalization had seemed enormous to all except ingrained reactionaries, and its costs minimal, nor did it seem to imply economic liberalization. The great tide of prosperity washing across the populations of the favoured regions of the world, reinforced by the increasingly comprehensive and generous public social security systems, appeared to remove the debris of social disintegration. Being a single parent (i.e. overwhelmingly a single mother) was still by far the best guarantee of a life of poverty, but in modern welfare states it also guaranteed a minimum of livelihood and shelter. Pensions, welfare services and, in the end, geriatric wards took care of the isolated old, whose sons and daughters could not, or no longer felt the obligation to, look after parents in their decline. It seemed natural to deal with other contingencies that had once been part of the family order in the same way, for instance by shifting the burden of caring for infants from mothers to public crèches and nurseries, as socialists, concerned with the needs of wage-earning mothers, had long demanded.

“Both rational calculation and historical development seemed to point in the same direction as various kinds of progressive ideology, including all those which criticized the traditional family because it perpetuated the subordination of women or of children and adolescents, or on more general libertarian grounds. Materially, public provision was obviously superior to that which most families could provide for themselves, either because of poverty or for other reasons. That the children in democratic states emerged from the world wars actually healthier and better fed than before, proved the point. That welfare states survived in the richest countries at the end of the century, in spite of systematic attacks on them

by free-market governments and ideologists, confirmed it. Moreover, it was a commonplace among sociologists and social anthropologists that in general the rule of kinship 'diminishes with the importance of governmental institutions'. For better or worse, it declined with 'the growth of economic and social individualism in industrial societies'. In short, as had long been predicted, *Gemeinschaft* was giving way to *Gesellschaft*, communities to individuals linked in anonymous societies.

"The material advantages of a life in the world in which community and family declined were, and remain, undeniable. What few realized was how much of modern industrial society up to the mid-twentieth century had relied on a symbiosis between old community and family values and the new society, and therefore how dramatic the effects of their spectacularly rapid disintegration were likely to be. This became evident in the era of neo-liberal ideology, where the macabre term 'the underclass' entered, or re-entered the socio-political vocabulary around 1980. These were the people who, in developed market societies after the end of full employment, could not manage or did not want to make a living for themselves and their families in the economy of the market (supplemented by the social security system), which seemed to work well enough for most of the inhabitants of such countries, at all events until the 1990s...

"The drama of collapsed traditions and values lay not so much in the material disadvantages of doing without the social and personal services once supplied by family and community. These could be replaced in the prosperous welfare states, although not in the poor parts of the world, where the great majority of humanity still had little to rely on except kin, patronage and mutual aid... It lay in the disintegration both of the old value systems and the customs and conventions which controlled human behaviour. This loss was felt. It was reflected in the rise of what came to be called (again in the USA, where the phenomenon became noticeable from the end of the 1960s) 'identity politics', generally ethnic/national or religious, and of militantly nostalgic movements seeking to recover a hypothetical past age of unproblematic order and security. Such movements were cries for help rather than carriers of programmes – calls for some 'community' to belong to in an anomic world; some family to belong to in a world of social isolates; some refuge in the jungle. Every realistic observer and most governments knew that crime was not diminished or even controlled by executing criminals or by deterrence through long penal sentences, but every politician knew the enormous, emotionally loaded strength, rational or not, of the mass demand of ordinary citizens to *punish* the anti-social.

"These were the political dangers of the fraying and snapping of the old social textures and value systems. However, as the 1980s advanced, generally under the banner of pure market sovereignty, it became increasingly obvious that it also constituted a danger to the triumphant capitalist economy.

"For the capitalist system, even while built on the operations of the market, had relied on a number of proclivities which had no intrinsic connection with that pursuit of the individual's advantage which, according to Adam Smith, fuelled

its engine. It relied on 'the habit of labour', which Adam Smith assumed to be one of the fundamental motives of human behaviour, on the willingness of human beings to postpone immediate gratification for a long period, i.e. to save and invest for future rewards, on pride in achievement, on customs of mutual trust, and on other attitudes which were not implicit in the rational maximisation of anyone's utilities. The family became an integral part of early capitalism because it supplied it with a number of these motivations. So did 'the habit of labour', the habits of obedience and loyalty, including the loyalty of executives to their firm, and other forms of behaviour which could not readily be fitted into rational choice theory based on maximisation. Capitalism could function in the absence of these, but, when it did, it became strange and problematic even for businessmen themselves. This happened during the fashion for piratical 'take-overs' of business corporations and other financial speculations which swept the financial districts of ultra-free-market states like the USA and Britain in the 1980s, and which virtually broke all links between the pursuit of profit and the economy as a system of production. That is why capitalist countries which had not forgotten that growth is not achieved by profit maximisation alone (Germany, Japan, France), made such raiding difficult or impossible.

"Karl Polanyi, surveying the ruins of nineteenth-century civilization during the Second World War, pointed out how extraordinary and unprecedented were the assumptions on which it had been constructed: those of the self-regulating and universal system of markets. He argued that Adam Smith's 'propensity to barter, truck and exchange one thing for another' had inspired 'an industrial system.... which practically and theoretically implied that the human race was swayed in all its economic activities, if not also in its political, intellectual and spiritual pursuits, by that one particular propensity'. Yet Polanyi exaggerated the logic of capitalism in his time, just as Adam Smith had exaggerated the extent to which, taken by itself, the pursuit by all men of their economic advantage would automatically maximize the wealth of nations.

"As we take for granted the air we breathe, and which makes possible all our activities, so capitalism took for granted the atmosphere in which it operated, and which it had inherited from the past. It only discovered how essential it had been, when the air became thin. In other words, capitalism had succeeded because it was not just capitalist. Profit maximisation and accumulation were necessary conditions for its success, but not sufficient ones. It was the cultural revolution of the last third of the century which began to erode the inherited historical assets of capitalism and to demonstrate the difficulties of operating without them. It was the historic irony of neo-liberalism that became fashionable in the 1970s and 1980s, and looked down on the ruins of the communist regimes, that it triumphed at the very moment when it ceased to be as plausible as it had once seemed. The market claimed to triumph as its nakedness and inadequacy could no longer be concealed."⁴³

⁴³ Hobsbawm, op. cit., pp. 334-338, 339-343.

5. THE FALL OF SAIGON

The terrible facts about Communism were slow to become publicly known and acknowledged. Nevertheless, anyone living in the West who wanted to know the truth would be able to find it – and this proved a vital weapon in the life-and-death struggle against the totalitarian enemy. For, as Revel pointed out, “Democracy’s only superiority in the ideological war is the truth, even if it is often too unsure of itself to use that superiority. The Communists are addicted to disinformation because Communist propaganda in its raw state is not trusted. This is why, in spreading tales and exciting prejudices that will enlist people in support of Communist policy, they prefer to exploit the bourgeois trustworthiness of Western information sources.”⁴⁴

When the West would become a source of disinformation and misinformation to the same degree as Communism, it would fall. And indeed it had begun to totter in the early 1970s, when lies about the Vietnam War and Watergate, among other things, engendered distrust among the western peoples in their governments and security services. Fortunately for the West and mankind in general, that process had not gone so far as to prevent the victory of the West in the Cold War...

In February, 1972, as we have seen, the US President Nixon went to Beijing and made huge concessions to the Chinese, including a promise to leave Vietnam. However, he did obtain a Chinese promise not to intervene in Vietnam after the Americans had left – one of the Americans’ main fears. And so Nixon “returned home confident that he could now do almost anything he liked to the North with the decade-long spectre of Chinese intervention banished. His Indochina policies would hereafter be constrained by the American people, represented by Congress, rather than by China – or the Soviet Union. Le Duan and his comrades in Hanoi grasped this shift in the strategic balance, and were furious about what they perceived as a betrayal by Mao, who might with warning words to the US president have spared them from a new rain of bombs. A senior cadre grumbled that for China’s chairman to receive Nixon was ‘throwing a life-raft to a drowning pirate’. Hanoi’s sense of grievance was not assuaged by a deluge of fresh Chinese aid.”⁴⁵

However, Nixon’s apparent victory in Beijing concealed the deeper reality of a major defeat... Richard Nixon had come to power in January, 1969 as “the implacable Cold Warrior, willing to embrace every extreme of violence if the enemy declined to cut a deal.”⁴⁶ But the enemy, though severely weakened and regularly sustaining far more deaths in battle than the Americans and South Vietnamese, refused to cut a deal. And so Nixon bowed to the popular mood and embarked on a policy of “Vietnamization”, whereby American troops would be withdrawn and South Vietnamese take their place. For, as he said in his memoirs,

⁴⁴ Revel, op. cit., pp. 180-181.

⁴⁵ Max Hastings, *Vietnam*, London: William Collins, 2019, p. 521.

⁴⁶ Hastings, *Vietnam*, p. 444.

"It was no longer a question of whether [I] would withdraw our troops, but of how they would leave and what they would leave behind."⁴⁷ But this was covered up in public in lying rhetoric: "Let historians not record," he said in his address to the nation on November 3, 1969, "that when America was the most powerful nation in the world we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism..."

The quality of the American army declined sharply. There were unprovoked massacres of peasants (My Lai was the most famous), gang-rapes, desertions, officers killed by their own men ("fraggings"). "It was driven by three related and mutually reinforcing elements: drug abuse, racial strife, powerfully influenced by the US domestic Black Power movement; and a decline of discipline and will to fight. A US general said later: 'We went into Korea with a rotten army, and came out with a fine one; we went into Vietnam with a great army, and finished with a terrible one.'"⁴⁸

Nevertheless, the Americans continued to bomb North Vietnam, and started to bomb Cambodia and Laos. "Morally," according to Brogan, "the attack on Cambodia was America's worst crime, for it forced a neutral, peaceful people to experience the horrors of war and generated a uniquely horrid aftermath, when a genocidal communist regime [the Khmer Rouge] took power for three years."⁴⁹ Then, in February, 1971 a joint South Vietnamese and American invasion of Laos codenamed Lam Son 719 was a disaster, and its main aim, the closure of the "Ho Chi Min trail" through Laos – not fulfilled.

On March 30, 1972 the North Vietnamese charged through the demilitarized zone to launch the biggest battle of the war. The outcome was "a tactical victory for the South, won at a cost of eleven thousand men killed, perhaps fifty thousand casualties in all. Most of the three hundred Americans who fell that year perished during the spring offensive. The Northerners' casualties probably exceeded a hundred thousand. They lost over half their committed armoured force – at least 250 tanks – and most of their heavy artillery. Some twenty-five thousand civilians were killed..."⁵⁰

American air-power had been decisive in gaining this hollow victory. And yet even while the battle was being waged, 350,000 Americans went home. For the Americans were no longer interested in saving South Vietnam, but only in gaining as strong a position as possible for Kissinger at the peace talks taking place in Paris (to which both the Chinese and the Soviets drove the North Vietnamese). Agreement was more or less reached with the North Vietnamese by October, 1972, but the South Vietnamese president Thieu still held out against the betrayal of his country. In November Nixon was re-elected, and Thieu, under

⁴⁷ Nixon, in Hastings, op. cit., p. 445.

⁴⁸ Hastings, op. cit., p. 454.

⁴⁹ Brogan, *The Penguin History of the USA*, London: Penguin, 2019, p. 662.

⁵⁰ Hastings, *Vietnam*, p. 550.

enormous pressure, eventually gave in. At Christmas Nixon launched the heaviest bombing raid yet on Hanoi, so as to make sure that the communists – if they were still susceptible to such pressure – would not pull out of signing the peace agreement.

Finally, on January 27, 1973, “in Paris, Nixon’s Secretary of State William Rogers, and Nguyen Duy Trinh of North Vietnam signed an ‘Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam’. The merit of this understanding, which made it possible for America to leave Vietnam, was that it reserved Nixon’s right to maintain carriers in Indo-Chinese waters and to use aircraft stationed in Taiwan and Thailand if the accords were broken by Hanoi. So long as Nixon held power, that sanction was a real one. Granted the situation he had inherited and the mistakes of his predecessors, Nixon had performed a notable feat of extrication.”⁵¹

However, Nixon’s struggle to avoid impeachment for the “Watergate” scandal weakened him, and in August, 1974 he resigned. For over two more years after the Paris agreement, the fighting continued, both sides violating the terms of the agreement; thousands were killed. The Americans had promised to support the South Vietnamese with troops if the North violated the ceasefire. But Congress, determined not to allow the Presidency to take the nation back into the war, banned even the provision of sorely needed aid – food, spare parts for military vehicles – to Vietnam.

The United States Defence Department, at the time of the ceasefire agreement, published the statistics of the war, first and foremost the numbers of those killed in Vietnam since the United States became involved in the war on 8 March 1965. In order of magnitude the highest death toll was that of the North Vietnamese civilians and soldiers, and Vietcong, 922,290 in all. The South Vietnamese armed forces lost 181,483 men, in addition to whom 50,000 South Vietnamese civilians were killed. The United States war deaths were 55,337.

“More than 150,000 American soldiers had been wounded, some terribly. As the American public turned against the war, it also seemed to turn against the search for adequate provision for the veterans, for adequate recognition of what they had been through. On their return to the United States, many of those who had fought felt spurned and scorned, their suffering of no interest to those among whom they lived and worked. The war had been lost; for millions of Americans it had become a source of shame. Those who had fought it felt that they had been cast as villains and pariahs. It took a decade and more before there was a change. At the turn of the century, at the Vietnam War memorial in Washington, visitors walk in shocked silence along the long list of names. That memorial was not created until 1982...”⁵²

⁵¹ Johnson, *Modern Times*, pp. 648-649.

⁵² Gilbert, *Challenge to Civilization. A History of the 20th Century 1952-1999*, London: HarperCollins, 1999, pp. 453-454.

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In spite of the edge they retained over their enemies in numbers and resources, the South Vietnamese lost the war mainly because most of them did not know what communism really was – they would find out soon enough. A deeper cause, according to Hastings, was a lack of patriotism. “A young Southern officer said to a journalist friend, Gavin Young, ‘The argument against communism must be material or moral, mustn’t it, Gavin? But the conditions we find here now are unemployment, rising prices, and corruption, *n’est-ce pas*? So no moral or material argument exists; there is no real patriotism in Saigon, I mean. So how can we resist? And yet we want to resist – most of us, you know – and we cannot. Isn’t that the tragedy of it, Gavin?’

“... US embassy political officer Hal Meinheit said: ‘It was a divided society with no common sense of where its people wanted to go...’”⁵³

America, too, was divided. And yet the common perception that most Americans were against the war is simply not true. “In poll after poll in 1972, and indeed right up until 1975, more Americans supported the war than opposed it. If it was a ‘desperate war’, it was helped to be made so by vociferous domestic opposition to the war that could not help but deflate the morale of the men fighting in the field to preserve South Vietnam’s independence...”⁵⁴

“As US aid tailed off, the military balance shifted decisively to the North in 1973. By the end of the year the North had achieved a two-to-one advantage and launched a general invasion. In January 1975 the whole of central Vietnam had to be evacuated, and a million refugees fled towards Saigon. In a last desperate appeal to Congress, President Ford pleaded: ‘American unwillingness to provide adequate assistance to allies fighting for their lives could seriously affect our credibility throughout the world as an ally.’ But Congress did nothing. At his news conference on 26 March Ford appealed again, warning of ‘a massive shift in the foreign policies of many countries and a fundamental threat... to the security of the United States.’ The face of Congress remained averted. Less than four weeks later, on 21 April, the Vietnamese government abdicated. Marine helicopters lifted American officials, and a few Vietnamese friends, from the rooftop of the US embassy in Saigon. Nine days later Communist tanks entered the city. It was the gravest and most humiliating defeat in American history. For the peoples of the region it was a catastrophe...”⁵⁵

And all this took place under the full, humiliating glare of television cameras...

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⁵³ Hastings, *Vietnam*, p. 589.

⁵⁴ Hendrickson, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June, 1998, p. 117.

⁵⁵ Johnson, *Modern Times*, p. 654.

The North's treatment of the South was predictably harsh and vindictive. As the KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky said: "North Vietnam, in breach of the Paris Accord, seized the whole South, killing democrats, liberals, Buddhists and Catholics, and installed a totalitarian regime."⁵⁶ There was hunger, looting and internment in re-education camps for sentences up to seventeen years.

"Thousands of ex-ARVN [South Vietnamese] officers were shipped to camps in the North, where one group laboring under guard found themselves fiercely reproached by an elderly villager. 'Since 1954 we have been waiting for you to liberate us. Instead, you come here at last as prisoners. You are shameful! It's because you didn't fight hard enough, you tolerated corruption, you enjoyed too much. You have betrayed us.' One of his hearers, Major Luan, wrote, '[We] quietly swallowed the stinging words as a punishment we deserved.'"⁵⁷

Jean-Louis Margolin writes that the fall of the South Vietnamese regime on April 30, 1975 "was not in fact followed by the bloodbath that so many feared and that did take place in neighbouring Cambodia. But the Vietnamese prisoners of the Communist forces – including 'traitors' from their own ranks – were severely abused and often simply liquidated rather than moved...

"For a few brief weeks, the approximately 1 million officials and soldiers in the Saigon regime could even believe that the much-vaunted 'policy of clemency' of President Ho was more than simple political rhetoric. As a result, these officials began to cooperate and register with the new authorities. Then, in early June, people were suddenly called in for re-education, which officially lasted three days for simple foot-soldiers and an entire month for officers and civil servants. In fact three days often became three years, and the month became seven or eight years. The last survivors of the re-education programs did not return home until 1986. Pham Van Dong, the prime minister at the time, admitted in 1980 that 200,000 had been re-educated in the South. Serious estimates range from 500,000 to 1 million out of a population of 20 million. The victims included a large number of students, intellectuals, monks (both Buddhist and Catholic), and political militants (including Communists). Many of these people had been in sympathy with the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, which revealed itself to be no more than a cover for Northern Communists and which almost immediately broke all its promises to respect the wishes of the people of the South. As in 1954-56, onetime comrades-in-arms were soon suffering in the rectification campaigns. To the number of prisoners who were trapped in special camps must be added an indeterminate but large number of 'minor' re-education cases who were locked up for several weeks in their place of work or study. By comparison, during the worst periods of the anti-Communist regime in the South, enemies on the left claimed that some 200,000 people were locked up in camps.

"Conditions of detention under Communist rule varied considerably. Some camps near towns did not even have barbed-wire fences, and the regime there

⁵⁶ Gordievsky, in Roberts, op. cit., p. 497.

⁵⁷ Hastings, *Vietnam*, p. 633.

was more one of constraint than of actual punishment. The more difficult cases were sent further north, to the more unhealthy, distant areas, to camps originally built for French prisoners. Isolation was total, and there was almost no medical care. Survival in these camps [as in the Soviet Gulag] often depended on parcels sent by the families of prisoners. Undernourishment was as bad as it was in the prisons; detainees were fed only 200 grams of poor-quality rice filled with stones per day. As elsewhere, hunger was often used as a weapon by the authorities against those awaiting trial. Doan Van Toai has left a gripping account of life in one such prison, which shows that this universe shared many of the characteristics of the Chinese prison camps, but was somewhat worse in terms of overcrowding, sanitary conditions, the prevalence of violent and often fatal punishments such as whipping, and long delays before trial. There were sometimes seventy to eighty prisoners in a cell built for twenty, and walks were often impossible because of construction inside the prison yard. The cells of this colonial period were seen as havens of peace and tranquillity in comparison. The tropical climate and the lack of air made breathing very difficult. All day long, people took turns standing by the one small airhole. The smells were unbearable, and skin complaints were rife. Even water was severely rationed. The hardest punishment was undoubtedly solitary confinement, sometimes for years on end, with no contact allowed with family. Torture was hidden but ever-present, as were executions. In prison, the tiniest infringement of regulations was punished harshly, and rations were so small that death often came within weeks...

"To this strange tableau of 'liberation' should be added the spectacle of hundreds of thousands of boat people, who fled misery and repression, many of whom drowned or were killed by pirates. [1.5 million fled the country.] The first real sign of relaxation in repression came only in 1986, when the new secretary general of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Nguyen Van Linh, freed a large number of political prisoners and closed the killing camps of the northern region..."⁵⁸

In 1975, "with the consent of Congress, 132,000 Vietnamese refugees were offered sanctuary in the United States. Some faced cries of 'Go home!' when they reached the town of their destination – especially if it was an area of high unemployment. But many more were met by town bands that marched in parade to welcome them."⁵⁹

The boatpeople of Vietnam repeated the experience of the boatpeople of Cuba: nobody who has lived under real communism wants to stay there – if he has not himself been morally broken and become a communist ...

Certainly, as David C. Henrickson writes, "Those who advised that we should wash our hands of the entire business and let events take their course are really

⁵⁸ Margolin, "Vietnam and Laos: The Impasse of War Communism", in Stéphane Courtois and others, *The Black Book of Communism*, London and Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. 571, 572-573, 574.

⁵⁹ Gilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 488.

in no position to hurl thunderbolts at those who counselled resistance to a communist takeover.”⁶⁰

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We have dwelt on Vietnam *after* the war to show, not only that the end of the war brought the traditional sufferings of a communist “peace” – economic collapse, “re-education”, murder and torture, – but also that the war was indeed *just and necessary* from a Christian and humanitarian point of view.

That is why the Holy Synod of ROCOR under Metropolitan Philaret always supported it – the end, that is, if not always the means.

Even in defeat, there were undoubtedly gains from the war. “In fact, as McGeorge Bundy has pointed out, the Vietnam War gave South-East Asia an invaluable twelve-year breathing space in which to develop their societies peacefully. Singapore’s long-standing leader Lee Kuan Yew was certain that it saved the region from falling under the communist maw. Maxwell Taylor’s fear that ‘If Vietnam goes, it will be exceedingly difficult to hold Southeast Asia’ has been sneeringly referred to on the Left as ‘the domino theory’, yet because the United States held up communist insurgency in the Vietnamese peninsula for over a decade, the rest of South-East Asia did not ‘go’.”⁶¹

The problem is: good ends have to be pursued by good means and with pure intentions. The professed aim of the Vietnam War – the protection of the Vietnamese people, and South-East Asia in general against the supreme evil of communism – was undoubtedly good. But the means and the intentions with which the Americans pursued this good end were mixed with evil, and therefore bound to fail. The means included terrible damage to the environment, the property and the lives of the people they were supposed to be defending, and a severe disruption of their traditional way of life by western corruption. But the intentions were also evil. They included a president’s desire to get re-elected as a victor – or, at any rate, not loser – in war; and his generals’ desire to wage war for the sake of personal glory, not for the sake of the good of the Vietnam people or even of the American soldiers; and the intention of the American people towards the end to harden their hearts and wash their hands of responsibility for their allies and friends and even, sometimes, of their own warriors.

The Americans’ loss of Vietnam has been compared to the loss of China in 1949. But its impact on the American psyche was more profound; it could be said to have marked the beginning of the end of American democracy, and of its role as global hegemon and policeman. America is still with us, and still powerful; but the freshness, the faith and the idealism – and therefore its chances of ultimate survival – have gone. Too late, after the Americans had withdrawn, did the tragedy of the Vietnamese boat people, and the unbelievably brutal killing fields

⁶⁰ Hendrickson, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June, 1998, p. 117.

⁶¹ Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 480.

of Cambodia (one third of the whole population killed in the space of four years of Khmer Rouge rule!) register – and that only to a limited extent – with an increasingly inward-looking, cynical and divided American and Western public.

They had much to be cynical about. In 1973 there began the long-drawn-out Watergate scandal, which exposed the president as having connived at common burglary and violated his pledge to protect the American Constitution. Under threat of impeachment, Nixon reluctantly chose to resign in August, 1974. But the next few years continued to be dispiriting and undermining of American democracy.

President Jimmy Carter summed it up well in 1979: “We were sure that ours was a nation of the ballot, not the bullet, until the murders of John Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther King Jr. We were taught that our armies were always invincible and our causes always just, only to suffer the agony of Vietnam. We respected the Presidency as a place of honour until the shock of Watergate. We remember when the phrase ‘sound as a dollar’ was an expression of absolute dependability, until ten years of inflation began to shrink our dollar and our savings. We believed that our nation’s resources were limitless until 1973, when we had to face a growing dependence on foreign oil. These wounds are still very deep. They have never been healed...”⁶²

In this connection, we may also mention a change in the aim of American foreign policy at this time associated with the word *Realpolitik* and the name of Nixon’s national security adviser and Ford’s secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, a change in aim from not only that of *defeating* the communists, nor even the less ambitious one of *containing* them (the policy associated with the name of George Kennan), but that of *accommodating* them, even of becoming friends with them. The USA had successfully contained the Soviet Union until 1970. But at that time, as we have seen, it adopted a new, much friendlier policy in regard to China, which led to a decade of serious military and diplomatic defeats...

“Kissinger’s approach to world affairs,” writes Paul Kennedy, “was historicist and relativistic: events had to be seen in their larger context, and related to each other; Great Powers should be judged on what they did, not on their domestic ideology; an absolutist search for security was utopian, since that would make everyone else absolutely insecure – all that one could hope to achieve was relative security, based upon a reasonable balance of forces in world affairs, a mature recognition that the world scene would never be completely harmonious, and a willingness to bargain. Like the statesmen he had written about (Metternich, Castlereagh, Bismarck), Kissinger felt that ‘the beginning of wisdom in human as well as international affairs was knowing when to stop’. His aphorisms were Palmerstonian (‘We have no permanent enemies’) and Bismarckian (‘The hostility between China and the Soviet Union served our purposes best if we maintained closer relations with each side than they did with each other’), and were unlike anything in American diplomacy since Kennan. But Kissinger had a much greater

⁶² Carter, in Brogan, op. cit, p. 669.

chance to direct policy than his fellow admirers of nineteenth-century European statesmen ever possessed.

“Finally, Kissinger recognized the limitations upon American power, not only in the sense that the United States could not afford to fight a protracted war in the jungles of South-East Asia *and* to maintain its other, more vital interests elsewhere, but also because both he and Nixon could perceive that the world’s power balances were altering, and new forces were undermining the hitherto unchallenged domination of the two superpowers. The superpowers were still far ahead in terms of strictly military power, but in other respects the world had become more of a multipolar place: ‘In economic terms,’ he noted in 1973, ‘there are at least five groupings. Politically, many more centres of influence have emerged...’ With echoes of (and amendments to) Kennan, he identified five important regions, the United States, the USSR, China, Japan, and Western Europe; and unlike many in Washington and (perhaps) everyone in Moscow, he welcomed this change. A *concert* of large powers, balancing each other off and with no one dominating another, would be ‘a safer world and a better world’ than a bipolar situation in which ‘a gain for one side appears as an absolute loss for the other’. Confident in his own abilities to defend American interests in such a pluralistic world, Kissinger was urging a fundamental reshaping of American diplomacy in the largest sense of that word...”⁶³

In his 1965 essay, “Control Issues of American Foreign Policy”, Kissinger insisted that “the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order”.⁶⁴ However, there can be no *order* when a good half of the “international community” you are trying to create is intent only on creating *disorder* in the other half, by all means possible including systematic lying and the breaking of all agreements. Kissingerian *Realpolitik* was therefore fundamentally *unrealistic* and incongruent with the long-term interests of the Americans and their allies.

What goes under the name of *Realpolitik* here is essentially an extreme case of trying to reconcile good with evil by means of friendship with, or agreement with, the evildoer. But “friendship with the world is enmity with God” (James 4.4), especially when that evil is of the extreme kind represented by communism, which of its nature can be contained only temporarily. Indeed, in the final analysis *friendship with communism* ultimately means *conquest by communism*: God will not allow another outcome (at the time of writing, 2021, America is well on the way to communisation).

Like a malignant tumour Communism must be completely excised if it is not to destroy the whole body – which excision is only possible through the moral and spiritual renewal of the whole of society by God’s grace. Only the Orthodox autocrats understood this; so, as long as the Orthodox autocracy and the Orthodox Church existed, working in tandem, there was some hope of destroying

⁶³ Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, London: William Collins, 1988, pp. 526-527.

⁶⁴ Kissinger, in Roberts, op. cit., p. 495.

the revolution. But after 1917, “that which restrains” this ultimate evil, by God’s ordinance, was removed; and American power, great though it was, could not take the place of the God-ordained and God-empowered restrainer, the Orthodox Christian Empire. This was the main lesson of the Vietnam War; but it was not learned then, nor even after the supposed victory of America over communism in 1989-91...

6. CAMBODIA'S KILLING FIELDS AND NOAM CHOMSKY

In case the West should shrug off the experience of Vietnam and the horrific reality of communism too easily, the Lord allowed the now-underemployed demons of Vietnam to migrate to neighbouring Cambodia...

On April 29, 1970 19,000 American troops, pursuing Vietnamese guerrillas, had invaded the areas of Cambodia bordering on North and South Vietnam. These actions were precipitated, writes Max Hastings, "by an 18 March army coup in Phnom Penh led by Gen. Lon Nol, who seized power with a junta of fellow-officers while Prince Norodom Sihanouk was on his way to Beijing – ironically, in hopes of getting the Chinese to induce the North Vietnamese to curb operations in eastern Cambodia, which they treated as their own fiefdom. Indeed, Hanoi's conduct was as devoid of moral justification as Washington's: both sides were indifferent to the interests of the Cambodian people, whom Vietnamese despised. There is still no evidence of direct American complicity in the coup, and Sihanouk's erratic, eccentric rule over his erratic, eccentric little country had for years been precarious...

"Lon Nol and his fellow-plotters were driven by a genuine disgust and exasperation at the North Vietnamese occupation and the US bombings it had provoked, mingled with more mundane concerns: the Sihanouk family was thought to be appropriating too many of the spoils of power, the generals too few. If Washington had made it explicitly plain to the usurpers that it would not back them, it is unlikely they would have dared to overthrow the prince...

"Cambodia's rulers appealed to the Americans for aid. Washington responded with sufficient arms and cash to sustain Lon Nol's regime for the next five years, but not nearly enough to crush the indigenous communist Khmer Rouge, which almost overnight became a serious military force. Cambodia's ramshackle army, which had just twenty surgeons, was cruelly mauled. By autumn the Khmer Rouge threatened Phnom Penh, where refugees from American bombing and communist terror eventually swelled the population by two million destitute people. After a 24-25 April conference held on the Vietnam-Laos border, the Pathet Lao, the Khmer Rouge and North Vietnam proclaimed a common struggle. Sihanouk, for all his limitations, commanded immense prestige among his own people. When this was placed at the disposal of the communists following his overthrow, the prince became a serviceable tool..."⁶⁵

The regime of the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot presented perhaps the most murderous "government" in history, relatively speaking, if we take into account the shortness of the time (1975-1979) that they had in which to carry out their atrocities.

In terms of tyrannous social control they exceeded every other totalitarian regime. The atrocities "were carried out mainly by illiterate peasant soldiers, but

⁶⁵ Hastings, *Vietnam*, London: William Collins, 2019, pp. 480, 481.

they had been planned two years before by a group of middle-class ideologues who called themselves *Angka Loeu* ('the Higher Organization'). Details of their plan had been obtained by a State Department expert, Kenneth Quinn, who circulated it in a report dated 20 February 1974. The scheme was an attempt to telescope, in one terrifying coup, the social changes brought about over twenty-five years in Mao's China. There was to be 'total social revolution'. Everything about the past was 'anathema and must be destroyed'. It was necessary to 'psychologically reconstruct individual members of society.' It entailed 'stripping away, through terror and other means, the traditional bases, structures and forces which have shaped and guided an individual's life' and then 'rebuilding him according to party doctrines by substituting a series of new values'. *Angka Loeu* consisted of about twenty professional political intellectuals, mainly teachers and bureaucrats. Of the eight leaders, all in their forties (one a woman), five were teachers, one a university professor, one an economist, one a bureaucrat. All had studied in France in the 1950s, where they had absorbed the doctrines of 'necessary violence' preached on the radical Left. They were Sartre's children. It is notable that, while this group of ideologues preached the virtues of rural life, none had in fact ever engaged in manual labour or had any experience at all of creating wealth. Like Lenin, they were pure intellectuals. They organized the great destructive force of the twentieth century: the religious fanatic reincarnated as professional politician. What they did illustrated the ultimate heartlessness of ideas. In any other age or place, the plans of these savage pedants would have remained in their fevered imagination. In Cambodia in 1975 it was possible to put them into practice..."⁶⁶

As Daniel Goldhagen writes, "The communist Khmer Rouge resembled the Germans in much of Europe by turning Cambodia into a gargantuan camp, though the Khmer Rouge exerted a thorough totalitarian penetration of social life that other regimes seeking total control could only dream of, and to which the Nazis never aspired or came close to achieving. (For non-Jewish, non-gay, non-Gypsy Germans, the Nazis allowed a surprising degree of freedom.) The Khmer Rouge, like the Nazis, designated a range of ideological enemies, considered, to various degrees, polluted racially and by foreign acculturation, and also differentially dangerous to the Khmer Rouge and the putatively pure Khmer (Cambodian) people. Even though the Khmer Rouge controlled all Cambodians equally, their eliminationist orientation, like that of the Germans, played itself out markedly differently with different groups.

"The Khmer Rouge wanted to utterly purify the Khmer people according to their antimodern, racist, Marxist ideological amalgam, calling for primitive socialist equality and conformity. This accounts for their hatred of urban life and their intention that only racially pure Khmer live within Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge sought to reduce or destroy the country's putative polluted essence by eliminating all people of non-Khmer races, religions, locales, and allegiance.

⁶⁶ Johnson, *Modern Times*, pp. 654-655.

Theirs was to be the most thoroughgoing and rapid eliminationist transformation yet.”⁶⁷

Margolin writes: “The lineage from Mao Zedong to Pol Pot is obvious. This is one of the paradoxes that make the Khmer Rouge revolution so difficult to analyse and understand. The Cambodian tyrant was incontestably mediocre and a pale copy of the imaginative and cultivated Beijing autocrat who with no outside help established a regime that continues to thrive in the world’s most populous country. Yet despite Pol Pot’s limitations, it is the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward that look like mere trial runs or preparatory sketches for what was perhaps the most radical social transformation of all: the attempt to implement total Communism in one fell swoop, without the long transitional period that seemed to be one of the tenets of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. Money was abolished in a week; total collectivization was achieved in less than two years; social distinctions were suppressed by the elimination of entire classes of property owners, intellectuals, and businessmen; and the ancient antagonism between urban and rural areas was solved by emptying the cities in a single week. It seemed that the only thing needed was sufficient willpower, and heaven would be found on Earth, Pol Pot believed that he would be enthroned higher than his glorious ancestors – Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao Zedong – and that the revolution of the twenty-first century would be conducted in Khmer, just as the revolution of the twentieth century had been in Russian and then Chinese...

“The Khmer kingdom, which had been a French protectorate since 1863, escaped the Indochinese war of 1946-54 more or less unharmed. At the moment when resistance groups linked to the Viet Minh began to form in 1953, Prince Sihanouk began a peaceful ‘crusade for independence’. Facilitated by excellent diplomatic relations between Sihanouk and Paris, this ‘crusade’ met with considerable success and undercut his adversaries on the left. But in the face of the ensuing confrontation between the Vietnamese Communists and the United States, the subtle balancing act by which he attempted to preserve Cambodian neutrality earned him only the mistrust of all parties and growing incomprehension inside the country.

“In March 1970 the prince was ousted by his own government and by the Assembly, with the blessing (but apparently not the active participation) of the US Central Intelligence Agency. The country was thrown into disarray, and terrible pogroms against the Vietnamese minority began. Of the roughly 450,000 Vietnamese in the country, two-thirds were forced to flee to South Vietnam. Communist Vietnamese embassy buildings were burned down, and an ultimatum was issued for all foreign troops to leave the country immediately. The ultimatum was of course ignored. Hanoi, which found itself with no ally except the Khmer Rouge inside the country, decided to back them to the hilt, applying arms and military advisers and providing access to training camps inside Vietnam. Vietnam eventually occupied the greater part of the country in the name

⁶⁷ Goldhagen, *Worse than War. Genocide, Eliminationism and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity*, London: Abacus, 2009, pp. 370-371.

of the Khmer Rouge, or rather in the name of Sihanouk, who was so furious at his earlier humiliation that he joined with the local Communists, until then his worst enemies. On the advice of Beijing and Hanoi, the Communists rolled out the red carpet for him but gave him no actual political power. Thus the internal conflict became one of royalist Communists versus the Khmer Republic, with the latter led by General (soon Marshal) Lon Nol. The forces of the Khmer Republic were considerably weaker than those of the North Vietnamese and seemed unable to capitalize on Sihanouk's unpopularity among intellectuals and the middle classes in the cities and towns. They were soon forced to ask for American aid in the form of bombing raids, arms, and military advisers; they also accepted a futile intervention from the South Vietnamese.

"After the catastrophic failure of operation Chenla-II in early 1972, when the best republican troops were decimated, the war became a long agony as the Khmer Rouge tightened the screws around the main urban areas, which eventually could be supplied only by air. But this rear-guard action was murderously destructive, and it destabilized the population, who, unlike the Vietnamese, had never experienced anything like it. American bombing raids were massive: more than 540,000 tons of explosives were dropped on the combat zones, mostly in the six months before the US Congress cut off funding for such raids in August 1973. The bombing slowed the progress of the Khmer Rouge, but it also ensured that there would never be a shortage of recruits in a countryside now filled with hatred for the Americans. It also further destabilized the republic by causing a tremendous influx of refugees into the cities, probably one-third of a total population of 8 million. This build-up of refugees facilitated the evacuation of urban areas after the Khmer Rouge's victory and enabled the Khmers to claim repeatedly in their propaganda: 'We have defeated the world's greatest superpower and will therefore triumph over all opposition - nature, the Vietnamese, and all others.'"⁶⁸

Phnom Penh fell on April 17, 1975, which was now entitled "Year Zero". Sebag Sebastian Montefiore writes: "Pol-Pot - now known as Brother Number One"⁶⁹ - then embarked on an insane and doomed attempt to turn Cambodia into an agrarian utopia. The cities were cleared of their inhabitants, who were forced to live in agricultural communes in the countryside. In terrible conditions, with food shortages and crippling hard labour, these communes soon became known as the Killing Fields, where several million innocent Cambodians were executed. Despite a massive shortfall in the harvest of 1977 and rising famine, the regime arrogantly rejected the offer of outside aid.

"The capital, Phnom Penh, once a vibrant city of 2 million people, became a shot town. Following Chairman Mao's dictum that the peasant was the true

⁶⁸ Margolin, "Cambodia", in Stéphane Courtois and others, *The Black Book of Communism*, London and Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. 577, 580-581.

⁶⁹ "Brother Number Two" was Nuon Chea, who ran state security, carrying out purge after purge. He surrendered after the death of Pol Pot in 1998, was sentenced by UN tribunals to life imprisonment for genocide and crimes against humanity in 2018, and died in 2019 (*This Week*, 24 August, 2019, p. 43). (V.M.)

proletarian, Pol Pot believed that the city was a corrupting entity, a haven for the bourgeoisie, capitalists and foreign influence. "City dwellers were marched at gunpoint to the countryside as part of the plans of the new regime to abolish cash payments and turn Cambodia into a self-sufficient communist society, where everyone worked the soil. The regime made a distinction between those with 'full rights' (who had originally lived off the land) and 'depositees' taken from the city, many of whom were massacred outright. Those depositees – capitalists, intellectuals and people who had regular contact with the outside world – who could not be 're-educated' in the ways of the revolution, were tortured and killed at a number of concentration camps, such as the S-21 prison camp (also known as Strychnine Hill), or taken straight to the Killing Fields, where their rations were so small that they could not survive. Thousands were forced to dig their own graves before Khmer Rouge soldiers beat their weary bodies with iron bars, axes and hammers until they died. The soldiers had been instructed not to waste bullets."⁷⁰

"The Khmer Rouge, having destroyed practically Cambodia's entire physical plant, and, shunning machinery, shutting down the urban economy and all but ruining the agricultural one, compelled Cambodia's people to work growing rice and so fulfil the ideological need to work for working's sake, even in the most irrational ways. Tens of thousands of Cambodians died digging irrigation channels with the most primitive instruments, including their bare hands, all to restore the Angkor Wat Empire's twelfth-century glories, which rested partly on agricultural canals."⁷¹

Martin Gilbert writes: "In the Tuol Sleng prison registry, in Phnom Penh, the notation 'smashed' appears against the names of 107 prisoners during the two days March 17 and 18 [1977]. Such numbers were an almost daily occurrence. The registry for July 1 records the execution of 114 women: their sole 'crime' was to have been the wives of prisoners who had been executed earlier. On the following day thirty-one sons and forty-three daughters of prisoners were executed. Four days after the killing of these children, the prison registry records a further 126 prisoners 'smashed'. By the end of the year, 6,330 prisoners had been 'smashed' in Tuol Sleng. A chilling indication of the scale of the killings is found in the words of the historian Ben Kiernan. 'I first visited Cambodia in early 1975,' he writes. 'None of the Cambodians I knew then survived the next four years.'"⁷²

"Marek Sliwinski, in a recent innovative study using demographic techniques (rendered less reliable by the lack of any census from the late 1960s to 1993), speaks of a little more than 2 million dead, or 26 per cent of the population, not including deaths from natural causes, which he estimates at 7 percent. Sliwinski's is the only study that tries to break down the 1975-1979 figures by age and gender. He concludes that 33.9 percent of men and 15.7 percent of women died. A difference of that size is strong evidence that most of the deaths were from

⁷⁰ Montefiore, *Titans of History*, London: Quercus, 2012, pp. 608-609.

⁷¹ Goldhagen, op. cit., p. 426.

⁷² Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 513-514.

assassinations. The death rate is horrendous for all ages, but especially high for young males (24 percent of men aged twenty to thirty, 40 percent of men aged thirty to forty, and 54 percent of people of both sexes over age sixty)... No other country in the world seems to have suffered so much since 1945..."⁷³

Jonathan Glover writes: "Private property, markets and money were all to be eliminated. The Khmer Rouge's ultimate concern was the purity of the society. As one document put it, 'if we use money it will fall into the hands of individuals... If the money falls into the hands of bad people or enemies, they will use it to destroy our cadres by bribing them... Then in one year, ten years, twenty years, our clean Kampuchea will become Vietnam.'

"Religion was to be eliminated. One early order from the Central Committee was for the destruction of Phnom Penh's Christian cathedral. The traditional marriage ceremony was abolished, as were all other Buddhist ceremonies, and temples were destroyed or profaned. The Khmer Rouge overturned statues of Buddha, often smashing them or urinating on them.

"The idea of the family was attacked. People who were allowed to stay in their villages had to share everything, down to pots and pans. Communal meals for hundreds of families together were compulsory. Many families were split up, with men and women being forced to sleep in segregated communal dormitories...

'The Khmer Rouge went further than the Chinese Revolution had done. Mao had not swept away all cities, nor had he tried to eliminate money, nor had he so thoroughly sealed off his country from foreign contact..."⁷⁴

The Cambodian revolution drew in neighbouring Vietnam and China, and exacerbated the Sino-Soviet split. For "when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978, China engaged itself in bloody and not very successful border clashes with its southern neighbour, which was in turn being heavily supported with Russian weapons. By this stage, Moscow was even looking more favourably toward the Taiwan regime, and Peking was urging the United States to increase its naval forces in the Indian Ocean and western Pacific, to counter Russian squadrons. A mere twenty years after China was criticizing the USSR for being too soft toward the West, it was pressing NATO to increase its defences and warning both Japan and the Common Market against strengthening economic ties with Russia!"⁷⁵

On December 3, 1975, the king of Laos was forced to abdicate in favour of the Laotian Communists. "The middle class had been destroyed or driven out to Thailand by the end of 1975, when a People's Democratic Republic was declared, in reality a cover for colonization by North Vietnamese. Minorities were

⁷³ Margolin, "Cambodia", pp. 589-590.

⁷⁴ Glover, *Humanity. A Moral History of the Twentieth Century*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1999, pp. 303, 305.

⁷⁵ Kennedy, op. cit., p. 516.

destroyed or expelled and in the north mass-settlement by North Vietnamese peasants took place in the years 1977-8."⁷⁶ Hundreds of thousands fled, many thousands were killed, and some 30,000 were forcibly "re-educated".⁷⁷

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Yet again Communism had been shown to be the most terrible killer, both physical and spiritual, in the history of the mankind. But yet again Western intellectuals proved themselves criminally blind to what was really happening, endorsing, as Paul Johnson says, "what might be called the Necessary Murder Syndrome – or approving its use by those whom they sympathize. Other intellectuals, confronted with the fact of violence practised by those they wish to defend, simply transfer the moral responsibility, by ingenious argument, to others whom they wish to attack.

"An outstanding practitioner of this technique is the linguistic philosopher Noam Chomsky... In 1957... Chomsky produced a masterly volume called *Syntactic Structures*. This was a highly original, and seemed at the same time a decisive contribution to the ancient but continuing debate on how we acquire knowledge and, in particular, how we acquire so much. As Bertrand Russell put it, 'How comes it that human beings, whose contacts with the world are brief and personal and limited, are nevertheless able to know as much as they do know?' There are two rival explanations. One is the theory that men are born with innate ideas. As Plato put it in his *Meno*: 'There are, in a man who does not know, true opinions concerning that which he does not know.' The most important contents of the mind are there from the beginning, though external stimulation or experience, acting on the senses, is required to bring this knowledge into consciousness. Descartes held that such intuitive knowledge is more dependable than any other, and that all men are born with a residuum of it, though only the most reflective realize its full potentiality. Most Continental European philosophers take this view to some degree.

"As against this there is the Anglo-Saxon tradition of empiricism, taught by Locke, Berkeley and Hume. It argues that, while physical characteristics can be inherited, the mind is at birth a *tabula rasa* and mental characteristics are all acquired through experience. These views, usually in a highly qualified form, are generally held in Britain, the United States and other countries which follow their culture.

"Chomsky's study of syntax, which is the principles governing the arrangement of words or sound to form sentences, led him to discover what he called 'linguistic universals'. The world's languages are much less diverse than they superficially appear because all share syntactic universals which determine the hierarchical structure of sentences. All the language he, and later his followers, studied conformed to this pattern. Chomsky's explanation was that

⁷⁶ Johnson, *Modern Times*, p. 657.

⁷⁷ Margolin, op. cit., pp. 575-576.

these unvarying rules of intuitive syntax are so deep in the human consciousness that they must be the result of genetic inheritance. Our ability to use language is an innate rather than an acquired ability. Chomsky's explanation of his linguistic data may not be correct. But so far it is the only plausible one produced, and it puts him firmly in the Cartesian or 'Continental' camp.

"It also aroused considerable intellectual excitement, not merely in academic circles, and made Chomsky something of a celebrity, as Russell became after his work on mathematical principles, or Sartre when he popularized existentialism. The temptation for such celebrities is to use the capital they have acquired from eminence in their own discipline to acquire a platform for their views on public issues. Both Russell and Sartre succumbed to this temptation..., and so did Chomsky. Throughout the 1960s, intellectuals in the West, but especially in the United States, became increasingly agitated by American policy in Vietnam, and by the growing level of violence with which it was executed. Now therein lies a paradox. How came it that, at a time when intellectuals were increasingly willing to accept the use of violence in the pursuit of racial equality, or colonial liberation, or even by millenarian terrorist groups, they found it so repugnant when practised by a Western democratic government to protect three small territories from occupation by a totalitarian regime? There is really no logical manner in which this paradox can be resolved. The explanations intellectuals offered, that they were objecting to 'institutionalized violence' on the one hand, and justifying individual, personal, counter-violence on the other (and many variations on the same) had to suffice. They certainly sufficed for Chomsky, who became and remained the leading intellectual critic of US Vietnam policy. From explaining how mankind acquired its capacity to use language, he turned to advising it on how to conduct its geopolitics.

"Now it is a characteristic of such intellectuals that they see no incongruity in moving from their own discipline, where they are acknowledged masters, to public affairs, where they might be supposed to have no more right to a hearing than anyone else. Indeed they always claim that their special knowledge gives them valuable insights. Russell undoubtedly believed that his philosophical skills made his advice to humanity on many issues worth heeding – a claim Chomsky endorsed in his 1971 Russell Lectures. Sartre argued that existentialism was directly relevant to the moral problems raised by the Cold War and our response to capitalism and socialism. Chomsky in turn concluded that his work on linguistic universals was itself primary evidence of the immorality of American policy in Vietnam. How so? Well, Chomsky argued, it depends on which theory of knowledge you accept. If the mind at birth is indeed a *tabula rasa*, and human beings are, as it were, pieces of plasticine which can be modelled into any shape we please, then they are fit subjects for what he calls 'the shaping of behaviour' by the state authority, the corporate manager, the technocrat or the Central Committee'. If on the other hand, men and women possess innate structures of mind and have intrinsic needs for cultural and social patterns which for them are 'natural', such state efforts must fail in the end, but in the process of failing they will hinder our development and involve terrible cruelty. The attempt of the United States to impose its will, and particular patterns of social, cultural and

political development, on the peoples of Indo-China was an atrocious instance of such cruelty.

“It required a peculiar perversity, with which anyone who studies the careers of intellectuals becomes depressingly familiar, to reach this conclusion. Chomsky’s argument from innate structures, if valid, might fairly be said to constitute a general case against social engineering of any kind. And indeed, for a variety of reasons, social engineering has been the salient delusion and the greatest crime of the modern age. In the twentieth century it has killed scores of millions of innocent people, in Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany, Communist China and elsewhere. It is the last thing [supposedly] which Western democracies, with all their faults, have ever espoused. On the contrary. Social engineering is the creation of millenarian intellectuals who believe they can refashion the universe in the light of their unaided reason. It is the birthright of the totalitarian tradition. It was pioneered by Rousseau, systematized by Marx and institutionalized by Lenin. Lenin’s successors have conducted, over more than seventy years, the longest experiment in social engineering in history, whose lack of success does indeed confirm Chomsky’s general case. Social engineering, or the Cultural Revolution as it was called, produced millions of corpses in Mao’s China, and with equal failure. Though applied by illiberal or totalitarian governments, all schemes of social engineering have been originally the work of intellectuals. Apartheid, for instance, was worked out in its detailed, modern form in the social psychology department of Stellenbosch University. Similar systems elsewhere in Africa – Ujaama in Tanzania, ‘Consciencism’ in Ghana, Negritude in Senegal, ‘Zambian Humanism’, etc. – were cooked up in the political science or sociology departments of local universities. American intervention in Indo-China, imprudent though it may have been, and foolishly conducted as it undoubtedly was, was originally intended precisely to save its peoples from social engineering.

“Chomsky ignored such arguments. He showed no interest in totalitarian attempts to suppress or change innate characteristics. He argued that the liberal democracy, the laissez-faire state, was just as objectionable as the totalitarian tyranny, since the capitalist system, of which it is necessarily an organic part, supplies the elements of coercion which produce the same denial of self-fulfilment. The Vietnam War was the outstanding case of capitalist-liberal oppression of a small people who were trying to respond to their own intuitive urges; of course it was bound to fail but unspeakable cruelty was meanwhile being inflicted.

“The arguments of intellectuals like Chomsky undoubtedly played a major part in reversing what was originally a strong determination on the part of the United States to ensure that a democratic society had the chance to develop in Indo-China. When the American forces withdrew, the social engineers promptly moved in, as those who supported American intervention had all along predicted they would. It was then that the unspeakable cruelty began in earnest. Indeed in Cambodia, as a direct result of American withdrawal, one of the greatest crimes, in a century of spectacular crimes, took place in 1975. A group of Marxist intellectuals, educated in Sartre’s Paris but now in charge of a formidable army,

conducted an experiment in social engineering ruthless even by the standards of Stalin or Mao.

“Chomsky’s reaction to this atrocity is instructive. It was complex and contorted. It involved the extrusion of much obfuscating ink. Indeed it bore a striking resemblance to the reactions of Marx, Engels and their followers to the exposure of Marx’s deliberate misquotation of Gladstone’s Budget Speech. It would take too long to examine in detail but the essence is quite simple. America was, by Chomsky’s definition, which by now had achieved the status of a metaphysical fact, the villain in Indo-China. Hence the Cambodian massacres could not be acknowledged to have taken place at all until ways had been found to show that the United States was, directly or indirectly, responsible for them.

“The response of Chomsky and his associates thus moved through four phases. (1) There were no massacres, they were a Western propaganda invention. (2) There may have been killings on a small scaled; but the ‘torment of Cambodia had been exploited by cynical Western humanitarians, desperately eager to overcome the ‘Vietnam Syndrome.’ (3) The killings were more extensive than at first thought, and were the brutalization of the peasants by American war crimes. (4) Chomsky was finally driven to quoting ‘one of the handful of authentic Cambodian scholars’ who, by skilful shifting of the chronology, was able to ‘prove’ that the worst massacres occurred not in 1975 but ‘in mid-1978’, and took place not for Marxist but for ‘traditionalist, racist, anti-Vietnamese reasons’. The regime had by then ‘lost any Marxist coloring it had once had’ and had become ‘a vehicle for hyper-chauvinist poor peasant populism’. As *such* it ‘at last’ won the approval of the CIA, who moved from exaggerating the massacres for propaganda purposes to actively perpetrating them. In short Pol Pot’ crime was in fact America’s *quod erat demonstrandum*.”⁷⁸

7. THE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS RIGHT

Christianity was declining everywhere in the West. But it was stronger in America than in Europe... In the American South, Evangelical Protestants numbered, depending on how we define the term, between 70 and 100 million believers; a 2008 study showed that in the year 2000 about nine percent of Americans attended an evangelical service on any given Sunday.⁷⁹ These were

⁷⁸ Johnson, *Intellectuals*, London: Harper Perennial, 1988, 2007, pp. 335-339.

⁷⁹ "Lift every voice", *The Economist*. May 5, 2012.

much higher than the corresponding figures for church attendance in both Western and Eastern Europe... Evangelicalism is also powerful in many other countries, especially Brazil and South Korea, where by the year 2000 about twenty percent of the population was evangelical. The most rapid expansion of Evangelical Protestantism has been in China, where it is persecuted... By any standards, this is an important religious movement which we would expect to have a significant impact on the religion, morality and politics of those states in which its numbers are large.

One aspect of Evangelical influence has been their support of "Christian Zionism". The links between American Protestant Zionism and the land of Israel go back a long way – to before the First World War – and played an important role in the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948. However, it was only after the Israeli victories over the Arab states in 1967 and 1973 that the relationship between America and Israel became virtually symbiotic. It is generally accepted that there was a close link between the steady rise of Evangelical Protestantism in the United States, the evangelicals' "Christian Zionist" understanding of the destiny of the Jews and the State of Israel, and American foreign policy in the Middle East.

From an Orthodox Christian point of view, the American Evangelical Protestants are most significant for their insistence on *creationism*, that is, their rejection of the theory of evolution and belief that in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. Their amassing of scientific evidence to demonstrate that the traditional naturalist and Darwinist account of origins cannot be true has been valuable. Unfortunately, some Orthodox Christians have reasoned, quite illogically, that since the Evangelicals agree with creationism, the latter must be false and Darwinism true!

As regards morality, the conservative reaction (both Catholic and Protestant) against what was perceived to be America's fall into immoral liberalism centred on two issues: abortion and the feminist revolution. More recently, transgender issues have also become important...

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This period could with some justice be called *the Age of Mass Murder*. The murders took place in three main spheres: the battlefields of the Cold War, the concentration camps of the Communist states and the abortion clinics of both the Communist and Capitalist states. As regards the killing fields of the Cold War, "between 1945 and 1983 around 19 or 20 million people were killed in around 100 major military conflicts".⁸⁰ And the great majority of these were civilian deaths. Daniel Goldhagen points out: "The ratio of military to civilian deaths and injuries during war was ten military casualties for every civilian casualty during World War I. Even in World War II, which became infamous for the Germans' slaughter of civilians, the ratio was one to one. Since 1945, in more than two hundred civil

⁸⁰ Ferguson, op. cit., p. 613.

wars – most wars have been fought *within* countries – the civilian to military casualty ration has nearly reversed. Civilian deaths and injuries now outstrip military ones, by more than nine to one...”⁸¹ As regards deaths in concentration camps, new gulags were appearing, such as those in China, North Korea and Cambodia, which killed even more people than in the Soviet gulag both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the population.

Thirdly, in both East and West abortion clinics killed tens of millions of human embryos. The only real barrier against abortion is religious faith, especially Christian faith, but this was declining rapidly in both East and West. The human rights philosophy, it might have been thought, would seek to protect the human rights of the unborn child. But this philosophy, being formulated from a consciously secular viewpoint, has very weak spiritual foundations, if any; and while it is no doubt better to believe in human rights than in nothing at all, it has proved a weak reed indeed against the hurricane of world evil.⁸² In fact, by giving women the supposed right to control their own bodies, and in refusing human embryos the status of human beings, the human rights movement has *supported* the abortion holocaust.

Critical in this process was *Roe v. Wade*, a Supreme Court ruling in 1973 that overturned the State of Texas’s anti-abortion laws. As David Reynolds writes, “By seven to two the justices – all male – upheld the appeal of Jane Roe and declared the Texas anti-abortion statute unconstitutional. This they did by reaffirming the constitutional ‘right to privacy’ they had already discerned and developed in judgements over the previous decade. But the court also went much further, setting out a framework for abortion by dividing pregnancies into three equal ‘trimesters’. In the first third of a pregnancy, a woman needed only the consent of her doctor but in the later two-thirds the state’s interests in the potential life allowed it to impose ever tighter regulation over abortion.

“The decision on *Roe v. Wade* proved doubly controversial – the Court was adjudicating on an issue of enormous moral and religious sensitivity, and it was doing so via very arguable legal reasoning...

“Two justices dissented from both the decision and the reasoning – Byron White and William Rehnquist. They were not against some kinds of abortion, particularly where the health of the mother or of the foetus was in doubt, but were opposed to what seemed to them abortion on demand. As White put it in a fierce dissent in a related abortion case, ‘At the heart of the controversy in these cases are those recurring pregnancies that pose no danger whatsoever to the life or

⁸¹ Goldhagen, *Worse than War. Genocide, Eliminationism and the Ongoing Onslaught on Humanity*, London: Abacus, 2012, p. 573. Cf. Barbara Ehrenreich: “in World War I, 15 percent of the fatalities were civilians, with that proportion rising to 65 percent in World War II. In the ‘low- intensity’ wars of the late twentieth century – the wars of Ivory Coast, Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, East Timor, and the former Yugoslavia – civilians constitute 90 percent of the dead.” (*Blood Rites*, London: Virago, 1998, p. 227)

⁸² Jonathan Glover, *Humanity. A Moral History of the Twentieth Century*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1999.

health of the mother but are, nevertheless, unwanted for any one or more of a variety of reasons – convenience, family planning, economics, dislike of children, the embarrassment of illegitimacy, etc.’ His colleagues, White said, had in effect stated that ‘during the period prior to the time the fetus becomes viable, the Constitution of the United States values the convenience, whim, or caprice of the putative mother more than the life or potential life of the fetus.’

“White was also sure that the Court had far exceeded its authority by offering such a broad reading of the Fourteenth Amendment of 1868, which had been intended to secure civil rights for former slaves: ‘I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support the Court’s judgement. The Court simply fashions and announces a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers and, with scarcely any reason or authority for its action, invests that right with sufficient substance to override most existing state abortion statutes. The upshot is that the people and the legislatures of the fifty States are constitutionally disentitled to weigh the relative importance of the continued existence and development of the fetus, on the one hand, against a spectrum of possible impacts on the mother, on the other hand.’ White condemned the judgement as ‘an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to this Court.’

“*Roe v. Wade* in 1973 cast a long shadow. The Supreme Court’s decision became a fault line in American society, around which the arguments for and against abortion would polarize – pro-choice versus pro-life. *Roe v. Wade* also became a litmus test in American politics, an identifying mark of whether one was liberal or conservative. Finally, the decision and the way it was written became a landmark in American constitutional law. The angry dissent from Byron White – about how the Court was exceeding its authority, stretching the Constitution, even acting as the maker of law rather than its interpreter – set out claims around which conservatives would rally as their backlash against the rights revolution gathered momentum. So although millions of Americans applauded *Roe v. Wade* for making abortion constitutional, for millions more it seemed like a constitutional abortion.”⁸³

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“The central engine of social change in the seventies,” writes Hugh Brogan, “was undoubtedly the women’s movement... The American workforce had never been wholly male, but after 1945 women poured into the labour market, until by 1980 more than half of all adult women had jobs. The number went on rising thereafter. Many of them were married, with small children. This development – a social revolution in itself – was caused partly by the changing needs of the US economy, which was creating more and more service employment, while the number of jobs in manufacturing was static or declining; partly by the wish of American families to maximize their income (and thus enable themselves to take advantage of the ever-expanding market in consumer goods) by bringing home

⁸³ Reynolds, *America. Empire of Liberty*, London: Penguin, 2010, pp. 485-486.

two wage-packets instead of just one; partly by the wish of American women themselves for horizons wider and challenges more stimulating than domesticity alone would provide. The result was an irreversible transformation of marriage, of the family, and of relations between the sexes both in private and working life. The political consequences were just as profound. After the founding of the National Organization of Women, a mass women's movement, dormant since the twenties, mobilized increasing numbers and greatly influenced the views of countless others. NOW and other organizations such as the National Women's Political Caucus concerned themselves specifically with promoting women's involvement in politics, but also pressed for action on a wide range of issues such as equality in education and employment, 'reproductive rights', child care, maternity leave, health care, and women's roles in the armed forces. The 1970s brought major successes, although they were mostly due to judicial decisions rather than legislation. In 1971 the Supreme Court for the first time found certain kinds of discrimination against women to be violations of federal law and even unconstitutional; in 1972 Congress passed the Equal Rights Amendment, which had first been proposed in 1923; and in 1973, in the *Roe v. Wade* decision, the Supreme Court found that restrictive state laws against abortion were unconstitutional. The women's movement seemed to be sweeping all before it.

"But it was hardly possible that, in a society which was still so conservative in many respects (although its dynamism made it also a perpetual fount of radical change), this spectacular transformation could be universally accepted. Too much change of too many kinds had already affronted too many Americans; things, they felt, had gone far enough... There was much bitterness against the so-called youth culture, and as it became clear that the newest teenage generation was not going to give up such pleasures as pre-marital sex and smoking marijuana, the religious Right prepared for another battle... Above all, a great many women and men were simply not prepared to accept the feminist revolution if they could help it..."⁸⁴

"The backlash against feminism," writes Reynolds, "took the form of a defence of family values. One traditionalist, Connie Marshner, depicted the campaign for women's rights as 'a drab, macho-feminism of hard-faced women' who were 'determined to secure their places in the world, no matter whose bodies they have to climb over'. Their position, she said, was utterly selfish: 'A relationship that proves burdensome? Drop it! A husband whose needs cannot be conveniently met? Forget him! Children who may wake up in the middle of the night? No way!' In reality, Marshner claimed, women were innately 'other-oriented... ordained by nature to spend themselves in meeting the needs of others. And women, far more than men, will transmit culture and values to the next generation.' As that last sentence suggests, the defence of traditionalism often had an undercurrent of feminine superiority – women as the glue holding family and therefore society together.

⁸⁴ Brogan, *The Penguin History of the USA*, London: Penguin, 2019, pp. 678-679.

“In the 1970s the campaign to save the American family centred on blocking the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, or ERA. The idea for such an amendment to the US Constitution, affirming that equal rights should not be denied or abridged on grounds of sex, had been around since the end of the First World War – to complete the campaign for women’s suffrage. But although the ERA was introduced in every session of Congress from 1923 it got nowhere until the 1970s; then the fresh wind of women’s liberation helped it sail through the House and the Senate in 1971-2. All the ERA needed to become part of the Constitution was ratification by three-quarters of the state legislatures, thirty-eight out of the total of fifty. Twenty-two states had approved the ERA by the end of 1972 and it appeared to be coasting, until Phyllis Schlafly came along.⁸⁵

“On one level, Schlafly seemed like the archetypal homemaker. The wife of a successful lawyer in Alton, Illinois, just across the river from St. Louis, she spent most of the fifties and sixties raising her six children. But she did so in unconventional ways, feeding them porridge for breakfast and sending them to school with healthy lunches of organic peanut butter sandwiches on wholewheat bread. Yet that did not make her a counter-culture mom, for Schlafly and her husband were committed Catholics and fervent anti-communists. She threw herself into various activities for conservative and Republican causes, including running for Congress, but always emphasized the role that could be played by grass-roots activists. One of her standard speeches was entitled ‘The Big Things Are Done By Little People’, starting with Christ choosing his disciples.

“Schlafly was the counter-example to Betty Friedan’s ‘concentration camp’ homemaker in *The Feminine Mystique* – a suburban mother who felt fulfilled and who engaged in community life yet was angered by national politics. She spoke for thousands of similar women who had been mobilized by Barry Goldwater’s presidential campaign in 1964 in grass-roots organizations like ‘Mothers for a Moral America’, insisting that ‘the time is past when women of the Republican Party are merely doorbell pushers’.

“So, although many feminists regarded Schlafly with near hatred as a cynical opportunist – ‘I’d like to burn you at the stake,’ Friedan exploded during a debate in 1973 – she tapped deep into American society. Her campaign against the ERA did not deny continued discrimination against women, especially in employment, but argued that this could be addressed through existing legislation. Passing the ERA, Schlafly claimed, would deprive women of their freedom to be women, and the laws that guaranteed this. Instead, the ERA would impose ‘a doctrinaire equality under which women must be treated the same as men’. Schlafly asserted it would ‘take away from girls their exemption from the draft and their legal protection against predatory males. It will take away from wives and mothers their right to be provided with a home and financial support from their husbands. It will take away from senior women their extra social security benefits. It will take away a woman’s present *freedom of choice* to take a

⁸⁵ Her story has been dramatized by the BBC2 film starring Cate Blanchett under the title “Mrs. America”. (V.M.)

job – or to be a full-time wife and mother. In short, it will take away the right to be a woman.’

“ERA supporters strenuously contested Schlafly’s interpretation of what the amendment would do to women’s right, but they were slow to organize against her campaign. Schlafly’s STOP ERA – where STOP cleverly stood for ‘Stop Taking Our Privileges’ – did indeed halt the momentum for ratification in the mid-1970s. *Time* magazine described Schlafly as ‘feminine but forceful... a very liberated woman’. When she campaigned against the ERA in Illinois in June 1978 she looked ‘crisp and composed in a red shirtwaist dress, red-white-and-blue scarf and frosted hair’. She and 500 supporters brought legislators trademark loaves of home-baked bread – gifts from the bread makers, she liked to say, for the breadwinners. But, noted *Time*, ‘as she climbed onto a kitchen stool to address the cheering crowd, Schlafly the demure house-wife turned into Schlafly the aggressive polemicist, warning that passage of the ERA would mean ‘Government-funded abortions, homosexual schoolteachers, women forced into military combat and men refusing to support their wives.’

“By 1978 thirty-five states had approved the ERA, but that was three short of the threshold for ratification. Although Congress extended the deadline for ratification to June 1982, no more states followed suit. In fact, five legislatures voted to rescind their original approval.”⁸⁶

Schlafly was a Catholic. But the right was galvanized more by Evangelical Protestants such as the Reverend Jerry Falwell.

“Falwell and thousands of other American evangelical Protestants were mobilized politically by what they saw as the godless drift of American life. It was a gathering storm, brewing since the early 1960s. Many liberals were surprised by its vehemence but that was because they had failed to appreciate that evangelical Protestantism had not been killed off by the modern secular society.

“Evangelicals slipped off the national radar after the Scopes trial of 1925, about the teaching of Darwinism in schools. Since that ill-fated campaign by William Jennings Bryan, Protestants who took a literalistic view of the Bible had kept out of the political limelight, but they remained a potent force in the American heartland. One sign of this was the growth of Bible colleges, which placed the teaching of Christian fundamentals ahead of all else – there were 144 of these by 1950, almost triple the figure twenty years before. Even more important were Christian radio ministers like Charles E. Fuller, whose nationwide *Old Testament Revival Hour* ran for more than thirty years from 1937.

“The pastor who really brought evangelicalism into the national mainstream was Billy Graham, from North Carolina, who developed a revivalist movement known as Youth for Christ. With slogans like ‘Geared to the Times but Anchored to the Rock’, Graham’s rallies used the razzmatazz of popular culture – music,

⁸⁶ Reynolds, op. cit., pp. 487-489.

celebrities, quizzes, even magicians – but all building up to preaching by Graham himself...

“Younger evangelicals saw the story of the 1960s and 1970s as a series of attempts to push God out of the American way of life. A major affront was the Supreme Court decisions in 1962 and 1963 to outlaw officially sponsored prayers, Bible reading and the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer in schools. The cases had been brought by the American Jewish Congress as a violation of the First Amendment upholding the separation of church and state, but evangelicals were appalled...

“By the late 1970s Falwell had become a nationally renowned figure, pushing the still-revered Billy Graham to the edge of the spotlight. His pastorate had mushroomed with a mega-church, a vast youth programme and a TV ministry whose title, the *Old Times Gospel Hour*, echoed Fullers’ pioneering radio broadcasts; his Bible college, up and running, was grandly named Liberty University. Like many evangelicals, Falwell was particularly concerned by the growing public profile of homosexuals – reflected in many sex-education courses in schools and in the test cases being put to the courts. October 1979 saw the first national gay rights rally in Washington, DC. In one mailing, Falwell told supporters that ‘gays were recently given permission to lay a wreath on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington Cemetery to honor any sexual deviants who served in the military. That’s right,’ he added incredulously, ‘the gays were allowed to turn our Tomb of the Unknown Soldier into: THE TOMB OF THE UNKNOWN SODOMITE.’

“So, by the later 1970s there was a slate of moral issues that offended significant sections of conservative Christian opinion in the American heartland. Washington-based groups like the Heritage Foundation and the Conservative Caucus saw an opportunity to mobilize the grass-roots Christians as a nationwide force...”⁸⁷

⁸⁷ Reynolds, op. cit., pp. 493, 494, 496-497.

8. THE ORTHODOX ZEALOTS CLOSE RANKS

By the 1970s only ROCOR, the Russian Catacomb Church and the Greek and Romanian Old Calendarists stood in the way of the complete triumph of Ecumenism. It was time for this last remnant of the True Church of Christ to renounce all hesitations, all false hopes, all temptations to compromise in the face of the completely unambiguous apostasy of the official churches of "World Orthodoxy". It was time to declare that Ecumenism was not simply uncanonical, but heresy, and not simply heresy, but "the heresy of heresies".

This definition came in a report that Archbishop Vitaly (Ustinov) of Canada gave to the Synod of ROCOR on the 1968 Uppsala Assembly of the WCC: "At the opening of the Assembly an ecumenical prayer was read in the name of all those assembles: 'O God our Father, You can create everything anew. We entrust ourselves to You, help us to live for others, for Your love extends over all people, and to search for the Truth, which we have not known...' How could the Orthodox listen to these last words? It would have been interesting to look at that moment at the faces of the Orthodox hierarchs who had declared for all to hear that they, too, did not know the Truth. Every *batiushka* of ours in the remotest little village knows the Truth by experience, as he stands before the throne of God and prays to God in spirit and in truth. Even *The Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*, which is completely subject to the censorship of the communist party, in citing the words of the prayer in its account of this conference, did not dare to translate the English 'truth' by the word '*istina*', but translated it as '*pravda*' ['righteousness']. Of course, everyone very well understood that in the given case the text of the prayer was speaking without the slightest ambiguity about the Truth. Perhaps the Orthodox hierarchs have resorted, in the conference, to the old Jesuit practice of *reservatio mentalis*, but in that case if all these delegates do not repent of the sin of communion in prayer with heretics, then we must consider them to be on the completely false path of apostasy from the Truth of Orthodoxy... Ecumenism is the heresy of heresies because until now each heresy in the history of the Church has striven to take the place of the true Church, but the ecumenical movement, in uniting all the heresies, invites all of them together to consider themselves the one true Church."⁸⁸

On December 16, 1969, the MP Synod resolved to allow Catholics and Old Ritualists to receive communion from Orthodox priests if they asked for it.⁸⁹ The MP's Archbishop Basil of Brussels recalled: "It fell to me to defend the good name and Orthodoxy of the Russian Church at the Pan-Orthodox conferences (those like the Pan-Orthodox commission for dialogue with the Anglicans) with the following argumentation: 'This resolution of the Synod was elicited by a completely special situation of believers, and in particular of Catholics in the

⁸⁸ Vitaly, "Ekumenizm" (Ecumenism), *Pravoslavnij Vestnik* (Orthodox Herald), June, 1969, pp. 14-30; *Moskva* (Moscow), 1991, No 9, p. 149.

⁸⁹ *Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii* (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), 1970, No 1, p. 5.

Soviet Union. Where there is not one Catholic church of priest for thousands of kilometres. Such a resolution was made by the Synod of Constantinople and Patriarch Joachim II in 1878 in relation to the Armenians. Theologically, it is difficult for me to justify such *oikonomia*, but I cannot judge the Russian hierarchs who live in contemporary Russia in difficult conditions. They know better than we what they are doing.' This argumentation satisfied everyone, even on Athos, but everything was destroyed by Metropolitan Nikodem giving communion [to Catholic students] in Rome. 'What 'pastoral *oikonomia*' forced him to commune Catholics where there are so many Catholic churches?' they asked me. The only reply that I could give was: 'Your hierarchs even worse when they give to communion to everyone indiscriminately.' 'Our hierarchs, like Archbishop James of America or Athenagoras of London, are traitors to Orthodoxy, we have known that for a long time (replied to me Abbot George of the monastery of Grigoriou on Athos). But that the Moscow Patriarchate, the Russian Orthodox Church, which we respect for her firmness in Orthodoxy, should act in this way in the person of Metropolitan Nicodemus, shocks us and deeply saddens us.' I recounted this reaction to Metropolitan Nicodemus. He even became angry: 'It's not important what they say on Athos. Athos is not an Autocephalous Church.'"90

Neither side in this argument seemed to understand that the giving of communion to a heretic *in any circumstances* is harmful for that heretic so long as he remains in his heresy. More Orthodox, therefore, was the robust response of the ROCOR Synod, which on March 31, 1970 condemned the MP resolution as follows: "The decision of the Moscow Patriarchate to give access to Roman Catholics to all the sacraments of the Orthodox Church... both violates the sacred canons and is contrary to the dogmatic teaching of Orthodoxy. By entering into communion with the heterodox, the Moscow Patriarchate alienates itself from unity with the Holy Fathers and Teachers of the Church. By this action it does not sanctify the heretics to whom it gives sacraments, but itself becomes a partaker of their heresy." Archbishop Averky (Taushev) of Jordanville commented: "Now, even if some entertained some sort of doubts about how we should regard the contemporary Moscow Patriarchate, and whether we can consider it Orthodox after its intimate union with the enemies of God, the persecutors of the Faith and Christ's Church, these doubts must now be completely dismissed: by the very fact that it has entered into liturgical communion with the Papists, it has *fallen away from Orthodoxy* and can no longer be considered Orthodox."91

This stronger attitude to the MP was paralleled by a reiteration of the Russian Church's originally very uncompromising attitude towards the revolution. Thus on January 1, 1970 the ROCOR Synod confirmed Patriarch Tikhon's 1918 anathema against the Bolsheviks, adding one of its own against "Vladimir Lenin and the other persecutors of the Church of Christ, dishonourable apostates who have raised their hands against the Anointed of God, killing clergymen,

⁹⁰ Monk Benjamin, *Letopis'*, part 5, p. 40.

⁹¹ Averky, *Contemporary Life in the Light of the Word of God: Sermons and Speeches (1969-1973)*, volume III, Jordanville, p. 216.

trampling on holy things, destroying the churches of God, tormenting our brothers and defiling our Fatherland.”⁹²

During this period of *rapprochement* between the MP and the Vatican, the KGB had managed to penetrate the Vatican. As I.I. Maslova writes, in August, 1970, “the KGB informed the Central Committee that ‘in the course of carrying out the given undertakings the agents of the organs of state security succeeded in making personal approaches to Pope Paul VI and his immediate entourage’. “Useful influence” was exerted, and specially prepared materials were “put forward” in which the thought was emphasized that hostile actions on the part of the Vatican and its centres (especially in the emigration) against the USSR would complicate the position of believers and clergy in the country and, in particular, hinder the establishment of closer relations between the ROC and the Catholic Church.”⁹³

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An important part of ROCOR was what is called the American Metropolia. Fr. John Shaw (now Bishop Jerome of Manhattan) explains its origins: “The Russian-American Metropolia had been part of ROCOR from 1920 till 1926, when it separated over the decision of the first All-Diaspora Sobor to call for the restoration of the Russian monarchy. It rejoined ROCOR in 1936 at the urging of the Serbian Church, but again separated at the Cleveland Sobor of 1946.

“In my opinion, a key underlying cause for the breach, was the different makeup of the Metropolia.

“ROCOR was formed by Russian refugees: people who left Russia against their will and hoped to go back. These people were mostly well-educated, and for about 50 years produced a great deal of religious literature in Russian and other languages.

“The majority of the Metropolia's members had come, not from Russia, but from Austria- Hungary, and were former Uniates or the children and grandchildren of Uniates. They thought of themselves as ‘Russians’, but today would have been classed as Ukrainians or Carpatho-Russians.

“Most of those who had come from the Russian Empire had come to America looking for a new life, for economic success. Relatively few of them were well-educated.

“The reconciliation of 1936 followed by a new break 10 years later marked a period in which Metropolitan Theophilus of the Metropolia tried to ‘unify’ the former ROCOR parishes with his ‘Little Russian’ flock, by reassigning priests. If the parish was pro-ROCOR, he assigned a committed Metropolia priest; the

⁹² http://catacomb.org.ua/modules.php?name=Pages&go=print_page&pid=1775.

⁹³ Maslova, “Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ i KGB (1960-1980-e gody)” (The Russian Orthodox Church and the KGB (1960s-1980s), in <http://elmager.livejournal.com/217784.html>.

ROCOR priests were reassigned to 'Little Russian' parishes that were not interested in ROCOR.

"When the second break came in 1946, only Holy Trinity Monastery in Jordanville, St. Alexander Nevsky parish in Lakewood NJ, and a few other parishes here and there remained in ROCOR."⁹⁴

The American Metropolia fell away from the Church by succumbing to a KGB plot... On the very same day that ROCOR condemned the MP for "partaking in heresy" through its relationship with the Vatican, Metropolitan Irenaeus of All America and Canada and Metropolitan Nikodem (Rotov) of Leningrad (KGB Agent "Sviatoslav") signed an Agreement giving autocephaly to the American Metropolia – a deal which was rejected by all the other Autocephalous Orthodox Churches. On April 2, a delegation of the Japanese Orthodox Church set off for Moscow, where on April 10 it received from Patriarch Alexis a *Tomos* of Autonomy. On the same day Archbishop Nicholas (Kasatkin) of Japan was canonised.⁹⁵ In this way, as part of the deal with the Metropolia, the Japanese Church, which formerly had been under the Metropolia, came under Moscow's jurisdiction. However, the MP's parishes in North America, which were supposed to come under the Metropolia – or the Orthodox Church of America, as it was now called – did not do so, and remain so to this day.

On June 24 Patriarch Athenagoras in a letter to Patriarch Alexis touched on two important questions: the authority competent to grant autocephaly, and the factors and conditions necessary for a correct proclamation of autocephaly. With regard to the first question he declared that "the granting of it is within the competence of the whole Church." But to a Local Church "is proper only the right to receive the first petitions for independence from those concerned and to express whether the bases suggested for it are worthy of justification". With regard to the second question, Patriarch Athenagoras expressed the opinion that in order to announce an ecclesiastical autocephaly that aims to satisfy purely ecclesiastical needs, the opinion of the clergy and laity, the judgement of the Mother Church and the expressed will of the whole Church is required. Considering that these conditions had not been fulfilled in the giving of autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in America, the patriarch called on the Russian Church to apply "efforts to annul the canonical confusion that has been created". Otherwise, he threatened to regard the action "as if it had never taken place".⁹⁶

Of course, the patriarch had a point. But since his own patriarchate, by creating a whole series of unlawful autocephalies since the 1920s, was the first sinner in this respect, it is not surprising that his voice was not heeded...

⁹⁴ Shaw, post on "orthodoxy-or-death" Yahoo discussion group, Saturday March 18, 2006.

⁹⁵ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 5, p. 43.

⁹⁶ K.E. Skurat; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 5, p. 44.

Hieromonk Seraphim Rose wrote of the union of the Metropolia with Moscow: "The American Metropolia doubtless fell into this trap out of naïveté, and already its hierarchs are demonstrating that its so-called 'independence' conceals a subtle form of psychological dependence." Newspaper articles showing that Metropolitan clergy and bishops had begun to apologize, not only for the Soviet domination of the church organization, but even for the Soviet system itself. One priest "admits some Soviet bishops are Soviet agents, that the whole autocephaly follows political trends set forth by the Soviet government; Bishop ____ is quoted as saying that he found the Soviet people to be happy and well dressed, and if some complain about the Government, well, so do Americans." Elsewhere Fr. Seraphim quoted the same bishop as saying, "As Americans we have to reassess our ideas of life in the Soviet Union." Such statements, Fr. Seraphim wrote, "reveal the 'autocephaly' as an important tool for Moscow in politically 'neutralizing' public opinion in the West."

Asserting that it was far worse to capitulate to a nihilist state in freedom than under compulsion, Fr. Seraphim wrote to a priest of the Metropolia: "You will find in our midst great sympathy and pity for all but the leading hierarchs of Moscow – and even for some of them you will find fellow-feeling owing to the inhuman circumstances under which they have been forced to betray Orthodoxy... But this fellow-feeling cannot allow us who are free to... place ourselves in the same trap she [the MP] was *forced* into! And this the Metropolia has done... With every fiber of our being and every feeling of our soul we are repulsed by this *free* act of betrayal... Do you not grasp the immensity of your spiritual bondage?"

"Is 'stepping out onto the world Orthodox scene' really so important to the Metropolia that it must do it at the expense of the suffering Russian Orthodox faithful? To give one small example: Metropolitan Nikodem is the Metropolia's great 'benefactor', and no one can doubt that his success with the Metropolia has strengthened his position with the Moscow Patriarchate. On the other hand, the layman Boris Talantov in the USSR has openly called Metropolitan Nikodem a betrayer of the Church, a liar, and an agent of world anti-Christianity, for which statements (among others) he was imprisoned by the Soviets; Metropolitan Nicodemus tells the West that he was in prison for 'anti-governmental activities'. On January 4 of this year Boris Talantov died in prison, undoubtedly the victim of Metropolitan Nikodem (among others). Can the Metropolia feel itself to be on the side of this confessor? I don't see how it can."⁹⁷

In March, 1969, the Great Council of the Metropolia made a last Orthodox statement on Ecumenism before succumbing to the heresy:-

"The basic goal of the ecumenical movement... is the unity of all Christians in one single body of grace. And here the Orthodox Church firmly confesses that such a genuine unity is founded, above all, on the unity of faith, on the unanimous acceptance by all of the Holy Scriptures and the Holy Traditions as they are

⁹⁷ Fr. Seraphim, in Hieromonk Damascene, *Not of this World*, pp. 400-401.

wholly and integrally preserved by the Church. Real love for brothers separated from us [*sic* – a misleading description of heretics, who are not our brothers in Christ] consists therefore not in silencing all that divides us, but in a courageous witness to the Truth, which alone can unite us all, and also in a common search for the ways to make that Truth evident to all. Only in this way did the Orthodox Church always understand her participation in the ecumenical movement...

“However, within the ecumenical movement there has always existed another understanding of unity. This other understanding seems to become more popular today. It recognizes virtually no importance at all in agreement in faith and doctrine, and is based on relativism, i.e., on the affirmation that the doctrinal or canonical teachings of the Church, being ‘relative’, are not obligatory for all. Unity is viewed as already existing, and nothing remains to be done except to express it and strengthen it through ecumenical manifestations or services. Such an approach is totally incompatible with the Orthodox concept of the ecumenical movement.

“The differences between these two approaches is best illustrated by the attitudes towards concelebration and intercommunion among divided Christians. According to the Orthodox doctrine, the prayers and the sacraments of the Church, especially the Divine Eucharist, are expressions of full unity – in faith, in life, in service of God and man – as given by God. This unity with other Christians we seek, but we have not reached it yet. Therefore in the Orthodox understanding, no form of concelebration, i.e., no joint participation in liturgical prayer or the sacraments, with those who do not belong to the Orthodox Church can be permitted, for it would imply a unity which in reality does not exist. It would imply deceiving ourselves, deceiving others, and creating the impression that the Orthodox Church acknowledges that which in fact she does not acknowledge.”⁹⁸

In 1974, at the Third All-Emigration Council, ROCOR issued the following statement: “The American Metropolia has received its autocephaly from the Patriarchate of Moscow, which has not possessed genuine canonical succession from His Holiness Patriarch Tikhon from the time when Metropolitan Sergius, who later called himself Patriarch, violated his oath with regard to Metropolitan Peter, the locum tenens of the patriarchal throne, and set out upon a path which was then condemned by the senior hierarchs of the Church of Russia. Submitting all the more to the commands of the atheistic, anti-Christian regime, the Patriarchate of Moscow has ceased to be that which expresses the voice of the Russian Orthodox Church. For this reason, as the Synod of Bishops has correctly declared, none of its acts, including the bestowal of autocephaly upon the American Metropolia, has legal force. Furthermore, apart from this, this act, which affects the rights of many Churches, has elicited definite protests on the

⁹⁸ *The Orthodox Church*, May, 1969; *Eastern Churches Review*, Autumn, 1969, pp. 425-26. “It is natural to surmise,” writes Andrew Psarev, “that this epistle, to a certain degree, appeared as a result of the private meetings held at the time between Metropolitans Philaret and Irinei, first hierarch of the North American Metropolia” (op. cit., p. 7)

part of a number of Orthodox Churches, who have even severed communion with the American Metropolia.

“Viewing this illicit act with sorrow, and acknowledging it to be null and void, the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, which has hitherto not abandoned hope for the restoration of ecclesiastical unity in America, sees in the declaration of American autocephaly a step which will lead the American Metropolia yet farther away from the ecclesiastical unity of the Church of Russia. Perceiving therein a great sin against the enslaved and suffering Church of Russia, the Council of Bishops DECIDES: henceforth, neither the clergy nor the laity [of the Russian Church Abroad] are to have communion in prayer or the divine services with the hierarchy or clergy of the American Metropolia.”

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In May-June, 1971 there was a council of the MP attended by 75 hierarchs, 85 clergy and 78 laymen, representatives of many other Orthodox Churches and the general secretary of the WCC. It confirmed all the previous decisions made by the MP since 1945. Only one candidate for the patriarchate (Patriarch Alexis had died in April) was put forward: the weak Metropolitan Pimen, who was elected unanimously in an open ballot (a secret ballot was not allowed by the all-powerful Metropolitan Nikodem).⁹⁹ The Council also confirmed the 1961 statute taking control of the parishes away from the clergy as well as Metropolitan Nikodem's report on the decision to give communion to Catholics, in which he said that the measure was justified “insofar as we have a common faith with them in relation to the sacraments”.¹⁰⁰

In his *Memoirs* Archbishop Basil of Brussels recalls asking the formerly Catacomb Archbishop Benjamin (Novitsky) of Irkutsk why he had not spoken against this measure. Benjamin replied: “You know, I did 12 years forced labour in Kolyma. I don't have the strength at my age to start that again. Forgive me!”¹⁰¹

The MP council also resolved: “to entrust to continue efforts to reunite with the Mother Church the so-called Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (the

⁹⁹ Former KGB Lieutenant-Colonel Constantine Preobrazhensky writes: “They say that the first Communist within the church was Patriarch Pimen. He was a Senior Officer of the Red Army, and joined the Communist Party at the front. There could not have been any officers who believed in God, nor officers who were not Communist Party members. More than that, they were all forced to fight religion. That means that the future patriarch of the MP renounced his faith” – if he ever had it. (“Putin's Espionage Church”, <http://portal-credo.ru/site/print.php?act=english&id=281>).

In the same article Preobrazhensky points out not only that all MP bishops were KGB agents, but also that they engaged in espionage. Thus in 1969 Metropolitan Irenaeus of Vienna and Austria recruited the American military intelligence officer George Trofimov, who served a sentence in the United States.

¹⁰⁰ *Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii* (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), 1971, No 7, p. 31, No 8, pp. 23- 24; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 5, pp. 47-49.

¹⁰¹ Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 5, p. 47.

Karlovtzy schism), the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church Abroad and other scattered children of hers... In view of the fact that the activity of supporters of the so-called Russian Orthodox Church Abroad... against the Mother Russian Orthodox Church and against the Holy Orthodox Church as a whole is harming Holy Orthodoxy, the higher ecclesiastical authority of the Moscow Patriarchate is entrusted with realizing in the nearest future the necessary canonical sanctions in relation to the apostate assembly..., the Karlovtsy schism and its unrepentant followers."¹⁰²

ROCOT's Hierarchical Council reacted to the MP council by passing two resolutions. The first, dated September 1/14, 1971, declared: "The free part of the Russian Church, which is beyond the frontiers of the USSR, is heart and soul with the confessors of the faith who... are called 'the True Orthodox Christians', and who often go by the name of 'the Catacomb Church'... The Council of Bishops recognizes its spiritual unity with them..."

The second, of the same date, is called "Resolution of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia Concerning the Election of Pimen (Izvekov) as Patriarch of Moscow": "All of the elections of Patriarchs in Moscow, beginning in 1943, are invalid on the basis of the 30th Canon of the Holy Apostles and the 3rd Canon of the 7th Ecumenical Council, according to which, 'if any bishop, having made use of secular rulers, should receive through them Episcopal authority in the Church, let him be defrocked and excommunicated along with all those in communion with him'. The significance that the Fathers of the 7th Council gave to such an offence is obvious from the very fact of a double punishment for it, that is, not only deposition but excommunication as well, something unusual for ecclesiastical law. The famous commentator on Canon Law, Bishop Nicodemus of Dalmatia, gives the following explanation of the 30th Canon of the Holy Apostles: 'If the Church condemned unlawful influence by the secular authorities in the ordination of bishops at a time when the rulers were Christians, then it follows that She should condemn such action all the more when the latter are pagans and place even heavier penalties on the guilty parties, who were not ashamed of asking for help from pagan rulers and the authorities subordinated to them, in order to gain the episcopate. This (30th) Canon has such cases in view'. If in defence of this position examples are given of the Patriarchs of Constantinople who were placed on the Throne at the caprice of the Turkish Sultans, one can reply that no anomaly can be regarded as a norm and that one breach of Canon Law cannot justify another.

"The election of Pimen (Izvekov) as Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia at the gathering calling itself an All-Russian Church Council in Moscow the 2nd of June of this year, on the authority of the 3rd Canon of the 7th Ecumenical Council and other reasons set forth in this decision, is to be regarded as unlawful and void, and all of his acts and directions as having no strength."¹⁰³

¹⁰² Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 5, p. 49.

¹⁰³ However, in 1974 ROCOT did confirm one measure adopted by the MP's 1971 Council: the removal of the curses on the old rites and those who observed them.¹⁰³ This did not by itself make

On September 28, 1971, ROCOR's Hierarchical Council decreed: "The lack of accord of the decree of the Moscow Patriarchate, concerning the granting of communion to Roman Catholics, with Orthodox dogmatic teaching and the Church canons is completely clear to any person even slightly informed in theology. It was justly condemned by a decree of the Synod of the Church of Greece. The holy canons do permit the communication of a great sinner who is under penance (epitimia) when he is about to die (I Ecumenical 13, Carthage 6, Gregory of Nyssa 2 and 5), but there is not a single canon which would extend this to include persons foreign to the Orthodox Church, as long as they have not renounced their false doctrines. No matter what explanation Metropolitan Nikodem and the other Moscow hierarchs might try to give of this act, it is completely clear that by this decision, even though with certain limitations, communion has been established between the Moscow Patriarchate and Roman Catholics. Furthermore, the latter have already made the decision to permit members of the Orthodox Church to receive communion from them. All this was particularly clearly demonstrated in the service held on December 14, 1970, in St. Peter's Basilica in Rome, when Metropolitan Nikodem gave communion to Catholic clerics. It is perfectly clear that this act could not be justified by any need. By this act the Moscow Patriarchate has betrayed Orthodoxy. If the 45th Canon of the Holy Apostles excommunicates from the Church an Orthodox bishop or cleric who has 'only prayed together with heretics', and the 10th Apostolic Canon forbids even prayer together with those who are excommunicated, what can we say about a bishop who dares to offer the Holy Mysteries to them? If catechumens must leave the church before the sanctification of the Gifts and are not permitted even at point of death to receive communion until they are united to the Church, how can one justify the communicating of persons who, being members of heretical communities, are much farther away from the Church than a catechumen, who is preparing to unite with her? The act of the Moscow Synod, which was confirmed by the recent Council of the Moscow Patriarchate in Moscow, extends the responsibility for this un-Orthodox decision to all participants of the Moscow Council and to their entire Church organization. The decision to admit Catholics to communion is an act that is not only anticanonical, but heretical as well, as inflicting harm on the Orthodox doctrine of the Church, since only true members of the Church are called to communicate of the Body and Blood of Christ in the Eucharist. The Moscow decree, logically considered, recognizes as her members those who, through their doctrinal errors, in both heart and mind are far from her."

The ROCOR Council then issued an important statement on the reception of heretics, considerably "tightening up" its practice: "The Holy Church has from antiquity believed that there can be only one true baptism, namely that which is accomplished in her bosom: 'One Lord, one Faith, one Baptism' (Ephesians 4.5). In the Symbol of Faith "one baptism" is also confessed, while the 46th canon of

the Old Ritualists Orthodox; but it removed the main obstacle to their rejoining the Orthodox Church, taking to its logical conclusion Tsar Paul's introduction of the *yedynoverie* in 1801, which allowed penitent Old Ritualists to retain their use of the Old Rites.

the Holy Apostles indicates: 'We order that a bishop or priest who has accepted (that is, recognized) the baptism or sacrifice of heretics should be deposed.'

"However, when the zeal of any heretics in their struggle against the Church weakened, and when there was a question of their mass conversion to Orthodoxy, the Church, to ease their union, accepted them into her bosom by another rite. [There follows a discussion of St. Basil's first canonical epistle.]

"And so St. Basil the Great, and through his words the Ecumenical Council, in establishing the principle that outside the Holy Orthodox Church there is no true baptism, allowed out of pastoral condescension, so-called *oikonomia*, the acceptance of certain heretics and schismatics without a new baptism. And in accordance with this principle, the Ecumenical Councils allowed the reception of heretics by various rites, taking account of the weakening of their fierceness against the Orthodox Church....

"In relation to the Roman Catholics and Protestants who claim to preserve baptism as a sacrament (for example, the Lutherans), the practice was introduced from the time of Peter the First of receiving them without baptism, through the renunciation of heresy and chrismation of Protestants and unconfirmed Catholics. Before Peter Catholics were baptised in Russia. In Greece the practice also changed, but for almost three hundred years, after a certain break, the practice of baptising those who came from Catholicism and Protestantism was again introduced. Those who are received by another rite are not recognized as Orthodox in Greece. In many cases also such children of our Russian Church were not even allowed to receive Holy Communion.

"Bearing in mind this circumstance, and the present growth of the ecumenical heresy, which tries completely to wipe out the difference between Orthodoxy and every heresy, so that the Moscow Patriarchate, in spite of the sacred canons, has issued a resolution allowing Roman Catholics to be communed in certain cases, the Hierarchical Council has recognized the introduction of a stricter practice to be necessary, that is, that all heretics coming to the Church should be baptized, and that only insofar as it is necessary and with the permission of the bishop, from considerations of *oikonomia*, should another practice be allowed in relation to certain people, that is, the reception into the Church of Roman Catholics and Protestants who have been baptised in the name of the Holy Trinity through renunciation of heresy and chrismation."¹⁰⁴

This decision brought the practice of ROCOR back into line with that of the Russian Church in the early seventeenth century, and of the Greek Church since 1756. "It should be noted," writes Psarev, "that, within the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, it was Bishop James of Manhattan, who led the American Orthodox Mission for a period of time, who first began the reception of Catholics

¹⁰⁴ *Tserkovnaia Zhizn'* (Church Life), July-December, 1971, pp. 52-54; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., part 5, pp. 52-53.

by baptism, regarding which he informed the Council of Bishops in 1953.”¹⁰⁵ Now the Russian bishops followed the lead taken by their “convert” colleague...

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Now the lifting of the anathemas in 1965 had caused the majority of monasteries, sketes and dependencies of Mount Athos – always in the forefront of the struggle for the faith against ecumenism – to cease commemorating the patriarch. On November 13, 1971 a special session of the Holy Assembly, the governing body of Mount Athos, resolved that “on the issue of resuming the commemoration of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, each Holy Monastery, as a self-governing entity, is to remain free to choose a course of action in accordance with its conscience.”¹⁰⁶ However, although Esphigmenou, along with other monasteries, remained faithful to this resolution, the abbots of St. Paul’s and Xenophontou monastery were removed and replaced by hand-picked appointees.

In 1972 Esphigmenou raised the flag “Orthodoxy or Death” over the monastery in protest against the joint prayer service held by Athenagoras and the Pope, and broke communion with the other monasteries. However, in July Athenagoras died, and hopes were raised that his successor, Demetrius, would abandon his predecessor’s uniatism and return to Orthodoxy. But these hopes were dashed when, at his enthronement speech on July 5/18, the new patriarch affirmed his commitment to Ecumenism and the WCC, and spoke about “the pressing need to initiate dialogues first of all with Islam, and then with the other great monotheistic religions.”¹⁰⁷

In 1972 Demetrius addressed the Muslims on the feast of Bairam: “The great God whose children we all are, all of us who believe in and worship him, wishes us to be saved and to be brothers. He wishes this to be so even though we belong to different religions. In these religions, however, we have learned both to recognize the holy God as the beginning and end of all, to love each other and to think only good things – which things let us practise towards each other.”¹⁰⁸

This did not prevent the Sacred Community of the Holy Mountain from issuing an encyclical to the monasteries on July 8/21, instructing them to resume the commemoration of the Ecumenical Patriarch. “A new climate has been established between the Holy Mountain and the Ecumenical Patriarchate,” the encyclical stated. “With the death of Patriarch Athenagoras, the reasons which led certain holy monasteries to break off the commemoration of their bishop’s name now exist no longer.”

¹⁰⁵ Psarev, op. cit., pp. 7

¹⁰⁶ “A Rejoinder to a Challenge of the Legitimacy of the Orthodox Monastic Brotherhood of the Holy Monastery of Esphigmenou”, orthodox-synod@yahoogroups.com, January 29, 2003.

¹⁰⁷ *Episkepsis*, No 59, July 25, 1972, p. 6; *Eastern Churches Review*, vol. IV, No 2, Autumn, 1972, p. 175.

¹⁰⁸ The Zealot Monks of Mount Athos, *Phoni ex Agiou Orous* (Voice from the Holy Mountain), 1988, p. 73; *Ekklesiastiki Alitheia* (Ecclesiastical Truth), No 70, 1972.

Nevertheless, even after this statement and the visit to the Holy Mountain of an exarchate from the Ecumenical Patriarchate in September, seven monasteries still refused to commemorate the patriarch. And one of them, Esphigmenou, began to commemorate the Old Calendarist Archbishop Auxentius instead.¹⁰⁹

In September, 1973, another exarchate arrived on the Holy Mountain. It condemned Esphigmenou's rebellion.

Then, "on 11 March 1974 the Ecumenical Patriarch wrote to the Holy Community, announcing his decision. Penalties were imposed on thirteen monks. These included Archimandrite Athanasius, Abbot of Esphigmenou, the two *epitropoi* and the secretary of the monastery, who were to be expelled immediately from the Mountain... Archimandrite Eudocimus, Abbot of Xenophontos, was to be deposed and expelled from his monastery, but permitted to live in some other Athonite House. The abbots of the two other communities – Archimandrites Dionysius of Grigoriou and Andrew of St. Paul's – were to be deposed unless within two months they resumed the commemoration of the Patriarch's name...

"On the arrival of the Patriarch's letter, the police cut the telephone line to Esphigmenou and installed a guard outside the monastery. Meanwhile the monks kept the gates closed and hung from the walls a large black banner inscribed 'Orthodoxy or Death'. They warned the civil governor that they would resist any attempt to effect a forcible entry. In a declaration smuggled to the outside world, they stated that they continued to regard themselves as canonically subject to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, but did not recognize the present occupant of the Patriarchal throne, since 'he is an enemy of Orthodoxy'."¹¹⁰

At a critical moment in the struggle, the monks of Esphigmenou, on entering the sanctuary were met with a great fragrant cloud. On examination, they found that the cloud was coming from the relics of St. Agathangelus, a martyr-monk of the monastery; and they took this to mean that the saint was approving of their struggle against the greatest heresy of the age.

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ROCOR'S decision on baptism was also undoubtedly influenced by the fact that at the same time ROCOR had achieved union with the second Greek Old Calendarist Synod, that of the Matthewites. For the practice of both Greek Old Calendarists, both Florinites and Matthewites, was stricter in relation to the reception of heretics than ROCOR's. However, most ROCOR hierarchs paid scant attention to this decision...

¹⁰⁹ *Eastern Churches Review*, vol. IV, No 1, Spring, 1973, pp. 72-73.

¹¹⁰ *Eastern Churches Review*, vol. IV, No 1, Spring, 1974, pp. 109-110

On December 18/31, 1969, the ROCOR Synod officially recognized the Florinite hierarchy led by Archbishop Auxentius,¹¹¹ and wrote to him: "The many trials which the Orthodox Church has endured from the beginning of its history are especially great in our evil times, and consequently, this especially requires unity among those who are truly devoted to the Faith of the Fathers. With these sentiments we wish to inform you that the Synod of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad recognizes the validity of the episcopal ordinations of your predecessor of blessed memory, the reposed Archbishop Acacius, and the consequent ordinations of your Holy Church. Hence, taking into account also various other circumstances, our hierarchical Synod esteems your hierarchy as brothers in Christ in full communion with us."¹¹²

This his act by the ROCOR Synod dispelled any lingering doubts in the rest of the True Orthodox about their canonicity. Except among the Matthewites. So on September 1/14, 1971, the Matthewites sent an exarchate, consisting of Metropolitans Callistus of Corinth and Epiphanius of Kition (Cyprus) and the Chancellor, Protopriest Eugene Tombros, to the Synod of ROCOR in New York.¹¹³ They went, as the Matthewites wrote to the Russians some years later, "in order to come into contact with your Synod and regularize spiritual communion with you for the strengthening of the Holy Struggle of Orthodoxy".¹¹⁴ Or, as Metropolitan Epiphanius wrote to Metropolitan Philaret, "I went to carry out with you a common duty 48 years late. I went with the conviction that, through human weakness, we carried out in 1971 what we should have done in 1924... I believed that in entering into sacramental communion with you I became with you the same Body and Blood of Jesus Christ."¹¹⁵

But the Matthewites, according to their own account, did not immediately seek communion in prayer with the Russians. First they asked what the Russians' attitude to the new calendarists was. The Russians replied that the introduction of the new calendar was a mistake, and promised, in the person of Archbishop Philotheus of Hamburg, that they would not henceforth concelebrate with the new calendarists. However, they did not say whether they regarded the new calendarists as having valid sacraments.

¹¹¹ ROCOR restored the hierarchy of the Greek Old Calendarists. In 1960 Archbishop Seraphim (Ivanov) of Chicago consecrated Acacius (the elder) to the episcopate. And in May, 1962, Archbishop Leonty (Filippovich) of Chile (+1971) visited Athens and said: "I'm not coming here for the sole purpose to ordain three or four bishops. My purpose is wider. Orthodoxy is at risk. That is why I desire to create a resistance place here in Greece, which will soon be extended to the Patriarchates of the East that are being ravaged by the Masons." In 1964, after the death of Archbishop Acacius (the elder), Bishops Gerontius and Acacius (the younger) elected Auxentius as archbishop – but without the agreement of Bishop Chrysostom (Naslimes), whose fears about the fitness of Auxentius were soon to prove tragically justified... Bishop Acacius the Younger also came bitterly to regret his putting forward the name of the relatively unknown Auxentius (Bishop Photius of Marathon, personal communication, July 11/24, 2005).

¹¹² Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Boston, *The Struggle against Ecumenism*, 1998, pp. 82-83.

¹¹³ Metropolitans Callistus and Epiphanius had already visited the ROCOR in America in 1969, as guests of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Boston.

¹¹⁴ Letter of February 20, 1976 from the Matthewite Synod to the Russian Synod, *Kyrion Gnision Orthodoxon* (Herald of the True Orthodox Christians), February, 1976, pp. 5-12.

¹¹⁵ Letter of Pascha, 1979 from Metropolitan Epiphanius to Metropolitan Philaret (in French).

Apparently satisfied with this reply, the Matthewites asked for the Russians to pass judgement on their own canonical situation. More precisely, the exarchate in their letter of September, 1971 wrote that their Synod had entrusted them "to enter into negotiations with your Holy Synod with regard to the sacred struggle for Orthodoxy. As regards the question of our ordinations (the ordination of a bishop by one bishop) we communicate the following to your Holy Synod."

There then followed a short justification of Bishop Matthew's ordinations, concluding that "there could not remain any doubt" about their canonicity. "In view of this," they concluded, "we present the present petition for the review of your Holy Synod, and we are ready to accept any decision it makes on the basis of the holy canons".

But if there could be no doubt about Matthew's ordinations, what, precisely were the Matthewites asking the Russians to do? Simply to agree with them, and then enter into communion with them without more ado? But in that case their readiness "to accept any decision [they made] on the basis of the holy canons" was somewhat disingenuous, since they had already made it clear that, in their opinion, the only canonical decision was to accept their point of view...

Having examined the Matthewite case, on September 15/28, the Russians presented, in writing, a dogmatic-canonical examination of the case of ordinations by one bishop only. They noted that while single-handed ordinations of bishops were strictly speaking uncanonical, they might be justified by special circumstances (the existence of persecution, and the lack of another bishop in the vicinity). And so three single-handed ordinations carried out by Bishop Gabriel of Zarna in 1825 were recognized as justified by the Constantinopolitan Synod of 1834, whereas his ordination of Procopius was not recognized as justified and was deemed to be invalid. Both Gabriel and Procopius were forgiven and restored to their Episcopal rank. In other words, it rested with the decision of a later Synod to recognize the original ordinations as valid or invalid..."

There followed a lengthy canonical discussion, after which the Russians concluded: "It is evident from the cited examples that there is sufficient basis to apply *oikonomia* in relation to them, in accordance with the Eighth Canon of the First Ecumenical Council and the 79th of the Council of Carthage.

"Taking into account all that has been said above, and also the desire to attain the union of all those who are devoted to True Orthodoxy that was expressed by Archbishop Auxentius, the Hierarchical Council adopted the following decision:

"1. To recognize the possibility of fulfilling the petition of Metropolitans Callistus and Epiphanius. To that end, two bishops must perform the laying-on of hands over them. They, in turn, must subsequently perform the same over their brethren, and all bishops [must perform the same rite] over the priests.

“2. To oblige Metropolitans Callistus and Epiphanius, as well as their brethren, to take all possible steps to unite their hierarchy, clergy, and people with those who are headed by his Beatitude, Archbishop Auxentius.

“3. To inform his Beatitude, Archbishop Auxentius, concerning the aforesaid [decision].

“4. To delegate the Most Reverend Archbishop Philotheus and Bishop Constantine to fulfil the provision of paragraph one of this Resolution at Transfiguration Monastery in Boston.”¹¹⁶

It must be recognized that with regard to the vital question whether Matthew’s original ordinations were valid or not this Definition was ambiguous – probably deliberately so. On the one hand, it cited canons, such as the 8th of the First Ecumenical Council and the 79th of the Council of Carthage that related originally to schismatics. On the other hand, it deliberately rejected comparison with these schismatics, saying: “it is evident that the Old Calendarists led by the hierarchy of Matthewite ordination *cannot* be compared with such schismatics as the Donatists and Novationists”. So were the Matthewites schismatics or not, in the Russians’ opinion? We cannot say for certain...

The laying on of hands, together with the reading of several prayers from the service for the consecration of bishops¹¹⁷, duly took place, on September 17/30 and September 18 / October 1.

On the same day (October 1) Metropolitan Philaret wrote to Archbishop Auxentius: “They [Metropolitans Callistus and Epiphanius] laid before us the question of their hierarchy, and declared that they relied completely on the decision of our Council, which they were obliged to accept whatever it might be.

“We rejoiced at the humility and firm Orthodox faith with which they came to us. Therefore we treated them with brotherly love and the hope that their good feelings would serve the affair of a general union. We based our decision also on the fact that the indicated hierarchs agreed to do all they could to unite with your Church. That is, what seemed to you and us unrealizable, with the help of the grace of God turned out to be possible. We hope that your Beatitude, being led by the Holy Spirit, will treat them with brotherly love and that through your and our joint efforts all will be united by you...”

For a very short period the two Greek Synods called each other “brothers in Christ”, and in the opinion of the present writer this is what they in fact were (and are). For it makes no ecclesiological sense to claim that two Churches which derive their orders or correction of their orders from the same source, are in communion with each through that source, and have the same confession of faith, can be of a different status ecclesologically.

¹¹⁶ *Vozdvizhenie* (Exaltation), 1999, No 8 (28), pp. 10-15; *The Struggle against Ecumenism*, pp. 95, 97.

¹¹⁷ This is according to Anastasios Hudson, *Metropolitan Petros of Astoria, USA*, 2014, p. 22.

That there was no difference in faith between the two Synods was confirmed on June 5, 1974, when, in an encyclical to its clergy, the Auxentiite Synod reaffirmed that the new calendarists were schismatics with no grace of sacraments and should be received into the True Church by chrismation: "The ministration of the Holy Gifts to the new calendarists has been forbidden since the beginning of the schism of the official Church; and you must observe this line of conduct unswervingly in a spirit of discipline towards our ecclesiastical traditions. If someone joins our ranks from the new calendar, an indispensable condition of his acceptance is the confession of faith and the condemnation of every heresy and innovation, including the new calendar, by the acceptance of which the Greek Church became schismatic from 1924, as the reformer Archbishop Chrysostom Papadopoulos himself averred, and in consequence of which its sacraments are deprived of sanctifying grace. If people who have been baptised in that Church convert to the Faith, they must again be chrismated with holy chrism of canonical origin, in accordance with the First Canon of St. Basil the Great."¹¹⁸

This confession of the faith removed the main obstacle to union with the Matthewites – the suspicion that the Auxentiites recognised the new calendarists. However, it had no effect on the Matthewites, who went even further to the right by rejecting the 1971 *kheirothesia*, declaring: "1. We accepted spiritual communion with the Russian Synod after an oral declaration-assurance with regard to agreement and unity in the faith, i.e. the confession-ecclesiology of the True Orthodox Church. 2. We accepted the *kheirothesia* as an external act – and wholly formal, in order to efface the pretext of anticanonicity which the followers of the former [Bishop] of Florina, i.e. the Acacians, had put forward in opposition to unity, and not as something that affected the Hierarchy, which was dogmatically complete and perfect. 3. We accept that there were canonical breaches (irregularities), but what moved us was the fact that the Russians, in accordance with the declarations of the Exarchate, had confessed the True Confession. However, when the opposite started to reveal itself, after desperate attempts which lasted for approximately four years, we were compelled to break off spiritual communion, being indifferent to the issue of the *kheirothesia*, because neither had anything been added to us, nor subtracted from us. ... 4. Yes, as has been revealed, the act of 1971 was a robber act, which had been previously constructed by the enemies of the Church."¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ Full text in *The Struggle against Ecumenism*, pp. 99-100. A footnote to the encyclical declared: "The present encyclical was ready to be issued on April 4, 1973. It has been postponed until now awaiting his Eminence, Bishop Peter of Astoria, who, though invited repeatedly to endorse the encyclical, refused to do so. On this account, in its meeting of June 5, 1974, the Holy Synod struck him from its membership and removed him from the exarchate of the True Orthodox Christians of America." (p. 100). According to Lardas (op. cit., p. 21), Bishop Peter refused to sign the encyclical "on advice from the Synod of the ROCA"

¹¹⁹ *Kirix Gnision Orthodoxon* (Herald of the True Orthodox Christians), March, 1984, pp. 102-103, Epistle No 1897 of March 1; *The Struggle against Ecumenism*, pp. 87-100.

Much later, on November 28, 2007 the Matthewite Synod under Archbishop Nicholas declared: "The so called *laying-on-of-hands* which was performed by the ROCOR in 1971, according to the faith of the Genuine Orthodox Church of Greece and according to its ecclesiastical totality, neither added to, nor gave legitimacy, wholeness, grace or power to the high-priesthood of the Bishops of the Church of the GOC of Greece - and in a strict *canonical review* should never have been permitted to have taken place."

9. SOLZHENITSYN ON COMMUNISM AND CAPITALISM

The *Realpolitik* of pragmatic American leaders like Kissinger was in sharp contrast to the idealism, even heroism, of dissidents in the Soviet Union who believed passionately in a principled struggle against Communism, and saw that the important changes that had been taking place in the Soviet Union in recent decades promised the ultimate fall of the system. Under Khrushchev socialism was still seen as something to be attained in the future. Under Brezhnev, however, it was seen as something “already realized”, “mature socialism”. Therefore the emphasis was no longer offensive, but defensive; and it was implied that the Soviet Union was perfect and did not need improving – or criticising. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was therefore essentially a defensive measure (even if it felt offensive to the Czechs): the aim was not to acquire new territory, but to preserve what had already been attained – and prevent the virus of new ideas and dissent spreading to the Soviet homeland.

However, in this aim the Soviets failed. The invasion of Czechoslovakia may have crushed the Czechs temporarily, but in the Soviet Union it gave new lease of life to the dissident movement. Thus already on August 25, 1968 a small demonstration by Pavel Litvinov and Larisa Daniel against the invasion took place on Red Square. In their trial, to which no Western correspondents were allowed, they were each sentenced to several years of exile. In the same year Anatoly Kuznetsov fled to the West, declaring: “It is impossible to be at the same time a Soviet citizen and a decent person.”

Other important dissidents were the nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov and the writer Andrei Amalrik. Charles King writes: “In the summer of 1968, just weeks before Soviet tanks rolled into Prague, *The New York Times* set aside three pages for an essay by Sakharov on ‘progress, peaceful coexistence, and intellectual freedom.’ In the era of nuclear weapons, Sakharov said, the West and the Soviet Union had no choice but to cooperate to ensure the survival of humankind. The two systems were already witnessing a ‘convergence,’ as he put it. They would have to learn to live together, levelling out national distinctions and taking steps toward planet-wide governance.

“To all of this, Amalrik showed up with a bucket of cold water. In the fall of 1970, he managed to smuggle his own short manuscript out of the Soviet Union. It soon appeared in the London-based journal *Survey*. Global capitalism and Soviet-style communism were not converging, Amalrik argued, but were in fact growing further apart. Even the communist world itself was in danger of splitting up. The Soviet Union and China were increasingly mistrustful of each other and seemed on a clear course toward a cataclysmic war. (A year earlier, in 1969, the two countries had skirmished along their common border, with significant casualties.) But the real problem with Sakharov, Amalrik wrote, was that he failed to recognize that the Soviet state and the Soviet system – both the country and communism as a political and economic order – were headed for

self-destruction. To make his point, he titled his essay 'Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?'"¹²⁰

Dissidence took several forms: movements for freedom from literary and artistic censorship (Solzhenitsyn, Rostropovich, Sinyavsky and Daniel), for national liberation (Jews, Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars), for religious freedom (Catholics in Lithuania, Baptists in the Volga region and Siberia, Orthodox in the major Russian cities). While all these various movements were tinged with dissatisfaction with the Soviet order and all appealed to the concept of human rights, they did not at any time coalesce into a movement to overthrow the Soviet order, that is, into counter-revolution. But this did not stop the Soviet authorities from treating them as rebels and counter-revolutionaries.

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In 1973 Sakharov hailed Allende's overthrow in Chile, and called for democratization in the Soviet Union. He was then put forward for the Nobel Peace Prize in the West German press – to the fury of the Soviets. In 1975 Elena Bonner, Sakharov's wife, received the Nobel Prize on behalf of her husband in Oslo (he had been refused a visa to travel abroad).

The other famous Soviet dissident, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, was exiled to the West in 1974, settling in America. As a proven campaigner for human rights in the Soviet Union, he was expected to confirm the West's image of itself as the upholder and defender of human rights and democratic freedoms. And so he was given a hero's welcome.

However, admiration quickly turned to disillusion when he proceeded, not only to attack the Soviet Union for its lack of freedom, but also to criticize the West for its feeble resistance to Communism and abuse of its freedom. Very soon he was being labelled, even by some of his compatriots, as a Great Russian chauvinist¹²¹, although the charge was demonstrably false ¹²²; and by the 1980s his voice was hardly heard any more. Nevertheless, his ideas were valuable, timely and powerfully expressed...

The first point that needs to be made is that, for all his criticisms of the West, Solzhenitsyn draws no sign of equality between the capitalist West and the communist East. The West is distinctly superior, in his view, because (a) it is free as opposed to the East's tyranny, and (b) it has a framework of law as opposed to the East's essential lawlessness. Censorship is condemned by Solzhenitsyn; he values the traditional freedoms guaranteed by a stable and enforced code of laws no less than any western liberal. Moreover, he is grateful to the West for the support it offered him and other dissidents. And if he criticizes the West, it is the criticism of a friend

¹²⁰ King, "How a Great Power Falls Apart", *Foreign Affairs*, June 30, 2019.

¹²¹ Andrei Sinyavsky, "Solzhenitsyn kak ustroitel' novogo edinomyslia" ("Solzhenitsyn as a Constructor of the New Unanimity"), *Sintaksis*, 1985, pp. 16-32.

¹²² Dora Shturman, *Gorodu i Miru* (To the City and the World), New York: Tretia Vol'na, 1988.

offered with a constructive aim - that of the strengthening of the West against its deadly rival in the East.

At the same time, clear philosophical differences emerge between Solzhenitsyn and his western interlocutors, and first of all in relation to the supreme value of the West - freedom. For Solzhenitsyn, freedom is valuable and indeed necessary, but not as an end in itself. Rather, he sees it as a means to a higher end - moral perfection. And when he sees freedom being used to undermine rather than to support that higher end, he waxes eloquently scornful, as in his 1976 speech on receiving the "Freedom Fund" prize: "Freedom! - to forcibly defile postboxes and the eyes, ears and brains of people with commercial rubbish, and television programmes in which it is impossible to see any coherent sense. Freedom! - to impose information on people without taking into account their right not to receive it, their right to mental relaxation. Freedom! - to spit in the eyes and souls of those passing by advertisements. Freedom! - of publishers and cinema producers to poison the young generation with corrupt abominations. Freedom! - for adolescents between the ages of 14 and 18 to get drunk on leisure and pleasure instead of concentrated study and spiritual growth. Freedom! - for young adults to seek idleness and live at the expense of society. Freedom! - for strikers, to the extent of allowing them to deprive all the other citizens of a normal life, work, movement, water and food. Freedom! - for justifying speeches, when the lawyer himself knows that the accused is guilty. Freedom! - to raise the juridical right of insurance to such a degree that even charity could be reduced to extortion. Freedom! - for casual, trite pens to irresponsibly slide along the surface of any question in their haste to form public opinion. Freedom! - for the collection of gossip, when a journalist in his own interests spares neither his father nor his Fatherland. Freedom! - to publicize the defence secrets of one's country for personal political ends. Freedom! - for a businessman to make any deal, however many people it may reduce to misery or even if it would betray his own country. Freedom! - for political leaders to lightmindedly carry out what the voter wants today, and not what from a longer-term perspective will protect him from evil and danger. Freedom! - for terrorists to escape punishment, pity for them as a death sentence for the whole of the rest of society. Freedom! - for whole states to parasitically extort help from others, and not to work to build their own economy. Freedom! - as indifference to the trampling of the freedom of others far from us. Freedom! - even not to defend one's own freedom, as long as someone else risks his life."¹²³

The only real defence of freedom against its own worst consequences is a good set of laws and an effective system for enforcing them. However, democracy guarantees neither the one nor the other. For a good set of laws depends on the wisdom and morality of the lawmakers - and democratic lawmakers are elected to follow the will of their constituents, not the objective good of the country. And effective enforcement presupposes a generally high respect for the law in the population as a whole - a condition that is notably lacking in most democratic societies today.

In any case, according to Solzhenitsyn, western democratic legalism has become, to a dangerous and debilitating degree, an end in itself. Every conflict is solved

¹²³ Solzhenitsyn, in Shturman, op. cit., p. 156.

according to the letter of the law, and voluntary self-restraint is considered out of the question. It is not enough to have a wonderful system of laws and every democratic freedom. If the people are selfish, then life will still be hell.

Pluralism, freedom of speech and the press and democratic elections are all fine, says Solzhenitsyn, but they only make the choice possible: they do not tell us what to choose. The decision of the majority is no guarantee against "misdirection"; fascists, communists, nationalists and unprincipled demagogues are frequently voted in by majorities. Even in an established democracy major decisions can be swung by the vote of a small but determined and extremely selfish minority which holds the balance of power and can therefore impose its will on the majority.

In 1978 Solzhenitsyn gave a speech at Harvard which he summarized as follows: "Western society in principle is based on a *legal* level that is far lower than the true moral yardstick, and besides, this legal way of thinking has a tendency to ossify. In principle, moral imperatives are not adhered to in politics, and often not in public life either. The notion of *freedom* has been diverted to unbridled passion, in other words, in the direction of the forces of evil (so that nobody's 'freedom' would be limited!). A sense of responsibility before God and society has fallen away. "Human rights" have been so exalted that the rights of society are being oppressed and destroyed. And above all, the press, not elected by anyone, acts high-handedly and has amassed more power than the legislative, executive, or judicial power. And in this *free* press itself, it is not true freedom of opinion that dominates, but the dictates of the political fashion of the moment, which lead to a surprising uniformity of opinion. (It was on this point that I had irritated them most.) The whole social system does not contribute to advancing outstanding individuals to the highest echelons. The reigning ideology, that prosperity and the accumulation of material riches are to be valued above all else, is leading to a weakening of character in the West, and also to a massive decline in courage and the will to defend itself, as was clearly seen in the Vietnam War, not to mention a perplexity in the face of terror. But the roots of this social condition spring from the Enlightenment, from rationalist humanism, from the notion that man is the center of all that exists, and that there is no Higher Power above him. And these roots of irreligious humanism are common to the current Western world and to Communism, and that is what has led the Western intelligentsia to such strong and dogged sympathy for Communism.

"At the end of my speech I had pointed to the fact that the moral poverty of the 20th century comes from too much having been invested in sociopolitical changes, with the loss of the Whole and the High. We, all of us, have no other salvation but to look once more at the scale of moral values and rise to a new height of vision. 'No one on earth has any other way left but — upward,' were the concluding words of my speech..."¹²⁴

Undeterred by the generally unfavourable reaction to this speech, a few years later, in an article entitled "The Pluralists", Solzhenitsyn wrote: "They [the pluralists] seem to regard pluralism as somehow the supreme attainment of history, the supreme intellectual good, the supreme value of modern Western life. This principle

¹²⁴ Solzhenitsyn, "My Harvard Speech in Retrospect", *National Review*, June 7, 2018.

is often formulated as follows: 'the more different opinions, the better' - the important thing being that no one should seriously insist on the truth of his own.

"But can pluralism claim to be a principle valuable in itself, and indeed one of the loftiest? It is strange that mere plurality should be elevated to such a high status...

"*The Washington Post* once published a letter from an American, responding to my Harvard speech. 'It is difficult to believe,' he wrote, 'that diversity for its own sake is the highest aim of mankind. Respect for diversity makes no sense unless diversity helps us attain some higher goal.'

"Of course, variety adds colour to life. We yearn for it. We cannot imagine life without it. But if diversity becomes the highest principle, then there can be no universal human values, and making one's own values the yardstick of another person's opinions is ignorant and brutal. If there is no right and wrong, what restraints remain? If there is no universal basis for it there can be no morality. 'Pluralism' as a principle degenerates into indifference, superficiality, it spills over into relativism, into tolerance of the absurd, into a pluralism of errors and lies. You may show off your ideas, but must say nothing with conviction. To be too sure that you are right is indecent. So people wander like babes in the wood. That is why the Western world today is defenceless; paralysed by its inability any longer to distinguish between true and false positions, between manifest Good and manifest Evil, by the centrifugal chaos of ideas, by the entropy of thought. 'Let's have as many views as possible - just as long as they're all different!' But if a hundred mules all pull different ways the result is no movement at all.

"In the whole universal flux there is one truth - God's truth, and, consciously or not, we all long to draw near to this truth and touch it. A great diversity of opinions has some sense if we make it our first concern to compare them so as to discover and renounce our mistakes. To discover the true way of looking at things, come as close as we can to God's truth, and not just collect as many 'different' views as we can."¹²⁵

Solzhenitsyn was here appealing to an older, pre-liberal tradition of Western thought; for, as Sir Isaiah Berlin writes, "the notion that One is good, Many - diversity - is bad, since the truth is one, and only error is multiple, is far older, and deeply rooted in the Platonic tradition. Even Aristotle, who accepts that human types differ from each other, and that therefore elasticity in social arrangements is called for, accepts this as a fact, without regret but without any sign of approval; and, with very few exceptions, this view seems to prevail in the classical and medieval worlds, and is not seriously questioned until, say, the sixteenth century.

"Who in the ancient world or the Middle Ages even spoke of the virtues of diversity in life or thought? But when a modern thinker like Auguste Comte wondered why, when we do not allow freedom of opinion in mathematics, we allow it in morals and politics, the very question shocked J.S. Mill and other liberals. Yet most of these beliefs, which are part of modern liberal culture (and today under attack from both the right and the left on the part of those who have reverted to an older view) - these

¹²⁵ Solzhenitsyn, "Our Pluralists", *Survey*, vol. 29, no. 2 (125), 1985, pp. 1-2.

beliefs are relatively novel, and draw their plausibility from a deep and radical revolt against the central tradition of Western thought. This revolt... seems to me to have become articulate in the second third of the eighteenth century, principally in Germany..."¹²⁶

Thus just as Western democratic pluralism would not save the West from Soviet totalitarianism, so Russia would not be delivered from the same totalitarianism by simply trying to make it more democratic. Solzhenitsyn did not believe that there was any realistic path of transition to a democratic republic in the Soviet Union without creating a number of nationalist wars - a judgement that we can now see to have been prophetically true. A multi-party democracy in Russia would be "merely be a melancholy repetition of 1917".

For the failure of Russian democracy in 1917 was not the result simply of the immaturity of Russian democratic institutions, but rather of a fundamental flaw in the basic theory and spirit of democracy. Communism itself springs, not from traditional authoritarian systems, which, for all their faults, still recognized the authority of God above them, but from "the crisis of democracy, from the failure of irreligious humanism".

Indeed, "Solzhenitsyn repeatedly and angrily repudiated the notion that the Soviet regime was in any sense whatever a continuation of the Tsarist autocracy. Politically and morally, the Soviet regime was more a self-perpetuating conspiracy than a legitimate form of government."¹²⁷

Solzhenitsyn admitted that there were defects and dangers in the traditional systems, but "authoritarian regimes as such are not frightening - only those which are answerable to no one and nothing. The autocrats of earlier, religious ages, though their power was ostensibly unlimited, felt themselves responsible before God and their own consciences. The autocrats of our own time are dangerous precisely because it is difficult to find higher values which would bind them."¹²⁸

Solzhenitsyn saw communism as a universal disease based on a universalist ideology. As Daniel Hannan writes: "Every communist regime, from Albania to Angola, from Benin to Bulgaria, from Cuba to Czechoslovakia, relied on labour camps, torture and execution. You didn't have to be an opponent of the party to be liquidated. Your crime might be having the wrong parents, or attending church, or holding a university degree. In Cambodia, wearing glasses was enough to condemn you, being taken as evidence that you were not a manual worker.

"What explains slaughter on such a scale?... Solzhenitsyn, himself a gulag survivor, knew the answer. There had been sadists before, he wrote, and tyrants and murderers, but their homicidal tendencies had eventually been exhausted 'because they had no ideology. Ideology - that is what gives the evil-doer the necessary steadfastness and determination.' Here is one way to quantify communism's

¹²⁶ Berlin, "The Apotheosis of the Romanic Will", *The Proper Study of Mankind*, London: Pimlico, 1998, pp.553-554.

¹²⁷ Johnson, *Modern Times*, p. 677.

¹²⁸ Kelley, D.R., *The Solzhenitsyn-Sakharov Dialogue*, London: Greenwood Press, 1982, pp. 75-87.

destructive power. In 1917 America and Russia had the same population. After a century of asymmetric longevity, abortion and migration, there are now twice as many Americans as Russians..."¹²⁹

All these ideas are developed with great power in Solzhenitsyn's vast novel about the revolution, *The Red Wheel* - the *War and Peace* of the twentieth-century. In it none of the leaders of pre-revolutionary Russian society, from the Tsar and his ministers to the politicians, the soldiers and the peasants emerges without blame, it is clearly on the westernizing liberals and revolutionaries, who acted in the name of democracy, that the main guilt falls. In this way did Solzhenitsyn describe the defects of democracy - the licence to which its liberty led, its cowardice in defence of its own values, its tendency to anarchy and hence, ultimately, to despotism.

Democracy is in essence "a mechanism for the satisfaction of the demands of the consumer-voter".¹³⁰ The problem is, that in the absence of a higher ideal - and very few democracies, whether ancient or modern, have had any such ideal - the demands of the consumer-voter are bound to be multiple, contradictory, changeable, fallen, materialistic and egoistical. Thus the tendency to atomization and self-destruction is built into the very base of democracy...

"Solzhenitsyn," writes J.R. Nyquist, "says there are striking similarities between the party mob in the East and the commercial mob in the West. Both are boundlessly materialistic and free from religion. Both emphasize social instead of individual responsibility. Both share the scientific approach to human problems rather than the spiritual approach, and both put man at the center. Each has the same basic program: namely, that man should step into God's shoes. This is the reason why we find ourselves the victims of ever-increasing government controls. Human arrogance, embodied in the state, now usurps God. And the state, as never before, slowly finds its way into every question. But first there is the matter of how to get rid of God, whose tattered authority yet stands in the way. In Russia we can see that God died violently, murdered with the Czar. In the West He dies by inches, killed in shops and malls. In the former, a coup d'état; in the latter, a slow poisoning..."¹³¹

In 1983 Solzhenitsyn was awarded the Templeton prize for religion and gave a speech in which he attributed the cause of all the terrible calamities of the twentieth century to a simple cause: people have forgotten God.¹³² It was not an original thesis, but it needed to be heard. And it was necessary that the West should hear it from a refugee from the Orthodox East...

¹²⁹ Hannan, "Despite History, People fall for Communism", *Sunday Telegraph*, October 29, 2017, p. 18.

¹³⁰ Shturman, op. cit., p. 165.

¹³¹ Nyquist, *Origins of the Fourth World War*, Chula Vista, Ca.: Black Forest Press, 1999, p. 38.

¹³² Solzhenitsyn, "Men have forgotten God", *National Review*, December 11, 2018.

10. THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov presented an untamed duo of Soviet dissident Nobel Prize winners whose influence, in spite of the KGB's disinformation and "active measures" against them, presented a real and growing threat to the prestige, and therefore ultimately the survival, of the Soviet Union. For while the Soviet Union was not a democracy in any normal sense, since the death of Stalin it had chosen not to become a hermetically sealed kingdom on the model of North Korea and Albania. This laid it open to "ideological subversion" from human rights activists.

And so "on August 1 1975," write Christopher Andrew and Vasily Mitrokhin, "the Soviet leadership committed what turned out to be a strategic blunder in its war against the dissidents. As part of the Helsinki Accords on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United States, Canada and all European states save Albania and Andorra agreed to protect a series of basic human rights. Though Andropov [head of the KGB] warned against the consequences, a majority of the Politburo shared Gromyko's confident view that 'We are masters in our house' – that the Soviet Union would be free to interpret the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords as it saw fit. In fact, as Zbigniew Brzezinski predicted, the accords 'put the Soviet Union on the ideological defensive'. Henceforth its human rights critics both at home and abroad could justly claim that it was in breach of an international agreement it had freely entered into..."¹³³

However, Paul Johnson disagrees with this judgement. "The idea was to force Soviet Russia to liberalize its internal policy. The effect was quite different. Behind the Iron Curtain, the Helsinki Accords were ignored and voluntary groups set up to monitor observance were arrested. In the West, American found herself campaigning against some of its closest allies. Again, a human rights lobby grew up within the Administration, including an entire bureau of the State Department, which worked actively against America's interests. In September 1977 Brazil reacted to State Department criticisms by cancelling all its four remaining defence agreements with the US, two of which went back to 1942. Argentina was similarly estranged. The State Department played a significant role in the overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. An Assistant Secretary, Viron Vaky, announced on behalf of the US government: 'No negotiation, mediation or compromise can be achieved any longer with a Somoza government. The solution can only begin with a sharp break from the past.' The 'sharp break' took the form, in 1979, of the replacement of Somoza, a faithful if distasteful ally of the West, by a Marxist regime whose attitude to human rights was equally contemptuous and which immediately campaigned against American allies in Guatemala, El Salvador and elsewhere in Central America. Again, in 1978, the State Department's Bureau of Human Rights actively undermined the Shah's regime in Iran, playing a significant role in its destruction in 1979 and its replacement by a violently anti-Western terrorist regime..."¹³⁴

¹³³ Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive. The KGB in Europe and the West*, London: The Allen Press, 1999, p. 420.

¹³⁴ Johnson, *Modern Times*, p. 673.

Helsinki was the climax of *Détente*, a process of relaxation of tension between East and West that began in 1969 with the election of the first social democratic chancellor of West Germany, Willy Brandt. He adopted the policy of *Ost-Politik*, or closer relations with the communist states in the East. East Germany itself was recognized, more visas were given to East Germans to come to the West, and there was an easing of restrictions on East-West trade. Also, the first strategic arms limitation talks (SALT-1) were initiated, leading to an anti-ballistic treaty being signed in 1972, which was designed to reduce the risk of a pre-emptive first strike.

However, there were serious downsides to this process. Bonn laid itself dangerously open to espionage (Brandt's secretary turned out to be a spy), and many of the trade deals were manifestly to the advantage of the communists. Thus the Russians got much needed credits to import Western technology, develop their gas fields and build pipes to the West, while the West thereby became more dependent on Soviet energy. Again, Brandt's successor, Helmut Schmidt, "offered Russia favourable trade terms for a series of developments, including the provision by German firms of nine thousand 'heavy-duty' trucks, and the construction, by German firms, of a number of chemical plants throughout the Soviet Union. The Russians agreed to increase the existing supply of natural gas. Schmidt also offered the German construction of a nuclear reactor at Kaliningrad." ¹³⁵

The German example was continued by the Americans, though more cautiously. The West's motivation was threefold: a desire to spend less money on armaments as the oil crisis began to bite into western pockets; a desire to get a deal to import Soviet gas; and, probably most important, a gradual loss of faith – caused particularly by the defeat in Vietnam – in the importance and righteousness of the struggle against Communism. Thus *Détente* in the West began to resemble the West's *appeasement* of Nazi Germany in the 1930s.

On the Soviet side, the "targets of *Détente*" were also threefold. "First," as Revel writes, "international recognition of Soviet territorial gains resulting from the Second World War and from the 1945-50 period in which the Sovietization of Central Europe was completed.

"Second, through negotiations on arms limitation, to profit from American goodwill to increase the USSR's military potential.

"Third, to obtain financial, industrial, and trade contributions from the capitalist countries that would relieve or at least attenuate the shortcomings of socialist economics.

"What concessions or promises did the Soviets have to make to the West in exchange for these benefits?

¹³⁵ Martin Gilbert, *Challenge to Civilization. A History of the 20th Century 1952-1999*, London: HarperCollins, 1999, p. 477.

“First, they promised to allow the Americans to conduct on-site inspections to verify that their military strength did not exceed the levels set by the agreements on strategic arms limitations.

“Next, they vowed they would adopt a general policy of restraint throughout the world, or so they led the West, especially Nixon and Kissinger, to believe in 1972-73. This was the notion of ‘linkage’ or ‘attachment – the indissoluble nature of all aspects of Détente’, as Sakharov put it. Washington and Moscow specifically agreed to use their influence to prevent their respective allies and the countries with which they enjoyed special relationships from undertaking offensive actions, especially military.

“Finally, in the most sensational part of the Helsinki agreement, the Soviet Union had to sign a guarantee that it would respect human rights and basic freedoms in the USSR itself and throughout the Soviet sphere of influence. Concretely, the agreement was supposed to remove obstacles to the ‘free circulation of persons and ideas’ in both directions between East and West. Including these incredible promises in a treaty that was otherwise so advantageous for the Communists could reasonably be seen by the Soviets as a necessary concession. Their object was to reassure people who, in the West, needed a moral justification that would consecrate the philosophy of Détente.

“A quick glance at these two lists shows that, for the Soviets, the credit column in this balance sheet is incomparably more substantial than the debit column.

“It was soon obvious that the ‘third basket’ as it was called in Helsinki, the one dealing with human rights, was riddled with holes. French President Giscard d’Estaing, who had functioned, at Brezhnev’s urging, as the catalyst for the Helsinki conference, persuaded the reluctant Americans to attend. He was poorly rewarded for his zeal. At his first dinner during an official visit to Moscow shortly after the conference ended, he naively proposed a toast to human rights and freedom and to the improvements his hosts had promised concerning them. Furious, the Soviet leadership froze Giscard out the next morning. By a deplorable coincidence, all the members of the Politburo were suddenly as indisposed as they were unavailable: one felt a chill, another had a headache, Brezhnev sneezed nonstop, and all of them vanished. The world watched the humiliating spectacle of a French head of state wandering alone through a deserted Moscow for two long days. Instead of returning at once to Paris, he waited until, at dawn on the third day, he was received by a resuscitated Brezhnev, jovial and patronizing and delighted to have taught a lesson to the insolent greenhorn whose lack of resistance he had correctly gauged.

“We know what happened next: the leaders of the ‘social groups for application of the Helsinki agreement’ in the Soviet Union and its satellites were arrested, imprisoned, sent to strict detention camps; permission to emigrate, to travel abroad, to marry someone outside the East bloc became harder than ever to obtain; the movement of ideas and information was as sharply curtailed as that of people, and, after a brief interlude, Western radio programs were jammed more intensively than ever, in defiance of all the promises Moscow had made. And as an edifying crown to this triumph of liberalization and open dialogue, the USSR huffily withdrew from the human rights commission at the 1978 Belgrade conference, the first of the periodical

meetings scheduled for 'verification of application of the Helsinki pact'. The subsequent assembly, in Madrid in 1980, was just as much of a success for the Soviets, who had stuck to their tactic of flatly refusing to discuss the subject of the conference.

"Even after martial law was declared in Poland, Westerners broken to the saddle returned to Madrid in 1982 to go through their paces, chewing over the rotten hay of human rights under the mocking gaze of the Soviet delegation. Not only were the years following the signing of the Helsinki pact marked by tighter repression in the Communist countries, but the Soviet government was ingenious enough even to plead Détente to demand – and win – agreement from Western governments and some Western newspapers to stop encouraging East- bloc dissidents. President Ford refused to see Andre Amalrik. Dissidents were simply people calling for respect of the Helsinki agreement, which the West had signed. In a paradox that will not surprise connoisseurs, the Soviet As we have seen, groups were formed in several countries to monitor the degree to which the Helsinki accords on human rights were being observed. A *Chronicle of Current Events* "bore on its front page article 19 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights (which the Soviet Union had signed), which guaranteed the 'right to freedom of opinion and expression'. The presentation was equally restrained. There was no editorial comment, merely a list of disciplinary actions, searches, interrogations, warnings, arrests, trials, and other official sanctions. One copy was always sent abroad, to be broadcast on Russian-language foreign radio stations, while others were typed and re-typed on a distribution network. Which, in reverse, became a channel for the communication of information. With imperfect but still remarkable regularity, this journal continued to appear every two or three months right through to 1982."¹³⁶

A prominent dissident, Vladimir Maximov, established a journal, *Kontinent*, published in several languages, to record violations in the Soviet Union. "Doubtless to the intense irritation of the Centre [of the KGB], *Kontinent* was able to publicize the formation during 1976 and 1977 of 'Helsinki Watch Groups' in Moscow, Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia and Armenia to monitor Soviet compliance with the terms of the Helsinki Accords."¹³⁷ And so Détente "represented an important structural change, for contact with the free societies of the West did in the end introduce a fatal contagion into the communist system."¹³⁸

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However, the importance of the Helsinki Watch Groups in the Soviet Union can be exaggerated. First, they were exploited by only a tiny percentage of the Soviet population, mainly Jewish dissidents in the big cities. As Gromyko had predicted, the Soviets remained the masters in their own house.

¹³⁶ Hosking, op. cit., p. 557.

¹³⁷ Andrew and Mitrokhin, op. cit., p. 423.

¹³⁸ David C. Hendrickson, in *Foreign Affairs*, May/June, 1998, p. 116.

For, as Revel pointed out, totalitarian regimes can snuff out such anti-systemic viruses much more effectively than democratic ones – or at any rate, keep them at bay for much longer periods. For “police repression is seamless, the compartmentalization of people and regions is effective in nipping organized protest in the bud, the great mass of the population, deprived of any basis of comparison, is largely unaware of other standards and styles of living.

Because of these factors,” continued Revel, writing in 1985, “it is hard to see what could force the Soviet state in the short run to replace its military and imperialistic priorities with an intensive program of internal economic developments and social progress.”¹³⁹ In fact, it was not any grass-roots movement that forced the Soviet leadership to change course in the later 1980s, but the wholly unexpected and unpredictable rise of Gorbachev to the leadership of the Communist Party.

“In essence, the [Helsinki] agreement provided for a swap. The West presented the U.S.S.R. with two lavish gifts: we recognized the legitimacy of the Soviet empire over Central Europe, which it had illegally grabbed at the end of World War II, and we offered massive and almost interest-free economic and technological aid. In return, the Soviet Union promised a more moderate foreign policy and respect for human rights within its empire.

“Only an unfathomable lack of comprehension of communism’s real nature could have made Western statesmen take that second proviso seriously; in any case, it quickly became clear that the promise was merely a joke designed to liven up dull Politburo meetings. But the topper was that Western governments, ever prompt to anticipate the KGB’s wishes, were the first to proclaim that insisting on enforcement of the article was a provocation of the Soviet Union. President Carter’s obstinacy in promoting a human-rights policy throughout the world was soon assailed as interference in other countries’ internal affairs and a threat to peace – except, of course, in Chile and Saudi Arabia.

“Humiliation followed for the West at the 1978 Belgrade conference, which had theoretically been called to verify that the Helsinki agreement was being applied. Without any superfluous hesitation or temporizing, the Soviets simply refused to take part in the work of the human-rights commission. Nevertheless, in 1980 we rushed merrily to a follow-up conference in Madrid, to go once again through the same vain farce that, for the democracies, remained as pointless as ever. Doubly pointless, in fact: since the Belgrade conference, the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan and colonized vast segments of Africa, thus shattering the credibility of the other Soviet promise at Helsinki, for moderation in foreign policy. So all that remained of that celebrated pact was the Western contribution: economic aid to the U.S.S.R. and recognition of its empire. By their concrete actions after the reestablishment of real and total socialism in Poland, the West Europeans staunchly affirmed their unshakable determination to live up unilaterally to their Helsinki commitments without as much as pretending to ask anything in return. Even the few concessions

¹³⁹ Revel, op. cit., p. 17.

made by East Germany to ease restrictions on travel between the two Germanies were revoked at the end of 1980..."¹⁴⁰

The main exception to the complete Soviet exploitation of the Détente process was Jewish emigration. As Martin Gilbert writes, when American President Gerald Ford went to Vladivostok in November, 1974, he "insisted that the Russian search for closer trade relations with the United States would depend on a more liberal Soviet attitude to Jewish emigration, which had fallen from 34,000 to 20,000 in the two previous years. *Pravda* denounced this linkage as having been forced on the President by the 'enemies of détente'. Ford's insistence on this linkage arose as a result of a Congressional vote, the Jackson- Vanik amendment of the previous year. The content and success of this binding legislation was an example of the efforts of an effective American pressure group, the National Conference of Soviet Jewry, which urged that the United States Trade Reform Act of 1972 be amended to include the linkage of emigration with trade. A strong armoury of support had been enlisted. In an open letter to the United States Congress, sent on 14 September 1973 Andrei Sakharov, the Soviet Union's best-known human rights activist – not a Jew, although married to one – had urged support for the amendment on behalf of 'tens of thousands of citizens in the Soviet Union'. These citizens included Jews 'who want to leave the country and who have been working to exercise that right for years and for decades at the cost of endless difficulty and humiliation'.

"The Jackson-Vanik amendment had been passed on 11 December 1973. A year later it was an integral part of the Vladivostok negotiations. The Soviet authorities bowed to the pressure, and Jewish emigration grew annually, reaching a peak of 50,000 in 1979..."¹⁴¹

However, as Paul Johnson writes, "there were conflicting desires to use and exploit the Jews, to keep them prisoners, and also to expel them, the common factor in both cases being an anxiety to humiliate. Thus in 1971 Brezhnev decided to open the gates, and during the next decade 250,000 Jews were allowed to escape. But with every increase in emigration there was a sharp rise in trials of Jews, and the actual exit visa procedure itself was made as complex, difficult and shameful as possible. The need for a character reference from the applicant's place of work often led to a sort of show trial there, in which the Jew was publicly discussed, condemned and then dismissed. So he was often jobless, penniless and liable to be gaoled for 'parasitism' long before the visa was granted."¹⁴²

It was not only governments that the Soviets wrapped around in the cotton wool of disinformation, yielding the fruits of completely one-sided Détente. Thus Revel mentions "the Nonaligned Countries Movement, the Socialist International, the ecologists, the pacifists, the UN (where the capitalist powers pay almost all the costs) and, above all, UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). Add to this the perversion of revolutions and nationalist movements in the Third World; of the Interparliamentary Union (where so-called deputies from the East sit on an equal basis with others elected by genuine popular vote); of the

¹⁴⁰ Revel, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

¹⁴¹ Gilbert, op. cit., p. 476.

¹⁴² Johnson, *A History of the Jews*, London: Phoenix, 1995, p. 571

World Council of Churches, which, in opening its doors to Eastern Orthodox churches, was invaded by a heavy brigade of Orthodox popes from the KGB. For communism can also borrow the voice of God to preach unilateral Western disarmament.”¹⁴³

All this infiltration and perversion was made easier and more effective by the atmosphere created by Détente. It must therefore be counted as having aided and abetted Communist deception and aggression around the globe. But its promoters displayed the psychological phenomena of cognitive dissonance and denial in refusing to face the facts and even justifying them. As Revel writes, “Disclosures long after the fact are often more irritating than enlightening. The men responsible for Détente in 1970-80 resented having to admit its failure afterward. So they did not alter their thinking, they clung to it even harder. The diplomats, politicians and political scientists who had made a heavy intellectual investment in Détente over a period of ten or fifteen years and who remained in positions of power or influence after it failed were incapable of fostering a stern public reappraisal of their policy.”¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ Revel, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-189.

¹⁴⁴ Revel, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

11. HELSINKI AND THE LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS

However, while leftist thinking was undoubtedly dominant throughout Western Europe in the 1970s and 80s, there were also signs of a movement in the opposite direction – not back to truly Christian thought, of course, but at any rate away from orthodox communism. Thus Tony Judt sees a change beginning in 1973, when faith in the Marxist revolution, already shaken by the Soviet invasion of Prague in 1968, received a further blow in the publication in French of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago*. "The Communist daily newspaper *L'Humanité* dismissed it, reminding readers that since 'everyone' already knows all about Stalin, anyone rehashing all *that* could only be motivated by 'anti-Sovietism'. But the accusation of 'anti-Sovietism' was losing its force. In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Prague and its repressive aftermath, and of reports filtering out of China about the Cultural Revolution, Solzhenitsyn's root and branch condemnation of the whole Communist project rang true – even and perhaps especially to erstwhile sympathizers.

"Communism, it was becoming clear, had defiled and despoiled its radical heritage. And was continuing to do so, as the genocide in Cambodia and the widely-publicized trauma of the Vietnamese 'boat people' would soon reveal. Even those in Western Europe – and there were many – who held the United States largely responsible for the disasters in Vietnam and Cambodia, and whose anti-Americanism was further fuelled by the [supposedly] American-engineered killing of Chile's Salvador Allende just three months before the publication of *The Gulag Archipelago*, were increasingly reluctant to conclude as they had once done that the Socialist camp had the moral upper hand. American imperialism was indeed bad – but the other side was worse, perhaps far worse.

"At this point the traditional 'progressive' insistence on treating attacks on Communism as implicit threats to *all* socially-ameliorative goals – i.e. the claim that Communism, Socialism, Social Democracy, nationalization, central planning and progressive social engineering were part of a common political project – began to work against itself. If Lenin and his heirs had poisoned the well of social justice, the argument ran, we are *all* damaged. In the light of twentieth-century history the state was beginning to look less like the solution than the problem, and not only or even primarily for economic reasons. What begins with centralized planning ends with centralized killing...

"France in the Seventies and Eighties was no longer Arthur Koestler's 'burning lens of Western civilization', but French thinkers were still unusually predisposed to engage universal questions. Writers and commentators in Spain or West Germany or Italy in these years were much taken up with local challenges – though the terrorist threat that preoccupied them carried implications of its own for the discrediting of radical utopianism. Intellectuals in the UK, never deeply touched by the appeal of Communism, were largely indifferent to its decline and thus kept their distance from the new continental mood. In France, by contrast,

there had been widespread and longstanding local sympathy for the Communist project. As anti-Communism gathered pace in French public discussion, abetted by the steady decline in the Communist Party's vote and influence, it was thus fuelled by local recollection and example. A new generation of French intellectuals transited with striking alacrity out of Marxism, driven by a sometimes unseemly haste to adjure their own previous engagement...

"In 1978 Karl Popper's *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* appeared in French for the first time, the harbinger of a steady absorption into the French mainstream of a whole corpus of 'Anglo-American' scholarship in philosophy and the social sciences of which the local intellectual culture had for decades remained in near ignorance. In the same year the historian François Furet published his path-breaking *Penser la Révolution Française*, in which he systematically dismantled the 'revolutionary catechism' through which the French had for many decades been taught to understand their country and its past.

"In this 'catechism' as Furet dissected it, the French Revolution had been the ur-moment of modernity: the confrontation that triggered France's division into opposing political cultures of Left and Right, ostensibly determined by the class identities of the antagonists. That story, which rested upon the twin pillars of early-nineteenth century liberal optimism and a Marxist vision of radical social transformation, had now, in Furet's account, run into the ground – not least because Soviet Communism, the revolutionary heir presumptive in this morality tale of purposeful radical transformation, had retroactively polluted the whole inheritance. The French Revolution, in Furet's words, was 'dead'.

"The political implications of Furet's thesis were momentous, as its author well understood. The failings of Marxism as a politics were one thing, which could always be excused under the category of misfortune or circumstance. But if Marxism was discredited as a Grand Narrative – if neither reason nor necessity were at work in History – then all Stalin's crimes, all the lives he lost and resources wasted in transforming societies under state direction, all the mistakes and failures of the twentieth century's radical experiments in introducing Utopia by *diktat*, ceased to be 'dialectically' explicable as false moves along a true path. They became instead just what their critics had always said they were: loss, waste, failure and crime

"Furet and his younger contemporaries rejected the resort to History that had so coloured intellectual engagement in Europe since the beginning of the 1930s. There is, they insisted, no 'Master Narrative' governing the course of human actions, and thus no way to justify public policies or actions that cause real suffering today in the name of speculative benefits tomorrow. Broken eggs make good omelettes. But you cannot build a better society on broken men...

"Intellectual self-abnegation before History was once described by Isaiah Berlin as 'the terrible German way out of the burden of moral choice'. This is a little hard on Germans, who were hardly the only Europeans to abase themselves on the altar of historical necessity, though it is true that the idea had its roots in

German romantic philosophy. But it points to an emerging vacuum in European political ideas: if there was no 'great cause' left; if the progressive legacy had run into the ground; if History, or necessity, could no longer be credibly invoked in defense of an act, a policy or a programme; then how should men decide the great dilemmas of the age?

"This was not a problem for Thatcherite radicals, who treated public policy as an extension of private interests and for whom the marketplace was a necessity and sufficient adjudicator of values and outcomes. Nor were the times unusually troubling for Europe's traditional conservatives, for whom the measure of good and evil in human affairs remained anchored in religious norms and social conventions, bruised but not yet altogether displaced by the cultural *tsunami* of the Sixties. It was the progressive *Left*, still the dominant presence in European political and cultural exchanges, which was urgently in need of a different script.

"What it found, to its collective surprise, was a new political vernacular – or, rather, a very old one, freshly rediscovered. The language of rights, or liberties, was firmly inscribed in every European constitution, not least those of the People's Democracies. But as a way of thinking about politics, 'rights talk' had been altogether unfashionable in Europe for many years. After the First World War rights – notably the right to self-determination – had played a pivotal role in international debate over a post-war settlement, and most of the interested parties at the Versailles Peace Conference had invoked their rights quite vociferously when pressing their case upon the Great Powers. But these were *collective* rights – the rights of nations, peoples, minorities.

"Moreover, the record of collectively-asserted rights was an unhappy one. Where the rights of more than one ethnic or religious community had clashed, usually over a conflicting territorial claim, it had been depressingly obvious that force, not law, was the only effective way to establish precedence. Minority rights could not be protected within states, nor the right of weak states secured against the claims of their more powerful neighbors. The victors of 1945, looking back on the dashed hopes of Versailles, concluded as we have seen that *collective* interests were better served by the painful but effective solution of territorial regrouping (ethnic cleansing as it would later be known). As for stateless persons, they would no longer be treated as a judicial anomaly in a world of states and nations, but as individual victims of persecution or injustice.

"Post-1945 rights talk thus concentrated on individuals. This too was a lesson of the war. Even though men and women were persecuted in the name of their common identity (Jews, gypsies, Poles, etc.) they suffered as individuals, and it was as individuals with individual rights that the new United Nations sought to protect them. The various Conventions on Human Rights, Genocide or Social and Economic Rights that were incorporated into international law and treaties had a cumulative impact upon public sensibilities: they combined an eighteenth-century, Anglo-American concern for individual liberties with a very mid-twentieth-century emphasis upon the obligations of the state to ensure that a

growing spectrum of greater and lesser claims were met – from the right to life to the ‘right’ to ‘truth in advertising’ and beyond.

“What propelled this legal rhetoric of individual rights into the realm of real politics was the coincidence of the retreat of Marxism with the International Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which had opened in Helsinki the same year that *The Gulag Archipelago* was published in Paris. Until then, talk of ‘rights’ had long been disfavored among left-leaning European intellectuals, echoing Marx’s famous dismissal of ‘the so-called rights of man’ as egoistical and ‘bourgeois’. In progressive circles, terms such as ‘Freedoms’ or ‘Liberty’ or ‘Rights’, and other abstractions associated with ‘man in general’, were taken seriously only when preceded by an adjectival modifier: ‘bourgeois’, or ‘proletarian’ or ‘Socialist’...

“... From the mid-seventies it became increasingly common to find speeches and writings from all across the political spectrum in Western Europe unrestrainedly invoking ‘human rights’ and ‘personal liberties’. As one Italian observer remarked in 1977, the idea and ideal of ‘undivided’ freedom was being openly discussed on the Left ‘without mystification or demagogy’ for the first time since the war. This did not necessarily translate immediately into politics – for much of the Eighties West European Labour and Socialist parties floundered quite helplessly, resorting in many cases to the illicit appropriation of their opponents’ programmes to cover their own nakedness. But their new openness to the vocabulary of rights and liberties did give Western European scholars and intellectuals access to the changing language of political opposition in *Eastern* Europe and a way of communicating across the divide – just in time, for it was *east* of the Iron Curtain that truly original and significant change was now under way...”¹⁴⁵

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The philosophy of human rights served rather as a double-edged sword that undermined the unity of western governments even more than communist ones. For, as Revel wrote: “The omnipotence based on consensus that Tocqueville forecast [in *Democracy in America*] is only one side of the coin of modern government. The other is an equally general impotence to deal with the conflicting daily claims made on it by constituents eager for aid but less and less willing to assume obligations. By invading every area of life, the democratic state has stuffed itself with more responsibilities than powers. The very contradictions among special interests that are as legitimate as they are incompatible, all expecting to be treated with equal goodwill, show that the state’s duties are expanding faster than its means of performing them. There is no denying how burdensome a tutelary government is on society – provided we add that its expansion makes it vulnerable, often paralyzing it in its relations with client groups that are quicker to hurry it than to obey it.

¹⁴⁵ Judt, *Postwar*, London: Pimlico, 2007, pp. 561, 562, 563, 564-565, 566.

“This sort of behavior splinters democratic societies into separate groups, each battling for advantage and caring little for the interests of others or society as a whole. Public opinion, instead of being united by uniform thinking, is fragmented into a variety of cultures that can be so different in tastes, ways of living, attitudes and language that they understand each other only dimly, if at all. They coexist but do not mingle. Public opinion in today’s democracies forms an archipelago, not a continent. Each island in the chain ranks its own distinctiveness above membership in a national group and even higher than its association with a group of democratic nations.

“In one sense, we do live in a mass era as residents of a ‘planetary village’ where manners and fashions blend. But, paradoxically, we also live in an age of the triumph of minorities, of a juxtaposition of widely different attitudes. While it is obvious that the passion for equality, identified by Tocqueville as the drive wheel of democracy, generates uniformity, let’s not forget that democracy also rests on a passion for liberty, which fosters diversity, fragmentation, unorthodoxy. Plato, democracy’s shrewdest enemy, saw this when he compared it to a motley cloak splashed with many colors. In a democracy, he said, everyone claims the right to live as he chooses, so that ways of living multiply and jostle each other. To Aristotle, too, liberty was the basic principle of democracy. He broke this down into two tenets: ‘for all to rule and be ruled in turn’ and ‘a man should live as he likes’. To American democracy, the right to do one’s own thing is as much or more cherished than equality.

“The ideological and cultural wars among the islands in the archipelago now take precedence over defense of the archipelago itself. In Holland in 1981, a considerable share of public opinion, questioned about its feelings on Poland and Afghanistan, declared that the Dutch lacked a moral right to criticize Communist repression or Soviet imperialism ‘as long as housing conditions in Amsterdam fail to meet the highest standards of modern comfort, as long as women remain exploited and the legal rights of heterosexual married couples are denied to homosexual married couples.’”¹⁴⁶

This egoistic mentality translated into a lack of interest in, or compassion for, those living in the Gulag archipelago of the Soviet Union, and in an increasing willingness to ignore the sufferings even of those living much closer – in Communist Central and Eastern Europe. Hence the betrayal of the interests of the East Europeans in the Helsinki Accords.

¹⁴⁶ Revel, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

12. THE SOVIET ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY

The Soviet Union had always prided itself on its supposed scientific foundation. But its science was as often as not pseudo-science, the “half-science” that Dostoyevsky had prophesied in *The Devils*. Marxism was, of course, one of those false sciences. Another was Lysenko’s biology. A third was Soviet psychiatry, which saw religion and political dissidence as mental illnesses and interned these “patients” in special psychiatric hospitals, where they were injected with drugs in order to destroy their minds and their faith.

Luke Harding writes: “It was Yuri Andropov – the KGB boss and future head of the politburo – who drew up a secret plan to use psychiatric facilities to “treat” dissidents. It was based on Nikita Khrushchev’s belief that anti-Soviet consciousness was a mental disease. Political opponents including [Vladimir] Bukovsky were detained without trial. There was no appeal. They were injected with psychotropic drugs.”¹⁴⁷

“In one respect,” writes Paul Johnson, “Soviet policy towards opposition elements was consistent, from the first phase of Lenin’s rule to the early 1980s: dissent has always been treated as a mental illness, and dissenters have always been liable to suffer ‘treatment’ in special Soviet psychiatric hospitals. The first known case in 1919, when Lenin had Maria Spiridonova, a leader of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, sentenced by the Moscow Revolutionary Tribunal in internment in a sanatorium. The large-scale, systematic use of psychiatric punishment began in the late 1930s, when the NKVD built a special 400-bed penal establishment in the grounds of the regular mental hospital in Kazan. By the late 1940s, the Serbsky Institute, the main Soviet centre for teaching and research in criminal psychiatry, had a special department for ‘political’ work. By the early 1950s, at least three establishments ‘treated’ cases of political prisoners, since we know of one man, Ilya Yarkov, who suffered in all of them. Psychiatric punishment was given chiefly to offenders under the catch-all Article 58 of the criminal code, dealing with ‘anti-Soviet acts’. Yarkov’s fellow-inmates included Christians, surviving Trotskyists, opponents of Lysenko, heterodox writers, painters and musicians, Latvians, Poles and other nationalists. The system, far from being abandoned, greatly expanded under Khrushchev, who was anxious to persuade the world that Soviet Russia no longer imprisoned political offenders, merely the unbalanced, and was quoted by *Pravda* (1959) as saying: ‘A crime is a deviation from the generally recognized standards of behaviour, frequently caused by mental disorder... clearly the mental state of such people is not normal.’

“The West first became aware of Soviet penal psychiatry in 1965 with the publication of Valery Tarsis’s *Ward 7*, and thereafter efforts were made within the psychiatric profession to obtain documentation of specific cases and to raise the issue at meetings of the World Psychiatric Association. These efforts were partly frustrated by the anxiety of some (chiefly American) psychiatrists to preserve Iron

¹⁴⁷ Harding, “Vladimir Bukovsky Obituary”, *The Guardian*, October 28, 2019.

Curtain participation in the body at any cost, partly by the skill with which the Soviet psychiatric establishment covered its tracks and, in 1973, arranged a Potemkin-type visit to the Serbsky. Nevertheless during the period 1965-75 details of 210 fully authenticated cases were obtained. In addition to the first psychiatric punishment prison in Kazan, at least thirteen other Special Psychiatric Hospitals were opened in the 1960s and 1970s. No Westerner, whether psychiatrist or not, was allowed to visit an SPH. But it was established they were under the Ministry of the Interior (MVD) not the Ministry of Health, were headed by military officers and run administratively like prisons. Reports from former prisoners showed the SPHs bore a marked resemblance to the experimental prison-clinics run by SS doctors as part of Himmler's race-programme, in both the cruelties practised and the type of doctor in charge. The most common torture, the wet canvas 'roll-up' method, appears to have been invented by a Dr. Elizaveta Lavritskaya, one of the most hardened of the creatures described by Yakov. Details of tortures, beatings and the punitive use of drugs were provided at US Senate hearings in 1972. The worst offenders were identified as Professor Andrei Snezhnevsky, Director of the Institute of Psychiatry at the Academy of Medical Sciences, who led the campaign to diagnose dissent as a form of schizophrenia; Professor Ruben Nadzharov, his deputy; Dr. George Morozov, head of the Serbsky; and Professor Daniel Lunts, regarded by the dissenters as the worst of the practitioners of psycho-terror. As with the SS, some of the doctors held military rank: Lunts was variously identified as a KGB colonel or a major-general in the MVD. These men were allowed to travel abroad to represent Soviet psychiatry, had salaries three times as large as other psychiatrists, and enjoyed access to the luxuries and privileges of the higher echelons of the Soviet ruling class.

"Psychiatric punishment expanded greatly under Brezhnev, though following the campaign of exposure in the West it was confined largely to the humble worker-protestor unlikely to attract outside attention. For the prominent, there were many increasingly severe grades of oppression, none of which need even involve a trial. Commenting on the exile of Sakharov to Gorky, Medvedev noted: 'From Gorky Sakharov could be sent to Irkutsk in Siberia, to Tomsk, or to Chita. Worse every time... The important thing is that the victim must always have something to lose, therefore something to be afraid of.' ... | "148

In June, 1971 the ROCOR Synod of Bishops issued a special statement condemning this barbaric practice of Soviet penal psychiatry..¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸ Johnson, *Modern Times*,

¹⁴⁹ "Soviet Psychiatric Torture",
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mJ8rYeQrSak&list=PLjJEXmzbyxxXqtlw8KV2XHGsDyfcEjzXy&index=2>.

13. ROCOR'S THIRD ALL-EMIGRATION COUNCIL

On May 14/27, 1964, ROCOR's Metropolitan Anastasy retired (he died in 1965). Known as "most wise" already from the time of the 1917-18 Council, his period as first hierarch represents a "holding operation", a preservation of the *status quo* in a very difficult period interrupted by the chaos of the Second World War and the transfer of ROCOR's headquarters from Europe to the United States. It left certain important questions unanswered – questions that would have to be answered unambiguously sooner or later. But it had at any rate kept the voice of opposition to the MP alive in the West.

Deacon Andrei Psarev writes: "Since Byzantine times, conciliarity was maintained in the Orthodox Church by [or: in spite of] the confrontation between the 'diplomats; and the 'zealots.' At the time of the Council of Bishops in 1964 there was a sharp confrontation between these two episcopal parties. The leader of the 'zealots' was St. John (Maximovitch) of Shanghai and San Francisco, and the leader of the 'diplomats' was Archbishop Nikon (Rklitskii) of Washington and Florida. The election of a First Hierarch from either of these two factions would have made it extremely difficult for the other party to work with this person. To resolve this crisis, St. John offered to withdraw his candidacy, if Archbishop Nikon would follow suit. The result was that Bishop Philaret (Voznesenskii) became the Primate of the Russian Church Abroad. This opened a new period in ROCOR history. Bishop Philaret had been consecrated only a year earlier, and represented a new generation of leaders."¹⁵⁰

¹⁵⁰ Psarev, "May 1964: A Radical Change in the History of the Russian Church Abroad", *Orthodox History*, August 27, 2012. There was such animosity between the supporters of the two candidates for the vacant post, Archbishops Nikon and John Maximovich, that to avoid a schism Archbishop John withdrew his own candidature and put forward in his place the youngest bishop, Philaret (Voznesensky) of Brisbane. However, Fr. Alexey Young has a slightly different version of events: "I have learned that at the time time Met. Anastasy retired, Vladika John was about to be elected Metropolitan, when Vladika Vitaly threatened the Synod that he would 'make a schism' if John was elected (apparently coveting the office himself). Rather than risk schism in such a small jurisdiction, Vladika John bowed out in favor of Philaret, whom Vitaly also found acceptable. It was a measure of the kind of man Bl. John was" (private communication to writer, May 16, 1983). According to Fr. Christopher Birchall, Philaret's election was "entirely due to the prompting and influence of Archbishop John" (*Embassy, Emigrants, and Englishmen. The Three-Hundred Year History of a Russian Orthodox Church in London*, Jordanville, N.Y.: Holy Trinity Publications, 2014, p. 425). According to one source, Archbishop John's candidature was especially opposed by Archbishop Anthony of Geneva. The two men had never been friends... For the life of Metropolitan Philaret, see Nun Cassia (Tatiana Senina, "'And his lot is among the saints...'", *Vertograd-Inform* (English edition), No 15, January, 2000, pp. 6-24; *Fiery Pillar. Metropolitan Philaret (Voznesensky) of New York and Eastern America and the Russian Church Abroad (1964-1985)*; Monk Vsevolod (Filipiev), "Mitropolit Filaret: k dvadtsatiletiu co dnia konchiny, 1985-2005", *Pravoslavnaia Rus'*, No 22 (1786), November 15/28, 2005, pp. 1-3; *Pravoslavnaia Rus'*, June 14, 1981; Bishop Gregory Grabbe, *Pis'ma (Letters)*, Moscow, 1998, pp. 14-15; *Tserkovnaia Zhizn'*, No1, 1962; Protopriest Alexis Mikrikov, "Unia s MP privedet k dukhovnoj karastrofe" (The Unia with the MP will lead to a spiritual catastrophe), <http://metanthonymemorial.org/VernostNo34.html>; Monk Benjamin (Gomarteli), "Letopis' Tserkovnykh Sobytij Pravoslavnoj Tserkvi nachinaia s 1917 goda" (A Chronicle of Church Events of the Orthodox Church beginning from 1917),

Metropolitan Philaret's first act was to canonize St. John of Kronstadt. This was the first time that ROCOR had canonized a saint from within Russia. It showed, as Psarev writes, that "the Russian Church Abroad was turning into a self-sufficient entity."¹⁵¹

In 1974 the Third All-Emigration Council of ROCOR took place in the monastery of the Holy Trinity in Jordanville, New York. Just as the First Council, held at Karlovtsy in 1921, had defined the relationship of ROCOR to the Bolshevik regime and the Romanov dynasty; and the Second Council, held in Belgrade in 1938, defined her relationship to the Church inside Russia; so the Third Council tried to define her relationship to the ecumenical and dissident movements. As Metropolitan Philaret, president of the Council, said in his keynote address: "First of all, the Council must declare not only for the Russian flock, but for the entire Church, its concept of the Church; to reveal the dogma of the Church... The Council must determine the place our Church Abroad holds within contemporary Orthodoxy, among the other 'so-called' churches. We say 'so-

<http://www.zlatoust.ws/letopis.htm>; Metropolitan Valentine of Suzdal, *Nativity Epistle*, 2000/2001; Ivan Ostroumoff, *The History of the Council of Florence*, pp. 193-199; Archbishop Averky, *Sovremennost' v svete Slova Bozhia. Slova i Rechi* (1969-1973) (Contemporary Life in the Light of the Word of God: Sermons and Speeches), Jordanville: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1975, vol. III, p. 216; Archbishop Vitaly, in *Orthodox Life*, vol. 34, no. 4, July- August, 1984; Fr. Alexey Young, *The Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia: A History and Chronology*, San Bernardino: The Borgo Press, 1993, pp. 117-118; Nun Vassa (Larin) "'Glory be to God, Who did not Abandon His Church', The Self-Awareness of ROCOR at the 1974 Third All- Diaspora Council", <http://www.russianorthodoxchurch.ws/01newstructure/pagesen/articles/svassasobor.htm>; A. Golitsyn, *The Perestroika Deception*, London and New York: Edward Harle, 1995, p. 175; Protodeacon Basil Yakimov, "Re: Fundamental Question", orthodox-synod@yahoo.groups.com, 4 June, 2003; *Vertograd-Inform*, No 11 (68), November, 2000, pp. 52-53; *Vertograd-Inform*, No 11 (44), November, 1998, pp. 24-27, 28-32; "A Letter from Metropolitan Philaret (Voznesensky) to a Priest of the Church Abroad concerning Father Dimitry Dudko and the Moscow Patriarchate", *Vertograd-Inform*, No 4, February, 1999, pp. 16-20; *Vestnik Zapadno-Evropejskoj Eparkhii* (Herald of the Western European Diocese), 1979, No 14; *Tserkovnie Novosti* (Church News), No 4 (95), June-July, 2001, p. 9; "A Contemporary Patristic Document", *Orthodox Christian Witness*, November 14/27, 1983, p. 3; "Encyclical Letter of the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia", *Orthodox Life*, vol. 33, No 6, November-December, 1983, p. 13; Protopresbyter Valery Lukianov, "The Transfer of the Blessed Remains of Metropolitan Philaret", *Orthodox Life*, vol. 48, no. 6, November- December, 1998, pp. 33-36; "Miraculous Occurrences Associated with Metropolitan Philaret", *Orthodox Life*, November-December, 1998, pp. 37-38; "An Important Anniversary", *Orthodox Life*, July-December, 2010, pp. 60-65; Hieroschemamonk Akakije, personal communication, March, 2006; Matushka Tatiana Fyodorov, personal communication, April, 2006; Nun Xenia (Mitrenina), personal communication, April, 2006; K. Preobrazhensky, "Otravlenia v Zarubezhnoj Tserkvi", *Nasha Strana*, No 2816, March 23, 2007, p. 8; Bishop Agathangelus of Odessa, August 21, 2007, <http://guest-2.livejournal.com/294723.html>; *Vernost*, no. 104, March, 2008, <http://metanthonymemorial.org/VernostNo104a.html>; Nun Euphrosyne (Molchanova), "Doklad Osviaschennomu Soboru RIPTs o podvige sviatitel'skogo sluzhenia Mitropolita Filareta (V oznesenskogo)", http://catacomb.org.ua/modules.php?name=Pages&go=print_pagelid=1441; Milivoje Miljkovic, personal communication; "An Important Anniversary", *Orthodox Life*, July- December, 2010, pp. 60-65; Nikolai Smolentsev-Sobol', "K Biografiju Sviatitelja Filareta (V oznesenskogo)", <http://m-Idelamballe.livejournal.com/28963.html>; www.monasterypress.com/mphilaret.html; <http://www.homb.org/calendar-and-daily-readings/docs/28-st-philaret-feast-day.pdf?PHPSESSID=b6bedde089e1addfb19c855658265a03>

¹⁵¹ Psarev, op. cit.

called' for though now people often speak of many 'churches', the Church of Christ is single and One."¹⁵²

There was much to discuss. In the last decade the apostatic influence of the ecumenical movement had broadened and deepened, and Metropolitan Philaret, had assumed a leading role in the struggle against it through his "Sorrowful Epistles". Under the influence of his leadership, many non-Russians, such as the Greek American Monastery of the Holy Transfiguration in Boston, had sought refuge in ROCOR, and this movement had been strengthened by the application of the two Greek Old Calendarist Synods to enter into communion with her. ROCOR was no longer an exclusively Russian jurisdiction in the make-up of her members, and she could no longer be seen as simply an outpost of Russian Orthodox anti-communism. She was a multi-ethnic, missionary Church fighting the main heresies of the age on a number of fronts throughout the world. However, such a vision of ROCOR was shared by only a minority of her hierarchs, among whom Archbishop Averky of Jordanville was the most prominent.

ROCOR was now isolated from almost all other Orthodox Churches; and the question arose how to justify this. Some saw the isolation of ROCOR as necessitated, not so much by the struggle against ecumenism, as by the need to preserve *Russianness* among the Russian émigrés. This created a problem for a Church that was rapidly filling up with non-Russian converts. It was not that the preservation of Russianness as such was not an undoubted good. The problem arose when it hindered the missionary witness of the Church to non-Russian believers. Such phyletistic tendencies inevitably led to a loss of Church consciousness in relation to ecumenism, and to a feeling that ROCOR was closer to Russians of the MP, ecumenist though they might be, than to True Orthodox Christians of Greek or French or American origin.¹⁵³

Another cause of division was the stricter attitude that ROCOR was now being forced to adopt towards "World Orthodoxy", the Local Orthodox Churches that participated in the ecumenical movement. Most of the hierarchs had passively acquiesced in Metropolitan Philaret's "Sorrowful Epistles", and in the union with the Greek Old Calendarists. But they began to stir when the consequences of this were spelled out by the zealots in ROCOR: no further communion with the new calendarists, the Serbs and Jerusalem. The unofficial leader of this group of bishops was Archbishop Anthony of Geneva, who was supported by Bishop Laurus of Manhattan, Archbishop Philotheus of Hamburg and Bishop Paul of Stuttgart. His main opponents were Metropolitan Philaret, Archbishops Anthony

¹⁵² Third All-Diaspora Council, 1974, Protocol 1, August 26 / September 8, Synodal Archives, p. 2; quoted in Nun Vassa (Larin) "'Glory be to God, Who did not Abandon His Church', The Self-Awareness of ROCOR at the Third All-Diaspora Council of 1974", <http://www.russianorthodoxchurch.ws/01newstructure/pagesen/articles/svassasobor.htm>.

¹⁵³ Eugene Pavlenko, "The Heresy of Phyletism: History and the Present", *Vertograd-Inform*, No 13, November, 1999.

of Los Angeles and Averky of Syracuse, Bishop Gregory (Grabbe)¹⁵⁴ and the Greek-American Monastery of the Holy Transfiguration in Boston.

Anthony of Geneva was a powerful hierarch who had already once apostasized to the Moscow Patriarchate.¹⁵⁵ He continually proclaimed that the MP was a true Church. Moreover, he concelebrated frequently with the heretics of "World Orthodoxy", and in 1986, ordered his Paris clergy to concelebrate with the new calendarists in Greece, and not with the Old Calendarists. He was a thorn in the side of Metropolitan Philaret until the latter's death in 1985... In his address to the Council, entitled "Our Church in the Modern World", he declared: "By the example of our First Hierarchs [Anthony and Anastasy] we must carefully preserve those fine threads which bind us with the Orthodox world. Under no circumstances must we isolate ourselves, seeing around us often imagined heretics and schismatics. Through gradual self-isolation we will fall into the extremism which our metropolitans wisely avoided, we will reject that middle, royal path which until now our Church has travelled... By isolating ourselves, we will embark upon the path of sectarianism, fearing everyone and everything, we will become possessed with paranoia."

This somewhat hysterical appeal not to separate from the World Orthodox at just the point when they were embarking upon "super-ecumenism" was criticised by Fr. George Grabbe: "The report does not mention to the degree necessary, maybe, that life goes on, and the sickness of ecumenism deepens and widens more and more. Condescension, *oikonomia*, must under different circumstances be applied differently, and to different degrees. In doses too great it can betray the Truth." Archbishop Anthony of Los Angeles also opposed him. Already at the Hierarchical Council in 1971, he had declared: "If heretics are graceless, then so much the more should the Patriarchate be recognized to be such, for its position if worse than here, because it cooperates with the God-fighters."¹⁵⁶ Now

¹⁵⁴ "In his report to Metropolitan Philaret on 7 December of 1972, Archpriest George Grabbe, who then headed the Synod's External Affairs Department, protested against Bishops Nikon and Laurus having united in prayer with Archbishop Iakovos during the visit of the relics of St. Nicholas to the Greek Church in Flushing, NY. His protest was motivated on the basis of determinations of the ROCOR Councils of Bishops of 1967 and 1971 that its clergy must by all means avoid prayerful communion with hierarchs who were ecumenists, and even more so because ROCOR had accepted clerics who had left these other churches for 'dogmatic reasons'." (Psarev, op. cit., p. 4).

¹⁵⁵ "In 1945, being in Serbia, he went over to the MP and waited for a Soviet passport so as to go to the USSR, but the Soviet authorities took their time with the passport, bestowing on him in the meantime the rank of archimandrite [through Patriarch Alexis I]. But, fed up with waiting for permission to return, [in 1949] the future bishop left for Switzerland to his brother Bishop Leontius, where he was reunited with ROCOR, having received a penance for his joining the MP." (Vladimir Kirillov, May 15, 2006 <http://elmager.livejournal.com/66190.html?thread=283278>; Bernard le Caro, "A Short Biography of Archbishop Antony (Bartoshevich) of Geneva and Western Europe (+1993)", http://www.orthodoxengland.org.uk/vl_antony_b.pdf).

¹⁵⁶ Arch. Anthony, cited in A. Kostriukov, "Position of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia on the issue of Holiness of Moscow Patriarchate in the Period of Metropolitan Filaret (Voznesensky), *Vestnik Pravoslavnogo Sviato-Tikhonovskogo gumanitarnogo universiteta*. Seriya II: Istorii. Istorii Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi, 2021. Vol. 98, pp. 130-

he reminded the Council members that “we have many Greek [Old Calendarist] parishes. Our concelebration with the new calendarists was very bitter for them.”¹⁵⁷

The leader of one of the Greek Old Calendarist parishes within ROCOR, Fr. Panagiotes Carras, sent an appeal to the Synod of Bishops on August 24, 1974 on behalf of all “non-Russian monasteries, parishes, and laity of ROCOR”, in which he called on the ecumenists to be labelled as heretics who had lost the Holy Spirit and who should be subjected to the canonical sanctions that apply to heretics and schismatics.

Metropolitan Philaret was sympathetic to this appeal, and moved for an official statement that the MP was graceless. According to the witness of a seminarian present at the Council, the majority of bishops and delegates would have supported such a motion. However, at the last minute the metropolitan was persuaded not to proceed with the motion on the grounds that it would have caused a schism.¹⁵⁸

Voices were heard at the 1974 Council arguing for union between ROCOR and the schismatic Paris and American Metropolia jurisdictions. Love, they said, should unite us, and we should not emphasize our differences. Metropolitan Philaret, however, pointed out that love which does not wish to disturb our neighbour by pointing out his errors is not love but hatred!¹⁵⁹

The divisions that were beginning to emerge between Metropolitan Philaret and the majority of other hierarchs were expressed by him in a letter to one of his few allies, Protopresbyter George Grabbe, the Secretary of the Synod. Describing a meeting with the hierarchs, he wrote: “I saw how truly alone I am among our hierarchs with my views on matters of principle (although on a personal level I am on good terms with everyone). And I am in earnest when I say that I am considering retiring. Of course, I won’t leave all of a sudden, unexpectedly. But at the next Sobor I intend to point out that too many things that are taking place in our church life do not sit well with me. And if the majority of the episcopacy

142, “https://periodical.pstgu.ru/ru/pdf/article/7418?fbclid=IwAR2E0YhIJ1vF8wSkkRsipVzP_P_vTNaDozLfbIF8bmDbHYiuMf4OwzKFQlyM.”

¹⁵⁷ *Protocol No 4 of the All-Diaspora Council*, August 29 / September 11, 1974.

¹⁵⁸ Fr. Basil Yakimov, “Re: Fundamental Question”, orthodox-synod@yahoo.groups.com, 4 June, 2003. And the following is an extract from Protocol no. 3 of the ROCOR Sobor, dated October 8/21, 1974: “Bishop Gregory says that to the question of the existence (of grace) it is not always possible to give a final reply immediately. The loss of grace is the consequence of spiritual death, which sometimes does not come immediately. Thus plants sometimes die gradually. In relation to the loss of grace in the Moscow Patriarchate, it would be interesting to make the comparison with the position of the iconoclasts, although the sin of the Patriarchate is deeper. The President [Metropolitan Philaret] says that we cannot now issue a resolution on grace in the Moscow Patriarchate, but we can be certain that grace lives only in the true Church, but the Moscow hierarchs have gone directly against Christ and His work. How can there be grace among them? The metropolitan personally considers that the Moscow Patriarchate is graceless.” (*Tserkovnie Novosti* (Church News), No 4 (95), June-July, 2001, p. 9).

¹⁵⁹ See his letter to Fr. Victor Potapov, *Vertograd-Inform*, No 11 (44), November, 1998, pp. 28-32, and to Abbess Magdalena of Lesna.

agrees with me than I will not raise the matter of retiring. But if I see that I am alone or see myself in the minority then I will announce that I am retiring. For I cannot head, nor, therefore bear the responsibility for that with which I am not in agreement in principle. In particular, I do not agree with our practice of halfway relations with the American and Parisian schismatics. The Holy Fathers insistently state that long and obdurately continuing schism is close to being heresy, and that it is necessary to relate to stubborn schismatics as to heretics, not allowing any communion with them whatsoever (how Vladyka Anthony's hair would stand on end at such a pronouncement! But I remain unyielding)..."¹⁶⁰

With regard to the new calendarist schism, on September 12/25 the Council took the following decision: "Concerning the question of the presence or absence of Grace among the new calendarists, ROCOR does not consider itself or any other Local Church as having the authority to make a final decision."¹⁶¹ This was, of course, a very "liberal" decision, which went against the official position of the Greek Old Calendarist Churches (both Matthewite and Florinite) with whom ROCOR had entered into official communion in 1969-71. Six days later, the Council passed another resolution calling on the Old Calendarists to unity, but emphasizing that "ROCOR has no canonical power over the church jurisdictions in Greece and they cannot interfere in their life with decisions that would be obligatory in controversial questions."

¹⁶⁰ Metropolitan Philaret to Fr. George Grabbe, July 12/25, 1975, *Vertograd-Inform*, No 11 (68), November, 2000, pp. 52-53.

¹⁶¹ <http://sinod.ruschurchabroad.org/Arh%20Sobor%201974>.

14. ROCOR AND THE SOVIET DISSIDENTS

The movement of ecclesiastical dissent among some of the clergy of the MP began with the open letter of the Priests Nicholas Yeshliman and Gleb Yakunin to President Podgorny in 1965. They protested against the subservience of the Church to the State, particularly during the Khrushchev persecution, when the Church effectively gave control of the parishes to the State-controlled *dvadsatsky*, handed over of lists of those baptized to the local authorities, did not allow children and adolescents under 18 to participate in church life, and ordained to the clergy only men who were pleasing to the Council for Religious Affairs. In 1966 the patriarchate reacted by banning both priests from serving.

Among the laity, the most significant dissident was the philosopher Boris Talantov, who was imprisoned for exposing the activities of the Kirov Bishop John in the closing of churches and suppression of believers. He was slandered publicly on the BBC by Metropolitan Nikodem of Leningrad, and was eventually sent to prison in Kirov, where he died in 1971. In an article entitled "Sergianism, or adaptation to atheism", which had the subtitle "The Leaven of Herod", Talantov denounced Metropolitan Sergei's 1927 declaration as a betrayal of the Church, and the MP as "a secret agent of worldwide antichristianity". Sergianism had not only not "saved" the Church, but, on the contrary, had assisted the loss of true ecclesiastical freedom and turned the Church administration into the obedient tool of the atheist authorities. "Metropolitan Sergei," he wrote, "by his adaptation and lies saved nobody and nothing except himself."

In another samizdat article entitled "The Secret Participation of the Moscow Patriarchate in the struggle of the CPSU against the Orthodox Christian Church" Talantov wrote: "The Moscow Patriarchate and the majority of bishops participate in organized activities of the atheist authorities directed to the closing of churches, the limitation of the spreading of the faith and its undermining in our country... In truth the atheist leaders of the Russian people and the princes of the Church have gathered together against the Lord and His Christ".¹⁶²

In 1972, Alexander Solzhenitsyn wrote an open "Lenten Letter" to Patriarch Pimen, describing the patriarchate as being "ruled dictatorially by atheists - a sight never before seen in two millenia!" "The Russian Church," he wrote, "expresses its concern about any evil in distant Africa, while it never has anything at all to say about things which are wrong here at home." And he went on: "By what reasoning is it possible to convince oneself that the planned destruction of the spirit and body of the church under the guidance of atheists is the best way of preserving it? Preserving it for whom? Certainly not for Christ. Preserving it by

¹⁶² Talantov, in "Tserkov' Katakombnaia na zemle Rossijskoj (III)" (The Catacomb Church in the Russian Land (III), *Pravoslavnaia Zhizn'* (Orthodox Life), No 12 (635), December, 2002, pp. 10-11.

what means? By falsehood? But after the falsehood by whose hands are the holy sacraments to be celebrated?"¹⁶³

Solzhenitsyn's appeal "not to live by the lie" was seen by some to lead logically to the adoption of a catacomb existence for the Church. Thus Fr. Sergei Zheludkov replied: "What are we to do in such a situation? Should we say: all or nothing? Should we try to go underground, which in the present system is unthinkable? Or should we try somehow to accept the system and for the present use those opportunities that are permitted?"¹⁶⁴

Solzhenitsyn emigrated to the West in 1974¹⁶⁵ and was brought to the Third All-Diaspora Council in Jordanville by Archbishop Anthony of Geneva, who took the opportunity of his presence to read a report calling on ROCOR to support the dissidents, in spite of the fact that they were ecumenists and in the MP. The implication of the report was to raise the dissidents to the status of true Church confessors on a par with those of the Catacomb Church. Solzhenitsyn denied the very existence of the Catacomb Church... Metropolitan Philaret expressed no desire at all to meet him.¹⁶⁶

This report was countered by Archbishop Anthony of Los Angeles, a member of the zealot group of hierarchs that included Metropolitan Philaret and Archbishop Averky of Jordanville, who, while respecting the courage of the dissidents, objected to a recognition that would devalue the witness of the true catacomb confessors.

One of the most important Soviet dissidents was the Moscow priest Fr. Dmitri Dudko, who conducted open meetings in his church that attracted many. Unlike Solzhenitsyn, he knew of the Catacomb Church, and wrote of it in relatively flattering terms: "We all recognize Patriarch Tikhon and we look on Patriarch Sergei's [acts] as a betrayal of the Church's interests to please the authorities. The following (Patriarchs) – Alexis and the present Pimen – only go on the road already opened. We have no other hierarchy. The Catacomb Church would be good – but where is it? The True Orthodox Church – these are good people, morally steadfast; but they have almost no priesthood, and you simply can't find them, while there are many who are thirsting. And one has to be ministered to by the hierarchy we do have. Immediately the question arises: are they ministering to us? Basically, they are the puppets of the atheists. And another question: at least, are they believers? Who will answer this question? I fear to answer..."¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ Jane Ellis, *The Russian Orthodox Church*, London: Allen Croom, 1986, p. 304.

¹⁶⁴ Ellis, op. cit., p. 305.

¹⁶⁵ In Switzerland he would go to the Moscow Patriarchate, while his wife would go to ROCOR, whose ruling bishop there was Anthony of Geneva (personal communication to the writer by Metropolitan Anthony Bloom in 1975).

¹⁶⁶ See his 1975 letter here: https://goctoronto.org/two-letters-by-the-new-confessor-saint-philaret-metropolitan-of-new-york/?fbclid=IwAR03r0GOtockeszegtAbuBLhTlyuqE-QDd0QgGJN_oHT_Fjg6zT8R2Rv5eI

¹⁶⁷ Dudko, in *Posev*, translated in *The Orthodox Word*, September-October, 1979.

These sentiments elicited sympathy from members of ROCOR. Less well known was Fr. Dmitri's ecumenism – because edited out of his books as published in the West.¹⁶⁸ The right attitude to him would have been to applaud his courage and the correct opinions he expressed, while gently seeking to correct his liberalism and ecumenism. In no way was it right to treat him as if he were a true priest in the True Church, and an example to be followed that was no less praiseworthy than those of the true confessors in the catacombs. But that is precisely what many in ROCOR now began to do.

Even the 1974 Council was tempted, declaring: “The boundary between preservation of the Church and seductive self-preservation was drawn by his Holiness Patriarch Tikhon, his lawful *locum tenens* Metropolitan Peter, Metropolitan Cyril of Kazan, Metropolitan Joseph of Petrograd and the Solovki confessors headed by Archbishop Hilarion (Troitsky). In recent years, this boundary has again been clearly drawn by Archbishop Hermogenes, several priests, among them Nicholas Gainov and Dmitri Dudko, the laypeople of Vyatka led by Boris Talantov, the defenders of the Pochaev Lavra such as Theodosia Kuzminichna Varavva, and many others. This boundary has also been drawn by Solzhenitsyn in his appeal ‘Do not live by the lie!’ Not to live by the lie and to honour the memory of the holy martyrs and confessors of our Church – this is the boundary separating the true Tikhonites from ‘the sergianist leaven of Herod’, as wrote Boris Talantov, the rebukers of the present leaders of the patriarchate who died in prison. In our unceasing prayers for each other, in our love for the Lord Jesus, in our faithfulness to the ideal of the past and future Orthodox Russia, the faithful archpastors, pastors, monks and laymen on both sides of the iron curtain are united. Together they constitute the Holy Church of Russia, which is indivisible just as the seamless robe of Christ is indivisible.”¹⁶⁹

This was a serious distortion: to place the confessors of the Catacomb Church on the same level as sergianist dissidents. A case could be made for considering that Boris Talantov was a true martyr, since he denounced the MP in terms identical to those employed by the Catacomb Church and paid for his words with his life. But Dudko and Solzhenitsyn did not share the faith of the True Church, and did not join it even after the fall of communism...

Fr. Seraphim Rose criticized Solzhenitsyn: “Let us return to the belief of Solzhenitsyn and all the defenders of the Moscow Patriarchate that the betrayal of her hierarchs does not affect the Church's faithful. This view is based on an entirely false view of the nature of the Church which artificially separates the hierarchs from the believing people and allows ‘church life as normal’ to go on no matter what happens to the Church leaders. On the contrary, the whole history of the Church of Christ persuades us of the exact opposite. Who else was it but the Bishops of Rome who led the Church of the West into apostasy and schism

¹⁶⁸ Personal communication from Monks of Monastery Press, Montreal, January, 1977.

¹⁶⁹ *Poslanie Tret'ego Vsezarubezhnogo Sobora Russkoj Pravoslavnoj Tserkvi Zagranitsej Pravoslavnomu russkomu narodu na rodine* (Epistle of the Third All-Emigration Council of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad to the Russian People in the Homeland), September 8/21, 1974.

and heresy? Is it the fault of ordinary believing Roman Catholics that they, the largest group of 'Christians' in the world, are today outside the Church of Christ, and that in order to return to the true Church they must not only reject the false doctrines of Rome, but also completely reform their religious mentality and unlearn the false piety which has been transmitted to them precisely by their bishops? Today, it is true, the Moscow Patriarchate allows Roman Catholics to receive its Sacraments and implicitly already teaches the ecumenist doctrine that these Catholics too are 'part of the Church'. But this fact only shows how far the Moscow Patriarchate has departed from the universal Orthodox tradition of the Church into an erroneous ecclesiology, and how correct the True Orthodox Church is in refusing to have communion with an ecclesiastical body which not only allows its policies to be dictated by atheists, but openly preaches the modern heresies of ecumenism and chiliasm."¹⁷⁰

In 1976 the ROCOR Synod issued an Epistle to the Russian people which, after declaring unity with the Catacomb Church, went on to say to MP dissidents: "We also kiss the cross that you have taken upon yourselves, O pastors who have found in yourselves the courage and strength of spirit to be open reproachers of the weakness of spirit of your hierarchs, who have surrendered before the atheists... We know of your exploit, we pray for you and ask your prayers for our flock that is in the diaspora. Christ is in our midst! He is and shall be!"¹⁷¹

"Christ is in our midst! He is and shall be!" are words that Orthodox priests exchange in the altar after the consecration of the Holy Gifts. Their use here implied the recognition of the dissidents as co-celebrants with ROCOR, members of the same Church. Clearly the influence of the dissidents was having a corrosive effect on the ecclesiology of ROCOR.

In February, 1976 the Matthewites broke communion with ROCOR, claiming that they had broken their promise to give them a written confession that the new calendarists were graceless¹⁷², and that Archbishop Anthony of Geneva was

¹⁷⁰ Rose, "The Catacomb Tikhonite Church 1974", *The Orthodox Word*, 1974, pp. 241-242.

¹⁷¹ *Pravoslavnaia Rus'* (Orthodox Russia), 1976, No 20.

¹⁷² Although ROCOR officially refused to call the new calendarists graceless, there is evidence that Metropolitan Philaret's personal views were stricter and closer to those of the Greeks. Thus on September 20, 1975, he wrote to Metropolitan Epiphanius of Kition, the leader of the Old Calendarist Church of Cyprus, with whom he continued to have friendly relations even after the Matthewite Synod to which Epiphanius belonged had broken communion with ROCOR: "From the beginning our Russian Church has known that the calendar innovation was unacceptable, and has not dared to move this boundary set by patristic tradition, for the Ecclesiastical Calendar is a support of the life of the Church and as such is fortified by decrees of Holy Tradition.

"However, it is obvious to all that the calendar innovation caused a schism in the Greek Church in 1924, and the responsibility for the schism weighs exclusively on the innovators. This is the conclusion that will be reached by anyone studying the Patriarchal *Tomoi* (as that of 1583) and taking into account the wretched and self-evident fact of the schism and the frightful punishments, persecutions and blasphemies which those who have cleaved to the patristic piety of Holy Tradition have undergone.

"Thinking in this way, our Holy Synod has decreed that we 'flee' concelebrations with the new calendarist modernists. We do not concelebrate with them, nor do we give permission or a blessing to our clergy for such a concelebration. In order to assure you of the truth of what we

continuing to have communion with the new calendarists.¹⁷³ This was true; and his ecumenist activities continued even after the break with the Matthewites. Thus at Pascha, 1976, he asked permission for pastoral reasons to serve with Russian clerics of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in Europe.¹⁷⁴ In October he again concelebrated in London with several heretics at the funeral of Archbishop Nikodem of Great Britain.¹⁷⁵ And in May, 1977 he travelled to Birmingham, England to concelebrate with the local Serbs.

Archbishop Anthony's ecumenist actions caused several priests and parishes to leave him for the Matthewites, including Fr. Basile Sakkas in Switzerland, Hieromonk Cassian (Braun) in France, and a parish in England. Metropolitan Philaret also expressed disapproval of Archbishop Anthony's canonical transgressions.¹⁷⁶

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In the same critical year of 1976 the well-known Brotherhood of St. Herman of Alaska in Platina, California began to turn away from its previously zealot course to a markedly softer line in relation to the MP and World Orthodoxy.¹⁷⁷ They were

say, we inform you that whenever a community in the diaspora is received into our Church, they are required to follow the patristic Calendar of the Orthodox Church..." (from the archives of the True Orthodox Church of Greece)

¹⁷³ *Kyrix Gnision Orthodoxon* (Herald of the True Orthodox Christians), February, 1976, pp. 5-12.

¹⁷⁴ Psarev, op. cit., p. 4.

¹⁷⁵ Archbishop Nikodem was a hierarch of the old school, who rejected the idea that either the Moscow Patriarchate or the Serbian patriarchate had grace. But after his death at the age of 93 in October, 1976, the liberal views of Archbishop Anthony became the norm in both the British and the West European dioceses. According to his obituary in *The Times* (October 19, 1976) Archbishop Nikodem was "born Nikolai Nagaiev, he was educated at the elite Pavlovsky military academy, later becoming an officer in the Tsar's Guards, the Light Infantry 'Sharpshooters' Battalion at Tsaskoe Selo. He fought in the First World War, receiving both wounds and medals. Then came the Communist Revolution, and he became an officer of the general staff of the White Army. Eventually he arrived in Belgrade. In 1943 Metropolitan Anastasy ordained him to the priesthood, and he became a Hieromonk. After the Second World War he went to Munich, thence in 1948 to France to become a parish priest. Then, in 1952, he was appointed Administrator of the Russian Orthodox Diocese in Great Britain. He was raised to the episcopate in 1954,

¹⁷⁶ As he told the present writer in January, 1977, he had a gun at his head. However, he was able to remove the British diocese, where Archbishop Anthony's ecumenism had elicited protests from the English Orthodox Parish of St. Michael, Guildford, to his own jurisdiction later that year.

¹⁷⁷ See especially Fr. Seraphim Rose's article, "The Royal Path" (*The Orthodox Word*, No 70, 1976), in which he wrote: "The Russian Church Outside of Russia has been placed, by God's Providence, in a very favourable position for preserving the 'royal path' amidst the confusion of so much of 20th century Orthodoxy. Living in exile and poverty in a world that has not understood the suffering of her people, she has focused her attention on preserving unchanged the faith which unites her people, she has focused her attention on preserving unchanged the faith which unites her people, and so quite naturally she finds herself a stranger to the whole ecumenical mentality, which is based on religious indifference and self-satisfaction, material affluence, and soulless internationalism. On the other hand, she has been preserved from falling into extremism on the 'right side' (such as might be a declaration that the Mysteries of the Moscow Patriarchate are without grace)... If there seems to be a 'logical contradiction' here... it is a problem only for rationalists; those who approach church questions with the heart as well as the head have no trouble accepting this position..."

influenced in this direction partly by the “dissident fever” that was now raging through most of the Russian part of ROCOR, and partly by the “moderate” ecclesiology of the Greek Old Calendarist Metropolitan Cyprian of Fili. However, a still more important influence may have been a series of controversies – on evolution, on the soul after death, on Blessed Augustine of Hippo – conducted exclusively in the “convert” part of ROCOR between the Platina Brotherhood and the Greek-American monastery in Boston. In all these controversies, in the present writer’s opinion, Platina was right as against Boston. But the negative impression that the Platina monks formed of Boston as a result led them to error in the one area of controversy in which the Boston monastery was right – the canonical status of World Orthodoxy and the MP. Arguing that the Boston monastery’s “super-correctness” was leading them to abandon the “Royal Way” as regards the status of the World Orthodox, Platina came out strongly on the side of the liberal wing of ROCOR led by Archbishop Anthony and his idolisation of Fr. Dmitri Dudko and the other dissidents.

Another important issue was relations with the Serbian Church. The Serbs had joined the WCC in 1965, their ecumenism extended to official acceptance of the canonicity of the Anglican Church¹⁷⁸, and they were as fully under the thumb of the communists as the MP. In spite of this, Archbishop Anthony continued to serve with the Serbs, citing the pre-war hospitality of the Serbs to ROCOR in his justification.

In this connection Metropolitan Philaret wrote to him: “I consider it my duty to point out to you, Vladyka, that your assertion that we must thank the Serbian Church for her treatment of us, I fully accept, but only as regards her past – the glorious past of the Serbian Church. Yes, of course, we must keep the names of their Holinesses Patriarchs Demetrius and Barnabas in grateful memory for their precious support of the Church Abroad at that time when she had no place to lay her head.

“There is no denying that a certain honour is due the Serbian Church for her refusing to condemn our Church Abroad at the parasynagogue in Moscow in 1971, and also on later occasions when Moscow again raised the matter. But then, on the other hand, she did participate in the aforementioned parasynagogue, when it elected Pimen, and the Serbian hierarchs did not protest against this absolutely anti-canonical election, when he who had already been chosen and appointed by the God-hating regime was elected. Our Sobor of 1971 did not, and could not, recognize Pimen, whereas the Serbian Patriarchate recognized and does recognize him, addressing him as Patriarch, and is in full communion with him. And thus she opposes us directly, for we attempt at all times to explain to the “Free World” that the Soviet Patriarchate is not the genuine representative and head of the much-suffering Russian Church. But the Serbian Church

¹⁷⁸ Thus George Deretich writes: “In Waukegan, Illinois (Feb. 7, 1980),... the pro-Belgrade Bishop Firmilian stated openly in court under oath that Episcopalian clergy are canonical priests recognized by his Orthodox Church” (*Treacherous Unity*, Accl Officeworks, 1998, p. 68).

recognizes her as such, and by so doing commits a grave sin against the Russian Church and the Russian Orthodox people.

“How can there be any talk here of a special gratitude to her? Oh, if the Serbian Church would, while recognizing our righteousness, likewise directly and openly, boldly recognize the unrighteousness of the Soviets! Well – then there would truly be something for us to thank her for! But now, as it is, while extending one hand to us, she extends her other hand to our opponents and the enemies of God and the Church. If it pleases you, having shut your eyes to this sad reality, to thank the Serbs for such ‘podvigs’ of theirs, then that is your affair, but I am not a participant in this expression of gratitude.

“How dangerous are compromises in matters of principle! They render people powerless in defence of the Truth. Why is it that the Serbian Patriarchate cannot resolve to sever communion with the Soviet hierarchy? Because she herself is travelling along the same dark and dangerous path of compromise with the God-hating communists. True, she has not progressed along that path to the extent that the Soviet hierarchy has, and she attempts to preach and defend the faith, but if the shades and nuances here are quite different, yet, in principle, the matter stands on one and the same level.”¹⁷⁹

In 1979, in response to a series of protests by Fr. Dmitri Dudko against what he saw as excessive strictness on the part of ROCOR towards the MP, Archbishop Anthony of Geneva, breaking the rule imposed by Metropolitan Anastasy (and reasserted by Metropolitan Philaret) that ROCOR members should have no contact, “even of an everyday nature”, with Soviet church clergy, wrote to Dudko: “I hasten to console you that the part of the Russian Church which lives in freedom beyond the bounds of the homeland, has never officially considered the Moscow Patriarchate, which is recognised in the USSR, as graceless.... We have never dared to deny the grace-filled nature of the official church, for we believe that the sacraments carried out by her clergy are sacraments. Therefore our bishops received your clergy into the Church Abroad in their existing rank... On the other hand, the representatives of the Catacomb Church in Russia accuse us of not wanting to recognise the Moscow Patriarchate as graceless.”¹⁸⁰

However, in 1980, Fr. Dmitri was arrested, which was closely followed by the arrest of his disciples Victor Kapitanchuk and Lev Regelson. Then Dudko issued a recantation on Soviet television in which he confessed that his “so-called struggle with godlessness” was in fact “a struggle with Soviet power”.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ Letter of Metropolitan Philaret to Archbishop Anthony of Geneva, November 16/29, 1977; https://goctoronto.org/two-letters-by-the-new-confessor-saint-philaret-metropolitan-of-new-york/?fbclid=IwAR03r0G0tockeszegtAbuBLhTlyuqE-QDd0QgGJN_oHT_Fjg6zT8R2Rv5eI.

¹⁸⁰ *Vestnik Zapadno-Evropejskoj Eparkhii* (Herald of the Western European Diocese), 1979, No 14; *Posev* (Sowing), 1979, No 12.

¹⁸¹ In fact, before his death in 2004 Dudko became an open advocate of Stalinism and Putin’s neo-Stalinism: “I hope so much for Vladimir Putin now. It seems to me that he is like Joseph Stalin. I treat Stalin with respect, and I think that he was a very wise leader. It is Stalin who established such a powerful country. Russia has never been that powerful since, and there was no tsar in

Kapitanchuk and Regelson confessed to having “criminal ties” with foreign correspondents and of mixing religious activity with politics, while Kapitanchuk said that he had “inflicted damage on the Soviet state for which I am very sorry”. Both men implicated others in their “crimes”.

Metropolitan Philaret wrote: “Why did this calamity befall Father Dmitri Dudko? Let's assume the best, not suspecting him of conscious collaboration with the KGB and betrayal of his convictions, but simply noting the sad fact that he did not endure, but was broken; he capitulated before the enemies of the Church. Why? It would seem that he did display courage and daring; and then suddenly, such an inglorious end. Why?!

“Because his activity took place outside of the true Church...

“What then is the Soviet church? Archimandrite Constantine has often and insistently stated that the most horrible thing that the God-hating regime has done in Russia is the creation of the Soviet Church, which the Bolsheviks presented to the people as the true Church, having driven the genuine Orthodox Church into the catacombs or into the concentration camps.

“This pseudo-church has been twice anathematized. His Holiness Patriarch Tikhon and the All-Russian Church Sobor anathematized the Communists and all their collaborators. This dread anathema has not been lifted till this day and remains in force, since it can be lifted only by a similar All-Russian Church Sobor, as the canonical supreme ecclesiastical authority. And a terrifying thing happened in 1927, when the head of the Church, Metropolitan Sergei, by his infamous and apostate Declaration, subjected the Russian Church to the Bolsheviks and proclaimed collaboration with them. And thus in a most exact sense was fulfilled the expression in the prayer at the beginning of Confession: having fallen under their own anathema! For in 1918 the Church anathematized all the confederates of Communism, while in 1927 she herself joined the camp of these collaborators and began to laud the red, God-hating regime to laud the red beast spoken of in the Apocalypse.

“As if that is not enough. When Metropolitan Sergei promulgated his criminal Declaration, then the faithful children of the Church immediately separated themselves from the Soviet church, and thus the Catacomb Church was formed. And she, in her turn, has anathematized the official church for its betrayal of Christ.

“And it was within this very church of evil-doers that the activities of Father Dmitri Dudko occurred, who has frankly declared in the press that he is not going to break with the Soviet church but will remain in her. Had his spiritual eyes been

Russia who was able to accomplish the things that Stalin did. He managed to overcome and sacrifice so much for the sake of the country's greatness. I hope that Putin will follow in Stalin's path...” (<http://english.pravda.ru/politics/2002/11/13/39433>; quoted by Nicholas Candela, “[paradosis] the wisdom of an MP priest”, orthodox-tradition@yahoo.com, January 22, 2004).

open, and had he seen the true nature of the official church, he might have found within himself the courage to say: I have hated the congregation of evil-doers, and with the ungodly will I not sit. I am breaking off with the company of the enemies of God, and I am withdrawing from the Soviet church. Why, then for us he would have become one of our own his courage would have destroyed the barrier which irrevocably stands between us by virtue of the fact that the Sobor adopted as its guiding principle the Testament of Metropolitan Anastasy. For in this Testament it is ordered that we must not have any communion whatsoever with the Soviets, not only no communion in prayer, but not even ordinary contact in daily life. But as long as Father Dmitri would have refused to remain in the Soviet pseudo-church, and would have withdrawn from membership in her the barrier would no longer have applied to him.”¹⁸²

Metropolitan Philaret had been proved right – although many continued to justify Dudko and denounced those who “judged” him. But it was not a question of “judging” in the sense of harsh personal condemnation, but of the correct discerning of the boundaries of the Church and the correct attitude to those outside it.

Dudko’s vulnerability consisted, not so much in the fear of physical torture, as in the KGB’s ability to induce in him a feeling of false guilt, guilt that he had objectively harmed the Soviet State. This tragedy exposed an inescapable dilemma facing all the dissidents: that action aimed to restore the freedom of the Church was necessarily anti-soviet, insofar as the Soviet State and the Orthodox Church represented incompatible aims and ideologies. Therefore every committed campaigner for Church freedom sooner or later had to admit that he was working against Soviet power – if not by physical, at any rate by spiritual, means, and that he had to work outside the political and ecclesiastical institutions of Soviet power. The failure of the dissidents was the natural consequence of the refusal to obey the Apostle’s command: “Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers” (II Corinthians 6.14). They refused to obey Patriarch Tikhon’s adjuration to the faithful to have no communion at all with the communists, “the outcasts of humanity”. They tried to do good from within an accursed evil - the pact between Metropolitan Sergei and the Communists which, in the words of a *samizdat* document dating from the early 1970s, “tied the Church hand and foot by imposing on her a loyalty not only to the State, *but mainly to the communist ideology*.”¹⁸³

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¹⁸² “A Letter from Metropolitan Philaret (Voznesensky) to a Priest of the Church Abroad concerning Father Dmitri Dudko and the Moscow Patriarchate”, *Vertograd-Inform*, No 4, February, 1999, pp. 16-20. https://blessedphilaret.blogspot.com/2008/09/letter-concerning-fr-dimitry-dudko-and.html?m=1&fbclid=IwAR1HxO6kR2z4phdbLoOZPElh5BT-N2-yVQJ_5HukL6WGqtmIVjDW6758HU0. A few years earlier, on August 14/27, 1977, Metropolitan Philaret had told the present writer: “I advise you always to remain faithful to the anathema of the Catacomb Church against the Moscow Patriarchate.”

¹⁸³ Keston College *Archives* 12/92, No 8926 March 29, 1972, in *Orthodox Life*, September-October, 1974.

The breaking of Dudko elicited the inevitable question: to what extent was the dissident movement infiltrated by the KGB? And still more important: to what extent was ROCOR infiltrated by the KGB? Such a question would arise with particular urgency in the 1990s and 2000s as ROCOR collapsed into union with the MP; but an incident in 1979 involving a layman of ROCOR, Mark Arndt, the future ROCOR Archbishop of Berlin, showed how relevant the question was to Church life already at that time.

Mark was arrested at Leningrad airport for importing anti-Soviet material and then released. The former KGB lieutenant-colonel, now church subdeacon, Konstantin Preobrazhensky, writes:-

“In 1979 the future Archbishop Mark [of Berlin] was arrested at the Soviet border for importing anti-Soviet literature. Nobody knows on what date. Nor does anybody know how long Mark was detained by the KGB, whether for one day or several...

“At that time Mark Arndt was an activist of NTS, the People’s Labour Union, which had once been a warlike anti-Soviet organisation but was then properly crammed with KGB agents.

“Some Russian émigrés today say: ‘What if the KGB simply frightened Mark and then let him go with God’s blessing?’

“I assure you as a retired lieutenant-colonel of the KGB: this could not have happened. Because the import of anti-Soviet literature came under article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, “Anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda”. It was considered an especially dangerous state crime and promised a considerable jail sentence.

“And how then, after arresting Mark, would the chekists have given an account of their work? Explained that they had let him go? And where would the concrete result so valued by the KGB be? Or, as they say there, ‘the dry remains’?

“But nobody would have allowed him to be released!

“After all, every foreigner who fell for righteousness’ or unrighteousness’ sake into the hands of the KGB was considered to be a fat, tasty chicken. He could have been exchanged for a Soviet spy who had fallen into captivity, or used for communist propaganda.

“All this would have been considered to be a great success and promised rewards for the chekists. But if they released him, there would have been no bonus. After all, the KGB is a military system. Every step there has to be agreed with tens of bosses.

“The chekists could have released him only in exchange for a still greater bonus. And they give that for the recruitment of a foreigner. It is considered the greatest achievement in the work of a chekist. His career would have been on the up.

“They teach how to recruit foreigners who are arrested by them in the Minsk KGB school...

“They worked on Mark. He would even have had to spend the night in the KGB...

“Sergei Grigoryants [the founder of the journal *Glasnost*] told me the following: ‘... The fact that the KGB let Mark go in such a “humane” fashion shows that a love match may have been set up between them.’...

“There are *agents of influence*, who act on the politics of their country in a spirit that is useful for Russia. But as a rule they do not break its laws.

“If Archbishop Mark is truly an agent of the KGB, then he belongs to this category. Does his activity correspond to the external political aims of the Putin administration? Undoubtedly yes. It helps submit the Church Abroad to Moscow, so as to take the Russian emigration under the control of the FSB [the new name for the KGB]...”¹⁸⁴

Archbishop Mark immediately and sharply responded to Preobrazhensky’s accusations: “I have never and nowhere been arrested, and I will not comment on every absurdity”.

More recently, Preobrazhensky has returned to the attack on Archbishop Mark, citing the witness of Bishop Irenaeus of Verney and Semirechiye of the Russian True Orthodox Church, who in 1990, as Protopriest Vladimir Klipenshtein, was appointed rector of the church of St. Symeon of the Wonderful Mountain in Dresden by Archbishop Mark. To his surprise he discovered that this church had formerly been in the MP, but that in that year the government of United Germany had decided to return all the Russian churches to ROCOR – and were prepared to enforce that decision by force if necessary. Fr. Vladimir joyfully phoned Archbishop Mark to tell him about this, but received the unexpected reply:

“I’m ready to hang myself because of your actions!”

“But where then am I to serve?” said Fr. Vladimir in amazement.

“Rent a flat and serve at home!” shouted Archbishop Mark.

¹⁸⁴ Preobrazhensky, “Dve Tajny Arkhiepiskopa Marka” (Two Mysteries of Archbishop Mark), Portal-credo.ru, 12 May, 2004, <http://cherksoft.narod.ru/mut59.htm>.

“It was strange: it was he who had appointed Fr. Vladimir as rector of the church, but now he was not allowing him to serve in it! Where was the logic in that?”

Fr. Vladimir later learned that, over ten years before ROCOR was engulfed by the MP, Archbishop Mark served with his patriarchal “double”, Archbishop Theophan of Berlin and Germany. Moreover, although he visited the Dresden parish and served with its patriarchal rector, Fr. George Davidov, he never took the church from him. Then Fr. Vladimir found out from the German counter-espionage service that all the patriarchal priests in Germany were KGB agents!

Fr. Vladimir’s inquiries were extremely displeasing to Archbishop Mark, who recalled him to his monastery of St. Job in Munich, and then told him that he would not be serving in Germany, whereupon he returned to his homeland.

“Bishop Irenaeus noted in a conversation with me that if at that time, in 1999, Mark’s work on the cadres in favour of Moscow had become widely known, this would have elicited such a scandal that last year’s ‘union of the Churches’ could not have taken place. The more so in that at that time the leader of the Church Abroad was Metropolitan Vitaly, who was known for his categorical rejection of the Bolsheviks, the chekists and ‘the Soviet patriarchate’.

“‘I am convinced that it was precisely Mark who led the conspiracy to remove Metropolitan Vitaly in 2000,’ noted Bishop Irenaeus.”¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁵ Preobrazhensky, “Sviaschenniki
<http://elmager.livejournal.com/222404.html?reply>.

i Razvedchiki”,

15. THE GEORGIAN CHURCH AND THE KGB

The Georgian Church, like the Russian, suffered much from the anti-religious policies of Khrushchev in 1959-64. And again, like the Russian, it was completely under the control of the KGB.¹⁸⁶ Thus declassified documents from the KGB archives contain the following assessment for 1982: "Through the work of our agents the Russian Orthodox, Georgian and Armenian churches maintain staunchly loyal positions"¹⁸⁷ – loyal, that is, to Soviet Communism.

Patriarch Ephraim II may have been nominated by the KGB in 1960, and bowed to their pressure. As Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the future president of independent Georgia, wrote: "From 1965 I became much more active in church affairs... Between 1965 and 1969 I and my friends drew many young people towards an interest in religion. We gave them spiritual literature, explained the basic doctrines of religion, argued with atheists until gradually we attracted a significant number of Georgian young people to the Church. This was especially noticeable at Eastertide when all the churches overflowed. The income of the Church greatly increased, its bank balance grew, and so did the number of those applying to enter the seminary.

"All this aroused a great deal of concern in government circles. As is well known, the Soviet government tries by all means to deflect young people from religion. This happened in Georgia too.

"The authorities began by blackmailing and pressurizing Ephraim II. Georgia was filled with damaging rumours about him. I shall not repeat any of them, but will only report what I know definitely and what I am personally convinced is the truth.

"The pressure from the authorities alarmed Ephraim II. He was not like those strong and high principled Patriarchs, Ambrosy Kalaya or Kalistrat Lintsadze. All this slowly affected the style and content of his preaching and his relationship with us, the young flock of the Georgian Church. If before Ephraim had spoken boldly, expressing covert opposition to the Soviet regime (the newspapers even used to criticize his sermons), in his later years his preaching became empty, his appeals merely patriotic, so that it was hard to believe that it was a Christian pastor who spoke. The only bold appeal he made was to believing women to have large families. 'Be fruitful and multiply!' was the chief theme of his preaching at that time. Naturally all this had a bad effect on the young laity, who expected much from a Patriarch. (In addition, a number of priests unworthy of the name caused abuses in the Church which repelled and disillusioned young people ...)

¹⁸⁶ The following account relies heavily on Steven Jones' article, "Soviet Religious Policy and the Georgian Orthodox Apostolic Church: from Khrushchev to Gorbachev", *Religion in Communist Lands*, vol. 17, No 4, Winter, 1989, pp. 292-312.

¹⁸⁷ *Vestnik Germanskoj Eparkhii Russkoj Pravoslavnoj Tserkvi za Granitsej* (Herald of the German Diocese of the Russian Church Abroad), No 1, 1992, p. 20

“Ephraim made no secret of the fact that it was the KGB who forbade him to lend books to the young believers. Once he even joked about it: ‘You know that when Moscow calls the tune, we must dance to it, or it will go ill with us.’”¹⁸⁸

However, the fire of resistance to Communism had not died out completely within the Georgian Church. On May 1, 1965, during the May demonstration, Archimandrite Gabriel (in the world Goderji Vasilievich Urgebadze) set fire to a huge portrait of Lenin, for which he was beaten by an angry crowd. Half-alive with eighteen fractures, he was arrested for “anti-Soviet activities” and delivered to the KGB. On being questioned whether his act had been carried out by the order of the highest Church leadership, Fr. Gabriel denied it, explaining that the reason for his act was simply that only God deserves worship, not man. Threats of torture and death did not persuade him to change his testimony.

The international resonance caused by the incident prevented the authorities from executing him. He was transferred to a psychiatric hospital. On November 19, 1965, Fr. Gabriel was discharged from hospital with a diagnosis of “psychopathic personality with a disposition to schizophrenic psychosis”.

One of the senior bishops in the Georgian Church at this time was Metropolitan Ilia (Shiolashvili) of Sukhumi, who from 1963 to 1972 was Rector of the Georgian Orthodox Theological Seminary. In 1962 he had been recruited by the Georgian KGB Unit V with the codename “Iverieli”.¹⁸⁹ And when the future Georgian president Edward Shevardnadze became Georgian party First Secretary in 1972, there began a long, “symphonic” relationship between the two men which lasted until Shevardnadze’s fall from power in 2003.

In spite of this, according to Shotiko Akhvlediani, Fr. Gabriel (Urgebadze) “was harsh with those who judged the clergy (of Georgian Orthodox Church). Once, when the patriarch Ilia was even blamed in his presence, an angry father Gabriel addressed the accusing person: ‘How dare you! Look at my threadbare knee! Do you see that I am praying day and night for him? When you say such accusing words, do you have love for him?! I have the right, and if necessary, I will tell!’”¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁸ “Dr. Gamsakhurdia writes to RCL”, *Religion in Communist Lands*, vol. 4, No 4, Winter, 1976, pp. 48, 49.

¹⁸⁹ *Orthodox Tradition*, vol. XV, No 1, p. 34. According to Alexander Soldatov (“Cherez revoliutsii – k tsarstvu”, *Ogonek*, <http://www.ogoniok.com/5023/16/>, p. 2), his recruitment took place in 1968.

¹⁹⁰ Akhvlediani, *Facebook*, February 13, 2021. However, there is some evidence that he broke with the official Georgian Church. “The Church of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary is closed Eucharistic union with the Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia Ilia II, because of ecumenical heresy. The head of the monastery, priest-nun Angia, Monk Eutychus, Monk Gabriel, Obedient Mamuka, Obedient Kakhaberi”

Translated from: <http://dl.sangu.edu.ge/pdf/dissertacia/lashadeisadze.pdf>.

Ilia proved his worth to his employers when, as Metropolitan of Sukhumi in the 1970s, he betrayed the Catacomb Bishop Gennady (Sekach) to the authorities.¹⁹¹ And he was an ardent ecumenist, travelling to many ecumenist forums in many countries as the representative of the patriarchate of Georgia. From 1978 to 1983 he was even co-president of the World Council of Churches...

Ilia set his face firmly against the dissident movement among Georgian Orthodox Christians, which combined concern for human rights with a campaign against Church servility and corruption with a strong emphasis on Georgian nationalism. In 1975-77, the leaders of this movement – Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Valentina Pailodze and Merab Kostava – were all arrested and given sentences in the camps.

Donald Rayfield writes: “Pailodze, a church choir leader indicted in 1974 for complaining of patriarchate corruption, was told by the KGB that Sheverdnadze had ordered her arrest on any pretext...

“In 1973 Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Merab Kostava published the underground *The Golden Fleece* exposing KGB corruption, and recording the oppression of Georgian intellectuals in the 1920s. By 1975 Gamsakhurdia became influential. The USSR had signed the Helsinki convention on security, gaining recognition of the inviolability of its borders, but forced in exchange to acknowledge human rights. Dissident movements throughout the Soviet bloc now had guarantees against the communist authorities’ retaliation. Gamsakhurdia formed his own ‘Helsinki Group’, and joined the Moscow branch of Amnesty International. He induced Congressman Waggoner of Louisiana to read out to Congress Patriarch Ambrosi’s protest to the Genoa Conference of 1922: Waggoner then argued that the USA should recognize *de jure* independent Georgia as it did the Baltic States.

“Konstantine Gamsakhurdia, the country’s greatest living writer, died in 1975, leaving a testament in which he refused burial in the Pantheon because ‘in every country Christ and Judas are mentioned in the same breath, but only in Georgia are they buried together.’ (The issue of *Mnatobi* that printed this testament was pulped.) Zviad Gamsakhurdia inherited not just his father’s Tbilisi mansion but also his mantle, and lambasted the government and party. In April 1976 Zviad accused KGB agents of attempting to poison his father, of burgling their house and trying to confiscate his father’s archive (he also accused the KGB of faking the suicide of the poet Galaktion Tabidze, who fell from a hospital window in 1958.) So perturbed was Sheverdnadze that he held meetings with the Union of Writers, the KGB and the party all summer. Zviad and Kostava had for years been a thorn in the flesh of the government: they printed dissident materials, including Solzhenitsyn’s *The Gulag Archipelago*; they protested at the destruction of the ecology and historical heritage such as the demolition by the artillery practice of the Red Army of Davit Garesja and Gelati monasteries. Dissident lobbying stopped the building of a nuclear power station on the Black Sea and a railway

¹⁹¹ Nun E., a disciple of Gennady, personal communication, 1990.

under the Daryal Pass, although it failed to stop the Roki tunnel now linking South and North Ossetia.

“At first Shevardnadze and [General Aleksii] Inauri fought dissidence with disinformation: Gamsakhurdia’s writings, and the finding of a prosecutor, David Koridze, who tried to investigate the lootings of museums, were declared by foreign friends, such as Professor David Marshall Lang, to be the forgeries of Paris émigrés. Dissidents were attacked with toxic gas. Zviad’s publication ‘On Tortures in Georgia’ in *The Chronicle of Current Events* was the last straw. In 1976 Zviad collaborated closely with Moscow dissidents Andrei Sakharov, Amalrik and Iuri Orlov, and was frequently detained by the KGB: friends in the west (including the author of this history) invited him to Britain and Switzerland, but were told that the sum they were prepared to pay the Union of Writers was insufficient. In spring 1977 the Union of Writers in Tbilisi was instructed to condemn Zviad: two poets, Muman Lebanidze and Zviad’s godmother, Ana Kalanadze, dared to defend him (but nevertheless also voted to expel him). Those who duplicated and bound Zviad’s materials were dismissed from their jobs. Zviad was expelled from the university and arrested. The KGB compiled a 56-volume treason case against him and Merab Kostava, from which the World Congress of Psychiatrists in Honolulu and the French Psychiatric Association finally saved him. By spring 1977, however, Zviad was broken, and agreed to recant in an interrogation edited into a television documentary. (Zviad’s admirers believed he was drugged: two western journalists were prosecuted in Moscow for dismissing the interview as a fabrication.) In Tbilisi, Bishop Gaioz led a press campaign against dissidents. On May 19 1977 Zviad and Merab received three years in the camps and two years’ exile; Zviad’s doctor Samkharadze was locked up in a psychiatric hospital. Shevardnadze immediately released Zviad ‘to do cultural work with Georgian shepherds’ for two years in the Nogai steppes, while Merab, who had not repented, spent two years in the Gulag. Inauri, now in his 70s, summoned Zviad to Tbilisi in 1979 and assured him of personal protection. Despite being nominated by the USA for the Nobel Peace Prize, Zviad was now shunned by both communists and dissidents as a KGB-protected pariah: Shevardnadze had won the first round of a 20-year duel. Gamsakhurdia tried to justify his recantation: he had saved his associates from further persecution, protected his achievements, stopped the destruction of Dvit-Garesja monastery, and helped Shevardnadze to save the Georgian language’s official status. He wrote to *Pravda* that he had not repented his patriotic or humanitarian work. Now immersed in religious study, he developed a morbidly Messianic self esteem...”¹⁹²

On November 9, 1979, “Catholicos-Patriarch David V of Georgia died. *Religion in Communist Lands* reports that, upon the death of Patriarch David V, Metropolitan Ilia was appointed Patriarchal *locum tenens* of the Georgian Orthodox Church by the Holy Synod. Leading the delegation dispatched by Patriarch Pimen of Moscow to the funeral of Patriarch David was Metropolitan Alexis (Ridiger) of Tallinn and Estonia, the present Patriarch of Russia, and Pimen's

¹⁹² Rayfield, *Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia*, London: Reaktion, 2012, pp. 374-375.

direct successor. The *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate* notes that 'during his stay in Tbilisi, the head of the delegation from the Russian Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Alexis, paid a visit to T. D. Onoprishvili, representative of the Council for Religious Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers in the Georgian SSR' (*JMP*, No. 3, 1978, p. 43)...

"...The most likely candidate for the patriarchal throne seemed to be Metropolitan Gaioz (Kepatishvili) of Tsilkani, on whose side were the majority of the bishops and clergy. Another contender was Metropolitan Ilia of Sukhumi and Abkhazia, who also had a sizable following. Metropolitan Gaioz and his supporters forcibly occupied the Patriarchal headquarters, having ejected the watchman and lone nun, supporters of Ilia, who had been guarding it. Thereupon telegrams were sent to all the heads of the Local Orthodox Churches, announcing that Metropolitan Gaioz had been 'elected' *Locum Tenens* of the Patriarchal throne. Oddly enough, these telegrams got no further than the local post office. It seems that the appropriate 'competent organs' of state had by this time already reached a decision. (More on this below.) Then the militia burst into the headquarters of the Patriarchate, in turn forcibly expelled the followers of Metropolitan Gaioz, and ushered in those of Metropolitan Ilia, who was then declared *locum tenens*. And, of course, this time his telegrams reached their destination. The new *locum tenens* hastily ordained several bishops from among his supporters in the clergy, thus 'packing the court'.

"Metropolitan Gaioz was forced, for appearance sake, to participate in the election and enthronement of Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II. He was made to place the Patriarchal panagias and cross around the neck of the new Primate -- a bitter pill to swallow indeed! Soon thereafter Metropolitan Gaioz was arrested and charged with various crimes, including theft of church property, speculation in foreign currency, and moral depravity. The public prosecutor asked for the maximum sentence permitted by the law code then in force, which was fifteen years imprisonment. However, the plaintiff on behalf of the Church, Archimandrite Nicholas Makharadze, demanded the death penalty! Metropolitan Gaioz was eventually sentenced to fifteen years in prison...

"... In 1979 Patriarch Ilia II was... elected one of the six presidents of the World Council of Churches... He then inserted the new title into the text of his official commemoration during the church services: 'For our Great Lord and Father, Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, Archbishop of Mtskheta and Tbilisi, *President of the World Council of Churches*, Ilia II'! He likewise used the title when issuing his annual Paschal and Christmas encyclicals, and in all published accounts of his ecumenical activities abroad (e.g.: *Grapevine Cross*, No. 2, 1981, p. 3)..."¹⁹³

Patriarch Ilia remains in power to this day, 2021 – the longest-serving KGB patriarch in history.

¹⁹³ "Out of thine own mouth will I judge thee", *Orthodox Christian Witness*, August 3/16, 1998 and August 17/30, 1998; <http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Thebes/1865/ili.htm?200522>.

Meanwhile, true sanctity still existed in the region. Nun Helena was born in Minsk, Belorussia of noble parents who were related to both the Russian and the Greek ruling families (through Queen Olga of the Hellenes, Abbess Tamara Romanov of the Convent of the Ascension, Eleon, Jerusalem was her cousin). According to Olga Abramides, who had been healed by the saint and lived with her for some months in her hermitage, the family of the blessed one had nine children (six daughters and three sons), all of whom embraced the monastic life at an early age. Helena and her sister Nina struggled under the direction of a certain virtuous abbess in a coenobitic monastery near Batumi, in Georgia, in order to learn the monastic life. The only photograph of Mother Helena shows her wearing the great schema.

At this time there died a virtuous bishop in the Batumi area. During his burial the face of the virtuous bishop sweated, and came down in streams which the faithful standing by gathered up with reverence. Mother Helena took some of this "holy water" and kept it for the next 75 years. Through her faith, and the faith of those sufferers who came to her, this "holy water" became wonder-working.

After the revolution, the monastery in which the sisters were struggling was destroyed by the Bolsheviks, and they sought refuge in the Caucasus mountains, in an impassable ravine one hour's walk from the village of Chin, in a thick forest of evergreen trees. For the first two years of their struggle here, the sisters lived in complete isolation. Their only food was a little warm water and a prosphora once a day, which appeared in a miraculous way. Later, when the villagers learned about them and began to help them, and they began to cultivate a garden, the fresh prosphora ceased to come...

During the winter they lived in an underground passage. Then the villagers helped them to build a typical Russian cell made out of trunks of trees with a stove. They ate only once a day – boiled potatoes. They never had oil. For Pascha, "to honour the day", they ate one egg.

The nuns had no communion with the official Churches of Russia or Georgia, and when clergy from these Churches would come up to meet them, Mother Helena would not let them into her cell, nor allow them to celebrate Divine services. For confession and communion they themselves went down to Sukhumi to an exiled priest of Bulgarian origin.

Once some secret policemen tried to catch them. However, Mother Helena was hidden in a miraculous manner, so they found only Mother Nina.

"Are you praying?" one of them asked.

"Yes," she replied, "for all the Christians. And also for you, since you were baptized in the Name of Christ but have denied Him."

In 1957 the hermitage was struck by fire. Flames were destroying everything. Then Mother Helena knelt down, raised her hands to heaven and fervently prayed to the Mother of God to help her servants. The Mother of God appeared and put out the fire! And as a sign of her appearance she left the mark of her immaculate foot there. From that time many people came to the hermitage to venerate the footprint of the Mother of God.

To repair the damage caused by the fire, Mother Helena accepted help from the villagers and pilgrims. A twenty-year-old young man called Christopher Damianides and 42 other Christians worked for three months there to erect new buildings. (Christopher had come a long way from Kazakhstan on hearing of the fame of the saint, although he was very ill. And Mother Helena had healed him after putting him on a strict fast.)

The hermitage was built from wood. So to reconstruct it they had to use huge trees up to 50 metres high. After the completion of the works, Mother Helena called the Christians together, thanked them and said that the next day "Christopher will be able to leave". The following day, however, she asked him to stay, because "they would have a great temptation". And indeed, they had many problems from the local Forestry department, because the trees had been cut down without its permission.

After the work was done, some of the faithful offered to Matushka that they use a tree in order to construct a fence around the hermitage.

"No," she said, "we shall not cut down another tree. But if God wills this work, He Himself will send it us."

That night there was a terrible storm, and the next morning everyone saw to their amazement that a fir-tree of enormous proportions had been uprooted and stretched from the water right to the boundary of the hermitage. So, in accordance with the saint's prophecy, the Lord Himself had sent wood to fence it round, in a manner that exceeded human and natural strength.

They had also build a little chapel inside the hermitage. When it was completed, Matushka called the young Christopher, together with Theodore Boukharides, and sent them to the village, saying: "There where the Georgians have built a school, there is a buried church dedicated to Saints Constantine and Helena. You excavate it and you will find a hidden icon." The two young men obediently dug for the church, but could not find anything, and so set off back to the hermitage. Matushka Helena sent them there again, this time with clear and accurate instructions (how many steps to the right and to the left). The young man dug, and this time they found a big icon of the All-Holy Mother of God. While they were bringing it to the hermitage, Matushka, informed "from above" about the discovery, went to meet them holding the honourable Cross and wonderworking holy water. She took the icon, kissed it and put it in the chapel. Then, in the presence of about 50 faithful, the church was filled with a wonderful

fragrance. "Come, my children," she said, "come and see the grace of the Holy Spirit."

Through the grace of God, Mother Helena knew who were coming to visit her; she called them by their Christian names and said who would be received and who not. She did not receive those with little faith or those burdened by mortal sins.

Once (according to the witness of the monk Fr. Luke Panides) she was visited by a mother with a sick child, who was carrying some food. Matushka did not receive her. Later, when asked she explained that "all of them in the family are unbelievers". Another time, she told her visitors to sit in a room containing the icon of the Lord not-made-with-hands. While they all saw that the eyes in the Lord's face were open, one woman saw that they were closed.

"Why is that, Gerontissa?" asked one man.

"John," she replied, "I am not hindering her, but the Lord Himself, because she practices magic."

Mrs. Despoina Kalaitzides got to know Mother Helena in 1965 together with a relative of hers. Matushka – who had not seen them before – said to her:

"You are the daughter of Alexandra and you are very like her. I see your father Panagiotes dressed in green."

Before Despoina and her relative, the hermitage had been visited by two Russian women, bringing some food. However, Blessed Helena had again not received them. Later Matushka Nina told Despoina and her relative that the Russian women had a sick child and on an earlier visit Matushka Helena had advised them to keep the fasts of the Church in order that the child should be healed. And indeed, the child was healed. However, "the Russians easily forget", and since they were careless, in the end the child fell ill again. And she did not receive the food because it had been stolen from a state institution where they worked.

One evening a bear started groaning mournfully outside the hermitage of the saint. Matushka was frightened at the beginning. However, the cries of the animal forced her to interrupt her prayer. Then she saw that the bear's paw was wounded. The blessed one plucked up courage, came closer to the bear and bound up the wound.

A few days later the bear returned peacefully, holding in its paws some maize. Matushka received the animal's gift gratefully, but when she understood that it had taken it from some farm, doing injustice in this way to some unsuspecting farmer, she "scolded" the bear and showed him a piece of wood, indicating in this way that in the future it should bring her firewood. From then on the animal brought firewood, demonstrating in this way his gratitude to the saint.

When sick people came to Matushka, she would counsel them to fast and pray, “for this kind cometh not out except by prayer and fasting” (Matthew 17.21). And since there were no priests to read the Gospel, she would read the Gospel, sprinkling the sick with “holy water” and anointing them with oil from the lampada of the Mother of God. And in accordance with the faith of the sick people, the Lord performed miracles. From the sick she demanded only faith in the power of God and a Christian life thenceforth. At that time there were many “healers” in the Soviet Union. When the sick could not go to the hermitage themselves, their relatives sent their clothes there so that Matushka should bless them.

Like a true nun, Mother Helena had prepared her own grave while she was still alive, outside the hermitage. The simple people, during her lifetime, would take earth from the grave and it would work miracles.

One of the first to be healed through the prayers of Mother Helena was “Katya from Krasnodar”, who suffered from epilepsy. After her healing Katya stayed at the hermitage and became a nun with the name Catherine.

Olga Simeonides witnesses that when she was newly married and her son George was one year old, she fell mentally ill. She was oppressed, didn’t want to be in the house, feared lights and people, etc. With her mother and husband she went to many psychiatrists, with no result. Then a lecturer in psychiatry who was probably a believer discreetly recommended that the prayers of the Church for driving out demons be read. These prayers also did not work, but they did make the condition evident: Olga produced symptoms of demon-possession, and attacked the priests (of the official Georgian Church). Finally her mother in despair began to visit “magicians” and “healers”. At one such visit to a well-known medium, God had mercy on her: the medium, compelled by the grace of God, told her:

“Sit down and listen. You have to find a woman; only she will be able to heal your daughter. She has seven Gospels. At the third your daughter’s illness will be loosed.”

“Since the wretched husband and parents of Olga did not know where to go, they brought the sick woman to her house. For the next month Olga remained lying in a dark room, wrapped in a bed sheet, with absolutely no food or water. There was an icon of the Deisis in the room. One day she heard a sound. Starting up, the sick woman saw a nun standing in front of the icon.

“I am sorry for you,” she said. “Give me your hand, so that I can lift you up. You have twelve days left to live.”

Olga found the courage to stretch out her hand, and hardly had the unknown nun touched her than she felt a supernatural power go through her. Her strength returned and she was completely healed!

When this miracle became known, the thoughts of all turned to "Matushka Helena of Chin". Olga visited the hermitage to thank her, and recognized in the face of the blessed one the unknown nun who had healed her. Then the saint told her about the satanic bonds of magic, with which, with the permission of God, she had been bound.

"Don't seek to find out who was responsible," she said, "because then you will die from sorrow."

The wife of a very high-ranking Soviet general fell mentally ill. No psychiatrists could help her, so her husband took her – at great risk to himself, since people of his rank were supposed to be atheists – to the hermitage of Chin. Matushka Helena healed the woman. Then the general offered to bring electricity to the hermitage. Matushka refused"

"We are nuns," she said. "Wax and oil are sufficient for us."

The general then offered to bring water from the sides of the hill into the depths of the ravine by aqueduct. She accepted this gift.

Matushka Helena was also a prophetess. In 1955 Christopher Damianides, aged 18, was told by his parents to go to Matushka to ask her whether there would be a war.

"No," she replied. "There will be no war."

"And how will the situation develop?" asked Christopher.

"The eighth leader [of the Soviet Union] is called Michael [i.e. Michael Gorbachev, the eighth Soviet leader since Lenin]. He will be young and good-looking. He will change the situation. However, there will come great poverty. But finally good times will come..."

Many Pontiac Greeks living in the region wanted to return to Greece. She warned them that they must go only to the Old Calendar Church:

"In Greece there is the new calendar. Don't go to the churches where it is followed... If Greece returns to the Old Calendar, it will triumph. Otherwise it will perish."

Matushka Helena died in 1977 (her sister Nina died between the years 1957 and 1959). A Russian-style "open" wooden church has been erected over her grave, and a monk called Boris lives at the hermitage. Her relics have not been uncovered yet. But the earth from her grave is refreshed by a fragrant myrrh which, especially at night, makes the whole area fragrant. And the saint once appeared in a dream to the person who buried her and said:

“Don’t move me, for the oil has reached my eyes...”¹⁹⁴

In the early 1980s a small secret community of monastics was discovered in the mountains above Sukhumi by the KGB. 18 monastics managed to take shelter in a cave. The pursuers in a helicopter threw a cask full of burning liquid into the entrance and set it on fire. All those in the cave died: Irina, Maria, Eudocia, Ulyana, John, Gregory, Basil, Andrew, Stephen, and others.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁴ Antonios Markou, *I Oσία Eleni tou Kavkasou* (St. Helena of the Caucasus), Koropi, Attica, 2001.

¹⁹⁵ D. Pospelovsky, "Russian persecution ignored by the West", *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), October 1, 1983.

16. “NIKODEMOVSHCHINA”

From the 1970s we see the ascendancy in the MP of a school of thought devoted simultaneously to the interests both of the Soviet State and of the ecumenical movement – more specifically, Roman Catholic uniaticism – which was called “Nikodemovshchina” from its first leader and originator, Nikodem (Rotov), KGB Agent “Sviatoslav”. Nikodem ended his career as Metropolitan of Leningrad and, as Vatican Radio announced on the day after his death, as a Roman Catholic cardinal.¹⁹⁶

Nikodem’s dual activity working for both the Soviets and the Vatican was. Largely through him, as the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* recorded, “by 1972 the WCC had been converted from a ‘pro-Western’ to a ‘progressive’ orientation in its policies on peace, disarmament and related matters. Assiduous advocacy by the Christian Peace Conference and others of the view that Christianity and communism were natural allies in support of the national liberation movement induced the WCC to provide funds for African guerrilla movements, including the Rhodesian Patriotic Front, believed to be responsible for a massacre of British missionaries in 1978.”¹⁹⁷

Ever since writing his master’s thesis on Pope John XXIII, the man who led the Catholic Church onto the ecumenical scene, Metropolitan Nikodem had been trying to do the same for the MP.

Igumen Theophan (Areskin) writes: “Metropolitan Nikodem begins his exposition of his ecumenist faith with an Orthodox thesis on the unity of the whole human race in Adam: ‘Mankind, the whole Adam (in the expression of St. Macarius the Great) is united by means of the Incarnation, Cross and Resurrection of the last Adam (I Corinthians 14.45), the second Man, the Lord Who “for us men” came down from the heavens (I Corinthians 15.47), and, having tasted “death for us all by the grace of God” (Hebrews 2.9), “is the Saviour of all men” (I Timothy 4.10)... We all, in accordance with the ineffable wisdom of God, have been bound from the beginning with the bonds of unity and brotherhood’. But further on Metropolitan Nikodem reveals his understanding of this unity: ‘Christ died for all men, and, as the new Adam, he laid the beginning for a new humanity... The fullness of the grace-filled gifts is communicated to people by the Holy Spirit in the Church of Christ. However, it would be a dangerous error to consider that Christ, the Redeemer of the whole world, does not extend His saving influence on the whole of humanity.’ This saving influence consists, according to Metropolitan Nikodem, ‘in faith in Christ Jesus, acting through love in each separate person, as in the whole of humanity, with which we are united by our common human nature. God redeemed us into an undivided, indivisible,

¹⁹⁶ V. Sokolov, “Okatolichennie Razrushiteli Pravoslavia” (Catholicized Destroyers of Orthodoxy), *Literaturnaiia Rossia*, May 26, 2020, <https://litrossia.ru/item/10017-okatolichennnye-razrushiteli-pravoslaviya/?fbclid=IwAR2eYhDruc1zxUkNg6fVhX9CvmJXxW-ZL-n12lhuIzCnSONe7diroUCfXxc>.

¹⁹⁷ Dr. Olga Ackerly, “High Treason in ROCOR: The Rapprochement with Moscow”, http://stnicholasandles.com/High_Treason.htm, p. 32.

unchanging and unconfused union with this nature through the incarnation of the Only-Begotten Son.' 'By taking on and deifying our nature in the Divine Incarnation the Chief and Accomplisher of our faith (Hebrews 12.2) and of eternal salvation (Hebrews 5.9), our Lord Jesus Christ reconciled, united and related *the whole of humanity with God, and all people with each other*'. 'The Church as the Kingdom of God is likened to leaven which penetrates into all the parts of the whole that is humanity, into the whole world, and acts with that measure of power which corresponds to the moral level of the bearers of Christ's truth. And although far from all people actively and consciously abide in the Church, *the Church abides in all through the love of Christ*, for this love is not limited by any part of humanity, but is distributed to all people.' Hence 'the activity of the Spirit of God is not limited by confessional limits. His manifestation is completely and, above all, unconditionally revealed in the Church, but the traces of His presence are evident everywhere where there are the fruits of spiritual life: love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness...' Therefore all people, the whole Body of humanity (Adam), are invisibly united with God and is a certain 'invisible Church'. The organization of the Church is understood by Nikodem as 'the visible Church', in which 'baptism defines the *visible* belonging to Christ'. Metropolitan Nikodem consciously confesses the 'baptism' of Protestants to be true, turning to his 'brothers in Christ', the Protestants, the members of the WCC: 'Through the mystery of holy Baptism we are engrafted onto the saving Divine Vine...' But the visible Church 'is called to realize the fruits of the Incarnation and Redemption in the life of her *immediate* members.'

"And so, according to Metropolitan Nikodem, all people are 'Christians'. It is true that the Church of Christ, the Body of Christ, the New Adam, is one, but it is not yet united into one ecclesiastical organization under one leader. The aim of the ecumenists is to create this *mediation*, that is, one single visible ecclesiastical organization for all. In this way the ecumenical Church and the world become indistinguishable from each other. It is not difficult to find the primary source of this faith. It is sergianism – a heretical teaching that the Church, the Body of Christ, is a simple ecclesiastical organization, just like ordinary secular organizations, political parties, communities, commercial structures, etc."¹⁹⁸

The death of Nikodem in 1978 in Rome at the feet of Pope John-Paul I¹⁹⁹, was a graphic symbol of the true direction of Orthodox-Catholic ecumenism – aided and abetted by the KGB – in a distinctly pro-Soviet direction. As Lev Regelson writes, "after Pope John-Paul I said of him 'This is a person from whom I can learn how one must love the Church', it was almost guaranteed that the following Pope would be pro-Soviet... [Fr. Gleb Yakunin] sat down to write a letter to the Vatican in which he exposed the antichristian activity of Metropolitan Nikodem... I know

¹⁹⁸ Areskin, "The Head of the Moscow Patriarchate", *Vertograd-Info*, October, 2000, pp. 18-19.

¹⁹⁹ *Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii* (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), 1978, No 11; *The Boston Globe*, September 6, 1978, p. 65; "On the Death of a Soviet Bishop", *Orthodox Christian Witness*, October 23 / November 5, 1978; Piers Compton, *The Broken Cross: The Hidden Hand in the Vatican*, Sudbury: Neville Spearman, 1983, pp. 158-159; Metropolitan Hierotheos of Nafpaktos, "The Secret of the Metropolitan who died at the Feet of the Pope", April 2, 2013, <http://www.johnsanidopoulos.com/2013/04/the-secret-of-metropolitan-who-died-at.html>.

all this at first hand because I helped him work on this letter. Finally, it was read out at the Conclave for the election of the new Pope, and produced such a powerful impression – in the words of one of the cardinals passed on to Fr. Gleb – that the Polish cardinal Wojtila was elected as Pope. He was a convinced ‘anticommunist’, who knew of the methods of the Soviet secret service from personal experience. Many investigators had supposed, with good reason, that the 27-year pontificate of John-Paul II played a decisive role in the beginning of the weakening of Soviet global expansion, and thereby in the fall of the USSR, which without this expansion lost ‘the meaning of its existence’...”²⁰⁰

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Nikodem’s place both as chief ideologist of the MP, Metropolitan of Leningrad and leader of the “Nikodemovshina” school of theology, was taken by his pupil, the future Patriarch Alexis II (Ridiger). And when Pope John-Paul died a few days after Nikodem, Alexis celebrated a festive service for the repose of his soul in the Moscow Cathedral of the Epiphany, while another of Nikodem’s disciples and future patriarch, Cyril (Gundyaev), celebrated a similar service in the Alexander Nevsky Lavra in Leningrad.²⁰¹ In 2016, Gundyaev, now Patriarch of Moscow, met Pope Francis I in Castro’s Cuba – another powerful symbol of how Orthodoxy, Catholicism and a resurrected Communism still planned to share the world between them...

Alexis, an Estonian by birth (he was bishop in Tallin before his transfer to Leningrad), had been a KGB agent with codename “Drozdov” since 1958 and an active ecumenist for almost as long as his mentor. Already from 1966 he made it clear that he considered heretics to be members of the Church.²⁰²

Following the directions of the KGB, Alexis was sent as a delegate to the Third General Assembly of the WCC in New Delhi in 1961, (with Metropolitans Nikodem and Anthony (Bloom)). He became a member of the Central Committee of the WCC from 1961 to 1968, president of the World Conference, “The Church and Society” in Geneva in 1966, and a member of the Commission “Faith and Order” of the WCC from 1961 to 1968.

In the 1974 Furov report to the Central Committee of the USSR Alexis (together with his predecessor Patriarch Pimen) was placed in the category of those bishops who “affirm both in words and deeds not only loyalty but also patriotism towards the socialist society; strictly observe the laws on cults, and educate the parish clergy and believers in the same spirit; realistically understand that our state is not interested in proclaiming the role of religion and the church in society; and, realizing this, do not display any particular activeness in extending the influence

²⁰⁰ Regelson, personal communication on his Facebook page, January 24, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/lregelson/posts/981429488551934?comment_id=983137605047789&offset=0&total_comments=96¬if_t=feed_comment_reply.

²⁰¹ L. Perepiolkina, *Ecumenism – A Path to Perdition*, St. Petersburg, 1999, p. 129.

²⁰² Areskin, op. cit.

of Orthodoxy among the population.”²⁰³ According to a KGB document of 1988, “An order was drafted by the USSR KGB chairman to award an honorary citation to agent DROZDOV” [i.e. Alexis] for unspecified services to state security.²⁰⁴

²⁰³ Christopher Andrew and Vasily Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin File*, London: Allen Lane the Penguin Press, 1999, pp. 639-640.

²⁰⁴ Andrew and Mitrokhin, op. cit., p. 650.

17. THE SOVIET ADVANCE

The Cold War was very far from cold outside Europe; many millions died. We have already seen how many millions died in South-East Asia: there would be many more in Latin America and Africa – and most of the dead, if they were not killed by famine and disease, were the victims of communist aggression. The Third World was the arena in which the Soviets tried to make up for their failure to penetrate into Western Europe – until the fall of the Union itself forced them to give up most of their gains...

“Operating from a base of political stability, Soviet global power expanded steadily during the Seventies. The most striking and visible sign of this expansion was the spectacular growth of the Soviet navy. In many ways it was comparable to the German naval programme of the 1890s and 1900s: it was not justified by any need to protect traditional lines of supply and communications but was deliberately aimed to change the existing balance of maritime power. Like the British Navy in the nineteenth century, American sea-air power was the great stabilizing fact in the post-war world. In 1945 America had 5,718 ships in active service, including ninety-eight aircraft carriers, seventy-three battleships, seventy-two cruisers and over 700 destroyers and escorts. At the end of 1951 it was still possible for Admiral Carney, commander of NATO forces in Southern Europe, to dismiss Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean: ‘He said it was possible there were a few ‘maverick’ Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean and they might be able to push in some others in preparation for a war. But they couldn’t support them long. The big change came after 1962, when the Cuban missile crisis persuaded the Soviet leadership that, if they wished to expand Communism outside the Eurasian landmass, they would have to build a big surface navy.

“The new strategy was the work of Admiral Gorshkov, whose writings constituted a body of doctrine comparable to Admiral Mahan’s, and whose advocacy of a huge submarine fleet plus a global surface force became established policy in the early 1960s. In the fourteen-year period following the missile crisis, Soviet Russia built a total of 1,323 ships of all classes (compared to 302 American), including 120 major surface combat ships, eighty-three amphibious and fifty-three auxiliaries. By the same date (1976), Gorshkov had accumulated a fleet of 188 nuclear submarines, forty-six of them carrying strategic missiles. In the later 1970s, the first genuine Soviet carriers appeared. The impact of the new Soviet navy on geopolitics became undeniable in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, when a large Soviet presence in the Eastern Mediterranean was established on a permanent basis. By 1973, during the Yom Kippur war, the position of the American fleet in this theatre was described by one of the commanders as ‘very uncomfortable’ for the first time since the destruction of Japanese naval power. By this point the Soviet navy, already predominant in the North-East Atlantic and North-West Pacific, was ready to move into the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean.

“Naval power was one element in the Soviet descent on black Africa which was a major feature of the later 1970s. The other was the use of Cuba as a satellite-

mercenary. In the 1960s Soviet Russia bought Cuban allegiance relatively cheaply: less than half a billion dollars a year. In return it got verbal support: Castro loudly defended the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. By the early 1970s the Cuban economy was degenerating fast and in 1972 there was an agonizing reappraisal of Soviet-Cuban relations. The Cuban debt to Russia now stood at nearly \$4 billion, and Brezhnev saw no alternative but to defer all interest and principal payments to 1986 and in the meantime bail Cuba out. The cost to Russia rose first to \$8 million, then \$10 million and (by the early 1980s) \$12 million a day: nearly \$4.5 billion a year. In return, however, Brezhnev acquired a valuable instrument for the penetration of sub-Saharan Africa. Soviet Russia had of course been active in Arab Africa since the Nasser deal in 1955. But Soviet military and economic missions had often made themselves unpopular, and, being white, were easily accused of 'imperialism'. As one of the Arab premiers, Mahgoub of the Sudan, put it, Arab states got 'obsolete machinery' from Soviet Russia in return for primary products, 'a form of barter'; and the Soviet bloc 'often resold the raw materials obtained from us to the capitalist West' at below market prices, with 'disastrous effects on our countries producing the raw materials.' One of the many advantages of using Cuban surrogates was that, by an inexplicable paradox, Cuba was a member of the 'non-aligned bloc', though in fact the most vociferously faithful of the Soviet client-states. Cuban soldiers, being non-white (in many cases black), were not easily presented as imperialists. Castro had already earned his keep by defending Soviet Russia from the charge of imperialism at the 1973 Algiers Conference of the non-aligned. Where, he asked, were Russia's 'monopoly corporations'? Where its participation in the multinational companies? What factories, what mines, what oilfields does it own in the underdeveloped world? What worker is exploited in any country of Asia, Africa or Latin America by Soviet capital? Now he was asked to go further and provide non-imperialist invasion forces. In December 1975, under Soviet naval escort, the first Cuban troops landed in Angola. In 1976 they moved into Abyssinia, now in the Soviet camp, and into Central and East Africa. As far back as 1963, the old colony of French Congo proclaimed itself the People's Republic of the Congo, the first Marxist-Leninist state in Africa. It did not always behave like one. European political categories did not always translate into African realities. But by the end of the 1970s there were ten such African states providing Soviet Russia, in varying degrees, with diplomatic and propaganda support, economic advantages and military bases. And in 1879, in Nicaragua, Cuba acquired the first satellite of its own, in Central America..."²⁰⁵

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Perhaps the key event in Latin America was the election of the Chilean President Salvador Allende.

South America. "During the 1970 elections," writes Andrew Roberts, "Allende had misled the electorate about quite how left-wing his Unidad Popular (Popular Unity) Government would truly be, and he won by 36.2%, against the opposition

²⁰⁵ Johnson, *Modern Times*, pp. 683-685.

candidate Alessandri's 34.9%, with a third candidate receiving 27.8%. Under the Chilean Constitution as then pertaining, if no candidate had an absolute majority the decision had to be made by Congress. Support for Allende was withheld until he signed a 'Statute of Constitutional Guarantees' before assuming office, affirming that his socialist reforms would not undermine any element of the Chilean Constitution. Only after he signed did parliament vote for him. It was not long before he broke its provisions, however.

"As economic problems heightened after his nationalisation programme, excess profits taxes, moratorium on foreign debt repayments, defaulting on international loans and price-freezes, Allende tried to rule by decree, using what he called *resquicios legales* (legal loopholes), which ignored Chile's Christian Democrat and National Parties that dominated Congress. He also angered the Judiciary by refusing to permit the police to carry out judicial sentences that he felt ran contrary to 'the revolutionary process'.

"There were massive shortages of basic foodstuffs, industrial production collapsed, foreign currency reserves dried up, two huge strikes brought the country to a near halt and hyper-inflation was met with strong price-control measures, which sometimes failed. Chaos descended on Chile as *cordones industriales* (workers' committees) failed to run the nationalised industries successfully and political violence started to become an almost daily occurrence.

"The Allende Government also attempted to suppress free speech. Radio stations were nationalised, newspaper offices and university departments were occupied by violent government demonstrators, and state advertising budgets were offered and withheld in order to influence editorial comment. Throughout 1972, the Chilean Supreme Court, the country's highest legal authority, as well as her Comptroller-General (whose duty it was to protect the Constitution), declared that the Government was acting in defiance of the Constitution over the way it condoned the illegal and often violent seizures of private land by peasant communes. (In all, there were about 2,000 such incidents.) The peso, meanwhile, reached an official (i.e. artificially low) inflation rate of 600%, triggering fresh crises.²⁰⁶

"On 8 July 1973 the presidents of both houses of the Chilean legislature – the Senate and Chamber of Deputies – issued a statement which said that 'neither the laws nor institutions are respected' by the Government. In a formal resolution of the Chilean Chamber of Deputies on 22 August 1973, the Allende Government was accused of systematic human rights abuses and was declared to be illegitimate. Among other things, this resolution called upon the 'Secretaries of State, members of the Armed Forces and the Carabineros Corps' – i.e., the service chiefs of the Armed Forces, who were then members of the Cabinet – to 're-

²⁰⁶ "Chile had chronic inflation: about 20 per cent. Year in the late 1950s; 26.6 per cent in 1968, 32.5 per cent in 1970. Virtually the sole cause was government over-spending and money-printing... At the time Allende took over, in January 1971, inflation had actually fallen to 23 per cent. Within months it was hyperinflation. In 1972 it was 163 per cent. In the summer of 1973 it was 190 per cent, the highest in the world..." (Johnson, *Modern Times*, p. 737). (V.M.)

establish the rule of law'. It was signed by Patricio Aylwin, the President of the Senate.

"Mounting evidence that arms were being accumulated by the *industrials*, and of the creation of militias heavily infiltrated by foreign military 'advisors', persuaded the Chilean armed forces to act... On 11 September 1973, [the Chilean Army under Pinochet] acted swiftly and ruthlessly in overthrowing the Government..."²⁰⁷

Contrary to generally accepted myth, the CIA did not take part in the coup.²⁰⁸ Allende committed suicide in the presidential palace "using a machine-gun inscribed with the words, 'To my good friend Salvador Allende from Fidel Castro... It was the first time in history [since 1919] that a Marxist-Leninist government had lost power, proving that there was nothing historically inevitable about the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat after all.'"²⁰⁹

"When the military coup got under way, Allende, who was already guilty of a number of illegalities and who was opposed by the majority of Chileans, could only hang on to power by suspending the Chilean constitution and modelling his regime on Castro' – something he had long since been heading toward. Had he succeeded, Chile would have entered the Soviet orbit while the West looked on impotently as its sphere of influence shrank. When he lost the West was blamed for his fall. And because the Army won the final shoot-out when it took Allende's Castroists by surprise, the West lost on different grounds: it was charged with having assassinated a democracy and its President..."²¹⁰

Allende's fall, which was followed by "complete political and economic breakdown. The reconstruction of the economy had to begin against a background of world recession. The merit of the regime [led by General Augusto Pinochet] was that it was able to reverse a course of government-led inflation that had persisted for many decades and become part of the structure of the Chilean economy. This was painful and unpopular and led initially to a falling GNP and high unemployment. But it allowed the economy to be refloated on a market basis with the help of loans. During the later 1970s, with inflation at last under control, growth was resumed and by the beginning of 1980 the World Bank was able to report: 'Under extraordinarily unfavourable circumstances, the Chilean authorities have engineered an economic turnaround without precedent in the history of Chile.'"²¹¹

The recovery in the Chilean economy was a major blow for the Soviets. But they were fortunate: instead of stepping aside after the coup and arranging for elections, the right-wing army leader, Augusto Pinochet, chose to remain in

²⁰⁷ Roberts, *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples since 1900*, London: Penguin, 2015, pp. 501-502, 503.

²⁰⁸ Jack Devine, "What Really Happened in Chile", *Foreign Affairs*, July-August, 2014, p. 27.

²⁰⁹ Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 503.

²¹⁰ Revel, *op. cit.*, pp. 313-314.

²¹¹ Johnson, *Modern Times*, pp. 738-739.

power as dictator (until 1990), killing 2,528 Chileans in the following months.²¹² This was a tremendous propaganda coup for the Soviets because, as Revel continues, “a dictatorship like Pinochet’s is infinitely more useful to the Soviet Union than a bland, Western-style democracy. It is the most valuable of allies because the Communists’ *bête noire*, their worst enemy, is capitalistic, welfare democracy that works reasonably well. A rightist dictatorship is a redoubtable weapon for the Soviets to wield in subverting the democracies everywhere in the world: if they succeed in their subversion, they rack up another satellite; if they fail, they have at least created the conditions for a rightist dictatorship that, for years afterward, their propagandists can throw in the West’s face. What makes this weapon so effective is that these dictatorships *really are* evil; the Soviet Union has only to insist that they exist by the will and design of the free world...”²¹³

So in Chile the Soviets snatched victory out of the jaws of defeat... Meanwhile, in 1974 the heads of the security agencies of Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay and Bolivia met with the leader of Chile’s secret police, Manuel Contreras, in Santiago. With the backing of the CIA they agreed to implement “Operation Condor”, a plan to cooperate with each other in targeting political opponents and armed groups in the region. This plan, ostensibly to stem the tide of communism, soon got out of control.

“The dictatorships and their intelligence services were responsible for tens of thousands of killed and missing people in the period between 1975 and 1985. Analyzing the political repression in the region during that decade, Brazilian journalist Nilson Mariano estimates the number of killed and missing people as 2,000 in Paraguay; 3,196 in Chile; 297 in Uruguay; 366 in Brazil; and 30,000 in Argentina. According to John Henry Coatsworth, a historian of Latin America and the provost of Columbia University, the number of victims in Latin America alone far surpassed that of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc during the period 1960 to 1990. Very conservative estimates of numbers of killed and disappeared by member countries during the period of operation are, 7,000–30,000 in Argentina, 3,000–10,000 in Chile, 116–546 in Bolivia, 434–1,000 in Brazil, 200–400 in Paraguay and 123–215 in Uruguay.”²¹⁴

Central America. Thanks to these ruthless tactics, the Soviets were in general foiled in Latin America. In Central America, they also came up against determined opposition from the Right.

According to Daniel Goldhagen, “the El Salvadoran rightist regime slaughtered perhaps seventy thousand people during a counterinsurgency campaign during the 1970s, though few of the victims were actual guerrillas.”²¹⁵ This regime was supported by the Americans, while the Soviets backed the

²¹² Gilbert, op. cit., p. 458.

²¹³ Revel, op. cit., p. 314.

²¹⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Condor; Ben Biggs, “The CIA Versus Communism”, *All About History*.

²¹⁵ Goldhagen, *Worse than War. Genocide, Eliminationsm and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity*, London: Abacus, 1009, p. 44.

Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) rebel group in the early 1980s. The twelve-year civil war ended in January, 1992, when a UN-brokered peace deal was signed. The 7000 FMLN rebels laid down their arms and became a legal political party.²¹⁶

In Guatemala, the regime “turned a campaign against a relatively unthreatening, leftist insurgency into a systematic slaughter of perhaps 200,000 Maya, mainly from 1978 to 1983, expelling from their villages between a half million and a million more.”²¹⁷

Castro exported the revolution in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Haiti (where “Papa Doc” Duvalier became a ruthless dictator with Voodoo tendencies). Che Guevara, the famous Argentine revolutionary, had played a major part in the Cuban revolution in 1959 before leading Cuban bandits throughout the region. However, Cuban rule was not to everyone’s taste. After the USA offered refugees from Cuba unhindered entry, hundreds of thousands of people, called *balseros*, tried to make the very dangerous sea crossing to Florida. Although about one third died at sea, “over thirty years, approximately 100,000 have attempted the journey. The result of this exodus is that out of 11 million inhabitants, 2 million now live in exile. Exile has scattered many families among Havana, Miami, Spain, and Puerto Rico.”²¹⁸

By the time the Soviet Union fell in 1989-91, most Cubans had lost their ideological zeal for the revolution and were ready for a transition to a moderate form of capitalism...

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The Cold War was increasingly a three-way fight between the Americans, the Soviets – and the Chinese. The Chinese were especially active (then, as now) in Africa: “By one estimate, Beijing spent between \$170 million and \$220 million from 1964 to 1985 in Africa alone”.²¹⁹

Burma. Burma (now Myanmar), writes Montefiore, “has been ruled by a military junta since a coup in 1962 led by Ne Win, who established a one-party state, dissolved Parliament, curtailed civil right, arrested opponents, nationalized business and set about marginalizing ethnic minorities. Ruthlessly crushing protests, riots and – in 1976 – an attempted coup, he handed over the presidency in 1981 to San Yu, but remained firmly in control as chairman of the Burma Socialist Programme Party, handpicking army officers and ministers.

²¹⁶ Maria Teresa Gutierrez, “Anyone who voiced opposition was targeted by right-wing death squads and ‘disappeared’”, *BBC World Histories*, N 3, April/May, 2017, pp. 29-31.

²¹⁷ Goldhagen, op. cit., p. 44.

²¹⁸ Fontaine, Santamaria and Boulouque, op. cit., p. 663. It is said that Castro took advantage of the *Balseros* to include most of the inmates of Cuba’s jails among their number, thereby causing a huge increase of crime in Miami.

²¹⁹ Fareed Zakaria, “The New China Scare”, *Foreign Affairs*, January/February, 2020, p. 56.

“Obsessed with numerology, Ne Win bizarrely revised the currency in 1987 into tender divisible by his lucky number – 9 – destroying the savings of millions. Mounting unrest led to his resignation as party chairman in July 1988. In the same year, the Four Eights Uprising, a massive pro-democracy protest, was crushed in a coup that saw a twenty-one-strong military junta – the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) – take control, led by General Saw Maung. Up to 10,000 protestors, mostly students and Buddhist monks, were killed, causing outrage in a country where the latter are revered as spiritual leaders. The SLORC subsequently instigated a twin programme of deforestation – to accommodate mass opium production – and systematic genocide against groups such as the Karen, Karenni, Shan, Kachins (Jingpo), Mons, Rohingyas, Wa and Chin (Zomis). Rape, torture, forced relocation, slave labour and murder have led to over 650,000 people – including 250,000 Karen – being displaced in eastern Burma alone, and around 2 million fleeing to Thailand.”²²⁰

Tanzania. However, writes Yuval Noah Harari, “Julius Nyerere, the idealistic president of Tanzania, was deeply impressed by the Chinese success. In order to modernise Tanzanian agriculture, Nyerere resolved to establish collective farms on the Chinese model. When peasants objected to the plan, Nyerere sent the army and police to destroy traditional villages and forcibly relocate hundreds of thousands of peasants onto the new collective farms.

“Government propaganda depicted the farms as miniature paradises, but many of them existed only in government documents. The protocols and reports written in the capital Dar-es-Salaam said that on such-and-such date the inhabitants of such-and-such villages were relocated to such-and-such farm. In reality, when the villagers reached their destination they found absolutely nothing there. No houses, no fields, no tools. Officials nevertheless reported great successes to themselves and to President Nyerere. In fact, within less than ten years Tanzania was transformed from Africa’s biggest food exporter into a net food importer that could not feed itself without external assistance. In 1979, 90 per cent of Tanzanian farmers lived on collective farms, but they generated only 5 per cent of the country’s agricultural output...”²²¹

Uganda. In 1971 Colonel Idi Amin came to power in Uganda through a military coup. He was one of the few African leaders not permanently attached to either side in the Cold War. “During his years in power, Amin shifted from being a pro-western ruler, enjoying considerable Israeli support to being backed by Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko, the Soviet Union, and East Germany. In 1975, Amin became the chairman of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), a Pan-Africanist group designed to promote solidarity among African states. During the 1977–1979 period, Uganda was a member of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Amin did, however, have the support of the US Central Intelligence Agency, which helped deliver bombs and other military equipment to Amin’s army and took part in military operations

²²⁰ Montefiore, *Titans of History*, p. 642.

²²¹ Harari, *Homo Deus*, London: Vintage, 2017, pp. 193–194.

with Amin's forces in Uganda... Amin's rule was characterized by rampant human rights abuses, political repression, ethnic persecution, extrajudicial killings, nepotism, corruption, and gross economic mismanagement. The number of people killed as a result of his regime is estimated by international observers and human rights groups to range from 100,000 to 500,000.”²²²

“There can be little doubt,” writes Paul Johnson, “that he was a ritual cannibal, keeping selected organs in his refrigerator.

“The image of refrigerated cannibalism encapsulated the regime, which was a grotesque caricature of a Soviet-type terror. The traditional police simply faded away, as their senior officers were murdered for investigating Amin’s crimes. Like Stalin, Amin had competing security services. They included his personal creation, the Public Safety Unit, the military police and his equivalent of the KGB, an organization called the State Research Centre which had evolved out of the old Cabinet Research Section... The SRC was run on the advice of Palestinians and Libyans who had themselves, in some cases, had Russian training. It usually killed with sledgehammers but it was by no means primitive in all respects. It was linked by tunnel to Amin’s villa so that intended victims who came to see him (he liked to ask them to cocktails) could be taken away without being seen again. SRC beatings were regular affairs, carried out at specific times every day. In contrast to Amin’s impulsive nature, there was an element of totalitarian routine and bureaucratic order about the terror. As in the Soviet bloc, at least two SRC agents were attached to Ugandan overseas missions. Like the KGB, the SRC financed itself by commercial activities (including drug rackets) and often killed for hard currency. Amin was not just as case of reversion to African primitivism. In some respects his regime was a characteristic reflection of the 1970s. His terror was a Muslim-Arab phenomenon; his regime was in many ways a foreign one, run by Nubians, Palestinians and Libyans...”

Amin “invaded Tanzania on 30 October 1978, an act which led to his downfall five months later. The OAU [which he headed] refused to condemn him and told Nyerere to accept mediation...”²²³

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On April 25, 1974, in the so-called “Carnatian Revolution”, the Portuguese “New State” dictatorship was overthrown and an Armed Forces Movement installed a left-wing regime in its place. It soon liberated all Portugal’s colonies, including Portuguese Guinea, Angola, Mozambique and East Timor in Indonesia. The result for them was anything but real liberation...

Angola. Angola, writes Martin Gilbert, “had become independent from Portugal on November 11, 1975. It did so in the midst of a civil war between the factions that had hitherto focused their struggle against the Portuguese. The

²²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idi_Amin

²²³ Johnson, *Modern Times*, pp. 535, 537.

victorious group, the Marxist-Leninist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was given military help by both the Soviet Union, which sent arms and military advisers, and Cuba, which sent five thousand combat troops. The rival group, the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), fought on, but the Soviet weaponry of the MPLA was decisive. On November 24 President Ford warned the Soviet Union that the dispatch of weapons, and also of Soviet military advisers, had introduced the rivalry of Great Powers to Africa for the first time since the collapse of European colonial rule fifteen years earlier."²²⁴

In March, 1976, the communists triumphed in the civil war. But in June, at the UN Security Council, the US "vetoed the admission of Angola [into the UN] for as long as Cuban troops remained there. Only after the United States agreed, five months later, to abstain rather than cast its veto, was Angola admitted. The Cuban troops – 20,000 in all by the summer – had by then completed their mission of helping secure, together with Soviet arms, the victory of the Marxist-led Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. That the civil war would cease became clear when the United States Senate banned any further American aid to the anti-Marxist groupings."²²⁵

UNITA, led by the brutal Jonas Savimbi, continued to fight. However, most of their ideas were derived from Maoism; so the Angolans truly found themselves between the devil and the deep blue sea...²²⁶ The MPLA state produced the anticipated tragic results for the Angolan population: a crumbling economy, famine (tens of thousands of children died in 1986), forced conscription and massive population transfer.

By the mid-1980s, writes James, "Angola alone owed the Soviet Union US \$5bn, which it could not repay. In 1977 the Soviets attempted to unseat [Angolan president] Neto, whom they now distrusted. Afterwards he made oblique approaches to the US..."²²⁷

Mozambique. On December 25, 1974 the Portuguese entrusted Mozambique to Frelimo, a Marxist-Leninist party founded in 1962 by Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, who managed to get the support both of the West and of the Soviet Union. On receiving power, Frelimo decided to extend a process called "villagization" throughout the country. As Yves Santamaria writes, "All peasants (80 percent of the population) were expected to abandon their traditional homes and to regroup in new villages. In the initial enthusiasm of independence, the population responded quite favorably to the government's requests, creating collective farms and sometimes cooperating in the construction of communal buildings, although they generally refused to inhabit them and soon abandoned

²²⁴ Gilbert, op. cit., p. 490. "By 1975," according to James, "some 36,000 Cuban reservists with artillery, tanks and missile systems were serving in Angola, while Cuban doctors, teachers and technicians replaced their Portuguese counterparts who had returned home." (op. cit., p. 82)

²²⁵ Gilbert, op. cit., p. 499.

²²⁶ Yves Santamaria, "Afrocommunism", in *The Black Book of Communism*, p. 700.

²²⁷ James, op. cit., p. 81.

the communal fields. On paper it appeared that the country was under the careful control of a hierarchical administration through a network of Communist cells.

"In 1977 the Frelimo leaders had openly proclaimed their allegiance to the Bolshevik ideal, calling for extended collectivization and closer links with the international Communist movement. Various treaties were signed with the countries of the Soviet bloc, which provided arms and military instructors in exchange for close support of the Rhodesian nationalists of the Zimbabwe African National Front (ZANU)." ²²⁸

An opposition movement called Renamo arose; it was supported at first by the Rhodesian secret services until the foundation of Marxist Zimbabwe in 1980, and then by South Africa. "To the surprise of numerous observers, the population of the villages rallied to the resistance movement despite the barbarism of Renamo's methods..."

However, "the actions of Renamo, on the whole, were considerably less systematic than the state violence perpetrated by Frelimo, and the support that Renamo received demonstrated just how hated the regime had become. Frelimo justified its actions in terms of a struggle against tribalism, against antiquated and outdated religious practices, and against the deep-seated belief in lineage and ancestral fiefdom, which the Front had rejected at independence, disparaging it as 'feudalism'..."

Communist (SWAPO) guerrillas also invaded Namibia from bases in Zambia and Angola. ²²⁹ There were also Soviet bases in Mozambique. ²³⁰

"According to Human Rights Watch, in the period 1975-1985 food shortages caused more deaths than did armed violence. This view is shared by UNICEF, which calculated that 600,000 died of hunger in this period, a loss of life comparable to that caused by famine in Ethiopia..." ²³¹

Ethiopia. Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown on September 12, 1974 by a Provisional Military Administrative Committee, or Dergue, led by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam. "The ensuing Marxist regime suffered several coups, uprisings, wide-scale drought, and a huge refugee problem. In 1977, Somalia, which had been receiving assistance and arms from the USSR invaded Ethiopia in the Ogaden War, capturing part of the Ogaden region. Ethiopia recovered it after it began receiving massive military aid from the USSR, Cuba, Yemen, East Germany and North Korea. This included around 15,000 Cuban combat troops. Up to 500,000 were killed as a result of the Red Terror, from forced deportations, or from the use of hunger as a weapon under Mengistu's rule. The Red Terror was carried out in response to what the government termed the "White Terror", a supposed chain of violent events, assassinations and killings

²²⁸ Santamaria, op. cit., pp. 701-702.

²²⁹ Gilbert, op. cit., p. 536.

²³⁰ Revel, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

²³¹ Santamaria, op. cit., pp. 702, 704.

attributed to the opposition.”²³² Daniel Goldhagen calculates that the Dergue regime “slaughtered perhaps 150,000 political enemies, killed perhaps another 100,000 during a regional expulsion program of 1.5 to 2 million people, and caused another million to die through famine.”²³³ “As a million Ethiopians starved, the streets of Addis Ababa were festooned with posters that read ‘The oppressed masses will be victorious’, ‘Marxism-Leninism is our guideline!’ and ‘Temporary natural setbacks will not deter us from our final objective of building Communism!’ This reality was often missed in the emotional European response to the Ethiopian Famine, which culminated in the 1985 Live Aid concert, organized by the Irish singer Bob Geldof.”²³⁴

The Ethiopian Communists also persecuted the Church; in February 1976 the Ethiopian Patriarch was uncanonically deposed and disappeared, presumed killed.²³⁵

“According to Human Rights Watch, in the period 1975-1985 food shortages caused more deaths than did armed violence. This view is shared by UNICEF, which calculated that 600,000 died of hunger in this period, a loss of life comparable to that caused by famine in Ethiopia...”²³⁶ However, according to other estimates, in Ethiopia alone “up to 1.2 million died between 1984 and 1985 (2.7 percent of the population).”²³⁷

Spanish Guinea. Spanish Guinea became independent in 1968 as the Equatorial Republic of Guinea. “In July 1970, Macias Nguema created a single-party state and made himself president for life in 1972. He broke off ties with Spain and the West. In spite of his condemnation of Marxism, which he deemed “neo-colonialist”, Equatorial Guinea maintained very special relations with socialist countries, notably China, Cuba, and the USSR. He signed a preferential trade agreement and a shipping treaty with the Soviet Union. The Soviets also granted loans to Equatorial Guinea.

“The shipping agreement granted the Soviets permission to establish a pilot project of fishery development and a naval base at Luba. The USSR was in return to supply fish to Equatorial Guinea. China and Cuba also gave different forms of financial, military, and technical assistance to Equatorial Guinea, which gave them a measure of influence in Equatorial Guinea. For the USSR, despite the unsavoury background of Macias Nguema, there was an advantage to be gained in the War in Angola by having access to Luba base and later on to Malabo International Airport.

“Towards the middle 1970s the Macias regime came under grave accusations of being guilty of mass killings. In 1974 the World Council of Churches affirmed

²³² <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiopia>.

²³³ Goldhagen, op. cit., p. 52.

²³⁴ Ferguson, *Doom. The Politics of Catastrophe*, London: Allen Lane, 2021, p. 190.

²³⁵ *Sobornost*, 1979, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 64-65., vol. 2, no.2, p. 65

²³⁶ Revel, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

²³⁷ Ferguson, *Doom. The Politics of Catastrophe*, London: Allen Lane, 2021, p. 190.

that large numbers of people had been murdered since 1968 in a 'reign of terror' which continued. The same body claimed that a quarter of the whole population had fled abroad, while 'the prisons are overflowing and to all intents and purposes form one vast concentration camp'. On Christmas 1975, Macías Nguema had 150 alleged coup plotters executed. Out of a population of 300,000, an estimated 80,000 were killed. Apart from allegedly committing genocide against the ethnic minority Bubi people, he ordered the deaths of thousands of suspected opponents, closed down churches and presided over the economy's collapse as skilled citizens and foreigners left the country..."²³⁸

Nguema was executed in 1979. "He was charged with 'genocide, treason, embezzlement and systematic violation of human rights'. He had reduced his country to little more than a prison camp, and ordered the deaths of thousands of people. He was found guilty and executed. The firing squad that carried out the execution had been brought specially from Morocco, because local people were afraid that Nguema's spirit was too strong for bullets, and that he would return as a tiger."²³⁹

Nguema was succeeded by his nephew, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo. He continued the reign of terror for another thirty years. "Torture is endemic, and local radio hails him as a god while he grooms his son to succeed him."²⁴⁰

Zimbabwe. An indigenous force that contended with the Marxists in Southern Africa was the white supremacist movement in South Africa and Rhodesia, which had proclaimed its independence from Britain some years before. In Rhodesia in 1977, writes Gilbert, "even as the White government of Ian Smith was being pressed strongly by the United States and Britain to honour its pledge of majority rule, a 'war of liberation' was being fought by those who preferred to seize power rather than wait for it to be transferred. It was the thirteenth year of illegal independence, and the two main guerrilla groups, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), under Joshua Nkomo, and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), under Robert Mugabe, had united to form a single political and fighting force, the Patriotic Front. Rejecting negotiations, it carried out continual attacks on Rhodesian military installations, operating from bases in both Mozambique and Zambia. AZPU was able to call upon arms and ammunition from the Soviet Union; ZANU from China..."

"The Smith regime carried out a series of military raids into the countries in which the Rhodesian guerrillas were based. In May, President Kaunda of Zambia declared that this country was 'in a state of war' with Rhodesia. During a Rhodesian army attack into Mozambique in November, 1,200 members of the Patriotic Front were killed. There was widespread international condemnation of this cross-border raid. Inside Rhodesia the killings mounted. In February three Jesuit priests and four Dominican nuns were murdered at the Musanu mission

²³⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equatorial_Guinea#25273869.

²³⁹ Gilbert, op. cit., p. 551.

²⁴⁰ Montefiore, op. cit., p. 606.

station forty-three miles east of the capital, Salisbury, bringing the number of murdered missionaries to thirteen in nine months. The death toll during the year was 1,759 ZANU and ZAPU guerrillas killed, a thousand Black Rhodesians, 244 members of the Rhodesian security forces and fifty-six White Rhodesians. In measures designed to cut off the guerrillas from local support, the Smith government resettled more than a quarter of a million Africans in 'protected villages'."²⁴¹

Under British and American pressure, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) finally accepted black majority rule in 1979. The next year, the Marxist government of ZANU under Mugabe. Peter Furtado writes: "Despite the high ideals and constitutionalism of the early years, Mugabe's rule became steadily more partisan and arbitrary. The policy of allowing 'war veterans' to seize white-owned farms, in a belated attempt at land reform, drove hundreds of White Zimbabweans to emigrate, leaving the once agriculturally abundant country dependent on food aid. At the same time, hyper-inflation reached eye-watering levels..."²⁴²

South Africa. By 1980, writes James, "South Africa – ruled by what Castro called a 'Fascist-Racist' regime – stood alone against the forces of African nationalism. For 40 years, the apartheid regime had presented itself as a bastion against communism – a stance that had secured it a steady flow of western arms. The Soviet Union and Cuba provided weapons and training camps for African National Congress guerrillas fighting black oppression by the apartheid government. South Africa was also, as US President Ronald Reagan remarked in 1981, 'essential to the free world in its production of minerals we all must have'.

"In the event, Reagan did not need to commit his country to support South Africa's last stand; events inside the Soviet Union were now dictating the outcome of the Cold War in Africa. By the mid-1980s, the communist powerhouse was facing an economic crisis, losing a war in Afghanistan and overstretched in Africa. One Kremlin official, Anatoly Adamishin, spoke for many others when he asked: 'Why, with all our problems, did we have to get involved [in Africa]?... We could not afford it.' Angola alone owed the Soviet Union \$5bn, which it could not repay. In 1977 the Soviets attempted to unseat Neto, whom they now distrusted. Afterwards he made oblique approaches towards the US.

"It was left to the last leader of a communist Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, to disengage from Africa. In 1988 he salvaged what he could in agreement with the United States, by which all Soviet and Cuban forces would withdraw from the continent, and South Africa pulled out of Namibia, which was granted independence in 1990. Castro growled about 'betrayal', but acquiesced.

²⁴¹ Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 514-515.

²⁴² Furtado, *History Day by Day*, London: Thames & Hudson, 2019, p. 80.

“The Cold War in Africa had ended. The United States had won on points. But Africa was left, traumatized, to pick up the pieces and face the problems caused by the corrupt dictatorships that were the Cold War’s lasting legacy...”²⁴³

Even South Africa by no means turned into the paradise of racial coexistence and cooperation promised by the fall of the undoubtedly evil apartheid regime and its replacement, following elections, by the formerly communist African National Congress party in 1994. The ANC leader and new president, Nelson Mandela, excused the violence the ANC had committed as “a purely defensive action against the violence of apartheid”, and did his best to bring about racial reconciliation, receiving the Nobel Peace Prize together with the former South African President F.W. de Clerk. But after Mandela’s death the situation deteriorated. Thus “over 90,000 white people have been killed since the early 2000's with hundreds of thousands of them robbed of their farms that they built.”²⁴⁴

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Western Europe. Outside the Third World the Communists made few seizures of territory in the 1970s. However, if we count terrorism as a form of war, then the Soviets must certainly be counted responsible for waging a terrorist war against Western Europe even while it preached peace and Détente and traded with the enemy.

Revel writes: “Because it is an old trick for governments to blame their internal difficulties on foreign plots, prudent commentators and political figures long made a habit of skepticism about the exact extent of Soviet responsibility for the spread of terrorism in Europe since 1970 and in Latin America since 1960 and earlier. As time went on, however, enough circumstantial evidence was amassed to narrow the gap between the opinions these observers expressed in private and those they voiced in public. In private, they had long believed Moscow was supporting terrorism, but they did not abandon their reserve in public until 1980. Then Italian President Alessandro Pertini openly linked the Soviet Union to the Red Brigades and, in Portugal, Socialist leader Mario Soares implicated the Soviets in the terrorist marauding of the Basque ETA in Spain. In 1977, *Le Monde* had opened its pages to defenders of the Baader-Meinhof group with a generosity that indicated some sympathy with terrorism in West Germany; in 1982, however, in reporting on the investigation into the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II on May 13, 1981, the paper almost unreservedly approved the charge that the shooting had been ordered by the Soviet Union through its Bulgarian vassals. And in a column in the French magazine *Le Point*, the very sober Olivier Chevrillon, discussing a series of terrorist killings in Paris, declared: ‘The flood of comment... neglects one aspect of terrorism today that nevertheless seems ... glaringly obvious... Terrorism, of course, is still what it has always been – a form of madness – but hasn’t it also become a reckless auxiliary to [one

²⁴³ James, op. cit., p. 82.

²⁴⁴ James, op. cit., p. 82; Mark von Sorgs, *Facebook*, December 5, 2017.

country's] diplomacy? By showering every kind of *pistolero* with arms and rubles, the Soviets are surely giving themselves an added means of pressure and blackmail against the European democracies.'...

"Terrorism must, however, have local roots to be exploitable. And there is no denying that the Soviet Union and Cuba, its agent in Latin America, have infiltrated *homegrown* terrorist movements, amplified their natural strength, supplied equipment and advisers; when necessary, terrorist leaders have been trained in Eastern Europe camps that the West has known about for years. The range of possibilities offered has been vast, from Mid-eastern terrorism through Irish and Spanish separatism and the bloody paranoiacs in West Germany and Italy to the Latin American guerrilla movements. On their own manpower and resources, none of these movements except the Arab terrorists could have gone very far or lasted long. But with so many screens to hide behind, the Soviet Union and its vassals, without ever showing themselves, can maintain a permanent state of insecurity in the Western countries that admirably suits Communist purposes...

"... Terrorism has nothing do with the indignation and spontaneous insurrection of the masses. Its roots are elsewhere. It is based on psychological conditioning, indoctrination, and military organization into small, secret and fanaticized groups that have no need whatsoever of support from a general population whose hostility towards them, in Italy as in Germany, is ferocious and virtually unanimous.

"Terrorists in such countries are not fighting for freedom. The Communists are not fighting for the national independence of the people in the Third World or against neocolonialism. The proof of this is that they have grabbed power in countries that had long been independent and nonaligned: Ethiopia, for example, and Afghanistan. It is a lie that the Communists are fighting for democracy: the proof of this is that they have tried to overturn democratic regimes in such countries as Venezuela and Portugal, that they methodically try to topple democracy wherever it exists. It is true that in Cuba in 1959 and in Nicaragua in 1979 the *guerrilleros* overturned dictatorships, but only to replace fascist dictatorships with Communist dictatorships..."²⁴⁵

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The United Nations. Where, it may be asked, was the United Nations in all these murderous wars and fearful tyrannies and terrorisms that became so prominent in these years?

"As a threat to the stability of all societies under the rule of law," writes Paul Johnson, "international terrorism should have been the primary concern of the United Nations. But by the 1970s, the UN was a corrupt and demoralized body, and its ill-considered interventions were more inclined to promote violence than

²⁴⁵ Revel, op. cit., pp. 204, 206, 209.

to prevent it. Truman's fatal mistake in allowing executive power to slip towards the General Assembly in 1950, compounded by Eisenhower's error in 1956, when he allowed Hammarskjöld to hound Britain and France as aggressors, now yielded a bitter and abundant harvest. The UN was founded by fifty-one states, the great majority of them democracies. By 1975 there were 144 members, with plans for 165, all but twenty-five of them totalitarian or one-party states, mainly of the Left. The Soviet, Arab-Muslim and African states together constituted a working majority. There was thus no question of taking action against terrorism. On the contrary... Idi Amin, a terrorist himself and a patron and beneficiary of terrorism, was given a standing ovation in 1975 when he advocated genocide.²⁴⁶ Yasser Arafat, head of the PLO, the world's largest terrorist organization, was actually given a seat in the Assembly. The UN Secretariat had long since ceased to apply the principles of the Charter. The Secretary-General functioned as a mere post-office...

"Broadly speaking, during the 1970s the UN majority concentrated on three issues: organizing the destruction of South Africa and Israel, and condemning 'imperialism' as personified by America... But the real danger of the UN was that paper majorities tended to grow into real policies: the corrupt arithmetic of the Assembly, where in the Seventies votes could be bought by arms or even by personal bribes to delegates, tended to become imperceptibly the conventional wisdom of international society.

"This was particularly true of the attacks on America, now increasingly isolated and, as the economic crisis of the 1970s deepened, blamed as the source of the world's evils. It was a striking consequence of UN arithmetic that the Arab oil states, whose price-increases added \$70 billion a year to their incomes in 1974-5, all of it at the expense of the industrial nations and underdeveloped countries, were never once criticised in any resolution of the Assembly or a UN committee. Nor was any attempt made by the UN majority to get them to disgorge these excess profits in the form of mandatory aid. The synthetic anger of the UN was concentrated wholly on America, one of the chief victims, and by extension to the West as a whole. It is illuminating to trace the genesis of this assault. The original Marxist thesis was that capitalism would collapse. That had not happened. The first fall-back position (Khrushchev's) was that the 'socialist bloc' would overtake the West in living standards. That had not happened either. The second fall-back position, used from the early 1970s onwards, which was sold to the Third World and became the UN orthodoxy, was that high Western living standards, far from being the consequence of a more efficient economic system, were the immoral wages of the deliberate and systematic impoverishment of the rest of the world. Thus in 1974 the UN adopted a 'Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States' which condemned the workings of Western economics. The 1974 UN World Population Conference was a prolonged attack on US selfishness. The 1974 UN World Food Conference denounced America and other states, the only ones

²⁴⁶ "As chairman of the OAU, he addressed the General Assembly on 1 October 1975 in a rabid speech which denounced the 'Zionist-US conspiracy' and called not only for the expulsion of Israel but for its 'extinction' (i.e. genocide)." (Johnson, *Modern Times*, p. 536).

actually to produce food surpluses. The Indian Food Minister thought it 'obvious' they were 'responsible for the present plight' of the poor nations, and had a 'duty' to help them. Such help was not 'charity' but 'deferred compensation for what has been done to them in the past by the developed nations'. Next February the 'non-aligned' countries castigated 'the obstinacy of the imperialist powers in preserving the structures of colonial and neo-colonial exploitation which nurture their luxurious and superfluous consumer societies while they keep a large part of humanity in misery and hunger.'

"The attack was particularly unreasonable since during the previous fourteen years alone (1960-73), official development aid from the advanced nations direct to the poorer countries, or through agencies, amounted to \$91.8 billion, the largest voluntary transfer of resources in history..."²⁴⁷

²⁴⁷ Johnson, *Modern Times*, pp. 690-691.

18. EUGENICS RESURGENT

Eugenics is usually considered to have been a characteristic of Nazism, and opposed by liberal regimes. However, in the 1930s most European states favoured it; and in the Protestant countries of Northern Europe eugenics was neither forgotten nor abandoned. It was also not forgotten by the United Nations. Julian Huxley, brother of Aldous, was director-general of UNESCO, and in 1947 he penned the organization's first manifesto, called "UNESCO: Its Purpose and Philosophy", which declared: "Even though it is quite true that any radical eugenic policy will be for many years politically and psychologically impossible, it will be important for Unesco to see that the eugenic problem is examined with the greatest care, and that the public mind is informed of the issues at stake so that much which is now unthinkable may at least become thinkable."²⁴⁸

So the unthinkable was to become thinkable. And already practical, particularly in Scandinavia. Thus Sweden "operated programmes of compulsory sterilization directed at the mentally ill, people with learning difficulties and inheritable diseases, and the Roma population, among others, until 1976..."²⁴⁹

As Tony Judt writes, "Early twentieth-century confidence in the capacity of the state to make a better society had taken many forms: Scandinavian Social Democracy – like the Fabian reformism of Britain's welfare state – was born of a widespread fascination with social engineering of all kinds. And just a little beyond the use of the state to adjust incomes, expenditures, employment and information there lurked the temptation to tinker with individuals themselves.

"Eugenics – the 'science' of racial improvement – was more than an Edwardian-era fad, like vegetarianism or rambling (though it often appealed to the same constituencies). Taken by thinkers of all political shades, it dovetailed especially well with the ambitions of well-meaning social reformers. If one's social goal was to improve the human condition wholesale, why pass up the opportunities afforded by modern science to add retail amelioration along the way? Why should the prevention or abolition of imperfections in the human condition not extend to the prevention (or abolition) of imperfect human beings? In the early decades of the twentieth century the appeal of scientifically manipulated social or genetic planning was widespread and thoroughly respectable; it was only thanks to the Nazis, whose 'hygienic' ambitions began with ersatz anthropometrics and ended in the gas chamber, that it was comprehensively discredited in post-war Europe. Or so it was widely supposed.

"But, as it emerged many years later, Scandinavian authorities at least had not abandoned an interest in the theory – and practice – of 'racial hygiene'. Between 1934 and 1976 sterilization programmes were pursued in Norway, Sweden and Denmark, in each case under the auspices and with the knowledge of Social

²⁴⁸ Huxley, in Phillip Darrell Collins and Paul David Collins, *The Scientific Dictatorship*, New York: iUniverse, 2004, pp. 99-100.

²⁴⁹ Gray, op. cit., p. 27.

Democratic governments. In these years some 6,000 Danes, 40,000 Norwegians and 60,000 Swedes (90 percent of them women) were sterilized for 'hygienic' purposes 'to improve the population'. The intellectual driving force behind these programmes – the Institute of Racial Biology at the University of Uppsala in Sweden – had been set up in 1921, at the peak of the fashion for the subject. It was not dismantled until fifty-five years later..."²⁵⁰

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Closely related to eugenics is the euthanasia movement. In 1981 the French banker and advisor to President Mitterand, Jacques Attali, said: "In the future it will be a question of finding a way to reduce the population. We will start with the old, because as soon as it exceeds 60-65 years man lives longer than he produces and costs society dearly, then the weak and then the useless who do nothing for society because there will be more and more of them, and especially the stupid ones.

"Euthanasia targeting these groups; euthanasia will have to be an essential instrument of our future societies, in all cases. We cannot of course execute people or set up camps. We will get rid of them by making them believe it is for their own good...

"We will find something or cause it, a pandemic that targets certain people, a real economic crisis or not, a virus that will affect the old or the fat, it doesn't matter, the weak will succumb to it, the fearful and the stupid will believe it and ask to be treated.

"We will have taken care to have planned the treatment, a treatment that will be the solution. The selection of idiots will thus be done on its own: they will go to the slaughterhouse on their own."

"Finally (and perhaps especially), since no war can be won unless the peoples waging it believe it just and necessary, and unless the loyalty of citizens and their belief in its values are maintained, the chief weapons of the future will be the instruments of propaganda, communication, and intimidation."²⁵¹

In 2002 assisted suicide and euthanasia was legalized in the Netherlands. A few years later, it was found that more and more people were asking for euthanasia even when they did not have life-threatening diseases. The reason might be that their children did not visit them, or that they felt they would become a burden on their family. Most recently, cases of euthanasia *against* the will of the patients have been recorded..."²⁵²

²⁵⁰ Freedland, "Eugenics: the skeleton that rattles loudest in the Left's closet", *The Manchester Guardian*, February 17, 2012.

²⁵¹ Attali, *Interviews with Michel Salomon - The Faces of the Future*, Seghers edition.

²⁵² Cassy Fiono-Chesser, "1 in 20 deaths in the Netherlands is now due to euthanasia", *Live Action*, August 7, 2017.

Still more recently, eugenics has enjoyed a boost from Bill Gates, the founder of Microsoft Systems, who openly declares his intention to reduce the world's population by various technological means (especially vaccination) by 15 per cent... Slowly, the old idea is creeping back: the idea of a super-race that is worthy to live, and for whose sake the older and sicker must die...

As Gray has pointed out, "there are different conceptions of how society is evolving, but they have some things in common. All have an ersatz-religious quality. Shaw described his theory of 'creative evolution' as 'the religion of the future', while [Julian] Huxley [president of the British Eugenics Society] as a 'scientific religion'. All of these ideologues extrapolate from a seemingly dominant trend to a single universal end-point, invariably one in which people like themselves come out on top. And all of these end-points have failed to materialise as history stumbled on."²⁵³

The moral objection to eugenics is obvious: the superiority of one man to another consists, not in any calculus of men's abilities of mind or body, which God has distributed to men in accordance with His inscrutable will, but in his love for God and man – including men inferior to himself. The eugenicist is prepared to sacrifice others for the sake of himself and those like him: the Christian is prepared to do the exact opposite. The Christian dies for others; the eugenicist makes others die for himself.

The *theological* objection to eugenics consists in the assertion that man is constituted by his body – that is, his genes – alone, so that he can be improved by manipulating his genes alone. But man consists of both soul and body, and the soul is infinitely more important than the body. In fact, at the general resurrection, when man's soul and body will be reunited and transfigured, the state of his body – glorious and beautiful, "without spot or wrinkle", or corrupt and disgusting – will have been determined by the quality of his soul alone. Today, however, science in both East and West, while propelled, seemingly, by the most pious motives of love for mankind, no longer believes in the soul, having become completely conquered by atheist materialism... But how, if you do not believe in man, can you love him?

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All this is the result of the worship of science and the worship of man without the knowledge of the true nature of either, as was prophesied hundreds of years ago by the Athonite hermit St. Nilus the Myrrh-gusher: "About the year 1900, towards the middle of the twentieth century, the people of that time will begin to become unrecognizable. When the time of the coming of the Antichrist draws near, people's minds will be darkened from carnal passions, and dishonour and iniquity will become ever stronger. The world will then become unrecognizable, the appearance of people will change and it will be impossible clearly to

²⁵³ Gray, op. cit., p. 27.

distinguish men from women thanks to their shamelessness in clothes and hairstyle. These people will become savage and cruel, like beasts, because of the deceptions of the Antichrist. There will be no respect for parents and elders, love will disappear, Christian pastors, bishops and priests will become vainglorious men, completely unable to distinguish the right path from the left. Then the morals and traditions of Christians and of the Church will change. Modesty and humility will disappear from among men and adultery and dissipation will reign. Lies and love of money will reach the highest limits, and woe to those who gather treasures. Adultery, lust, homosexuality, secret deeds, thefts and murders will rule in society. At that future time, thanks to the strength of very great criminality and dissoluteness, people will be deprived of the grace of the Holy Spirit which they received in Holy Baptism, and they will equally lose the pangs of conscience. The Churches of God will be deprived of God-fearing and pious pastors, and woe to the Christians who remain upon the earth, who will completely lose their faith, because they will be deprived of the possibility of seeing the light of knowledge from anyone. Then they will depart from the world into holy refuges in search of a lightening of their spiritual sufferings, but everywhere they will meet hindrances and obstacles. And all this will be the result of the Antichrist's desiring to rule over them and become the ruler of the whole inhabited earth. He will work wonders and fantastic signs. He will also give corrupt wisdom to an unfortunate man, so that he will make discoveries enabling one man to conduct a conversation with another from one end of the earth to the other. Also, they will be able to fly in the air like birds, and descend to the bottom of the sea like fishes. And when they have achieved all this, these unfortunate people will live their lives in comfort, not knowing, wretched ones, that this is a deception of the Antichrist. And he, the dishonourable one, *will so complete science with vainglory that it will lose its way and lead people to unbelief in the existence of the God in three Persons...*"

19. SUPER-ECUMENISM (1)

Ecumenism by this time was especially occupied by two concerns: social justice and the expansion of ecumenical unification to include non-Christian religions, especially Islam and Judaism.

ROCOR's Archbishop Avery of Jordanville (+1976) was especially concerned by the obsession with social justice at the expense of dogmatic concerns: "...The ideal of 'social justice' and 'social righteousness' has become the highest ideal of a humanity which has denied Christ...

"The so-called 'social question' could not have taken root if people had remained faithful to true Christianity incarnate in life...

"The dearest thing of all for the Christian is the Truth, for the sake of witnessing to which the Lord Jesus Christ came to earth, as He Himself said to Pilate (John 18:37). And for the true Christian there can be only one desirable unity - unity in the Truth of Christ - the pure, undistorted, uncorrupted Truth, without any admixture of diabolic falsehood, not envenomed by any compromise with it.

"From this point of view, all these appeals for 'peace' and 'unity' are unacceptable, for they come from people who encroach on our principal treasure - the pure and undefiled truth of the teaching of Christ that has been preserved by us, and who wish to substitute for it a lie which is of the devil.

"The 'unity' which is now envisaged by the enemies of the pure truth of Christ is not unity in Christ. It is that unity which the Antichrist, who wishes to subject all to himself and to found his kingdom on earth is trying to create.

"Everything that now comes from people on the summits of religious, political, and communal life, since the time that our Orthodox Russia was trampled in the dust, is nothing else than the intense work of preparation by the servants of the coming Antichrist for his future kingdom."

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This was the supposed "age of the Spirit", when, ignoring the voice of the Holy Spirit: "Be ye not unequally yoked with unbelievers, for... what concord hath Christ with Belial?" (II Corinthians 6.14-15), the ecumenists invited to union with themselves not only Christians of all denominations but also members of all the other religions.

In 1970 Pope Paul VI spoke of "the Hebrew and Islamic peoples, and Christians... these three expressions of an *identical* [my italics - V.M.] monotheism", and confessed that "we are all sons of the same Father, and,... therefore, all brothers". Evidently he did not know the words of the Apostle John: "Whosoever denieth the Son [and both Jews and Mohammedans deny the Son],

the same hath not the Father" (I John 2.23). Nor those of the Lord Himself: "No man cometh unto the Father but by Me" (John 14.6).

An important influence, paradoxically, on Catholic ecumenism was the ecumenism of the Russian religious philosophers such as Soloviev and Berdiaev. Thus Patriarch Athenagoras noted the influence of Berdiaev on one of the architects of the Second Vatican Council, Cardinal Jean Daniélou, as well as on himself.²⁵⁴ And in a speech made on December 12, 1992, Pope John-Paul II said: "I confess the same Christian faith as was the faith of Soloviev."²⁵⁵

Catholic Super-Ecumenism was set in motion by the Second Vatican Council's decree, *Nostra Aetate* (Declaration on the Relations of the Church to Non-Christian Religions, October 28, 1965): "Even though the Jewish authorities and those who followed their lead pressed for the death of Christ, neither all Jews indiscriminately at that time, nor Jews today, can be charged with the crimes committed during his passion." And yet the Jewish religion to this day justifies the killing of Christ, saying in the Talmud that He was a magician and His Mother a prostitute!

The Orthodox were not far behind the Catholics in super-ecumenism, especially in relation to the Mohammedans. The leading Orthodox ecumenist, as we have seen was Patriarch Athenagoras. He appears to have been motivated by an expectation of the Second Coming of Christ, but which was in reality the Antichrist. Thus, as V. M. Lourie writes, according to Athenagoras, "Palestine has again become the centre of the world... We must pray and struggle that Jerusalem may again become a place of dialogue and peace. So that we may together prepare the way for the return of Jesus, the Mahdi of Islam, the Messiah of Israel, our Lord." "In Jerusalem Abraham met Melchizedek, a priest of the Most High God, a mystical foreshadowing of the Word which is present in all peoples and in all religions."²⁵⁶

Again, in 1970, wrote Fr. Seraphim Rose, "the WCC sponsored a conference in Ajaltoun, Lebanon, between Hindus, Buddhists, Christians and Moslems, and a follow-up conference of 23 WCC 'theologians' in Zurich in June declared the need for 'dialogue' with the non-Christian religions. At the meeting of the Central Committee of the WCC at Addis Ababa in January of this year, Metropolitan Georges Khodre of Beirut (Orthodox Church of Antioch) shocked even many Protestant delegates when he not merely called for 'dialogue' with these religions, but left the Church of Christ far behind and trampled on 19 centuries of Christian tradition when he called on Christians to 'investigate the authentically spiritual life of the unbaptized' and enrich their own experience with the 'riches of a universal religious community' (*Religious New Service*), for 'it is Christ alone who is received as light when grace visits a Brahmin, a Buddhist, or a Moslem reading his own scriptures' (*Christian Century*, February 10, 1971)." Evidently the

²⁵⁴ Olivier Clément, *Conversations with Patriarch Athenagoras*, in Lourié, op. cit.

²⁵⁵ *Irénikon*, 1993, vol. 66, p. 526

²⁵⁶ Lourié, "The Ecclesiology of a Retreating Army".

Metropolitan had forgotten that “all the gods of the heathen are demons” (Psalm 95.5)...

In 1975 the Orthodox delegates at the WCC General Assembly in Nairobi declared: “The Orthodox do not expect the other Christians to be converted to Orthodoxy in its historic and cultural reality of the past and the present and to become members of the Orthodox Church.”

In May, 1975 the WCC published an agreed statement of the Faith and Order Commission entitled *One Baptism, One Eucharist and a Mutually Recognised Ministry*, proclaiming a thoroughly Protestant doctrine of ecclesial and sacramental unity. As the title suggests, this document was aimed at the mutual recognition by the churches of each other’s sacraments. For example: “Our baptismal unity in Jesus Christ constitutes a call to the churches to overcome their divisions and achieve full visible union” (p. 10). And “the full recognition by churches of each other’s baptisms as the one baptism into Christ should be possible for all when Jesus Christ has been confessed as Lord by the candidate... and when baptism has been performed with water ‘in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit’” (p. 16). It should be remembered that the WCC includes sects which deny the Divinity of Christ, and that none of the member-churches except the Orthodox (and not even all of them) baptised in the apostolic manner with full threefold immersion.

The document also included a theologically incoherent doctrine of the transformation of the bread and the wine in the Eucharist, and the extraordinary statement that “the churches should test their liturgies in the light of the eucharistic agreement recently obtained” (p. 27) – as if the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom needed revision in the light of Protestant theology!

The Orthodox could hardly claim not to be committed to this document’s doctrines, for one of its chief architects was the Russian Protopresbyter Vitaly Borovoy, and none of the Churches disowned him. Moreover, it was a revision of previous statements “in the light of responses received from the churches” – including, presumably, from the Orthodox churches.

In the same year of 1975, Archbishop Athenagoras of Thyateira and Great Britain published, with the explicit blessing and authorisation of Patriarch Demetrius, his *Thyateira Confession*, which expressed the novel idea that the Church is a house without walls that anyone can enter freely. And he wrote: “Orthodox Christians believe that the following Churches have valid and true Priesthood or Orders. The Orthodox, the Roman Catholic, the Ethiopian, the Copto-Armenian and the Anglican. The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, the Patriarchate of Alexandria, the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, the Patriarchate of Romania and the Church of Cyprus half a century ago declared officially that the Anglican Church has valid Orders by dispensation and that means that Anglican Bishops, Priests and Deacons can perform valid sacraments

as can those of the Roman Catholic Church.”²⁵⁷ Athenagoras also asserted that “the idea that Masonry is a religion is mistaken” ...²⁵⁸

When Metropolitan Philaret criticized *The Thyateira Confession*²⁵⁹, Athenagoras responded with a fierce attack on ROCOR, declaring: “Of course the door of the Church is Holy Baptism which the Orthodox Church has recognised as being validly administered by Roman Catholics, the Copts, the Armenians, the Old Catholics and Anglicans, the Lutherans, the Methodists and some other Christian groups.”²⁶⁰

Again, at the WCC’s General Assembly at Nairobi in 1975, the Orthodox delegates, having signed an agreement to recognize the sacraments of the non-Orthodox delegates, had declared that “the Orthodox do not expect the other Christians to be converted to Orthodoxy in its historic and cultural reality of the past and the present and to become members of the Orthodox Church” – which gave the lie to their excuse that they were participating in the ecumenical movement “to witness to the non-Orthodox”.²⁶¹

Some opposition to ecumenism remained in some of the Local Churches – especially in Greece, where the well-known opposition of Esphigmenou Monastery kept the issue high on the agenda. Thus, as Archimandrite (later Metropolitan) Callistus (Ware) reported, “during May, 1978, after visiting the Ecumenical Patriarch, Dr. Potter and Archbishop Scott, the Chairman of the Central Committee of the WCC, went to Athens for discussions there with the Synodical Commission on Inter-Orthodox and Inter-Christian Relations. It seems that the explanations offered from the side of the WCC totally failed to meet the Greek Orthodox objections. In an interview with the *New York Times*, Archbishop Seraphim of Athens stated that the Church of Greece was now considering withdrawal from membership in the WCC...

“In April, 1980 another warning against ecumenism was issued by the Fathers of Mount Athos, who since the return of Vatopedi in 1975 were now all solidly Old Calendar, though most remained in communion with the Ecumenical Patriarch. And yet high-level negotiations between Orthodox and Catholics went ahead on the islands of Patmos and Rhodes in May and June of 1980. During these talks, news came – hastily denied by the Vatican – that Pope John-Paul II had pronounced papal infallibility to be ‘not negotiable’. And on June 5, the day after

²⁵⁷ Athenagoras (Kokkinakis), *The Thyateira Confession*, London, 1975, p. 61.

²⁵⁸ A parish of the Moscow Patriarchate in England protested about this to Metropolitan Anthony (Bloom) of Sourozh. He said he could do nothing about the *Confession*; he had orders to work with Athenagoras. The parish then joined the Russian Church Abroad...

²⁵⁹ Metropolitan Philaret of New York, “An Epistle to the Primates of the Holy Churches of God and the Most Reverend Orthodox Bishops on the ‘Thyateira Confession’”, *Orthodox Christian Witness*, May 17/30, 1976; “The Thyateira Confession”, *Orthodox Christian Witness*, February 23 / March 7, 1976. See also Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Boston, *A Reply to Archbishop Athenagoras*.

²⁶⁰ Athenagoras (Kokkinakis), *Ecclesiological Problems: “Church Beyond Boundaries”*.

²⁶¹ “Orthodoxy and the Ecumenical Movement”, *Orthodox Christian Witness*, October 27 / November 9, 1997, p. 2.

the ending of the talks in Rhodes, the Pope declared that papal infallibility was “the key itself for certainty in professing and proclaiming the faith...”²⁶²

As the 1970s and 1980s progressed talk of unity was succeeded by action, and communal services not only between Christians of different denominations, but also between Christians and non-Christians, became common. Thus on June 29, 1980, in Atlanta, Georgia, the Greek Archbishop James of New York served an “unprecedented” ecumenical service with various Catholics, Protestants and even Jews... Even clergy of Serbian Patriarchate were conducting ecumenical services with the participation of heterodox clerics and even rabbis and women. On January 22, 1981, the Ecumenical Press Service reported that the WCC was working on plans to unify all the Christian denominations into a single new religion which, the ecumenists hoped, would be generally accepted. To this end, a “preliminary plateau” was to be formed which would consolidate existing agreements between the churches. This would then lead to the formation of a universal council which would become a single body with sufficient authority to formulate a new confession of the apostolic faith!²⁶³

Also clear by this time was the *politicisation* of the WCC along the lines of the Moscow-inspired “movement for peace”. We can see this in a cursory reading of the titles of the statements of the 33rd and 34th sessions of the Central Committee of the WCC in 1981 and 1982: “The Churches and the Refugee Crisis”, “Statement on Namibia”, “Increased Threats to Peace and the Task of the Churches”, “Statement on South African Government Raids on Squatter Camps”, “On Northern Ireland”, “Statement on the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament”, “Statement on Lebanon”, “Statement on Extrajudicial Executions”.²⁶⁴ In 1982 the MP convened a conference entitled “Religious workers for saving the sacred gift of life from nuclear catastrophe”. It disclaimed any attempt “to produce some common syncretistic religion”. Nevertheless, the message implicit in its gathering of representatives of all the world’s religions under the MP’s aegis was that material prosperity is more important than truth.²⁶⁵

Again, Fr. Lev Gillet highlighted the so-called “ecumenism of the concentration camps”. “For it was in such places as Buchenwald, Dachau and Auschwitz (not to mention the camps of the Stalinist world)”, writes Fr. Sergius Hackel, “That ‘Christians belonging to different Churches discovered through their common sufferings and their burning charity a deep unity at the foot of the cross’. Furthermore, ‘this ecumenism had its witnesses, its martyrs’. And Fr. Lev mentions three to represent them all: the Protestant pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-45), the Catholic priest Josef Metzger (1887-1944), and the Orthodox nun Maria Skobtsova (1891-1945). ‘All three were killed for Christ, all three were

²⁶² *Newsletter*, Department of Public and Foreign Relations of the Synod of Bishops of ROCOR, January-March, 1981, pp. 2-4.

²⁶³ *Newsletter*, Department of Public and Foreign Relations of the Synod of Bishops of ROCOR, op. cit., pp. 2, 6-7.

²⁶⁴ *Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii* (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), 1981, No 12; 1982, No 10.

²⁶⁵ *Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii* (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), 1982, No 11.

witnesses for the ecumenical fellowship of blood which is expressed in this sentence from the [1943] testament of Metzger: 'I feel myself as closely united to my believing and conscientious Protestant brothers in Christ Jesus through Baptism and our common experience in the same Lord, as to the brethren with whom I share the fellowship of the Holy Sacrament'. The symbolic lighting of candles in the chapel of the twentieth-century martyrs in Canterbury Cathedral at the outset of Pope John Paul's visit to Great Britain (in 1982) was, among other things, a reminder of what such ecumenism can mean."²⁶⁶

But if Orthodox, Catholics and Protestants who suffered at the hands of the Nazis were all martyrs, what about the victims of the Jewish holocaust? Soon the industry of the holocaust would be compelling Christian leaders to pay homage also to these "martyrs", whose religion of the Talmud breathes the most extreme hatred of Christ and Christians!

In proof of this, persecution of Christians in Israel continued. Thus in 1979 Archimandrite Philoumenos, guardian of Jacob's Well for the Jerusalem Patriarchate took shelter when a group of people, believed to be fanatical Zionists, broke into the monastery and attacked him with hatchets. His face was cloven in two, his eyes plucked out and the fingers of his right hand, used to make the sign of the cross, were chopped into pieces. No one was ever arrested for the murder, which took place a week after a Zionist group had come to the monastery claiming that it was a Jewish holy place and demanding that all the crosses and other religious iconography be removed. His body was later found to be incorrupt.²⁶⁷

In fact, the concept of martyrdom exposes ecumenism for the lie that it is. For if all religions are holy and equal, then so are their martyrs. But this is impossible. For then Jews who are killed by Muslims are as "holy" as Muslim suicide bombers. And Jews who suffer at the hands of Christians are as holy as Christians who suffer at the hands of Jews. And Catholics who suffer at the hands of Nazis and Stalinists are as holy as Orthodox who suffer at the hands of Catholics. And Orthodox who die for Sovietism and the Soviet church (i.e. in the MP) are as holy as Orthodox who die *against* Sovietism and against the Soviet church...

The absurdity of ecumenism exposes the shallowness and falsehood of twentieth-century "spirituality" in general. As the American Hieromonk Seraphim (Rose) put it: "Never has there been such an age of false teachers as this pitiful twentieth century, so rich in material gadgets and so poor in mind and soul. Every conceivable opinion, even the most absurd, even those hitherto rejected by the universal consent of all civilized peoples — now has its platform and its own 'teacher.' A few of these teachers come with demonstration or promise of 'spiritual power' and false miracles, as do some occultists and 'charismatics'; but most of the contemporary teachers offer no more than a weak

²⁶⁶ Hackel, Editorial, *Sobornost*, vol. 5, No 1, 1983, p. 5.

²⁶⁷ "The Slaying of Archimandrite Philoumenos", *Orthodox Life*, vol. 30, No 5, November-December, 1980.

concoction of undigested ideas which they receive 'out of the air,' as it were, or from some modern self-appointed 'wise man' (or woman) who knows more than all the ancients merely by living in our 'enlightened' modern times. As a result, philosophy has a thousand schools, and 'Christianity' a thousand sects. Where is the truth to be found in all this, if indeed it is to found at all in our most misguided times?

"In only one place is there to be found the fount of true teaching, coming from God Himself, not diminished over the centuries but ever fresh, being one and the same in all those who truly teach it, leading those who follow it to eternal salvation. This place is the Orthodox Church of Christ, the fount is the grace of the All-Holy Spirit, and the true teachers of the Divine doctrine that issues from this fount are the Holy Fathers of the Orthodox Church."

20. THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

Beginning with the Iranian revolution of 1979, as Eric Hobsbawm writes, the Islamic fundamentalists became a powerful force, “as the secularized and modernizing elite minorities who had led their countries into the modern world were marginalized. They were popular because they were hostile to the Western civilization which was the agent of social disruption, and to the rich and godless countries that looked, more than ever, like the exploiters of the poor world’s poverty. That the local targets of such movements were the Westernized rich with their Mercedes and emancipated women, added a tinge of class struggle to such movements... Such movements looked back... to some simpler and stabler and more comprehensible age of the imagined past...”²⁶⁸

“The fundamentalist spirit of Islam,” writes Paul Johnson, “gathering force in the third quarter of the twentieth century, became a powerful, popular and, to many, frightening phenomenon in the 1980s. It affected all the great religions, often in response to fundamentalist outbreaks in their traditional rivals. Thus the revival of Islamic extremism, which began in the 1950s and by the early 1990s had spread to most of the Muslim world, provoked violent reactions. In India, for instance, the Hindu-based Janata Dal Parry had, by the end of the 1980s, been goaded into forms of religious extremism by Islamic pressure, and early in 1991 there was widespread violence in northern India as Hindus fought to reclaim the shrines of their gods where mosques had been built. Islamic fundamentalism also helped along the revival of Jewish ultra-Orthodoxy, started in New York under the Rabbi Meir Kahane, then transferring itself to Israel to promote both the expanding ‘historical’ frontiers of the Kingdom of David, and the transformation of Israel into a Jewish theocracy. This led to running legal battles and street fights with the Israeli authorities, and more serious violence between fundamentalist Jewish settlers and Arabs in the West Bank.

“Islamic militancy was the most important of the new fundamentalist forces because of the vast numbers involved and the huge geographical spread, curving in a long crescent from West Africa, through the southern Mediterranean, the Balkans, Asia Minor and the Middle East, across the interior of Southwest Asia, the Indian subcontinent and down into Malaysia and the Philippines. Its political, military and indeed cultural impact was felt over three continents. It was advancing in black Africa, often with the aid of Arab money, arms and indeed force. In the 1960s the ruling northern elite in the Sudan sought to impose Islam on the Christian south. In the 1970s and 1980s Gadafy tried to convert all of Chad by fire and sword, or rather by napalm and helicopters, just as Amin tried to Islamize Uganda by mass-murder. But Islam enjoyed natural growth as well and a new dynamism fuelled by its own internal revival. One reason for this was the increase of Muslim self-confidence, indeed stridency, as a result of the new wealth from oil. By filtering down to the masses it also made possible an unprecedented expansion in the number of Mecca pilgrims, flown by chartered jet to kiss the *Kaaba* and returning full of zeal for Islam, which is a far more political and this-

²⁶⁸ Hobsbawm, op. cit., p. 566.

worldly faith than Christianity. The prime beneficiaries of the new Islamic zealotry were not the orthodox Sunni Muslims, who constituted the majority, especially among Arabs, and represented the right-thinking [!], conservative, static establishment of Islam, including the two chief ruling families, the Hashemites and the Saudis. The effect of the revival was to reanimate the dramatic bifurcation of Islam in the seventh and eighth centuries, when Islamic nonconformism, in the shape of the Shi'ites and the many heterodox sects they spawned, such as the Druzes, the Ismailis and the Alawites, made their appearance. Shi'ite Islam, with its messianic belief in the 'hidden Imam' and its consequent millenarianism, its cult of martyrs and suffering, its puritanism and not least its addiction to violence (the Assassins were Shi'ite Ismailis) has always been a source of disorder in the Muslim world especially in Syria, the Lebanon and Iraq, where they are numerous, and Iran, where they form the majority. They claimed that the Sunni always, when possible, treated them like second-class citizens. The Islamic revival led them to demand a new deal for themselves as well as producing a new assertiveness by Islam towards the infidel world. They created a belt of crisis which cut across the familiar Cold War patterns..."²⁶⁹

The new Shiite Iranian assertiveness was countered by the ambitions of Sunni Saudi Arabia, which led by the visionary King Faisal, and encouraged by the vast power that its oil revenues gave it, undertook a bold programme of Islamic solidarity – but under the leadership of its own very conservative form of Wahhabi Islam that was intolerant of any Shiite rivalry. It backed the Sunni Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet communists, and therefore also the United States' participation in that struggle. But the Americans also backed the Shah's Shiite Iran, providing it with money, arms and even nuclear technology. Moreover, a scion of the Saudi royal house, Osama bin Laden, would soon prove a serious thorn in the side of the Americans.

The question was: which of the two states, Iran and Saudi Arabia, would lead the Islamic revival, and on which side would the United States find itself?

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Peter Mansfield writes: "Among the Arabs who most fiercely resisted Western domination there were some who saw nothing of value outside Islam. These were Muslim nationalists rather than Arab nationalists; today they are called fundamentalists. They had, and have, a utopian view that if Muslims were to set up an Islamic order in which the holy *sharia* would be the only authority, all the internal problems of government and society and the external problems of un-Islamic domination and influence would be solved. While their dedication and readiness for martyrdom made them formidable, they remained a minority in the Arab struggle for full independence from the West. Their refusal to compromise and their willingness to use violence against anyone who did not wholly share their views alienated potential allies. Whenever there seemed a chance that they might gain power, they deeply alarmed the majority..."

²⁶⁹ Johnson, *Modern Times*, New York: HarperPerennial, 1991, pp. 706-708.

“After the Arab catastrophe in 1967, volatile world opinion seized on the possibility of an Islamic fundamentalist revolution sweeping through the Arab countries. In the heyday of pan-Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s, the importance of Islam as a political force was grossly underestimated by the majority of Western journalists and academics – and, indeed, by much of the Arab intelligentsia. A common view was that the Arabs were determined to catch up with the West’s material and technical progress, and for this Islam had nothing to contribute. After 1967 there was a sudden reversal of this opinion. Secular Arab nationalism had been proved a failure and was dead, the masses would reject Western progress and turn to fundamentalist Islam as their only hope.

“Both views were misleading. Islam had never ceased to be a supremely powerful underlying force; it was only reasserting itself more openly in the wake of the Arab defeat. On the other hand, nationalism was far from dead, even if it had to modify its form. All the regimes of the Arab states – even in Saudi Arabia – still subscribed to the notion that the Arabs form a single nation which should be more closely united. There was no question of breaking up the League of Arab States. At the same time, it was apparent that there had been a strengthening of territorial nationalism – the local patriotism that had grown up around the flag and capital of the individual Arab states (however artificial their creation by the West may have been) and that supported their particular interests. There was no likelihood that an Islamic revolution would be able to sweep all this away.

“The Islamic revolution which did occur took place not in the predominantly Sunni Muslim lands but in Shiite Iran. All but a very few of the closest observers were taken by surprise.

“Since the overthrow of Mossadegh in 1953, Iran had come to be seen as an example of the progress and development which were widely held in the West to be synonymous with westernization. In the 1950s, elections to the Majlis were carefully controlled to ensure that acceptable candidates were elected. The National Front ceased to function as an organized political force and the communist Tudeh Party was proscribed. Power was increasingly concentrated in the hands of the shah. However, the task of the shah’s loyalist government was not easy. Their hope was that economic growth would dampen opposition to the control of political life, but, although oil revenues expanded, the large-scale projects to develop the infrastructure took time to mature and there was widespread corruption and inefficiency. Anti-Western nationalist feelings, inflamed during the Mossadegh crisis, were by no means extinguished. They gained strength from the regime’s close identification with the Western camp, symbolized by Iran’s adherence to the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact in 1955.

“In 1961 the unrest obliged the shah to appoint as prime minister Ali Amini, a wealthy aristocrat with a reputation as a liberal reformer. He tackled government extravagance and corruption and relaxed controls on the National Front and left-wing opposition. He brought into the cabinet as minister of agriculture Hassan Arsanjani, a radical political committed to land reform and

the break-up of the large estates consisting of scores of villages. Amini persuaded the shah to allow him to dissolve the Majlis and rule by decree to push through his reforms. But his reformist experiment was short-lived. He aroused opposition on all sides – from the land-owners and the army, as well as the politicians who demanded the restoration of the Majlis. Within a year he had been forced to resign and the shah reasserted his authority.

“The shah nevertheless pursued and even intensified some of the reform measures – notably land reform, which was extended to the Islamic *waqf* properties (whose revenues were used for the upkeep of mosques or charitable works), while the large land-owners were limited to the holding of one village. Female suffrage was introduced, and women’s rights were legally extended. A Literacy Corps was founded to enable high-school students to teach in village schools as an alternative to military service. In this way the shah’s government retained the initiative. The National Front declared that it favoured the reforms but said that they were ‘unconstitutional’, while the mullahs, whose most effective spokesman was Ayatollah Khomeini of Qum, denounced them as ‘un-Islamic’ as well as unconstitutional. In 1963 the National Front was disbanded by the government and then disintegrated. Khomeini and other religious leaders were arrested, and a year later Khomeini was sent into exile and took up residence in the Shiite region of southern Iraq. The religious opposition resorted increasingly to underground activity and violence, but this was ineffective and the government was able to denounce both the nationalists and mullahs as reactionary opponents of reform.

“For more than a decade the shah could rule without serious opposition pressure. He reconvened the Majlis and allowed it to function with officially sponsored political parties and an opposition which consistently voted for government bills. Outside parliament the ubiquitous SAVAK secret police relentlessly suppressed dissent.

“The shah showed increasing self-confidence and a vaulting ambition to make his country the indisputably dominant regional power. The West was always ready to provide him with the most sophisticated modern weapons. Although remaining in the Western camp, however, he improved relations with the Soviet-bloc countries and signed with them a series of large-scale industrial agreements. He secured greatly improved terms from the oil companies, which amounted to the National Iranian Oil Company taking control of operations. In 1967 he amended the constitution so that the queen would automatically become regent in the event of his death before the crown prince reached his majority, and in the twenty-sixth year of his reign he and the queen were crowned in a wholly un-Islamic ceremony. In 1971 he celebrated the two-thousand-five-hundredth anniversary of the Persian monarchy with colossal extravagance at the ancient capital of Persepolis.

“The huge increase in Iran’s oil revenues in 1973-4 drove the shah’s ambitions to the border of megalomania. He began to proclaim that his country would be among the six most advanced industrial countries of the world by the end of the

century. In fact – in spite of the real industrial progress, the extension of education and literacy, and the growth of the professional and business class – many of the standards of Iranian society remained those of the Third World. With hindsight it is possible to discern that the sudden vast increase in government revenues was the nemesis of the regime. The huge growth in spending which followed placed intolerable strains on the country's social and economic fabric. When overspending led to retrenchment and recession combined with continuing inflation, even the members of the new middle class who had benefited most from the shah's policies became disaffected, while the mass of the population tended to see the heavy westernization and un-Islamic modernization of the country as the source of all evil.

"The shah, in common with most Western observers (including ambassadors), still underrated the opposition. He saw only an opportunistic alliance between the extreme left and the mullahs, and referred contemptuously to 'Islamic Marxists'. In fact it was the mullahs who were best able to articulate the discontent of the majority..."²⁷⁰

In fact, the Shah's calling his clerical opponents "Islamic Marxists" was peculiarly inept, because some of his policies, especially in the countryside, recalled nothing more than Stalinist collectivization. "Having given the royal lands and the confiscated lands of the clergy to the peasants, he found, predictably, that output declined. In 1975, having thus turned Iran from a food-exporting to a food-importing nation, he changed the policy and embarked on collectivization. The model was the 1972-5 Dez irrigation project in northern Khuzestan, which had taken back 100,000 hectares of prime farmland, given to the peasants only five years before, and turned everything and everybody to what was called 'consolidated agricultural management'. Thus yeoman farmers were turned into a rural proletariat, earning a dollar a day and living in cinder-block two-room houses, back-to-back in new 'model towns' called *shahraks*. The law of June 1925 in extended this model to the whole country, forcing the independent peasants into several hundred 'agro-business units' or vast 'farm corporations' or into 2,800 co-operatives. It is true that the peasants, while relinquishing their freeholds, got shares in the new companies. But in essentials it was not very different from forced collectivization. The scheme involved knocking 67,000 small villages into 30,000 larger ones, each big enough to justify clinics, schools, piped water and roads. Large families were broken up. Menacing convoys of bulldozers and earth-moving equipment, often of stupendous size, would descend, without warning or explanation, upon 2,000-year-old village communities, and literally uproot them. The agricultural planners and the 'justice corpsmen', as they were called, behaved with all the arrogance of the party activists Stalin used to push through his programmes, though there was no resistance and no actual brutality. The programme as a whole was a deliberate assault on tribal diversity, local patriarchs, family cohesions, provincial accents and tongues, regional dress, customs and interest groups, anything in fact which offered alternative centres of influence to the all-powerful central state. It was fundamental to [what the Shah

²⁷⁰ Mansfield, *A History of the Middle East*, London: Penguin, 2003, pp. 323-324, 325-331.

called] the White Revolution that the ultimate freehold of all land and property resided in the crown, that is, in the state. Thus the Shah, despite his liberalism and his public posture as a pillar of the West, was pursuing a policy of radical totalitarianism. He argued: 'It shows that if you think that it is only through bloodshed that you make a revolution, you are wrong.' But it was the Shah who was wrong. The elders were pushed into the *shahraks* but their grown sons went into the cities and formed the Ayatollah's mob; and their brothers in the army were reluctant to shoot them when the time came. The shah was reluctant too. Collectivization is impossible without terror; and he had not the heart for it. When it came to the point, at the close of 1978, he felt he had been betrayed by his ally, President Carter. But he also betrayed himself. In the end he lacked the will to power..."²⁷¹

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"As the tide of unrest gathered momentum, it became apparent that popular opposition was massive and deep-seated. The huge coalition of discontent found its voice in Ayatollah Khomeini. After being ousted from his Iraqi exile by an embarrassed Iraqi government (which wanted stable relations with Iran), he took refuge in Paris, from where he issued uncompromising demands for the shah's abdication. As strikes and demonstrations spread, the shah attempted a series of measures, mixing concessions with firmness, in an effort to secure his power. But these were ineffective. The armed forces remained apparently loyal, but the shah had lost the will and determination to hold on to power through the massive repression which would have been necessary – his arrogant demeanour had always concealed a certain lack of decision. He was also suffering from the cancer which was to kill him two years later. Without the will to retain his throne, neither his loyal followers nor his US allies could help him. On 16 January 1979 he left Iran with his queen ostensibly on holiday but never to return. His departure from Tehran was cheered by two million supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini. Twenty-five centuries of the Persian monarchy had ended.

"This momentous event was soon to be compared in importance with the French Revolution of 1789 and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. For the comparison to be sustained it was necessary for the Iranian Revolution's influence to spread far beyond Iran's borders, and especially to the Muslim peoples of the Middle East. Khomeini and his clerical associates left no doubt that this was their intention. They proclaimed that all the regimes of Muslim countries in the region were corrupt, unworthy and un-Islamic and therefore deserved to be overthrown. They also denounced these regimes' association with the West. Khomeini declared that a true Muslim country should have no truck with either East or West, but his special hatred was directed towards the United States – 'the great Satan', the former ally of the shah. Anti-American rage swept Iran and, when President Carter allowed the shah to travel from his retreat in the Bahamas to the United States for medical treatment, a crowd of militants stormed the US embassy at Tehran, seizing some fifty US hostages and all the embassy documents. This

²⁷¹ Johnson, *Modern Times*, pp. 712-713.

outrage against all the norms of diplomacy, which even the most radical and revolutionary regimes usually accepted, provoked the United States, with the support its allies to declare Iran an international outlaw. Khomeini was not displeased. His uncompromising defiance of the West provoked admiration among all the Muslim masses to whom he wished to appeal. This was reinforced by his adoption of the cause of Palestine. He reversed the shah's *de facto* alliance with Israel and invited [Palestinian leader] Arafat to Tehran, where he was greeted as a hero.

"At home, Ayatollah Khomeini set about consolidating clerical rule under his leadership. His authoritarianism provoked the opposition of the secular nationalist and left-wing elements who had supported his revolution, but they were no match for the hold he had obtained over the Iranian people. In fact the most serious opposition to his rule came from more senior Islamic clerics who challenged his religious authority. But even this he was able to contain. He had political genius, which they lacked. He based his rule on the doctrine of *velayat-e faqih* – that is, 'government of the Islamic jurist' – which he had expounded in lectures in exile. This holds that the true Islamic state must be based on the Koran and be modelled after the Prophet's Islamic community in the seventh century, and that it should be administered by the clerical class as the Prophet's heirs. As the self-appointed governing Islamic jurist, Khomeini was able to hold supreme power above that of the president, prime minister and elected parliament, which were all provided for in the new Islamic constitution. Under his authority, mass trials of the shah's former supporters were organized, leading to many executions. The educational system was purged of non-Islamic influences. Squads of young Muslim militiamen enforced a strict Islamic code of conduct. Educated Iranian women, who had reached an advanced stage of emancipation before the revolution, had their role in public life sharply reduced and all had to envelop their heads and bodies in Islamic dress in public.

"The success of the Iranian Revolution and its declared desire to export itself caused serious alarm among Iran's Arab neighbours, but nowhere more than in Iraq. With its secular pan-Arab ideology and its large Shiite population with little share in political power, Iraq was a vulnerable target. Tehran Arabic broadcasts poured hatred and contempt on the Iraq regime and called on the Iraqi people to overthrow it.

"Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein, decided to act first. Although Iran has immense resources and three times Iraq's population, he believed that the Khomeini Revolution could be overthrown by a swift blow. The Iranian regular armed forces were demoralized. Iran's large minorities – the Kurds in the north-west, the Turkomans of the Caspian plain and the Arabs of Khuzestan in the south-west – saw their religious and cultural identities threatened by the Shiite fundamentalist policies of the Revolution and were demanding autonomy and threatening revolt. The economy, facing a Western boycott, was in dire condition. Almost certainly, exiled royalist Iranian officers helped to convince President Saddam that it was time to move. On 17 September 1980 Iraq, alleging various

minor acts of Iranian aggression, denounced the 1975 agreement with the former shah and invaded Iran.

“The eight-year war which ensued was on an epic scale, with colossal casualties, massive material destruction and mutual rocket attacks on Baghdad and Tehran in ‘the war of the cities’. Iraq initially advanced deep into Iranian territory, but its invasion soon proved the danger of attacking a revolution. Iranian morale was higher than expected, and the Arab Iranians of the south-west did not rise to support the invaders. Within a year Iraq had been forced back, and by May 1982 Iran had recaptured nearly all its territory. All Iraq’s outlets to the sea were cut off. A prolonged stalemate ensued, interspersed by large-scale offensives which, as in the First World War, left many dead but the battle lines scarcely changed. Iraq, which could obtain arms from both East and West, had the advantage in weapons – especially tanks and artillery. Iran, lacking fresh supplies of its American weapons, was forced to turn to sources such as North Korea or the international black markets in arms. It used its numerical superiority to launch human-wave assaults which often involved thousands of teenage youths imbued with the characteristically Shiite readiness for martyrdom...”²⁷²

The Iranian fundamentalists were called “Islamic Marxists” by the Shah. Of course, they were not atheists. But they shared the same fanatical hatred of the West; indeed, compared with the tired old men of the Polituro, they were much more fervent and fanatical. Thus in December, 1984 Ayatollah Khomeini said in a speech: “If one allows the infidels to continue playing their role of corrupters on Earth, their eventual moral punishment will be all the stronger. Thus, if we kill the infidels in order to put a stop to their [corrupting] activities, we have indeed done them a service. For their eventual punishment will be less. To allow the infidels to stay alive means to let them do more corrupting. [To kill them] is a surgical operation commanded by Allah the Creator... Those who follow the rules of the Koran are aware that we have to apply the laws of *qissas* [retribution] and that we have to kill... War is a blessing for the world and for every nation. It is Allah himself who commands men to wage war and kill.”

After citing these words, Roger Scruton writes: “The element of insanity in these words should not blind us to the fact that they adequately convey a mood, a legacy, and a goal that inspire young people all over the Islamic world. Moreover,... there is no doubt that Khomeini’s interpretation of the Prophet’s message is capable of textual support, and that it reflects the very confiscation of the political that has been the principal feature of Islamic revolutions in the modern world...”

“... Even while enjoying the peace, prosperity, and freedom that issue from a secular rule of law, a person who regards the *shari’a* as the unique path to salvation may see these things only as the signs of a spiritual emptiness or corruption. For someone like Khomeini, human rights and secular governments display the decadence of Western civilization, which has failed to arm itself

²⁷² Mansfield, *op. cit.*, pp. 325-331.

against those who intend to destroy it and hopes to appease them instead. The message is that there can be no compromise, and systems that make compromise and conciliation into their ruling principles are merely aspects of the Devil's work.

"Khomeini is a figure of great historic importance for three reasons. First, he showed that Islamic government is a viable option in the modern world, so destroying the belief that Westernization and secularization are inevitable. Second, through the activities of the Hizbullah (Party of Allah) in Lebanon, he made the exportation of the Islamic Revolution the cornerstone of his foreign policy. Third, he endowed the Islamic revival with a Shi'ite physiognomy, so making martyrdom a central part of its strategy."²⁷³

In the wake of the Islamic Revolution there began that cowardly wave of Islamophilia which, in the twenty-first century, has become an epidemic in western academic and cultural life.²⁷⁴ We may speculate that Divine Providence has allowed this phenomenon, partly in order to expose the pitifulness of western intellectuals, and partly in order to remind westerners that even in our secular age death for one's religious faith (albeit a false one) is still possible...

²⁷³ Scruton, *The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat*, London: Continuum, 2002, pp. 118-120.

²⁷⁴ Admirably chronicled by Douglas Murry in *Islamophilia* (2020) and *The Slow Death of Europe* (2018).

21. DECONSTRUCTIONISM AND POST-MODERNISM

The 1970s were a terrible decade for Capitalism as Communism made enormous strides while the West slept and most of the world concurred that the real enemy was America: China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Yemen, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Guinea, Afghanistan, Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua all fell in the thirty-year period from 1949 to 1979. The defeats were especially frequent and alarming in the late 1970s, after the fall of Saigon: the West's determination to fight Communism, already weak, collapsed almost entirely. Socialism, always popular among intellectuals, became dominant in the schools, universities and churches of the West, albeit often in more sophisticated versions than was taught in the East...

As Revel put it, with his usual acerbic clarity: "In 1975, the Vietnam debacle and the removal from office of President Richard M. Nixon left the United States cataleptic. Western Europe, sprawled on the sofa of détente, ecstatic over America's humiliation and over the Helsinki agreement, was determined to see nothing reprehensible in anything the Soviet Union might undertake. In less than five years, the USSR.... became a world superpower, spreading stout branches and promising shoots into Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Central America."²⁷⁵

Indeed, the second half of the 1970s – roughly from the fall of Saigon in April 1975 to the election of Ronald Reagan to the American Presidency in November 1980 – represents perhaps the deepest nadir in the history of the Cold War. We see a defeatist attitude in most of those who should have been in the forefront of the struggle against Communism. It was not the military defeats that were so damaging – although there were plenty of those in the Third World – as the conviction that the enemy *could not* be defeated, that he had to be not only "contained" but even "accommodated". This defeatist attitude was more pronounced in Western Europe than in the United States, whose official attitude remained anti-Soviet and anti-Socialist. And yet weak political leadership combined with similarly irrational and relativist tendencies of thought – Deconstructionism and Postmodernism in Europe, Cultural Marxism in America – combined to create a very dangerous situation when Communist victory in the Cold War looked like a real possibility.

The only battlefield of the war in which the Americans appeared to be in a good position was Western Europe, where millions of soldiers and thousands of missiles and tanks were deployed on either side. The Soviets had no realistic hope of conquering the region without triggering a nuclear holocaust and the probable destruction of the Soviet homeland. So the struggle settled into a kind of stalemate that recalled the stalemate of trench warfare in 1914-18, except that it was much less costly – in bodies, if not in souls.

²⁷⁵ Revel, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

Nevertheless, Western Europe was vulnerable. It was vulnerable for two reasons. First, there was always a doubt in European minds whether the Americans would really go to war for the sake of a territory thousands of miles away from their homeland on the other side of the ocean – a fear that the Soviets played on, trying to drive a wedge between the Europeans and their American protectors. Secondly, the Europeans were intoxicated with the relative success of their Social Democracy, despised the crudity of American capitalist culture, and entertained fond hopes that the Soviets might be converted by kindness to a gentler kind of socialism closer to their own. That this was not an entirely unfounded hope was proved by Gorbachev's *perestroika* in the second half of the 1980s, which seemed to indicate that he, following his trips to the major European states, had become a Social Democrat himself.

It was not that some scepticism with regard to American capitalism was altogether a bad thing. The problem was that healthy scepticism with regard to American capitalism's bolder claims was rarely combined with a corresponding scepticism towards Soviet communism, to whose profound evil Western intellectuals had been blind already for generations. Indeed, as late as the early 1980s, when the Soviet Union was intensifying its repression of Christians and dissidents, and was waging war against several states in the Third World, President Reagan's accurate description of it as "the evil empire" was met with widespread scorn by western intellectuals, especially in continental Western Europe.

This was the phenomenon that so surprised and dismayed Solzhenitsyn when he came to the West in the mid-1970s. He could not understand how, in the free West, in spite of the overwhelming evidence (added to by his own book on the Gulag) that wherever Communism goes rivers of blood flow, western intellectuals and statesmen continued to fraternize with the enemy. He was appalled that friendship between communists and capitalists should flourish (just as George Orwell had prophesied it would in his novella *Animal Farm*).

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Paul Johnson writes: "The attacks on America during the 1970s were so venomous and for the most part so irrational as to merit the description of an international witch-hunt. One might say that the most ubiquitous form of racism during the decade was anti-Americanism. The adage, 'to know all is to forgive all', does not work in international affairs. One reason why America was attacked so much was because so much was known about her, chiefly thanks to the American media and academia, which poured forth a ceaseless torrent of self-critical material. But a more fundamental reason was that America as a great power and still more Americanism as a concept stood for the principle of individualism as opposed to collectivism, for free will as opposed to determinism. The spirit of the late Sixties, and still more the early and mid-Seventies, was strongly collectivist and deterministic.

“Much of this was again due to intellectual trends in Paris, which France’s new-found economic dynamism helped to project forcefully onto the world stage. In the Forties and Fifties, Sartre had at least believed in free will. It was indeed the essence of his philosophy, which made it fundamentally incompatible with Marxism, however. Sartre lived on until 1980, but he was already an intellectual antique by the time of the student revolt of 1968. The mandarins who took his pace were all, in varying degrees, influenced by Marxist determinism, which denies any importance to free will or to moral conscience in shaping the world. Unlike the orthodox Marxists, they did not see economic forces, operating through classes, as the sole dynamic of human history. Each advanced alternative or complementary explanations. But all accepted Marx’s starting-point that events were determined not by human will, as had been traditionally supposed, but by the hidden structures of society. As Marx put it, ‘the *final pattern* of economic relatives as seen on the surface... is very much different from, and indeed quite the reverse of, their *inner but concealed essential pattern* and the *conception corresponding* to it.’ Man was imprisoned in structures: twentieth-century man in bourgeois structures. In *Structural Anthropology*, first widely read and translated in 1961, Claude Levi-Strauss insisted that, though social structures are not visible to the eye or even detectable by empirical observations, they were present, just as molecular structures existed though undiscoverable by all but the electron microscope. These structures determined the cast of mind, so what appeared to be acts of human will were merely concordance with the structure. For Levi-Strauss, as for Marx, history was not a succession of events but a discernible pattern working according to discoverable laws. A variation of this argument was provided by the French historians of the *Annales* school, especially by Fernand Braudel, whose *Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (1949) proved by far the most influential historical work published since the Second World War. They dismissed narrative as superficial and individuals as unimportant and preached a doctrine of geographical and economic determinism in history, whose long-term course was decided wholly by such structures. In psychology, Jacques Lacan reinterpreted Freud (hitherto largely ignored in France) to provide a new determinism of human behaviour, based on signs, signals, codes and conventions which, when analysed, left little room for human choice. In literature Roland Barthes argued that a novelist did not create by an act of imaginative will so much as in response to the social structures from which he derived his impulses, expressed in the symbols he used, which could be codified by the new science of semiology. In linguistics, the American scholar Noam Chomsky dismissed the physical characteristics of speech and language as superficial, determined by the so-called deep structures of linguistic rules.

“What all the structuralists had in common was the Marxist assumption that human attributes and activities were governed by laws in a way analogous to the way scientific laws governed inanimate nature. Hence it was the function of the social sciences to discover such laws, and then for society to act upon their discoveries. The emergence of this new form of intellectual Utopianism, with its strong suggestion of compulsory social engineering at the end of the road,

coincided exactly with the rapid expansion of higher education, especially of the social science disciplines, in the late Fifties and throughout the Sixties..."²⁷⁶

Thus did determinist, Marxist thinking in the broadest sense come to dominate the West as it had already dominated the East for many decades. Liberally funded academics in both East and West taught that man is an animal without free will and governed by innate "structures".

So what was the war about? Was it still worth fighting if the two sides were so close to each other in their fundamental assumptions? But the mountains of bodies in the Third World theatres showed that the war still had to be fought. If the two sides were more similar than they knew, one side was still bloodier than the other...

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Andrew Roberts writes: "The manner in which Western intellectuals were able to convince themselves that there was 'a greater truth' than the simple truth, one that was deserving of their utter fidelity in spite of the power of any contrary evidence, was hugely aided in the late 1960s by the philosophical theory of Postmodernism. In 1967, Jacques Derrida, and Algerian-born French intellectual, wrote two publications, *Writing and Difference* and *Of Grammatology*, in which he laid out the main themes behind this idea. The father of Deconstructionism and post-structuralism, Derrida pioneered a branch of critical analysis in the late 1960s that was to have a profoundly baleful effect on Western philosophy, anthropology, literature, linguistics, law and even architecture.

"By arguing that language had multiple layers, and thus multiple possible interpretations, Derrida advanced the notion that speech was therefore not a direct form of communication and that the author of a text was not necessarily the author of its meaning. By 'liberating' the written word from the structures of language, thereby opening up the possibility of endless textual interpretations of any piece of writing, Deconstructionism struck at the very heart of Western morality and ethics. It was not long before Derrida and his disciples attempted to apply Deconstructionism to political and moral values, arguing in effect that accepted mores were a gigantic fraud. The whole body of Western learning was thus denounced as 'nothing but the ideology of dead, white males'; and as a result, as the Australian historian Keith Windschuttle has put it, 'Multiculturalists want the curriculum of higher education to be rewritten from a "gender specific" or "Afrocentric" perspective.'

"Derrida taught philosophy at the Sorbonne University in Paris from 1960 to 1964, but from the early 1970s he spent much of his time at American universities such as Yale, Johns Hopkins and the University of California at Irvine. There is something indefinable about the great English-speaking universities that welcome those who are in effect their intellectual enemies. The complexity and

²⁷⁶ Johnson, *Modern Times*, pp. 694-696.

seemingly deliberate obscurantism of his written style led many philosophers of the English-speaking peoples, 'many of them reared in the tradition of plain-speaking Anglo-Saxon thought', to consider Derrida a fraud, and in 1992 twenty philosophers, including the world-renowned logician W.V. Quine, wrote a letter to Cambridge University at the decision to award Derrida an honorary doctorate there. A vote was then taken, which Derrida won. Nonetheless, one of the 40% who dissented, Howard Erskine-Hill, described the decision as 'symbolic suicide for a university'.

"Derrida and Deconstructionism on their own would hardly matter were their disciples not in a position by the later 1960s to lead a long march through Western educational institutions, first the university humanities departments and then later the secondary schools. Because intellectuals saw Western society as fundamentally irrational, they became highly dismissive of it. This led them to assume that anywhere that the English-speaking peoples went to war – in Vietnam, for example, or latterly in Iraq – they were necessarily in the wrong. When a physical as opposed to a philosophical attack was made at the heart of Western civilisation in Manhattan on 11 September 2001, Derrida refused to describe it as a terrorist act, arguing that 'an act of international terrorism is anything by a rigorous concept that would help us grasp the singularity of what we are trying to discuss', despite the fact that the attacks certainly seemed a rigorous enough concept for the people of New York to grasp at the time.

"Postmodernism, which the historian Richard Pipes has described as 'the latest poison to come out of France', further underlined the concept that nothing is objective, nothing 'is' but only 'seems to be'. Although this self-immolating culture flirts on the boundaries of nihilism, and tends to glorify destruction, Derrida always denied that he himself was a nihilist. In the 1960s, universities across the English-speaking world were to see department after department captured by the radical Left, whose grip on appointments and tenured posts was then near-impossible to loosen, lasting until even after the collapse of communism across Europe in 1989..."²⁷⁷

Derrida may have denied that he was a nihilist, but French Postmodernism and American Cultural Marxism were both in effect forms of nihilism, if we apply Nietzsche's definition: "That there is *no truth*; that there is no absolute state of affairs – no 'thing-in-itself'. *This alone is Nihilism, and of the most extreme kind.*"²⁷⁸

It was claimed that the conventional belief in objective truth was a product of political dominance. Thus Peter Osborne writes: "In the summer of 2002 the *New York Times* writer, Ron Suskind, met a senior adviser at the Bush White House. He was surprised to find that the aide dismissed his remarks: 'The aide said that guys like me were "in what we call the reality-based community", which he defined as people who "believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of

²⁷⁷ Roberts, op. cit., pp. 474-475.

²⁷⁸ Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, cited in Fr. Seraphim Rose, *Nihilism*, Platina, Ca.: St. Herman of Alaska Brotherhood Press, 1994, p. 12.

discernible reality". I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. "That's not the way the world really works anymore," he continued. "We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality – judiciously as you will – we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out.'

"Hostility to a 'reality-based' analysis of events can be traced back to postmodernism, which has become a fashionable orthodoxy among teachers of philosophy, and indeed other academic disciplines. Postmodernism is one modern manifestation of extreme philosophical scepticism, a tradition which can be traced back to the beginnings of thought and the ancient Greek school of Pyrrho. This school despaired of the notion that truth was accessible and deduced that no ultimately stable distinction could be drawn between truth and falsehood.

"Postmodernism denies that the truth can ever be known. It holds that words like falsehood, accuracy and deception, at any rate as used in ordinary speech, have no validity. That is because it concerns itself with the competing claims of rival truths. The idea of verifiable reality, so important to the Anglo-American school of empirical philosophy, is dismissed as an absurdity.

"Postmodern thinking grew up in the astonishingly influential school of French philosophy which flourished in the 1970s and 1980s and is perhaps associated in particular with the historian and philosopher Michel Foucault and the philosopher Jacques Derrida. Truth was, for Foucault, no more than an effect of the rules of discourse, itself a highly problematic concept, and for Foucault all discourses were equally valid. Perception and truth were there to be created. Though he was famous for historical studies of sex, madness and prisons, Foucault declared, 'I am well aware that I have not written anything but fictions.' Foucault sometimes argued that truth was the effect of power relations, the expression of dominance, whether political, economic or sexual..."²⁷⁹

²⁷⁹ Osborne, "What's truth got to do with it?", *The Spectator*, 30 April, 2005, p. 31.

22. EUROPEAN VERSUS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

What were the reasons for this besetting blindness of western intellectuals, especially French intellectuals, to the full evil of communism – even now, long after its evils had been fully exposed by such works as Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago*?

One reason undoubtedly lay in a weakness common to most men: even when we have seen through the falseness of our former beliefs, we nevertheless seek excuses for ourselves, excuses that make our errors “understandable” and perhaps not really that bad after all. And yet former Nazis or Nazi sympathizers are never given this grace: their views remain inexcusable and unforgiveable, and the hounding of Nazis, even minor ones, continues without mercy and without end. On the other hand, it is an extraordinary fact that even today, in 2021, no equivalent of the Nuremberg trials has ever taken place in the East. And so, while nobody, in East or West, would ever boast of having been a Nazi, Vladimir Putin, for example, boasts of his membership of the KGB., proudly declaring: “once a chekist, always a chekist” – and still gets to have tea with the Queen of England, whose relative, Tsar Nicholas II, was murdered by the Cheka. The fall of the Soviet Union, he says, was “the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the twentieth century, ignoring the revolution of 1917...

A deeper reason lay in the close kinship between Communism and Liberalism, in that both are derived, in their modern forms, from the Enlightenment. Both offer a utopian vision for mankind based on rationalism, science and education, in which religious belief had no place and was expected to wither away in time. Liberalism gives more place to individual initiative in economic and social life, and is more tolerant of individual idiosyncracies, such as religion. But the similarities between them are more striking than their differences. And from the point of view of traditional Christianity, the main difference is that while the one destroys faith slowly and painlessly, the other does it violently and relatively quickly.

Thus Stuart Reed writes: “In the Cold War, an unworkable revolutionary creed, communism, yielded to a workable revolutionary creed, liberal capitalism. Now liberal capitalism has replaced communism as the chief threat to the customs, traditions and decencies of Christendom...”²⁸⁰ In view of the inner spiritual kinship between Liberalism and Communism, western intellectuals feel compelled to be not too hard on the sister ideology – “no enemies to the left,” as they used to say in the Russian Duma. It is a different matter with anti-Enlightenment ideologies such as Nazism or Orthodox Autocracy, in spite of the fact that “opponents of the Enlightenment can seem to grasp truths which elude its followers, and repudiation of the Enlightenment is now fashionable among philosophers”.²⁸¹

²⁸⁰ Reed, “Confessions of a Fellow-Traveller”, *The Spectator*, 23 September, 2000, p. 45.

²⁸¹ Jonathan Glover, *Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1999, p. 7.

And so Soviet Communism, whatever its horrors, was felt to be justified at any rate to this extent: that the “evil” autocracy of “Bloody” Nicholas had to be replaced. Of course, it was regrettable, they said, that the revolution could not have been stopped during its liberal phase, between February and October, 1917. But the intention was good: it was the execution that was poor.

Daniel Pipes confirms this analysis: “The Soviet Union appeared less bad than the Third Reich. The Nazis rose and fell in spectacular fashion; the communist trajectory was a more gentle one. The Third Reich lasted only twelve years and ended in a blaze of gunsmoke and fire; the Soviet Union endured for three-quarters of a century and expired with a whimper. These differences have important consequences. While the results of Nazi conspiracism are the subjects of innumerable studies and artistic works, the comparable Soviet actions remain relatively obscure. Auschwitz, Birkenau, and the other death camps are known by name, but who knows their Soviet equivalents? German archives were captured in a fell swoop. Soviet ones are slowly unveiled.

“The same distinction applies to the two dictators. Hitler left behind a far more terrible reputation than Stalin. One ranted; the other calculated. Hitler made no discernible attempt to disguise his wickedness. In contrast, Stalin hid his evil with such diligence and success that his crimes became known only three years after his death and were then widely received with shock. Because the facts about Stalin came out in so disjointed a way, his crimes to this day lack the notoriety of Hitler’s murderousness. Hitler so discredited himself that to find any virtues in him implies a kind of insanity. Not so Stalin. If Hitler’s apologists are beyond the pale, Stalin’s remain within it...

“Analysts sympathize more with the Left. The liberal orientation of most scholars and journalists means that they treat comparable phenomena in different ways. They do not hide the Left’s turpitude, but they present it less harshly, in isolation, and usually as the idiosyncracies of an individual rather than faults intrinsic to the system. Leninism would have been more humane if only Stalin had not hijacked the revolution...”²⁸²

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A favourite tactic of left-leaning liberals was to represent American Capitalism and Soviet Communism as two extremes on a single continuum, with European Social Democracy occupying the central position and combining the virtues of both extremes while avoiding their vices. However, the American social scientist Charles Murray took issue with this representation. While demonstrating that America had begun to fall away from the sound ideals of the Founding Fathers since 1963, he still maintained the superiority of those ideals over those of European Social Democracy:-

²⁸² Daniel Pipes, *Conspiracy*, New York: The Free Press, 1997, pp. 164-165.

“The European model assumes that human needs can be disaggregated when it comes to choices about public policy. People need food and shelter, so let us make sure that everyone has food and shelter. People may also need self-respect, but this doesn’t have anything to do with whether the state provides them with food and shelter. People may also need intimate relationships with others, but that doesn’t have anything to do with policies regarding marriage and children. People may also need self-actualization, but that doesn’t have anything to do with policies that diminish the challenges of life.

“The tacit assumption of the advanced welfare state is correct when human beings face starvation or death by exposure. Then, food and shelter are all that count. But in an advanced society, the needs for food and shelter can be met in a variety of ways, and at that point human needs can no longer be disaggregated. The ways in which food and shelter are obtained affects whether the other human needs are met.

“People need self-respect, but self-respect must be earned – it cannot be self-respect if it’s not earned – and the only way to earn anything is to achieve it in the face of the possibility of failing. People need intimate relationships with others, but intimate relationships that are rich and fulfilling need content, and that content is supplied only when humans are engaged in interactions that have consequences. People need self-actualization, but self-actualization is not a straight road, visible in advance, running from point A to point B. Self-actualization intrinsically requires an exploration of possibilities for life beyond the obvious and convenient. All of these good things in life – self-respect, intimate relationships, and self-actualization – require freedom in the only way that freedom is meaningful: freedom to act in all arenas of life coupled with responsibility for the consequences of those actions. The underlying meaning of that coupling – freedom and responsibility – is critical. Responsibility for the consequences of actions is not the price of freedom, but one of its rewards. Knowing that we have responsibility for the consequences of our actions is a major part of what makes life worth living.

“Recall... the four domains that I argued are the sources of deep satisfaction: family, vocation, community, and faith. In each of these domains, responsibility for the desired outcome is inseparable from the satisfaction. The deep satisfactions that go with raising children arise from having fulfilled your responsibility for just about the most important thing that humans do. If you’re a disengaged father who doesn’t contribute much to that effort, or a wealthy mother who has turned over most of the hard part to full-time day care and then boarding schools, the satisfactions are diminished accordingly. The same is true if you’re a low income parent who finds it easier to let the apparatus of an advanced welfare state take over. In the workplace, getting a pay rise is pleasant whether you deserve it or not, but the deep satisfactions that can come from a job promotion are inextricably bound up with the sense of having done things that merited it. If you know that you got the promotion just because you’re the boss’s nephew, or because the civil service rules specify that you must get the promotion if you have served enough time in grade, deep satisfactions are impossible.

“When the government intervenes to help, whether in the European welfare state or in America’s more diluted version, it not only diminishes our responsibility for the desired outcome, it enfeebles the institutions through which people live satisfying lives. There is no way for clever planners to avoid it. Marriage is a strong and vital institution not because the day-to-day work of raising children and being a good spouse is so much fun, but because the family has responsibility for doing important things that won’t get done unless the family does them. Communities are strong and vital not because it’s so much fun to respond to our neighbour’s needs, but because the community has the responsibility for doing important things that won’t get done unless the community does them. Once that imperative has been met – family and community *really do* have the action – then an elaborate web of expectations, rewards, and punishments evolves over time. Together, that web leads to norms of good behaviour that support families and communities in performing their functions. When the government says it will take some of the trouble out of doing the things that families and communities evolved to do, it inevitably takes some of the action away from families and communities. The web frays, and eventually disintegrates...

“Europe has proved that countries with enfeebled family, vocation, community and faith can still be pleasant places to live. I am delighted when I get a chance to go to Stockholm or Paris. When I get there the people do not seem to be groaning under the yoke of an oppressive system. On the contrary, there’s a lot to like about day-to-day life in the advanced welfare states of western Europe. They are great places to visit. But the view of life that has taken root in those same countries is problematic. It seems to go something like this. The purpose of life is to while away the time between birth and death as pleasantly as possible, and the purpose of government is to make it as easy as possible to while away the time as pleasantly as possible – the Europe Syndrome.

“Europe’s short work-weeks and frequent vacations are one symptom of the syndrome. The idea of work as a means of self-actualization has faded. The view of work as a necessary evil, interfering with the highest good of leisure, dominates. To have to go out to look for a job or to have to risk being fired from a job are seen as terrible impositions. The precipitous decline of marriage, far greater in Europe than in the United States, is another symptom. What is the point of a life-time commitment when the state will act as surrogate spouse when it comes to paying the bills? The decline of fertility to far below replacement is another symptom. Children are seen as a burden that the state must help shoulder, and even then they’re a lot of trouble that distract from things that are more fun. The secularization of Europe is another symptom. Europeans have broadly come to believe that humans are a collection of activated chemicals that, after a period of time, deactivate. If that’s the case, saying that the purpose of life is to pass the time as pleasantly as possible is a reasonable position. Indeed, taking any other position is ultimately irrational...”²⁸³

²⁸³ Murray, *Coming Apart*, New York: Crown Forum, 2012, pp. 283-286, 287-288.

The contrast Murray draws between the American model of life with its greater emphasis on family, community and responsibility, and the European model, with its greater emphasis on the state as a safety net providing food and shelter, may seem exaggerated – especially from the perspective of 2021, when both the privileged and the working classes of American society have fallen considerably away from the ideals of the Founding Fathers. It shows that whatever the virtues of American society in the hey-day of Americanism, they were not so stable or well-grounded; and “the European Syndrome” of well-padded welfarism had undermined responsible life on *both* sides of the Atlantic. Nevertheless, the basic point he makes is a valid one. The Europeans had more government than the Americans, and it was successful in raising the living standards of Europeans in a remarkably egalitarian manner. But quantity of government cannot replace quality; and somehow, in the process of raising economic living standards, important things – family, community and responsibility – had been lost, proving the truth of the Lord’s words: “Man does not live by bread alone” (Matthew 4.4).

The evidence, sadly, is that in providing so well for their material needs, the West Europeans had betrayed their first spiritual task, which was to defend what was left of Christian civilization from the Soviet threat *in union with the Americans*, who continued to bear the main burden of that struggle. In France, in particular, loyalty to the revolutionary tradition of 1789, and a snobbish and nationalistic attitude of proud condescension towards the Anglo-Saxons, combined with an over-confident belief that Europe under French leadership could defend itself against any threat from the East, generated almost a reversal of values as between Communism and Capitalism. The French had their fine Mirage fighters and their nuclear *force de frappe*, their magnificent cultural tradition, their sophisticated “new wave” films, and their exquisite cheeses and wines. But by withdrawing from NATO they dealt a serious blow to the western alliance, providing the Soviets with the opportunity to “divide and conquer” by offering a separate peace to the French and the Eurocommunist left – an opportunity, fortunately, which they were not able to exploit. Proud of the success, from an economic and egalitarian point of view, of the European Union, and ignoring the fact that it was achieved only under the umbrella of the American armed forces and at the price of American money and American blood, the French felt free to spread disloyalty and sedition in the western alliance and the irrationality of their intellectuals’ teachings among western universities and opinion-formers. Of course, there were noble exceptions (Jean-Francois Revel, whom we have often quoted, was one). But in general, for Western Europe and its spiritual leader, France, the post-war period, far from being a revival of former glories, represented the nadir of European civilization...

II. CAPITALISM RECOVERS (1979-1985)

23. THE TURIN SHROUD

The Lord said to the Scribes and Pharisees: “An evil and adulterous generation seeks after a sign, and no sign will be given to it except the sign of the Prophet Jonah” (Matthew 12.29) – His resurrection from the dead. The generation of the post-war West was evil and adulterous – and it did not seek a sign. But a sign was given to it nonetheless – the same sign of the Prophet Jonah, the Resurrection of Christ, but in a material, evidential form appropriate to a generation that worshipped science.

Far from being an enemy of true religion, true science can be its valuable support (although never its foundation) – on condition that both the religion and the science are true and rational in the best and deepest sense. During the second half of the twentieth century there took place a scientific event which, if properly evaluated, could have helped resurrect the true faith, and with it, western Christian civilization if there had been enough people with eyes to see and ears to hear: the first systematic, scientific examination of the Turin Shroud, the extraordinary relic which purports to be, and almost certainly is, the burial shroud of Christ, and which now yielded what amounted to something as close to a *scientific proof* of the Resurrection of Christ as is possible – a precious gift from the age of faith to the age of scientism.

“The first direct examination of the shroud by a scientific team was undertaken in 1969–1973 in order to advise on preservation of the shroud and determine specific testing methods. This led to the appointment of an 11-member Turin Commission to advise on the preservation of the relic and on specific testing. Five of the commission members were scientists, and preliminary studies of samples of the fabric were conducted in 1973.

“In 1976 physicist John P. Jackson, thermodynamicist Eric Jumper and photographer William Mottern used image analysis technologies developed in aerospace science for analyzing the images of the Shroud. In 1977 these three scientists and over thirty others formed the Shroud of Turin Research Project. In 1978 this group, often called STURP, was given direct access to the Shroud.”²⁸⁴

It is worth recalling how the Shroud first came to the notice of scientists... In 1898, an amateur photographer called Secondo Pia took several photographs of yellowish, watery-looking linen shroud purporting to be the Burial Shroud of Christ in Turin. The negatives revealed a sharp and detailed image of the front and back of a tall naked man who appeared to have been crucified. This discovery, coming as it did at the height of the positivist belief in science as the arbiter of all knowledge issued a challenge to the scientific community that has been taken up frequently in the following century; by the end of the twentieth century almost all the sciences had been employed to try and answer the question: is in the man in the Shroud Christ Himself, or is it a fake? There have been many doubters, and sometimes it looked as if a scientific methodology had proved that

²⁸⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shroud_of_Turin.

it was a fake, notably when carbon-14 analysis was applied to the Shroud. But in the present writer's opinion, which relies heavily on the research of Ian Wilson²⁸⁵, the doubters have not proved their case, in which case this must count as the most important scientific discovery of all time, overthrowing the positivist scientism that remains the dominant theory of knowledge in the modern world.

Let us begin with the carbon-14 evidence. Now carbon-14 is a notoriously unreliable method of dating. Its accuracy depends very heavily on the degree to which the sample tested has been contaminated by the environment, and the degree to which that contamination is allowed for in determining the date. That is why archaeologists often come up with obviously wrong, "rogue dates", which are then quietly dismissed...

In 1988, using a new method of carbon-14 testing and without consulting any archaeologist, a team of scientists came up with a date of 1290-1360 for the Shroud. But the dating laboratories carried out only routine pre-treatment procedures to eliminate contamination, taking no account of the contamination that had been forced into the Shroud's permanent structure, that is, the molecular structure of its flax fibres. This "permanent" contamination could have been quantified only by chemical analysis – but no such analysis was done. Now it is known that even if the Shroud is only 600-700, and not 2000 years old, it has undergone massive contamination from fires, smoke, oil, wax, incense, water, tears, micro-organisms in the atmosphere and on hands and lips, etc. In the opinion of experts, much of this penetrated the molecular structure of the Shroud over time. As one senior Harwell scientist, P.J. Anderson, said: "The history of the Shroud does not encourage one to put a great deal of reliance upon the validity of my carbon-14 dating."

But even supposing that the 1988 dating procedures were impeccable, and the Shroud a forgery made in the Middle Ages, how could it have been done?

This question has not yet received an answer because of several facts:-

- The Shroud image could not have been created by the usual method of medieval forgery, painting. Much excitement was caused by the discovery, in the 1970s, of some traces of pigment on the Shroud. But these traces were randomly distributed and were clearly *not* used in the formation of the image. It is now generally recognized that the forgery was not created by painting.
- Attempts to reproduce the image by stretching a linen sheet over a body have produced absurd, macabre results with distortion of perspective, etc.

²⁸⁵ *The Shroud. The 2000-year-old Mystery Solved* (London: Bantam Press, 2010). Unless otherwise stated, all quotations are from this source.

- Since, to the naked eye, the image on the Shroud is very faint, of a yellowish colour similar to a scorch stain such as one might find on an ironing board, and since the Shroud bears the imprint of both the front and the back of a body, it has been suggested that the image was created by a very short blast of light from within the body. But this would come close to conceding that Christ Himself created the image in some miraculous fashion unknown to us. In any case, the miracle is still greater; for the full, astonishingly detailed and beautiful image of the Shroud is not visible to the naked eye, but only in a *photographic negative*. The only conclusion must be that the forger, if there was one, not only knew the art of photography at least 500 years before the technology became known in the 1840, but also was able to hide his photograph under the cover of the very faint image that is visible to the naked eye.

- There is another property of the image which no known forger, ancient or modern, can reproduce: when placed under a VP-8 Image Analyzer, the image is revealed *in three dimensions*. The Analyzer's inventor, Peter Schumacher, "has recalled his emotions on seeing the Shroud's full-body image on his system's TV monitor for the very first time: 'A true "true three-dimensional image" appeared on the monitor... The nose ramped in relief. The facial features were contoured properly. Body shapes of the arms, legs and chest and the basic human form... I had never heard of the Shroud of Turin before that moment. I had no idea what I was looking at. However, the results are unlike anything I have processed through the VP-8 Analyzer, before or since. Only the Shroud of Turin has [ever] produced these results from a VP-8 Image Analyzer.' With regard to the idea of some unknown medieval artist-forger producing such an image, Schumacher had this to say: 'One must consider how and why an artist would embed three-dimensional information in the "grey" shading of an image [when] no means of viewing this property of the image would be available for at least 650 years after this was done. One would have to ask why is this result not obtained in the analysis of other works?..."

- "From an art-historical point of view," writes art historian Thomas de Wesselow, "the idea that the Shroud's body-image was painted shortly before 1356, the approximate date of its first display in Lirey, is untenable. The Shroud's image is quite unlike any painting of the period - or, indeed, of any period. In the words of Ernst Kitzinger, 'The Shroud of Turin is unique in art. It doesn't fall into any artistic category.'... The Shroud is inconceivable as a medieval work of art."

- The forger must have possessed, besides extraordinary artistic ability (Leonardo da Vinci has been suggested, but the dates do not fit the carbon-14 results), greater anatomical and medical knowledge than seems possible for a medieval Catholic. The Shroud image's anatomical details and blood marks (the blood has been tested and shown to be real, of the AB group) are completely consistent with it being the image of the incorrupt body of a crucified dead Jew aged between 30 and 35 with a

crown of thorns on his head, a spear wound in his side with blood and serum around the wound, and nails through his wrists and ankles. One telling detail: the nails went through the wrists of the hands, not the palms, which we now know to have been standard practice with the Romans (because otherwise the nails could not have held up the weight of the body), but which was *not* known to medieval artists, who always portrayed Christ with the nails going through the palms. Another detail indicating expert knowledge: the image of the body shows marks of wounds corresponding in shape exactly to what we would expect to see as the result of scourging by the *flagrum*, the standard-issue Roman army instrument of torture of the time. In general, there can be little doubt that the image is of a man who was scourged and crucified in the Roman fashion – a practice that was discontinued with the coming of St. Constantine in the fourth century. Stephen Jones writes: “Atheist and Shroud critic Steven Schafersman agrees that because of these many specific matches between the Gospels' account of Jesus' passion and the image on the Shroud, 'the odds [are] 1 in 83 million that the man on the shroud is not Jesus' and therefore 'If the shroud is authentic' (i.e. not a forgery), 'the image is that of Jesus' (my emphasis)”.

- The forger must also have had expert archaeological knowledge. For the Shroud's weave is a complex three-to-one herringbone twill with a type of “invisible seam” for which there are no parallels in the medieval period, but which has been recovered from sites in Israel dating to the first century.

A film illustrating eight major scientific reasons why the Shroud should be considered to be the burial shroud of Christ has recently been published.²⁸⁶

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Let us now turn from science to history. One of the main arguments of the sceptics – especially Orthodox Christian sceptics – is that if the Shroud were genuine, we should expect to have references to it in Orthodox Church literature of the first millennium, or at any rate in other literature of antiquity or the early Middle Ages – that is, *before* the first certain historical references to the Shroud in the *late* medieval West. Wilson put forward an ingenious hypothesis in answer to this problem in his first book on the subject in 1978. Since then, the evidential basis for this hypothesis has been considerably strengthened.

The hypothesis is that the Shroud is identical with the Holy Mandylion, or Image not made with hands, whose feast is celebrated on August 16 in the Orthodox Church, and to which there are many references in ancient and early medieval literature. The Mandylion appears to have disappeared from the

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_9lMQII32wE&feature=share&fbclid=IwAR1cjXZb7gd45vYWBZ1Alkp60QrIgg2Fu3sVmF9kRHnijJuWoKexaPQdKJI

historical record at about the time of the sacking of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204. So the hypothesis asserts that it was captured by the Crusaders as part of their very extensive loot and then reappeared some years later as the Shroud in Turin...

Before examining this hypothesis, let us explode the myth that the Shroud is not mentioned in any ancient Orthodox sources.

Thomas de Wesselow writes: "The Sindon is first mentioned... in a letter of encouragement sent by Emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogennitus to his troops in 958. The emperor says that he is sending them some holy water consecrated by contact with various relics of the Passion in the Pharos Chapel, including the *theophoron sindonos* – the 'God-worn linen sheet' ...

"Again, the chronicler William of Tyre records the Sindon among various relics shown to King Amaury of Jerusalem and his entourage in 1171."

Again, Bishop Jacob Barclay of Jerusalem cites "a letter dated 1 August 1205, written by Theodore Angelos aka Theodore Komnenos Doukas, who was cousin of two former Byzantine emperors and second uncle of former emperor Alexios IV Angelos (the one who had enticed the Crusaders to seize Constantinople), and addressed to Pope Innocent III: 'Theodore Angelus wishes long life for Innocent [III], Lord and Pope at old Rome, in the name of Michael, Lord of Epirus and in his own name. In April of last year a crusading army, having falsely set out to liberate the Holy Land, instead laid waste the city of Constantine. During the sack, troops of Venice and France looted even the holy sanctuaries. The Venetians partitioned the treasures of gold, silver, and ivory while the French did the same with the relics of the saints and the most sacred of all, the linen in which our Lord Jesus Christ was wrapped after his death and before the resurrection. We know that the sacred objects are preserved by their predators in Venice, in France, and in other places, the sacred linen in Athens . . . Rome, Kalends of August, 1205.'"

Athens at this time was controlled by the de la Roche family, which was related by marriage and membership of the Templar order to the de Charny family, which, as we know for certain, came into possession of the Shroud sometime in the thirteenth or fourteenth centuries. Wilson provides extensive further evidence that the Templars possessed the Shroud and kept and venerated it in secret, which we shall not go into here. The important point is that here we have definite evidence, not only that the Shroud existed in pre-1204 Constantinople, but that it was stolen from there by the Crusaders and brought, first to Athens, and then to France.

But this is not the only evidence that the Shroud *was* venerated in the Orthodox East as the burial sheet of Christ. "In the earliest years of the thirteenth century, we find Nicholas Mesarites, custodian of the Pharos Chapel relic collection, referring to what is undoubtedly Jesus's burial shroud (whether imprinted or not imprinted). First, he described this as proof of Jesus's resurrection: 'In this chapel Christ rises again, and the *sindon* [the Greek word used in the Synoptic Gospels

to describe the burial shroud] with the burial linens is the clear proof.' Then, in his second reference to this same shroud, he remarked intriguingly, 'The burial *sindon* of Christ: this is of linen, of cheap and easily obtainable material, still smelling of myrrh, defying decay, because it wrapped the mysterious, naked dead body after the Passion.'"

A little later, during the siege of Constantinople by the Crusaders, the Shroud was moved to the church of the Mother of God of Blachernae, where regular presentations for the veneration of the whole people were staged every Friday. This is the witness of an ordinary crusader, Robert de Clari: "There was another church which was called My Lady St Mary of Blachernae, where there was the *sydoine* [old French for *sindon*] in which our Lord had been wrapped, which every Friday stood upright, so that one could see the figure of our Lord on it."

However, this description of the Shroud "standing upright" immediately raises the question: how could the Shroud, a fourteen-foot long relic with the imprint of the *whole* body of the Lord on it, be confused with the Mandylion, which shows only the head of Christ? In order to answer this question, we have to examine the Holy Mandylion itself. But we are not able to do this, because it disappeared at the same time in the same sack of Constantinople in 1204 – coincidentally, at the same time as the Shroud...

We must turn, then, to the literary tradition concerning the appearance of the Mandylion. According to our earliest source, the fourth-century Bishop Eusebius of Caesarea, "[King] Abgar V of Edessa, then suffering from an incurable disease, heard of the miracles Jesus was performing and sent to Jerusalem a messenger bearing a letter addressed to Jesus, asking him to come to his city to heal him. Jesus declined, saying he needed to stay in Jerusalem to await his fate, but he blessed Abgar for his show of faith and promised that after being 'taken up' he would send one of his disciples to Edessa to cure him and bring him the Christian message."

That disciple was Addai, or Thaddeus in the Greco-Roman form of the name. According to the tenth-century *Story of the Image of Edessa*, Addai went to the king shortly after the Resurrection of Christ, bringing with him a cloth on which the Lord had imprinted an image of His face. Addai "placed the Image on his own forehead and went in thus to Abgar. The king... seemed to see a light shining out of his face, too bright to look at, sent forth by the Image that was covering him." The king was healed and became a Christian, and Edessa became perhaps the first Christian city in the world...

The *Story* goes on to explain how the king "ordered the image of a pagan god that had been over his city's gate to be taken down and replaced by the Image of Jesus. After his death, when Abgar's second son reverted to paganism, the son ordered the pagan image to be restored, and that of Christ destroyed. However, Edessa's bishop of that time managed to pre-empt this. In the words of the tenth-century writer, 'Given that the place where the Image was kept was shaped like a cylindrical semi-circle, he [the bishop] showed great foresight and lit a lamp in

front of the Image and put a tile on top of it. He then sealed the surface off with gypsum and baked bricks, finishing the wall off on the same level.”

Nothing further is known about the Image for a long time, until 544. In that year the Parthian King Chosroes appeared before the walls of Edessa. He brought a huge timber mound up to the walls and seemed about to conquer the city. But then, according to the tenth-century *Story*, someone appeared in a vision to Bishop Eulalios, informed him where the Image was stored (the bishop did not know that it even existed any longer), and told him to parade it in a procession. Eulalios found the Image with the lamp in front of it still burning, and then processed around the walls holding it in his arms. As the contemporary sixth-century writer Evagrius described it, the Edessans “brought the divinely created Image, which human hands had not made [*acheiropoietos*], the one that Christ God sent to Abgar when he yearned to see him. Then, when they brought the all-holy Image into the channel they had created and sprinkled it with water, they applied some to the pyre and the timbers. And at once the divine power made a visitation to the faith of those who had done this, and accomplished what had previously been impossible for them: for at once the timbers caught fire and, being reduced to ashes quicker than word, they imparted it to what was above as the fire took over everywhere.”

Two intriguing things happened after the rediscovery of the Image that support the idea that it is closely linked with the Shroud. First, the iconography of Christ undergoes a sudden and dramatic change throughout the Orthodox world. “Until at least the end of the fifth century,” writes Wilson, “the portrayals of Jesus lacked any authority, most representations depicting him as beardless. As evidenced by St. Augustine’s remarks, there was a general lack of any awareness of what he looked like. But in the art of the sixth century there occurred a remarkable transformation in the way Jesus was depicted.” He was now depicted in a very similar way to the face on the Shroud “before any discovery of the hidden photographic negative”: “the same frontality, the same long hair, long nose, beard, etc.” A series of such icons of Christ, of the “Pantocrator” type, appear in various parts of the Orthodox world, from Rome to Syria to Georgia, in the sixth and seventh centuries.

Of particular interest is one such icon from St. Catherine’s monastery in Sinai, which “features one highly important extra detail: on the forehead between the eyebrows there is a starkly geometrical shape resembling a topless square. Artistically it does not seem to make much sense. If it was intended to be a furrowed brow, it is depicted most unnaturally in comparison with the rest of the face. But if we look at the equivalent point on the Shroud face we find exactly the same feature, equally as geometric and equally as unnatural, probably just a flaw in the weave. The only possible deduction is that fourteen centuries ago an artist saw this feature on the cloth that he knew as the Image of Edessa and applied it to his Christ Pantocrator portrait of Jesus. In so doing he provided a tell-tale clue that the likeness of Jesus from which he was working was that on the cloth we today know as the Shroud.

“Seven decades ago Frenchman Paul Vignon identified another fourteen such oddities frequently occurring in Byzantine Christ portraits, likewise seemingly deriving from the Shroud. Among these is a distinctive triangle immediately below the topless square. But like a Man Friday footprint of the Shroud’s existence six centuries before the date given to it by carbon dating, the topless square alone is enough...”

A second intriguing fact about the Image that emerges after its rediscovery is that it was much larger than the simple rectangular head-and-shoulders image we are familiar with from countless iconographic reproductions. Thus the *Acts of Thaddaeus*, dating either to the sixth or early seventh century, describes “the cloth on which the Image was imprinted as *tetradiplon* – ‘doubled in four’. It is a very unusual word, in all Byzantine literature pertaining only to the Image of Edessa, and therefore coming to indicate some unusual way in which the Edessa cloth was folded.

“So what happens if we try doubling the Shroud in four? If we take a full-length photographic print of the Shroud, double it, then double it twice again, we find the Shroud in eight (or two times four) segments, an arrangement seeming to correspond to what is intended by the sixth-century description. And the quite startling finding from folding the Shroud in this way is that its face appears disembodied on a landscape-aspect cloth exactly corresponding to the later ‘direct’ copies of the Image of Edessa.

“In the *Story of the Image of Edessa*, the Image is specifically described as mounted on a board. So a folding for presentation purposes in this ‘doubled in four’ way actually makes a great deal of sense. It reduces the Shroud’s extremely awkward fourteen-foot length into a manageable and presentable twenty-one inches by forty-five inches, and displays by far the most meaningful section of the cloth, the face. And if we think of the face as seen in this way in the dim lighting conditions of a church interior – conditions in which, as we know from surgeon Dr. Pierre Barbet, the different colour of the bloodstains does not show up – it is easy to understand how the face might have been supposed to be of a watery origination, exactly as envisaged in the sixth-century *Acts of Thaddaeus* account [which explains the creation of the Image as by Jesus washing himself].”

But “if the Shroud and the Image of Edessa are identical, why”, the sceptic will ask, “did that not become obvious to its owners and to the Orthodox world in general? It seems implausible to suppose that the Image was never taken out of its container and opened up to reveal that it was in fact a fourteen-foot burial shroud.”

However, there *is* evidence that the secret of the hidden Shroud did in fact become known, if not to everyone (for reasons we will discuss shortly), at any rate to some. Thus in the *Life of St. Columba* by St. Adamnan of Iona, we read that in the 680s Bishop Arculf of Perigueux was shipwrecked off the Scottish island of Iona and told the abbot, St. Adomnan, that while on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem he had seen “the *sudarium* of our Lord which was placed over his head in the tomb”.

He said that the relic had just come to Jerusalem, which is quite possible, since in 679 there had been an earthquake in Edessa that damaged the cathedral of Hagia Sophia in which the Image was stored, which may have necessitated its temporary removal during rebuilding. Although Bishop Arculf does not seem to have seen the *sudarium* (another word for the Shroud, used in St. John's Gospel) unfolded, he was evidently told a different story about its origins by the Image's keepers – not that it was formed through Christ washing His face in it, but that it was the Burial Shroud of Christ that was placed over His head in the tomb...

That is not all. On August 16, 944, during the reign of Emperor Romanos Lecapenus, the Holy Mandylion was transferred from Edessa to Constantinople and placed in the Pharos chapel amidst great ceremonial. This event is the origin of the feast of the Holy Mandylion that is in the Orthodox *Menaion* for August 16, which also confirms the Abgar story...

"Amid so much ceremony and self-evident excitement it is difficult to determine when and where, if at any point at all, anyone meaningfully saw the Image removed from its casket in a way that could enable proper study. Nevertheless, that this actually happened is confirmed by an independent contemporary account, not part of the *Story of the Image of Edessa*. According to this, 'A few days beforehand, when they [the imperial party] were all looking at the marvellous features of the Son of God on the holy imprint, the Emperor's sons [i.e. Stephen and Constantine] declared that they could see only the face, while Constantine his son-in-law said he could see the eyes and the ears.

"Given the extraordinary efforts that had been made to obtain the Image, several historians have expressed puzzlement that it should have appeared so indistinct to the few who were allowed to view it directly. As the eminent Cambridge historian Sir Steven Runciman remarked, 'It is possible that the young Lecapeni [i.e. Emperor Romanos's two sons Stephen and Constantine] were drunk, though in that case it is curious that Constantine [i.e. the rightful emperor], who was notoriously fond of stimulants, should have missed the opportunity for drinking too.'

"If the Image of Edessa was genuinely one and the same object as today's Shroud of Turin, no such explanation is of course necessary. The Shroud's watery-looking impression and its uncertainty of detail would readily explain Romanos's sons' perception difficulties. Although we might question how Constantine Porphyrogenetos, even with his strong artistic interests, saw 'eyes' on the imprint, this perception corresponded to the then universal idea that the Image had been created by Jesus in life. The idea was notably shared by several of the artist copyists of the Shroud during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, despite their full awareness – almost certainly not yet shared by Constantine – that they were looking at the imprint of a dead body. It is almost entirely thanks to the discovery of the photographic negative that we know the eyes to have been closed in death."

Constantine Porphyrogennetos succeeded to the throne of Byzantium, and immediately proceeded to produce a new series of gold solidus coins that exhibit a remarkable change from their predecessors - "nothing other than what appears to have been a deliberate attempt to reproduce in the Christ face features quite uncannily close to the exact imprint that appears on the Turin Shroud.

"This characteristic, which first occurred less than a year after the Image of Edessa's arrival in Constantinople, was actually noted over twenty years ago by a Hungarian-born Oxford scholar with a very strong interest in Byzantine coins, Dr Eugene Csocsán de Várallja. As Csocsán de Várallja remarked of Constantine Porphyrogennetos's coin issues, 'Just following the arrival of the Edessa [Image in]... 944... a completely new image of Christ appeared on the bezants. On these coins Christ's nose became as elongated as on the Shroud, the angle of his eyebrows changed to match the Shroud eyebrows, and the slightly differing angle of each moustache seems to mirror that on the Shroud. In addition the Christ image took on just as impressionistic a character as on the Shroud.'

"Two decades on there is one further feature that can be added to these observations: the very distinctive mark running down from the hairline to immediately above Christ's (spectator's) right eyebrow, just to the right of the nose. It appears too deliberate to be some random blemish, and is in fact repeated on later coins. On the Shroud, in this identical location is the reverse '3'-shaped blood flow that runs from hairline to eyebrow."

The official story of how the Image came into being, the *Story of the Image of Edessa*, does not change after its transfer to Constantinople. However, the *Story's* author, considering that "it would not be at all strange if confusion has arisen in the story over such a long time", puts forward two versions of the story. The first is that Christ, in response to King Abgar's request, washed His face in the cloth. The second version is that during His agony in the Garden of Gethsemane. Christ "took this piece of cloth, which can still be seen, from one of His disciples, and wiped off the streams of sweat on it". Nevertheless, in spite of this uncertainty about how and when the Image was formed, in both versions it is said that Christ's *face* was imprinted on the cloth, with no mention of the whole body, as we see on the Shroud.

"Yet not very long after 945," continues Wilson, "some subtle hints begin to emerge that all about the Image may not have been quite as plain and above-board as many had assumed. As noted by Marc Guscín during his extensive browsing among the early manuscripts preserved in the monasteries at Mount Athos, in several of the Synaxarion manuscripts, at the very beginning of the entry for 16 August - that is, the celebration of the Feast of the Image of Edessa - there occurs the following verse:

In life you exuded your likeness on to a *sindon*.
In death you entered the final *sindon*.

“Although this did not exactly seem much to go on, Guscini also noticed in some of these same Mount Athos manuscripts a change in the request of King Abgar. He was represented as instructing his messenger to bring back to him details not only of Jesus’s face and hair, but also of his ‘whole bodily appearance’. As further noticed by Guscini, a late tenth- or eleventh-century manuscript of the sixth-century *Acts of Thaddaeus*, one of only two of this composition to have arrived to our time, differs from its partner in precisely this same piece of information, merely using different Greek words for this purpose.

“Supplementing and expanding on this, back in the early 1990s Rome-based scholar Gino Zaninotto had brought to attention a manuscript preserved at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands, the Codex Vossianus, in which Jesus, in his letter to Abgar, was represented as saying, quite illogically but reflecting a changed understanding that the image was of the full body, not just the face, ‘If you really want to see what my face looks like, I am sending you this linen cloth, on which you will be able to see not only the form of my face *but the divinely transformed state of my whole body* [my italics]. When you have seen it you will be able to soothe your burning desire. May you fare well for all time in the wisdom of my Father.’

“Because of its Carolingian-style handwriting, the Vossianus manuscript cannot date much later than the end of the tenth century. Furthermore, little more than a century later it finds support from another Latin source, the *History of the Church* written by English monk Ordericus Vitalis in 1130, in which Ordericus recorded that ‘Abgar the ruler reigned at Edessa, the Lord Jesus sent him a sacred letter and a beautiful linen cloth he had wiped the sweat from his face with. The image of the Saviour was miraculously imprinted on to it and shines out, *displaying the form and size of the Lord’s body* [my italics] to all who look on it.’”

We know from the words of a visitor to Constantinople in about 1090 that “when all the other palace relics are shown to the faithful at certain times, this linen cloth on which the face of our redeemer is depicted is not shown to anyone and is not opened up for anyone except the emperor of Constantinople” and visiting royal dignitaries. Could it be that this measure was elicited, not only by the exceptional holiness of the relic, but also because the palace wished to conceal something about it – that it was not all that it seemed to be, but was in fact a full-length Image of the whole of Christ’s body in death, back and front? Perhaps revealing the full truth might have caused scandal in the highly conservative society of Byzantium...

Be that as it may, Professor Kurt Weizmann has shown that “from the eleventh century on what had been a mummy-style mode of depicting Jesus’s entombment gradually gave way to a new concept of how Jesus was buried. The Byzantine Greeks called this new mode the *Threnos*, or Lamentation, its main feature being that Jesus is wrapped in a large cloth readily comparable with today’s Turin Shroud.” These representations often contain other details consistent with very close copying of the Image on the Shroud: the double body length cloth, the hands

crossed over the loins with only four fingers and no thumb visible, and the reverse '3'-shaped stain of the forehead of Christ.

But then something unexpected happens. In 1125 an English pilgrim reports the presence in Constantinople of *both* the Image of Edessa ("the holy handcloth") and the Shroud ("the linen cloth and *sudarium* of the entombment"). And this *duality* of relics is again reported by an Icelandic abbot, Nicholas Soemundarson, in 1157.

Our explanation of this duality is as follows. By the twelfth century, rumours of the existence of the full-body-length Shroud had leaked out and could no longer be denied – as we have seen, it is openly admitted by Nicholas Mesarites, keeper of the Pharos chapel, just before the Fourth Crusade. But that this was the same object as the Image of Edessa could not be admitted: it would confuse and scandalize the faithful. So it was said that there were two objects, one of which, the Image, disappeared after 1204, leaving only the Shroud...

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The facts assembled by Wilson put paid to the theory that the Shroud is a late medieval fake, an idea that was in any case incredible. At a minimum the Shroud must be six hundred years older than the carbon-14 dating, as is indicated by several facts: that the lignin of the Shroud has lost almost all its vanillin, which is inconsistent with a medieval date; that the weave appears to date from the first century; that the image must have been imprinted in some way from the real corpse of a crucified man, although crucifixion was not practised in the Mediterranean world after the fourth century.

Mark Guscini, in his work on the Ovieto *sudarium*, another relic that has been believed to have had contact with the face of Christ, has reduced the forgery hypothesis to absurdity, writing: "Let us suppose for a while that the results obtained from the carbon dating of both the *sudarium* and the Shroud are accurate, and neither cloth ever touched the body of Jesus. In that case, the following story would have to be true. Sometime in the seventh century, in Palestine, after reading the Gospel of John, a well-known forger of religious relics saw the opportunity of putting a new product on the market - a cloth that had been over the face of the dead body of Jesus.

"This forger was also an expert in medicine, who knew that a crucified person died from asphyxiation, and that when this happened, special liquids fill the lungs of the dead body, and can come out through the nose if the body is moved.

"The only way he could get this effect on the cloth was by re-enacting the process, so this is exactly what he did. He crucified a volunteer, eliminating those candidates who did not fulfil the right conditions - swollen nose and cheeks, forked beard to stain the cloth, etc. When the body was taken down from the cross, he shook it around a bit with the help of a few friends, holding the folded

cloth to the dead volunteer's nose so that future generations would be able to see the outline of his fingers.

"He even stuck a few thorns in the back of the dead man's neck, knowing that relic hunters would be looking for the bloodstains from the crown of thorns.

"Being an eloquent man, he convinced people that this otherwise worthless piece of cloth was stained with nothing less than the blood and pleural liquid of Christ, and so it was guarded in Jerusalem with other relics, and considered so genuine and spiritually valuable that it was worth saving first from the invading Persians and later from the Arabs.

"A few hundred years later, some time between 1260 and 1390, another professional forger, a specialist in religious relics too, decided that the time was ripe for something new, something really convincing. There were numerous relics from various saints in circulation all round Europe, bones, skulls, capes, but no, he wanted something really original. Various possibilities ran through his mind, the crown of thorns, the nails from the crucifixion, the table cloth from the last supper, and then suddenly he had it - the funeral shroud of Jesus! And not only that, but he would also put an image on the Shroud, the image of the man whom the Shroud had wrapped!

"The first step was difficult. Being an expert in textile weaves, (one of his many specialities, the others being pollen, Middle East blood groups, numismatism of the years of Tiberius, photography, Roman whips, and electronic microscopes) he needed linen of a special kind, typical of the Middle East in the first century.

"Once this had been specially ordered and made, he folded it up before starting his work, as a neighbour had suggested that such a cloth would have been folded up and hidden in a wall in Edessa for a few hundred years, so the image would be discontinuous on some of the fold marks.

"Leaving the cloth folded up, he travelled to Oviedo in the north of Spain, where he knew that a forerunner in his trade had left a cloth with Jesus' blood stains.

"On obtaining permission to analyse the *sudarium*, he first checked the blood group - AB of course, common in the Middle East and relatively scarce in Europe - then made an exact plan of the blood stains (carefully omitting those which would have already clotted when the *sudarium* was used) so that his stains would coincide exactly.

"After his trip to Oviedo, he went on a tour of what is now Turkey, forming a composite portrait of Jesus from all the icons, coins and images he could find. After all, he needed people to think that his Shroud had been around for over a thousand years, and that artists had used it as their inspiration for painting Christ. He didn't really understand what some of the marks were, the square box between the eyes, the line across the throat, but he thought he'd better put them

on anyway. He didn't want to be accused of negligence, because he was an internationally famous forger and had a reputation to maintain.

"Once he was back home, he somehow obtained some blood (AB, naturally) and decided to begin his work of art with the blood stains, before even making the body image.

"Unfortunately, he miscalculated the proportions, and the nail stains appeared on the wrist instead of on the palms of the hands, where everyone in the fourteenth century knew that they had been. 'Well', he thought, 'it's just a question of a few inches, nobody will notice.'

"Now, even the omniscient author is forbidden to enter in the secret room where the forger 'paints' the image of Christ, a perfect three dimensional negative, without paint or direction. His method was so secret that it went to the tomb with him.

"After a few hours, he opened the door, and called his wife, who was busy preparing dinner in the kitchen. 'What do you think?' 'Not bad. But you've forgotten the thumbs.' 'No, I haven't. Don't you know that if a nail destroys the nerves in the wrist, the thumbs bend in towards the palm of the hand, so you wouldn't be able to see them?'

"'But didn't the nails go through the palms?' 'Well, yes, but I put the blood on first, and didn't quite get the distance right.'

"'Oh, in that case ... and what about the pollen?' 'What pollen?' 'Well, if this Shroud has been in Palestine, Edessa, and let's suppose it's been in Constantinople too, it's going to need pollen from all those places.' Our forger loved the idea, got the pollen from all the places his wife had indicated, and delicately put it all over his Shroud.

"And then, the final touch. Two coins from the time of Christ, minted under the emperor Tiberius, to put over the man's eyes. Our man had a sense of humour too - he decided that the coins would be included in the image in such a way that they would only be visible under an electronic microscope.

"Such a story, even without the embellishments, is more incredible than the Shroud's authenticity."

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Perhaps no object in history has been the subject of such intense scientific examination, aesthetic delight and religious awe as the Shroud of Turin. As such, - and on condition, of course, that it is the authentic burial shroud of Christ, as we believe - it is vitally important as demonstrating *the essential unity of all knowledge, scientific, artistic and religious* in the Person of Jesus Christ, crucified, buried and risen from the dead.

Although truth and beauty are instinctively felt to be at one with goodness, this holy trinity of values has tended to be blown apart by unbelieving science and meretricious art, enabling the latter to be used by the devil against the only real good, which is God. The Shroud restores the original unity of the three modes of contemplating the world: scientific, artistic and religious.

Through the Shroud, that is, “through the flesh, as in a glass,” that is, through the flesh of Christ reflected in the Shroud, “[God] has shone upon the world, descending even unto hell”²⁸⁷, that is, the blind hearts of unbelieving scientists who cannot see beyond the ends of their noses (or microscopes). Through it He has “changed the beauty of created things”, making sensual aesthetes ascend from carnal charms to the eternal beauty not subject to change or corruption. The Shroud of Turin is the Image not-made-by-hands, by which that other image not-made-by-hands, mankind, can see beyond the Humanity of the Image to the Divinity of the Archetype, the God-Man Jesus Christ.

It was surely no coincidence, but a wonderful manifestation of Divine Providence, that the rediscovery of the Resurrection of Christ through the Shroud should have been revealed at perhaps the lowest moment of mankind’s apocalyptic struggle with militant atheism. It gave hope that even in the land from where militant atheism had launched its murderous “crusade”, the Light would again shine out through the Body of the Crucified Christ, the Orthodox Church.

²⁸⁷ *Octoechos*, Sunday, Tone 8, Vespers.

24. THE SOVIET DEFEAT IN AFGHANISTAN

The 1970s, as we have seen, was a very bad decade for the West. Defeatism and neutralism were common; few believed in the Soviets' ultimate defeat. The US President Reagan (1981-1989) was a notable exception: the Communists' "last few pages are even now being written", he said prophetically in 1981.²⁸⁸ This optimism, so different from the defeatism of his predecessors, would be vital to American victory in the Cold War.

It was Poland, Reagan believed, that might be the catalyst of the final fall of Communism. For, as Gilbert continues the story: "Deeply embroiled militarily in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union watched with grave alarm the political developments inside Poland, its western neighbour and hitherto loyal – or largely loyal – Communist partner. The Catholic Church, buoyed up by the moral and personal support of the 'Polish Pope', criticized in January [1980] the divisiveness of Communism in the social structure of Poland, and stated that every society had a right to form independent organizations in search of economic development. There was mockery in the streets when, at the parliamentary elections in March, 99.52 per cent of the votes went to the single Communist-dominated list of candidates. In June, 151 Polish intellectuals – leading writers, scientists and university professors – warned of 'negative changes' that would grow and reach 'avalanche stage, which would threaten open social conflict' unless reforms were instituted. University students, turning their backs on the Party-controlled youth organization, demanded a student association that would not be 'imposing any ideology'.

"Strikes began on July 1, with workers demanding free trade unions and better wages. No day passed without a strike in one or other of the shipbuilding yards of the Baltic coast or the mining regions of Silesia. The strikes reached a climax in August, when half a million shipyard workers in Gdansk, Szczecin and other Polish Baltic ports downed tools. They were joined by 200,000 coalminers in Silesia. Catholicism was a strong force in the workers' movement, which had been as affected as a sector of Polish society by the Pope's visit. In Gdansk, open-air Masses were held under a large portrait of the Pope.

"On August 16 a strike committee linking all the striking factories was set up under the leadership of a shipyard worker, Lech Walesa. Quickly the strikers' demands, which at first had been limited to censorship, the release of political prisoners and the establishment of free, independent trade unions. Under the banner of Solidarity, these unions sprang up despite the frown of the authorities. Students and workers found themselves gathering under the same Solidarity banner. Factories declared themselves for Solidarity, and took over the management. In many cases they were helped in organizing their independent activities by Catholic intellectuals..."²⁸⁹

²⁸⁸ Stone, *The Atlantic and its Enemies*, London: Penguin, 2010, p. 542.

²⁸⁹ Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 552, 561-

By September 1981 Solidarity had acquired 10 million members, one third of Polish workers – an astonishing number. It now constituted a far greater threat to Moscow's empire than any it had encountered before. Nor was it just the numbers that terrified them; for these were not small groups of Jewish dissident intellectuals, but working men, proletarians – precisely the kind of people who created the revolution and were supposed to be its prime beneficiaries.

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Olga Chetverikova tells us more (albeit from a pro-Soviet and anti-western perspective) about how Catholics both inside and outside Poland prepared the counter-revolution: "In August, 1980 the notable 'Gdansk Agreement' was signed ratifying the creation of 'Solidarity', the first independent trade union behind the 'iron curtain', led by Lech Walesa, who became the main object of the attention of the Holy See. As John-Paul II said, 'Walesa was sent by Divine Providence'. The Vatican thought that if the trade union triumphed, an explosive wave would roll towards the Ukraine, the Baltic region and the Balkans and, possibly, Czechoslovakia, which would finally result in the complete collapse of the socialist camp.

"In connection with this, the head of the Holy Alliance [the Vatican's secret service] Poggi was ordered by the Pope to infiltrate his agents into 'Solidarity' and make the organization more open, so as to attract into it pro-Catholic representatives of the intelligentsia. The best agent of the HA was the Polish Jesuit priest Casimir Przydatek, who had a wide net of informers in the Polish unions. Among them there stood out Father Jankowski, who led the church of St. Brigitta in Gdansk, one of whose members was Lech Walesa. Under the influence of Przydatek, Walesa in the end brought into the leadership of the union the editor of the Catholic newspaper *Wież Mazowiecki* and the Catholic historian B. Geremek, after which *the strike movement in Poland passed under the control of the Church*. 'Solidarity', supported by the Vatican and having received financial resources via the HA through the 'Ambrosiano' bank, began to spread through the whole territory of the country... *In all, about 500 million dollars were transferred to 'Solidarity' illegally.*

"After the election of Ronald Reagan relations of a strategic nature were established between him and Pope John-Paul II. As the investigator E. Lebecq wrote, 'In the first years of Reagan's administration one could see the appearance of convinced Catholic in the top posts, which had never happened before in the history of the United States.' Active roles in cooperation with the Vatican were played by the director of the CIA William Casey (Reagan's former election campaign manager), his deputy Vernon Walter, the State Secretary Al Haig and the National Security adviser Richard Allen – all Catholics and (except for Allen) knights of the Maltese Order...

"On June 7, 1982 there took place in the Vatican the first meeting between John-Paul II and R. Reagan, as a result of which *an agreement was concluded on carrying out a joint campaign in Poland whose aim was the destruction of 'the communist empire'.*

This agreement, which was called a 'holy alliance', was made public by the journalist Carl Bernstein in *Time* magazine. He received his information from the higher reaches of the Vatican and leading people in the American establishment. As D. Kalaich writes, the revelation of this pact 'to the whole world village' was aimed at showing to all Catholics that the Vatican was on the side of the new world order, and of suggesting that they follow the pontifex.

"As Richard Allen confirmed, 'the relationship with the Vatican represented one of the biggest secret unions in the whole of history'. It was after this meeting that Reagan gave a policy statement in London in which he proclaimed a 'crusade' against 'the empire of evil'. He declared 1983 to be 'the year of the Bible', which was confirmed on April 18 of the same year by the Pope in a meeting with members of the Trilateral Commission, which took place in the Vatican with almost all members present. *And in 1984 relations were established between the Vatican and Washington...*

"The actions of Reagan and the Pope in relation to Poland were completely coordinated. Reagan told Clark and Casey: 'We must not invade the country and overthrow the government in the name of the people. The only thing we must do is use 'Solidarity' to achieve success.' In sum, as the American journalist Carl Bernstein witnessed, 'the American embassy in Warsaw was turned into the leading centre of the CIA in the socialist world, while Casey became the 'chief architect' in working out policy in Poland.' Z. Brzezinski occupied the post of link between the White House and the Vatican's Holy Alliance, acting as the main expert and coordinator of the actions of the western secret services in the countries of Eastern Europe in the carrying out of secret operations..."²⁹⁰

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In November, 50,000 Soviet troops were massed on the Polish border. During the following year, however, the Soviets hesitated over whether to invade or not, while Jaruzelski, the Polish leader, tried in vain to get assurances from them that they would invade if his plan to introduce martial law failed. Finally, on December 13, 1981, he imposed martial law – by this time it had become clear that the Soviets would not invade in any case.

Walesa, writes Norman Stone, "was put in a comfortable villa with his wife (seventh time pregnant) and apologetic generals. It had been Gomulka's and he was there for seven months. There was no European reaction – quite the contrary, as Claude Cheysson even said, 'socialist renewal' was at stake. There were problems as soldiers took over the mines and the Sejm produced a huge reform package that meant decentralization, etc.; but it led nowhere. There were over 10,000 internments, and over 150,000 'prophylactic discussions' but the overtones were farcical. If you lifted the hotel telephone, you were told 'Rozmowa kontrolowana', meaning that someone was listening. That the tape was old and

²⁹⁰ Chetverikova, *Izmena v Vatikane ili Zagovor Pap protiv Khristianstva* (Betrayal in the Vatican, or the Conspiracy of the Popes against Christianity), Moscow, 2011, pp. 88-90.

wheezing did not inspire fear, and conversations with the Polish intelligentsia anyway consisted of funny stories.

“At any rate, Moscow was having considerable difficulty in digesting Poland...”²⁹¹

Sometimes the Communists’ patience snapped. Thus “on 19 October 1984 a thirty-seven-year-old pro-Solidarity Roman Catholic priest, Jerzy Popieluszko, was abducted in Warsaw. After eight days the Polish authorities admitted that he had been murdered by their internal security service. His corpse was found in a reservoir on 30 October, and the following day three secret policeman were charged with his killing...”²⁹²

This showed two things. First, Communism had not yet acquired a human face. But secondly and more significantly, the anti-Communist pressure was compelling them to attempt to hide that inhuman face, which portended badly for the long-term future of Communism in Eastern Europe...

²⁹¹ Stone, *op. cit.*, p. 534.

²⁹² Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 546,

25. THE REAGAN-THATCHER ALLIANCE: (1) POLITICS

After the removal from office of President Richard Nixon following the Watergate scandal in 1974, American foreign policy seemed to lose direction and consistency. Under Nixon's successor, Gerald Ford, "defence budget requisitions were frequently slashed by Congress. All further aid was cut off to South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in February 1975, a few months before those states were overrun. The War Powers Act sharply pared the president's capacity to commit American troops overseas. Soviet-Cuban interventions in Angola could not, Congress had voted, be countered by sending CIA funds and weapons to the pro-western factions there...

"As the United States grappled with serious socioeconomic problems throughout the 1970s and as different groups tried to reconcile themselves to its reduced international position, it was perhaps inevitable that its external policies would be more erratic than was the case in placid times. Nonetheless, there were to be 'savings' in policy over the next few years which were remarkable by any standards. Imbued with the most creditable of Gladstonian and Wilsonian beliefs about the need to create a 'fairer' global order, [the next president, Jimmy] Carter breezily entered an international system in which many of the other actors (especially in the world's 'trouble spots') had no intention of conducting their policies according to Judeo-Christian principles. Given the Third World's discontent at the economic gap between rich and poor nations, which had been exacerbated by the 1973 oil crisis, there was prudence as well as magnanimity in his push for north-south cooperation, just as there was common sense in the terms of the renegotiated Panama Canal treaty, and in his refusal to equate every Latin American reformist movement with Marxism. Carter also took justified credit for brokering the 1978 Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel – although he ought not to have been surprised at the critical reaction of the other Arab nations, which in turn was to give Russia the opportunity to strengthen its ties with the more radical states in the Middle East. For all its worthy intentions, however, the Carter government foundered upon the rocks of a complex world which seemed increasingly unwilling to abide by American advice, and upon its own inconsistencies of policy (often caused by quarrels within the administration). Authoritarian, right-wing regimes were berated and pressured across the globe for their human-rights violations, yet Washington continued to support President Mobutu of Zaire, King Hassan of Morocco, and the Shah of Iran – at least until the latter's demise in 1979, which led to the hostages crisis, and in turn to the flawed attempt to rescue them. In other parts of the globe, from Nicaragua to Angola, the administration found it difficult to discover democratic-liberal forces worthy of its support, yet hesitated to commit itself against Marxist revolutionaries. Carter also hoped to keep defence expenditure low, and appeared bewildered that *détente* with the USSR had halted neither that country's arms spending nor its actions in the Third World..."²⁹³

²⁹³ Kennedy, op. cit. pp. 528-529.

In November 1980 Ronald Reagan was elected to the presidency. He brought a new energy and determination to the Cold War on the American side. This is not to say that he was a war-monger: he was genuinely horrified when his responsibilities as controller of the American nuclear weaponry was explained to him. But at the same time he was less content with the status quo and the idea of mutually assured destruction than his predecessors, and wanted to defeat, rather than simply contain, or sign a mutual suicide pact, with the Soviet enemy. And he genuinely believed in the possibility of bringing freedom to the peoples of the Soviet Union.

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By Divine Providence Reagan was supported by a similarly bold and fresh-thinking Prime Minister of Great Britain, Margaret Thatcher (1979-90). These two leaders brought a breath of fresh air and renewed determination to the Western Alliance.

Thatcher's rise must be understood in the context of the severe crisis in Britain when she came to power... In modern times, the triumph of socialism in Britain has often been followed by a harsh winter, as if to signal that the murderous cold of Soviet Siberia had arrived. So it was after the Labour victory in 1945/46. So it was again after the Labour governments of the 1970s reached their chaotic peak in the "Winter of Discontent" in 1978/79.

"A hospital supervisors' strike was the first of a large number of public-sector disputes. Tanker drivers, teachers, sewage workers, janitors, water and electricity workers, ancillary health service staff and even grave-diggers came out on strike, in pursuit of wage increases as high as 25%. That winter turned out to be the coldest for sixteen year and along with blizzards there were, in the words of [Prime Minister James] Callaghan's obituaries in January 2005, 'blocked roads, undelivered fuel, closed public buildings, a paralyzed health service, bin bags piled high in the London squares and even the dead unburied'. Union picketing became extremely violent, and when Callaghan returned home from a G7 summit in the West Indies and said, 'I don't think that other people in the world would share the view that there is mounting chaos'. *The Sun* newspaper paraphrased him with the headline: 'Crisis? What crisis?'

"The strikes, unrest and economic disruption of that winter were followed on 28 March 1979 by the Government losing a confidence motion in the House of Commons by 311 votes to 310, and subsequently the election of a Conservative Government under Margaret Thatcher with an overall majority of 43 that May. When years later Mrs. Thatcher was asked what she had changed in politics, she answered, 'Everything'. In another politician that might have sounded absurdly egotistical; with her it was mere historical accuracy. She was the first prime minister of the twentieth century to have an '-ism' attached to her name."²⁹⁴

²⁹⁴ Roberts, op. cit., pp. 535-536.

The advent of Reagan and Thatcher marked the end of the period of détente and the beginning of the revival of the right in American domestic politics.²⁹⁵ Their alliance made possible the bringing to a peaceful end of the Cold War...

Reagan, as a member of the American religious right, peppered his speeches with references to God. Thus: "Our Pledge of Allegiance states that we are 'one nation under God', and our currency bears the motto 'In God We Trust'... The morality and values such faith implies are deeply embedded in our national character... [Yet] in recent years, well-meaning Americans in the name of freedom have taken freedom away. For the sake of religious tolerance, they've forbidden religious practice in our public classrooms... [How] can we hope to retain our freedom through the generations if we fail to teach our young that our liberty springs from an abiding faith in our Creator?"

Thatcher, in accordance with English sensibilities, referred less to God. Nevertheless, she resisted the tide of homosexual propaganda, and proclaimed her belief in Victorian (as opposed to Sixties) values. Her critics argued, however, that her economic policies, like Reagan's, undermined real Christianity – although by now no Western leader knew what that was.

The two leaders did not immediately hit it off or agree on all matters. When Argentina invaded the Falklands in 1982, and Thatcher sent in a naval force to recapture them, Reagan hesitated to help her, not wishing to break his ties with the important Latin American country (which was also supported by its ally the Pope, who sent Exocet missiles to Argentina). But eventually, under the prodding of his Defence Secretary, Caspar Weinberger, he provided "invaluable logistical, weaponry, intelligence and satellite support"²⁹⁶ for the British in their difficult and daring, but ultimately successful, recapture of the Falklands – a victory that was important, not so much strategically, as in re-establishing the Britons' belief in themselves.

Again, in October, 1983, when Marxists overthrew the lawful government of the former British colony of Grenada, and the Americans, in response to an appeal from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, invaded the island in order to restore order, Thatcher was furious; she thought he should at least have talked with the Queen, the head of the Commonwealth, before. And she protested: "If you are going to announce a new law, that wherever Communism reigns against the will of the people the United States shall enter, then we are going to have terrible war in the world."²⁹⁷

²⁹⁵ This not to say that the left was inactive. 1981 was the year of *Reds*, an American epic historical drama film, co-written, produced, and directed by Warren Beatty, about the life and career of John Reed, the journalist and writer who chronicled the Russian Revolution in his 1919 book *Ten Days That Shook the World*. Beatty was a leftist, and the revolution was portrayed with unmistakable sympathy.

²⁹⁶ Roberts, op. cit., p. 530.

²⁹⁷ Gilbert, op. cit., p. 600.

Nevertheless, Thatcher was converted to a more aggressive stance against Communism, becoming “the Iron Lady”, as *Pravda* called her. Meanwhile Reagan, faced with numerous opponents in Congress and in the Vietnam-war-weary American public, came to appreciate her support. In December, 1979 NATO leaders had agreed a “dual-track” policy in relation to the Soviets: on the one hand, the deployment of American intermediate-range weapons, the Cruise and Pershing II missiles in response to Soviet SS-20s, and on the other hand, the continuation of arms control talks. In their campaign both against the Cruise and Pershing missiles and against all new NATO missile systems, the Soviets preyed on European fears of war.

They had already succeeded in stopping deployment of the neutron bomb, which, as Revel wrote in 1985, “is the only weapon that would have made up for our inferiority in conventional forces. A tactical nuclear weapon, it is the only one that can stop an armoured invasion with pinpoint accuracy, killing tank crews without destroying cities and buildings, without harming the civilian population (which, in the circumstances, is by definition friendly) or contaminating the air over an area larger than the target. Propaganda by the Kremlin’s friends in the West, campaigning against adoption of the neutron bomb, represents it as a ‘capitalist’ weapon because it kills men without obliterating equipment and property, which can be salvaged when the holocaust is over. Salvaged by whom? By the multinationals, I suppose. Clearly a plan, say the partisans of Western unilateral disarmament, framed by the military-industrial complex to wipe out the populations of Italy, West Germany and Holland so that it can lay hands of those countries’ factories, homes, night-clubs, stadiums, sentry boxes, airports, churches, beehives, triumphal arches, tunnels, restaurants, and prisons, In other words, offering neutron bombs to NATO was part of a diabolical American plot to slaughter the Europeans and take over their property.

“Everyone knows that the most intelligent creatures on earth live in the Western part of Eurasia. Surely they will not fall into so crude a capitalist trap. With laudable consistency, President Carter [in 1978] cancelled plans to arm NATO with neutron bombs...”²⁹⁸

Reagan, however, was made of sterner stuff than his predecessor; his laid-back, “cowboy” image concealed a clever political brain and a strong will; and he restarted production in 1981, after which the Soviets began a propaganda campaign against it. It was at this point that the focus shifted to the Cruise and Pershing missiles. “In 1982,” writes Norman Stone, “there was a great fight over the placing of intermediate-range ultra-modern missiles on European soil, and vital countries, Germany especially, saw enormous demonstrations against this, the product in part of KGB manipulation, which Bukovsky, from Politburo documents, was able to demonstrate. In this atmosphere of the ‘Second Cold War’, as commentators called it, the transatlantic became all-important...”²⁹⁹

²⁹⁸ Revel, op. cit., pp. 72-73.

²⁹⁹ Stone, *The Atlantic and its Enemies*, London: Penguin, 2010, p. 486.

On March 8, 1983, in a speech to America's National Association of Evangelicals, Reagan warned the assembled clergymen that "wishful thinking about our adversaries was folly". He urged them to reject the nuclear freeze, calling the Soviet Union "the focus of evil in the modern world". "So in your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals," he said, "I urge you to beware the temptation of pride – the temptation of blithely declaring yourself above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil."

But Reagan was adopting (without consultation with anyone else) a bold and paradoxical "dual-track" approach. While lambasting the "peace-mongering" clergy for not identifying the Soviet Union as "an evil empire" he was about to come up with a revolutionary proposal for abolishing MAD and the policy of "deterrence based on the threat of nuclear counter-attack with surviving forces" for a *purely defensive system* whereby space-based weapons would destroy incoming missiles before they entered the earth's atmosphere.

This was the famous "star wars" idea... And so "on March 23, fifteen days after his 'evil empire' speech, Reagan spoke on television to the American people. He illustrated his remarks with graphs showing the dimensions of the Soviet build-up, and with aerial photographs which had been classified as secret until a few days earlier. These showed Soviet fighter aircraft and a Soviet Intelligence headquarters in Cuba, Soviet aircraft in Nicaragua, and the building of an airfield with a ten-thousand-foot runway in Grenada.

"Reagan then spoke of the future defence of the United States by means of laser weaponry in space. This 'Star Wars address', as it was called, while appearing to be bellicose and war-enhancing, gave the Soviet leaders cause to hesitate. Their expensive, much-vaunted nuclear weaponry would, if this space-laser technology could be developed, become obsolete and useless. Yet the Soviet Union did not have the technology or the economic resources to challenge the United States in this innovative and expensive sphere.

"More than any single American initiative, 'Star Wars' – although it would clearly take up to a decade to develop – spelt the end of the Soviet-American balance of power, and would tilt it significantly to the American side.³⁰⁰ As a sign of its seriousness, the American Department of Defense, headed by Caspar Weinberger, announced their prototype laser weapons had already been tested against both incoming missiles and 'attacking' unmanned aircraft. Among those who understood the meaning of Star Wars, and the inevitable Soviet fall from

³⁰⁰ The Star Wars project "surpassed neutron bomb production in ambition and vision and with that the neutron bomb quickly faded from the center of the public's attention." (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutron_bomb#cite_note-On_this_Day:_7_April-14) (V.M.)

Super Power equality as a result of it, was the recently appointed Communist Party Secretary responsible for Agriculture, Mikhail Gorbachev, a relatively young (fifty-two-year-old) political leader who was being spoken of in Moscow that year as a possible successor to the clearly ailing Andropov. Gorbachev had come to the attention of Western observers in March, when he encouraged small groups of peasants to take a more responsible attitude towards agricultural production by increasing their material self-interest through group contracts which gave them a direct stake in the profits of their collective labour. Under the contracts, they would be paid by results. Not pre-selected and rigidly enforced norms, but production targets profitable to the individual – through his group contract – would provide the incentive which collectivization, the Stalinist panacea so long adhered to, had failed to provide.”³⁰¹

In September, 1983 the Soviets accidentally shot down a Korean Airlines plane over Kamchatka, and the Americans reacted with fury. Tension increased between the superpowers, and the Soviets seemed genuinely apprehensive that the Americans might be planning a nuclear strike. The Americans in turn were alarmed and dismayed that the Soviets should think such a thing...

Reagan began openly speculating about the possibility of abolishing nuclear weapons altogether. But his advisors said the Soviets would never agree because without nuclear weapons they would no longer be a great power...

But Reagan carried on regardless. “Speaking in New York on September 26, at the United Nations General Assembly, Reagan set out in public some of the strategic arms reduction proposals that the United States had made earlier in the year to the Soviet Union, at the talks in Geneva. The principal American proposal was that if the Soviet Union would agree to an equal number of Soviet and American nuclear warheads worldwide, and would reduce the number of its existing land-based medium-range nuclear weapons, then for its part the United States, while retaining the right to deploy its nuclear warheads anywhere in the world, would not in fact redeploy in Europe the nuclear warheads to which, under the equality scheme, it was entitled globally. Reagan also agreed, in his speech of September 26, to an earlier Soviet proposal that the NATO and Warsaw Pact intermediate-range bomber forces should be included in the calculations of the arms reduction talks.

“The arms reduction talks continued. The main Soviet counter-proposal was that NATO cancel its plans to deploy Pershing and Cruise missiles in Europe. Were NATO to do so, Andropov announced, the Soviet Union would reduce its number of SS-20 missiles in Europe by one hundred, to 140. This the United States rejected on the ground that it would leave the Soviet Union with a monopoly of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.”³⁰² The United States then

³⁰¹ Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 596, 597-598.

³⁰² The aim, as Sir Geoffrey Hosking explains, “was to take western Europe hostage, since any threatened missile strike would not directly affect the United States, the Soviet leaders hoped the American leaders would not respond effectively, and a split would open up within NATO” (*Russia and the Russians*, London: Penguin, 2012, p. 517). (V.M.)

proposed that both sides should have an equal number of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. The Soviet Union rejected this because it would involve the United States introducing Pershing and Cruise missiles to Europe. On November 14, the day of the Soviet rejection, the first American Cruise missiles in Europe arrived at the United States air base at Greenham Common, in southern England.³⁰³ A week later the first Pershing missiles reached American air bases in West Germany. When the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks adjourned in December, the Soviet Union refused to agree to a date when they would be resumed..."³⁰⁴

"Although Reagan wanted to talk to the Soviet leadership, he also approved policies to directly challenge the Soviet Union. At the behest of CIA director Casey, he vastly expanded proxy wars against Soviet influence in the Third World. In 1984, covert US support for the *mujahedeen* fighting the Soviet army in Afghanistan reached a major turning point. The secret aid pipeline from the United States and Saudi Arabia, through Pakistan, suddenly bulged; by one account the total had tripled to hundreds of millions of dollars, in a matter of weeks. At the same time, Reagan wanted to channel money to guerrilla fighter, known as *contrarevolucionarios*, or *contras*, who were opposing the Sandanista government of Nicaragua. Reagan called the *contras* the 'moral equivalent of our Founding Fathers' and he cast Nicaragua's Sandanista junta, led by Daniel Ortega, as the front line in the war on communism. But Congress had cut off aid to the *contras*, and money was running out in 1984. Reagan instructed McFarlane his national security adviser, to keep the *contras* alive, 'body and soul'. That summer, McFarlane reassured Reagan that Saudi Arabia had pledged \$1 million a month into a secret bank account for the *contras*. The driving force in Afghanistan and Central America was Casey. 'By the end of 1984, Casey's covert war in the Third World against the Soviet Union and its surrogates was in full swing,' recalled Gates, who was then his deputy..."³⁰⁵

This period of confrontation brought the world closer to nuclear catastrophe than any event except the Cuban crisis of 1962. And yet, points out Chomsky, "there have also been hundreds of cases when human intervention aborted a first strike minutes before launch after automated systems gave false alarms. We don't have Russian records, but there's no doubt that their systems are far more accident prone..."³⁰⁶

The Reagan-Thatcher era is sometimes described as a revival of conservatism. There is some truth in this assertion, but not much. The two leaders were both Christians, and Thatcher stood for a revival of old-fashioned "Victorian values". Both can take credit for helping to bring down communism, which was not likely to have happened under their liberal predecessors, who wrongly believed that "communist reformers could succeed in peacefully transforming east European

³⁰³ The issues surrounding the Greenham Common demonstrations against the cruise missiles were well brought out in the film *Reunion at Farnborough* (1985) with Robert Mitchum and Deborah Kerr. (V.M.)

³⁰⁴ Gilbert, op. cit., p. 599.

³⁰⁵ Hoffman, op. cit., pp. 161-162.

³⁰⁶ Chomsky, *Who Rules the World?*, London: Penguin, 2017, p. 114.

economies into something close to the mixed economies of the West".³⁰⁷ But, as we have seen, for all their anti-collectivist zeal neither leader succeeded significantly in bringing down government spending; nor did they succeed in restraining the predominant cultural tendencies of their time, which were liberal and post-modernist.

Anglo-American conservatism had limped along, write Ofir Haivry and Yoram Hazony, until the 1930s. It "was really only broken in a decisive way by Franklin Roosevelt in America in 1932, and by Labour in Britain in 1945. At this point, socialism displaced liberalism as the worldview of the parties of the 'Left,' driving some liberals to join with the last vestiges of the conservative tradition in the parties of the 'Right.' In this environment, new leaders and movements did arise and succeed from time to time in raising the banner of Anglo-American conservatism once more. But these conservatives were living on a shattered political and philosophical landscape, having lost much of the chain of transmission that had connected earlier conservatives to their forefathers. Thus their roots remained shallow, and their victories, however impressive, brought about no long-term conservative restoration.

"The most significant of these conservative revivals was, of course, the one that reached its peak in the 1980s under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President Ronald Reagan. Thatcher and Reagan were genuine and instinctive conservatives, displaying traditional Anglo-American conservative attachments to nation and religion, as well as to limited government and individual freedom. They also recognized and gave voice to the profound 'special relationship' that binds Britain and America together. Coming to power at a time of deep crisis in the struggle against Communism, their renewed conservatism succeeded in winning the Cold War and freeing foreign nations from oppression, in addition to liberating their own economies, which had long been shackled by socialism. In both countries, these triumphs shifted political discourse rightward for a generation.

"Yet the Reagan-Thatcher moment, for all its success, failed to touch the depths of the political culture in America and Britain. Confronted by a university system devoted almost exclusively to socialist and liberal theorizing, their movement at no point commanded the resources needed to revive Anglo-American conservatism as a genuine force in fundamental arenas such as jurisprudence, political theory, history, philosophy, and education - disciplines without which a true restoration was impossible. Throughout the conservative revival of the 1980s, academic training in government and political theory, for instance, continued to maintain its almost complete boycott of conservative thinkers such as Fortescue, Coke, Selden, and Hale, just as it continued its boycott of the Bible as a source of English and American political principles. Similarly, academic jurisprudence remained a subject that is taught as a contest among abstract liberal theories. Education of this kind meant that a degree from a prestigious university

³⁰⁷ Mazower, *op. cit.*, pp. 371-372.

all but guaranteed one's ignorance of the Anglo-American conservative tradition, but only a handful of conservative intellectual figures, most visibly Russell Kirk and Irving Kristol, seem to have been alert to the seriousness of this problem. On the whole, the conservative revival of those years remained resolutely focused on the pressing policy issues of the day, leaving liberalism virtually unchallenged as the worldview that conservatives were taught at university or when they picked up a book on the history of ideas."³⁰⁸

Alarmingly, the fact that liberalism was virtually unchallenged in this period meant that it was allowed to develop in both America and Western Europe into the irrationalist desert known as "Cultural Marxism" and "Post-modernism". For, as Ian Kershaw writes, "the social, economic and cultural transitions that had taken root in Western Europe during the 1970s intensified during the subsequent decade. The term that seemed to capture the spirit of the age was 'post-modernism'. What it precisely meant no one could define. It was generally taken to imply a transition from a society dominated by industry to a computerized world shaped by information technology, and from 'high' Westernized culture to global mass culture. It also signified divergence, dissonance, a pluralism of interpretations, the absence of any claim to an authoritative voice, to cultural superiority or predominance. Perhaps the very vagueness of the concept helped its appeal. From philosophy to the visual arts, through literary criticism to historical understanding, it voiced a pervasive sense of scepticism, relativism, uncertainty and fragmentation. Notions of progress, of rationality, of truth, of any single comprehensible way of grasping where society had come from and where it was going evaporated under the lens of postmodernist critique. The rejection of any 'objective reality' favoured a splintering of cultural interpretation into a myriad of individualistic, subjective approaches or 'discourses', none of which could claim superiority over others. Although cultural unity had always been a chimera, the extent to which postmodernism penetrated intellectual understanding during the 1980s and afterwards did reflect in oblique ways the increasing breakdown of the collective and the dominance of the individualistic in society..."³⁰⁹

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Margaret Thatcher, for one, had no doubt that this postmodernist miasma was the product of Socialism. As she wrote in 1996: "Socialism has re-surfaced in the language and programmes of 'group rights'.

"In America, such affirmative action programmes have not only become a heavy burden on employers of all kinds: by increasing the resentment of the majority against minorities: they have precisely the opposite effect to that intended.

³⁰⁸ Haivry and Hazony, "What is Conservatism?", *American Affairs*, Summer, 2017, vol. I, no. 2.

³⁰⁹ Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster*, pp. 340-341.

“Closely linked to this approach is the obsessive political correctness that imperils serious scholarship in so many American universities and colleges.

“Concepts like truth and falsehood, beauty and ugliness, civilization and barbarism have been de-constructed to give way to judgements based on ideology. The results would be funny, if the consequences were not so serious.

“Whole shelf-loads of classics written by what they call ‘DWEMs’ – dead white European males – are nowadays consigned to ‘the dustbin of [whatever these people now call] history’.

“The great Milton is now, in the words of a Stanford University English Professor, regarded as ‘an ass [and]...a sexist pig’. Shakespeare is still on the syllabus of Duke University – but only, in the words of a professor, ‘to illuminate the way 17th century society mistreated women, the working class, and minorities’.

“All this can be called many things – collectivism, relativism, multi-culturalism – or just good old fashioned stupidity.”

“Marxist thinking,” we read in *The Economist* in 2002, “retains great influence far beyond the dwindling number who proclaim themselves to be Marxists. The labour theory of value and the rest of Marx's economic apparatus may be so much intellectual scrap, but many of his assumptions, analytical traits and habits of thought are widespread in western academia and beyond.

“The core idea that economic structure determines everything has been especially pernicious. According to this view, the right to private property, for instance, exists only because it serves bourgeois relations of production. The same can be said for every other right or civil liberty one finds in society. The idea that such rights have a deeper moral underpinning is an illusion. Morality itself is an illusion, just another weapon of the ruling class. (As Gyorgy Lukacs put it, ‘Communist ethics makes it the highest duty to act wickedly...This is the greatest sacrifice revolution asks from us.’) Human agency is null: we are mere dupes of ‘the system’, until we repudiate it outright.

“What goes for ethics also goes for history, literature, the rest of the humanities and the social sciences. The ‘late Marxist’ sees them all, as traditionally understood, not as subjects for disinterested intellectual inquiry but as forms of social control. Never ask what a painter, playwright, architect or philosopher thought he was doing. You know before you even glance at his work what he was *really* doing: shoring up the ruling class. This mindset has made deep inroads – most notoriously in literary studies, but not just there – in university departments and on campuses across Western Europe and especially in the United States. The result is a withering away not of the state but of opportunities for intelligent conversation...”

26. THE REAGAN-THATCHER ALLIANCE: (2) ECONOMICS

The economic shock administered by the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 had not received a satisfactory response from governments, and severe cuts in production, greatly increased unemployment and “staginflation” were the result. “The Keynesian approach of promoting growth by stimulating demand had been the basis of practically all post-war thinking on the economy. It had proved the tried and tested way out of economic trouble, stagnation and mass unemployment. But this remedy did not fit the conditions of the early 1970s. Two decades of high growth had produced full employment. The problem now was of high inflation. Pumping money into the economy was guaranteed merely to add to inflationary pressures. Stimulating demand simply prompted demands for higher wages. Without increased productivity that just fed into further inflation. A large and still rising proportion of workers, especially in the expanded public sector, belonged to trade unions – in 1970 around two-thirds in Sweden, half in Britain, a third in West Germany (though little over a fifth in France). Unions were able to exploit virtually full employment and a labour shortage to win sometimes spectacular wage increases – 19 per cent in Italian industry in 1969 - without commensurate increases in productivity. Governments were finding it more and more difficult to cope with levels of public expenditure, especially on welfare. This accounted for 40 to 50 per cent of the expenditure of Western countries by the early 1970s, quadrupling in Western Europe on average since the end of the war and rising especially fast in Italy and France. In these circumstances, Keynesian theory offered no solutions.”³¹⁰

By the end of the 1970s the most successful economies were the free enterprise economies of the Pacific, which “undoubtedly helped to rekindle belief in the market system both in North America and in Europe. The 1970s, as we have seen, were a discouraging decade for capitalism. It became fashionable among the intelligentsia, including many economists, to speak of ‘zero-growth’, or ‘late capitalism’ or even of ‘post-capitalism’, as though the system that had created, for the first time in history, what even its opponents dubbed the Affluent Society was now moribund. The most widely approved form of government in the West was the so-called ‘mixed society’, with the state sector absorbing between 40 and 60 per cent of the GNP, administering welfare services on a growing scale, and reserving the actual wealth-creating role to the private sector operating about half the economy. But the weaknesses of this Euro-American formula were reflected in the low growth rates, the phenomenon known as ‘stagflation’ which marked most of their economies as the decade progressed. Towards the end of the decade, as high-quality, low-priced Japanese (and South Korean and Taiwanese) goods began increasingly to penetrate Western markets, there was a growing demand for changes which would bring about Japanese-style efficiency.”³¹¹

The relative failure of European Keynesianism and relative success of the Pacific free-enterprise economies coincided with the appearance of a new

³¹⁰ Ian Kershaw, *Roller Coaster. Europe 1950-2017*, London: Penguin, 2019, p. 267.

³¹¹ Johnson, *Modern Times*, pp. 739-740.

economic philosophy embodied in a book, *Capitalism and Freedom*, “published in 1962 by the eminent economist Milton Friedman, a leading figure in the Chicago School of Economic. It amounted to a frontal rejection of Keynesianism. State intervention in the economy to stimulate demand was ruled out in this thinking. Friedman advocated instead an economy self-regulated by the forces of the free market. If money supply were kept in close tandem with gross national product, inflation would cease to be a problem. As it was, money supply had greatly outstripped production. Tightening the money supply was, therefore, the necessary remedy to bring inflation under control, even at the cost of higher unemployment. This monetarist philosophy was the core of what was widely coming to be called ‘neo-liberalism’ (though ‘monetarism’ was a more accurate term for the theory, and preferred by its exponents)... Neo-liberalism sought to produce long-term growth through low taxation, deregulation privatization of industry and public services, and reduction in the size of the public sector.”³¹²

This philosophy was music to the ears of both Reagan and Thatcher, who believed in “rolling back the boundaries of the State” in accordance with Barry Goldwater’s dictum: “A government big enough to give you everything you want is big enough to take away everything you have.” Their strategy involved, first of all, major tax cuts. Reagan delivered on this: he cut taxes from 70 per cent to 50 per cent to 28 per cent by 1986.

“For those who still doubt the efficacy of Reaganomics,” writes Andrew Roberts, “these key statistics from the Federal Reserve Bank ought to be instructive: between January 1981 when Ronald Reagan took office and January 1989 when he left it, US inflation dropped from 12% to 4.5%, the Standard & Poor 500 Index rose from 130 points to 285, unemployment inverted itself from 7.5% to 5.7%, the mortgage rate fell from 13.1% to 9.3%, while the top rate of personal tax plummeted from 70% to 33%. In Reagan’s second term alone, eighteen million new jobs were created and the prime interest rate fell nearly six points to 9.32%. Fostering private enterprise, reducing the size of government and cutting taxes produced a virtuous circle for the American economy. This prosperity allowed the Reagan Administration to spend enough on military rearmament to leave the Soviets little alternative but to sue for peace in the Cold War...”³¹³

However, Reagan’s refusal to cut the Social Security budget and increase of defence spending by a massive 50 per cent meant that the budget deficit soared from \$58 billion in Carter’s last year to \$221 billion in 1986-7.³¹⁴

Thus Reaganomics, whatever it was, was by no means pure monetarism or Friedmanomics...

³¹² Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster*, pp. 273-274, 275.

³¹³ Roberts, *op. cit.*, pp. 523-524.

³¹⁴ Brogan, *op. cit.*, p. 687.

As for Thatcher, she was only in a qualified sense an apostle of laissez-faire. She did cut *taxes*. “In the first decade of her premiership,” writes David Davies, “she reduced the basic rate of income tax to 25 per cent, down from 33 per cent. The top rate was cut to 40 per cent, down from 83 per cent under the previous Labour government. Tax receipts doubled.”³¹⁵ Moreover, she cut *State ownership*, thereby reversing the main, socialist direction of British domestic policy since 1943.

However, she did not cut the power of the state as such. “She believed in the power of the state, and in her elective right to wield it. While she disposed of much of the old public trading sector, what remained in government ownership was concentrated under ever tighter personal and Treasury control. Local democracy, responsible for 85 per cent of political participation in Britain, was emasculated. The relative independence of the courts, the universities, the education and health authorities and the police was weakened by a raft of legislation transferring policy over them to Whitehall. Thatcher’s state was a London-based governing machine with statutes stuffed with ‘Henry VIII’ clauses, allowing ministers to make discretionary decisions without recourse of parliament.”³¹⁶

Thatcher believed in monetarism. She thought she could turn the economy round by reducing inflation and government spending and promoting private entrepreneurship. But in 1981, two years into her premiership, the experiment seemed to be failing. Inflation rose; so did unemployment, as many industries folded, especially in the inner cities. But Thatcher refused to make a U-turn. “You can turn if you want,” she said. “The Lady’s not for turning.” Fortunately for her and Britain, oil was discovered in the North Sea; and oil revenues kept the economic machine turning while Thatcher introduced the other Friedmanite aspects of her revolution – notably privatization, the taming of the trade unions, the liberalization of the financial markets...

The European’s greater emphasis on the “social” aspect of social democracy, and less on the “democracy”, was rejected by the Anglo-Saxons, especially the Americans, who had always been suspicious of socialist tendencies.

For, as John Mickelthwait and Adrian Wooldridge write, “The United States was too individualistic, too decentralized and too business obsessed to embrace European-style social democracy. Still, during the mid-twentieth-century, even the United States laid the foundations of a welfare state: Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid...

“But Leviathan overreached. By the 1970s, the US government seemed to be spoiling everything it touched: grinding war in Vietnam, an economy hobbled by stagflation, cities wrecked by drugs and crime. Around the world, the decade brought labor strikes and energy crises. Those on the political left found

³¹⁵ Davies, “PM Must Act Like Reagan to Save our Economy”, *Daily Mail*, May 11, 2020, p. 7

³¹⁶ Simon Jenkins, *A Short History of England*, London: Profile, 2011, p. 274.

themselves 'mugged by reality', in the words of the neoconservative critic Irving Kristol – as did those in the West who still considered the Soviet Union a kind of noble experiment in collectivism. As the whole Soviet Union came to seem like one giant Potemkin village, it became painfully clear that there was nothing noble about Russian communism.

"Surveying the wreckage of the era, the economist Milton Friedman must have sometimes thought to himself, 'I told you so'. Born in Brooklyn in 1912 to poor Jewish immigrants from Hungary, Friedman... arrived at the University of Chicago in 1932 as a supporter of Norman Thomas, the perennial socialist candidate for US president. After earning a master's degree, Friedman worked first as a US government economist. Among his major contributions was helping devise one of the most powerful (and least loved) tools of big government, the payroll withholding tax. But during the Great Depression and World War II, Friedman's views changed dramatically, and when he returned to teach at the University of Chicago in 1946, he began to forge a very different course.

"The state, Friedman had come to believe, consistently failed to provide services as efficiently as the private sector. He adopted the pro-market, libertarian ideas of the so-called Austrian school of economists, notably Friedrich Hayek, and welded them to American populism to contrive a novel form of small government conservatism. During the 1960s and 1970s, Friedman became an intellectual celebrity, touring the United States to denounce everything that the American left, and, indeed, most of the center, held dear: government-provided health care, public housing, student grants, foreign aid. All of these, Friedman argued, were at best a waste of money and at worst an abuse of power on the part of an out-of-control, incompetent government. 'If you put the federal government in charge of the Saharan desert,' he once said, 'in five years there'd be a shortage of sand.'

"In the 1980s, Reagan and Thatcher tried to put Friedman's philosophy into practice. Reagan cut taxes and eliminated regulations. Thatcher faced down the United Kingdom's labor unions and privatized three-quarters of its state-owned companies, including such behemoths as British Airways and British Telecom. The Reagan-Thatcher model soon spread around the world, just as the social-democratic model had done earlier. From 1985 to 2000, western European governments sold off some \$100 billion worth of state assets, including such well-known state-owned companies as Lufthansa, Volkswagen, and Renault. After the fall of the Soviet Union, post-communist countries embraced the so-called Washington consensus with gusto: by 1996, Russia had privatized some 18,000 industrial enterprises. Leszek Balcerowicz, Poland's first postcommunist finance minister, regarded Thatcher as his hero. In the 1990s, US President Bill Clinton proclaimed an end to 'the era of big government', and British Prime Minister Tony Blair argued that 'the presumption should be that economic activity is best left to the private sector'.

"So Reagan and Thatcher – and, by extension, Friedman – won their battle: today, almost nobody speaks up for big government. But they did not win the

war. Leviathan hardly withered away. In her 11 momentous years in office, from 1979 to 1990, Thatcher succeeded in reducing public expenditure from 22.9 percent of GDP to 22.2 percent, while the government's take from GDP fell from 43 to 36.5 per cent.³¹⁷ Reagan failed to persuade the Democratic-controlled US Congress to enact the spending cuts that were supposed to accompany his tax cuts and as a result ended up triggering an explosion in the US deficit. For all the talk of the rise of neoliberalism and the 'shredding of the safety net', the state remained far bigger under Reagan and Thatcher than anything that Webb could have imagined, and it has only continued to grow in the decades since they left office."³¹⁸

Because of this partial nature of their victory, the Reagan-Thatcher "revolution" in economics should rather be called a "correction"; that is, it corrected the socialist over-reliance on the state that characterized not only the Communist states, but also the European Union. Moreover, even when we see (as we shall see shortly) the evil effects of Friedman's economics, it remains true that when it came to the communist economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, *some* degree of dismantling and destruction *had* to take place.

For the experience of Communism showed that if the state takes over everything, it also corrupts everything. It makes everybody supposedly equal (although some are definitely more equal than others) - but equal in misery rather than in any really worthwhile goods. So if privatization as practiced in the 80s in the West, or in the East in the 90s, was a deeply flawed, sometimes cruelly and unnecessarily violent process, it only highlighted the real lesson to be learned: never allow the State to become so overblown in the first place.

*

Whatever the evils of the Communist system, the unbridled Capitalist individualism associated with the Reagan-Thatcher era was a far from ideal alternative. One of the most striking characteristics of the modern world, especially in the age of globalization, has been the radical weakening of almost all institutions intermediate between the state and the individual, - the family, the local community, the local church - to the massive empowerment of the former and the ultimate enslavement of the latter. But the contemporary world is too complicated, and the individual too vulnerable, for him to live in a completely unregulated world in which the traditional supports of family and Church are being steadily undermined. And yet this was precisely what the monetarism and neo-liberalism of Reagan and Thatcher's economic revolution was doing. There was a deep contradiction in "an appeal to preserve old mores and communities combined with economic change that wrecked them".³¹⁹ Hence the tendency to

³¹⁷ Jenkins, op. cit., p. 275. According to Judt, however, the share of GDP absorbed by public expenditure fell from 42.5 percent in 1978 to 41.7 percent in 1988 (*Postwar*, p. 542). (V.M.)

³¹⁸ Mickelthwait and Wooldridge, "The State of the State", *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, 2014, pp. 126-128.

³¹⁹ "Party like it's 1999", *The Economist*, July 11-17, 2020, p. 76.

deny their existence: as Thatcher famously said, she did not believe in “society” – only the individual and the state.

Of course, the undermining of morals and community is a centuries-old process going back at least to the Industrial and French revolutions. As Yuval Noah Harari writes, “Prior to the Industrial Revolution, the daily life of most humans ran its course within three ancient frames: the nuclear family, the extended family and the local intimate community. Most people worked in the family business – the family firm or the family workshop, for example – or they worked their neighbours’ family businesses. The family was also the welfare system, the health system the education system, the construction industry, the trade union, the pension fund, the insurance company, the radio, the television, the newspapers, the bank and even the police.

“When a person fell sick, the family took care of her. When a person grew old, the family supported her, and her children were her pension fund. When a person died, the family took care of the orphan. If a person wanted to build a hut, the family lent a hand. If a person wanted to open a business, the family raised the necessary money. If a person wanted to marry, the family chose, or at least vetoed, the prospective spouse. If conflict arose with a neighbour, the family muscled in. But if a person’s illness was too grave for the family to manage, or a new business demanded too large an investment, or the neighbourhood quarrel escalated to the point of violence, the local community came to the rescue.

“The community offered help on the basis of local traditions and an economy of favours, which often differed greatly from the supply and demand laws of the local market. In an old-fashioned medieval community, where my neighbour was in need, I helped build his hut and guard his sheep, without expecting any payment in return. When I was in need, my neighbour returned the favour. At the same time, the local potentate might have drafted all of us villagers to construct his castle without paying us a penny. In exchange, we counted on him to defend us against brigands and barbarians. Village life involved many transactions but few payments. There were some markets, of course, but their roles were limited. You could buy rare spices, cloth and tools, and hire the services of lawyers and doctors. Yet less than 10 per cent of commonly used products and services were bought in the market. Most human needs were taken care of by the family and the community.

“There were also kingdoms and empires that performed important tasks such as waging wars, building roads and constructing palaces. For these purposes kings raised taxes and occasionally enlisted soldiers and labourers. Yet, with few exceptions, they tended to stay out of the daily affairs of families and communities. Even if they wanted to intervene, most kings could do so only with difficulty. Traditional agricultural economies had few surpluses with which to feed crowds of government officials, policemen, social workers, teachers and doctors. Consequently, most rulers did not develop mass welfare systems, health-care systems or educational systems. They left such matters in the hands of families and communities. Even on rare occasions when rulers tried to intervene

more intensively in the daily lives of the peasantry (as happened, for example, in the Qin Empire in China), they did so by converting family heads and community elders into government agents.

“Often enough, transportation and communication difficulties made it so complicated to intervene in the affairs of remote communities that many kingdoms preferred to cede even the most basic royal prerogatives – such as taxation and violence – to communities. The Ottoman Empire, for instance, allowed family vendettas to mete out justice, rather than supporting a large imperial police force. If my cousin killed somebody, the victim’s brother might kill me in sanctioned revenge. The sultan in Istanbul or even the provincial pasha did not intervene in such clashes, as long as violence remained within acceptable limits.

“In the Chinese Ming Empire (1368-1644), the population was organised into the *baofia* system. Ten families were grouped to form a *jia*, and ten *jia* constituted a *bao*. When a member of a *bao* committed a crime, other *bao* members could be punished for it, in particular the *bao* elders. Taxes too were levied on the *bao*, and it was the responsibility of the *bao* elders rather than of the state officials to assess the situation of each family and determine the amount of tax it should pay. From the empire’s perspective, this system had a huge advantage. Instead of maintaining thousands of revenue officials and tax collectors, who would have to monitor the earnings and expenses of every family, these tasks were left to the community elders. The elders knew how much each villager was worth and they could usually enforce tax payments without involving the imperial army.

“Many kingdoms and empires were in truth little more than large protection rackets. The king was the *capo di tutti capi* who collected protection money, and in return made sure that neighbouring crime syndicates and local small fry did not harm those under his protection. He did little else.

“Life in the family and community was far from ideal. Families and communities could oppress their members no less brutally than do modern states and markets, and their internal dynamics were fraught with tension and violence – yet people had little choice. A person who lost her family and community around 1750 was as good as dead. She had no job, no education and no support in times of sickness and distress. Nobody would loan her money or defend her if she got into trouble. There were no policemen, no social workers and no compulsory education. In order to survive, such a person quickly had to find an alternative family or community. Boys and girls who ran away from home could expect, at best, to become servants in some new family. At worst, there was the army or the brothel.

“All this changed dramatically over the last two centuries. The Industrial Revolution gave the market immense new powers, provided the state with new means of communication and transportation, and placed at the government’s disposal an army of clerks, teachers, policemen and social workers. At first the market and the state discovered their path blocked by traditional families and

communities who had little love for outside intervention. Parents and community elders were reluctant to let the younger generation be indoctrinated by nationalist education systems, conscripted into armies or turned into a rootless urban proletariat.

“Over time, states and markets used their growing power to weaken the traditional bonds of family and community. The state sent its policemen to stop family vendettas and replace them with court decisions. The market sent its hawkers to wipe out longstanding local traditions and replace them with ever-changing commercial fashions. Yet this was not enough. In order really to break the power of family and community, they needed the help of a fifth column.

“The state and the market approached people with an offer that could not be refused. ‘Become individuals,’ they said. ‘Marry whomever you desire, without asking permission from your parents. Take up whatever job suits you, even if community elders frown. Live wherever you wish, even if you cannot make it every week to the family dinner. You are no longer dependent on your family or your community. We, the state and the market, will take care of you instead. We will provide food, shelter, education, health, welfare and employment. We will provide pensions, insurance and protection.’

“Romantic literature often presents the individual as somebody caught in a struggle against the state and the market. Nothing could be further from the truth. The state and the market are the mother and father of the individual, and the individual can survive only thanks to them. The market provides us with work, insurance and a pension. If we want to study a profession, the government’s schools are there to teach us. If we want to open a business, the bank loans us money. If we want to build a house, a construction company builds it and the bank gives us a mortgage, in some cases subsidised or insured by the state. If violence flares up, our health insurance takes care of us. If we are debilitated for months, social security steps in. If we need round-the-clock assistance, we can go to the market and hire a nurse – usually some stranger from the other side of the world who takes care of us with the kind of devotion we no longer expect from our own children. If we have the means, we can spend our golden years in a senior citizens’ home. The tax authorities treat us as individuals, and do not expect us to pay the neighbours’ taxes. The courts, too, see us as individuals, and never punish us for the crimes of our cousins...

“Not only adult men, but also women and children, are recognised as individuals. Throughout most of history, women were often seen as the property of family or community. Modern states, on the other hand, see women as individuals, enjoying economic and legal rights independently of their family and community. They may hold their own bank accounts, decide whom to marry, and even choose to divorce or live on their own.

“But the liberation of the individual comes at a cost. Many of us now bewail the loss of strong families and communities and feel alienated and threatened by the power the impersonal state and market wield over our lives. States and

markets composed of alienated individuals can intervene in the lives of their members much more easily than states and markets composed of strong families and communities. When neighbours in high-rise apartment buildings cannot even agree on how much to pay their janitor, how can we expect them to resist the state?

“The deal between states, markets and individuals is an uneasy one. The state and the market disagree about their mutual rights and obligations, and individuals complain that both demand too much and provide too little. In many cases individuals are exploited by markets, and states employ their armies, police forces and bureaucracies to persecute individuals instead of defending them. Yet it is amazing that this deal works at all – however imperfectly. For it breaches countless generations of human social arrangements... Within a mere two centuries we have become alienated individuals...”³²⁰

True. And yet the situation in the 1980s was more serious than mere that. Crushed between an overpowering state and the all-consuming market, late-twentieth-century man had lost his soul, becoming, as Fr. Seraphim Rose wrote, “the rootless man, discontinuous with a past that Nihilism has destroyed, the raw material of every demagogue’s dream; the ‘free-thinker’ and skeptic, closed only to the truth but ‘open’ to each new intellectual fashion because he himself has no intellectual foundation; the ‘seeker’ after some ‘new revelation,’ ready to believe anything new because true faith has been annihilated in him; the planner and experimenter, worshipping ‘fact’ because he has abandoned truth, seeing the world as a vast laboratory in which he is free to determine what is ‘possible’; the autonomous man, pretending to the humility of only asking his ‘rights,’ yet full of the pride that expects everything to be given him in a world where nothing is authoritatively forbidden; the man of the moment, without conscience or values and thus at the mercy of the strongest ‘stimulus’; the ‘rebel,’ hating all restraint and authority because he himself is his own and only god; the ‘mass man,’ this new barbarian, thoroughly ‘reduced’ and ‘simplified’ and capable of only the most elementary ideas, yet scornful of anyone who presumes to point out the higher things or the real complexity of life.”³²¹

Tony Judt continues: “Starting with the tax and employment reforms of the Thatcher-Reagan years, and followed in short order by deregulation of the financial sector, inequality has once again become an issue in Western society. After notably diminishing from the 1910s through the 1960s, the inequality index has steadily grown over the course of the past decades.”³²²

After comparing Clinton’s 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act to the New Poor Law of 1834, which Dickens satirized in *Oliver Twist*, Judt asks why the new rich are idolized and the poor stigmatized. His answer comes from an unexpectedly unsocialist source, the first ideologue of

³²⁰ Harari, *Sapiens. A Short History of Humankind*, London: Vintage, 2014, pp. 398-403, 404.

³²¹ Rose, *Nihilism*, Platina, Ca.: St. Herman of Alaska Brotherhood, 2001, p. 83.

³²² Judt, “What is Living and What is Dead?” *When the Facts Change*, London: Vintage, 2015, p. 325.

capitalism, Adam Smith: "This 'disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean condition... is... the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments.' Those are not my words. They were written by Adam Smith, who regarded the likelihood that we would come to admire wealth and despise poverty, admire success and scorn failure, as the greatest risk facing us in the commercial society whose advent he predicted. It is now upon us."³²³

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Another idol of the Thatcher era was *privatization*. "Two-thirds of the once state-owned British industries were in private hands by 1992, including some of the most crucial parts of industry such as gas or telecommunications."³²⁴ A former conservative prime minister, Harold Macmillan, condemned it as "selling the family silver". But it was popular among the public. And among foreign governments: "Western European states profited from privatization – at least in the short term – by some \$150 billion by the late 1990s."³²⁵

Judt writes: "The most revealing instance of the kind of problem we face in comes in a form that may strike many as a mere technicality: the process of privatization. In the last thirty years, a cult of privatization has mesmerized Western (and many non-Western) governments. Why? The shortest response is that, in an age of budgetary constraints, privatization appears to save money. If the state owns an inefficient public program or an expensive public service – a waterworks, a car factory, a railway – it seeks to offload it onto private buyers.

"The sale duly earns money for the state. Meanwhile, by entering the private sector, the service or operation in question becomes more efficient thanks to the working of the profit motive. Everyone benefits: the service improves, the state rids itself of an inappropriate and poorly managed responsibility, investors profit, and the public sector makes a one-time gain from the sale.

"So much for the theory. The practice is very different. What we have been watching these past decades is the steady shifting of public responsibility onto the private sector to no discernible collective advantage. In the first place, privatization is inefficient. Most of the things that governments have seen fit to pass into the private sector were operating at a loss: whether they were railway companies, coal mines, postal services, or energy utilities, they cost more to provide and maintain than they could ever hope to attract in revenue.

"For just this reason, such public goods were inherently unattractive to private buyers unless offered at a steep discount. But when the state sells cheap, the public takes a loss. It has been calculated that, in the course of the Thatcher era UK privatizations, the deliberately low price at which long-standing public assets

³²³ Judt, *op. cit.*, p. 326.

³²⁴ Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster*, p. 344.

³²⁵ Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster*, p. 343.

were marketed to the private sector resulted in a net transfer of £14 billion from the taxpaying public to stockholders and other investors.

“To this loss should be added a further £3 billion in fees to the banks that transacted the privatizations. Thus the state in effect paid the private sector some £17 billion (\$30 billion) to facilitate the sale of assets for which there would otherwise have been no takers. These are significant sums of money – approximating the endowment of Harvard University, for example, or the annual gross domestic product of Paraguay or Bosnia-Herzegovina. This can hardly be construed as an efficient use of public resources.

“In the second place, there arises the question of moral hazard. The only reason that private investors are willing to purchase apparently inefficient public goods is because the state eliminates or reduces their exposure to risk. In the case of the London Underground, for example, the purchasing companies were assured that whatever happened they would be protected against serious loss – thereby undermining the classic economic case for privatization that the profit motive encourages efficiency. The ‘hazard’ in question is that the private sector, under such privileged conditions, will prove at least as inefficient as its public counterpart – while creaming off such profits as are to be made and charging losses to the state.

“The third and perhaps most telling case against privatization is this. There can be no doubt that many of the goods and services that the state seeks to divest have been badly run: incompetently managed, underinvested, etc. Nevertheless, however badly run, postal services, railway networks, retirement homes, prisons, and other provisions targeted for privatization remain the responsibility of the public authorities. Even after they are sold, they cannot be left entirely to the vagaries of the market. They are inherently the sort of activity that *someone* has to regulate...”³²⁶

“‘Thatcherism’,” writes Judt, “stood for various things: reduced taxes, the free market, free enterprise, privatization of industries and services, ‘Victorian values’, patriotism, ‘the individual’.”³²⁷ But the essential contrast was between what Thatcherism meant by the *economy* and *society*.

“As an *economy*, then, Thatcherized Britain was a more efficient place. But as a *society* it suffered meltdown, with catastrophic long-term consequences. By disdaining and dismantling all collectively-held resources, by vociferously insisting upon an individualistic ethic that discounted any unquantifiable assets, Margaret Thatcher did serious harm to the fabric of British public life. Citizens were transmuted into shareholders, or ‘stakeholders’, their relationship to one another and to the collectivity measured in assets and claims rather than in services or obligations. With everything from bus companies to electric supply in

³²⁶ Judt, op. cit., pp. 326- 328.

³²⁷ Judt, *Postwar*, p. 540.

the hands of competing private companies, the public space became a market place.

“If – as Mrs. Thatcher asserted – there is ‘no such thing as Society’, then in due course people must lose respect for socially-defined goods. And so they did, as late-Thatcherite Britain began to take on some of the more unappealing characteristics of the American model that the Iron Lady so admired. Services that remained in public hands were starved of resources, while significant wealth accumulated in the ‘emancipated’ sectors of the economy – notably the City of London, where investment bankers and stockbrokers benefited greatly from the ‘Big Bang’ of 1986, when Britain’s financial markets were deregulated and opened to international competition. Public spaces fell into neglect. Petty crime and delinquency rose in line with the growing share of the population caught in permanent poverty. Private affluence was accompanied, as so often, by public squalor.”³²⁸

And yet it must not be forgotten that the real squalor of British public life had begun with the prodigal, socialist “Swinging” Sixties...

All this is true, and suggests that the Reagan-Thatcher “revolution” was broadly successful in its political, anti-communist aspect but much less so in its economic, neo-liberal aspect.

Nevertheless, “Reaganomics” and “Thatcherism” “had a global influence during the 1980s which went well beyond the new fashion for privatization and reducing the state sector. The 1980s was a radical conservative decade, and even in states where socialist or Labour governments were elected, the drift away from Marxism, collectivism and all the traditional ‘isms’ of the Left was marked. The process was particularly notable in France. The election of the socialist Francois Mitterand as President in 1981, after twenty-three years of Gaullism and its successors, introduced a brief period of socialist egalitarianism and anti-business policies, which led in rapid succession to three devaluations of the franc; thereafter, the French Socialist Party moved sharply to the Right and to free-market policies; and in the later 1980s and early 1990s, alterations in power between socialist and Conservative prime ministers appeared to make little difference, in economic policy, defence or foreign affairs. The German Social Democrats had renounced Marxism, or anything approaching it, a generation before. In Portugal, Dr. Martin Soares, elected premier for the first time in 1976 and President in 1987, under the new and liberal 1992 constitution, gradually steered Portuguese socialism into the free-market camp during the 1980s. There was a similar movement in Spain, where the Socialist Party, under its moderate leader Felipe Gonzales, far from exploiting its landslide victory of 1982, reinforced the enterprise culture which had transformed the Spanish economy during the years 1950-75. In Australia Bob Hawke’s Labour Party, which returned to power in March 1983 and was later re-elected three times, moved consistently towards the Right; indeed in March 1991, Hawke himself made a ringing

³²⁸ Judt, *Postwar*, pp. 543-544.

declaration, warning the country that it could no longer afford to impose irksome restraints on business, for socialist, environmental or any other reasons. In New Zealand, the Labour leader David Lange, who became Prime Minister in 1984, took his party and government in the same direction, though evidently not fast enough for some of his colleagues, who in effect forced his resignation in August 1989, as a result of a right-wing *putsch*. In Britain, following the Labour Party's third successive electoral defeat in 1987, its leader, Neil Kinnock, began the painful process of dropping the traditional Labour policies, and by 1990-1 had made Labour, at least in theory, electable again..."³²⁹

Indeed, it was this continued adherence of western intellectuals to leftist liberal and socialist thinking that was the real reason why Thatcher lost office in 1990: her opposition to the collectivist tendencies of the West Europeans finally came up against the Eurocratic and socialist sympathies of her more powerful colleagues. The State marched on. And the reason was: there was nothing to replace or complement or check it, nothing capable of playing the role assumed by the Church in the Middle Ages.

In the final analysis, the Reagan-Thatcher alliance, important as it was especially in helping to bring the Cold War to an end, was a conservative blip in the history of western civilization, not a revolution, still less a real counter-revolution against the leftist slide that the West had been undergoing for centuries, and especially since the 1930s.

³²⁹ Johnson, *Modern Minds*, pp. 745-746.

27. THE DEBATE OVER HOMOSEXUALITY

In the last quarter of the twentieth century the main moral debate in the United States was over homosexuality and gay rights. As in the debates over Darwinism and abortion, pseudo-science was invoked to undermine Christianity. It was claimed that homosexuality was as natural as heterosexuality, and that there must be a “gay gene”, in spite of the fact that no such gene or combination of genes has been discovered and twin studies indicate that homosexuality is caused by environmental, not genetic factors. Scientific research has not confirmed the thesis that homosexuality is an innate, immutable condition. There have been many cases in which people who have been led to think that they are homosexual, but return quickly and joyfully to the natural order once they have been freed from the unnatural power that controlled them. And this without any “aversion therapy”. While supporters of homosexuality mock this evidence, it is actually very important in demonstrating that homosexuality is by no means natural.

Thus Robert Epstein writes: “In a landmark study published in the *Archives of Sexual Behavior* in October 2003, [Robert L.] Spitzer interviewed 200 men and women who once considered themselves homosexuals but who had lived their lives as heterosexuals for at least five years. Most of the participants had undergone some form of reorientation therapy. In addition to determining whether such therapy actually worked, Spitzer wanted to know just how dramatically people could alter their orientation. To his surprise, most of his subjects not only reported living long-term (more than 10 years) as heterosexuals, they also declared that they had experienced ‘changes in sexual attraction, fantasy and desire’ consistent with heterosexuality. The changes were clear for both sexes...”³³⁰

Again, in the course of eight studies on identical twins carried out in the last twenty years by Dr. N. Whitehead in Australia, the US and Scandinavia, it was discovered, not only that homosexuality is not genetic in origin, but also that it very easily turns back to the natural condition.

“In the identical twin studies, Dr. Whitehead has been struck by how fluid and changeable sexual identity can be.

“Neutral academic surveys show there is substantial change. About half of the homosexual/bisexual population (in a non-therapeutic environment) moves towards heterosexuality over a lifetime. About 3% of the present heterosexual population once firmly believed themselves to be homosexual or bisexual.’

“‘Sexual orientation is not set in concrete,’ he notes.

³³⁰ Robert Epstein, “Do Gays have a Choice?”, *Scientific American Mind*, vol. 20, no. 3, 2009, pp. 66-67.

“Even more remarkable, most of the changes occur without counselling or therapy. ‘These changes are not therapeutically induced, but happen ‘naturally’ in life, some very quickly,’ Dr. Whitehead observes. ‘Most changes in sexual orientation are towards exclusive heterosexuality.’”³³¹

A document entitled “A Christian Understanding of Homosexuality” declares: “The Judeo-Christian view of homosexual behavior was dominant in the cultures of Western nations from the 4th century to the mid-20th – a period of some 1700 years, and also was, officially at least, the view of the Muslim world. Even cultures outside the Abrahamic religions were influenced by their dominant worldview.

“How then, did an almost complete reversal of this understanding occur in little more than a generation?

“It should be emphasized, at the outset, that it had very little to do with science – rather, it has been characterized by the systematic *suppression* of science.

“The roots of the change in popular attitudes are much deeper than the last 50 years. In the 18th century, the writers and philosophers of the Enlightenment largely saw the fallen state of man as *natural*. Associated with this was an increase in religious skepticism, challenging Western culture’s Christian foundations and restraint of man’s passionate impulses. The psychological theories of the late-19th and early- 20th centuries (e.g., those of Sigmund Freud and his contemporaries), following their Enlightenment forbearers, described attempts to curb the spiritual illnesses of fallen human nature as unhealthy ‘repression.’ In the characterization of sociologist Pitirim Sorokin and others, the cultural mentality of the West became increasing ‘sensate’ – that is, one in which truth is drawn exclusively from the senses, and in which pleasure is therefore always the goal, because pleasure is always the (material) good.

“In literature, the years prior to World War I saw few novels with homosexual characters, and in these novels the homosexual characters typically came to a bad end. Following World War I, Hemingway wrote a number of short stories with homosexual characters and themes that may be described as descriptive and cynical in tone, as opposed to cautionary. However, the first novel to deal openly with homosexuality and to achieve wide distribution was Gore Vidal’s *The City and the Pillar*, in 1948. In this novel, Vidal – himself a lifelong homosexual – portrayed overt homosexuality as a natural behavior. Even among the literary establishment of that day, this was too much; major newspapers would not advertise the novel, and magazines blacklisted Vidal’s work for a number of years. Eugene O’Neill’s famous play, *Cat on a Hot Tin Roof*, in 1955, brought an underlying homosexual theme to Broadway, complete with a star-studded cast,

<http://www.redflagnews.com/headlines/identical-twin-studies-prove-homosexuality-is-not-genetic>. See also <http://patdollard.com/2014/12/identical-twin-studies-prove-homosexuality-is-not-genetic/#ehmuFWlQgYU9qyFw.99>.

but this aspect of the play was written out of the 1958 Hollywood film based upon it.

“In the field of scientific research – although perhaps it is now more aptly regarded as science fiction – the *Kinsey Reports* of 1948 and 1953 opened sexual topics for discussion, including homosexuality, that had formerly been taboo. Although Alfred Kinsey’s work is now widely recognized as flawed, it had a significant impact for many years. The notorious 10% figure for the incidence of homosexuality in the general population originates with Kinsey. During the 1970s and 1980s, gay activists quoted this figure as often as possible. (Although one would think that it should have been so thoroughly discredited as to be extinct today, it can be found in contemporary brochures prepared for adolescents questioning their sexuality. Notwithstanding the discrediting of much of his research, Kinsey was treated sympathetically in a 2004 film.)

However, underlying changes in Western culture were laying the foundation for a major shift in the attitudes of the general public. Although couples had long controlled their fertility with various prophylactic devices, the introduction of oral contraception in 1960 contributed to the separation of procreation and sex in the mind of the public. The affluence and leisure of the post-war period facilitated pleasure-seeking in all its forms. And although nominal religious observance remained strong through the mid-1960s, at least in America, there was a significant ‘social’ dimension to this participation, which masked a strong current of theological liberalism and the decay of traditional religious belief.

“These intellectual and social currents contributed to what is usually referred to as the ‘sexual revolution’ of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. These trends led to an increase in divorce, premarital sex, and abortion, and also paved the way for the mainstreaming of homosexuality. Popular ‘sex manuals’ (e.g., *The Joy of Sex*, in 1972, followed by *The Joy of Gay Sex*, in 1977) presented sex as a recreational activity to be practiced using an array of techniques, including sodomy. The widespread adoption among heterosexual couples of sexual practices formerly associated principally with homosexuals – for example, oral sex, mutual masturbation, and anal sex – tended to blur the distinctions between the two in the mind of the public.

“In a broader context, the movement to remove traditional attitudes around homosexuality (and a myriad of other sexual constraints) was part of a larger project, to bring every aspect of traditional culture under sceptical challenge.

“The movement to mainstream homosexuality has been, from the start, a *political* struggle. The start of a formal movement in the United States can be traced to the New York Stonewall Riots of mid-1969. In the 1960s, the New York City Police Department routinely raided bars, bathhouses, and clubs catering to a homosexual clientele, in enforcement of then-current anti-sodomy and public decency laws. Their raid on the Stonewall Inn on June 28, 1969 attracted a large crowd, and the police lost control of the situation. Rioting occurred over several days. This event served as a catalyst, and within six months, two ‘gay rights’

organizations focusing on confrontational tactics and three homosexual periodicals had been founded. The first 'Gay Pride' march was conducted in New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Chicago on June 28, 1970, the first anniversary of the riots. Such events are now held worldwide at this time of year, in commemoration of these events.

"If the Stonewall Riots were the initial catalyst, unquestionably the most significant enabler of the homosexual revolution was the 1973 removal of homosexuality as a psychiatric illness by the American Psychiatric Association (APA). The story of how this occurred is representative of the politicization of science pursued by homosexual activists from the very inception of the movement.

"As an example of the *status quo ante*, in 1963 the New York Academy of Medicine asked its Committee on Public Health to report on the subject of homosexuality. The Committee reported that:

"Homosexuality is indeed an illness. The homosexual is an emotionally disturbed individual who has not acquired the normal capacity to develop satisfying heterosexual relations.

"Significantly, however, the same report also noted that: 'Some homosexuals have gone beyond the plane of defensiveness and now argue that deviancy is a "desirable, noble, preferable way of life."

"In the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* (DSM) of the APA, homosexuality was initially (in 1953) defined as a 'sociopathic personality disturbance'; in the DSM-II of 1968, as a 'sexual deviation.' DSM-II read, in part:

"This category is for individuals whose sexual interest are directed primarily towards objects other than people of the opposite sex, toward sexual acts . . . performed under bizarre circumstances . . . Even though many find their practices distasteful, they remain unable to substitute normal sexual behavior for them.

"No new scientific evidence emerged during the 1960s and early 1970s to contradict these statements. How, then, did the APA come to make such an extraordinary reversal?

'Franklin Kameny, a homosexual activist, said 'I feel that the entire homophile movement . . . is going to stand or fall upon the question of whether or not homosexuality is a sickness, and upon our taking a firm stand on it.' Indeed, it would be difficult to promote a mental illness or pathology as a civil right. Their principal target therefore became the classification in the DSM-II.

"In the absence of supporting scientific evidence, the only possible avenue was political action. This took two forms: internal and external.

"In the early 1970s, open homosexuals were not permitted to practice psychiatry. As a result, homosexual psychiatrists were very closely closeted; not surprisingly, they regarded overturning their professional association's definition of homosexuality as an illness as a most-desired goal. With this in mind, they began to work their way into the upper echelons of the Association.

"In parallel, outside homosexual activist groups began a campaign of disruption against APA meetings and conventions. At the 1970 annual meeting, Gay Liberation Front members disrupted events with what they termed 'guerrilla theater,' in an effort to delegitimize the proceedings. At the 1971 meeting, Kameny stormed the conference at the head of thirty protesters, shouting 'We are here to denounce your authority to call us sick or mentally disordered . . . For us, as homosexuals, your profession is the enemy incarnate.' He followed up this disruption with a letter to the *Psychiatric News* which promised future action, and threatened that if the APA did not change their position on homosexuality, they would act to discredit the entire profession of psychiatry.

"If these sound like storm trooper tactics, this is quite literally true. The co-founder of ACT-UP/DC, Eric Pollard, stated frankly: 'I have helped to create a truly fascist organization. We conspired to bring into existence an activist group that . . . could effectively exploit the media for its own ends, and that would work covertly and break the law with impunity . . . we subscribed to consciously subversive modes, drawn largely from the voluminous *Mein Kampf*, which some of us studied as a working model.'

"Meanwhile, the efforts of the underground homosexual lobby within the APA were beginning to bear fruit. Dr. John P. Spiegel became president-elect of the APA in 1973. Dr. Spiegel was a homosexual so carefully closeted that his own family did not suspect it until he revealed it on his 70th birthday. In fact, Spiegel had for some time been leading a covert group of activists within the APA, some of whom began referring to themselves informally as the GayPA. They had facilitated the disruptive activities of outside agitators by providing press passes that gave them access to APA meetings.

"At the 1973 Honolulu meeting, Dr. Robert Spitzer, head of the APA's committee on nomenclature, was convinced by a meeting with homosexual activists to draft a change to language in the DSM. The key phrase in the forthcoming DSM-III would be that 'Homosexuality *per se* is one form of sexual behavior and, like other forms of sexual behavior which are not by themselves psychiatric disorders, is not listed in this nomenclature of mental disorders.'

"The sole caveat to this change was that homosexuals who were unhappy with their same-sex attraction could still be diagnosed with 'ego-dystonic homosexuality.' Even this caveat would be removed in 1987, in the DSM-III Revised.

"The new language was submitted simply to a vote of the Board of Trustees, without a single supporting scientific paper. The matter was later submitted to a

referendum of the membership, who were lobbied in advance by a letter signed by unidentified GayPA members, and funded and partly written by the National Gay Task Force (NGTF), which had purchased the APA's mailing list. Because a majority of the APA members who responded voted to support the change in the classification of homosexuality, the decision of the Board of Trustees was allowed to stand. But in fact only one-third of the membership did respond. Four years later the journal *Medical Aspects of Human Sexuality* conducted a survey of the membership, which reported that 69% of psychiatrists disagreed with the vote, and still considered homosexuality a disorder.

"As lesbian activist Barbara Gittings put it, 'It never was a medical decision – and that's why I think the action came so fast. After all, it was only three years from the time that feminists and gays first zapped the APA at a behavior therapy session to the time that the Board of Trustees voted in 1973 to approve removing homosexuality from the list of mental disorders. It was a political move.'

"Dr. Charles Socarides, a psychoanalyst in the field of homosexual treatment, noted that the decision 'involved the out-of-hand and peremptory disregard and dismissal not only of hundreds of psychiatric and psychoanalytic research papers and reports but also of a number of other serious studies by groups of psychiatrists, psychologists, and educators over the past seventy years.'" The 1973 APA decision, he said, 'remains a chilling reminder that if scientific principles are not fought for, they can be lost – a disillusioning warning that unless we make no exceptions to science, we are subject to the snares of political factionalism and the propagation of untruths to an unsuspecting and uninformed public.

"The decision appalled even some liberal psychiatrists. Drs. Rogers Wright and Nicholas Cummings noted that it was 'the first time in the history of healthcare that a diagnosis or lack of diagnosis was decided by popular vote rather than scientific evidence.' Even a supporter of the homosexual cause, Professor Ronald Bayer, commented: 'The entire process, from the first confrontation organized by gay demonstrators at psychiatric conventions to the referendum demanded by orthodox psychiatrists, seemed to violate the most basic expectation about how questions of science should be resolved. Instead of being engaged in a sober consideration of data, psychiatrists were swept up in a political controversy . . . The result was not a conclusion based on an approximation of the scientific truth as dictated by reason, but was instead an action demanded by the ideological temper of the times.'

"The American Psychological Association followed suit in 1975, and today states, as a 'scientific fact', that 'being gay is just as healthy as being straight', and that 'same-sex sexual attraction, behavior, and orientation *per se* are normal and positive variance of human sexuality.'"

28. AIDS AND THE TYRANNY OF SCIENCE

The debate over homosexuality was greatly influenced by the outbreak of an epidemic called "Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome" (AIDS), which may or

may not have been caused by “Human Immunodeficiency Virus” (HIV). In 1986 Dr. Anthony Fauci, the head of the US government agency NIAID (the National Institute for Allergic and Infectious Diseases), which controlled vast funds for scientific research, insisted that HIV was the cause of AIDS, and that he had found the cure, an extremely toxic and expensive chemical called AZT. Fauci, who was in financial cahoots with Big Pharma, and especially with the British company Wellcome (now Glaxo-Smith-Kline), which manufactured AZT, used his considerable political influence with the regulatory authorities, and his scientific influence with certain corrupt virologists, particularly Dr. Robert Gallo, to prevent the development of other promising – and far less expensive – treatments of AIDS that did not presume its link with a virus like HIV. This caused a political storm in Congress and among AIDS sufferers and their doctors.

Robert F. Kennedy, the son of the famous president, writes: “The loudest, most influential, and persistent challenge to the thesis that HIV might not be the only cause of AIDS came from Dr. Peter Duesberg, who in 1987 enjoyed a reputation as the world’s most accomplished and insightful retrovirologist. Specifically, Dr. Duesberg accuses Dr. Fauci of committing mass murder with AZT, the deadly chemical concoction that according to Duesberg causes – and never cures – the constellations of immune suppression that we now call “AIDS.” But Duesberg’s critique goes deeper than his revulsion for AZT. Duesberg argues that HIV does not cause AIDS but is simply a “free rider” common to high-risk populations who suffer immune suppression due to environmental exposures. While HIV may be sexually transmittable, Duesberg argues, AIDS is not. Duesberg famously offered to inject himself with HIV-tainted blood “so long as it doesn’t come from Gallo’s lab.” For starters, Duesberg points out that HIV is seen in millions of healthy individuals who never develop AIDS. Conversely, there are thousands of known AIDS cases in patients who are not demonstrably infected with HIV. Dr. Fauci has never been able to explain these phenomena, which are inconsistent with the pathogenesis of any other infectious disease.

“Many other prominent and thoughtful scientists have offered a variety of well-reasoned hypotheses to explain these baffling fissures in the HIV orthodoxy. Most of these alternative conjectures accept that HIV plays a role in the onset of AIDS but argue that there must be other cofactors, a qualifier that Dr. Fauci and a handful of his diehard PIs [Principal Investigators] stubbornly deny.

“Prior to advancing his own theory for the etiology of AIDS, Duesberg methodically laid out the logical flaws in Dr. Fauci’s HIV/AIDS hypothesis in a ground-breaking 1987 article in *Cancer Research*. Dr. Fauci has never answered Duesberg’s common-sense questions.

“In his subsequent book, *Inventing the AIDS Virus*, Duesberg, in 724 riveting pages, expands his dissection of the hypothesis’s flaws and outlines his own explanation for the etiology of AIDS.

“For those subsumed in the theology that HIV is the sole cause of AIDS, Dr. Duesberg’s critiques seem so outlandish that they automatically debase anyone

who even considers them. It's telling, then, to discover how much traction his arguments have among the world's most thoughtful and brilliant scientists, including many Nobel laureates, perhaps most notably Luc Montagnier, who first isolated HIV. To date, Dr. Fauci has been able to silence but not to answer or to refute Duesberg's thesis.

"I restate that I take no side in this dispute. It seems undeniable to me that the dissidents have raised legitimate queries that should be researched, debated, and explored. I believe public health officials have a duty to answer these sorts of questions, and I yearn to hear those arguments in an energized debate; Dr. Fauci's aggressive censorship campaign and his refusal to debate arouse my suspicion and my ire. It brings to mind George R. R. Martin's observation that entrenched powers remove men's tongues not to prevent them from telling lies, but to stop them from speaking the truth.

"If any of Dr. Duesberg's revelations are solid, his story has momentous relevance today—as the removal of his tongue illustrates the capacity of the pharmaceutical cartel, in league with self-interested technocrats, to exaggerate and exploit viral pandemics, to foist toxic and dangerous remedies onto a credulous public, and promote self-serving agendas—even those with terrible outcomes—with the complicity of a fawning and scientifically illiterate media. Duesberg and others charge that by stifling debate and dissent, Dr. Fauci milled public fear into multi-billion-dollar profits for his Pharma partners while expanding his own powers and authoritarian control. The resulting policies, they say, have caused calamity to global economies and public health, and vastly expanded the pool of human suffering."³³²

Whatever the exact nature and extent of the links between AIDS and homosexual and bisexual behaviours, it was clearly folly for society as a whole to reject the obvious precaution of condemning and abstaining from the disease-transmitting behaviours, such as homosexuality and bisexuality. "As a result," writes Niall Ferguson, "AIDS has now killed thirty-two million people around the world. At the height of the epidemic, in 2005-6, fifteen years after the death of [gay pop-star] Freddie Mercury, nearly two million people a year were dying of AIDS.

"... HIV/AIDS moved at a snail's pace contrary to the prophecies of many doomsayers. Why, then, was the national and international response so ineffectual? According to the San Francisco-based journalist Randy Shilts, who himself died of AIDS in 1994, it was because of a systemic failure: in the United States, the medical and public health bodies, federal and private scientific research establishments, the mass media, and the gay community's leadership all failed to respond in the ways they should have"³³³ - the most important of which was abstinence from perverted sexual practices and the outright condemning of homosexuality...

³³² Kennedy, *The Real Anthony Fauci*, 2021, pp. 350-351.

³³³ Ferguson, *Doom. The Politics of Catastrophe*, London: Allen Lane, 2021, p. 239.

By allowing the disease to move at a snail's pace, God was mercifully giving men time to repent and change their behaviour, increasing the fear of God in those whose consciences were not completely seared (I Timothy 4.2). But western society was no longer willing to provide the most effective preventive measure: unequivocal public condemnation of homosexuality and sexual promiscuity in general by opinion-leaders in Church and State. Society (outside some African states) had long ago lost the fear of God, and the fear of eternal damnation unequivocally pronounced by the Word of God for the sin of homosexuality (Romans 1; I Corinthians 6.19).

And now the fear of men – the fear, not only of coming down with the disease, but also of condemning such a popular sin, and of finding oneself isolated and condemned in the court of public opinion – took hold of society...

*

The Fauci AIDS scam, and the many other scams and frauds he has been involved in, has culminated in the contemporary covid-19 scam, where, as in the 1980s, a scientific cabal led yet again by Fauci has been allowed to kill millions of people, undermining the world's economy by a mixture of (1) inventing a new virus, (2) banning the use of cheap, simple and well-tested remedies such as ivermectin that could have stopped the epidemic a long time ago, (3) convincing world elites and governments to introduce entirely unsuitable and terribly damaging methods of stopping the spread of the infection, and (4) forcing through a semi-mandatory "vaccine" regime that is a completely novel and untested form of gene therapy which is more dangerous to health than the disease it pretends to cure. But the most serious consequence of the scam is that it constitutes a still more serious assault on liberty and truth than that presented by Soviet power: *the tyranny of science and scientism in the modern age*.

The best-known historical examples of the tyranny of science have been in the totalitarian regimes of Hitler (Aryan eugenics) and Stalin (Marxism, Lysenkoism, Soviet psychiatry). This has led to the false conclusion that true science can flourish only in democratic regimes. But the flourishing of such false theories as Darwinism and Faucian virology precisely in the most democratic of countries shows that free speech can be subverted by ruthless and skilful pseudo-scientific cabals that know how to use the power and money given to them by elected governments, agencies, universities and corporations to gain still more money and power – Faustian Fauci has the biggest salary in the US government, plus huge kickbacks from Big Pharma and those he patronizes).

Many true scientists have been appalled at the way in which these cabals have been used by science administrators to suppress free speech and their "heretical" opponents.

The authority given in previous ages to religion has been transferred to science. This is the authority of *certain knowledge*, which in the past was attributed only to

God (“let God be true, but every man a liar” (Romans 3.4)) and “the Church of the living God, the pillar and foundation of the truth” (I Timothy 3.15) and the only true collective depository of certain knowledge. Individuals, it was believed, could acquire certain knowledge only by belonging to the Church, where they would receive “the faith once given to the saints” (Jude 3), a faith that is not knowledge of transitory, material things but “the substance [the Greek word here is *hypothesis*, understood in a pre-scientific sense] of things hoped for, the evidence [*elegkos*] of things not seen” (Hebrews 11.1).

To the neo-Faustians/Faucians of today, however, *real, certain* knowledge is attributed only to “the scientific consensus”. But “the scientific consensus” is another idol; *certain* knowledge is never given to scientists, whether individually or collectively, who study only transitory, material things through the prism of their fallen, corrupted minds. The best any scientist can do is put forward more or less *uncertain hypotheses*, about which consensus is unattainable or, if attained, irrelevant. For, as novelist and physician Dr. Michael Crichton observed, “Consensus is the business of politics. Science, on the contrary, requires only one investigator who happens to be right, which means that he or she has results that are verifiable by reference to the real world. In science consensus is irrelevant. The greatest scientists in history are great precisely because they broke with the consensus. There is no such thing as consensus science. If it’s consensus, it isn’t science. If it’s science, it isn’t consensus. Period.”³³⁴

However, the high priests of modern science (as prophesied in Dostoyevsky’s apocalyptic novel, *The Devils*) anoint certain scientists, such as Darwin, or certain scientific administrators, such as Fauci, with the charisma of infallibility, as the oracles of “the scientific consensus”. Following their self-appointed spiritual leaders, the multitudes and the nations and the governments all bow down before the new Babylonian idol with a serpent inside, this repository of many small truths and some very large falsehoods – but never of *certain knowledge*. They do this because they have come to believe in the Lord Chancellor of England Francis Bacon’s famous saying: “*knowledge is power*”. In his utopian novel *New Atlantis* (1627) Bacon envisaged a collective body of scientists taking the place of individual geniuses and having real *power*, a power greater than that of kings and rulers. Now, in our day, his dystopian dream would appear to have come true...

December 30 / January 12, 2021/2022.

29. THE CHICAGO SCHOOL AND THE THIRD WORLD

While Friedman’s economics influenced Reagan and Thatcher, it was not in the UK and the USA that his policies were carried out in a more than very partial manner. The reason was obvious: such radicalism was politically unfeasible in the English-speaking world. The necessary consensus was lacking, as was a

³³⁴ Crichton, in Kennedy, op. cit., p. 348.

disaster so great that it could silence opposition to radical change. Moreover, we can see in the relatively mild variety of Friedman's economics that we have called the Reagan-Thatcher "correction" some important positive side-effects. Thus it gave Western Democracy a much-needed psychological fillip in its struggle with Communism, renewing its faith in the righteousness of the struggle, which had been badly shaken during the 1970s. Indeed, the moral capitulation of the West at Helsinki was, if not wiped out, at any rate on the way to being reversed and redeemed. For now the two Anglo-Saxon politicians together with the Polish Pope not only succeeded in "containing" Soviet expansionism (the aim of western leaders since the late 1940s): they went onto the offensive, showing themselves – unlike their predecessors in the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and the Prague Spring of 1968 – as being not ashamed to interfere in Eastern Europe for the sake of the freedom of its peoples from Communism.

And so the flaws of Friedmanite economics only became clear later as their consequences came to be applied in other countries such as Poland, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Russia. For since its first experimental application in Pinochet's Chile in 1973, as Naomi Klein points out, it has become clear that Friedman's three main principles – "privatization, deregulation of government spending and deep cuts to social spending"³³⁵ – have tended to be applied when a special opportunity arises – that is, when a country has just been through a major shock (a war, a tsunami, a stock market crash), – and then have proceeded to take advantage of the people's trauma to apply still more – and, as often as not quite unnecessary shocks. It is not that "all forms of market systems are inherently violent", writes Klein – "markets need not be fundamentalist".³³⁶ But Friedman's economics, as applied by neoconservative politicians *was* fundamentalist. For on the "clean slate" created by the initial disaster it forces the already deeply traumatized society through a process of massive economic and social engineering that literally tear it to pieces. Thus "its main characteristics are huge transfers of public wealth to private hands, often accompanied by exploding debt, an ever-widening chasm between the dazzling rich and the disposable poor and an aggressive nationalism that justifies bottomless spending on security. But because of the obvious drawbacks for the vast majority of the population left outside the bubble, other features of the corporatist state tend to include aggressive surveillance (once again, with government and large corporations trading favors and contracts), mass incarceration, shrinking civil liberties and often, though not always, torture."³³⁷

Klein summarizes her thesis: "This fundamentalist form of capitalism has consistently been midwived by the most brutal forms of coercion, inflicted on the collective body politic as well as on countless individual bodies."³³⁸ While she may have somewhat overstated her thesis with regard to torture, Klein has undoubtedly built up a powerful case that Friedman's "shock doctrine" has

³³⁵ Klein, *The Shock Doctrine*, London: Penguin, 2007, p. 7.

³³⁶ Klein, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

³³⁷ Klein, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

³³⁸ Klein, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

indeed been a shock and torture for many people in many countries where it has been applied. Indeed, she draws powerful analogies between Friedman's "shock doctrine" in economics and Cameron's behaviourist psychotherapy, which employed electric shock among other tortures. Both sciences coercively reduce their subjects to a primitive "tabula rasa" before restructuring them "from scratch".

"Thus Friedman's mission, like Cameron's, rested on a dream of reaching back to a state of 'natural health', when all was in balance, before human interferences created distorting patterns. Where Cameron dreamed of returning the human mind to that pristine state, Friedman dreamed of depatterning societies, of returning them to a state of pure capitalism, cleansed of all interruptions – government regulations, trade barriers and entrenched interests. Also like Cameron, Friedman believed that when the economy is highly distorted, the only way to reach that prelapsarian state was to deliberately inflict painful shocks: only 'bitter medicine' could clear these distortions and bad patterns out of the way. Cameron used electricity to inflict his shocks, Friedman's tool of choice was policy – the shock treatment approach he urged on bold politicians for countries in decline. Unlike Cameron, however, who was able to instantly apply his pet theories on his unwitting patients, Friedman would need two decades and several twists and turns of history before he too got the chance to put his dream of radical erasure and creation into action in the real world...

"A large part of the appeal of Chicago School economics was that, at a time when radical left ideas about workers' power were gaining ground around the world, it provided a way to defend the interests of owners that was just as radical and was infused with its own claims to idealism [and scientism]. To hear Friedman tell it, his ideas were not about defending the right of factory owners to pay low wages but, rather, all about a quest for the purest possible form of 'participatory democracy' because in the free market, 'each man can vote, as it were, for the color of the tie he wants'. Where leftists promised freedom for workers from bosses, citizens from dictatorship, countries from colonialism, Friedman promised 'individual freedom', a project that elevated atomized citizens above any collective enterprise and liberated them to express their absolute free will through their consumer choices. 'What was particularly exciting were the same qualities that made Marxism so appealing to many other young people at the time,' recalled the economist Daon Patinkin, who studied at Chicago in the forties – 'simplicity together with apparent logical completeness, idealism combined with radicalism'. The Marxists had their workers' utopia, and the Chicagoans had their entrepreneurs' utopia, both claiming that if they got their way, perfection and balance would follow.

"The question, as always, was how to get to that wondrous place from here. The Marxists were clear: revolution – get rid of the current system, replace it with socialism. For the Chicagoans, the answer was not as straightforward. The United States was already a capitalist country, but as far as they were concerned, just barely. In the U.S., and in all supposedly capitalist economies, the Chicagoans saw interference everywhere. To make products more affordable, politicians

fixed prices; to make workers less exploited, they set minimum wages; to make sure everyone had access to education, they kept it in the hands of the state. These measures often seemed to help people, but Friedman and his colleagues were convinced – and they ‘proved’ it with their models – that they were actually doing untold harm to the equilibrium of the market and the ability of various signals to communicate with each other. The mission of the Chicago School was thus one of purification – stripping the market of these interruptions so that the free market could sing.

“For this reason, Chicagoans did not see Marxism as their true enemy. The real source of the trouble was to be found in the ideas of the Keynesians in the United States, the social democrats in Europe and the developmentalists in what was then called the Third World. These were believers not in a utopia but in a mixed economy, to Chicago eyes an ugly hodgepodge of capitalism for the manufacture and distribution of consumer products, socialism in education, state ownership for essentials like water services, and all kinds of laws designed to temper the extremes of capitalism. Like the religious fundamentalist who has a grudging respect for fundamentalists of other faiths and for avowed atheists but disdain for the casual believer, the Chicagoans declared war on these mix-and-match economists. What they wanted was not a revolution exactly but a capitalist Reformation: a return to uncontaminated capitalism...

“Though always clothed in the language of math and science, Friedman’s vision coincided precisely with the interests of large multinationals, which by nature hunger for vast new unregulated markets. In the first state of capitalist expansion, that kind of ravenous growth was provided by colonialism – by ‘discovering’ new territories and grabbing land without compensating local populations. Friedman’s war on the ‘welfare state’ and ‘big government’ held out the promise of a new font of rapid riches – only this time, rather than conquering new territory, the state itself would be the new frontier, its public services and assets auctioned off for far less than they were worth...”³³⁹

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The multinationals by definition owed no loyalty to any individual government or nation-state. If it was more profitable to move factories from one country to another, they did so, whatever the devastating effects of the move on the original home of the industry. And there was very little that governments could do to stop them; even collecting taxes from the multinationals often proved problematic. Everything was subordinate to the demand of the global market and its players, the multinational corporations. The nation-state seemed destined to wither away...

The first country which clearly demonstrated the catastrophic results of Friedman’s economics was *Bolivia*, where the disaster necessary to bring in the Chicago boys had taken place. For in 1985 inflation had reached 14,000 percent

³³⁹ Klein, op. cit., pp. 50, 52-53, 59.

and the interest on its debt was greater than the entire national budget. To “normalize” the situation, a doctor prepared to administer shock therapy, the Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, was found. Though not an “orthodox” Friedmanite, he would provide perhaps the clearest example so far of what Friedmanism really meant; for, as he said to the Bolivian-American Chamber of Commerce, with a policy jolt, “an economy can be reoriented from a dead end, a dead end of socialism or a dead end of mass corruption or a dead end of central planning, to a normal market economy”.

When Victor Paz Esterissoro, a former nationalist, became President of Bolivia he adopted Sachs’ plan for, and within seventeen days of furious – and top secret – activity his planning minister had the draft, as Klein writes, “of a textbook shock therapy program. It called for the elimination of food subsidies, the cancelling of almost all price controls and a 300 percent hike in the price of oil. Despite the fact that life was about to get a lot more expensive in an already desperately poor country, the plan froze government wages at their already low levels for a year. It also called for deep cuts to government spending, flung open Bolivia’s borders to unrestricted imports and called for a downsizing of state companies, the precursor to privatization. Bolivia had missed the neoliberal revolution imposed on the rest of the Southern Cone in the seventies; now it was going to make up for lost time.

“When the members of the emergency team had finished drafting the new laws, they still weren’t ready to share them with Bolivia’s elected representatives, let alone the voters, who had never cast their ballots for such a plan. They had one more task to complete. As a group, they drove over to the office of the International Monetary Fund’s representative in Bolivia and told him what they were planning to do. His response was at once encouraging and harrowing. ‘This is what every official at the IMF has dreamed about. But if it doesn’t work, luckily I have diplomatic immunity and I can catch a plane and flee.’

“The Bolivians preparing the plan had no such escape hatch, and several were terrified of how the public was going to react. ‘They are going to kill us,’ predicted Fernando Prado, the youngest member of the group. Bedregal, the plan’s main author, attempted to stiffen spirits by comparing the team to fighter pilots attacking an enemy. ‘We have to be like the pilot of Hiroshima. When he dropped the atomic bomb, he didn’t know what he was doing, but when he saw the smoke he said: “Oops, sorry!” And that’s exactly what we have to do, launch the measures and then: “Oops, sorry!”’

“The idea that policy change should be like launching a surprise military attack is a recurring theme for economic shock therapists. In *Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance*, the U.S. military doctrine published in 1996 that eventually formed the basis of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the authors state that the invading force should ‘seize control over the environment and paralyze or so overload an adversary’s perceptions and understanding of events so that the enemy would be incapable of resistance.’ Economic shock works according to a similar theory: the premise is that people can develop responses to gradual change – a slashed health

program here, a trade deal there – but if dozens of changes come from all directions at once, a feeling of futility sets in, and populations go limp.

“Hoping to induce that sense of hopelessness, the Bolivian planners required all their radical measures to be adopted at the same time, and all within the first hundred days of the new government. Rather than presenting each section of the plan as its own individual law (the new tax code, the new pricing law and so on), Paz’s team insisting on bundling the entire revolution into a single executive decree, D.S. 21060. It contained 220 separated laws and covered every aspect of economic life in the country, making it the equivalent, in scope and ambition, to ‘The Brick’, the hefty blueprint written by the Chicago Boys in preparation for Pinochet’s coup. According to its authors, the entire program had to be accepted or rejected, it couldn’t be amended. It was the economic equivalent of Shock and Awe.

“When the document was complete, the team made five copies: one for Paz, one for Goni [head of the emergency team] and one for the treasury minister. The destination of the other two copies revealed how certain Paz and his team were that many Bolivians would regard the plan as an act of war: one was for the head of the army, and the other was for the chief of police. Paz’s cabinet, however, was still in the dark. They continued to be under the mistaken impression that they were working for the same man who had nationalized the mines and distributed land all those years ago.

“Three weeks after being sworn in as president, Paz finally called his cabinet together to let them in on the surprise he had in store. He ordered the doors closed to the governing chambers and ‘instructed the secretaries to hold all of the ministers’ telephone calls’. Bedregal read the full sixty pages to the stunned audience. He was so nervous, he confessed, that he ‘even got a nosebleed only minutes later’. Paz informed his cabinet members that the decree was not up for debate; in yet another backroom deal, he had already secured support from Banzer’s right-wing opposition party. If they disagreed, he said, they could resign.

“‘I don’t agree,’ announced the minister of industry.

“‘Please leave,’ Paz replied. The minister stayed. With inflation still soaring and strong hints that a shock therapy approach would be rewarded with significant financial aid from Washington, no one dared leave. Two days later, in a televised presidential address titled ‘Bolivia is Dying’, Paz dropped Bolivia’s ‘Brick’ on a completely unsuspecting public.

“Sachs was correct in predicting that price increases would end hyperinflation. Within two years, inflation was down to 10 percent, impressive by any standard. The broader legacy of Bolivia’s neoliberal revolution is far more contentious. All economists agree that rapid inflation is enormously damaging, unsustainable and must be controlled – a process that imposes significant pain during the adjustment. The debate is over how a credible program can be

achieved, as well as who, in any given society, is forced to bear the brunt of that pain. Ricardo Grinspun, a professor of economics specializing in Latin America in York University, that an approach in the Keynesian or developmentalist tradition seeks to mobilize support and share the burden through 'a negotiated process involving key stakeholders – government, employees, farmers, unions and so on. In this way, the parties come to agreements over income policies, like wages and prices, at the same time that stabilization measures are implemented.' In sharp contrast, says Grinspun, 'the orthodox approach is to shift all the social cost onto the poor through shock therapy.' That, he told me, is precisely what happened in Bolivia...

"Just as Friedman had promised in Chile, free trade was supposed to create jobs for the newly jobless. It didn't, and the unemployment rate increased from 20 percent at the time of the elections to between 25 and 50 percent two years later. The state mining corporation alone – the same one that Paz had nationalized in the 1950s – was downsized from twenty-eight thousand employees to just six thousand.

"The minimum wage never recovered its value, and two years into the program, real wages were down 40 percent, at one point they would drop 70 percent. In 1985, the years of shock therapy, the per person capital average income in Bolivia was \$845; two years later it had fallen to \$789. This is the measure used by Sachs and the government, and despite the lack of progress it conveys, it does not begin to capture the degradation of daily life for many Bolivians. Average income is derived by adding up the country's total income and dividing it by the number of people in the country; it glosses over the fact that shock therapy in Bolivia had the same effects that it had in the rest of the region: a small elite grew far wealthier while large portions of what had been the working class were discarded from the economy altogether and turned into surplus people. In 1987, Bolivian peasants, known as campesinos, were earning, on average, just \$140 a year, less than one-fifth of the 'average income'. That is the problem with measuring only the 'average': it effectively erases those sharp divisions.

"A leader of the peasants' union explained that 'the government's statistics don't reflect the growing number of families forced to live in tents; the thousands of malnourished kids who get only a piece of bread and a cup of tea a day, the hundreds of campesinos who have come to the capital in search of work and end up begging on the streets.' That was the hidden story of Bolivia's shock therapy: hundreds of thousands of full-time jobs with pensions were eliminated, replaced with precarious ones with no protection at all. Between 1983 and 1988, the number of Bolivians eligible for social security dropped by 61 percent.

"Sachs, who returned to Bolivia as an adviser in the midst of the transition, opposed raising salaries to keep up with the price of food and gasoline and instead favoured an emergency fund to help the hardest hit – a Band-Aid on what had become a gaping wound. Sachs returned to Bolivia as Paz Estenssoro's request and was working directly for the president. He is remembered as an unyielding presence. According to Goni (who would later become president of

Bolivia), Sachs helped to stiffen the resolve of policy makers when public pressure was building against the human cost of shock therapy. 'In his visits [Sachs] said, "Look, all this gradualist stuff, it just doesn't work. When it really gets out of control, you've got to stop it, like a medicine. You've got to take some radical steps, otherwise your patient is going to die.'"

"One immediate result of this resolve was that many of Bolivia's desperately poor were pushed to become coca growers, because it paid roughly ten times as much as other crops (somewhat of an irony since the original economic crisis was set off by the U.S.-funded siege on the coca farmers). By 1989, an estimated one in ten workers were turning to work in some aspect of the coca or cocaine industries. These workers would include the family of Exo Morales, future president of Bolivia and a former leader of the militant coca growers' union.

"The coca industry played a significant role in resuscitating Bolivia's economy and beating inflation (a fact now recognized by historians but never mentioned by Sachs in explanation of how his reforms triumphed over inflation). Just two years after the 'atomic bomb', illegal drug exports were generating more income for Bolivia than all its legal exports combined, and an estimate 350,000 people were earning a living in some facet of the drug trade. 'For now,' a foreign banker observed, 'the Bolivian economy is hooked on cocaine.'"³⁴⁰

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In this period, several Latin American countries were emerging from under the yoke of military dictatorships. However, they now exchanged political oppression for economic slavery. And the cause was - *debt*. There were two main causes for the huge escalation in debt. The first was that the dictators had borrowed heavily to spend on armaments and a modern security apparatus. And the second was what came to be known as "the Volcker Shock".

Klein writes: "Economists used this term to describe the impact of the decision made by Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker when he dramatically increased interest rates in the United States, letting them rise as high as 21 percent, reaching a peak in 1981 and lasting through the mid-eighties. In the U.S., rising interest rates led to a wave of bankruptcies, and in 1983 the number of people who defaulted on their mortgages tripled.

"The deepest pain, however, was felt outside the U.S. In developing countries carrying heavy debt loads, the Volcker shock - also known as the 'debt shock' or the 'debt crisis' - was like a giant Taser gun fired from Washington, sending the developing world into convulsions. Soaring interest rates meant higher interest payments on foreign debts, and often the higher payments could only be met by taking on more loans. The debt spiral was born. In Argentina, the already huge debt of \$45 billion passed on by the junta grew rapidly until it reached \$65 billion in 1989, a situation reproduced in poor countries around the world. It was after

³⁴⁰ Klein, op. cit., pp. 144-150.

the Volcker Shock that Brazil's debt exploded, doubling from \$50 billion to \$100 billion in six years. Many African countries, having borrowed heavily in the seventies, found themselves in similar straits. Nigeria's debt in the same short time period went from \$9 billion to \$20 billion.

"These were not the only economic shocks zapping the developing world in the eighties. A 'price shock' occurs every time the price of an export commodity like coffee or tin drops by 10 percent or more. According to the IMF, developing countries experienced 25 such shocks between 1981 and 1983; between 1984 and 1987, the height of the debt crisis, they experienced 140 such shocks, pushing them deeper into debt. One hit Bolivia in 1986, the years after it had swallowed Jeffrey Sachs's bitter medicine and submitted to a capitalist makeover. The price of tin, Bolivia's major export other than cocoa, dropped by 85 percent, devastating the country's economy through no fault of its own. (This was precisely the kind of dependence on raw resource exports that developmentalist economics had been trying to transcend in the fifties and sixties – an idea dismissed as 'fuzzy' by the Northern economic establishment.)

"This is where Friedman's crisis theory became self-reinforcing. The more the global economy followed his prescriptions, with floating interest rates, deregulated prices and export-oriented economies, the more crisis-prone the region became, producing more and more of precisely the type of meltdowns he had identified as the only circumstances under which governments would take more of his radical advice.

"In this way, crisis is built into the Chicago School model. When limitless sums of money are free to travel the globe at great speed, and speculators are able to bet on the value of everything from cocoa to currencies, the result is enormous volatility. And, since free-trade policies encourage poor countries to continue to rely on the export of raw resources such as coffee, copper, oil or wheat, they are particularly vulnerable to getting trapped in a vicious circle of continuing crisis. A sudden drop in the price of coffee sends entire economies into depression, which is then deepened by currency traders who, seeing a country's financial downturn, respond by betting against its currency, causing its value to plummet. When soaring interest rates are added, and national debts balloon overnight, you have a recipe for potential economic mayhem.

"Chicago School believers tend to portray the mid-eighties onward as a smooth and triumphant victory march for their ideology: at the same time that countries were joining the democratic wave, they had the collective epiphany that free people and unfettered free markets go hand in hand. That epiphany was always fictional. What actually happened is that just as citizens were finally winning their long-denied freedoms, escaping the shock of the torture chambers under the likes of the Philippines' Ferdinand Marcos and Uruguay's Juan Maria Bordaberry, they were hit with a perfect storm of financial shocks – debt shocks, price shocks and currency shocks – created by the increasingly volatile, deregulated global economy.

“Argentina’s experience of how the debt crisis was compounded by their other shocks was, unfortunately, typical. Raul Alfonsin took office in 1983, in the midst of the Volcker Shock, which placed the new government in crisis mode from day one. In 1985, inflation was so bad that Alfonsin was forced to unveil a brand-new currency, the austral, gambling that fresh start would allow him to regain control. Within four years, prices had soared so high that massive food riots broke out, and Argentine restaurants were selling the currency as wallpaper because it was cheaper than paper. In June 1989, with inflation up 203 percent that month alone, and five months before his term was about to expire, Alfonsin gave up: he resigned and called early elections.

“Other options were available to politicians in Alfonsin’s position. He could have defaulted on Argentina’s huge debt. He could have joined with neighbouring governments in the same crisis and formed a debtors’ cartel. These governments could have created a common market based on developmentalist principles, a process that had begun when the region was torn apart by sadistic military regimes. But part of the challenge at the time had to do with the legacy of state terror faced by new democracies. In the eighties and nineties, much of the developing world was in the grip of a kind of terror hangover, free on paper but still cautious and wary. Having finally escaped the darkness of dictatorship, few elected politicians were willing to risk inviting another round of U.S.-supported coups d’état by pushing the very policies that had provoked the coups of the seventies – especially when the military officials who had staged them were, for the most part, not in prison but, having negotiated immunity, in their barracks, watching.

“Understandably unwilling to go to war with the Washington institutions that owned their debts, crisis-struck new democracies had little choice but to play by Washington’s rules. And then, in the early eighties, Washington’s rules got a great deal stricter. That’s because the debt shock coincided precisely, and not coincidentally, with a new era in North-South relations, one that would make military dictatorships largely unnecessary. It was the dawn of the era of ‘structural adjustment’ – otherwise known as the dictatorship of debt...”³⁴¹

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The change was made possible by a distortion of the original purpose of the institutions created in 1944 to help countries in financial difficulties – the IMF and the World Bank. The original idea was explained by Klein: “The World Bank would make long-term investments to development to pull countries out of poverty, while the IMF would act as a kind of global shock absorber, promoting economic policies that reduced financial speculation and market volatility. When a country looked as though it was falling into crisis, the IMF would leap in with stabilizing rents and loans, thereby preventing crises before they occurred. The two institutions, located across the street from each other in Washington, would coordinate their responses.

³⁴¹ Klein, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-161.

“John Maynard Keynes, who headed the U.K. delegation, was convinced that the world had finally recognized the political perils of leaving the market to regulate itself. ‘Few believed it possible,’ Keynes said at the conference’s end. But if the institutions stayed true to their founding principles, ‘the brotherhood of man will have become more than a phrase’.

“The IMF and the World Bank did not live up to that universal vision: from the start they allocated power not on the basis of ‘one country, one vote’, like the UN General Assembly, but rather on the state of each country’s economy – an arrangement that gave the United States an effective veto over all major decisions, with Europe and Japan controlling most of the rest. That meant that when Reagan and Thatcher came to power in the eighties, their highly ideological administrations were essentially able to harness the two institutions for their own ends, increasing their power and turning them into the primary vehicles for the advancement of the corporatist crusade.

“The colonization of the World Bank and the IMF by the Chicago School was a largely unspoken process, but it became official in 1989 when John Williamson unveiled what he called ‘the Washington Consensus’. It was a list of economic policies that he and both institutions now considered the bare minimum for economic health – ‘the common core of wisdom embraced by all serious economists’. These policies, masquerading as technical and uncontentious, included such bald ideological claims as all ‘state enterprises should be privatized’ and ‘barriers impeding the entry of foreign firms should be abolished’. When the list was complete, it made up nothing less than Friedman’s neoliberal triumvirate of privatization, deregulation/free trade and drastic cuts in government spending. These were the policies, Williamson said, ‘that were being urged on Latin America by the powers-that-be in Washington’. Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist of the World Bank and one of the last holdouts against the new orthodoxy, wrote that ‘Keynes would be rolling over in his grave were he to see what has happened to his child.’

“Officials with the World Bank and the IMF had always made policy recommendations when they handed out loans, but in the early eighties, emboldened by the desperation of developing countries, those recommendations morphed into radical free-market demands. When crisis-struck countries came to the IMF seeking debt relief and emergency loans, the fund responded with sweeping shock therapy programs, equivalent in scope to ‘The Brick’ drafted by the Chicago Boys for Pinochet and the 220-law decree cooked up in Goni’s living room in Bolivia.

“The IMF issued its first full-fledged ‘structural adjustment’ program in 1983. For the next two decades, every country that came to the fund for a major loan was informed that it needed to revamp its economy from top to bottom. Davison Budhoo, an IMF senior economist who designed structural adjustment programs in Latin America and Africa throughout the eighties, admitted later that ‘everything we did from 1983 onward was based on our new sense of mission to

have the south “privatized” or die; towards this end we ignominiously created economic bedlam in Latin America and Africa in 1983-1988’.”³⁴²

³⁴² Klein, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-164.

30. ROCOR'S ANATHEMA AGAINST ECUMENISM

On November 1, 1981 the Russian Church Abroad led by Metropolitan Philaret of New York officially glorified the Holy New Martyrs and Confessors of Russia, headed by Tsar-Martyr Nicholas in New York. Shortly afterward three very important Church events took place: the secret consecration to the episcopate in Moscow of the Catacomb Church hierarch Lazar (Zhurbenko) of Tambov by a bishop of ROCOR, the appearance of the wonderworking "Montreal" Iveron icon of the Mother of God, and (in 1983) the anathema against ecumenism.

"In 1982," declared Archbishop Benjamin of the Black Sea and Kuban in 1993, "soon after the secret consecration of Vladyka Lazar, in Montreal in Canada, the newly-painted image of the Iveron icon of the Mother of God, universally known as the "Montreal", began to gush myrrh abundantly, which was undoubtedly a clear [sign of] the protection and blessing of the Mother of God on the historical event of great spiritual importance that had taken place. Later, at the urging of the Mother of God, the keeper of the wonder-working Icon, the servant of God Jose Munos, made an exact copy of the holy thing, so as to transfer it to Russia. But when Brother Jose did not know to whom to give it, on the night of August 30 / September 12 1993 [the feast of St. Alexander Nevsky] his spiritual father, the hierarch Leonty of Chile, appeared to him in a dream, in glory and in bishop's vestments with a staff. Vladyka said that the icon should be entrusted to the pillar of the True Church. When Brother Jose asked who that was, the hierarch named Archbishop Lazar. The hierarch also said that the new icon would be glorified with many miracles.

"The special providence and care of God for the Russian True Orthodox Church, as well as the meaning of Brother Jose's vision, was revealed after his martyric death and the mysterious disappearance of the original myrrh-streaming icon of the 'Montreal' myrrh-streaming icon, when the fragrant image of the wonderworking Iveron icon handed over to Archbishop Lazar turned out to be the only one left. This became especially evident after the mysterious 'disappearance' of the Russian Church Abroad itself (in which the wonder-working icon had appeared) and the transfer of the lamp of the True Orthodox Faith and Church back to the Homeland, to Holy Rus', to the True Orthodox Catacomb Church, headed since 1982, through the Providence of God, by Archbishop Lazar."³⁴³

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³⁴³ Address of Archbishop Benjamin and his clergy of the Black Sea – Kuban diocese of the Russian True Orthodox Church (RTOC), March 3, 2009. (http://www.ripc.info/library/doc/obrashchenie-arkhiepiskopa-veniamina-i-dukhovenstva-chernomorsko-kubanskoi-eparkhii-russkoi-istinno-pravosl/?fbclid=IwAR11pMKdLchfxXcrAqG2ynFI5xcMt6_dA_SGM0IgA43Z0TcJPp214mmsJ8o)

In its undermining of the traditions of Christianity, Ecumenism was the religious equivalent of the Chicago economists' shock therapy and free-market economics; and from the early eighties onwards it began to effect a radical revamping of the world's religions. Two ecumenical events combined to elicit a powerful response from the True Orthodox Church. The first took place in 1982, when an inter-denominational eucharist service was composed at a conference in Lima, Peru, in which the Protestant and Orthodox representatives to the WCC agreed that the baptism, eucharist and ordinations of *all* denominations were valid and acceptable.³⁴⁴ The second came in 1983, at the Vancouver General Assembly of the WCC, which began with a pagan rite performed by local Indians and contained prayer services in which Orthodox hierarchs as well as representatives of many non-Christian religions took part. These events indicated that ecumenism had gone well beyond the bounds of inter-Christian friendship and was now into inter-religious merging.

The Vancouver Assembly unanimously approved a statement entitled "My Neighbor's Faith and Mine, Theological Discoveries Through Interfaith Dialogue: A Study Guide" (Geneva: WCC, 1986). After claiming the need "a more adequate theology of religions," the statement declared "that in Jesus Christ, the incarnate Word, the entire human family has been united to God in an irrevocable bond and covenant. The saving presence of God's activity in all creation and human history comes to its focal point in the event of Christ. . . because we have seen and experienced goodness, truth, and holiness among followers of other paths and ways than that of Jesus Christ..., we find ourselves recognizing a need to move beyond a theology which confines salvation to the explicit personal commitment to Jesus Christ."

When the Greek Old Calendarist Metropolitan Gabriel of the Cyclades attempted to address the Vancouver Assembly, he was not allowed to speak by the ecumenists. The *New York Times*, however, published his report, which included the following words: "Modern ecumenism is the reflection of the latest radical, atheistic and anti-Christian anthropomorphism which has as its principle that God is as necessary to man as man is to God. This radical anthropomorphism continues to struggle through the WCC to make the salvific message of Christ simply a servile element of the socio-political and earthly needs of man. Thus it struggles for the actualisation of the unity of the Christian world without Christ, who is 'the Way, the Truth and the Life' of the Church and the faithful. Dogmatic and ethical minimalism, spiritual nihilism, humanistic pacifism and horizontal social activism lead to a union of the Christian world without Christ. So these attempts of the WCC constitute the modern blasphemy of the Holy Spirit *par excellence* and declare a deep crisis of faith in the Western Christian world..."³⁴⁵

³⁴⁴ Archbishop Vitaly, "The 1983 Sobor of Bishops", *Orthodox Christian Witness*, August 20 / September 2, 1984, p. 4.

³⁴⁵ Metropolitan Gabriel, "Orthodox Reactions to the Aims of the World Council of Churches", *The New York Times*, August 16, 1983. Minor changes have been made in the wording of the article, which was obviously translated from the Greek by a non-native English speaker.

The Synod of ROCOR, also meeting in Canada, condemned this latest and most extreme manifestation of ecumenism as follows: "In its decision of 28 July / 10 August, our Council explained that the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia does not participate in the World Council of Churches insofar as the latter attempts to represent those assembled in it, representatives of religions differing in their opinions, as though they had some sort of unity in faith. In reality, though, this very position is a lie, inasmuch as they, members of various confessions and sects, have not given up their points of disagreement with each other, much less with the Orthodox Church, in dogmas and in fundamental attitudes. In the name of unifying formulas, these differences of opinion are not destroyed, but are just set aside. Instead of the unshakable truths of the faith, they try to see only opinions, not obligatory for anyone. In reply to the confession of the one Orthodox Faith, they say together with Pilate: 'What is truth?' And the nominally Orthodox members of the Ecumenical Movement more and more deserve the reproach of the Angel of the Church of Laodicea: 'I know your works: you are neither hot nor cold: O if only you were hot or cold' (Revelation 3.15). A clear manifestation of such false union was the serving of the so-called Lima Liturgy..."

Then the Synod anathematised ecumenism, declaring: "To those who attack the Church of Christ by teaching that Christ's Church is divided into so-called 'branches' which differ in doctrine and way of life, or that the Church does not exist visibly, but will be formed in the future when all 'branches' or sects or denominations, and even religions will be united in one body; and who do not distinguish the priesthood and mysteries of the Church from those of the heretics, but say that the baptism and eucharist of heretics is effectual for salvation; therefore to those who knowingly have communion with these aforementioned heretics or advocate, disseminate, or defend their new heresy of Ecumenism under the pretext of brotherly love or the supposed unification of separated Christians, **Anathema**."³⁴⁶

The Anathema against Ecumenism was welcomed with joy by the True Orthodox not only in ROCOR, but also in Greece and on Mount Athos, and may be considered the single most important ecclesiastical act of the True Orthodox Church in the second half of the twentieth century. For many who had been worried that ROCOR was not being firm and clear enough in her dealings with the ecumenists, it put an end to their doubts for the time being, and reaffirmed their faith in her at a time when the Greek Old Calendarist Church was going through a very difficult period with multiple schisms. Even at the present time, adherence to this decree remains one of the touchstones of True Christianity. Most schisms from the True Church since 1983 have been aimed at undermining its validity in one way or another...

³⁴⁶ "A Contemporary Patristic Document", *Orthodox Christian Witness*, November 14/27, 1983, p. 3; "Encyclical Letter of the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia", *Orthodox Life*, vol. 33, No 6, November-December, 1983, p. 13; Bishop Hilarion of Manhattan, "Answers to Questions Posed by the Faithful of the Orthodox Parish in Somerville, South Carolina", Sunday of the Myrrhbearers, 1992.

Some criticized the anathema for not spelling out precisely which bodies fell under it and were therefore outside the True Church.³⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the implication of this anathema was clear: all Orthodox Churches that were fully participating members of the WCC fell under it.

As I.M. writes: "There is no heresy without heretics and their practical activity. The WCC in its declarations says: The Church confesses, the Church teaches, the Church does this, the Church does that. In this way the WCC witnesses that it does not recognize itself to be simply a council of churches, but the one church. And all who are members of the WCC are members of this one false church, this synagogue of Satan. And by this participation in the WCC all the local Orthodox churches fall under the ROCOR anathema of 1983 and fall away from the True Church. In their number is the Moscow Patriarchate..."³⁴⁸

One ROCOR hierarch rejected the anathema – Archbishop Anthony of Geneva. Since 1974, as we have seen, he had been opposing any hardening of ROCOR's attitude towards "World Orthodoxy". Now he ordered the Paris Mission of ROCOR, led by Archimandrite Ambroise Frontier, to concelebrate with new calendarists, and not with Old Calendarists, when in Greece – which caused the whole mission to leave ROCOR and join the Greek Old Calendarists. He was even accused of concelebrating with Roman Catholics. After the Paris mission left him, Archbishop Anthony began to distribute epistles and "explanations" written by him with the aim of justifying the concelebrations with clergy of the "official churches" that were taking place in his diocese.

Unfortunately, the ROCOR Synod was by now too weak to check his harmful influence... Metropolitan Philaret was the only hierarch willing and able to fight for the True Orthodox confession against Archbishop Anthony. However, he had very few allies in the Synod. Even a conservative such as Bishop Gregory (Grabbe) would not go so far as him. As Bishop Gregory's daughter, Matushka Anastasia Shatilova, recalls: "[Metropolitan Philaret] had especially many quarrels with Archbishop Anthony of Geneva... mainly on ecumenist questions... with the Serbs, the Antiochians and all kinds... Unfortunately, Archbishop Anthony was distinguished for his very sharp character and wrote several very boorish letters, to which the Metropolitan replied a little sharply... Vladyka Gregory was distinguished by somewhat greater diplomacy and was afraid that to speak in this way could create too great problems... [and] restrained the declarations of the Holy Hierarch Philaret concerning the lack of grace in the MP. For example, he used to say: '... tell 60 million Russian people that they are not chrismated, and have been baptized only according to the laymen's rite...' The Metropolitan was prepared to say this, but Vladyka Gregory thought that for the sake of Church construction it would be more correct not to put it so sharply..."

³⁴⁷ "Epi Enos Anathematos" (On An Anathema), *Kirix Gnision Orthodoxon* (Herald of the True Orthodox Christians), February, 1984, pp. 47-56.

³⁴⁸ "Iskazhenie dogmata 'O edinstve Tserkvi' v ispovedaniakh very Sinodom i Soborom Russkoj Pravoslavnoj Tserkvi Zagranitsej" (Distortion of the Dogma 'On the Unity of the Church' in the Confessions of Faith of the Synod and Sobor of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad) (MS).

Metropolitan Philaret died on November 8/21, 1985, the feast of the Holy Archangel Michael. It has been claimed that he was poisoned, but this is disputed by others. In any case, his holy death and incorrupt relics and miracles witnessed to the truth of his confession, and all truly Orthodox Russian Synods since his death in 1985, beginning with the ROCOR Synod under Metropolitan Vitaly in 1998, have reiterated the anathema against ecumenism. This is what the Catacomb Church of Russia and the Old Calendarists of Greece and Romania have always believed. This is the faith of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church.

Years later, however the wording of the anathema was changed by Jordanville to read: "To the blasphemers of the Christian Faith, the ecumenists who say that they do not confess the Orthodox Eastern Church to be One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic, but madly say that the true Church seems to be a combination of various heresies, ANATHEMA!"

Christ Gorman writes: "Ecumenism, at its most fundamental level and as understood by its supposedly Orthodox advocates, teaches that while the Orthodox Church IS the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church of Christ our God, the "fullness" of the One Church (Una Sancta) extends beyond the Orthodox Church, and encompasses, in varying and imprecise degrees, those communities ("churches") that have traditionally been considered heretical and/or schismatic. The bond that unites these communities with the One Church is the sacrament of Trinitarian baptism administered everywhere, supposedly recognized as valid by the Orthodox Church. In the view of "Orthodox" Ecumenists, the theology of Ecumenism does not strive to unite separated churches, but to unite separated Christians, through recognizing their already existing, yet imperfect (or incomplete) membership in the One Church. It pretty much mirrors the Roman Catholic reform of identifying the One Church not so much as the Roman Church, but that the Roman Church "subsists" within a larger Church of Christ.

"By essentially dumbing-down the definition of Ecumenism, it can be reasonably argued the very people which are supposed to be anathematized avoid the condemnation."³⁴⁹

In recent decades several Russian Synods, notably RTOC and ROAC, have confirmed the 1983 anathema in its original wording. It remains the official confession of the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church.

³⁴⁹ Gorman, *Facebook*, March 10, 2020.

31. CHAOS AMONG THE GREEK OLD CALENDARISTS

In the early 1970s the Greek Florinite Synod under Archbishop Auxentius, appeared to be in a strong position as a result of its union with ROCOR. However, Auxentius began ordaining unworthy men and receiving priests from the new calendarists whose reputation was already besmirched. As a result, in 1974, following the commandment: “Be not partakers of other men’s sins” (I Timothy 5.2)), Metropolitans Acacius of Diauleia, Gabriel of the Cyclades and Chrysostom (Kiouisis) of Thessalonica stopped attending the Synod. Chrysostom left because Auxentius wanted to consecrate a bishop for Germany, Marcian, who had been caught red-handed without a *rasa* in the “red light” district of Athens.³⁵⁰ These three bishops were joined by Bishop Peter of Astoria³⁵¹, and on September 9, 1976 all four bishops wrote a letter to the ROCOR Synod in which they criticized Auxentius for his receiving priests from the new calendarists who had been defrocked for immorality.³⁵²

Sadly, the process of disintegration did not stop there. In June, 1977, Metropolitan Callistus of Corinth, being unhappy with the Matthewites’ break with the Russians and the Matthewites’ rejection of the *kheirothesia* of 1971 (he was one of the two bishops who had secured the union with the Russians in 1971), broke communion with the Matthewites and joined the Holy Synod.³⁵³ However, he was soon to rue his association with Auxentius. In 1978, a Portuguese priest of ROCOR, Joao Rocha, unhappy with Archbishop Anthony of Geneva’s refusal to create a diocese in Portugal, applied to join the True Orthodox Church of Greece. To the fury of Archbishop Anthony, Archbishop Auxentius baptised and reordained him on the grounds that he was a convert who had never had Orthodox baptism³⁵⁴ before consecrating him as Bishop Gabriel of Lisbon together with Metropolitan Callistus, who later claimed that he had been deceived.

³⁵⁰ Bishop Photius of Marathon, personal communication, June 28, 2003. After failing to receive ordination from Auxentius, Marcian left him and joined the Synod of Maximus Valianatos.

³⁵¹ In June, 1974, Bishop Petros was removed from being exarch of America for the Auxentiite Synod by a majority vote “without any decision being made that would forbid us serving with him.” (Letter of Metropolitans Chrysostom and Gabriel in *I Phoni tis Orthodoxias* (The Voice of Orthodoxy)). He then joined the three independent bishops, an act that was contested by Fr. Simon of Simonopetra monastery, Mount Athos, in view of Peter’s refusal to sign the encyclical of 1974. All this time Bishop Peter claimed to be still in communion with ROCOR. However, in 1976 ROCOR decided to cease communion with Bishop Peter “because of Bishop Petros’ questionable canonical position with Archbishop Auxenios” (*Bulletin of the Foreign Relations Department*, 4, 1976). Bishop Petros protested that he had rejected the Auxentiite Encyclical of 1974 precisely in order to remain loyal to ROCOR’s position on the question of grace in the new calendarist churches. Finally, in 1995, the ROCOR Synod re-entered communion with Bishop Petros (Anastasios Hudson, *Metropolitan Petros of Astoria, USA*, 2014, chapter 5).

³⁵² Hudson, op. cit., p. 54.

³⁵³ According to Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Boston, he acted thus “in protest over what he considered the Matthewite Synod’s lack of good faith in the effort at reconciliation with the Holy Synod of Archbishop Auxentius” (*The Struggle against Ecumenism*, p. 103).

³⁵⁴ According to Lardas (B.Th. thesis on the Old Calendarists, Holy Trinity Seminary, Jordanville, p. 20), he had in fact received chrismation in ROCOR.

Profoundly disillusioned with Auxentius, from February 20 to 23, 1979, Metropolitan Callistus, together with Metropolitan Anthony of Megara, ordained eight archimandrites to the episcopate, who were, in order of ordination: Cyprian (Koutsoubas) of Fili and Orope, Maximus (Tsitsibakos) of Magnesia, Callinicus (Sarantopoulos) of Achaia, Matthew (Langis) of Oinoe, Germanus (Athanasiou) of Aiolia, Calliopius (Giannakouloupoulos) of Pentapolis, Mercurius (Kaloskamis) of Knossos and Callinicus (Karaphyllakis) of the Twelve Islands.³⁵⁵ During the services, Archbishop Auxentius was commemorated; but they had not informed him! It was only on February 27 that they called Auxentius and asked for his approval. The "Callistites" claimed that this was only a "temporary and curable deviation from the canonical order" whose aim was the cleansing of the Church from moral vices, especially sodomy, since "men have been raised to the priesthood who are both unworthy and incapable."³⁵⁶

However, on March 21, 1980 the Callistite Synod consecrated Holy Chrism. This was bold, hardly the act of a Synod that considered itself a "temporary and curable deviation from the canonical order". Moreover, it now entered into communion with another Local Church. Thus in 1979 it received Bishop Silvestru as emissary of the True Orthodox Church of Romania, and decided, having examined both the circumstances of the case and its historical/canonical basis, synodically to recognise the validity of the consecration performed by Galaction alone, as of those that followed.³⁵⁷ In April, 1980 the Callistites entered into official communion with the True Orthodox Church of Romania under the presidency of Metropolitan Glycerius.

Archbishop Kallinikos of Athens, a member of the Callistite Synod, later claimed that in 1981 he, together with Metropolitan Callistus and Metropolitan Cyprian of Fili went to Romania and performed the act of *cheirothesia* on the Romanian bishops in order to regularize their position. This was officially denied by the Romanian Synod in 2010³⁵⁸, as also by the translator for the two sides, Bishop (then Hieromonk) Ambrose.

³⁵⁵ According to Bishop (now Archbishop) Macarius of Petra (1973-2003: *Thirty Years of Ecclesiastical Developments: Trials-Captivity-Deliverance*, an unpublished report given to a clergy conference on May 8, 2000, Metropolitan Anthony first travelled to Cyprus to ask the Matthewite Metropolitan Epiphanius to participate in the ordinations. He refused.

³⁵⁶ For two antithetical accounts of this Synod, see *Phylakes Orthodoxias* (Guardians of Orthodoxy), vol. 1, March, 1979, pp. 1-2 and *Agios Kyprianos* (St. Cyprian), No 122, February, 1979, p. 240, on the one hand, and "Latest developments in the Church of the Genuine Orthodox Christians of Greece", special supplement to *Orthodox Christian Witness*, November, 1984, vol. XVIII, No 12 (St. Nectarios Educational Series No 93), Priest-Monk Haralampus (Book Review in *The True Vine*, No 21, vol. 6, No 1, 1994, pp. 56-63), and Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Boston, *The Struggle against Ecumenism*, pp. 102-112, on the other.

³⁵⁷ "Panigyrikon Sulleitourgou Ellinon kai Roumanon G.O.X." (Festive Concelebration of Greek and Romanians of the True Orthodox Christians), *Phylakes Orthodoxias* (Guardians of Orthodoxy), N 9, November, 1979, pp. 72-74; Bishop Ambrose of Methone, personal communication, December 24, 2009.

³⁵⁸ <http://mitropoliaslatioara.ro/stire.php?id=91>

At 6 p.m. on February 27, the same day he was informed of the Callistite ordinations³⁵⁹, Archbishop Auxentius met Metropolitans Gerontius and Callinicus “in order to formulate a position on the sedition brought about by its members, Callistus of Corinth and Anthony of Megara, who illegally severed themselves from the body [of the Holy Synod] and high-handedly undertook to consecrate bishops. Upon discussing this matter at length, on the basis of the holy canons of the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church of Christ, [the Holy Synod] unanimously decreed and imposed upon the two seditious Metropolitans the punishment of deposition, as the holy canons themselves enjoin. [The Holy Synod decrees] that this decision be released and published straightway in the Athenian press. Since there was no time to convoke the assembly of the clergy, upon deliberation, because of the gravity of the event, it decided this very day to consecrate new bishops for [the Holy Synod’s] restoration and replenishment. Various points of view were exchanged and proposed by all the holy hierarchs...”

Then, according to the minutes of the meeting, no less than *ten* new bishops were elected and ordained in the following order: Euthymius (Orphanos) of Stavropolis (later Thessalonica), Paisius (Loulourgas) of Gardikion (later of America), Theophilus (Tsirbas) of Christianoupolis (later Patras), Athanasius (Postalas) of Platamon (later Larissa), Maximus (Vallianatos) of the Seven Islands, Stephen (Tsikouras) of Kardamila (later Chios), Paisius (Phinikaliotis) of Aegina, Gerasimus (Vrakas) of Talantion (later Thebes), Athanasius (Haralambidis) of Grevena (later Acharnae) and Justin (Kouloutouros) of Marathon (later Euripus).

Some days later, the newly augmented Auxentiite Synod met in order to confirm the invalidity of the Callistite ordinations and the deposition of the Callistites as “conspirators, factionalists, establishers of unlawful assemblies and schismatics”.³⁶⁰ Strangely, according to the minutes, while 13 bishops were present, only 8 signed the conciliar encyclical. The bishops who were present but apparently did not sign were Gerontius, Callinicus, Stephen, Paisius of Gardikion and Paisius of Aegina. Another curious feature of the minutes of this meeting is that some of bishops had changed their titles from the list of those present to the list of those who signed the encyclical.³⁶¹

But the strangest aspect of this Auxentiite “counter-coup” was the *extraordinary speed* with which it was accomplished. Three senior bishops *on one and the same day* (February 14 or 27): (1) heard of the Callistite ordinations, (2) met in order to condemn them and depose the Callistites, (3) drew up a list of 10 candidates for the episcopate, (4) assembled the 10 candidates (were they all waiting in the next room?), (5) obtained the permission of the two other members of the Synod, Paisius of Euripus and Acacius of Canada (this is not mentioned in the minutes,

³⁵⁹ There is some confusion about the exact dates here. In *The Struggle against Ecumenism*, it is said that this meeting took place on February 14, and that the Callistites informed Auxentius of the ordinations in a letter also dated February 14 (but received on March 3. However, according to other sources, the Callistite ordinations took place between February 20 and 23, and that Auxentius was informed on February 27.

³⁶⁰ *I Phoni tis Orthodoxias* (The Voice of Orthodoxy), No 759, March 2, 1979.

³⁶¹ *The Struggle against Ecumenism*, pp. 105-109.

but Bishop Macarius assures us it happened), and (6) ordained them. Another source says that two of the new bishops (Athanasius of Larissa and Stephen of Chios) were ordained on one and the same day in different churches by different bishops.³⁶²

Even the extremely pro-Auxentiite Bishop (now Archbishop) Macarius admits, with almost British under-statement, "that Archbishop Auxentius did act in a rather hurried manner..."³⁶³

And indeed, the scale and uncanonicity of the Callistite coup was exceeded, if that were possible, by the still greater scale uncanonicity - and extraordinary speed - of the Auxentiite counter-coup! The explanation Bishop Macarius gives for this extraordinary speed - "things were in such a wild and unexpected state" - is weak, to say the least. A more likely explanation is that the Auxentiite coup was not a wild reaction to a totally unexpected event, but a carefully planned reaction to an already foreseen event: the Auxentiites knew of the Callistite coup well in advance, and were therefore able to plan their own counter-coup well in advance, putting it into effect immediately they heard about the Callistite ordinations. In fact, there are some indications that Auxentius was not totally opposed to the Callistite coup, in that it "freed his hands"³⁶⁴ to consecrate those whom *he* wanted as bishops - and of whom he knew that several of his bishops, the future Callistites, would not approve.

On the other hand, one of those newly ordained by Callistus, Callinicus of the Twelve Islands, claimed that the whole venture was planned by one of the newly-ordained bishops and his own spiritual father, Metropolitan Cyprian of Fili, without Auxentius' knowledge. Metropolitan Callinicus writes: "I was urgently summoned to Athens, knowing nothing about what was going on, and to my great surprise heard my Elder Cyprian tell me to prepare to be ordained to the episcopate during the vigil service that would begin in a short time. To the appropriate question of the writer why he himself (Fr. Cyprian) or this or that hieromonk (I mentioned a few names) should not be ordained, I learned that Fr. Cyprian as well as the other hieromonks I mentioned had already been ordained, and that Archbishop Auxentius was aware of the ordinations!"³⁶⁵

However, when all the bishops were in the sanctuary taking off their vestments, Cyprian said to one of them, "Now, how are we going to explain all this to Archbishop Auxentios?" Callinicus overheard this and realised that his spiritual father had lied to him. He believed that the whole venture was planned by Cyprian, and that he had deceived Callistus and Anthony into believing that Auxentius had given his permission.³⁶⁶

³⁶² Bishop Photios of Marathon, *Chronicle of the Schism of 1995* (Woking, 2005, unpublished MS).

³⁶³ Bishop Macarius, op. cit.

³⁶⁴ Bishop Photius, op. cit.

³⁶⁵ Metropolitan Callinicus of the Twelve Islands, in Bishop Macarius, op. cit. The Cyprianites continued to maintain that Archbishop Auxentius knew of and blessed the ordinations.

³⁶⁶ Bishop Gregory of Denver, "Re: Re[2]: [paradosis] Kallistos Metropolitan of Korinthos", orthodoxtradition@yahoogroups.com, 31/07/02.

However, the Cyprianite Bishop Ambrose of Methone disagrees: "Having followed personally all the events in question, I can assure you that Metropolitan Cyprian had absolutely nothing to do with the planning of the ordinations; indeed, though he had very friendly relations with Metropolitan Callistus, he had up to that time never met Metropolitan Anthony. He consulted the brotherhood, and his confessor, Archimandrite Ambroise Frontier, before accepting the proposition of the two metropolitans. He was in fact opposed to some of the candidates proposed, but was not in a position to veto them."³⁶⁷

While it seems very unlikely that Auxentius gave his permission (here we agree with Bishop Macarius), it is equally unlikely, for the reasons given above, that Auxentius did not know what was going to happen. Probably both sides knew already, before their split, that the candidates to the episcopate of the one side would not be acceptable to the other; so *both* sides prepared coups.

The Callistite Synod approached ROCOR, but the Russians refused to get involved in Greek quarrels...

The independent Metropolitans Acacius and Chrysostom disapproved of both the coup and the counter-coup, but were especially scathing about Auxentius' new ordinations. As they wrote: "The 'three hierarchs' (the archbishop and the metropolitans of Piraeus and Phthiotis) blatantly and scandalously nourished for years the ground for the creation of suitable conditions for the ordination... of people who do not have a good external or internal image... You removed Synodal hierarchs for no other reason than that they sought moral and legal order in the Church administration and the cleansing of the clergy... You displayed unbelievable vengefulness against those hierarchs who rebuked your iniquities... You ordained without any examination the uneducated, the elderly and paralysed and other who were weighed down by accusations concerning moral and other crimes of which they had been officially charged in the Holy Synod... We judge your act to be worse than the uncanonical act of Bishops Anthony and Callistus..."

The words about "moral crimes" were probably aimed especially at Bishop Euthymius, who was accused by many of being a homosexual...

Notwithstanding this fierce rebuke, the Auxentiite Synod made several approaches to Metropolitans Acacius and Chrysostom. But the latter resisted these blandishments, believing that their concerns for the cleansing of the Church had not been addressed.

However, on January 28, 1980, the two metropolitans addressed a letter to Auxentius entitled "The Correct Road that will lead out of the Dead-End", in which they suggested that ROCOR be asked to act as mediators between the "Callistites" and "Auxentiites". And they put forward a second suggestion in case

³⁶⁷ Bishop Ambrose, personal communication, November 10, 2005.

this first one was rejected: “that all the bishops should abdicate. We shall all live private lives from now on... Three hieromonks known for their morality, decency and faith, preferably from Mount Athos, should be ordained as bishops to feed and administer the Church by those bishops who took no part in the coups. In this way all the divisions, personality struggles and counter-accusations will cease, and the troubled people of the True Orthodox Christians will be united... We personally, for the sake of the Church and the spiritual unity of the flock, will be the first to give our places over to the new spiritual leaders and live private lives. We pray that all the others will follow us...”³⁶⁸

It is a pity that neither of these suggestions was acted upon. Instead, on September 16, the Auxentiite Synod removed Metropolitan Chrysostom from his see in Thessalonica and on October 23 raised Bishop Euthymius to the rank of metropolitan to take his place. However, the majority of the flock in Northern Greece continued to remain faithful to Metropolitan Chrysostom; and on November 23 tens of priests from Katerini to Messoropi to Sidirokastron left the Auxentiites and joined Metropolitan Chrysostom.

In 1981 the Auxentiite Synod removed the penalties it had imposed on Metropolitans Acacius and Chrysostom. Then, in the next year, it reimposed them. Then the Synod itself split, with one part remaining with Auxentius and the other following Metropolitan Gerontius of Piraeus. Bishop Macarius, who likes to dwell in detail on all the other divisions, passes this one over very hastily: “In the meantime a division broke out, the Lord alone knows for what reason He allowed it, in the canonical [according to Macarius: Auxentiite] Holy Synod. I don’t think it is necessary to spend any more time on this short division...”³⁶⁹

However, this “short division” related to an issue that was to become increasingly important – that of the *legal corporations*. This issue was important because Churches as such are not registered in Greece with the exception of the new calendarist State Church. So the only way any religious community can acquire legal status and some legal protection (apart from the general protection provided by freedom of worship) is through registering as an association, corporation or foundation.³⁷⁰ Bishop Photius writes: “In the beginning, there existed the corporation ‘The General Fund of the Church of the True Orthodox Christians of Greece’, which had control of about 25 churches. It was under the control of the Auxentiite-Gerontians, who in the period 1971-1976 had removed from the board the four hierarchs – Acacius, Auxentius, Peter and Gabriel – who disagreed with them. In 1979, with the coup, the Auxentiite-Gerontians removed from the ‘General Fund’ all those who had taken part in the coup. Thus Callistus of Corinth, Anthony of Megara, Cyprian of Orope, Maximus of Magnesia, Callinicus of Achaia, Matthew of Oinoe, Germanus of Aiolia, Calliopius of Pentapolis, Mercurius of Knossus and Callinicus of the Twelve Islands were removed from the board of the ‘General Fund’ and founded the corporation ‘the

³⁶⁸ Metropolitans Acacius and Chrysostom, in Bishop Macarius, op. cit.

³⁶⁹ Bishop Macarius, op. cit.

³⁷⁰ Bishop Photius, personal communication, October 20, 2005.

Greek Church of the True Orthodox Christians'. More accurately: they were inscribed into an already existing corporation having the same name, which had been founded by Calliopius in 1961.

"In June, 1983, the hierarchs Maximus of Magnesia (from now on 'of Demetrias') and Callinicus of the Twelve Islands left the Antonio-Callistites and joined the Auxentiites. They were received through *cheirothesia* (whose content must have been a simple prayer of forgiveness).³⁷¹ The same happened later with Germanus of Aiolia. These three were removed from the corporation 'The Greek Church of the True Orthodox Christians'. The Auxentiite-Gerontians did not inscribe them into the 'General Fund'.

"In the same year a struggle broke out between the Auxentiites and Gerontius for control of the 'General Fund'. Gerontius emerged as winner from the struggle."³⁷²

The Callistites also began to split up - over the old question whether the new calendarists had valid sacraments or not. As we have seen, in 1983 three metropolitans - Maximus, Germanus and Callinicus of the Twelve Islands - joined Auxentius. In 1984 four other metropolitans - Anthony, Callinicus of Achaia, Matthew and Calliopius - joined the Gerontians. Meanwhile, Metropolitan Cyprian was giving communion to new calendarists on the grounds that the new calendarist church was "not yet condemned" and therefore still the "Mother Church" of the Old Calendarists.³⁷³ And he rejected Metropolitan Callistus' ecclesiology, saying that it was "without witness, unproven, anti-patristic, and hence un-Orthodox".³⁷⁴ In other words, he regarded Callistus' views to be heretical - even if he did not use the word "heretical" for diplomatic reasons. This disillusioned Metropolitan Callistus, who had always maintained the official view of the True Orthodox Church of Greece since 1935 that the new calendarists had no sacraments. So he retired to his monastery, where he died in isolation in 1986...³⁷⁵

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³⁷¹ This I heard from the two hierarchs Maximus and Callinicus themselves (Bishop Photius).

³⁷² Bishop Photius, op. cit.

³⁷³ The evidence is in *The Struggle against Ecumenism*, pp. 111-11

³⁷⁴ *Agios Kiprianos*, July, 1983, p. 210.

³⁷⁵ However, the Cyprianite Bishop Ambrose of Methone writes: "The retirement of Metropolitan Callistus had nothing to do with our position on the admission of new calendarists to the Mysteries (in a much less liberal way than that of many others, e.g. Metropolitan Anthony). It was in fact occasioned by (a) the behaviour of Metropolitan Callinicus of Achaia, who refused to leave the convent in Athikia and go to his own diocese, despite repeated promises, and finally more or less expelled Metropolitan Callistus from the Convent he had himself founded, and (b) the unanimous outrage of all the members of the Synod over a pamphlet expressing the most extreme 'Matthaist' positions, which Callistus published and distributed without their knowledge. Having been expelled from his own home, he was taken in by his brother, Archimandrite Nicodemus, and lived the rest of his days as a guest at the convent of Agia Marini, Sofikon" (personal communication, November 10 2005). But this account is rejected by others, who point out that Metropolitan Kallistos' supposedly extreme confession had been known and accepted for years...

As we have seen, in 1978 Archbishop Auxentius took a man from ROCOR's West European diocese, baptized him and ordained him as Bishop Gabriel of Lisbon. In June, 1984, he ordained a second Portuguese bishop, James, without the knowledge of part of his Synod. "Auxentius had promised his clergy that he would call them and listen to their opinions before any episcopal ordination. Therefore, in order to bring about this ordination, he summoned a few of them (those whom he wanted) and decided, in spite of the reasonable objections of two or three clerics, that Hieromonk James should be elected as assistant bishop to Bishop Gabriel of Lisbon."³⁷⁶

Not content with this uncanonicity, Auxentius proceeded to another. "Both Auxentius and Gabriel had promised before God, the hierarchs and the priests present at that time that James would remain as Gabriel's assistant, so that he would not be able to take part in the ordination of another bishop with Gabriel. However, in October, 1984, we were informed to our astonishment that the two Portuguese 'bishops' had ordained yet another Portuguese bishop and two Italians, with the blessings and prayers of Auxentius,"³⁷⁷ and the participation of Metropolitans Gerasimus, Maximus, Germanus and Athanasius of Larissa. One of the new bishops, the Italian Gabriel of Aquileia, turned out to be a fervent supporter, if not worshipper, of the fascist dictator Mussolini!

Moreover, Auxentius – acting *completely on his own* this time, now gave this new group a "Tome of Autonomy!"³⁷⁸

In 1987 this newly "autonomous" Church split up, with the Metropolitan Eulogius of Milan being received into the Polish Orthodox Church. In 1990 Metropolitan Gabriel followed, claiming that he had not known that Auxentius confessed that the new calendarists had no grace, which, he said, was a "heretical opinion". He took with him two bishops, 60 parishes and about 80,000 laity. Soon this Portuguese church was practising a particularly strange form of ecumenism.³⁷⁹

³⁷⁶ *Orthodoxos Khristianikos Agon* (Orthodox Christian Struggle), No 3, November 1985, p. 4.

³⁷⁷ *Orthodoxos Khristianikos Agon* (Orthodox Christian Struggle), No 3, November 1985, p. 4.

³⁷⁸ *Orthodoxos Khristianikos Agon* (Orthodox Christian Struggle), No 3, November, 1985, p. 3; February, 1987, p. 8. It appears that the "Tome of Autonomy" was signed by Auxentius alone, who wrote: "I, Auxentius, by God's grace Archbishop of Athens and all Greece, acting within the boundaries of our territory of Western Europe (which I created on June 7, 1978) have decided to give permission to the Metropolis of Portugal, Spain and Western Europe to govern itself, having as their principal headquarters the God-protected metropolitan city of Lisbon... This metropolis will be under the direction of the GOC of Greece... P.S. The above Metropolitan with his vicar bishops is obliged to present himself to the Hierarchical Synod each October."

³⁷⁹ Ivan Moody ("Scandal for Orthodoxy in Portugal", ORTHODOX@LISTSERV.INDIANA.EDU (Orthodox Christianity) (01.02.2000)) tells us to what depths this new Portuguese Church has fallen: "Tomorrow, Wednesday 2nd January 2000, there will be inaugurated a new basilica in Torres Novas, north of Lisbon. In attendance will be, according the information we have received, bishops from the Churches of Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and from OCA.... The true leader of this sect is a lady known as "A Santa da Ladeira", who was excommunicated from the Roman Catholic Church many years ago and subjected in the early 1970s to psychological examination which found her to be profoundly

After Gabriel's death, Bishop Joao was elected metropolitan and confirmed by the Polish Synod. Subsequently, the Polish Church, alarmed by the eccentric practices of the Portuguese diocese, excised it from their communion.³⁸⁰ In 1993 the "Synod of Milan" joined the "Patriarchate of Kiev", which was led by the KGB agent Philaret Denisenko, and was given yet another "Tome of Autonomy" by them...³⁸¹

*

By this time the Greek True Orthodox Church was disintegrating so fast that the Auxentiite and Gerontian Synods (which now included most of the defunct Callistite Synod) decided to cast aside their differences and unite. And so on January 4/17, 1985, they came together and agreed: (1) to recognise the ordinations of 1979 on both sides, (2) to remove the penalties they had placed on each other, and (3) remove the accusations they had cast against each other. The reunited Synod was composed of 17 bishops.³⁸² Meanwhile, the original "rebels" against the Auxentiite Synod, Metropolitans Acacius, Chrysostom, Gabriel and Peter, still refrained from joining this union, fearing that it served simply to cover up unrepented-of crimes, and would soon disintegrate.

More surprising, even Bishop Macarius criticised the union, saying: "Immeasurable grief takes hold of my heart". Why? Because the recognition of the ordinations on both sides meant that the small group of formerly Callistite bishops whom he blames for subsequent events – especially Callinicus of Achaia and Calliopius of Pentapolis – and who had not, unlike the other penitent Callistite bishops, received *cheirothesia* from Auxentius, were not forced to repent

schizophrenic. Charges of fraud were also to be brought against her but this did not happen with the chaos of the 1974 Revolution. She was subsequently adopted by Joao Gabriel and later elevated to be an "abbess", though she is married, with results that may be seen in a series of photographs I have in my possession and which have been forwarded to various competent authorities. They show: 1. This lady seated on a special throne in the church; 2. An "Orthodox" bishop holding up a RC host in a monstrance, this being adored by the "Santa" and the other clergy; 3. The "Santa", in the regalia of an abbess, with her husband and an "Orthodox" bishop in the church; 4. An earlier photograph showing her as the "reincarnation" of the Mother of God; 5. The "Santa" kissing a RC host, behind which appears a strange stain on the photograph, apparently not present on the film, which is claimed to be the bread of the Orthodox Eucharist and therefore to represent the union of the Roman and Orthodox Churches, of which the new basilica is symbolic; 6. Earlier photographs of her with stigmata - this was the time at which she was held for fraud and psychological examination. On the front of the basilica is an engraved colour picture of the "Santa" and her husband. There can be no doubt as to the link between these "Orthodox" and this offensive phenomenon. All this will be widely covered in the newspapers and on the television. Whatever political or other factors have prevented the hierarchies of the various churches from realizing the gravity of this situation, it seems to us, the Greek Orthodox here, that we have been abandoned. My priest, having spent the whole of yesterday telephoning to the Embassies of the various countries, is exhausted and depressed. Is this, he is asking, the Orthodoxy I have spent my life here trying to protect and promote?"

³⁸⁰ Bishop Ambrose of Methone (personal communication, November 10, 2005).

³⁸¹ *Kirix Gnision Orthodoxon* (Herald of the True Orthodox), 42, No 236, September, 1997, p. 228.

³⁸² "Enkyklios" (Encyclical), *Ekklesiastiki Paradosis* (Ecclesiastical Tradition), January-February, 1985, No 20, pp. 262-263.

of having been schismatics and receive *cheirothesia*. But Bishop Macarius fails to see that if Auxentius was essentially blameless and all those who broke communion from him thereby became schismatics, then the group of Gerontian bishops to which he belonged (and belongs) – Callinicus of Phthiotis and Euthymius of Thessalonica – *also became schismatics* when they broke away from Auxentius in 1983, *and should also have received cheirothesia*. In fact, it could be argued that insofar as the Gerontians broke away from Auxentius over the question of who controlled certain church buildings – in other words, over “filthy lucre” (I Peter 5.2), their motivation was worse than that of the Callistites, and they deserved a more severe penalty. So, as the English proverb goes: “Those who live in glass houses should not throw stones...”

In the opinion of the present writer, however, *all* the factions were guilty in different ways and to different degrees, and so union between them was possible without hypocrisy only on the basis of mutual forgiveness of sins and removal of all bans. Or if, as Bishop Macarius asserts, this was impossible on canonical grounds, then the only solution was for all 17 bishops to retire...

In any case, the union collapsed when it emerged that Auxentius had secretly ordained Dorotheus Tsakos, a former new calendarist priest who had been defrocked in 1968 for homosexuality. Tsakos had then twice been ordained “metropolitan” by Old Calendarist *episcopi vagantes*. In July, 1985 he began to show priests an ordination certificate purporting to prove that he had been ordained “Metropolitan of Sparta and all the Peloponnese”. The priests were troubled to see that the signatures of Archbishop Auxentius and Metropolitan Gerasimus of Thebes were on this document. Tsakos claimed that he had been ordained by Metropolitans Gerasimus of Thebes and Maximus of Cephalonia on the orders of Archbishop Auxentius; but he refused to reveal (by covering the relevant part of the ordination certificate with his hand) on what date the ordination had taken place.

On July 6/19, 1985, at a meeting of the Holy Synod, the three metropolitans involved denied that the ordination had taken place. Auxentius admitted that his signature might be genuine because he did sometimes sign blank ordination certificates to be filled in later (a revealing confession in itself!). But he denied – and always continued to deny – that he knew anything at all about the ordination of Tsakos. However, immediately after this meeting of the Synod, Gerasimus of Thebes confessed that the ordination had taken place as Tsakos had stated, and signed a written affidavit to that effect in the presence of eight other bishops.

Fr. Basil of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Boston, tried to minimise the significance of this confession by pointing out that Gerasimus twice confessed that he had participated in the ordination and twice denied it. Moreover, Gerasimus and the other witnesses were inconsistent in the date they ascribe to the event. Therefore, wrote Fr. Basil, “what is the value of such depositions, made by false witnesses who contradict and refute themselves?... Which one of all these written depositions says the truth? When did the ordination take place? In 1983?

In 1984? In 1985? We admit that we see no possibility of finding any clue.”³⁸³
“What is the validity of such depositions, made by witnesses who contradict and refute themselves?”³⁸⁴

However, is it not usual for a criminal caught red-handed in a criminal act to lie and then to change his testimony when his lie is exposed? In any case, why should Gerasimus have admitted to the crime even once if he was in fact innocent? Moreover, there were other eyewitness testimonies confirming Gerasimus’ guilt. One of these was the Reader Pericles Tsakiris, whom the translator of Fr. Basil’s letter rather furtively and obliquely sought to blacken in a footnote.

As a result of their inquiries the committee came to the following conclusions, which any unprejudiced observer must agree with: (a) the ordination of Dorotheus Tsakos did take place, at the hands of Metropolitans Maximus and Gerasimus, and on the orders of Archbishop Auxentius; (b) the date was probably after Pascha, 1985 (in his last deposition, in January, 1986, he confirmed under oath that the ordination had taken place on July 5, 1985); and (c) the participants in the event, having been sworn to secrecy by Auxentius, lied to the Holy Synod and for fairly obvious reasons tried to obscure the date of the event.

Fr. Basil went on to claim that before the investigative committee could complete its work, the seventeen bishops who eventually defrocked Auxentius had created a schism. Therefore, he said, even if the ordination did take place, it is not Auxentius but his accusers who are the guilty ones! This was *the exact opposite of the truth!* The fact of the matter was that in September, while the investigating committee was still carrying out its work and interrogating witnesses (as far as they could, for Auxentius and Maximus refused to cooperate in any way), a group of Auxentiite bishops decided to declare the affair of Dorotheus Tsakos “closed”, regarding “every attempt to revive it as anticanonical and an attack on the Church”. They also declared that the invitation to the metropolitans to give evidence to the investigating committee the next day was “anticanonical”, “parasynagogical” and “counter to the will of the Holy Synod” - although the Holy Synod had appointed the investigating committee only two months before!

It is interesting to note which bishops signed this astonishing attempt to silence the work of the investigating committee: the oath-breaking and Mussolini-loving Portuguese and Italians Gabriel, James, Eulogius, Theodore and Gregory, *who were not even members of the Holy Synod*; Auxentius, Athanasius, Maximus and Germanus, *who had participated in the uncanonical ordinations of the Portuguese and Italians and (in the cases of Auxentius and Maximus) Tsakos*; and the Americans Paisius and Vincent, who had been closely associated with Auxentius in the early

³⁸³ “Excerpts from a Response by Fr. Basil of Holy Transfiguration Monastery to a Bishop of the Kiouisis group, Kallinikos of the Dodecanese, concerning the ‘ordination’ of Dorotheos Tsakos” (MS), pp. 1, 2.

³⁸⁴ *The Struggle against Ecumenism*, p. 121, footnote.

1980s (for example, in the Auxentiite union with the Free Serbs in 1982) and later joined the new calendarists. In other words, these bishops who were now trying to stop the work of the investigating committee were in essence the same group of bishops who had been associates of Auxentius before the union of January, 1985, and had caused such damage to the Church before that date.

In spite of this provocation, the investigating bishops patiently continued their work. They invited Auxentius to appear before the Synod three times, but he refused. Then Auxentius, anticipating the announcement of his deposition, formed an "anti-Synod" and called on the president of the Synodical Court, Metropolitan Gerontius, to appear before a five-member pseudo-Synod to answer a false charge of having married two persons of the same sex in 1981! Gerontius convincingly refuted this charge (which has never, to our knowledge, been brought up again). Finally, on October 22, Auxentius, Maximus, Gerasimus, Athanasius and Germanus were deposed for "consecrating" Tsakos, for lying to the Synod and for creating a schism.³⁸⁵

Even Archbishop Macarius admitted that Auxentius's actions in this period were indefensible, but chose only to say that Auxentius and his bishops "undertook a series of hurried and uncanonical defrockings of many of our hierarchs."³⁸⁶ He was reticent because one of the hierarchs defrocked by Auxentius was Macarius' fellow-worker, Metropolitan Euthymius of Thessalonica, whom Auxentius accused of initiating his trial and deposition in order to avoid investigation of moral charges against himself: "while an order was given that a judicial examination should be put into operation in order to elucidate the accusations against the moral situation of Metropolitan Euthymius Orphanos, they turned round and incompetently initiated an examination against us to see whether we had indeed proceeded to nominate and consecrate Archimandrite Dorotheus Tsakos as Metropolitan of Patras..." Auxentius defrocked Euthymius on October 31, 1985 (№ 2137/18) for "factionalism, conspiracy and rebellion". Also defrocked was his elder, Iakovos Papadelis, "on the basis of accusations of moral falls against him by Athonites".³⁸⁷

And yet in spite of this Archbishop Macarius vehemently rejected the validity of Auxentius' defrocking by – among others – his own party of Gerontius, Callinicus and Euthymius! And some years later, in 1997, his Synod (headed at that time by Callinicus of Phthiotis and now, in 2005, by Macarius himself) declared that "the altercations during the year 1985 between the blessedly reposed hierarchs Auxentius and Gerontius arose from the plots of third parties and... the verdicts of both are uncanonical and invalid... It is understood that we recognize and also bless all the priestly services and other sacred ecclesiastical actions of the aforementioned Archbishop and Metropolitans, except the

³⁸⁵ *Ekklesiastiki Paradosis* (Ecclesiastical Tradition), 20, January-February, 1985, pp. 261-263; "Eis tas Epalxeis!" (To the Ramparts!), *I Phoni tis Orthodoxias* (The Voice of Orthodoxy), NoNo 802-803, November-December, 1985, pp. 1-33; *Orthodoxos Khristianikos Agon* (Orthodox Christian Struggle), November, 1985, p. 3, February, 1987, p. 8.

³⁸⁶ Bishop Macarius, op. cit.

³⁸⁷ *I Phoni tis Orthodoxias* (The Voice of Orthodoxy), No 921, March-April, 2003, p. 15.

ordinations which they performed after 1985 to the present, which we reserve the right to examine upon the petition of the ordinands.”³⁸⁸

However, this made no sense. If, as Archbishop Macarius asserted time and time again, Auxentius was the last true archbishop of the True Orthodox Christians (before himself), and his defrocking in 1985 was uncanonical, then he (Macarius) condemned himself and his own party on at least three counts: (1) for breaking with Auxentius over the issue of the legal corporation in 1983, (2) for unjustly defrocking Auxentius for the ordination of Tsakos, and (3) for remaining in communion with Euthymius after Auxentius defrocked him and his elder. But Macarius wishes to exonerate *both* Auxentius (although he admits that his actions in 1985 were wrong) *and* himself and his party – while laying all the blame on mysterious “plots of third parties”.

Auxentius’ defenders sought to demonstrate that Orthodox Christians are not allowed to break communion with their lawful ecclesiastical authority unless that authority has proclaimed heresy, and even if that authority has committed flagrant crimes. This is true – so long as the possibility of bringing the sinning archbishop to trial exists. But Fr. Basil appeared to reject the possibility that metropolitans can bring their archbishop to trial for any other charge than heresy. In this opinion he was mistaken. There have been many occasions in Church history when archbishops have been defrocked by their fellow bishops in accordance with the Holy Canons for transgressions other than heresy. If such were not the case, then as long as the archbishop did not proclaim heresy he could commit murder and adultery and remain first-hierarch of the Church – which is halfway to Papism...

In March, 2014, when the True Orthodox Church of Greece under Archbishop Kallinikos entered into a union with the Cyprianites, they secretly removed all bans on Archbishop Auxentius (this was probably a demand of the Cyprianites). However, none of his episcopal ordinations were accepted as valid...³⁸⁹

In November, 1985, Metropolitan Gerontius approached Metropolitan Chrysostom (Kioussis) and invited him to join the Synod that had been purged of Auxentius and his supporters. Chrysostom replied in a conciliatory manner, thanked Gerontius “for your recognition of the righteousness of our (four bishops’) break of relations with the Synod”, but insisted on the fulfilment of two conditions before he could join: “the removal of Bishop Euthymius from my diocese” and the seeking of the written opinion of theologians on the degree to which “economy” (condescension) could be employed with regard to the earlier canonical questions that had not yet been resolved. This was necessary “in view of the extremely detailed deadlock into which our Holy Struggle has come...”

³⁸⁸ Protocol No 73, decision of April 1/14, 1997, in *Orthodoxon Paterikon Salpisma* (Orthodox Patristic Trumpet Call), March-April, 1997).

³⁸⁹ Bishop Photius of Marathon, private communication, 2014.

The opinions of six theologians (three priests and three laymen) were duly sought. They said that the four bishops – Acacius, Chrysostom, Gabriel and Peter – could join the Synod led by Gerontius provided that the new president of the Synod should not be any bishop who had been involved in the Callistite coup or Auxentiite counter-coup of 1979. This was an eminently reasonable condition, since all of the participants in the coup and counter-coup of 1979, not to mention the Gerontian schism of 1983, had besmirched their reputations, and would not have had the authority to unite the Church for long. The new archbishop could only come from one of the four bishops – Acacius, Chrysostom, Gabriel and Peter – who had taken no part in these events, but who had pointed out the need for a cleansing of the Church from the tares sown by Auxentius. This need was now, belatedly, recognised by all.

Of these four bishops, Metropolitan Peter, as living in America and as having rejected the encyclical of 1974, was clearly not a candidate. Therefore he created another problem for the new archbishop, whoever he might be, in that he would have to see that Metropolitan Peter conformed to the 1974 encyclical...³⁹⁰

Finally, in January, 1986, Metropolitan Chrysostom joined, and was elected archbishop by ten votes to six. It will be remembered that Chrysostom had been elected as second candidate for the episcopate (after Acacius Pappas) as far back as the pan-clerical congress in April, 1957.³⁹¹ So there was a certain historical justice in his being elected archbishop now, some thirty years later.

However, Bishop Macarius writes: “My conscience forces me to condemn the election of Chrysostom as archbishop as totally uncanonical because, first and foremost, it was made as a result of the uncanonical defrocking of the canonical Archbishop Auxentius, whose throne Chrysostom seized while the archbishop still alive, making him an adulterous free-rider...”

Macarius here fails to mention the rather important fact that Chrysostom took no part in the defrocking of Auxentius. That was done by Gerontius and his faction – that is, Bishop Macarius’ own faction! As for “seizing” the throne, what kind of “seizure” are we talking about when Chrysostom in no way imposed himself, but was first invited by Gerontius to join the Synod, and was then elected in a perfectly canonical election?! So if Chrysostom was an “adulterous free-rider”, the Gerontian bishops were those who prepared the bedchamber and even invited the lovers into it!

“Secondly,” continues Bishop Macarius, “during the proceedings of the election, there were present two Metropolitans of Thessalonica, Chrysostom and Euthymius, and both of them voted as such, something that is totally contrary to the Holy Canons.”³⁹²

³⁹⁰ In the spring of 1985, in his monastery in Paiania, Metropolitan Acacius told the present writer that he was deeply unhappy that Metropolitan Peter gave communion to new calendarists in his Astoria diocese.

³⁹¹ *Khristianiki Poreia* (The Christian Way), March, 1992, p. 8.

³⁹² Bishop Macarius, op. cit.

This is a more just accusation. Nevertheless, it may well be asked: whose fault was it that there were two metropolitans of Thessalonica? Chrysostom had been made metropolitan of the city much earlier than Euthymius, and the Gerontians, as Chrysostom noted, had recognised the justice of his struggle against corruption in the Church. Clearly, therefore, if one of the two metropolitans was an adulterer bishop, it was Euthymius!

The issue was the more serious in that the flock in Thessalonica was divided, with one part refusing to accept Euthymius because of his reputation as a homosexual.

It was agreed that the dissident parishes in Thessalonica should be allowed to commemorate Chrysostom for one year while they got used to the idea that they were now in communion with Euthymius. However, when the year was over, they had still not got used to it, and refused to commemorate Euthymius. Clearly, the only solution to the problem was a canonical ecclesiastical trial of Euthymius....

Almost immediately the problem of the legal corporations raised its head again. 8 hierarchs – Gerontius of Piraeus, Callinicus of Phthiotis, Euthymius of Thessalonica, Stephen of Chios, Athanasius of Acharnae, Justin of Euripus, Paisius of America and Vincent of Aulona (the last two joined a little later) – belonged to the board of the corporation “General Fund of the Church of the True Orthodox Christians of Greece”. 4 hierarchs – Anthony of Megara, Callinicus of Achaia, Matthew of Oinoe and Calliopius of Pentapolis – belonged to the board of the corporation “Greek Church of the True Orthodox Christians”. The remaining 4 hierarchs – Archbishop Chrysostom, Peter of Astoria, Maximus of Magnesia and Callinicus of the Twelve Islands – did not belong to any board. Overtures towards a union of the two corporations were made by the board of the “Greek Church of the True Orthodox Christians” to the board of the “General Fund”. But these overtures were rejected. Here we can already see the outlines of the schism of 1995...

32. THE SCHISM OF THE CYPRIANITES

The most important, long-lasting and damaging schism among the Greek Old Calendarists in this period was that of the Cyprianites...

On January 20, 1984 an article appeared in the new calendarist newspaper *Orthodoxos Typos* criticizing Metropolitan Cyprian, the last heir of the Callistite coup, and the only one who did not repent of it, for giving the sacraments to hundreds of new calendarists. In the February-March issue of his journal, *Agios Kyprianos*, Cyprian did not deny these charges but simply called them "purely personal attacks". In September, Cyprian was banned from serving by Metropolitan Anthony and the Synod to which he then belonged for entering into communion of prayer with Patriarch Nicholas of Alexandria the previous month. Cyprian rejected this act, and early in 1985 he formed a new "Synod of Resistors" with Metropolitan Giovanni (Bascio) of Sardinia, a former Capuchin monk who, after being in the MP and the Nestorian heresy, had been baptized and ordained by the Callistites in 1982.³⁹³

Cyprian's position was based on a new ecclesiology that in view of its subsequent importance is worth examining in some detail. It was expounded in his book, *Ecclesiological Theses* (1984). "The Orthodox Church as a whole is unerring and invincible," he writes. "It is possible, however, for Christians and for local Churches to fall in faith; that is to say, it is possible for them to suffer spiritually and for one to see a certain 'siege of illness within the body of the Church', as St. John Chrysostom says. It is possible for Christians to separate and for 'divisions' to appear within the Church, as the Apostle Paul writes to the Corinthians. It is possible for local Churches to fall into heresy, as occurred in the ancient Orthodox Church of the West, which fell into the heresies of Papism and Protestantism and finally into the pan-heresy of ecumenism.

"Spiritual maladies within the Church are cured either by repentance or by judgement. Until the judgement or expulsion of a heretic, schismatic, or sinner – either by the Church or, in a more direct manner, by the Lord –, the opinion of a believer cannot be a substitute for the sentence of the Church and of her Lord, Jesus Christ, even if the resolution of a situation be prolonged until the Second Coming. As is well known, in the Scriptures, the Church is likened to a field replete with 'wheat' and 'tares', in accordance with Divine and ecclesiastical economy. Sinners and those who err in correctly understanding the Faith, yet who have not been sentenced by ecclesiastical action, are simply considered ailing members of the Church. The Mysteries [sacraments] of these unsentenced

³⁹³ It is sometimes asserted that the Italian parishes under Giovanni voluntarily left the Moscow Patriarchate and joined the Nestorians before returning to the Old Calendarists. In 1975 the present writer heard a different story from the Italians' bishop when they were in the MP, Metropolitan Anthony (Bloom) of Sourozh, who said that he had been forced to expel the Italians following a phone call from Metropolitan Juvenal of Tula. Juvenal said that the MP was having negotiations with the Vatican over the uniatic question in the Ukraine, and the Pope had laid it down as a condition for the success of the negotiations that there should be no MP parishes in Italy. So the Italians were in fact *expelled* from the M

members are valid as such, according to the Seventh Ecumenical Council, as, for example, the President of the Synod, St. Tarasios, remarks: '[their] Ordination' 'is from God'. By contrast, should expositors of heresy punish the Orthodox opposed to them, these punishments are ecclesiastically invalid and groundless 'from the time their preaching began' (i.e., from the moment they began preaching heresy), as St. Celestine of Rome wrote and as the Third Ecumenical Synod agreed."³⁹⁴

When a bishop preaches heresy "publicly" "and bareheaded in the Church", continues the metropolitan, the Orthodox Christians should immediately separate themselves from him, in accordance with the 31st Apostolic Canon and the 15th Canon of the First-and-Second Synod of Constantinople. Such action by the Orthodox does not introduce schism, but rather serves to protect the Church from schisms and divisions. "He who preaches heresy or he who brings innovation into the Church divides her and abrogates her oneness or unity. He who opposes the preaching of heresy, or who separates himself from it, is eager to save the oneness or unity of the Church. The aim of opposition and separation is the combatting of heresy, the defense of the Orthodox Faith, and the preservation of the unity of the Orthodox Church, indeed of Orthodoxy itself."³⁹⁵

So far so good. However, Cyprian then makes a distinctly controversial claim: "With regard to the innovation in the festal calendar, Orthodox are divided into two parts: into those who are ailing in Faith and those who are healthy, into innovators and opposers – into followers of innovation, whether in knowledge or in ignorance, and those opposed to it, who have separated themselves from heresy, in favor of Orthodoxy. The latter are strugglers for oneness among the 'divided', as the Seventh Ecumenical Synod calls those who so separated for the Orthodox unity of the Church. The followers of the festal calendar innovation have not yet been specifically judged in a Pan-Orthodox fashion, as provided for by the Orthodox Church. As St. Nikodemos of the Holy Mountain writes, the violator of established precepts is considered sentenced, insofar as he is judged by 'the second entity (which is the council or synod).' Since 1924, the innovators have been awaiting judgement and shall be judged on the basis of the decisions of the holy Synods, both Oecumenical and local, and, to be sure, on the basis of the ecclesiastical pronouncements of the sixteenth century against what were then Papal proposals for changes in the festal calendar. In this respect, those who have walled themselves off from the innovators have actually broken communion 'before [a] conciliar or synodal verdict,' as is allowed in the Fifteenth Canon of the First-and-Second Synod. That is to say, the innovators are still unsentenced. Consequently, their Mysteries are valid..."³⁹⁶

"Every innovationist member of the divided Greek Church is capable of changing over to opposition against the Ecumenist innovation. This can be accomplished through repentance... A return to Orthodoxy can also take place

³⁹⁴ Metropolitan Cyprian, "Ai Ekklesiologikai Theseis Mas" (Our Ecclesiological Theses), *Agios Kyprianos* (St. Cyprian), November, 1984, 191; translated in Patrick G. Barker, *A Study of the Ecclesiology of Resistance*, Etna, Ca.: Center for Traditionalist Orthodox Studies, 1994, pp. 57-58.

³⁹⁵ Barker, op. cit., p. 59.

³⁹⁶ Barker, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

through a formal renunciation of heresy... Therefore, the Orthodox Tradition of the Holy Oecumenical Synods and of the Holy Fathers of the Orthodox Church prescribes that that part of the divided Greek Church that is ailing in Faith be received by one of the foregoing means of repentance and returned to the ranks of Orthodoxy. For they are not condemned schismatic or heretical Christians, but members of the Church who have not yet been brought to trial."³⁹⁷

To suppose that the innovators were "still unsentenced" was a mistake. In May, 1935, all the truly Orthodox (i.e. Old Calendar) Metropolitans of the Church of Greece came together and synodically condemned the new calendarists as schismatics without the grace of sacraments. Concerning the implications of this declaration with regard to the question of grace, the metropolitans made themselves crystal clear in an encyclical issued on June 8/21, 1935: "We recommend to all those who follow the Orthodox Calendar that they have no spiritual communion with the schismatic church of the schismatic ministers, from whom the grace of the All-Holy Spirit has fled, because they have violated the decisions of the Fathers of the Seventh Ecumenical Council and the Pan-Orthodox Councils which condemned the Gregorian calendar. That the schismatic Church does not have Grace and the Holy Spirit is affirmed by St. Basil the Great, who says the following: 'Even if the schismatics have erred about things which are not Dogmas, since the head of the Church is Christ, according to the divine Apostle, from Whom all the members live and receive spiritual increase, they have torn themselves away from the harmony of the members of the Body and no longer are members [of that Body] or have the grace of the Holy Spirit. Therefore he who does not have it cannot transfer it to others.'"³⁹⁸

Now some have argued that this conciliar decision was later rejected by the leader of the Greek Old Calendarists, Metropolitan Chrysostom of Florina, and that it therefore represents only an "extremist", "Matthewite" position. However, the doctrine that schismatics have no grace is not a specifically "Matthewite" position, but was proclaimed as early as 1935, *before* the Matthewite faction was formed. Indeed, it is based on many canons and patristic sayings, notably the First Canonical Epistle of St. Basil the Great.

As Bishop Ephraim of Boston pointed out, the new calendarists and the Moscow Patriarchate have adopted a distinctly "Matthewite" position in relation to the True Orthodox, declaring that they have no grace of sacraments – while at the same time declaring that the Western heretics do have grace!³⁹⁹

In any case, it is not true that Metropolitan Chrysostom renounced the Council of 1935. From 1937 to 1950 he appeared to doubt it, introducing the notion (unknown in patristic literature, as Bishop Ephraim again correctly points out), of "potential schism". But in 1950 he repented of these doubts and openly and unambiguously returned to the confession of 1935. Some have said that in private

³⁹⁷ Barker, op. cit., pp. 61, 62.

³⁹⁸ Calliopius, op. cit., pp. 277-278.

³⁹⁹ Letter of Reader Polychronios, April 29 / May 12, 1987.

correspondence he claimed to have been pushed into making this confession by “extremists”, that he made it for the sake of unity and that it did not represent his true thinking. It seems extremely unlikely that such a great confessor, whose relics are fragrant and who was canonized in 2016, could have dissembled in his confession of faith. But in any case, even if he had private doubts, it is his public confession that we must judge him by – and that, from 1950 to the end of his life, was thoroughly Orthodox.

Now Cyprian does not mention the Council of 1935. Nor does he mention Metropolitan Chrysostom’s encyclical of 1950, nor the Old Calendarist Council under the presidency of Archbishop Auxentius in 1974 (when Cyprian himself was under his omophorion), which explicitly declared that the new calendarist ecumenists had no grace of sacraments. Nor does he mention ROCOR’s anathema against ecumenism in the previous year (1983), which fell also on the new calendarists. The reason for these omissions cannot be that he does not know of their existence. The reason can only be – although he does not write this explicitly – that he rejects their validity, or at any rate the validity of their decisions in relation to the ecumenists.

To understand why he does this, let us now turn to his theory of the Councils and their relationship to heretics... Of central importance in Cyprian’s argument is his concept of the “Unifying Synod”, that is, a Synod that unites the heretics to Orthodoxy, such as the Seventh Ecumenical Council. By implication – although, again, he does not state this explicitly here – a Synod that simply condemns the heretics without uniting them to Orthodoxy (such as the decisions of the Greek Old Calendarist Councils of 1935 and 1974 against the new calendarists, or the 1983 anathema of the Russian Church Abroad against Ecumenism) is of less significance and is not in fact competent to expel heretics from the Church. Since Cyprian’s work appeared the year after the 1983 anathema, it is possible that the whole purpose of his ecclesiology is to refute it and denigrate its significance.

In fact, it is difficult to see, according to Cyprian’s theory, how or when any heretic has been expelled from the Church. For if, before the convening of a Unifying Synod, the heretics are not outside the Church but simply an ailing faction *within* the Church, and if a Unifying Synod does not expel heretics from the Church but simply unites the ailing and the healthy parts of the same Church in a closer union, there seems to be no mechanism for the expulsion of heretics *from* the Church altogether – in other words, there are no *Separating* or *Expelling* Synods. It would not be inconsistent with his theory to suppose that those heretics who refuse to be unified by the Unifying Synod are thereby expelled from the Church altogether; but this is not stated explicitly (at any rate, in the position paper under review), so heavy is the emphasis on the supposed fact that these Synods unified rather than expelled the heretics.

Cyprian develops his concept of a “Unifying Council” thus: “During the reign of the iconoclastic innovation, for example, it was impossible for an Orthodox Synod of the entire Church to be convened. For this reason, such a Synod was convened when the iconoclastic heresy was no longer in power, that is, in 787, as

the Seventh Oecumenical Synod of union. The same Seventh Oecumenical Synod writes through its Fathers that the Synod took place 'so that we might change the discord of controversy into concord, that the dividing wall of enmity might be removed and that the original rulings of the Catholic [Orthodox] Church might be validated.' That is, it was convened so that the differing factions of the Church, divided up to the time of the Synod – the Iconoclasts disagreeing with the Orthodox belief and the Orthodox opposed to the iconoclastic heresy – might be united by means of an agreement within Orthodoxy."

This is inaccurate both as regards the Ecumenical Councils in general and as regards the Seventh Council in particular. First, there were some Ecumenical Councils that took place without the participation of heretics – the Second and the Fifth. According to the reasoning of Cyprian, these must be considered not to be "Unifying" and therefore lacking in full validity! And yet there is no "more valid" Council in Orthodox history than the Seven Ecumenical Councils.

Moreover, after several of the Ecumenical Councils many of the heretics were not only not "united", but remained in bitter enmity to the Orthodox Church. Thus there were many Arians after the First Council, many Nestorians after the Third and many Monophysites after the Fourth – in fact, all three heresies are very numerous to the present day. Even the Seventh Council was only temporarily "unifying", since the iconoclastic heresy broke out again some years later. Thus according to the reasoning of Cyprian, we must eliminate the First, Third and Fourth Ecumenical Councils from the category of "Unifying Council".

Secondly, even those Councils which took place with the participation of heretics did not receive them until they had renounced their heresies. The heretics were *outside* the Church until then. However, if, as Cyprian asserts, heretics cannot be considered to be outside the Church until they have been condemned at a "Unifying Council" in which they themselves participated, then not only were the Arians, Nestorians, Monophysites and others still "members of the Church weak in faith" until the Unifying Councils that condemned them, but, as Bishop Nektary (Yashunsky) pointed out, "we shall have to recognize the Roman Catholics and Protestants as 'as yet uncondemned members of the Church', because since the time of their separation there has not been (and until 'their union in Orthodoxy' there cannot be) a Council of the united (undivided Universal Church) in common with them!"⁴⁰⁰

"As far as the Seventh Council is concerned," continues Bishop Nektary, "not only did it not consider the iconoclasts to be a part of the Church, but they themselves did not pretend to be such."

In support of this statement, Bishop Nektary quotes from the Acts of the Seventh Ecumenical Council. "These are the words of the uniting iconoclasts. Thus Basil, bishop of Ancyra, said: 'As far as I was able, I investigated the question of the icons and converted to the Holy Catholic Church with complete

⁴⁰⁰ Yashunsky, *Ekklesiologicheskie Antitezisy* (Ecclesiological Antitheses) (MS).

conviction.' Theodore, bishop of Myra, said: '... I beseech God and your holiness to unite me, the sinful one, to the Holy Catholic Church.' (pp. 41, 43 in the edition of the Kazan Theological Academy). "

And here are the witnesses of the holy Fathers of the Council: "His Holiness Patriarch Tarasius said: 'What is now to be our relationship to this heresy that has again arisen in our time?' John, the most beloved of God, *locum tenens* of the apostolic throne in the east, said: 'Heresy divides every man from the Church.' The Holy Council said: 'That is evident.' The Holy Council said: 'Let the bishops who are standing before us read their renunciations, insofar as they are now converting to the Catholic Church.'" (p. 48).

Thirdly, the exceptional importance of Ecumenical or "Unifying" Councils should not lead us to cast doubt on *local* Councils' authority to expel heretics from the Church. Many of the heretics of the early centuries were first cast out of the Church by local Councils. For example, Arius was cast out by a local Council presided over by St. Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, in 321 and again in 323 (the First Ecumenical Council did not take place until 325). Again, local Councils convened at Rome condemned the Nestorians (under Pope St. Celestine), the Monothelites (under Pope St. Martin) and the Iconoclasts (under Pope Gregory III) – in each case *before* the convening of the Third, Sixth and Seventh Ecumenical Councils, which never disputed the validity of these local Councils, but rather *confirmed their decisions*.

Thus when the heretical bishop Theodosius in conversation with St. Maximus the Confessor disputed the validity of the local Council under St. Martin that condemned the Monothelites on the grounds that it was not convened by an emperor, St. Maximus replied that the validity of a Council depended on its recognising "the true and immutable dogmas", not on who convened it or how general it was. Again, when the same saint was asked in the Emperor's palace why he was not in communion with the Throne of Constantinople, he replied: "... They have been deposed and deprived of the priesthood at the local council which took place recently in Rome. What Mysteries, then, can they perform? Or what spirit will descend upon those who are ordained by them?"⁴⁰¹

Again, Bishop Theophan the Recluse points out that before the beginning of the Seventh Ecumenical Council, its president, St. Tarasius, bewailed the fact that "we (the iconoclastic Church of Constantinople) are being anathematised by them (the other Local Churches in Local Councils) every day".⁴⁰²

If local Councils did not have the authority to expel heretics from the Church, we should have to condemn many local Councils for exceeding their competency and assuming an authority that did not belong to them. These would include

⁴⁰¹ Fr. Christopher Birchall, *The Life of our Holy Father Maximus the Confessor*, Boston: Holy Transfiguration Monastery, 1982, p. 38.

⁴⁰² Bishop Theophan, "Chto takoe 'anafema'?" (What is 'anathema?'), quoted by Vladislav Dmitriev, *Neopravdannoe Edinstvo* (Unjustified Unity) (MS, 1996, p. 19).

many of the Councils of the Early Church, which expelled such heretics as Marcion and Sabellius; the local Councils of the Great Church of Constantinople between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries that expelled the Roman Catholics; and the Councils of the Russian Church presided over by Patriarch Tikhon that anathematized the communists and their co-workers in 1918 and the renovationist heretics in 1923. However, the Church, which has the mind of Christ, has accepted all of these acts as lawful and valid. To think otherwise is to suppose that for the last several hundred years the Church has – God forbid! – lost her God-given power to bind and to loose since the convening of the last Ecumenical or Pan-Orthodox Council!⁴⁰³

The danger to which the false Cyprianite ecclesiology exposes its followers can be seen from the behaviour of one of Cyprian's bishops, Chrysostomos (Gonzales) of Etna, California. On July 18, 1986 he wrote an open letter to the new calendar Archbishop James (Koukouzis) in which he said that his synod had cut itself off from the rest of the Old Calendar Church because it believed that the new calendar church was the mother church. "We never denied the existence of the Grace in our Mother Church" – that is, the new calendar church. "We are not another Church over and above the Mother Church". He congratulated James on "his many accomplishments" and hoped that there would one day figure among his "many accomplishments" "the bringing of your Orthodox brethren (Old Calendarists) together with you" (where?). And he ended his open letter by saying: "I the youngest and least among the traditionalist bishops in this country, ask your forgiveness for any involuntary offense and humbly kiss your right hand."

Such treachery against the Old Calendarists could not go unpunished, and on November 5/18, 1986, Archbishop Chrysostom's Synod proceeded to defrock Metropolitans Cyprian and "John of Sardinia, and those ordained by them, to wit: a) Chrysostomom Gonzales (Mexican), b) Niphon Gigoundou (Kenyan), c) Chrysostom Kouskoutopoulos, d) Chrysostom Marlasis and three more, that is: one Swedish, one Italian and one Austrian of whom their identities are unknown to us, all of whom compose the innovative "Holy Synod of Resistance". The Cyprianites were deposed for creating a schism, for giving communion to new calendarists ("because he without discernment gives the Holy Mysteries of our Church to modernizing, schismatic and ecumenist new calendarists") and for preaching that the new calendarists have grace of sacraments ("because he has fallen from the Orthodox faith... and embraced *ecumenist false beliefs*, namely, that the schismatic new-calendarists make up the unaltered One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church., which is the treasury of saving grace").⁴⁰⁴ The judgement was signed by Archbishop Chrysostomos and Metropolitans Gerontius, Callinicus (of

⁴⁰³ For the Cyprianite position, see Patrick Barker, op. cit. For criticism of the Cyprianite ecclesiology, see Holy Transfiguration Monastery, *The Struggle against Ecumenism*, pp. 112-120; V. Moss, "Can Heretics have the Grace of Sacraments?", *Tserkovnost' (Churchness)*, No 1, 2000 (in Russian); I.I. Voloshin, "Vozmozhen li 'Istinno-Pravoslavniy Ekumenizm'?" (Is 'True Orthodox Ecumenism' Possible?), *Vertograd-Inform*, July-August, 2000, pp. 45-59.

⁴⁰⁴ *Phoni tis Orthodoxias (The Voice of Orthodoxy)*, No 811, January-February, 1987, pp. 22-32. See also *Orthodoxos Khristianikos Agon (Orthodox Christian Struggle)*, No 8, February, 1987, p. 7.

Thaumakou), Anthony (of Attica and Megara), Maximus (of Demetrias and Magnesia), Callinicus (of Achaia), Matthew (of Oinoe), Calliopius (of Pentapolis), Callinicus (of the Dodecanese), Euthymius (of Thessalonica), Stephanos (of Chios), Athanasius (of Acharnae) and Justin (of Euboea).

The judgement points out that in September, 1984, after Cyprian had prayed with the ecumenist Patriarch Nicholas he had been summoned to give an account of himself, but had not appeared. Then, on September 19, he had been banned from serving for 40 days, but had continued to serve. Finally, on April 5, 1985 Cyprian and Giovanni of Sardinia had formed their own Synod and separated from the GOC Synod. The Cyprianites contested the decision on procedural grounds, in that they had not been given notification of the trial⁴⁰⁵, on factual grounds, in that they had not concelebrated with Patriarch Nicholas⁴⁰⁶, and on canonical grounds, in that they could not be judged by the Chrysostomites anyway since they had never formed part of their Synod.

This latter defence was very weak. The “Florinite” bishops as a whole formed a single group, in spite of schisms. If Florinites could not judge Florinites, then who – the new calendarists?! More serious was the criticism that if Cyprian was defrocked for giving communion to new calendarists, why not Peter of Astoria also, since he also gave communion to new calendarists, considering them to be Orthodox? In answer to that it could be pointed out that Cyprian was also defrocked for *heresy*, the heresy of ecumenism. In fact, he had developed a whole ecclesiological theory, a subtle variant on ecumenism – a charge that could not be leveled at Bishop Petros.

Nevertheless, the problem with Bishop Petros was becoming more acute. In May, 1994, Archimandrite Paul Stratigeas, Peter’s nephew and chancellor of the diocese of Astoria, admitted in an interview to the New York *National Herald*: “I provide the Mysteries to the followers of the new calendar.” However, Archimandrite Paul sincerely repented, and later, as Metropolitan of Astoria in

⁴⁰⁵ Bishop Ambrose wrote: “You also mention the fact that Archbishop Chrysostomos’ Synod apparently deposed our Metropolitan in 1986. As now, almost twenty years later, no such document has ever been communicated to us, we are still in the dark. All we have seen is a text printed in their periodical, but the four then members of their Synod whom we asked (Petros of Astoria, Gerontios of Piraeus, Antonios of Attika, and Euthymios of Thessaloniki) all said that no such text had ever been shown to them, nor had they signed it; they regarded the whole affair as an invention of the personal animosity of Kalliopios.” (personal communication, August 12, 2005)

⁴⁰⁶ Bishop Ambrose of Methone wrote: “The accusation of ‘praying with the ecumenist Patriarch Nicholas’ is delightfully absurd. As I was present, I can witness what happened: One Sunday, when the Liturgy had already begun, the door of the altar opened and in tottered, totally unexpected, Patriarch Nicholas of Alexandria. He sat there until the end (he was by then almost blind) and in the sermon the Metropolitan mentioned his presence and expressed a prayer that God would enlighten him to condemn the ecumenist heresy – otherwise no-one outside would have known he was there. Afterwards he tottered off again. Should we have thrown the old man down the steps? When one reaches such a level of silliness, how can one take anything seriously? As to the 40 days’ suspension, we knew nothing of such a decision until afterwards, when I was given a copy of the document in Kenya, of all places, by a priest of Paisios, the rev. David Palchikoff, who had been given it by Bishop Vikentios during his visit to Africa a few weeks before.” (personal communication, November 10, 2005)

succession to Peter, decreed that new calendarists who came to church seeking communion must first have confession, and then, during confession, be instructed that they must repent of the heresies of the new calendarists and receive Chrismation.

In 1994 the foremost canonist of ROCOR, Bishop Gregory (Grabbe) of Washington, deploring the decision of the ROCOR Synod to enter officially into communion with the Cyprianites, wrote, in an article entitled "The Dubious Orthodoxy of Metropolitan Cyprian's Group"⁴⁰⁷: "The newspaper *Pravoslavnaiia Rus'*, in its issue number seventeen of the present year, published the Decision of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad concerning the establishment of prayerful Eucharistic communion with the group of Old Calendarists headed by Metropolitan Cyprian of Oropos and Fili.

"In its concluding section the Decision elucidates the causes that prompted the Sobor to take this step. However, in not one of its six points does it mention that the Sobor of 1975 resolved not to have communion with the Greek groups until they themselves had become united, and the Synod, already presided over by Metropolitan Vitaly, reaffirmed this wise decision in the spring of 1993, that is, a mere year and a half ago. Everyone is aware that the Greek groups can in no wise boast of having already achieved unity, yet the present Conciliar Decision offers no explanation whatsoever for this abrogation by the Sobor of its previous resolutions.

'Thus, in the Decision it is stated; 'After deliberation and analysis of all aspects of these questions [concerning the history and ideology of this group] the Council of Bishops maintains that at the present time, when apostasy is spreading and the so-called official representatives of Orthodoxy, such as the Patriarchate of Constantinople and other patriarchates, are succumbing to and embracing the position of the Modernists and Ecumenists, it is very important for the True Orthodox to unite, make a stand together, and oppose the betrayers of the Orthodoxy of the Holy Fathers. In this regard, the Council of Bishops has decided:

'1) To establish communion in prayer and the Eucharist with the Greek Old Calendarist Synod of Metropolitan Cyprian, as well as with His Grace, Bishop Photios of Triaditsa, who heads the Bulgarian Old Calendar diocese.'"

"Bishop Photios was consecrated for the Bulgarians by the self-same Metropolitan Cyprian, and thus his legitimacy is dependent upon the legitimacy of Metropolitan Cyprian.

"It is of interest that our Sobor, while seeking union with the 'True Orthodox' Greek groups, made no effort whatsoever toward unity with the far more numerous and decent group of Archbishop Chrysostom (Kiouisis) of Athens, who has a Sobor consisting of nineteen bishops.

⁴⁰⁷ *Church News* [in Russian], No. 5, Sept. - Oct. 1994, pp. 2-4.

"The second point [of the decision] deals with informing the flock abroad of this event.

"In point number three it is stated, 'During the deliberations, the statements of those opposed to the union were also taken into account, in which the question was raised concerning the canonicity of Metropolitan Cyprian's group and their allegedly un- Orthodox teaching on Grace.'"

"Aside from his personal teaching on Grace (more on this below), Metropolitan Cyprian has likewise been accused of preaching the heresy of chiliasm.

"Concerning the 'canonicity' of this group enough has already been said and written. But what then is their 'allegedly un-Orthodox teaching on Grace?

"Preparing the ground for possible union with the Church Abroad well in advance, Metropolitan Cyprian issued a pamphlet entitled *An Ecclesiological Thesis, or Exposition on the Doctrine of the Church, for the Orthodox Opposed to the Heresy of Ecumenism*. It would seem that, judging from the title of the pamphlet, nothing could be said against such a program. The pamphlet is quite handsomely printed, even to the point of using the old orthography [i.e., pre-Revolutionary]. It was very widely distributed, and each member of the Bishop's Sobor undoubtedly received a copy.

"However, with great consternation and dismay one is forced to point out that apparently the very members of the Bishops' Committee investigating the Greek question themselves, and all the members of the Bishops' Sobor together, failed to pursue sufficiently what is called 'reading between the lines' of this pamphlet, which abounds in ancient texts and is deftly put together, but which bears little relation to the contemporary ecclesiastical situation.

"Moreover, it is obvious that they took scant notice of the canonicity (very doubtful) of Metropolitan Cyprian's group, for the subject is not at all reflected in the text of the Sobor's Decision. Likewise evident is the fact that the committee took no account whatsoever of the motives behind our own previous resolutions.

"Let us now attempt to determine precisely what sort of Orthodoxy Metropolitan Cyprian does confess and whether or not one can actually say with a clear conscience that both he and his synod 'adheres wholly to the exact same ecclesiological and dogmatic principles as our Russian Church Outside Russia' (point five of the Sobor's Decision).

"In the chapter [of the pamphlet] entitled 'The Church and Heresy,' page two, it says:

"Sinners and those who err in correctly understanding the Faith, yet who have not been sentenced by ecclesiastical action, are simply considered ailing members of the Church. The Mysteries of these unsentenced members are valid as such,

according to the Seventh Ecumenical Council, as, for example, the President of the Council, Saint Tarasios, remarks: "[their] ordination" "is from God."

"Later, in the third chapter, the author turns to the matter, 'The Division in the Church Over Ecumenism' - as he calls it.

"It seems strange to hear from a bishop who proclaims his Orthodoxy the idea that the Church can be 'divided.' The Holy Fathers have taught that She always was, is, and shall be the indivisible Bride of Christ. One can only fall away from Her or be reunited to Her through repentance. Metropolitan Anthony [Khrapovitsky] especially emphasized to his priests the necessity, after confession, of reading the ancient Prayer of Absolution which contains the word, 'reconcile and unite him to Thy holy Church,' thereby indicating that he who sins falls away from the Church. Although private confession can heal personal moral falls, it in no wise cures a public and obdurate inclination to heresy.

"Metropolitan Cyprian correctly points out that the beginning of the malady was the introduction of the Western calendar into the life of the Church in 1924. But then later he advances an opinion which in no wise corresponds to the present ecclesiastical situation.

"The followers of the festal calendar innovation,' says he, 'have not yet been specifically judged in a pan-Orthodox fashion, as provided for by the Orthodox Church. As Saint Nicodemos of the Holy Mountain writes, the violator of established precepts is considered sentenced, insofar as he is judged by 'the second entity (which is the Council or Synod).' Since 1924, the innovators have been awaiting judgment and shall be judged on the basis of the decisions of the holy Councils, both Ecumenical and local, and, to be sure, on the basis of the ecclesiastical pronouncements of the sixteenth century against what were then Papal proposals for changes in the festal calendar. 'In this respect those who have walled themselves off from the innovators have actually broken communion 'before conciliar or synodal verdict,' as is allowed in the Fifteenth Canon of the First-and- Second Council. That is to say, the innovators are still unsentenced. Consequently, [according to the teaching of Metropolitan Cyprian], 'their Mysteries are valid.'

"Metropolitan Cyprian chooses a convenient quotation from this canon to suit his purpose, but intentionally does not cite the subsequent text of the canon concerning those who separate themselves from their presidents before a synodical judgment in cases where the open preaching of heresy is taking place:

"Such persons as these not only are not subject to canonical penalty for walling themselves off from communion with the so-called bishop before synodical clarification, but [on the contrary] they shall be deemed worthy of due honor among the Orthodox. For not bishops, but false bishops and false teachers have they condemned, and they have not fragmented the Church's unity with schism, but from schisms and divisions have they earnestly sought to deliver the Church. (Canon Fifteen of the so-called First-Second Council)'

“The adherents of Roman Catholicism in Russia have from of old cited the fact that not one Ecumenical Council has ever condemned Roman Catholicism and therefore it, they say, is not a heresy. Such an opinion was quite widespread among our intelligentsia, and especially in military circles.

“Chapter Four is entitled ‘Repentance and Return.’ That which is expounded therein concerning the principle of repentance is entirely correct and in accord with the canons. Yet while offering us numerous examples of repentance which took place at one or another Ecumenical Council, Metropolitan Cyprian never so much as mentions the fact that the New Calendarists/Ecumenists not only have no intention whatsoever of repenting, but on the contrary, they persecute the True Orthodox in a most cruel manner. We have before our eyes the example of how quite recently they ‘strangled,’ one could say, Patriarch Diodoros of Jerusalem, who was attempting to defend the Orthodoxy of the Holy Fathers. Only a few months have now passed since they - by means of threats of expulsion from their monasteries, and canonical sanctions, have forced to repent before them that last bastion of Orthodoxy, the Holy Mountain - which was defending the Church from the inroads of the heresy of Ecumenism.

“Metropolitan Cyprian sees no grounds for severing communion with the New Calendarists/Ecumenists until such a time as it will be possible for a future Ecumenical Council to judge them. But who could not be aware (including the Metropolitan himself) that for almost twenty years now the Ecumenists have been preparing the program for the future - and not in the least Orthodox - ‘Eighth Ecumenical Council’? The Preconciliar Committee has already on more than one occasion published its drafts for the reports to be delivered at this future ‘Council.’ The issues to be discussed at it include the unification of all Christians, the total abolition of the fasts, married bishops, and second marriages for the clergy.

“Who, then, will be the president of this dishonorable assembly, which, according to Metropolitan Cyprian's daydreams, is supposed to condemn the Ecumenists/New Calendarists? Obviously, that crypto-Roman Catholic, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew. And those like unto him will prove to be its members: the Patriarch of Alexandria, Parthenios (who has officially declared Mohammed to be a great prophet and personally considers him an Apostle!); the Patriarch of Antioch (who has already issued a directive to his clergy granting them permission to concelebrate with the heretical Monophysites); the Patriarch of Moscow (who has signed both the Balamand Unia and the agreement concerning the Monophysites, and who has even initiated a dialogue with the Jews ‘on the highest possible level’).

“I have been given the opportunity to acquaint myself with several letters written by one of the bishops of Metropolitan Cyprian's group. From these it is quite evident that he and his fellow bishops confess their own personal, and in no wise Orthodox, doctrine concerning the possibility of the Grace-filled activity of the Holy Spirit within churches which have become manifestly heretical. ‘ALL the New Calendarists - without the least exception - are likewise very active

Ecumenists.' The Old Style Churches (Russian and Serbian) have for a long time now also confessed this very same heresy.

"But behold, this hierarch of Metropolitan Cyprian's group insists on the opinion that, so he says, 'the New Calendarists, besieged by the heresy of Ecumenism and Innovation, have not been deprived of Grace] or at any rate, it is not within our competency to make such a pronouncement on our part ... we are not speaking of union with Belial, but (only) with those ailing in faith, several of whom are in need of spiritual treatment ... in view of this, we do not totally break off communion with them.'" In another letter the same hierarch expresses the thought - totally unacceptable and absurd from a dogmatic point of view and from that of the Holy Fathers - that this group, while recognizing that the Ecumenists have Grace, is only 'walling itself off from their errors.'

"In pronouncing its Decision concerning communion with Metropolitan Cyprian's group, our Sobor, unfortunately, did not also call to mind the text of that Decision taken formerly, under the presidency of Metropolitan Philaret, anathematizing the heresy of Ecumenism. Among others it contains such words as these 'Therefore, to those who knowingly have communion with these aforementioned heretics, or who advocate, disseminate, or defend their new heresy of Ecumenism: Anathema.'

"Indeed, by not investigating the matter seriously and by forgetting about this previously confirmed anathematizing of the New Calendarists/Ecumenists (or perhaps not venturing to abrogate this resolution), our Sobor, as frightful as it may be to admit, has fallen under its own Anathema. Had it probed the net spread before it more carefully, it would never have issued such a contradictory Decision.

"Our previous Bishops' Sobors never raised the particular question concerning whether or not the New Calendarists have Grace. But the fact that formerly concelebrations with them were never permitted already testifies with sufficient clarity that the Church Abroad considered them to be without Grace.

"Must we consider that our Synod has entered upon the path of betrayal of the traditions of the Holy Fathers, or did it merely commit an error owing to poor judgment which it is still not too late to correct at the next session of the Sobor to be held in November in France?"

Metropolitans Cyprian and John "proceeded to consecrate new bishops for their self-styled 'Synod of Those in Resistance'. Unfortunately, many of the newly-consecrated bishops for the Cyprianite Synod were of similar ill-repute as their consecrators. Among the first Cyprianite bishops to be consecrated were Chrysostom (Mariasis) of Christianoupolis, Ambrose (Baird) of Methone, Michael (Pirenta) of Nora, and Symeon (Minihof) of Lampsacus. This latter bishop, among others, has a very interesting history. Born Helmut Clemens Kyrillus Symeon Minihof-Windisch, he was ordained and consecrated by bishops of the so-called 'American Orthodox Catholic Church' - a Roman Catholic organization

of Brazilian origin, in schism from the Vatican. In 1978, he was elected as 'Patriarch' Cyril of the 'American Orthodox Catholic Church', though he resided in Switzerland. 'Patriarch' Cyril resigned from his position in 1985, and was accepted into the 'Synod of Those in Resistance' under Bishop Cyprian, who installed him as Symeon, the titular bishop of Lampsacus.

At some point during this time, a certain Bishop Eulogius of Milan, formerly of the 'Lisbonite' schism and a Freemason, joined the Cyprianites. "He assisted Bishop Cyprian in performing more consecrations. Among the new bishops consecrated were Chrysostom (Gonzales) of Etna, Niphon (Kigundu) of Uganda, Auxentius (Chapman) of Photike, Photius (Siromachov) of Triaditsa, and Chrysostom (Alemangos) of Sydney. Unfortunately, all of these bishops have the same typical defects as their consecrators: they are either unacceptable on canonical grounds or confess an ecclesiology that is contrary to the teachings of the Orthodox Church."⁴⁰⁸

And so the multiplication of uncanonical Synods continued, and has continued to the time of writing...

⁴⁰⁸ Antonios Markou, personal communication.

33. ROCOR BEGINS TO CRACK

“After my death,” prophesied St. Philaret of New York (+1985), “our beloved Church abroad will break three ways ... first the Greeks will leave us as they were never a part of us ... then those who live for this world and its glory will go to Moscow ... what will remain will be those souls faithful to Christ and His Church.”⁴⁰⁹

Let us see how the first schism took place...

Metropolitans Acacius of Diauleia and Gabriel of the Cyclades had refrained from joining the Synod under Archbishop Chrysostom, and in a publication entitled *An End to Silence* (1986) they fiercely criticised their former colleague's agreement to become archbishop. In retrospect, and in view of the collapse of the Synod again in 1995, it must be admitted that there was some justice in their criticism. The problems in the dioceses of Thessalonica and Astoria had not been resolved, and would not be resolved in the period 1985-1995. On the other hand, it could be argued that *someone* had to lead the remnants of the former Auxentiite Synod, and such a leader had to come from one of Metropolitans Acacius, Gabriel and Chrysostom, who alone had not participated in the sins of that Synod. And it was now the turn of Metropolitans Acacius and Gabriel to make a mistake, when, early in 1987, they received under their *omophorion* 40 mainly Greek-American parishes led by the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Boston.

When Metropolitan Philaret died on November 21, 1985, the Boston monastery immediately expressed its support for his successor, Metropolitan Vitaly (Ustinov). Thus on February 10, Archimandrite Panteleimon wrote: "The Synodal Church is a real standard of Orthodoxy.... Therefore, discerning where the Truth is found, we remain in unity under our bishops in the midst of many trials and temptations...because grace abides in the Synod.... We uphold our Synod primarily and foremostly as a standard of Orthodoxy. All others have betrayed the Truth. This was demonstrated of late by the election of our new Metropolitan."⁴¹⁰

However, the same council which elected Metropolitan Vitaly also, writes Fr. Alexey Young, “appointed a special commission of two bishops to visit the Boston monastery and begin a private investigation into charges of sexual perversion. The commission presented its report at a meeting of the Synod on May 29, 1986, receiving testimony in person from four monks who had left the Holy Transfiguration Monastery. Fr. Panteleimon was present and denied the charges, but asked to be relieved of his position as abbot. The bishops granted his request, placing the monastery temporarily under Archbishop Anthony (Sinkevich) of Los Angeles and Southern California. The monks at the monastery

⁴⁰⁹ Fr. John Mahon, in *Facebook*, 8 October, 2016, on the basis of the testimony of Fr. Vladimir Shishkoff and Matushka Maria Shishkoff.

⁴¹⁰ Fr. Alexey Young, *The Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia*, San Bernardino, CA: the Borgo Press, 1993, pp. 75-76.

in Boston, however, ignored this and elected one of their own – another monk who had also been charged with immorality – as abbot.

“For the next several months, information and testimony continued to be gathered, with no predetermination of Panteleimon’s guilt or innocence. Looking back, the bishops may well feel that they should have hastened the investigation, for, during this period of time, an unprecedented explosion of protest erupted from the supporters of Fr. Panteleimon. The bishops were bombarded by hundreds of letters, petitions, phone calls, and personal visits – all of them protesting their ‘Elder’s’ innocence and the unfair, even ‘un-American’ way in which they believed his case was being handled.⁴¹¹

“Simultaneously, Fr. Panteleimon began to make public his own list of grievances, announcing that the bishops were, practically speaking, abandoning the Anathema against Ecumenism and beginning to compromise the Faith. Secret plans and negotiations, he charged, were being worked out with the Moscow Patriarchate so that the Church Abroad could unite with the Mother Church by 1988 (the millennium of the Baptism of Russia). According to Panteleimon, this meant that the hierarchs had become, or were in the process of becoming, *heresiarchs*, and that the faithful had better look to their souls! This was a complete reversal of his published views of only months before.

“On November 25, 1986, Metropolitan Vitaly was asked by the Synod of Bishops to suspend Fr. Panteleimon and the abbot [Isaac] who had been uncanonically elected to succeed him, pending a canonical trial.⁴¹² This was done on December 3; nine days later, Vitaly received a letter announcing that the monastery in Boston had left the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia and was taking refuge under an unnamed Greek Old Calendar bishop.⁴¹³ Synod headquarters immediately declared this action to be ‘... a flagrant violation of the holy canons of the Church and... an attempt to avoid the consequences of any final decision a spiritual court might have made concerning the accusations [of immorality]... [This is an attempt] to flee from the spiritual authority of the Church’s hierarchy...’⁴¹⁴

⁴¹¹ Fr. Alexey Young, *The Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia*, San Bernardino, CA: the Borgo Press, 1993, pp. 75-76.

⁴¹² The suspensions were in accordance with rule 159 of Peter the Great’s *Regulations* of the Spiritual Consistories: “A clergyman who has been accused of a crime is to be suspended from serving... The order for this to be done is entrusted to the local Bishop, who is obligated to take care that those who are accused of grave violation of good conduct according to God’s laws not approach to serve before the Altar of the Lord.” Also, a commission was appointed to investigate the charges of immorality against Fr. Isaac, and Hieromonk Justin was appointed as temporary administrator of the monastery. Justin later left the monastery, convinced of Panteleimon’s guilt. (V.M.)

⁴¹³ The letter was dated November 25 / December 7. (V.M.)

⁴¹⁴ Young, op. cit., pp. 77-78. For details on the case, see “Archimandrite Panteleimon Mitropoulos”, <https://www.pokrov.org/persons/archimandrite-panteleimon-mitropoulos/?fbclid=IwAR02UgeIx9rLBMimYmwSqNxR88zTVmUagyZwWijHUfkDze5vDRc0i9bSPdI>.

In their defence, the Bostonites declared that they were fleeing the ecumenism of ROCOR, its relapse into its former lax ways in relation to the "World Orthodox" only a few years after the anathema against ecumenism...

This anathema, as we have seen, was signed by all the ROCOR bishops and was entered into the *Synodicon* to be read on the Sunday of Orthodoxy each year. This was the achievement, within the Synod, especially of Metropolitan Philaret, the righteousness of whose stand against ecumenism and the MP was revealed on November 8/21, 1998, when his body was found to be incorrupt.⁴¹⁵ However, he found very little support among his fellow-bishops, and was only rarely able to impose his will, especially on the West European diocese under Archbishop Anthony of Geneva, from which several priests and parishes fled in the 1970s. Even with the more conservative hierarchs he sometimes had problems. Thus he once ordered the sprinkling with holy water of the church in the Monastery of the Holy Trinity, Jordanville, after Archbishop Averky had permitted Copts to serve there.⁴¹⁶

After Metropolitan Philaret's death, a certain weakening in the confession of ROCOR was discernible, even if the contrast between the period before and after the metropolitan's death was not as sharp as the Bostonites made it out to be. Thus early in 1986 Archbishop Anthony of Geneva openly declared his recognition of World Orthodoxy and blessed the French Mission of ROCOR under Archimandrite Ambroise (Frontier) to concelebrate with the new calendarists when they were in Greece, but not with the Old Calendarists.

They considered this to be contrary to the 1983 anathema and wrote to him: "In sending your clergy to concelebrate with the ecumenists or new calendarists, you place them under this anathema, which is a grave error... When you say that your clergy who desire to concelebrate with the ecumenists or new calendarists must, beforehand, ask for your blessing, you remind (us) of a father of a family, who would permit his children who would wish to throw themselves into the fire, to do so."⁴¹⁷

Again, in October, 1986, at a clergy conference of the Midwest Diocese, Bishop Alypius of Cleveland, standing next to the icon of the Mother of God of Kursk, declared that "in spite of all the difficulties occurring throughout world-wide Orthodoxy, our Synod of Bishops of the Russian Church Abroad does not judge any other jurisdiction as being without grace or in heresy."⁴¹⁸

Still more seriously, in his Christmas Epistle of 1986/87, Archbishop Vitaly issued an Epistle declaring that the 1983 anathema was *not* of universal

⁴¹⁵ "Incorrupt Relics Recovered", *Vertograd-Inform*, No 4, February, 1999, p. 8.

⁴¹⁶ "Metropolitan Philaret's Two Letters to Archbishop Averky", *Vertograd-Inform*, No 4, February, 1999, pp. 11-15.

⁴¹⁷ Archimandrite Ambroise, Priest Patric and Hieromonk Joseph, letter to Archbishop Anthony of Geneva, May 14/27, 1986.

⁴¹⁸ Fr. Alexey Young, "A Tireless Pilgrim", *Orthodox America*, vol. 7, No 4, October, 1986.

significance, but applied only to ecumenist members of ROCOR.⁴¹⁹ Of course, the anathema was issued by a Local Council, not an Ecumenical one. But, as we have seen, this by no means meant that, as Vitaly and the opponents of the anathema were trying to say, the anathema in fact had *no power* over anyone outside ROCOR – which was equivalent, in effect, to annulling it. The Bostonites seized on this as evidence of the fall of ROCOR. But since the epistle was published only *after* their departure, it was not direct justification of that departure...

In the opinion of the present writer, on the one hand the Bostonites *did* have a *prima facie* case for leaving ROCOR on the grounds of betrayal of the anathema against ecumenism. Moreover, it is clear that this was the decisive issue for many of the rank-and-file clergy and laity who followed them. On the other hand, the timing of the departure, the fact that they had upheld the Orthodoxy of the ROCOR Synod only a few months before, the extreme haste with which they left, and the abundant evidence of moral transgressions, makes it likely that the issue of ecumenism was not the real reason for *the leaders'* flight, but rather a fig-leaf to cover their fear of conviction at their forthcoming trial.

This is confirmed by Fr. (later Metropolitan) Anthony Gavalas: "My position when we left the Synod was that we should commemorate no-one until we saw our way clearly in the confusion. I was told that while this would be possible for the monastery, it would be destructive to the Parishes. Then, within a few hours, we were told that we must all go under Archbishop Acacius immediately so that the monastery would be covered in the face of suspensions and depositions of Frs. Panteleimon and Isaac, and I, of course, cooperated."⁴²⁰

Among the hierarchs, only Bishop Gregory (Grabbe) supported the Boston monks. The Synod, he believed had acted hastily in relation both to them and to his son, Archimandrite Anthony, who had been defrocked.⁴²¹ Bishop Gregory was promptly sacked from his post of Secretary of the ROCOR Synod after over fifty years work at the centre of the Church administration. This was contrary to the advice of both of the deputy-presidents of the Synod, Archbishops Anthony

⁴¹⁹ See "Reflections on Metropolitan Vitaly's Nativity Epistle", *Orthodox Christian Witness*, February 16 / March 1, 1987; "An Annulment of the Anathema of 1983", *Orthodox Christian Witness*, May 4/17, 1987.

⁴²⁰ Gavalas, letter of June 20 / July 3, 1987 to Fr. Neketas Palassis.

⁴²¹ The reason, according to Bishop Gregory, was his opposition to Vitaly's plans to sell the Synod building in New York (Letter to Abbess Magdalina, May 11/24, 1986; *Church News*, June, 2003, vol. 14, No 65 (#119), pp. 10-11). Bishop Gregory's daughter and Archimandrite Anthony's sister, Mrs. Anastasia Shatilova, writes: "The necessity to dismiss by any means possible the Head of the Jerusalem Ecclesiastical Mission [Archimandrite Anthony] of 17 years – is explained rather simply. Archimandrite Anthony, shortly before the repose of Metropolitan Philaret won a court case against the state of Israel over property belonging to the Mission, confiscated by the former in 1948, and Israel was to pay back 7 million dollars. This sum is laughably small, considering the true value of the confiscated property, but the Mission's lawyer believed that the material, about to be filed against the USSR, using the precedent of the case against Israel, had all the chances of winning. The case against the USSR, over the seized Gorny Convent and Holy Trinity Church with numerous buildings, which also belonged to the Mission – was to start within a couple of weeks. This is the main reason why intrigues were absolutely necessary to remove this Chief of the Mission" (*Church News*, July, 2003, vol. 14, No 66 (#120), pp. 10-11)

of Geneva and Seraphim of Chicago. It led directly to the domination of the pro-Moscow party in ROCOR. Thus from 1986 there began a “purging of the cadres”, in the course of which the leading opponents of the union with Moscow were removed and replaced by pro-Moscow ecumenists. The leaders of the pro-Moscow clique were Bishops Mark, Lavr and Hilarion. There can be little doubt, then, that the accession to power of Metropolitan Vitaly did not bring about a kind of “revolution” in ROCOR. Certainly, the last remaining elders in ROCOR, Igumen Ignaty of Hebron and Archimandrite Nektary of Eleon, bewailed it.⁴²²

In May, 1994 Bishop Gregory wrote to Metropolitan Vitaly: “For a very long time now in fact, since the first days of your leadership of our Church Abroad I have with great anxiety and turmoil of heart been tracing how quickly she has begun to slide into the abyss of administrative disorder and canonical chaos... Our woes began with the first Hierarchical Council to take place after the death of Metropolitan Philaret... On the disorganization of our Chancellery I can judge from a series of signs. Thus I was sent from Russia copies of your letters to Archbishop Lazarus and Bishop Valentine. First, I very soon managed to find out that these documents were unknown to both Secretaries of the Synod, to whom I handed over these copies. Moreover, the very subject of these letters, by the delicacy of their content, demanded their presentation by you for discussion in the Hierarchical Synod. But it turned out that the letters were not only dispatched without the knowledge of the Secretaries, but also had a whole series of other defects which quite clearly demonstrated the bankruptcy of your personal Chancellery. Although Russian notepaper was available, the letters to Russia were sent on English notepaper; they not only had no numbers, but even no dates. In the letter to Archbishop Lazarus there was no indication of whom it was being sent to, while Bishop Valentine’s title was incomplete. Finally, the very text of the letters was by no means brilliant grammatically and stylistically. Moreover, it also emerged (which is especially terrible) that at the bottom of both letters was not your signature in your own hand, but a facsimile!

Bishop Gregory concludes crushingly: “For all the years of the existence of the Church Abroad we have enjoyed respect and glory for nothing else than for our uncompromising faithfulness to the canons. They hated us, but they did not dare not to respect us. But now we have shown the whole Orthodox world that the canons are for us just an empty sound and we have become a laughing-stock in the eyes of all those who have any kind of relationship to Church questions. Look: you yourself, at the Council in Lesna, permitted yourself to say that for us, the participants in it, this was not now the time to examine canons, but we had to act quickly. You, holding the tiller of the ecclesiastical ship, triumphantly, in front of the whole Council, declared to us that now we had to hasten to sail without a rudder and without sails. At that time your words appalled me, but I, knowing of your irritation towards me because I insist that we have to live in accordance with the canons, still hoped that all was not lost and that our Bishops would somehow shake off the whole nightmare of these last years. Think, Vladyko, of the tens of thousands of Orthodox people we have deceived both abroad and in

⁴²² Isaac Gindis of Jerusalem, personal communication.

Russia. Don't calm yourself with the thought that if there is some guilt somewhere, then it lies equally on all our hierarchs. The main guilt will lie on you, as the leader of our Council. I have had to hear from some Bishops that sometimes the Synod decrees one thing, and then you, taking no account of previous resolutions, on your own initiative either change them or simply rescind them. And look now, as has already become quite well known, after the stormy March session of the Synod, it dispersed without making a single resolution. During it the question was discussed of banning the Russian Hierarchs from serving. Nevertheless, you demanded that the Secretariat that it send off an ukaz banning bishops who were not even under investigation. Both from the point of view of the 34th Apostolic canon, and from an ecclesiastical-administrative point of view, this is unprecedented lawlessness. Remember, Vladyko, your reproachful speech against Metropolitan Philaret, when in 1985 you for ten minutes non-stop fulminated against him for transgressing the 34th Apostolic canon. The crimes of Metropolitan Philaret seem to me to be miniscule by comparison with what is happening now."⁴²³

Patrick Barrett considers that the schism between ROCOR and the "Bostonites" could have been avoided if Bishop Gregory had still been at the helm: "Both Father Panteleimon and Father Isaac were prepared to step aside. True panic only hit the monastery and the parishes allied to it when the Synod refused to allow Father Justin to be named acting abbot. That's when people began to believe that the synod's true purpose was to seize the monastery. Then people began to think, well, they've eliminated Bishop Gregory and now they're going after Father Panteleimon, so they're obviously trying to take out everybody who opposes union with the MP. Bishop Gregory could have handled this situation easily. In fact, many of the people who ended up leaving ROCOR in 1986 were calling Bishop Gregory hoping for help or reassurance, but who was Bishop Gregory? By then, he was nobody to the Synod. Bishop Gregory had moral authority with the monastery and those parishes, with his help, the synod could even have removed Fathers Panteleimon and Isaac and still not lost the monastery and parishes."⁴²⁴

Be that as it may, the Bostonites fled to the protection of the Greek Old Calendarist Metropolitans Acacius and Gabriel. They were undoubtedly True Orthodox... However, in 1987, 39 of the 40 parishes left the two metropolitans *giving no canonical reason* and came under the *omophorion* of Auxentius.

Now it may be asked: why did the Bostonites not join Auxentius in the first place? The answer is clear: the crimes of Auxentius were known to Panteleimon, and more than one person who knew him well has testified that for several years before he joined Auxentius he considered him to be a traitor to Orthodoxy. It was because of this strongly expressed rejection of Auxentius that the Bostonites did

⁴²³ *Church News*, July, 2003, vol. 13, #6 (107), pp. 3-4. See also his letter of April 27 / May 10, 1986 to Archbishop Seraphim of Chicago, in *Church News*, July, 2003, vol. 14, #6 (120), p. 11.

⁴²⁴ Barrett, "ROCOR's biggest error", orthodox-tradition@yahoogroups.com, 21 July, 2004.

not join him at the beginning, but instead joined the two independent metropolitans, who were not tainted with Auxentius' crimes.

So far, an argument can be adduced in defence of the Bostonites' actions. But then why, only six months later, did they leave the two metropolitans and join Auxentius? Because Metropolitan Gabriel, disturbed by the accusations against Panteleimon, had separated from Metropolitan Acacius. This meant that the Bostonites now had no possibility of achieving one of their principal aims – a bishop or bishops of their own for America. Auxentius' Synod, on the other hand, was notoriously willing to consecrate new bishops. So it became expedient to keep silent about Auxentius' crimes (which, according to witnesses, Fr. Panteleimon had been more than willing to condemn in previous years), and to seek refuge in this most unsafe haven.

That the Bostonites were seeking of their bishop of their own is evident from a letter of Fr. Neketas Palassis to Fr. Anthony Gavalas: "Frankly, we were stunned and sorrowed by Metropolitan Gabriel's departure. Actually, it appeared we had been detoured and led into a dead-end street. Without a second bishop to give us support and credibility, we face the prospect of being one of the hundreds of *vaganti* groups which flood our nation. Without at least a second bishop we can have no hope that the clergymen who are watching us so carefully will ever join with us. Conversations with several of them have confirmed that fact. They are not attracted to us with a single bishop..."⁴²⁵

Further proof is provided by the letter of the Bostonites' secretary, dated July 2/15, 1987 to Metropolitan Acacius, in which he writes: "It is evident to all that without a hierarch who knows both English and Greek and who has sufficient theological training, the flock in America, which is constituted of both English and Greek-speaking faithful, cannot be properly served." However, it was obvious that their bishop's not knowing English was not a canonical reason for leaving him. So the Bostonites invented another reason: in the last six months, they said, they had "formed a more precise picture of ecclesiastical matters which – to an especially greater extent in recent times – have become obscured under the prism of subjective judgements, or unverified information, and this because of the difficulties of communication between the New World and Greece. Thus, they have arrived at the conclusion and conviction that, today, the reasons for your position of protest and voluntary absence from the meetings of the Synod of Archbishop Auxentios have ceased."⁴²⁶

These statements are extremely vague – we are given no idea of what new facts emerged that could so radically change their opinion of Auxentius and prove his innocence. In truth, there were no such facts. The Bostonites were thoroughly acquainted with the Church situation in Greece; it was not new knowledge that had changed the situation but the departure of Metropolitan Gabriel from their Church.

⁴²⁵ Palassis, letter of June 15/28, 1987.

⁴²⁶ Letter of Fr. Christos Constantinou, July 2/15, 1987.

Another Bostonite argument was that since Metropolitan Acacius had stated both that “if you are able to find hierarchs who have Apostolic succession, you should turn to them”, and that “the judgement, the choice and the formulation of your future course depends on you”⁴²⁷, this meant that he had blessed them to join Auxentius. But Metropolitan Acacius’ extremely negative attitude towards Auxentius was well known to all. It was obvious that by a “hierarch who has Apostolic succession” he did not mean Auxentius., whom he considered to be uncanonical.

Thus on hearing that they were going to invite Auxentius to their conference in Worcester, Massachusetts in July, 1987, he wrote: “While we were preserving vividly and indelibly the wonderful image of all that we had seen and heard during our recent visit to your Orthodox parishes, suddenly the information came, like a lightning bolt out of a clear sky, that a few of your spiritual leaders are thinking of going under the irrevocably fallen former Archbishop Auxentius.

“We hope that it is only some malicious rumour designed to defame your Orthodox ecclesiastical communities before all Orthodox everywhere and to render futile the struggle you have waged on behalf of the strictness of Orthodoxy. That is what we believe, for only the utmost madness and morbid recklessness would otherwise explain the subjugation of a Movement on behalf of piety and the preservation of the traditional genuineness of our Holy Orthodoxy under a leader who so tragically failed and brought the Church of the True Orthodox in Greece into contempt and disrepute.

“A multitude of uncanonical actions and illegal ordinations done with supreme disdain for the authority of our Holy Church, the ungodfearing trampling down of the Sacred Canons, and the devious manner of the ‘ordination to the episcopate’ of the piteous and miserable Dorotheus Tsakos render Auxentius guilty before Divine and human justice, as well as before the impartial and unbribable judgement of history itself.

“Can it be that you seek refuge in such a wreckage of a house? Shudder, O sun, and groan, O earth! If that be the case, you will with your own hands destroy your own work and raze your spiritual edifices to the ground. Moreover, you offer to your enemies unexpected arguments against yourselves. These are much more powerful than the arguments with which they presently seek to sully the reputation of the pious and virtuous clergymen who, at the present moment, stand at the head of your struggle!

“And, above all, such a thoughtless and frivolous action will sever the unity of your ecclesiastical communities because those among you whose souls have a more acute sense of smell will not be able to tolerate the stench of that devious failure Auxentius’ condemned and illegal actions.

⁴²⁷ Letter of Metropolitan Acacius to Protopresbyter Panagiotes Carras and the most venerable presbyters and hieromonks with him, February 17, 1987, Protocol No 282.

“It is out of a pained heart that we write the above so that the beacon of Orthodoxy will not be so ignominiously extinguished, the beacon which is lit by the strictness of your Orthodoxy and your blameless ecclesiastical ethos.

“And besides, as long as you came freely and unconstrained by anyone and committed the episcopal supervision of your parishes to me, I condemn any discussions with Auxentius as divisive acts and I advise you to cut them off completely.

“Do not forget that ‘he who acts in secret from his bishops serves the devil’, according to St. Ignatius the Godbearer...”⁴²⁸

However, the Bostonites concealed the letter of their archpastor from his flock and, to the great distress of many clergy and laity, removed almost all their parishes from the jurisdiction of a true bishop to that of a condemned schismatic, *giving no canonical justification whatsoever for their act.*

In December, the former French mission of ROCOR in Paris, led by Archimandrite Ambroise Frontier, left the Chrysostomites because of dissatisfaction with a priest in the south of France and followed the Bostonites under Auxentius’ *omophorion*.⁴²⁹ Before his death in 1994, Auxentius ordained several bishops for this group, who now call themselves “The Holy Orthodox Church in North America” (HOCNA). And so Auxentius’ Church, which had almost died out in Greece, received a new lease of life.

Auxentius proceeded to acquit the Bostonite leaders of homosexuality. But Fr. Anthony Gavalas wrote: “Given Archbishop Auxentius’ toleration, at least, of homosexuals in his own jurisdiction, of what use will be an exoneration signed by him? Will it not allow our enemies to say that the monastery is guilty and so placed itself in a jurisdiction tolerant of such violations?”⁴³⁰

He was not far off the mark, and in 2012 Abbot Isaac admitted publicly that the charges against Fr. Panteleimon were true... This, together with HOCNA’s embracing of the name-worshipping heresy, led to most of HOCNA’s clergy and parishes leaving and joining the Florinite Old Calendarists under Archbishop Kallinikos of Athens...

⁴²⁸ Metropolitan Acacius, letter of July 1, 1987, Protocol No 287. For other criticism of the Bostonite position, see Letter of Reader Polychronius to Monk Pachomius, October 12/25, 1989; “Pis’mo Arkhiep. Antonia Los-Anzhelosskogo V. Redechkinu” (A Letter of Archbishop Anthony of Los Angeles to V. Redechkin), *Russkoe Pravoslavie* (Russian Orthodoxy), No 4 (8), 1997, pp. 26-28. For the Bostonites’ account of these events, see *The Struggle against Ecumenism*, op. cit., pp. 125-160.

⁴²⁹ The present writer’s parish in England was being served by the French mission at this time. When he protested to Fr. Ambroise that he felt he had no good canonical reason for following Ambroise out of the Chrysostomite Synod, Fr. Ambroise said to him: “Yes, you have no good reason; you should stay.”

⁴³⁰ Gavalas, quoted by Archpriest Alexander Lebedev, “Re: [paradosis] Re: Re 1986-1987”, orthodoxtradition@yahoo.com, January 12, 2002).

34. SUPER-ECUMENISM (2)

In the 1980s Western Christianity continued its unrelenting descent into paganism. A kind of climax was achieved in 1984, when the Anglican Dr. David Jenkins, who did not believe in the Divinity of Christ or His Resurrection, was appointed Bishop of Durham. The people finally rebelled, signing a huge petition that he should not be ordained. The Anglican hierarchy rejected the petition, and the ordination took place in York Minster at the hands of the Archbishop of York, Dr. John Habgood. On the Sunday evening following, the archbishop preached in favour of the ordination. A few hours later, in the early morning of July 9, 1984, out of a cloudless sky, lightning struck precisely the part of the cathedral where the ordination had taken place. The wooden vaulted roof of the south transept was destroyed. The interior suffered extensive damage. The bishops said that, far from being an act of God demonstrating God's wrath, it actually showed His mercy in that most of the cathedral had been preserved. The *London Times* begged to differ. It pointed out in an editorial the next day: "A bolt from heaven the very night after the Archbishop preached in defence of his Durham appointment before the assembled synod: it is hard not to be reminded of Elijah and the priests of Baal..."⁴³¹

Not only did the leading bishops of the West not believe in the main dogmas of the Christian faith: they placed Christianity on a level with the non-Christian religions. Thus Pope John Paul II, while remaining conservative in his moral teaching and trashing Marxism in his native Poland, showed himself extremely accommodating to the theist enemies of Christianity. Thus in 1985 he blessed the publication, by the Vatican's Pontifical "Commission for Union with Non-Christians", of a twelve-page document containing new directives "for a correct presentation of Jews and Judaism in sermons and in the catechism of the Catholic Church". The twelfth paragraph of this document declared: "Heeding the same God, Who has spoken on the foundation of the same word (that the Jews have), we must bear witness according to the same remembrance and with a common hope in Him Who is the Lord of history. Therefore it is necessary for us to take upon ourselves the obligation to prepare the world for the coming of the Messiah, working together for social justice, for the respect of the rights of the human personality, and of the nation, and of international social reconstruction. The law of love for one's neighbour, the common hope of the Kingdom of God, and the great heritage of the prophets motivate us, both Christians and Jews, to do this. Such a conception, taught sufficiently early through the catechism, would educate young Christians for a cooperation and collaboration with the Jews which would exceed the limits of simple dialogue."⁴³² It would indeed, for it would involve Catholics becoming Jews, awaiting the same "Messiah" that the Jews are waiting for – that is, the Antichrist!...

⁴³¹ *The Times*, July 10, 1984.

⁴³² Bishop Gregory (Grabbe), "Partnership – the Pope and an Atheist", *Orthodox Life*, vol. 42, No 3, May-June, 1992, p. 16.

On February 2, 1986, John Paul II received on his forehead the Tilac or Tika, the red powdery paste of the Hindus, the sign of recognition of the adorers of Shiva.

Then, in 1986 the Pope invited the leaders of all the world's religions to pray for "peace in our time" in Assisi. "On the joint prayers in Assisi (Italy) we have documentary films. How useful it would be to show them to the zealots of 'Orthodoxy Soviet-style'! Behind the tribune there followed, one after the other, Catholics, Protestants, African idolaters in war-paint, Red Indians in feathers, an invoker of snakes, the Dalai Lama, who confesses himself to be a god, Metropolitan Philaret [Denisenko] of the Moscow Patriarchate, and many, many others, raising up prayers behind the tribune – each in his own style: the Red Indian smoked the pipe of peace, the invoker of snakes brought his cobra. And over all this there ruled, as the chief pagan priest, the Pope of Rome, whom the whole of this multi-coloured crowd in feathers, tattoos, loin-cloths and metropolitan mitres came up to greet in a luxurious, colourful and unending queue – over which there hovered, unseen, the 'positive relationship' and blessing of Patriarch Pimen..."⁴³³

An Italian Catholic newspaper, *Si Si No No* wrote: "Never has our Lord been so outraged, never have His holy places been so profaned, His Vicar so humiliated, His people so scandalized by His own ministers, as at Assisi. The superstitions of the several false religions practised at Assisi pale by comparison with the betrayal of our Lord by these ministers. In St. Peter's the bonzes adored the Dalai Lama (for them, a reincarnation of Buddha). In that church a statue of the Buddha was placed atop the Tabernacle on the main altar. In St. Gregory's the Red Indians prepared their pipe of peace on the altar; in Santa Maria Maggiore's, Hindus, sitting around the altar, invoked the whole range of Hindu gods; in Santa Maria degli Angeli's, John-Paul II sat in a semi-circle of wholly identical seats amidst the heads of other religions so that there should be neither first nor last."⁴³⁴

Even as ecumenism reached its zenith, difficulties were encountered. The Pope, in particular, in spite of his extreme ecumenism, was having difficulties in his relations with the Jews, with the Anglicans and with the Orthodox, not to mention the liberal wing of his own confession.⁴³⁵ Thus in May, 1987, during his visit to Germany, the Pope planned to canonize Edith Stein, a Jewish convert to Catholicism who became a Carmelite nun and was tortured to death by the Nazis in Auschwitz. In memory of this new saint the Polish Carmelite Order decided to construct a small monastery on the site of the former concentration camp. But this aroused great fury among the Jews, who claimed that Auschwitz was "a Jewish

⁴³³ *Obnovlentsy i Moskovskaia Patriarkhia: preemstvo ili evoliutsia?* (The Renovationists and the Moscow Patriarchate: succession or evolution?), Suzdal, 1997, p. 15. In September, 1998 the Pope said: "Through the practice of what is good in their own religious traditions, and following the dictates of their consciences, members of other religions positively respond to God's invitation, even though they may not recognize Him as their Saviour" (*Vertograd* (English edition), December, 1998, p. 11)

⁴³⁴ Cf. Leslie Childe, *The Daily Telegraph*, October 28, 1986, p. 7.

⁴³⁵ "The Pope and his Critics", *The Economist*, December 9, 1989.

monument" and that the canonization of a Jewish convert to Catholicism was "not particularly tactful", since it implied that for the Pope only those Jews who converted to Catholicism were good. Eventually, the Jews dropped their objections to the canonization; but the nine Catholic nuns were forced to leave Auschwitz and abandon their plans of building a monastery there.⁴³⁶

Again, difficulties arose in relations with the Anglicans because of the Anglican decision, in March, 1987, to allow women to serve as priests - in spite of the fact that it had been made quite clear to the Anglicans that their ordination of women priests would endanger ecumenical relations with the Orthodox and the Catholics. It demonstrated that the real inner dynamic of ecumenism is *not the desire for union, but the desire for the new* - that is, modernism in all its forms. Although Rome remained committed to a male celibate priesthood, it, was affected by these modernist winds, as Malachi Martin wrote: "A peculiar piece of desecration of Christ's Church is being committed by the anti-church in its fomenting of the feminist movement among female religious. Jesus, in his sufferings, had at least the consolation of knowing that the women among his followers did not scatter like scared rabbits, nor did they betray him. They stayed with him to the bitter end of Calvary. Today, the women's movement in the Church, certainly allowed and in some cases encouraged by the anti-Church, is bent on desecrating the Body of the Church in the Sacrament, in the sacred vows of religion, in the precious function of priest, pastor and teacher. All this can be traced to the Judas complex, part of the mystery of iniquity that is now operating in high gear throughout the Roman Catholic institutional organization."⁴³⁷

A third difficulty was the increasing tension in Catholic-Orthodox relations. These relations had reached a new high in November, 1987, when Patriarch Demetrius went to Rome and concelebrated with the Pope (up to but not including communion from a common chalice).⁴³⁸ At this point it seemed as if nothing could prevent the full union of the Orthodox Churches with Rome.

But while the Pope's ecumenism was welcome to the apostate Orthodox hierarchs, his anti-communism was not. Thus in 1986 Patriarch Pimen publicly criticised the Pope for criticising socialism and dialectical materialism. "We speak out," he said, "for the cooperation of Christians, Marxists and all people of good will... which only increases our perplexity at those sections of the recent Encyclical of Pope John-Paul II, *Dominum et vivificantam* which are devoted to materialism and Marxist doctrine.... [The encyclical] contains elements directed towards the division and opposition of Christians and Marxists... In the encyclical an attempt is made to analyse the system of materialism... as an ideology... It is quite obvious that such a combined application of materialist doctrine to life can be found first of all in the socialist states and countries, which

⁴³⁶ "Vatikan i Evrei" (The Vatican and the Jews), *Pravoslavnaia Rus'* (Orthodox Russia), No 8 (1340), April 15/28, 1987, p. 9.

⁴³⁷ Martin, *The Keys of This Blood*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990, p. 676.

⁴³⁸ "O 'Patriarkhis' Dimitrios symprosevkhetai kai sylleitourgei me tous airetikous" (Patriarch Demetrios prays together and liturgises with heretics), *Agios Agathangelos Esphigmenitis* (St. Agathangelos of Esphigmenou), No 104, November-December, 1988, pp. 10-44.

have chosen the socialist path of development... It is precisely in these countries that the creation of a new life by the efforts of believers and unbelievers working together is being realised... This reality, as we understand it, contradicts those positions of the encyclical in which it is affirmed that materialism as a system of thought has as its culmination – death... Insofar as ‘signs of death’ are indicated in relation ‘to the dark shadow of materialist civilisation’, the impression is created, in the context of a critique of Marxist doctrine, that in all this the states and people who follow the socialist path of development are guilty... It remains to express our profound sadness at such a position.”⁴³⁹

Even in an age distinguished by unheard-of betrayals of Orthodoxy, this amazes one by its audacity: the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church officially defending the doctrine of materialism!!!

A critical point was reached in the millennial year of the Baptism of Rus’ in 1988. Since the Baptism of Rus’ in 988 had taken place when the Eastern and Western Churches were in full communion, this festivity might have been expected to have ecumenical potential. However, the nationalist revival had begun in the Baltic States, and the Russian secular and ecclesiastical authorities feared that if the Pope were invited to the country, his presence might provide a focus for separatist sentiment in the Baltic and Ukraine as it had in Poland earlier in the decade. So they offered him an invitation on condition he did not visit those areas. The offer was refused...

Encouraged by the radicalism of their “elder brother”, the Pope, Orthodox leaders plunged to new depths of apostasy. Thus in 1989 Patriarch Parthenius of Alexandria declared: “The prophet Mohammed is an apostle. He is a man of God, who worked for the Kingdom of God and created Islam, a religion to which belong one billion people... Our God is the Father of all men, even of the Muslims and Buddhists. I believe that God loves the Muslims and the Buddhists... When I speak against Islam or Buddhism, then I am not found in agreement with God... My God is the God of other men also. He is not only the God of the Orthodox. This is my position.” A Greek newspaper commented on these words: “So ‘Mohammed is an apostle’ and the new-martyrs, then, are ‘not found in agreement with God!’”⁴⁴⁰ Another newspaper said: “He denies Christ and likens himself to Mohammed!”⁴⁴¹

This amounted, according to A.D. Delimbasis, to “the mortal sin of denial of one’s faith. Even were Patriarch Parthenius to repent of this, he can be accepted in the Orthodox Church only as a layman. ‘Should he repent, let him be received as a layman,’ says the Canon [Apostolic Canon 62].”⁴⁴²

⁴³⁹ *Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii* (The Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), No 10, 1986.

⁴⁴⁰ *Epignosis* (Knowledge), December, 1989, 20. See “Vremia Dejstvovat” (It is Time to Act), *Moskovskij Tserkovnij Vestnik* (Moscow Ecclesiastical Herald), No 17, December, 1989, p. 3; *Orthodoxos Typos* (Orthodox Press) (Athens), No 854, October 6, 1989; *La Lumière Du Thabor* (The Light of Tabor) (Paris), No 24, 1990, pp. 121-23.

⁴⁴¹ *Neoi Anthropoi* (New Men), February 24, 1989.

⁴⁴² Delimbasis, *Rebuttal of an Anticanonical “Verdict”*, Athens, 1993, p. 12.

The newspapers and theologians might criticise the patriarch's blasphemy, but not one of the Local Orthodox Churches did repent. On the contrary: they seemed by their actions to express their approval of the Alexandrian patriarch's conversion to Islam, and strove to imitate it. Thus Metropolitan Pitirim of Volokolamsk, the head of the MP's publishing department, instead of using the new-found freedom of his Church to publish desperately needed Bibles and patristic literature, blessed the publication of – the Koran!

Extreme though Catholic ecumenism might be, it did not go so far as to include communism and dialectical materialism in its embrace. In fact, as we have seen, Pope John-Paul II played a part in the downfall of communism in his native Poland, and hence in the rest of Eastern Europe. The "honour" for taking ecumenism to the extreme even of embracing materialism belongs, unfortunately, not to the Catholics, but to the pseudo-Orthodox.

"To what lengths of lunacy," exclaims St. Philaret the New Confessor, "has contemporary mankind gone to! It is not difficult to arrive at this conclusion, if one observes what is transpiring in the world. Recently, there was a press report stating that the organization of the so-called World Council of Churches - which includes nearly all Christian denominations and Orthodox Churches, except one i.e., ROCOR - has accepted as a full member, a new religious order that serves Satan! Satanism has been embraced by the World Council of Churches! Consequently, this means that the ill-fated person, which heads this frightening and ungodly teaching - Satanism, will be seated at the same table with representatives of Christian faiths, perhaps assisting in the formulation of ecumenical communion and services that will not displease anyone! This means that the WCC has secured a new brother-in-arms, a new colleague - the leader of this insane Satanism. Incidentally, in passing, and as I stated before, nearly all Orthodox Churches have joined the World Council of Churches, the most recent being the partial entry of the American Red Sovietonomous Church, which has now existed for a number of years. All these developments beg the question - where to now? This is the extent of madness that humanity has reached! Yet they yell that the Church cannot keep up with them. But keep up with what? I reiterate - it's not the Church that has lagged behind the times, but these people that have created their new lifestyle. They are the ones that have fled from the Church to who knows where, and their demise will be frightening!"⁴⁴³

⁴⁴³ St. Philaret, from his homily on "Love Your Enemy" (in its original, unexpurgated version).

35. JAPAN AND THE TIGER ECONOMIES

If West Germany was the hub of one of the two new areas of sustained growth and prosperity in the world, the other was Japan, which led the way for the East Asian “tiger economies”. The essential conditions of the two miracles were the same: American military protection from communist aggression and the free development of a market economy. Both regions were recovering from the terrible destruction of world war, and the virtual tabula rasa they therefore started from enabled them to build sounder institutional foundations for their societies (from a secular point of view) and thereby, in a seemingly miraculous way, to catch up with, and even overtake, the older market economies, which did not need to undergo radical reconstruction.

“Japan had completed its post-war reconstruction by 1953, only four years after Germany, and then embarked on a twenty-year period of growth which averaged 9.7 per cent annually. This was nearly twice the rate of any other major industrial nation in the post-war period. The only true comparison is with the spectacular growth of the American economy in the forty years up to 1929. The ‘miracle’ was based on the car, with the growth of passenger car production in the intense period 1966-72 at the astonishing rate of nearly 29 per cent a year, with Japanese car ownership rising by a third annually. Between the end of the 1950s and the end of the 1970s, Japanese car production increased one hundred times, reaching over 10 million in 1979, roughly the American total, and overtaking it decisively in the early 1980s. Of this production about half was exported. From cars the Japanese spread over virtually the whole range of consumer goods. In 1979 they became the world’s leading watch producer, with 60 million (50 million for Switzerland). They ousted America as the leading producer of radios in the 1960s, and of television sets in the 1970s, the same decade they took the lead from Germany in camera production. During the 1970s, Japan’s *per capita* industrial production equalled America’s and in certain important respects she became the world’s leading industrial power. In 1978 she had an industrial trade surplus of \$76 billion (against a US industrial trade deficit of \$5 billion). By the end of the decade she had a steel capacity as big as America’s and almost as big as the entire EEC. In the 1980s, in many fields, Japan overtook the United States and European producers in quality too, particularly in high-technology areas such as jets, machine-tools, robots, semi-conductor, calculators and copiers, computers and telecommunications, advanced energy systems, including nuclear power, and rocketry. By 1980 her investment was twice America’s *per capita*, and in some years during the 1980s exceeded it in absolute terms.

“Japan’s rate of economic growth slowed a little in the 1980s but it continued to make spectacular advances in the financial sector. It weathered the stock market crash of October 1987 with remarkable aplomb and within a year had pushed the United States into second place as the world’s largest banking nation...”⁴⁴⁴

⁴⁴⁴ Johnson, *Modern Times*, pp. 731-732.

And yet, writes Paul Johnson, “there was nothing miraculous about this miracle. It was a straightforward case of Adam Smith economics, with no more than a touch of Keynesianism. A high percentage of fixed capital formation, very little of it in non-productive investment. Moderate taxation. Low defence and government spending. A very high rate of personal saving, efficiently channeled into industry through the banking system. Shrewd import of foreign technology under licence. Very fast replacement rate of existing plant, made possible by remarkable wage restraint, with productivity running well ahead of wages. Labour was plentiful because of construction in the agricultural sector, and exceptionally well-educated and skilled because Japan (and the Asian market states generally) geared the educational expansion noted already closely to industrial needs and not to social science ideologies. Indeed, the East Asian market states were the only ones to gain economically from the revolution in higher education in the 1960s, which in Europe and North America proved such a handicap. It is true that Japan benefited substantially from the windfalls of first the Korean then the Vietnam war. But all the other factors were of their own making. The Japanese government provided a degree of external protection and export support. But its chief contribution was to erect a framework of intense internal competition, on an Adam Smith model, and a climate of benevolence towards business.

“What was unique to Japan, and perhaps her most creative contribution to the modern world, was the way in which business used the principle of anthropomorphism and the new anti-collective stress on the family, already mentioned, to humanize the industrial process and so reduce the destructive impact of class warfare. Trade unions were by no means inactive in Japan: there were, in fact, 34,000 of them by 1949. Nor were they unsuccessful. Plant bargaining and productivity improvements, with the pressure coming from fellow-workers rather than management, meant that Japanese wage-rates rose faster in real terms than those of any other major industrial country during the 1970s and 1980s, with the highest degree of job security and the lowest unemployment, an average of 2.6 per cent in the late 1980s. Equally important, by the 1970s Japan had achieved greater equality of income distribution than any other industrial economy and, with the possible exception of the Scandinavian economies, have moved further than other market economies to eliminate absolute poverty. But most Japanese firms supplemented the efforts of unions by enveloping the worker in a familial embrace which included housing, meals, medical care, ethical guidance, sport and holidays. The anthropomorphism extended to the product and even the customers. At the Kubota Iron and Machinery Works, for instance, the workers were taught to see their machines as mothers and fathers, engendering sons and daughters – the company’s finished products – which were then ‘married’ to customers, using salesmen as marriage brokers. Kubota dealers then provided ‘postnatal aftercare’, to the satisfaction of both ‘bride’ and ‘bridegroom’. In the company’s chief product, a mechanical tiller, the casing of the machine was treated as the body, the engine as the heart. Visitors to the factory were ‘family relations’, ‘friends of the family’. The workers ran highly critical ‘self-improvement committees’ to promote productivity and sales, composed and calligraphed hortatory banners and were supplied with masses of

production and investment figures on which to brood. They contributed enthusiastic poetry to the works magazine. The kind of collectivist production propaganda which failed so signally in Soviet Russia, and even in China where it was applied far more skilfully, worked in the non-totalitarian context of Japan, where it was given a human scale, a voluntary impulse and, not least, was seen to produce immediate and substantial gains in personal consumption.”⁴⁴⁵

And yet there was something profoundly unsettling about Japan’s success in producing a successful “marriage” between man and machine in the workplace. As artificial intelligence and robotism has developed throughout the western world in the twenty-first century, the distinctions between human, animal and machine have become blurred in younger minds, to the extent that computers are perceived as living beings and (in Japan) female robots have come to exceed even human females in satisfying the needs of the male of the species. Steven Spielberg’s superb film *A.I.* (2001) is the first in a long series that has explored the implications for humanity of this new development, which may be described as both ultra-modern and neo-pagan, when the works of men’s hands will again be worshipped or venerated as at least equal to the image of God himself.

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“The huge and sustained expansion of the Japanese economy was decisive in creating a dynamic market environment for the entire Pacific areas. It acted both by direct stimulus and by example. The most striking example was South Korea. A World Bank team reported in 1977: ‘The sustained high rate of expansion in incomes over fifteen years has transformed Korea from one of the poorest developing countries, with heavy dependence on agriculture and weak balance of payments, to a semi-industrialized middle-income nation with an increasingly strong external payments position. Taiwan’s progress followed the same course. In 1949, when the now totally discredited KMT regime took over, the economy was substantially pre-industrial. The transformation, like Japan’s, began with a highly successful land reform, followed by a rapid rise in farmers’ incomes, creating a local market for new factories. Over 90 per cent of agricultural land passed into the hands of the farmers who tilled it. No-strike laws were agreed and enforced. Duty-free processing zones were created. At times in the 1970s and 1980s, exports rose to 90 per cent of GNP, the highest proportion in the world, and growth rates occasionally hit the 12-per-cent mark. Thus, on top of a sound agricultural base, a complex industrial economy was created, revolving around shipbuilding, textiles, petrochemicals and electronic equipment. Hong Kong’s progress was, in some ways, even more impressive, since it had to absorb about 5 million refugees from mainland China, about five times the number of Palestinians the entire Arab world had filed to resettle. Here again, as in Taiwan and Japan, stability of government (provided by the Colonial Governor, advised by a local Legislative Council), and consistency of economic policy over forty years, provided the ideal hospitable environment for business, though in Hong

⁴⁴⁵ Johnson, *Modern Times*, pp. 733-735.

Kong's case the future, during the early 1990s, became overshadowed by the approaching merger with the Chinese Communist Republic, set for 1997.

"Singapore, after some instability in the decade after 1945, at last found a solid government framework in 1959 under Lee Kuan Yew's People's Action Party which began as a socialist movement but soon became a passionate and masterful instrument of the market. As Lee put it, after two decades of successful wealth-creation: 'The question was how to make a living... a matter of life and death for two million people... How this was to be achieved, by socialism or free enterprise, was a secondary matter. The answer turned out to be free enterprise, tempered with the socialist philosophy of equal opportunities for education, jobs, health and housing. In the 1980s, Lee was frequently accused in the Western media of authoritarianism, putting pressure on the courts and local newspapers, and bullying the (tiny) opposition. On the other hand, during his rule of over thirty years (he went into semi-retirement in 1991), he had some claim to be considered the most successful of all the post-war statesmen, in terms of the material benefits he conferred on his country and its people.

"Singapore was notable for possessing no natural resources at all, other than its geographical position. Japan, Korea and Taiwan (but not Hong Kong) had some reasonably good agricultural land; otherwise none of these enterprise states began their ascent with any physical advantages, other than a potentially strong work-force. As one report put it: 'The success is almost entirely due to good policies and the ability of the people, scarcely at all to favourable circumstances or a good start.' The way in which these rugged market economies flourished from the 1960s onward encouraged better-endowed Pacific neighbours to switch to the free market for both agriculture and business. Thailand's growth accelerated rapidly after it acquired a stable pro-market government in 1958, and achieved economic 'take-off' in the 1960s with growth rates at one time of 9 per cent annually. It was one of the few Third World countries that managed to sustain its agricultural exports position, by raising productivity by 15 per cent a year and expanding acreages. During the 1980s its *per capita* income had risen to \$810 (1986), more than four times that of its once-richer but now long-socialist neighbour Burma, at \$200 (1986). During the 1970s and 1980s Malaysia also did well, thanks partly to handsome natural resources but mainly to political stability and economic realism, pushing itself into the middle-income bracket with \$1,850 *per capita* (1986). Indonesia, one of the world's best-endowed nations in natural resources, began to recover from a disastrous start under the Sukarno regime, and even the Philippines, bedevilled by Muslim-Catholic clashes, the pilfering of the monstrous Marcos regime and insurgency then and thereafter, made some progress, achieving a *per capita* income of \$614 by 1986.

"Hence during the quarter-century 1965-90, the Pacific, defying the tyranny of its vast distances, became the prime trade development area of the world, thanks of market economics..."⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴⁶ Johnson, *Modern Times*, pp. 735-736.

Taking the experience of the 1970s and 1980s in the First and Third Worlds together, we come to the following conclusions:-

1. Peace and prosperity are best served by a free market economy, albeit modified to some extent by the need for welfare provision and therefore taxation to that purpose.
2. Democracy is not a necessary condition of this peace and prosperity. What is necessary is political stability, whether achieved by a democratic or an authoritarian regime.
3. Totalitarianism of any kind destroys peace and prosperity.

Of course, this discussion has been conducted in purely secular terms, assuming that the aim of the state is purely secular and material. But this is not the case. Almost all states at all times have also had religious or ideological aims or bases.

The prosperous states of Eastern Asia in this period have almost all had as their main ideology the western one of democracy, free trade and human rights. This hardly qualifies as an ideology at all, since God, the soul and life after death do not figure in it at all. Rather, it is a mechanism for regulating conflict. As such it is not to be scorned. But the experience of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has shown that it is a weak defence against more powerful religious and nationalist ideologies. In particular, it fails against the ideology of communism, even if all the material advantages are on the side of the democrats, as the Vietnam War in particular demonstrates. But where God wills, even the mightiest totalitarian state can succumb even when no other state is seriously threatening it.

That is the subject of the next section.

III. COMMUNISM IMPLODES (1985-1991)

36. THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION: (1) THE COMING OF GORBACHEV

“Hardly anyone,” writes Ian Kershaw, “whether in Eastern or in Western Europe, foresaw what was coming. Radical change in an apparently ossified Soviet bloc seemed unthinkable. That it would come from within the Soviet Union itself was unimaginable. Nor did Mikhail Gorbachev have any idea, when he became head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 11 March 1985, that within six years his actions would utterly transform world history. He wanted to reform the Soviet Union; he ended up destroying it.”⁴⁴⁷

At the moment of Gorbachev’s accession, writes Ferguson, “the Soviet economy was still estimated by the CIA to be around 60 percent the size of the U.S. economy; the Soviet nuclear arsenal was larger than the American. The Third World had been going the Soviets’ way for much of the previous twenty years, with clients and proxies scattered across the globe. In the words of the historian Adam Ulam, ‘In 1985, no government of a major state appeared to be as firmly in power, its policies as clearly set in their course, as that of the USSR.’ Yet within four and a half years of Gorbachev’s appointment, the Russian imperium in Central and Eastern Europe had fallen apart, followed by the Soviet Union itself by the end of 1991...”⁴⁴⁸

The causes of the Fall of the Soviet Union and its empire were multiple: internal and external, material, psychological and spiritual. Putin has called it “the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the twentieth century”. For a communist, that is a fair assessment; for a Christian, the phrase applies with much greater justice to the Russian Revolution of 1917, which the events of 1985-91 appeared to reverse - although, as we shall see, the reversal was very far from complete.

Among the material causes perhaps the most important was the example and pulling power of the evil empire’s western competitor, the United States, and perhaps still more the prosperity and stability of its closer neighbour, the European Union, which acted as a dissolving acid sapping at the foundations of the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. In the 1970s the military dictatorships of Greece, Portugal and Spain had disappeared; and in the 1980s all three countries joined the European Union and NATO. If this could happen to the military dictatorships of the Right, why could not the same process happen to the military dictatorships of the Left? Already the Communist East was becoming dangerously influenced by, and dependent on, the Capitalist West. In politics, western parliamentary pluralism and human rights appealed to many of the subject-slaves of the Soviet empire. Culturally, Western pop music was as popular to the easterners as their own stars. Economically, the East increasingly depended on the West for technology, while its debts to Western banks increased inexorably - and were increasingly hard to repay.

⁴⁴⁷ Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster*, p. 313.

⁴⁴⁸ Ferguson, *Doom. The Politics of Catastrophe*, London: Allen Lane, 2021, pp. 208-209.

But Communism, though dead on its feet, stubbornly refused to be buried. "The problem of Communism," writes Lucian Boia, "was that in the natural order of things, it could not function. It was conceived and put into practice in defiance of elementary human and social laws. How could a system function without property, without competition and without sufficient individual motivation? Perhaps only by creating a 'new man', as was indeed the intention. Communism was kept alive by artificial means (tolerating a variable sector of private property and free commerce), and its survival was due to a great extent to the inflow of Western credit and assistance. The real miracle was not the collapse of Communism but the fact that it was able to go on so long!"⁴⁴⁹

"The Soviet Union," wrote Revel in 1985, "is undoubtedly sick, very sick. It will die, that's certain... because it is in and of itself a society of and for death. But the prime question of our time is which of the two events will take place first: the destruction of democracy by communism or communism's death of its own sickness?..."⁴⁵⁰ Indeed, a superficial view of the situation would have confirmed Revel's judgement that the West would collapse before the Soviet Union. As John Darwin writes, "In the mid-1980s the scope of Soviet ambition seemed greater than ever. From a forward base at Camranh Bay in southern Vietnam, the Soviet navy could make its presence felt across the main sea lanes running through South East Asia and in the Indian Ocean, a 'British lake' until the 1950s. By laying down huge new aircraft carriers like the *Leonid Brezhnev*, Moscow now aimed to rival the Americans' capacity to intervene around the globe. But then in less than half a decade this vast imperial structure – the ruling power across Northern Eurasia, the tenacious rival in Southern Asia, Africa and the Middle East – simply fell to pieces. By 1991 it was an empire in ruins. There was no 'silver age' or phase of decline: just a calamitous fall..."⁴⁵¹

This epochal change was made possible by the one institution in the state that understood what was happening - the KGB, which backed the one man in the Politburo willing and able to effect change - Gorbachev. For Gorbachev had visited the West and been influenced by it. And, as Norman Stone writes, the KGB, unlike almost everybody else, "knew how far things had gone wrong, and, with a view to shaking up the old men, saw that a degree of public criticism and respect for law would be helpful, quite apart from the good impression to be made abroad."⁴⁵²

For what? For averting looming catastrophe. For, as Vladimir Bukovsky and Pavel Stroylov write: "By the beginning of the 1980s, the Soviet leadership had finally woken up to the fact that their system had entered a period of profound structural crisis. On the one hand, their economic model, unproductive and wasteful by definition, like all socialist models, had brought them to the brink of bankruptcy. On the other, their very 'success' in exporting that model to other

⁴⁴⁹ Boia, *Romania*, London: Redakction, 2006, pp. 111-112.

⁴⁵⁰ Revel, *How Democracies Perish*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985, p. 85.

⁴⁵¹ Darwin. *After Tamerlane. The Rise & Fall of Global Empires, 1400-2000*, London: Penguin, 2007, p. 477.

⁴⁵² Stone, *The Atlantic and its Enemies*, London: Penguin, 2010, p. 541

countries was becoming an unbearable burden to carry on their shoulders. With their troops bogged down in Afghanistan, and with the Polish crisis looming large on their doorstep, the 'cost of Empire' had become virtually unsustainable. Simply put, they had suddenly realised that their economic base was too small for their global ambitions. Added to that a new round of the arms race forced on them by Ronald Reagan, falling oil prices and a growing discontent at home, and one could understand their sudden urge for reforms. A final blow came with Reagan's obsession with the 'Star Wars' project. The Americans might have been bluffing, but the Soviets had to follow suit regardless, trying to compete in the very sphere where they were most behind the West – high-tech."⁴⁵³

Yuri Andropov, Brezhnev's successor as general secretary, had been Soviet ambassador to Hungary in 1956, and then head of the KGB for many years. This made him a disciplinarian *par excellence*, who introduced an anti-corruption campaign and feared that more freedom would bring down the whole system (which it did). At the same time, he knew that liberalizing reforms had to be permitted, especially in economics; otherwise, the whole system would still collapse. After the death of the hard-line Kremlin ideologist, Mikhail Suslov, in 1982, he felt that a window of opportunity for change had come; but poor health prevented him from undertaking such change himself. In any case, he was himself a persecutor of dissidents and could probably never have broken the crust of Stalinism within himself, let alone in the country as a whole. His hope for the future was his friend Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, with whom he had had long discussions while on holiday in the North Caucasus.⁴⁵⁴

Who was Gorbachev? "Gorbachev's ideas," writes Figes, "were shaped by the Khrushchev thaw, the defining intellectual influence on the revolution's third and final generational phase. Born in 1921, Gorbachev came from a younger generation than the Party leaders who preceded him – Khrushchev (born in 1894), Brezhnev (1906), Andropov (1914) and Chernenko (1911) all having been born before 1917. Unlike them, he had not made his career in Stalin's time. He was the first leader to have played no part in Stalin's crimes. In fact his family – peasants from the Stavropol region in southern Russia – had been victims of Stalin's war against the peasantry during the 1930s. His paternal grandfather was sent into exile in Siberia for failing to fulfil the sowing plan of 1933 – a year of famine when three of his six sons and half the population of his village died of starvation. His maternal grandfather, who was the kolkhoz chairman, was arrested as a 'Trotskyist' in 1937. Gorbachev concealed this 'spoilt biography' until 1990. He made his way through life and rose through the Party despite the origins of his background as the grandson of an 'enemy of the people'. That experience was no doubt at the root of his commitment to overcome the legacies of Stalinism."⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵³ Bukovsky and Stroilov, *EUSSR: The Soviet Roots of European Integration*, Worcester Park: Sovereignty Publications, 2004, p. 4.

⁴⁵⁴ William Taubman, *Gorbachev. His Life and Times*, London: Simon & Schuster, 1988, 2017, pp. 138-144.

⁴⁵⁵ Figes, *Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991*, London: Pelican, 2014, pp. 382-383.

Gorbachev was a clever, hardworking man who did not drink or chase women or take bribes, and who, moreover, had learned from his own peasant background and from his time as party leader in Stavropol province, that the communist system was not delivering and badly needed reform. In fact, it was incapable of reform, and needed to be abolished, but Gorbachev did not realise this. His intellectual sympathies, cemented by several visits to Western Europe, were with the liberal Eurocommunists. Nevertheless, Figes aptly calls him “the last Bolshevik”, for he remained a convinced Leninist (apparently without ever fully understanding Lenin) until the end of his rule. Stone also aptly calls him, borrowing a phrase of Lenin’s to describe capitalists who unwittingly help the communist cause, “the last useful idiot”.⁴⁵⁶ But he was an idiot for the opposite reason, being more useful to the capitalists than the communists in that his reforms unwittingly destroyed the system he was trying to support.

As Norman Lowe writes, “Andropov had encouraged and promoted reform-minded people – Mikhail Gorbachev, Yegor Ligachev and Nikolai Ryzhkov were all appointed as Central Committee Secretaries. When Andropov realized that he probably had only a short time to live, he tried to make sure that Gorbachev would succeed him. He sent written instructions to this effect to the Central Committee, but Chernenko’s supporters intercepted them and Andropov died before he could take any further action. The Politburo chose Konstantin Chernenko as next Secretary-General, although he was 72 years old and already terminally ill with emphysema and hepatitis. He had had an undistinguished career in the party and owed his rise to the fact that he had been a personal assistant to Brezhnev. It seems incredible that the Politburo should have chosen such a man, who was intellectually limited, and so weak that he could hardly speak coherently, to be leader of their state. One suggested explanation is that the majority wanted somebody who would abandon the anti-corruption campaign and leave them in peace and quiet. Chernenko was just the man: he had no ideas of changing anything or even much awareness that things needed to change. As Dmitri Volkogonov puts it: ‘Chernenko was not capable of leading the country or the Party into the future. His rise to power symbolized the deepening of the crisis in society, the total lack of positive ideas in the Party, and the inevitability of the convulsions to come.’ After only 13 months in office, much of the time too ill to attend Politburo meetings, he died in March 1985.”⁴⁵⁷

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Gorbachev was finally elected unopposed to the post of Secretary General of the Soviet Union (he was even supported by the last of the Stalinist dinosaurs, Andrei Gromyko) in March, 1985. His first year in office was essentially a continuation of Andropov’s policies, including his anti-corruption campaign. But he quickly perceived that much more was required. For, as he admitted to the Twenty-Seventh Communist Party Congress in 1986, “the targets for economic development set in the Communist Party programme, and even the lower targets

⁴⁵⁶ Stone, *op. cit.*, p. 536.

⁴⁵⁷ Lowe, *Mastering Twentieth-century Russian History*, Houndmill: Palgrave, 2002, p. 396.

of the 9th and 10th 5-year plans have not been attained. Neither have we managed to carry out the social programme charted for this period. A lag has ensued in the material base of science and education, health protection, culture and everyday services.”

This lag was important because, as Plokhy writes, “the communists ruled the country not only by means of terror and coercion but also with the promise of a brighter future. That future was called the attainment of communism, which in the popular mind meant an abundance of food and consumer goods. Khrushchev had promised the advent of that paradise in the early 1960s. With no communism in sight and the economy in decline, faith in the coming paradise and its prophets hit bottom. In promising a communist future, the authorities had contrasted the achievements of the socialist economy with those of its capitalist counterpart in the West, claiming that Soviet socialism was destined to outperform capitalism in the interest of the toiling masses. That promise was never fulfilled. If the contrast was still plausible in the 1950s and 1960s – the Soviet gross national product (GDP) more than tripled between 1950 and 1965 – by the 1970s the Soviet economy was no longer competitive. In 1970, it was about 60 percent as large as the US economy; after that, it declined steadily, and by 1989 it was less than half the size of the American economy.”⁴⁵⁸

Especially striking was the sharp fall in grain production in the years 1980-84 by comparison with the rapid rise in Chinese production.⁴⁵⁹ Also important was the sharp drop in the price of oil – oil was the Soviet Union’s main foreign currency earner, and also a major means of blackmailing its satellite states in Eastern Europe, to whom the Soviets supplied the oil at prices far below world prices. According to Stephen Kotkin, it was only the high price of oil in the 1970s that “averted Armageddon” for the USSR.⁴⁶⁰ Only in the defence sector was the Soviet economy performing reasonably well – as well it should, considering the vast sums poured into it, at the expense of the living standards of ordinary people.

Yuval Noah Harari argues that it was the Soviets’ backwardness in technology that was the main cause in their country’s collapse: “Socialism, which was very up to date a hundred years ago, failed to keep up with new technology. Leonid Brezhnev and Fidel Castro held on to ideas that Marx and Lenin formulated in the age of steam, and did not understand the power of computers and biotechnology. This partly explains why Khrushchev’s 1956 [“we will bury you!”] never materialised, and why it was the liberal capitalist who eventually buried the Marxists. If Marx came back to life today, he would probably urge his few remaining disciples to devote less time to reading *Das Kapital* and more time to studying the Internet and the human genome.”⁴⁶¹

⁴⁵⁸ Plokhy, *Lost Kingdom. A History of Russian Nationalism from Ivan the Great to Vladimir Putin*, London: Allen Lane, 2017, p. 300.

⁴⁵⁹ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, London: William Collins, 1988, p. 636.

⁴⁶⁰ Kotkin, in Ferguson, *Doom*, p. 208.

⁴⁶¹ Harari, *Homo Deus*, London: Vintage, 2017, p. 319.

The technological gap was indeed growing larger. The backwardness of the Soviets in such fields as computer technology made them fall ever further behind the Americans, whose “Star Wars” technology threatened to make the Soviet missiles redundant. As David Reynolds writes, “Back in the 1970s the United States seemed to be floundering. Industrial growth had stagnated, inflation was out of control and the heavy industries on which the post-war boom had been based, like cars and textiles, were no longer competitive against Asian competition. Parts of urban America seemed like a rustbelt. In the 1980s, however, new service industries, spearheaded by IT and boosted by deregulation, seemed to signal a ‘post-industrial’ society. Meanwhile, however, the Soviet Union remained a ‘heavy metal’ society – locked in the smokestack industries of yesteryear. Behind the Iron Curtain deregulation and the IT revolution were inconceivable. The Soviets had found it hard enough to keep up with mainframe computers; their anaemic consumer economy offered no stimulus to PC development; and the cell-phone explosion was totally impossible in a closed society. Information is power and, under communism, both were tightly controlled.

“In computers and electronics the Soviet Union lagged behind European clients like Czechoslovakia and East Germany, yet even then their pirated products did not compare with authentic Western versions that were now flooding into eastern Europe. ‘With these computers comes not only technology but also ideology,’ lamented one Czech computer designer. ‘Children might soon begin to believe that Western technology represents the peak and our technology is obsolete and bad.’ In ten years’ time, he warned, ‘it will be too late to change our children. By then they will want to change us.’

“So the PC and information revolution posed a double challenge to the Soviet bloc – both economic and ideological. Moscow’s Five-Year-Plan of 1985 envisaged 1.3 million PCs in Soviet schoolrooms by 1995, but the Americans already had 3 million in 1985 and in any case the main Soviet PC, the Agat, was an inferior version of the crude and now antiquated Apple II.

“Gorbachev was keenly aware of these problems...

“Becoming part of the American-led information age was a major reason why Gorbachev was so anxious to forge a new relationship with the United States. Otherwise the USSR would be consigned to obsolescence. By the 1980s, in fact, the whole Soviet bloc was in ‘a race between computers and collapse’.”⁴⁶²

Dominic Lieven has compared Gorbachev’s task in modernizing the Soviet economy to Alexander II’s in modernizing Imperial Russia. But the risks for Gorbachev, he points out, were much greater than for Alexander II. “By 1986-7 it seemed clear that the socialist command economy, even when purged of

⁴⁶² Reynolds, *America. Empire of Liberty*, London: Penguin, 2010, pp. 525, 526. The importance of the new information technology was impressed upon him also by foreign visitors, such as Reagan’s Secretary of State George Schultz.

Brezhnevite sloth by Andropov's reforms, could not hope to compete with capitalism in the era of the spaceship and the computer. But, as the 1990s have shown, even in countries where the transition from socialism to the market is inherently easier than in the Soviet Union the process is bound to be lengthy, risky and very painful. Moreover, the nationalities problem was also much more serious than in the monarchy's last years. The bulk of the non-Russian population were no longer peasants and nomads, largely immune to nationalist appeals. Large middle classes existed in all the republics. Under Soviet law these republics were states in embryo, possessing even the constitutional right to secede. A Soviet regime which stressed its allegiance to the rule of law and began to breathe democratic life into representative institutions which previously had been merely a façade faced enormous risks.

"Difficult 'objective circumstances' were therefore one reason why, unlike under Alexander II, Gorbachev's attempt to introduce controlled modernization from above went swiftly off the rails and led to the collapse both of Communism and of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the 'human factor' cannot be ignored. The disintegration of the economy was, to a very great extent, due to a string of disastrous blunders made by the Gorbachev leadership itself, whose grasp of the principles underlying economic reform was very weak. By 1989 the economy was being integrated and disciplined by the old methods of command, not by a market. Complete financial irresponsibility reigned. Moreover, until it was far too late the leadership vastly underestimated the threat of minority nationalism and had no policy with which it might realistically be combated. Even in March 1990 a decision to accept the Balts as a special case and to offer generous levels of autonomy to other republics might well have held the core of the Soviet Union together but blindness continued to prevail. Economic collapse, which devastated Moscow's prestige and appeal, coupled with republican nationalism killed the Soviet Union but the process was far from inevitable..."⁴⁶³

The process was far from inevitable, for Gorbachev could have chosen the Chinese way of economic liberalization and decollectivization before and instead of political liberalization. But Gorbachev, who visited China during the Tiananmen demonstrations in June, 1989, consciously rejected the Chinese way. The result was the fall of the Soviet Union...

⁴⁶³ Lieven, *Nicholas II*, London: Pimlico, 1993, p. 358.

37. THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION: (2) CHERNOBYL AND REJKJAVIK

In his first year Gorbachev's rule the new slogan was "acceleration" – only it wasn't new (Khrushchev had coined it), and the only thing that accelerated was the decline of the country. Gorbachev worked very hard to get things moving. But his methods were the old, ineffective ones of more bureaucracy, more personnel changes and more centralization.

And then came Chernobyl. On April 26, 1986 at 1.23 a.m., "one of the four huge graphic reactors at the nuclear power plant at Chernobyl (Ukraine) exploded, releasing into the atmosphere 120 million curies of radioactive materiel – more than one hundred times the radiation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki *combined*. The plume of atomic fallout was carried north-west into Western Europe and Scandinavia, reaching as far as Wales and Sweden and exposing an estimated five million people to its effects. In addition to the 30 emergency workers killed on the spot, some 30,000 people have since died from complications caused by exposure to radiation from Chernobyl, including more than 2,000 cases of thyroid cancer among residents in the immediate vicinity.

"Chernobyl was not the Soviet Union's first environmental disaster. At Cheliabinsk-40, a secret research site near Ekaterinburg in the Ural Mountains, a nuclear waste tank exploded in 1957, severely polluting an area 8 km wide and 100 km long. 76 million cubic metres of radioactive waste poured into the Urals river system, contaminating it for decades. 10,000 people were eventually evacuated and 23 villages bulldozed. The reactor at Cheliabinsk was from the first generation of Soviet atomic constructions and had been built by slave labor in 1948-51.

"Other man-made environmental calamities on a comparable scale included the pollution of Lake Baikal; the destruction of the Aral Sea; the dumping in the Arctic Ocean and the Barents Sea of hundreds of thousands of tons of defunct atomic naval vessels and their radioactive contents; and the contamination by sulphur dioxide from nickel production of an area the size of Italy around Norilsk in Siberia. These and other ecological disasters were all the direct result of indifference, bad management and the Soviet 'slash and burn' approach to natural resources. They were born of a culture of secrecy. The Cheliabinsk-40 explosion was not officially acknowledged for many decades, even though it occurred within a few kilometres of a large city – the same city where, in 1979, several hundred people died of anthrax leaked from a biological weapons plant in the town centre.

"The problems with the USSR's nuclear reactors were well known to insiders: two separate KGB reports dated 1982 and 1984 warned of 'shoddy' equipment (supplied from Yugoslavia) and serious deficiencies in Chernobyl's reactors 3 and 4 (it was the latter that exploded in 1986). But just as this information had been kept secret (and no action taken) so the Party leadership's first, instinctive

response to the explosion on April 26th was to keep quiet about it – there were, after all, fourteen Chernobyl-type plants in operation by then all across the country. Moscow's first acknowledgement that anything untoward had happened came fully four days after the event, and then in a two-sentence official communiqué.⁴⁶⁴

“But Chernobyl could not be kept secret: international anxiety and the Soviets' own inability to contain the damage forced Gorbachev first to make a public statement two weeks later, acknowledging some but not all of what had taken place, and then to call upon foreign aid and expertise. And just as his fellow citizens were then made publicly aware for the first time of the scale of official incompetence and indifference to life and health, so Gorbachev was forced to acknowledge the extent of his country's problems. The bungling, the mendacity and the cynicism of the men responsible both for the disaster and the attempt to cover it up could not be dismissed as a regrettable perversion of Soviet values: they *were* Soviet values, as the Soviet leader began to appreciate.”⁴⁶⁵

As Alexander Lee writes, commenting on the testimonies collected in Svetlana Alexievich's *Chernobyl Prayer* (1997), “the disaster illustrated all that was wrong with the decaying Soviet system. It was not just that the reactor had been built by corrupt contractors, or poorly maintained by incompetent apparatchiks. It was that they had been lied to. No one had told them about radiation or its effects, even after the explosion. They had blundered blindly into a terrifying world of cancer and death. In their agony, they railed and fulminated at all that the USSR had been. But when they looked at what the Soviet Union had been replaced with, they saw even greater suffering. Now that socialism had gone, they were abandoned. No one wanted to be near them, let alone waste money treating their illnesses. It was no surprise that, when they narrated their experiences, they gave the impression that they would have preferred the rotten certainties of the Soviet system than this hopeless, inhuman freedom...”⁴⁶⁶

The worship of science in the Soviet Union had always been excessive – although this was a sin it shared with its rival, the United States. Thus the space race was more than simple technological rivalry; it was a race to see which system was superior because more “scientific”... However, on May 7, 1984, the Day of the Physicist, it became not just scientific, but idolatrous, even *satanic*. For on that day a satanic ball was staged by nuclear physicists that was captured in a 1988 documentary film called *Zvezda Polyn'* (the star of Chernobyl).⁴⁶⁷ The film-maker clearly saw a link between the ball and the terrible catastrophe that had taken place at Chernobyl only two years earlier...

⁴⁶⁴ The present writer was a member of a group of Surrey University students in Russia at the time. The first they heard of the disaster was not from the Soviet authorities, but from parents phoning up from England. The authorities at first denied the news. (V.M.)

⁴⁶⁵ Judt, *Postwar*, pp. 596-603.

⁴⁶⁶ Lee, “Portrait of the Author as a Historian, No. 12: Svetlana Alexievich”, *History Today*, June, 2017, p. 88.

⁴⁶⁷ <https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-3TYAU3i221c/WHuWLLamaJI>.

“The star of Chernobyl” is a clear reference to Revelation: “Then the third angel sounded. And a great star fell from heaven, burning like a torch. And it fell on a third of the rivers and on the springs of water. The name of the star is Wormwood [*Apsinthos* in Greek, *Chernobyl* in Ukrainian, denoting a bitter herb found in the region]. A third of the waters became wormwood, and many men died from the water because it was made bitter” (8.10-11)

Many Christians at the time saw the explosion at Chernobyl as the direct fulfilment of this prophecy. The KGB-ruled Moscow Patriarchate, of course denied it. But then, “four months later, on 31 August, the Soviet passenger liner *Admiral Nakhimov* sank in the Black Sea, with the loss of over 400 lives. Five weeks later, on 6 October, a Soviet nuclear submarine, with sixteen multiple nuclear warheads, disappeared without trace in the mid-Atlantic.”⁴⁶⁸ Another disaster linked with nuclear power. This could hardly be a coincidence... The nuclear industry was the jewel in the crown of Soviet industry...

Chernobyl constituted such a blow to the prestige of Soviet science and technology that it, more than any other event, must be considered to have precipitated the fall of the Soviet Union. For it forced the Soviet leaders to abandon traditional Soviet methods. The physical explosions prefigured the political implosion of the whole empire. ...

Already before Chernobyl, Gorbachev’s attempts to introduce a limited kind of market economy had turned out to be unsuccessful. For, as Tony Judt writes, “The reforming instinct was to compromise: to experiment with the creation – from above – of a few favoured enterprises freed from bureaucratic encumbrances and assured a reliable supply of raw materials and skilled labor. These, it was reasoned, would serve as successful and even profitable models for other, similar, enterprises: the goal was controlled modernization and progressive adaptation to pricing and production in response to demand. But such an approach was foredoomed by its operating premise – that the authorities could create efficient businesses by administrative fiat.

“By pumping scarce resources into a few model farms, mills, factories or services the Party was indeed able to forge temporarily viable and even notionally profitable units – but only with heavy subsidies and by starving less-favored operations elsewhere. The result was even more distortion and frustration. Meanwhile farm managers and local directors, uncertain of the way the wind was blowing, hedged their bets against the return of planned norms and stockpiled anything they could lay their hands on lest centralized controls tighten up again.

“To Gorbachev’s conservative critics this was an old story. Every Soviet reform program since 1921 began the same way and ran out of steam for the same reasons, starting with Lenin’s New Economic Policy.”⁴⁶⁹ Serious economic reforms

⁴⁶⁸ Johnson, *Modern Minds*, p. 756.

⁴⁶⁹ However, NEP did not so much fail as was not allowed to succeed by Stalin. Until Stalin cut it short, it was doing well – because its principles were capitalist, not communist. (V.M.)

implied the relaxation or abandonment of controls. Not only did this initially exacerbate the problems it was designed to solve, it meant just what it said: a loss of control. But Communism depended on control – indeed Communism *was* control: control of the economy, control of information, control of movement and opinion and people. Everything else was dialectics, and dialectics – as a veteran Communist explained to the young Jorge Semprún in Buchenwald – ‘is the art and technique of always landing on your feet’.

“It soon became obvious to Gorbachev that to land on his feet as he wrestled with the Soviet economy he must accept that the Soviet economic conundrum could not be addressed in isolation. It was but a symptom of a larger problem. The Soviet Union was run by men who had a vested interest in the political and institutional levers of a command economy: its endemic minor absurdities and quotidian corruption were the very source of their authority and power. In order for the Party to reform the economy it would first have to reform itself.

“This, too, was hardly a new idea – the periodic purges under Lenin and his successors had typically proclaimed similar objectives. But times had changed. The Soviet Union, however repressive and backward, was no longer a murderous totalitarian tyranny. Thanks to Khrushchev’s monumental housing projects most Soviet families now lived in their own apartments. Ugly and inefficient, these low-rent flats nonetheless afforded ordinary people a degree of privacy and security unknown to other generations: they were no longer so exposed to informers or likely to be betrayed to the authorities by their neighbors or their in-laws. The age of terror was over for most people and, for Gorbachev’s generation at least, a return to the time of mass arrests and party purges was unthinkable.

“In order to break the stranglehold of the Party *apparatus* and drive forward his plans for economic restructuring, then, the General Secretary resorted instead to ‘*glasnost*’ – ‘openness’: official encouragement for public discussion of a carefully restricted range of topics. By making people more aware of impending changes and heightening public expectation, Gorbachev would forge a lever with which he and his supporters might pry loose official opposition to his plans...”⁴⁷⁰

In his own words, the catastrophe “shed light on many of the sicknesses of our system as a whole. Everything that had built up over the years converged in this drama: the concealing or hushing up of accidents and other bad news, irresponsibility and carelessness, slipshod work, wholesale drunkenness...”

As William Tauber writes, “That even the untouchable nuclear realm turned out to be rotten suggested that the whole system was, too. For the flaws revealed at Chernobyl and afterward were characteristic of the system as a whole: rampant incompetence, cover-ups at all levels, and self-destructive secrecy at the top. ‘Chernobyl really opened my eyes,’ Gorbachev recalled. ‘In a sense, he continued, his life could be ‘divided into two parts: before Chernobyl and after it.’”⁴⁷¹

⁴⁷⁰ Judt, op. cit., pp. 596-603.

⁴⁷¹ Tauber, op. cit., p. 241.

Arms control talks now acquired a new relevance and urgency, as both countries, but especially the USSR, felt the financial strains of the arms race. In 1985 the Soviets reached their peak in nuclear warheads, which was now considerably higher than the Americans' stockpile. None of the geriatric leaders of the late Soviet Union – Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko – had the courage or the vision to suggest a massive mutual reduction in nuclear arms, which would have been to the advantage of both sides. Nor, at first, did Reagan. But he had been deeply affected by the Korean Airlines disaster in 1983, when a Soviet missile shot down a civilian airline that had accidentally strayed into Soviet airspace, and by apocalyptic films like *The Day After*.

Then, in 1984 Gorbachev visited London. After some lively, no-holds-barred conversations, Margaret Thatcher was favourably impressed, saying she thought she could “do business” with him. The news was conveyed to Washington, and with some misgivings on both sides the first Reagan-Gorbachev summit on arms reduction took place in Geneva in 1985.

Gorbachev was ready to play for huge, unprecedented stakes. The reason was simple: Star Wars and the American lead in military technology. “The response [to it] in the Soviet Union had been the usual one: step up military expenditure. Gorbachev, too, at first thought that the Soviet Union had to increase its military spending substantially, which would enable it to catch up with the USA and overcome the deficiency in, especially, information technology. But he quickly grasped that another way of approaching the problem would be to work for a fundamental alteration in international relations with the United States. He envisaged extensive nuclear disarmament. This would persuade the Americans that their expensive Strategic Defence Initiative was wholly unnecessary. Faced with the obvious problem that a substantially greater budget for defence when the civilian economy was already under strain would severely limit the possibilities of improving the standard of living of Soviet citizens, Gorbachev was able to persuade the Politburo to try his alternative approach. The conservatives had nothing with which to counter his arguments except persevering with policies – tried, tested and failed – that would make matters worse. Moreover, they were worried about what Andropov, only two years earlier, had emphasized as Reagan's reckless unpredictability, fearing that he was planning a surprise attack on the Soviet Union. They had come close to panic in 1983 when Soviet intelligence mistook a NATO military exercise as a sign of imminent nuclear attack – the most dangerous flashpoint since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, though hushed up at the time. Finally, they realized that the stationing of the SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe had been a failure, which – apart from the exorbitant cost – had merely provoked the West into retaliating by the deployment of the superior Pershing 11 missiles, against which the Soviet Union had no effective

protection. So the conservative military establishment was open to change. Again: the weakness of the conservatives was Gorbachev's strength..."⁴⁷²

Reagan was also prepared to take risks, and at the Reykjavik summit in October, 1986 a quasi-miracle nearly took place. According to the American minutes of the meeting Reagan "asked whether Gorbachev was saying that beginning in the first five-year period and then going on in the second we would be reducing *all* nuclear weapons – cruise weapons, battlefield weapons, sub-launched and the like. It would be fine with him if we eliminated all nuclear weapons" (emphasis added).

Gorbachev said, "We can do that. We can eliminate them."

"Then, let's do it," added Secretary Shultz.

"This was the climax of Reykjavik," writes William Taubman. "For those who believe in abolishing nuclear weapons, it was a miracle. It was bizarre. After decades of empty talk of eliminating all nuclear weapons and convoluted agreements to modestly limit their number, after leaders and experts on both sides reluctantly concluded they were actually a good way to keep the peace, and many around the world sadly reconciled themselves to their permanent existence, Gorbachev and Reagan suddenly agreed to eliminate them in ten years. This showed how far Gorbachev's 'new thinking', and Reagan's as well, had come. "

Everything now depended on whether SDI could be placed on the bargaining table. For it was SDI that rendered conventional nuclear arms talks obsolete. For if your enemy has SDI, what is the point of your having conventional nuclear weapons? "The rest of the discussion, which centered on SDI, was passionate but unproductive. Gorbachev took a 'principled' stand. Reagan said he would not 'give in'"⁴⁷³

Gorbachev was very angry at the outcome, and Reagan was very disappointed. Thatcher, by contrast, was "totally appalled" at the prospect of complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Her view was that nuclear weapons, once invented, could not be disinvented, so they just had to be accepted as a fact of life.

⁴⁷² Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster*, pp. 326-327.

⁴⁷³ Taubman, *Gorbachev. His Life and Times*, London: Simon & Schuster, 1988, 2017, pp. 300-301. At Reykjavik, writes Serhii Plokhy, "Reagan and Gorbachev all but agreed – to the horror of their advisers – to liquidate nuclear arms entirely. What stood in the way of the deal was Reagan's insistence on continuing to develop his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a missile defense program. Gorbachev believed that SDI, if ever implemented by the Americans, would put the Soviets at a disadvantage. The summit ended in a deadlock, and the world seemed to be returning to the darkest days of the Cold War. But the dialogue was eventually resumed. Andrei Sakharov, the father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb and a prominent political dissident, helped convince Gorbachev that SDI was little more than a figment of Reagan's imagination" (*The Last Empire*, London: Oneworld publications, 2015, p. 13). See also David Reynolds, "US-Soviet arms- control talks collapse in Iceland", *BBC World Histories*, April/May, 2017, pp. 66-71. (V.M.)

Nevertheless, a positive momentum had been created. In December, 1987 the two sides signed the Intermediate Forces Treaty, agreeing to eliminate all ground-based missiles within a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometres. Then, “addressing the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 7 December 1988 [the 71st anniversary of the foundation of the KGB], Gorbachev announced that he was unilaterally reducing the Soviet armed forces by half a million men and would be withdrawing six armoured divisions from the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Hungary by 1991. He referred to a ‘common goal’ for humanity in establishing a peaceful world. Class struggle was not mentioned. He was turning his back on the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. He had come far in a short time...”⁴⁷⁴

From then on, largely through the Gorbachev-Reagan talks, absolute numbers of nuclear weapons declined in both countries, especially in the USSR; approximate parity was reached in 2000.⁴⁷⁵

America eventually won the arms race, and the ruinous expense of the Soviets’ failure to keep up was one of the causes of the fall of the Union. However, the cost to America was also huge. The U.S. National Debt was already standing at \$2.3 trillion in April 1987, but in July 1992 it stood at \$4 trillion, which meant that each American family in effect owed something like \$50,000. Just over 40% of all personal income tax went into servicing this gigantic debt.

⁴⁷⁴ Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster*, p. 323.

⁴⁷⁵ See chart in “Going Nuclear”, *The Economist*, October 8-14, 2016, p. 36. We must not ignore biological weapons: “the Soviet Union was engaged in a massive program of research into biological weapons, in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention that it signed in 1972. According to Kenneth Alibek, a former Soviet scientist who worked in Biopreparat in the late 1980s, the Soviets developed antibiotic-resistant strains of plague, glanders, tularemia, and anthrax, including the highly virulent 836 strain. Its operational biological weapons were capable of delivering tularemia, glanders, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, and brucellosis about a hundred miles behind enemy lines, while its strategic biological weapons were designed to carry plague and smallpox to targets in the United States. Other pathogens being developed for use in biological weapons, according to Alibek’s testimony, included Q fever, the Marburg, Ebola and Machupo viruses, hemorrhagic fever, Lassa fever, and Russian encephalitis” (Niall Ferguson, *Doom. The Politics of Catastrophe*, London: Allen Lane, 2021, p. 232).

38. THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION: (3) GLASNOST' AND PERESTROIKA

Armed with a new insight into the radical inadequacies of the Soviet system, and inspired with a new courage to face the opposition from hardliners he knew must inevitably come, Gorbachev embarked on his flagship policy of perestroika, "reconstruction".

"It was not until the January 1987 Plenum of the Central Committee that Gorbachev announced the launching of his perestroika campaign, describing it as a 'revolution' in its radical restructuring of the command economy and the political system. Gorbachev invoked the Bolshevik tradition to legitimize his bold initiative, closing his speech with the lofty words: 'We want even the sceptics to say: Yes, the Bolsheviks can do anything. Yes, the truth is on their side. Yes, socialism is a system that serves man, his social and economic interests and his spiritual elevation.' This was the voluntarist spirit of another October 1917.

"Economically, perestroika... rested on the hopeful assumption that market mechanisms could be added to the structures of the planned economy to stimulate production and satisfy consumer needs. State controls on wages and prices were loosened by a 1987 Law on State Enterprises. Cooperatives were legalized in 1988, resulting in a NEP-like sprouting up of cafés, restaurants and small shops or kiosks, selling mostly vodka (now re-legalized), cigarettes and pornographic videos imported from abroad. But these measures failed to ease the shortages of food and more important household goods. Inflation grew, exacerbated by the lifting controls on wages and prices. Only the dismantling of the planned economy could have solved the crisis. But ideologically that was impossible until 1989, when Gorbachev began to break free from the Soviet mould of thinking, and even then it was too radical for him to legislate until August 1990, when the 500-Day Plan for the transition to a market-based economy was at last introduced by the Supreme Soviet. But by then it was too late to halt the economic crash..."⁴⁷⁶

Gorbachev had much greater success with his other flagship policy of glasnost, "openness", which began in December 1986 with the recall from exile in Gorky of the famous dissident and atomic scientist, Andrei Sakharov.

Then came liberalization in the arts. And among the arts, first of all the cinema.

This was logical for a Leninist, as Gorbachev always claimed to be. For, as Taubman writes, "Lenin had viewed film, with its vivid mass appeal, as a prime means of propaganda. 'For us,' he reportedly told People's Commissar of Culture Lunacharsky, 'cinema is the most important of all the arts.' Like writers, artists, and composers, filmmakers had been herded into a 'union', the better to tame them with a mixture of perks and threats. The union's leaders were only nominally 'elected'. In fact, the party apparatus prepared a slate of candidates

⁴⁷⁶ Figes, *Revolutionary Russia*, pp. 392-393.

(one candidate for each office) who were 'unanimously' approved at periodic union congresses. In the spring of 1986, however, filmmakers revolted. Instead of accepting the slate, the union's nominating committee expanded it, voted down the party-appointed nominees, and put forward their own. Asked later whether this upheaval wasn't stage-managed from above by liberals around Gorbachev, film and theatre critic Maya Turovskaya said the rebels were as 'flabbergasted' as the former leaders themselves. 'We hadn't agreed to advance on what we do, we hadn't prepared. It happened quietly, spontaneously, drastically.'

"Decades of discontent by filmmakers whose films had been cut or shelved exploded at the union congress between May 13 and 15. 'Critical speech after speech, very sincere, very harsh, very strident,' recalled film director Elem Klimov, who was elected the union's leader after the officially approved candidate was voted down and twelve others were rejected for the union board.

"What followed after the congress was even more striking. Klimov made it a priority to release 'arrested films', although 'none of us knew how many had been shelved.' The union formed a conflicts committee, which started reviewing and 'rehabilitating' banned films. It eventually released more than a hundred of them. *Repentance* had been completed in 1984 by the Georgian master Tengiz Abuladze, with the help of Sheverdnadze, then Georgian party boss, but hadn't been released. The film is a powerful allegory in which Varlam, the mayor of a small Georgian town, is a composite of Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin [not to mention Beria]: a man with a small moustache, a black shirt, and thick dark hair. Varlam dies and is buried with honor at the beginning of the film, but his corpse keeps reappearing until it, too, is 'arrested'. In flashbacks, the film describes how Varlam imprisoned and destroyed countless victims. *Repentance* is complicated and difficult to follow, but, at a time when it was still unclear whether Stalin could be criticized, the film was a revelation. Realizing that, Klimov took the issue directly to Yakovlev [Gorbachev's liberal ally in the propaganda department]. Yakovlev, despite his commitment to radical reform, hesitated, asking Klimov, 'What will comrades in other socialist countries say? The release of this film will change our social system.' Gorbachev, to whom Yakovlev took the film, recognized it was a 'bombshell'; he promised Sheverdnadze, who also lobbied him for the film, that it would eventually get a 'green light'. Some in the Politburo wanted to decide whether the film should be released, but Gorbachev insisted on letting the filmmakers' union decide, an unprecedented move. First, there were showings in Georgia, then selected ones in Moscow, finally, general release, but the reaction was spectacular. Soviet viewers immediately took it as a sign that truly radical change was indeed underway..."⁴⁷⁷

The release of *Repentance* was an event of the greatest importance, and it was followed by the publishing of many fictional and non-fictional works exposing the crimes of the Stalinist period. "Mass graves, dating from Stalin's time, were opened and publicized, and the number of Stalin's victims was constantly revised upwards. Bukharin and nine others, judicially murdered in 1938, were

⁴⁷⁷ Taubman, op. cit., pp. 247-248.

rehabilitated. Fewer people were sent to prison or psychiatric hospitals for political offences..."⁴⁷⁸

As the truth came out, many people did repent and threw away their party cards, and for a moment it looked as if a real resurrection of the Russian people might take place in time for the millennial anniversary of the Baptism of Russia in 1988. For this priceless fruit of *glasnost*, due credit must be given to Gorbachev, who, as Taubman's biography showed, had been a secret anti-Stalinist from his youth. True, repentance for the sins of Communism did not go far enough; it was not just Stalinism, but the whole Communist system and ideology that had to be rejected; and it may well be argued that this failure of repentance was the real cause why reconstruction failed in the longer term. For Gorbachev's aims were political rather than spiritual; his aim was the reconstruction of political structures and economies rather than human souls – but it was healing for the soul that Russians really needed.

But, as was only to be expected, the reaction of the impenitent was also gathering pace. Moreover, Gorbachev himself was limited in his understanding of the forces and counter-forces he had unleashed. Even at the political level, he did not understand that the root of Russia's problems lay, not in Stalin, but in Lenin, and that the democratization and tolerance of other opinions that he had hoped to instil had been destroyed, first of all, by his own hero, Lenin. Not understanding Lenin, he was quite incapable of going still deeper into the roots of the catastrophe that is, the rejection of Orthodoxy and the Russian Orthodox Autocracy that Lenin spearheaded in 1917. So while he destroyed the Soviet Union (unwittingly and unwillingly), he failed to destroy Sovietism...

Nevertheless, *glasnost* was certainly proving one thing: that Sovietism was a tissue of lies and half-truths, as a result of which "popular belief drifted away from the government – much of it transferring to the media outlets which revealed these truths. The most daring newspapers and magazines had fantastic circulations. The weekly subscription to *Argumenty i Fakty* (Arguments and Facts) – which ceased to be a propaganda organ and became a source of once-secret facts and critical opinions on Soviet life – grew from a million to 44 million copies between 1986 and 1990, making it the most popular publication in the world. Every Friday night tens of millions of younger viewers watched the programme *Vzglyad* (View), which pushed subversively on the foundations of taste, let alone of Soviet censorship, in its TV mix of current affairs, interviews and investigations into history (it was eventually banned in January 1991).

"Glasnost politicized society. Independent public bodies formed. By March 1989, there were 60,000 'informal' groups and clubs in the Soviet Union. They held meetings and joined demonstration in the streets, many of them calling for political reforms, civil rights, national independence for Soviet republics and

⁴⁷⁸ Johnson, *Modern Times*, p. 756.

regions, or an end to the Communist monopoly of power. The major cities were returning to the revolutionary atmosphere of 1917..."⁴⁷⁹

⁴⁷⁹ Figes, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

39. THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION: (4) DEMOCRATISATION

The question of the Communist monopoly of power, enshrined in Article 6 of the 1977 Constitution, was the key to the further development of perestroika. For after the (successful) introduction of glasnost' and the (unsuccessful) attempt to introduce elements of a market economy, the next step in Gorbachev's revolution was the democratisation of the political structure itself. Already the question of Article 6 had been raised by Sakharov on his liberation from exile. Gorbachev rejected the idea at that time. But things began to change, in his mind as well as in the country's, in the following year, as political prisoners began to be released in large numbers and as censorship was relaxed.

Thus, as Tony Judt writes, "1987 saw the long-delayed publication of Vassily Grossman's *Life and Fate* (twenty-six years after M.S. Suslov, the Party's ideological commissar, had predicted that it could not be released for 'two or three centuries'). The police were instructed to cease jamming foreign radio broadcasts. And the Secretary General of the CPSU chose the occasion of his televised speech to the Party Central Committee in January 1987 to make the case for a more inclusive democracy, over the heads of the Party conservatives and directly to the nation at large.

"By 1987 more than nine out of ten Soviet households possessed a television, and Gorbachev's tactic was initially a striking success: by creating a *de facto* public speech for semi-open debate about the country's woes, and breaking the governing caste's monopoly of information, he was forcing the Party to follow suit – and making it safe for hitherto silent reformers within the system to speak out and give him their backing. In the course of 1987-88 the General Secretary was, almost despite himself, forging a national constituency for change.

"Informal organizations sprang up: notably 'Club Perestroika', formed in Moscow's Mathematical Institute in 1987, which in turn gave birth to 'Memorial', whose members devoted themselves to 'keeping alive the memory of the victims' of the Stalinist past. Initially taken aback at their own very existence – the Soviet Union, after all, was still a one-party dictatorship – they soon flourished and multiplied. By 1988 Gorbachev's support came increasingly from outside the Party, from the country's newly emerging public opinion.

"What had happened was that the logic of Gorbachev's reformist goal, and his decision, in practice, to appeal to the nation against his conservative critics within the apparatus, had transformed the dynamic of *perestroika*. Having begun as a reformer within the ruling Party, its General Secretary was now increasingly working against it, or at least trying to circumvent the Party's opposition to change. In October 1987 Gorbachev spoke publicly of Stalinist crimes for the first time and warned that if the Party did not champion reform it would lose its leading role in society.

“In the [Nineteenth] Party conference of June 1988 he reiterated his commitment to reform and to the relaxation of censorship, and called for the preparation of open (i.e. contested) elections to a Congress of People’s Deputies for the following year. In October 1988 he demoted some of his leading opponents – notably Yegor Ligachev, a longstanding critic – and had himself elected President of the Supreme Soviet (i.e. head of state), displacing Andrei Gromyko, last of the dinosaurs. Within the Party he still faced strong rearguard opposition; but in the country at large his popularity was at its peak, which was why he was able to press forward – and indeed had little option but to do so.

“The elections of May/June 1989 were the first more or less free vote in the Soviet Union since 1918. They were not multi-party elections – that would not happen until 1993, by which time the Soviet Union itself was long gone – and the outcome was largely pre-determined by restricting many seats to Party candidates and forbidding internal Party competition for them; but the Congress they elected included many independent and critical voices. Its proceedings were broadcast to an audience of some 100 million spectators, and demands by Sakharov and others for further change – notably the dethroning of the increasingly discredited Party from its privileged position – could not be swept aside, even by an initially reluctant Gorbachev. The Communists’ monopoly of power was slipping away, and with Gorbachev’s encouragement the Congress [spurred on by an inter-regional group of Party and non-Party democrats] would duly vote the following February to remove from the Soviet constitution the key clause – Article Six – assigning the Communist Party a ‘leading role’...

“... Communist reformers... reformed some aspects of their system while keeping others unaffected – introducing market-oriented incentives while maintaining central planning controls, or allowing greater freedom of expression while retaining the Party’s monopoly of truth. But partial reform or reform of one sector in isolation from others was inherently contradictory. ‘Managed pluralism’ or a ‘socialist market’ was doomed from the start. As for the idea that the ‘leading role’ of the Communist Party could be sustained while the Party itself shed merely the pathological excrescences of seven decades of absolute power, this suggests a certain political naiveté on Gorbachev’s part. In an authoritarian [despotic] system power is indivisible – relinquish it in part and you must eventually lose it all...”⁴⁸⁰

Having started his reforms to save the one-party state,” writes Figes, Gorbachev “was now dismantling it. ‘In place of the Stalinist model of socialism,’ he said in a televised address on 2 July, ‘we are coming to a citizens’ society of free people. The political system is being transformed radically, genuine democracy with free elections, the existence of many parties and human rights is becoming established and real people’s power is being revived. Russia was returning to the February Revolution of 1917...”⁴⁸¹

⁴⁸⁰ Judt, *op. cit.*, pp. 596-603.

⁴⁸¹ Figes, *op. cit.*, pp. 397-398.

But not, unfortunately, to pre-revolutionary Russia, to the Russian Orthodox Autocracy of pre-February 1917, even in a modernized form. And therefore there was no guarantee, or even promise, that the Soviet Union's new-found democracy would not eventually culminate in another despotism on the pattern of October 1917 in Russia (or March 1933 in Germany)...

40. THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION: (5) PERESTROIKA AND ORTHODOXY

Gorbachev hoped, as Bernard Simms writes, “that a more conciliatory attitude towards dissidents would reduce the terrible international battering the Soviet Union had received over human rights since the mid-1970s... Greater freedom of expression, Gorbachev believed, would mobilize the intelligentsia and reduce incompetence and corruption. Dissidents were released, police repression was greatly eased, civil rights groups emerged, there was a revival of the [official] Russian Orthodox Church and a vibrant public sphere moved from the underground into the open...”⁴⁸²

True Russian Orthodoxy was indeed preparing to move from the underground into the open. The pseudo-Orthodoxy of the Moscow Patriarchate had been in the open for several decades. However, the questions that all believing Orthodox Christians – that is, all those Orthodox Christians who hated atheism and Sovietism – were asking in 1988, as the Soviet system began to disintegrate, were: (i) Had the persecution of Christians really ended? (ii) Could the official Orthodox Church in Russia be converted from being a pawn of Communist power to a fully autonomous religious institution subject only to God? And this in turn depended on a third question: (iii) Could the Russian people as a whole convert from the Communist world-view to that of genuine Orthodox Christianity?

The answer to the first question was: not just yet. Thus S.V. Shumilo writes: “In 1987, Georgy Stepanovich Chesnokov was arrested in the Voronezh region. When he was only 14 years old, his entire family was arrested for ‘belonging to the Catacomb Church’ and exiled to Siberia, where he grew up. 28 people were shot in his family.

“He was shepherded by the catacomb bishop Lazarus [Zhurbenko], who often secretly served at his home. And then one day, six months after Bishop Lazar's stay with him, in 1987, G.S. Chesnokov was arrested on someone's slander (possibly, the neighbors reported him).

“They asked: ‘Where is the one that you had six months ago?’ The KGB learned that a catacomb bishop had visited him, held a secret meeting, preached, served, and then disappeared. They could not track him down.

“Georgy Stepanovich was kept in a pre-trial detention center for about a year, being tortured and mocked. They cut his veins and drained his blood, in their attempt to get evidence about the whereabouts of the catacomb bishop, his name, surname, connections ...

⁴⁸² Simms, *Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy*, London: Allen Lane, 2013, pp. 479-480.

“But Georgy Stepanovich never confessed, he did not give out. After another series of cruel tortures the confessor lost consciousness, and they thought that he was near death. The orderlies were told: ‘Take it away, the dog is dead.’ But Georgy Stepanovich survived...”⁴⁸³

The answers to the second and third questions require a longer exposition...

As we have seen, Gorbachev’s aim in his reforms, at least until 1989, was simply to modernize the existing system, not make a transition to real democracy, let alone Orthodoxy and Orthodox autocracy. Communism would borrow from the West, but only in order to overthrow the West (to “bury” it, as Khrushchev had put it). In his book *The Perestroika Deception*, the former KGB agent and defector to the West Anatoly Golitsyn outlined a plan that the KGB had conceived for deceiving the West about its basic intentions. Several later defectors, planted by the KGB, tried to persuade the West that this plan was fictitious. But the development of events in the perestroika years, 1985-91, showed that almost all his predictions had been accurate...

This explains why, as late as early 1989, the American administration under its new president, George Bush, were more cautious than the West European leaders Thatcher, Mitterand and Kohl in committing themselves to supporting Gorbachev wholeheartedly.

They had reason to doubt. After all, in November, 1987 Gorbachev said to the Politburo: “*Perestroika* is no retreat from communism but rather a step toward the final realization of Marxist-Leninist utopia: a continuation of Lenin’s ideas. Those who expect us to give up communism will be disappointed. In October, 1917 we parted from the Old World, rejecting it once and for all. We are moving toward a new world, the world of communism. We shall never turn off that road. *Perestroika* is a continuation of the October revolution...”

“Comrades, do not be concerned about all you hear about *glasnost*’ and democracy. These are primarily for outward consumption. There will be no serious internal change in the USSR other than for cosmetic purposes. Our purpose is to disarm America and let them fall asleep. We want to accomplish three things: (1) the Americans to withdraw conventional forces from Europe, (2) the Americans to withdraw nuclear forces from Europe, and (3) the Americans to stop proceeding with SDI [the Star Wars Defence System].”⁴⁸⁴

Nevertheless, there was a difference between Gorbachev and the KGB. Gorbachev *genuinely believed* in perestroika, not just as a stratagem to outwit the Americans, but in and for itself; and from 1988 he was prepared to take it to its logical conclusion – that is, removing article 6 from the Soviet Constitution and

⁴⁸³ Shumilo, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zf-bj_yJtzY&feature=youtu.be&fbclid=IwAR0YuQqJbYttqllcqXXgIirPg39npAArt0WrhT86DCjKkpLrajdXWX61-6M.

⁴⁸⁴ Gorbachev, in Dr. Olga Ackerly, “High Treason in ROCOR: The Rapprochement with Moscow”, http://stnicholascandles.com/High_Treason.htm, pp. 13, 14.

allowing multi-party democracy. It was at this point, however, that the KGB came to believe that *they* had been deceived, which led to KGB chief Kriuchkov taking part in the 1991 *putsch*.

The evolution in the viewpoint of the KGB (in the opposite direction of Gorbachev's evolution) is described by William Tauber. Gorbachev had made Kriuchkov KGB chief in 1988 and trusted him "because Andropov had done so, and also because, as he told aides on several occasions, Kriuchkov's position in the KGB had been in foreign intelligence and therefore he was not associated with domestic oppression. Kriuchkov and [Gorbachev's main ally and chief ideologist, Alexander] Yakovlev had been together on March 11, 1985, when they learned Gorbachev was to be the new leader. Kriuchkov 'breathed a sign of relief', Yakovlev recounted; 'we congratulated each other and drank a toast to the new *Gensek*.' Yakovlev later chastened himself for mistaking Kriuchkov's careerist ambitions for sincere political ambitions. Kriuchkov later lamented, 'The KGB's biggest mistake in its whole history was to misunderstand Gorbachev.'" ⁴⁸⁵

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Now one of the chief litmus tests of true loyalty to the communist cause was hostility to religion. Multi-party democracy might be forgiven as long as the levers of real power remained in the hands of communists – which they did until 1991. But religion was another matter... Both the KGB and the early Gorbachev agreed on that: Leninism and religion were incompatible. "The opium of the people" had to be dispersed by the fresh, invigorating air of atheist Communism, even if the violent repressive measures of the Stalinist (and Leninist and Khushchevian and Brezhnevian and Andropovian) eras was no longer acceptable. And so, at the beginning of *perestroika* there was no sign of the religious liberalization that was to come. In fact, in November, 1986, Gorbachev told party officials in Tashkent that religious faith and party membership were incompatible: "There must be no let-up in the war against religion because as long as religion exists Communism cannot prevail. We must intensify the obliteration of all religions wherever they are being practised or taught."

What, then, was to be done about the millenium of the Baptism of Rus' that was to take place in 1988? After all, the Soviets had an official Orthodox Church, and such an anniversary could not be ignored. In 1987 Yakovlev said concerning it: "To God what is God's, to the Church what is the Church's, but to us, the Marxists, belongs the fullness of truth. And on the basis of these positions any attempts to represent Christianity as the 'mother' of Russian culture must be decisively rejected. And if the Russian Middle Ages merit the attention of historians, such cannot be said of the 1000-year date of Orthodoxy." ⁴⁸⁶

⁴⁸⁵ Tauber, op. cit., p. 227.

⁴⁸⁶ Yakovlev, *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR* (Herald of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR), 1987, No 6, p. 6.

In 1989, however, Gorbachev declared at a meeting of Warsaw Pact member states that “there does not exist any kind of universal socialist model, (and) no one possesses a monopoly of truth”.⁴⁸⁷ This was in direct contradiction to what Yakovlev – no hard-liner – had said in 1987. Between the two contradictory statements stood – the 1000-year-old anniversary of Russian Orthodoxy.

1988 did indeed prove to be a turning-point. In this year Gorbachev saw off the challenge of his hard-line opponent, Yegor Ligachev. And it was precisely at this time that Gorbachev’s decision to pass from what Sir Geoffrey Hosking called “Mark 1” to “Mark 2” *perestroika*, from tinkering with the system to removing one of its main planks, dictated a change in policy towards the Church, too.⁴⁸⁸ For the success of *perestroika* required sincere believers in the new order recruited from the Church, not just party hacks; the atheists decided that they needed God on their side...

In March, 1988 Constantine Mikhailovich Kharchev, the head of the Council for Religious Affairs, told the higher party school in Moscow: “We attained our greatest success in controlling religion and suppressing its initiative amidst the priests and bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church. At first this gave us joy, but now it threatens to bring unforeseen consequences in its train... Now a priest often has no connection with his parish, but he is born somewhere else, and is often even of a different nationality. He comes once a week to the parish in a car, serves the liturgy... and wants to know nothing more. Many even like this, after all they are not responsible for anything: neither for their flock, nor for the money, nor for the repair of the church. The official in giving him his licence warns him: take your 350 roubles, and don’t poke your nose into anything...”

“We, the party, have fallen into a trap of our own anti-ecclesiastical politics of bans and limitations, we have cut the pope off from the believers, but the believers have not begun as a result to trust the local organs more, while the party and the state is increasingly losing control over the believers. And in addition, as a consequence, we witness the appearance of unspiritual believers, that is, those who carry out the ritual side [of Church life] and are indifferent to everything. And the main thing – are indifferent to communism... It is easier for the party to make a sincere believer into a believer also in communism. The task before us is: the education of a new type of priest; the selection and placing of a priest is the party’s business.”

“For 70 years,” he said, “we have struggled with the Church. In particular, we have been concerned that the most amoral and corrupt people should be appointed to the most significant posts. And now, look, we want these people to arrange a spiritual regeneration for us...”⁴⁸⁹

⁴⁸⁷ Mazower, op. cit., p. 387.

⁴⁸⁸ Hosking, *The Awakening of the Soviet Union*, London: Mandarin Paperbacks, 1991, p. 120.

⁴⁸⁹ Kharchev, *Russkaia Mysl’* (Russian Thought), May 20, 1988, No 3725. See also Bishop Valentine of Suzdal, “Put’ nechestivikh pogibnet” (The Way of the Ungodly Will Perish), *Suzdal’skij Palomnik* (Suzdal Pilgrim), NN 18-20, 1994, pp. 96-97.

It was indeed an acute paradox. And it was not only party officials who had to perform somersaults. Church leaders, too, had to prove that St. Vladimir's deliverance of Russia from the curse of paganism in 988 was somehow compatible with Russia's worshipping of the golden calf in 1988...

The critical point came in April, 1988, when Gorbachev met church leaders and worked out a new Church-State concordat reminiscent of the Stalin-Sergei compact of 1943. This concordat, combined with the underlying growth in religious feeling that had now been going on for several years, and the recovery of courage made easier by *glasnost* and the release of most of the religious and political prisoners, made the millennial celebrations in June a truly pivotal event.

The fruits were soon evident for all to see. Religious and political prisoners were freed; permission was given for the reopening of hundreds of churches (1,830 in the first nine months of 1990); and religious societies and cooperatives of almost all denominations sprang up all over the country. Programmes on Orthodox art and architecture, and sermons by bearded clergy in cassocks, became commonplace on television; very wide publicity given to the millennial celebrations in the media; and commentators from right across the political spectrum began to praise the contribution of the Orthodox Church to Russian history and culture.

There was openness, too, on the terrible cost to the Russian Church of Leninism and Stalinism.⁴⁹⁰

There were, however, negative aspects to this process. The True Orthodox Church remained outlawed; resistance to the opening of churches by local officials continued in the provinces; and religious activists objected to the adulterous mixing of religion and nationalism, and religion and humanist culture.⁴⁹¹ Moreover, the suspicion continued to exist that the party's new-found respect for religion was simply a tactical ploy, a case of *reculer pour mieux sauter*.

Such scepticism had some basis in reality. After all, no leading communist had announced his conversion to Christianity. Moreover, in April, 1988, the month in which Gorbachev met the patriarch, an unsigned article in *Kommunist* hinted that the real aim of Gorbachev's rapprochement with the Church was to communize the Church rather than Christianize the party (it failed to mention that the Church hierarchs were already KGB agents!). And yet, if that was the party's aim, it backfired. For unlike the concordat of 1943, which did indeed have the effect of communising the official Church, the concordat of 1988 seems to have helped to free Orthodox Christians from bondage to Communist ideology and coercion. For if the Church hierarchs continued to pay lip-service to "Leninist norms", this was

⁴⁹⁰ D.I. Mendelev calculated that there were 125 million innocent victims of the communist yoke (in I.F. Okhotin, "Velichie i blagodenstvie Rossii v Tsarstvovanie Imperatora Nikolaia II podtverzhdennoe v tsifrakh i faktakh" (The Greatness and Prosperity of Russia in the Reign of Emperor Nicholas II Confirmed in Figures and Facts), *Imperskij Vestnik*, October, 1989, p. 12.)

⁴⁹¹ Gleb Anishchenko, "Vrata ada" (The Gates of Hell), *Posev* (Sowing), No 3 (1395), May-June, 1990, p. 135.

emphatically not the case with many priests and laity, of whom Fr. Gleb Yakunin (liberated from the camps in 1987) was probably the most influential and best known.

This was most strikingly evident in March, 1990, when the elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies returned 300 clerics of various faiths as deputies at various levels. These included 190 Russian Orthodox, while the Communist Party candidates in the major cities were routed. In April, the Christian Democratic Movement, led by RSFSR deputies Fr. Gleb Yakunin, Fr. Vyacheslav Polosin and philosopher Victor Aksyuchits, held its founding congress.

Then, on May 19, the birthday of Tsar Nicholas II, the Orthodox Monarchist Order met in Moscow, and called for the restoration of Grand-Duke Vladimir Kirillovich Romanov to the throne of all the Russias. From that time, Orthodox monarchism became a factor in Russian politics that has increased in importance right up to the present day. Thus a restoration of the Tsardom (more likely: constitutional pseudo-Tsardom) under one of the "Kirillovichi" is avidly discussed in Putin's Russia.⁴⁹²

Now Grand-Duke Vladimir was a member of ROCOR, so his recognition by the monarchists inside Russia would have meant an enormous increase in prestige for ROCOR at the expense of the patriarchate. However, the Grand-Duke spared the patriarchate this embarrassment by apostasizing to it. And then, in November, 1991, he died...⁴⁹³

Contrary to the hopes and expectations of many, the MP remained devoted to the Soviet ideology to the last minute. And yet even it began to show signs of change under the influence of *glasnost'*. The first sign was at the church council in June, 1988, when the 1961 statute making priests subordinate to their parish councils was repealed. Then came the canonization of Patriarch Tikhon, who anathematized Soviet power, in October, 1989. And then, on April 3, 1990 the Synod issued a declaration in which it (i) declared its neutrality with regard to different political systems and ideologies, (ii) admitted the existence of persecutions and pressures on the Church in the past, and (iii) tacitly admitted the justice of some of the criticism directed against it by the dissidents.⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁹² On the claims of the "Kirillovichi", see Mikhail Nazarov, *Kto Naslednik Rossijskogo Prestola?* (Who is the Heir of the Russian Throne?), Moscow, 1996.

⁴⁹³ Archbishop Anthony of Los Angeles, "Velikij Knyaz' Vladimir Kirillovich i ego poseschenie SSSR" (Great Prince Vladimir Kirillovich and his Visit to the USSR), *Pravoslavnij Vestnik* (Orthodox Herald), NoNo 60-61, January-February, 1993.

There are sharp differences of opinion on whether Grand Duke Vladimir Kirillovich was the true heir to the Russian throne. For the argument in favour, see Archpriest Lev Lebedev, "Kogo i chego nam nuzhno berech'sa?" (Who and what must we care for?), *Dal'nevostochnij Monarkhicheskiy Vestnik* (Far-Eastern Monarchist Gazette), No 18, 2006, pp. 1-3. And for the argument against, see Mikhail Nazarov, *Kto Naslednik Rossijskogo Prestola?* (Who is the Heir of the Russian Throne?), Moscow, 1996.

⁴⁹⁴ *Moskovskij Tserkovnij Vestnik* (Moscow Ecclesiastical Herald), No 9 (27), April, 1990, pp. 1, 3.

Finally, in May, Metropolitan Vladimir of Rostov, the head of a commission formed to gather material on priests and believers who had been persecuted, said that “up to now, the details of the repression of the Russian Orthodox Church have been ignored or falsified by official, state and even numerous Church figures in order to meet the accepted ideological stereotypes.”⁴⁹⁵

The climax to this process was reached in June, when the polls revealed that the Church had now passed the Party, the Army and the KGB in popularity.⁴⁹⁶

People wondered: could this be the beginning of the end of sergianism? Was this the moment when the MP, freed at last from the yoke of communism, and under no obligation to pursue the communist-imposed policy of ecumenism, would finally repent of its past and return to the True Church?...

Alas, it was not to be...

⁴⁹⁵ Oxana Antic, "The Russian Orthodox Church moves towards coming to terms with its past", *Report on the USSR*, March 8, 1991.

⁴⁹⁶ *Moscow News*, June 3-10, 10-17, 1990.

41. THE LIBERATION OF EASTERN EUROPE: (i) POLAND

"It is easy," writes Kershaw, "to pre-date, in the light of later events, the inevitability of collapse of the communist states. However grave the internal problems, the Soviet bloc looked far from being on the verge of collapse in March 1985, when Gorbachev assumed power in Moscow. Earlier Soviet leaders might well have reacted very differently to the difficulties in the satellite states. The iron fist had, after all, been the response in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Moscow had been allergic to a threat within any part of the imperium that had the potential to undermine the entire foundation of the system. The 'Brezhnev doctrine', formulated immediately after the suppression of the 'Prague Spring', if never officially enunciated, had defined the ideological basis for intervention. 'A socialist state that is in a system of other states constituting a socialist commonwealth', it averred, 'cannot be free of the common interest of that commonwealth'. Common socialist interests, in other words, justified military intervention to suppress anything that threatened it.

"The leaders of the Soviet satellites were still in the early 1980s more than conscious of the continuing veiled threat of military intervention. They could not be sure that the Soviet leadership had turned away from such a strategy. Some, indeed, took comfort from this possibility. General Jaruzelski [of Poland] in fact later justified the declaration of military law in December 1981 precisely on the grounds that he was heading off such an eventuality (although minutes of the Soviet Presidium indicate that Yuri Andropov, head of the KGB of the time, had discounted the possibility, even should Solidarity win power in Poland, and had persuaded Brezhnev not to intervene). Absolutely crucial, therefore, was Gorbachev's renunciation of the 'Brezhnev doctrine'.

"When the General Secretary informed the assembled leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries at their first brief meeting in the Kremlin after Konstantin Chernenko's funeral in March 1985 that future relations would respect the sovereignty and independence of each country, their reluctance to accept his affidavit at face value was understandable. The fear of intervention slowly diminished. Gorbachev repeated his message a month later at a meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries in Poland. His private remark, 'Let's not force anyone. Let each country decide what it should do,' became more widely known. To Polish observers, however, nothing pointed to what was to come. The rituals of Gorbachev's visit were no different from those of previous decades. In November 1986 in Moscow he made Eastern European leaders more formally aware that 'the Brezhnev doctrine' was obsolete. In Prague in April 1987 he declared the Soviet Union's acceptance of the right of each socialist land to determine its own future in the light of national interests. The following year Gorbachev again plainly stipulated that the states in the Soviet bloc had 'the right to choose'. The Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennady Gerasimov, later

wittily remarked that the 'Brezhnev doctrine' had been replaced by the 'Sinatra doctrine' – letting the Eastern Europeans do it their way..⁴⁹⁷

The reluctance of the East Europeans to believe Gorbachev's broad promise not to apply the Brezhnev Doctrine was understandable. After all, if Gorbachev and his liberal-minded neophyte foreign minister, Shevardnadze, were removed or retired by the Politburo (as Khrushchev had been retired in 1964), the policy could be reversed in a moment, by conservative politicians like Ligachev or under the pressure of army generals. As Stephen Kotkin writes, "in 1986-87, the Soviet military, preparing for all contingencies, studied what they should do should the Warsaw Pact suffer major difficulties. The high command opposed imperial retreat, except perhaps to 'cede' East Germany in exchange for a neutral unified Germany, thereby weakening NATO. The cost of having acquired a position in Europe in the Second World War, and maintained it through armed interventions, made the stakes very high. Above all, no one could be sure how changes in Eastern Europe might reverberate within the Soviet Union..."⁴⁹⁸

In December, 1988, as we have seen, Gorbachev delivered a speech to the United Nations in which, as Tauber writes, "all the ideas Gorbachev had been gathering, pondering, nurturing, and positioning to replace Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy poured forth in their fullest statement yet. In the new, interdependent world of global mass communications (pace George Schulz), a 'closed' society was impossible. In this world, neither force nor threat of force should be used, "freedom of choice" should have "no exceptions", ideology had no place in international relations, and no one had a monopoly on truth. Then came those dramatic improvements. The Soviet Union would unilaterally reduce its armed forces by 500,000 soldiers; 50,000 of these, along with six tank divisions including 5,000 tanks, assault troops, and all their weapons and combat equipment, would be withdrawn from Eastern Europe. In all, Soviet armed forces in the USSR's European region and on the territory of its East European allies would be reduced by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft, cuts that amounted (by U.S. calculations) to 10 percent of Soviet armed forces, and a much higher proportion of the forces in Eastern Europe, about which Western strategists had worried for so long."⁴⁹⁹

Nor was it just an empty promise. In the following fateful year of 1989, when national revolutions broke out throughout Eastern Europe and in many parts of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev, in accordance with his promise, never sent in the troops. Indeed, in July 1989 the "Brezhnev Doctrine" was formally renounced at a Warsaw Pact summit in Bucharest. This was just after the Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing in June, which confirmed Gorbachev in his conviction that the empire could not be defended under the barrel of a gun.

⁴⁹⁷ Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster*, pp. 334-335.

⁴⁹⁸ Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted. The Soviet Collapse 1970-2000*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 87.

⁴⁹⁹ Tauber, op. cit., p. 422.

“Poland,” writes J.J. Roberts, “led eastern Europe to freedom. The importance of events there had quickly been perceived in other communist countries, whose leaders were much alarmed. In varying degrees, too, all eastern Europe was exposed to the new factor of a steadily increasing flow of information about non-communist countries, above all, through television (which was especially marked in the GDR). More freedom of movement, more access to foreign books and newspapers had imperceptibly advanced the process of criticism there as in Poland. In spite of some ludicrous attempts to go on controlling information (Romania still required that typewriters be registered with the state authorities), a change in consciousness was under way...”⁵⁰⁰

In a remarkable reversal of fortune, writes Kotkin, “the Solidarity opposition, driven underground in late 1981, returned stronger than ever, and in June 1989 elections, it won 99 of the 100 seats in the newly created Senate or upper house (on independent who won a seat ended up sitting with Solidarity). Moreover, even though the Polish Communists had rigged matters to guarantee themselves a parliamentary majority by allowing contestation of only 161 of the 460 seats in the Sejm (lower house) – Solidarity won 160. The overall Communist majority ensured the election by parliament of a Communist to the powerful new presidency. But the elected president, General Wojciech Jaruzelski – who had ordered the 1981 crackdown – ended up inviting the anti-Communist opposition to form the government: reform had led to regime capitulation...”⁵⁰¹

In the same month democracy demonstrators were massacred in Beijing, which, though a victory for the Chinese Communists, helped the anti-Communist revolutionaries of Central and Eastern Europe by teaching them some valuable lessons. First, it showed that Communism could not be overcome by violence alone. Hence the remarkable eschewal of violence – with the partial exception of Romania – in the East European revolutions that developed with such extraordinary speed in the later part of 1989. A second lesson learned by the East Europeans – again with the partial exception of the Romanians – was that victory was not assured until the Communist Party itself, together with its security apparatus, had been at least partially “turned”, either through the removal of the threat of external invasion from Moscow (this was a particular threat to Poland and East Germany), or through shame at earlier betrayals of the nation (Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968). A third lesson was that the enslaved peoples of Communism were more likely to rise up against their enslavers if they had a flourishing example of a non-Communist state on their doorstep, to which they could be united. For the anti-Communists of Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 that alluring neighbouring state was the European Union...

But the remarkable thing about this process was how cautiously, not to say reluctantly, the European Union took part in it. The ugly truth was that the

⁵⁰⁰ Roberts, *History of the World*, Oxford: Helicon, 1992, p. 906.

⁵⁰¹ Kotkin, *Averting Armageddon*, p. 88.

European Union had become so accustomed to appeasing Communist Eastern Europe through decades of *Ostpolitik* and *Détente*, and so ready to turn its eyes away from the terrible reality of Communism for the sake of its own material comfort and security, that when it came to assisting in the process of finally destroying Communism and the Iron Curtain that separated East and West, they were unprepared and not sure whether they really wanted it. The real movers here were the captive peoples themselves, assisted by the heads of the superpowers, Gorbachev, Reagan and Bush – and Germany’s Helmut Kohl, who was determined to seize the opportunity to reunite his country. Thatcher and Mitterand feared the re-emergence of a newly powerful Germany at the centre of Europe. But they, too, eventually joined the consensus – albeit slowly and reluctantly...

Naomi Klein has persuasively argued that the real victor from the events of the summer of 1989 in Poland and China should not be seen as one or the other ideology, Capitalism or Communism, but as Friedman’s Chicago School doctrine of “shock economic therapy”. “As Latin America had just learned,” writes Klein, “authoritarian regimes have a habit of embracing democracy at the precise moment when their economic projects are about to implode. Poland was no exception. The Communists had been mismanaging the economy for decades, making one disastrous, expensive mistake after another, and it was at the point of collapse. ‘To our misfortune, we have won!’ Walesa famously (and prophetically) declared. When Solidarity took office, debt was \$40 billion, inflation was at 600 percent, there were severe food shortages and a thriving black market. Many factories were making products that, with no buyers in sight, were destined to rot in warehouses. For Poles, the situation made for a cruel entry into democracy. Freedom had finally come, but few had the time or the inclination to celebrate, because their pay-checks were worthless. They spent their days lining up for flour and butter if there happened to be any in the stores that week.

“All summer following its triumph at the polls, the Solidarity government was paralyzed by indecision. The speed of the collapse of the old order and the sudden election sweep had been shocks in themselves: in a matter of months, Solidarity activists went from hiding from the secret police to being responsible for paying the salaries of those same agents. And now they the added shock of discovering that they barely had enough money to make the payroll. Rather than building the post-Communist economy they had dreamed of, the movement had the far more pressing task of avoiding a complete meltdown and potential mass starvation.

“Solidarity’s leaders knew they wanted to put an end to the state’s vicelike grip on the economy, but they weren’t at all clear about what could replace it. For the movement’s militant rank-and-file, this was the chance to test their economic program: if the state-run factories were converted to workers’ cooperatives, there was a chance they could become economically viable again – worker-management could be more efficient, especially without the added expense of party bureaucrats. Others argued for the same gradual approach to transition that Gorbachev was advocating at the time in Moscow – slow expansion of the areas in which supply-and-demand monetary rules apply (more legal shops and

markets), combined with a strong public sector modelled on Scandinavian social democracy.

“But as had been the case in Latin America, before anything else could happen, Poland needed debt relief and some aid to get out of its immediate crisis. In theory, that’s the central mandate of the IMF: providing stabilizing funds to present economic catastrophes. If any government deserved that kind of lifeline it was the one headed by Solidarity, which had just pulled off the Eastern Bloc’s first democratic ouster of a Communist regime in four decades. Surely, after all the Cold War railing against totalitarianism behind the Iron Curtain, Poland’s new rulers could have expected a little help.

“No such aid was on offer. Now in the grips of Chicago School economists, the IMF and U.S. Treasury saw Poland’s problems through the prism of the shock doctrine. An economic meltdown and a heavy debt load, compounded by the disorientation of rapid regime change, meant that Poland was in the perfect weakened position to accept a radical shock therapy program. And the financial stakes were even higher than in Latin America: Eastern Europe was untouched by Western capitalism, with no consumer market to speak of. All of its most precious assets were still owned by the state – prime candidates for privatization. The potential for rapid profits for those who got in first were tremendous.

“Confident in the knowledge that the worse things got, the more likely the new government could be to accept a total conversion to unfettered capitalism, the IMF let the country fall deeper and deeper into debt and inflation. The White House, under George H.W. Bush, congratulated Solidarity on its triumph against Communism but made it clear that the U.S. administration expected Solidarity to pay the debts accumulated by the regime that had banned and jailed its members – and it offered only \$119 million in aid, a pittance in a country facing economic collapse and in need of fundamental restructuring.

“It was in this context that Jeffery Sachs, then thirty-four, started working as an adviser to Solidarity. Since his Bolivian exploits, the hype surrounding Sachs had reached feverish levels. Marvelling at how he could serve as economic shock doctor to half a dozen countries and still hold down his teaching job, the *Los Angeles Times* pronounced Sachs – who still looked like a member of the Harvard debate team – the ‘Indiana Jones of Economics’.

“Sachs’s work in Poland had begun before Solidarity’s election victory, at the request of the Communist government. It started with a one-day trip, during which he met with the Communist government and with Solidarity. It was George Soros, the billionaire financier and currency trader, who had enlisted Sachs to play a more hands-on role. Soros and Sachs travelled to Warsaw together, and as Sachs recalls, ‘I told the Solidarity group and the Polish government that I would be willing to become more involved to help address the deepening economic crisis.’ Soros agreed to cover the costs for Sachs and his colleague David Lipton, a staunch free-market economist then working at the

IMF, to set up an ongoing Poland mission. When Solidarity swept the elections, Sachs began working closely with the movement.

“Though he was a free agent, not on the payroll of either the IMF or the U.S. government, Sachs, in the eyes of many of Solidarity’s top officials, possessed almost messianic powers. With his high-level contacts in Washington and legendary reputation, he seemed to hold the key to unlocking the aid and debt relief that was the new government’s only chance. Sachs said at the time that Solidarity should simply refuse to pay the inherited debts, and he expressed confidence that he could mobilize \$3 billion in support – a fortune compared with what Bush had offered. He had helped Bolivia land loans with the IMF and renegotiated its debts; there seemed no reason to doubt him.

“That help, however, came at a price: for Solidarity to get access to Sachs’s connections and powers of persuasion, the government first needed to adopt what became known in the Polish press as ‘the Sachs Plan’ or ‘shock therapy’.

“It was an even more radical course than the one imposed on Bolivia: in addition to eliminating price controls overnight and slashing subsidies, the Sachs Plan advocated selling off the state mines, shipyards and factories to the private sector. It was a direct clash with Solidarity’s economic program of worker ownership, and though the movement’s national leaders had stopped talking about the controversial ideas in that plan, they remained articles of faith for many Solidarity members. Sachs and Lipton wrote the plan for Poland’s shock therapy transition in one night. It was fifteen pages long and, Sachs claimed, was ‘the first time, I believe, that anyone had written down a comprehensive plan for the transformation of a socialist economy to a market economy’.”⁵⁰²

After three months of debate and a lot of opposition from the Solidarity leadership (especially Walesa himself), the Sachs Plan was eventually accepted. The main argument that persuaded them appears to have been Sachs’ thesis that “Poland would cease being exceptional and become ‘normal’ – as in ‘a normal European country’.”⁵⁰³

True, Sachs then “helped Poland negotiate an agreement with the IMF and secured some debt relief and \$1 billion to stabilize the currency. But all of it, particularly the IMF funds, were strictly conditional on Solidarity’s submitting to shock therapy.”⁵⁰⁴

“Shock therapy” “made a mockery of the democratic process since it directly conflicted with the wishes of the overwhelming majority of voters who had cast their ballots for Solidarity. As late as 1992, 60 percent of Poles still opposed privatization for heavy industry. Defending his unpopular actions, Sachs claimed he had no choice, likening his role to that of a surgeon in an emergency room.

⁵⁰² Klein, op. cit., pp. 175-177.

⁵⁰³ Klein, op. cit., p. 179.

⁵⁰⁴ Klein, op. cit., p. 181.

'When a guy comes into the emergency room and his heart's stopped, you just rip open the sternum and don't worry about the scars that you leave,' he said. 'The idea is to get the guy's heart beating again. And you make a bloody mess. But you don't have any choice.'

"But once Poles recovered from the initial surgery, they had questions about both the doctor and the treatment. Shock therapy in Poland did not cause 'momentary dislocation's, as Sachs had predicted. It caused a full-blown depression: a 30 percent reduction in industrial production in the two years after the first round of reforms. With government cutbacks and cheap imports flooding in, unemployment skyrocketed, and in 1993 it reached 25 percent in some areas – a wrenching change in a country that, under Communism, for all its many abuses and hardships, had no open joblessness. Even when the economy began growing again, high unemployment remained chronic. According to the World Bank's most recent figures, Poland has an unemployment rate of 20 percent – the highest in the European Union. For those under twenty-four, the situation is far worse: 40 percent of young workers were unemployed in 2006, twice the EU average. Most dramatic are the number of people in poverty: in 1989, 15 percent of Poland's population was living below the poverty line; in 2003, 59 percent of Poles had fallen below the line. Shock therapy, which eroded job protection and made daily life far more expensive, was not the route to Poland's becoming one of Europe's 'normal' countries (with their strong labor laws and generous social benefits) but to the same gaping disparities that have accompanied the counterrevolution everywhere it has triumphed, from Chile to China..."⁵⁰⁵

⁵⁰⁵ Klein, op. cit., pp. 191-192.

42. THE LIBERATION OF EASTERN EUROPE: (ii) HUNGARY

“In Hungary the long-standing formula of unwavering loyalty to Moscow and the Warsaw Pact in return for tolerance of a domestic loosening of economic constrictions and ideological relaxation became neither necessary nor applicable once Gorbachev had established power in the Soviet Union. As Hungary’s economic problems worsened from the mid-1980s onwards and national debt rose by 1987 to the highest level within the Soviet bloc, the popularity of the government waned. Inspired by what was happening in Moscow, reformers within the party saw their chance for more radical change than had previously been possible. Janos Kadar, still party leader three decades after assuming power following the uprising of 1956, had for long steered Hungary’s cautious path towards internal change. But in the altered climate he feared the dangers in Gorbachev’s path for rapid reform. His failing health served as a useful pretext to justify his forced resignation as General Secretary of the Party in May 1988 when he was ‘elevated’ by those less hesitant about embracing change to the newly created – purely ceremonial – post of Party President. His replacement, both as party leader and already since June 1987, head of government, Karoly Grosz, a pragmatic conservative who favoured liberalizing economic reforms but also the intention of a communist monopoly of power, did not last long. He was himself ousted in November 1988 as head of government by Miklos Nemeth, backed by a reforming cabinet, which declared the need for a multi-party election.

“Months beforehand oppositional groups had been openly demanding political pluralism and a free press. Between September 1987 and March 1988 they formed a number of organizations – the ‘Hungarian Democratic Forum’, the ‘Network of Free Initiatives’ and FIDESZ (the Alliance of Young Democrats). With different emphasis, each of these rejected the communist one-party state in favour of pluralist politics, market-orientated economics, and the pursuit of overtly national interests. The pace of change accelerated. In November the Alliance of Free Democrats was founded as a political party, arising from the Network of Free Initiatives. Once obsolete pre-war parties – the Independent Small-holder Party (in November 1988) and the Social Democratic Party (in January 1989) – were resurrected. An independent trade union organization (though attracting only minority worker support) was established in December 1988. The foundation of a Christian Democratic People’s Party followed in March 1989. By then the ruling Communist Party had accepted – an important symbolic move – that the uprising of 1956 had represented a true struggle for independence, ‘a popular uprising against an oligarchic rule that had debased the nation’. A vital step, legitimizing what was now well under way had already been taken several weeks earlier, in January, 1989, when parliament had decreed that Hungary would become a multi-party state, and the Communist Party had formally accepted the end of its one-party rule. The revolution in Hungary was far from complete. But by the early months of 1989 it was unstoppable...”⁵⁰⁶

⁵⁰⁶ Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster*, pp. 330-332.

“On 16 June 1989, less than a fortnight after the election in Poland that had ushered in the end of communism there, came the Hungarian moment. An enormous crowd, around 200,000 people, had assembled in Heroes’ Square in Budapest for the televised ceremonial reburial of the hero of the 1956 uprising, Imre Nagy – hanged by the communist regime after a farcical show trial in 1956. The previous year police had violently broken up a demonstration to mark the anniversary of Nagy’s execution. Now, a year later, Heroes’ Square was draped no longer with the hammer and sickle banner but with the national flag. The last speaker to pay tribute to Nagy’s memory was Viktor Orban from the Young Democrats. Orban drew rapturous applause when he declared: ‘If we can trust our souls and strength, we can put an end to the communist dictatorship.’ The steps to that end followed rapidly one after the other. And, as in Poland, they proceeded peacefully.”⁵⁰⁷

Janos Kadar, who had been responsible for Nagy’s execution, had been removed in May 1988 as Party General Secretary, and, on 8 May 1989, as Party Chairman. He died of cancer on 6 July 1989. “A month earlier the Communist Party had agreed to talks with the Round Table of oppositional groups that had been set up in March. But much of the summer was taken up by disagreements within the oppositional groups, while the Communists – themselves divided – continued to run the government. In a confused and confusing situation, the trajectory was nonetheless plain. Free parliamentary elections were agreed on 18 September, though other aspects of the transition to democracy, especially the question of whether parliamentary elections should precede elections to the presidency, were still matters of dispute among the oppositional groups. Early the following month [on October 10 1989] the Communists dissolved their party and changed its name – officially, it had been the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party – or simply the Hungarian Socialist Party. On 22 October, the anniversary of the 1956 revolution, the new Hungarian Republic – as in Poland, no longer a ‘People’s Republic – was proclaimed in an enormous crowd gathered outside the parliamentary building in Budapest. The long-delayed parliamentary elections – marking the return to pluralist politics – eventually took place in March and April 1990 and produced an unwieldy coalition of many liberal and centre-right conservative parties.

“A summer of much inertia followed, during which the economic situation sharply deteriorated. Although Hungary’s economy had for many years been more open to limited forms of private enterprise than any other Soviet bloc state, and had recently moved further in that direction, full exposure to the vagaries of the market introduced Hungarians to the harsh realities of Western capitalism. But heavy indebtedness to the West and inflation that was threatening to run out of control meant, as in Poland, that there was little alternative to seeking Western support, however difficult the transition might be. IMF financial aid helped Hungary overcome the difficult transition – though only after new austerity measures had been introduced in July 1990. That autumn, too, the government introduced a big programme of privatization. As elsewhere in the former Soviet

⁵⁰⁷ Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster*, p. 357.

bloc, neo-liberal economic ideas, largely imported from the United States, were dominant. Opinion surveys indicated that by that time there was less public confidence in the recently elected democratic government than there had been in the previous communist administration. Meanwhile, Soviet troops, once numbering around 100,000 in Hungary, were withdrawing, the last of them leaving in March 1991. This was the most visible sign that Hungary had in effect pulled out of the Warsaw Pact and was turning to the West. The decisive moment had in fact already occurred in the summer of 1989..."⁵⁰⁸

⁵⁰⁸ Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster*, pp. 357-358.

43. THE LIBERATION OF EASTERN EUROPE: (iii) EAST GERMANY

In the German Democratic Republic (Communist East Germany) the people's alienation from the regime had begun many years before. Even before the building of the Berlin Wall in the early 1960s, two million East Germans had fled to the West. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was discovered that they were fleeing not only poverty and slavery, but also the extreme corruption of a regime in which "the secret police had been involved not only in international terrorism but in large-scale drug smuggling to the West, producing hard currency profits which had gone into Swiss bank accounts kept for the benefit of party leaders."⁵⁰⁹

However, the eventual fall of the East German regime was almost farcical. In the summer of 1989, writes Simon Jenkins, "the bicentennial of the French Revolution, Moscow lost its grip on the handle of Soviet power. In August, history descended into irony [or rather: farce] when a member of the European Parliament, Otto von Habsburg, pretender to the Austro-Hungarian throne, co-sponsored a 'pan-European picnic' on the Austria-Hungary border. Hundreds of East Germans trekked to it and, in a gesture of friendship, officials temporarily opened the border gates. Six hundred 'picknikers' stampeded across before they closed – and did not return. Pandemonium ensued as thousands rushed to the spot. [On 10 September the Hungarians opened their border with East Germany, and] on 11 September the Hungarian government announced they could no longer control the border. It opened, and some 50,000 East Germans crossed to the west.

"The Iron Curtain was breached, and the East German leader, Erich Honecker, resigned. In October the Hungarian government declared a new republic and free elections. A month later, on 9 November 1989 [the anniversary of the fall of the Second Reich in 1918], East Germany announced that east-west movement through the Berlin Wall would be eased. As crowds rushed the gates, soldiers abandoned all attempts to stop them. Ecstatic masses climbed the wall and lined its fortifications. Pictures of this photogenic symbol of ideological collapse flashed round the globe."⁵¹⁰

The irony of it was that this took place "on the eve of the carefully-planned and much-vaunted celebration of forty years' 'success' as a socialist country, and during a visit by Mr. Gorbachev (who, to the dismay of the German communists, appeared to urge the east Germans to seize their chance), riot police had to battle with anti-government demonstrators on the streets of east Berlin. The government and party threw out their leader, but this was not enough. November opened with huge demonstrations in many cities against a regime whose corruption was becoming evident; on 9 November came the greatest symbolic act

⁵⁰⁹ Johnson, *Modern Times*, p. 760.

⁵¹⁰ Jenkins, *A Short History of Europe*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2018, pp. 284-285.

of all, the breaching of the Berlin Wall. The East German Politburo caved in and the demolition of the rest of the Wall followed.”⁵¹¹

“It is rare,” writes the *Daily Telegraph* reporter Daniel Johnson, “for liberty and tyranny to confront one another without bloodshed. One such event, in which I happened to take part, was the fall of the Berlin Wall... The trigger for the opening of the Wall was the East German Communist Party spokesman Günther Schabowski’s press conference. Eight minutes before it was due to end, he unexpectedly announced new travel rules that would allow people to cross the border between East and West. The room was electrified: this was sensational news, though just how sensational we could not know. Someone (it is still unclear who) shouted out the question: ‘When do [the new travel rules] come into force?’ This elicited the reply: ‘Immediately, without delay.’ The careful choreography of the East German plan, which required a controlled opening of the border, was thereby cast to the winds. Several of the key players, including Schabowski himself, are now dead. So we may never know everything about what was happening backstage before and during the drama of those eight minutes.

“My role was to ask the last question – the only one that actually mentioned the Wall: ‘What will happen to the Berlin Wall now?’ It reduced Schabowski to silence for a second or two, followed by a rambling, incoherent response, as if he had simultaneously grasped what he had done and was at stake: the end of the Berlin Wall, the Cold War and the division of Europe by the Iron Curtain. He had no answer to my question, because of the obvious absurdity of keeping a wall through the German capital if people could pass through it. The phrase ‘a moment of truth’ is often misused, but in this case it is the *mot juste*. Schabowski was lost for words because the truth had just dawned on him – and on the multitudes watching on live television. He abruptly brought the press conference to an end, leaving many journalists confused about what had actually been announced. For my part, I was in no doubt that the Wall was opening and ran back to my hotel to report it to the disbelieving foreign desk of the *Daily Telegraph*. TV news reports soon reinforced this interpretation, but it took a couple of hours before people started gathering at the check-points and demanding to be let through. Even then, the opening was not inevitable – but there were no orders and the officer in charge was not prepared to open fire on his own compatriots.”⁵¹²

The wall quickly disappeared, but Berlin was still formally divided, and it was important to know how the wartime allies who controlled would react – and especially, of course, the Soviet Union.

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⁵¹¹ Roberts, *History of the World*, p. 908.

⁵¹² Johnson, “The Righteous and the Right: Thoughts on the Survival of Western Civilisation”, *Standpoint*, May, 2018, p. 47.

In essence, Gorbachev put no obstacles in the way either of the fall of the Berlin Wall, or of any of the revolutionary movements of liberation taking place in Eastern Europe. Inevitably, of course, the “loss” of Eastern Europe drew harsh criticism of him from his hardline opponents. In his defence, he could argue that, with the exception of Romania, no government had been overturned, no state boundaries had been changed, and there was nothing to prevent the Soviet Union and its former East European satellites continuing to form a single socialist or social democratic commonwealth of nations sharing a single defence structure (the Warsaw Pact) parallel to Western Europe and NATO but no longer in deadly and expensive competition with them. But such a vision rested on a crucial assumption: that East Germany, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), remained a viable state independent of West Germany.

However, this assumption proved to be false. For several weeks after the fall of the wall, while the possibility of the reunification of Germany was in everybody’s mind, no political leader declared himself in favour of it. This was not surprising in the case of Gorbachev. For although in 1952 Stalin had made the offer of a reunited, neutral Germany that the West firmly rejected, Soviet foreign policy since Stalin had consistently ruled out the possibility of such an act. It was also not surprising in the case of Thatcher and Mitterand, who both feared the emergence of a still more powerful Germany at the heart of Europe. As for the Americans, most of Bush’s advisers were against, while he himself was non-committal. (Reagan appears to have been more positive about the idea. In June 1987 he stood in front of the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin and said: “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!”)

A still greater obstacle was the fact that the West German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, did not trust Gorbachev – at the beginning, at any rate. “In an interview in October 1986 Kohl had even insultingly (and absurdly) compared Gorbachev’s mastery of the media with that of the Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels. The Soviet press naturally responded furiously. In the West, too, where disarmament talks were at an early and sensitive stage, Kohl’s clumsiness went down badly. It was, however, in the interest neither of Bonn nor of Moscow to dwell on the faux pas. Kohl apologized to Gorbachev, putting the blame on the press. Influenced by his experienced and diplomatically agile Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who quickly recognized that it was directly in West Germany’s advantage to work actively to support Gorbachev’s initiatives, Kohl became convinced of the new opportunities for close cooperation. His decision in October 1987 to remove Pershing missiles from West German soil signalled German readiness to adjust as rapidly as possible to the new climate.”⁵¹³

Then came the bombshell. On November 28, without even informing Genscher, Kohl “presented a ten-point plan for reunification. Its most important points were that Bonn would consider developing ‘confederative structures between both states in Germany, with the aim of creating a federation, that is, a federal order, in Germany’, and that, in the meantime, it would expand

⁵¹³ Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster*, pp. 339-340.

desperately needed economic aid to the GDR, but only 'if a fundamental transformation in the political and economic system of the GDR is definitively accepted and irreversibly set in motion.'"⁵¹⁴

The West German Chancellor, writes Judt, had been "initially as hesitant as everyone else... But after listening to East German crowds (and assuring himself of the support of Washington) Kohl calculated that unified Germany was now not merely possible but perhaps urgent. It was clear that the only way to staunch the flow west (2,000 people a day at one point) was to bring West Germany east. In order to keep East Germans from leaving their country, the West German leader set about abolishing it."⁵¹⁵

Gorbachev was shocked and angry. The fall of the Berlin Wall was one thing. But the dissolution of the East German state was quite different...

"Kohl's ten points were nothing less than 'ultimatums', Gorbachev warned Genscher, to be 'imposed on an independent and sovereign German state.' Less than three weeks earlier, he and Kohl had a 'constructive, positive' phone conversation in which they 'reached agreement on several fundamental issues.' But now Kohl 'probably already thinks his music is playing - a march - and that he is already marching with it.' He was 'treating the citizens of the GDR, in essence, like his own subjects.' 'Even Hitler did not allow himself anything like that,' Shevardnadze interjected. Kohl was preparing a funeral for the European process.' The 'confederation' he proposed 'implies a common defense system, a common foreign policy. Where will the FRG be, in NATO or the Warsaw Pact? Or will it become neutral? And what would NATO mean without the FRG? What will happen next, in general? Have you thought this all through? What will become of our existing agreements?'

"The shock of Kohl's bold move explains Gorbachev's emotional reaction... He interpreted the move, Chernyaev recalled, 'as a breach of [Kohl's] promise not to push events forward or to try to extract one-sided political advantage' and 'a violation of their agreement to consult each other on every new move.' Nor did Kohl's Western allies appreciate his unilaterally placing German unification squarely atop Europe's agenda. Hence his 'icy' reception (Kohl's description) at a December 8 European Community summit where the 'interrogation' he received reminded him of a 'tribunal'. But since West Germany had made clear its wishes, its allies (even Thatcher) could go only so far to oppose them. Kohl's ten points 'have turned everything upside down', Mitterand complained to Gorbachev in Kiev on December 6. Mitterand still wanted to make sure 'the all-European process develops more rapidly than the German question', but neither he nor Gorbachev had a plan for doing so."⁵¹⁶

⁵¹⁴ Tauber, op. cit., p. 492.

⁵¹⁵ Judt, op. cit., p. 638.

⁵¹⁶ Tauber, op. cit., p. 492.

What did Mitterand mean? How could German reunification hinder the all-European process? Thatcher feared "that German unification might destabilize Mikhail Gorbachev, possibly even leading to his fall (by analogy with Nikita Khrushchev's disgrace following his Cuban humiliation)."⁵¹⁷ That was a real, rational fear, but it was not Mitterand's. His fear was that German reunification would make the further integration of the European Union impossible because Germany would now become too powerful for French diplomacy to control.⁵¹⁸

He needn't have feared. For the sake of reunification, Kohl was prepared to make a deal with the French. Essentially Mitterand demanded the introduction of the euro as the common currency of the European Union, and the kind of increase in integration and centralization in the Community that became law in the Treaty of Maastricht two years later. Kohl accepted these conditions. He was in any case a firm adherent of the European project, and the Bundesbank assured him that they could control the Euro...

In fact, "the French were banking on Gorbachev to veto German unity - as Mitterand explained to his advisers on November 28th 1989, 'I don't want to do anything to stop it, the Soviets will do it for me. They will never allow this greater Germany opposite them.'"⁵¹⁹

But Gorbachev did allow it. Partly because he realized that the will for unity was very strong in both East and West Germany for a "united, German fatherland", so to oppose it, just as to oppose the anti-communist wave in Eastern Europe as a whole, would have been futile. Partly also Gorbachev may have calculated that it was no use his attempting to conciliate hard-line critics of perestroika any longer; many of them, he hoped, would be removed in the upcoming elections to the Congress of People's Deputies, so: "in for a penny, in for a pound!"

But the vital factor influencing Gorbachev's decision may have been his conversations with President Bush at their summit in Malta on December 2-3, 1989, which created a friendship that was less marred by suspicions than his relationship with Reagan had been, and which gave him the international support he needed to go the extra mile in both domestic and international affairs. Not that the two leaders discussed Eastern Europe much. But they did exchange "important confessions and compliments. Bush admitted that he was 'shocked' by how fast things were changing, and he offered high praise for Gorbachev's 'personal reaction and the reaction of the Soviet Union' to these changes. 'You are catalyzing changes in Europe in a constructive way.' 'Look at how nervous we are,' Gorbachev admitted at one point. 'What form of action should we take? Collective action?' 'I hope you noticed,' said Bush, 'that the United States has not engaged in condescending statements aimed at damaging the Soviet Union.'

⁵¹⁷ Judt, op. cit., p. 640.

⁵¹⁸ He may also have been influenced by French Masonry here - the European project was very close to the heart of the Grand Orient of Paris. His brother Jacques was the leader of French Masonry, and he himself was buried in a coffin with "666" engraved on it.

⁵¹⁹ Judt, op. cit., p. 640.

Some in the United States accused him of being 'too cautious', and it was true. 'I am a cautious man, but I am not a coward, and my administration will seek to avoid doing anything that would damage your position in the world.'

""You cannot expect us not to approve of German reunification.' Bush continued. But he admitted that 'some Western allies who pay lip-service to reunification' are actually 'quite upset by the prospect,' and he assured Gorbachev, 'We are trying to act with a certain reserve.' 'We will not take any rash steps; we will not try to accelerate the outcome of the debate on reunification.' If Kohl's declarations sounded more radical, that was because when Germans speak of reunification, they do so 'with tears in their eyes'."⁵²⁰

This subtle conversation, in which the vital question – was Gorbachev to use military force against the Germans? – was not even raised explicitly, finally resolved the question of German reunification. Having won Gorbachev's trust, Bush pushed somewhat harder in the following year. And soon the deed was done, thereby bringing a real end to the Cold War.

For that war had begun with Stalin's cold-hearted decision to divide Germany for the sake of consolidating his ill-gotten communist empire after 1945. The wishes of the vast majority of the German people, in both East and West, had had nothing to do with it. Moreover, the supposed military threat of the Germans was a fantasy: no people in history has been more thoroughly subdued and crushed than the Germans in 1945, and to this day the Germans have shown a distinct – indeed, excessive – distaste for the idea of rebuilding their military strength. Stalin's successors continued his struggle to divide and destroy the German people, not only by military occupation and the building of the wall, but also by making every fourth citizen of the GDR a spy in relation to his neighbour.

The division of Germany had therefore become a dogma of Soviet Communism just as much as state control of the commanding heights of the economy or one-party rule. Gorbachev had invoked glasnost' and perestroika for his liberal reforms that chipped away at the latter dogmas, but they were quite insufficient to justify the jettisoning of the Soviet dogma of Germany's eternal division. At the same time, he knew that vetoing reunification – or, a more likely necessity in view of East German popular sentiment, sending in the 400,000 Soviet troops stationed in Germany to prevent it – would have marked the immediate end of perestroika, the return of hardline communism with a vengeance, a reintensification of the Cold War – and probably his own political demise.

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The decisive mover of events was public opinion in Germany, both West and East. "The East German government at first wanted nothing to do with thoughts of reunification. The newly appointed Prime Minister, Hans Modrow, a moderate reformer who had earlier been party leader in the Dresden district, rejected

⁵²⁰ Tauber, op. cit., pp. 497-498.

outright what he described on 17 November 1989 as 'unrealistic and dangerous speculation' about unification. Even his opposite number, Hans Kohl, had not proposed *immediate* reunification in his Ten Points, thinking it would take years to realize. "During the course of December, however, it became clearer that popular pressure in both West and East Germany was driving a rapidly accelerating process towards unification that Kohl was happy to steer and that other European leaders could, even where they wished to, do little to prevent."⁵²¹

That included Gorbachev. On 30 January 1990 Modrow visited Moscow "and told Gorbachev that the majority of East Germans no longer wanted a separate state; it was going to be impossible to preserve the republic. Gorbachev seemed to take this news calmly, and in February he told Kohl that it was up to the Germans to decide things for themselves. In the run-up to the East German elections in March 1990, Kohl staged an election tour in support of the Alliance for Germany, the main opposition party to the communists."⁵²²

One important issue remained unresolved: whether the newly unified Germany should be allowed to join NATO. "The Soviet Union had earlier rejected such a notion outright. This remained Gorbachev's position in February 1990. But circumstances were changing fast. This was the most important single issue. It dominated diplomatic negotiations that month. The formula of 2+4 – the two German states and the four former occupying powers – was agreed as the basis for the negotiations. Britain and France more or less made up the numbers in these negotiations. So did the East Germans. The main players were the Federal Republic, the United States and the Soviet Union. The key actors were Kohl and Gorbachev, with an important though lesser role played by Bush.

"The East Germans wanted military neutrality for both parts of Germany as they moved towards a federation. There was no question of that in the eyes of the Western former occupying powers. At first, there was general acceptance among the Western powers of the suggestion, first made by the German Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich-Genscher, that NATO would continue, as currently, to have bases in the Federal Republic but that they would not be extended to the territory of the former German Democratic Republic. This, according to Gorbachev's recollection, was categorically stated as the American position by the US Secretary of State, James Baker, when he visited Moscow on 9 February. Gorbachev was still not ready to concede even this arrangement. Towards the end of February, however, the Americans changed their tune (though it was almost certainly what they wanted all along) and now insisted – in agreement with Chancellor Kohl – that NATO had after all to be extended to former GDR territory if the security of Germany as a whole was to be guaranteed. While, it is true, there had been no formal promise not to extend NATO, this alteration nevertheless explicitly contradicted an earlier understanding on all sides. It later prompted ill-feeling in Russia (and also to some extent in Western Europe) – a

⁵²¹ Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster*, p. 371.

⁵²² Lowe, *Mastering Twentieth-Century Russian History*, Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002, p. 425.

sense that the West had not acted in good faith and had reneged on its promises.”⁵²³

After the Washington summit of May-June 1990, writes Tauber, “the Soviet position on the German question which Gorbachev had seemed to settle in Washington, hardened. At a Two-plus-Four meeting of foreign ministers in East Berlin on June 21, Shevardnadze proposed that soon after unification the four former occupying powers retain their rights and that Germany in effect remain divided between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. German Foreign Minister Genscher passed a note to Baker calling the proposal ‘window dressing’, but Baker feared Gorbachev had been overruled in the Kremlin. One of Baker’s aides, Dennis Ross, challenged Shevardnadze’s assistant, Tarasenko, after the meeting, ‘This is a total reversal. You guys just screwed us. What the hell is going on?’

“What was happening was what Gorbachev had predicted in Washington – that there would be hell to pay at home for what he conceded in the White House. Tarasenko told Ross that Shevardnadze’s new stance was a Politburo position that had been ‘overtaken by events’, but could not be disowned until after the Twenty-Eighth Party Congress in early July, later adding that his boss had been forced to ‘go through the motions’ with the ‘military, hard-line document’. Deputy Foreign Minister Yulo Kvitsinsky, who feared that Shevardnadze was losing ‘one trump card after another’, had prepared the tough proposals to slow the runaway train. Shevardnadze in Berlin was as ‘beleaguered’ as Baker had ever seen him, as if overwhelmed by the domestic political struggle.”⁵²⁴

The Alliance for Germany party, which promised rapid unification, writes Judt, “won 48 percent of the vote: the Social Democrats, handicapped by their well-advertised ambivalence on the subject, won just 22 percent. The former Communists – now the Party of Democratic Socialism – secured a respectable 16 percent showing...

“The first act of the new majority in the GDR Volkskammer, represented by a CDU-SPD-Liberal coalition led by Lothar de Maizière, was to commit their country to German unity. On May 18th 1990 a ‘monetary, economic and social union’ was signed between the two Germanies, and on July 1st its crucial clause – the extension of the Deutschmark to East Germany – came into force. East Germans could now exchange their virtually useless East German marks – up to the equivalent of DM 40,000 – at a hugely advantageous rate of 1:1. Wages and salaries in the GDR would henceforth be paid in Deutschmarks at parity – a dramatically effective device for keeping East Germans where they were, but with grim long-term consequences for East German jobs and the West German budget.

⁵²³ Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster*, p. 375. The question of NATO expansion became a major political issue again in the 1990s.

⁵²⁴ Tauber, *op. cit.*, p. 561.

“On August 23rd, by pre-agreement with Bonn, the Volkskammer voted to accede to the Federal Republic. A week later a Treaty of Unification was signed, by which the GDR was absorbed into the FRG – as approved by its voters in the March elections and permitted under Article 23 of the 1949 Basic Law. On October 3rd the Treaty entered into force: the GDR ‘acceded’ to the Federal Republic and ceased to exist.”⁵²⁵

As J.M. Roberts writes, “The change was momentous, but no serious alarm was openly expressed, even in Moscow, and Mr. Gorbachev’s acquiescence was his second great service to the German nation. Yet alarm there must have been in the USSR. The new Germany would be the greatest European power to the west. Russian power was now in eclipse as it had not been since 1918. The reward for Mr. Gorbachev was a treaty with the new Germany promising economic help with Soviet modernization. It might also be said, by way of reassurance to those who remembered 1941-45, that the new German state was not just an older Germany revived. Germany was now shorn of the old east German lands (had, indeed, formally renounced them) and was not dominated by Prussia as both Bismarck’s *Reich* and the Weimar republic had been. More reassuring still (and of importance to west Europeans who felt misgivings), the Federal Republic was a federal and constitutional state seemingly assured of economic success, with nearly forty years’ experience of democratic politics to build on, and embedded in the structures of the EC and NATO. She was given the benefit of the doubt by west Europeans with long memories, at least for the time being.

“At the end of 1990, the condition of what had once seemed the almost monolithic east European bloc already defied generalization or brief description. As former communist countries (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary) applied to join the EC, or got ready to do so (Bulgaria), some observers speculated about a potentially wider degree of European unity than before. More cautious judgements were made by those who noted the virulent emergence of new – or re-emergence of old – national and communicable divisions to plague the new East. Above all, over the whole area there gathered the storm-clouds of economic failure and the turbulence they might bring. Liberation might have come, but it had come to peoples and societies of very different levels of sophistication and development, and with very different historical origins. Prediction was clearly unwise...”⁵²⁶

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Was German reunification a triumph of Europe or America? Primarily the former (both West and East Europe). But America’s contribution must not be forgotten. President Bush’s fine diplomacy played a critical role in the process, especially at the Malta summit, when he won Gorbachev’s trust. He showed he was not restricted by the narrow-minded ambitions of Europeans like Mitterand but genuinely wanted reunification – provided the whole of Germany was now

⁵²⁵ Judt, *Postwar*, pp. 638-640.

⁵²⁶ Roberts, *History of the World*, pp. 908-909.

within NATO. But he also showed sensitivity to Gorbachev's difficulties. He wanted Gorbachev not to hinder German reunification, hinting that there were powerful emotional forces ("tears in German eyes") that made its implementation almost impossible to prevent in the longer term. But he carefully refrained from putting any pressure on him, knowing that the hardliners in Russia would claim that he was America's poodle.

"Of course," writes Kotkin, "Gorbachev had never planned to 'lose' the bloc. Overtaken by events, he began pressing for guarantees that NATO would not absorb East Germany or expand eastward. But, in May, 1990, U.S. President George Bush pressed the issue of German unification *within* NATO. Two months later, Gorbachev presented the more cautious West German Chancellor with the gift of a phased, complete withdrawal of Soviet troops, without trying to secure German neutrality. Nor could the Soviet leader save the Warsaw Pact. A foreign policy aimed at a 'common European home' had led to the Soviet Union's ejection from Europe. 'I would be less than sincere,' Gorbachev wrote, if I said that I had foreseen the course of events and the problems that the German question would eventually create.'" ⁵²⁷

The truth of his words was borne out by the immediate consequences of German reunification. For "by the end of 1990," writes Lowe, "the USSR had not only lost control over the states of eastern Europe, it had also failed to retain much influence in the area. This, according to Archie Brown, was 'a giant failure of Soviet foreign policy over more than forty years', but not a failure on the part of Gorbachev, although the Soviet military leaders and communist hardliners interpreted it as such, and talked of the 'loss' of eastern Europe. But, asks Brown, 'who eventually lost?' He goes on to argue that the only people who actually lost were 'those forces with an interest in confrontation – ideological, political and military – and who wished to preserve authoritarian regimes.' But everybody else gained: the West gained because it was no longer faced by a hostile Warsaw Pact; the countries of eastern Europe gained because they were now independent; and Russia also gained because it was saved from massive military expenditure and was no longer responsible, and held accountable, for everything which happened in eastern Europe. Gorbachev also deserves enormous credit for refusing to use force to preserve the communist regimes of eastern Europe, even though he must have known that their collapse would make it all the more difficult for him to preserve his own regime in the USSR..." ⁵²⁸

There are few events in international politics that are unreservedly welcomed by all the nations. German reunification is no exception to this rule. For the event that was the cause of rejoicing to so many millions was the cause of fear, resentment and a desire for revenge in one KGB agent stationed at that time in Leipzig, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. As he burned sensitive files, he witnessed

⁵²⁷ Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted*, p. 89.

⁵²⁸ Lowe, *op. cit.*, p. 417.

the anger of the East German crowds. And he never forgot the fear and the humiliation he and his fellow KGB agents suffered...

44. THE LIBERATION OF EASTERN EUROPE: (iv) CZECHOSLOVAKIA

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the communist states began to fall like dominoes... "All over eastern Europe it was suddenly clear that communist governments had no legitimacy in the eyes of their subjects, who either rose against them or turned their backs and let them fall down. The institutional expression of this alienation was everywhere: a demand for free elections, with opposition parties freely campaigning... In none of these countries did the former communist politicians get more than 16 per cent of the vote...⁵²⁹

In Czechoslovakia, under the leadership of the playwright Vaclav Havel, some 10,000 people "demonstrated on 18 October 1989 on the anniversary of the foundation of [democratic] Czechoslovakia in 1918. A petition put together by Havel (who had been released from prison in May) and a number of associates, entitled 'A Few Sentences', seeking the introduction of democratic rights, attracted around 37,000 signatories by November. The pressure for change mounted rapidly... But the regime in Czechoslovakia was not ready to capitulate. Riot police wielding truncheons brutally attacked student demonstrators on 17 November. Far from deterring the demonstrators, the police violence encouraged further much larger demonstrations. Within days the numbers of demonstrators demanding an end to the communist dictatorship had swollen to 200,000. By 24 November three-quarters of a million protesters assembled on Wenceslas Square. [On November 27, after Alexander Dubček, the hero of the 1988 Prague Spring, had made an emotional speech - his first public appearance since his removal by Soviet troops over 20 years earlier - a national strike was declared, lasting two days, which half of the country's workforce supported.] Opposition groups had meanwhile, on 19 November, organized themselves in a 'Civic Forum' ["Charter 77"], led by Havel, to demand democratic change. The discussions in its headquarters, the bowels of Prague's Magic Lantern Theatre, were often inchoate, rambling and confused. But, both prompting and also being driven by the huge popular groundswell of opposition, the Civic Forum orchestrated the 'velvet revolution' that swept away the tottering remnants of communist rule.

"Before the end of November the entire party leadership resigned and the party's pre-eminent position was erased from the constitution. The government tried, in a major reshuffle on 3 December, to keep control in the hands of the communists. It was too late for that. Threatened with a general strike a new cabinet, most of whose members were drawn from Civic Forum, was sworn in on 10 December. The great survivor from 1968 and embodiment of the old regime, Gustav Husak, at last conceded defeat and resigned. On 29 December 1989, just before the end of a year so rich in momentous events, Vaclav Havel took the oath as the new head of state [having been elected by a unanimous vote of the Federal Assembly]. In a profoundly symbolic move the hero of 1968, Alexander Dubček, had been appointed a day earlier to the essentially honorific position as Chairman of the Federal Assembly. Soviet troops began withdrawing from Czechoslovakia

⁵²⁹ Roberts, op. cit., p. 908.

in late February 1990. [It was agreed that they should evacuate the country completely by May 1990.] Elections in June 1990 (and Havel's re-election as President the following month) confirmed Czechoslovakia's successful transition to a liberal democracy."⁵³⁰

⁵³⁰ Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster*, pp. 364-365.

45. THE LIBERATION OF EASTERN EUROPE: (v) BULGARIA

“Todor Zhivkov, leader since 1954 of the Bulgarian Communist Party, since July 1971 also head of state, and still clinging to power, was unlikely to be impressed by Gorbachev’s reforms in the Soviet Union renounced its monopoly on power. An attempt in 1982 to boost the flagging economy, and in particular to improve the supply of consumer goods, had failed. The country’s economic problems worsened when the Soviet Union faced with falling revenue from oil exports, reduced its oil supplies to Bulgaria (and the other Eastern European satellites). Bulgaria’s economy, Gorbachev later noted, was kept alive by the ‘artificial respiration’ of foreign capital. Faced with ballooning foreign debt and an economy deemed to be ‘on the verge of a heart attack’, Zhivkov diverted attention by intensifying discrimination against the Turkish minority [Pomaks] – about a tenth of the population.⁵³¹ As ‘restructuring’ proceeded in the Soviet Union, relations with Moscow became more strained. Zhivkov paid lip service to reform in a half-hearted ‘Bulgarian perestroika’ introduced between 1986 and 1988. He was even taken to task – at least nominally – by Gorbachev in 1987 for adopting a line that might ultimately threaten the communist monopoly of power in Bulgaria, and for surrounding himself with advisors who favoured an orientation towards the West. But Zhivkov’s stance contained no small dose of hypocrisy. For he had no intention of weakening, let alone surrendering, his hold on power. In 1987 the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party expressly rejected perestroika as inapplicable to Bulgaria.”⁵³²

Eventually, on 10 November 1989,” under pressure by senior BCP members due to his refusal to recognise problems and deal with public protests”⁵³³, Zhivkov resigned. Within a month, Communist rule in Bulgaria had effectively ended. But the Bulgarian communists resurrected themselves: in June 1990 they won a free election, but now calling themselves the Bulgarian Socialist Party.

This tactic of resurrecting their power under a new name was adopted by many communists in Eastern Europe and Russia in the following decades. It cast doubt on the reality of the supposed fall of communism, especially since very few former communists were tried for their crimes... Was this simply part of “the Perestroika Deception” as one KGB defector to the CIA, Anatoly Golitsyn, called it?...

⁵³¹ In 1984-85 there was a drive to rename the Turks, restoring to them what were claimed to be their original Bulgarian Christians names. (V.M.)

⁵³² Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster*, p. 327.

⁵³³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Todor_Zhivkov.

46. THE LIBERATION OF EASTERN EUROPE: (vi) ALBANIA

The Albanian communist dictator Enver Hoxha, together with his wife Nexhinje and their protégé Ramiz Alia, fell from power, after which the ban on religion was lifted, in December, 1990. In 1992 the first non-communist president was elected. "Diplomatic relations were restored with the Soviet Union (1990) and the United States (1991), but in 1992 the economy collapsed, with unemployment at 70 per cent and inflation at 150 per cent. Foreign donations were required to feed the population."⁵³⁴

Most recently, however, Albania's recovery has gathered pace.⁵³⁵

Philip Jenkins writes: "Albania... recovered only slowly from the horrendous communist tyranny of Enver Hoxha, a self-proclaimed Stalinist who had a deep animus against religion of all kinds. In 1967 he declared Albania the world's first wholly atheist state, and persecutions were wide-ranging and ferocious. Catholics and Muslims were targeted for harsh treatment. In its way, then, postcommunist Albania needed a thoroughgoing spiritual reconstruction no less than Bosnia.

"The most impressive leader of this process has been Anastasios, the [new calendarist] archbishop of Tirana and the primate of the Autocephalous Albanian Orthodox Church. (He is by origin an ethnic Greek.) When he took office in 1992 he faced a nightmare situation. His see had been vacant since 1973, and virtually all its institutions formally closed. Albanian Orthodoxy survived in a diasporic existence, with its overseas capital in Boston. The country's Orthodox Church, claiming the loyalty of perhaps 15 percent of the population, faced extinction.

"First and foremost, Anastasios is a polymath scholar, with interests in history, linguistics, and comparative religion, but it is difficult to imagine any religious leader accomplishing so much practical real-world good in such a short time. In 20 years he reorganized several hundred parishes, a process that often demanded whole new buildings. Monasteries flourish once more. The archbishop restored the theological academy and seminary and ordained hundreds of new priests. A whole range of Orthodox media now operate, including newspapers and radio stations.

"The church's social outreach and charitable works have been spectacular. The results include new schools and medical clinics, which serve people without regard to religious affiliation. When the wars in former Yugoslavia drove thousands of refugees into Albania, the Orthodox Church took the lead in humanitarian efforts, with Muslims the main beneficiaries..."⁵³⁶

⁵³⁴ Rhys Friffiths, "National Gallery Albania", *History Today*, June, 2017, p. 85.

⁵³⁵ Andrew Cook, "Capitalist Rebirth of Hoxha's Hellhole", *Standpoint*, February, 2018, p. 17-19.

⁵³⁶ Jenkins, "Revival in the Balkans", *The Christian Century*, June 27, 2014, <http://www.christiancentury.org/article/2014-06/revival-balkans>.

47. THE LIBERATION OF EASTERN EUROPE: (vii) ROMANIA

Romania requires was the largest Orthodox nation outside the Soviet Union, and had suffered perhaps more than any other Balkan country from fascism in the pre-war and war period, and from communism in the post-war period. But at the same time – and perhaps in consequence of these sufferings - it gave birth to easily the largest True Orthodox Church in the region, led by the extraordinary figure of Metropolitan Glykerie (+1985), which remains to this day the most flourishing True Orthodox Church in the world.

“The 24-year dictatorship of the party boss there, Nicolae Ceausescu, like that of his predecessor Gheorghiu-Dej, was exceptionally brutal and corrupt even by the standards of most Marxist regimes, his rule reinforced by a secret police organization known as the Securitate. Ceausescu, dreaming of a nation of 100 million Romanians, refused to allow the sale of contraceptives, banned abortions and penalized the unmarried and childless. In consequence there were large numbers of illegitimate or unwanted children. Suitable male orphans were taken into cadet battalions in their early teens and were trained, under Ceausescu’s supervision, to regard the regime as their parents and to serve it with fanatical loyalty. As adult members of the Securitate, they were given special privileges, and indeed were among the few Romanians who regularly enough to eat. The Securitate was in some ways organized like Hitler’s SS, with its own tanks and aircraft, and had built a complex network of tunnels and strongpoints under Bucharest.....”⁵³⁷

The early 1980s, writes Mark Mazower, were “a period of austerity harsh even by Romanian standards: consumption was being squeezed to pay off foreign debts, and daily life was ravaged by the insanely destructive programme of ‘systematization’ through which the regime demolished thousands of villages, scores of towns and eventually a large part of Bucharest itself...”⁵³⁸ To a greater degree than in any other country of Eastern Europe (including Russia), power in Romania was concentrated in the hands of one man. Supported by the very powerful secret police, the Securitate, Ceausescu turned Romania “virtually into a personal fiefdom. Even the most senior echelons of the *nomenklatura* were sidelined, as all decisions were taken, without prior discussion, by the Conducator and his powerful, sinister wife, Elena. Party officials were treated much like their Ottoman predecessors, moved from posting to posting, to prevent their building power bases which might threaten their master. After their daughter, Zoia, a mathematics student, tried to flee her parents, an angry Ceaușescu closed down the Bucharest Mathematical Institute, provoking a massive brain drain of some two hundred of the country’s leading mathematicians.”⁵³⁹

⁵³⁷ Johnson, *Modern Times*, p. 761.

⁵³⁸ Mazower, *Dark Continent. Europe’s Twentieth Century*, London: Penguin, 1998, p. 375

⁵³⁹ Mazower, *op. cit.*, p. 377.

“Romania also exemplified another way in which communist elites tried to regain some popularity – through the cultivation of national aspirations. Ceaușescu pushed the use of nationalism further than any other leader, and achieved an apparent detachment from Moscow which brought rich rewards from the West. But national communism became part of a common strategy for clinging on to power. Older gods from the nationalist pantheon were introduced into the Marxist-Leninist liturgy. Marshal Pilsudski started to appear on Polish postage stamps; Luther and Frederick the Great were commemorated in East Germany. Compliant professors produced works like the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences’ fourteen-volume history of the country, or the infamous nationalist memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences. Archaeology, history and ethnography all helpfully uncovered socialism’s deep roots in the nation...”⁵⁴⁰

“As Romanians starved and froze, Ceausescu increasingly resembled a latter-day Nero, luxuriating (with his wife Elena) in a life-style of brazen luxuriousness and relishing a personality cult that plumbed depths of servility and absurdity rare even by the standards of authoritarian regimes. Signs of megalomania were unmistakable. Grandiose prestige projects swallowed fabulous sums of money. Around 40,000 inhabitants were turned out of their homes to make way for the ‘House of the Republic’ in Bucharest, stylistically reminiscent of the worst excesses of Stalinist architecture.⁵⁴¹ In 1988 Ceausescu announced a scheme entailing the destruction of 8,000 villages in order to build ‘agro-industrial complexes’. Villagers who would not destroy their own houses received no compensation. The Hungarian minority were to be ‘Romanianized’... Contraception and abortion were banned and the age of marriage reduced to fifteen. Tens of thousands of children were removed from poor families and placed in orphanages.”⁵⁴²

“Curiously, enough, Ceausescu was not unpopular in the West⁵⁴³; indeed he was praised for his unwillingness to follow all the twists and turns of Soviet foreign and defence policy, and for his ability to service and repay his debts and pay for Western goods on the nail – a policy made possible by starving the mass of the people of all but the barest necessities, leaving the rest for export. But Western support evaporated when the nature and scale of his rural destruction became known, as it did from 1988 onwards. Moreover, this policy brought the regime into direct conflict with its large Hungarian minority, and its troubles started in earnest when discontent burst into active revolt at the mainly Hungarian-speaking town of Timisoara....”⁵⁴⁴

On 16 December 1989, “the Hungarian minority in Timișoara held a public protest in response to an attempt by the government to evict Hungarian

⁵⁴⁰ Mazower, *op. cit.*, pp. 377-378.

⁵⁴¹ It was also reminiscent of Nero’s “Golden House”, 2.6 square kilometres in size, which was built in 64 AD after a great fire, attributed falsely to the Christians, destroyed a large part of Rome

⁵⁴² Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster*, pp. 325-326.

⁵⁴³ He even had tea with the Queen of England! (V.M.)

⁵⁴⁴ Johnson, *Modern Times*, p. 761.

Reformed church Pastor László Tőkés. In July of that year, in an interview with Hungarian television, Tőkés had criticised the regime's systematization policy and complained that Romanians did not even know their human rights. As Tőkés described it later, the interview, which had been seen in the border areas and was then spread all over Romania, had 'a shock effect upon the Romanians, the *Securitate* as well, on the people of Romania. [...] [I]t had an unexpected effect upon the public atmosphere in Romania.'

"The government then alleged that Tőkés was inciting ethnic hatred. At the behest of the government, his bishop removed him from his post, thereby depriving him of the right to use the apartment to which he was entitled as a pastor, and assigned him to be a pastor in the countryside. For some time his parishioners gathered around his home to protect him from harassment and eviction. Many passersby spontaneously joined in. As it became clear that the crowd would not disperse, the mayor, Petre Moț, made remarks suggesting that he had overturned the decision to evict Tőkés. Meanwhile, the crowd had grown impatient and, when Moț declined to confirm his statement against the planned eviction in writing, the crowd started to chant anti-communist slogans. Subsequently, police and *Securitate* forces showed up at the scene. By 19:30 the protest had spread and the original cause became largely irrelevant. Some of the protesters attempted to burn down the building that housed the district committee of the PCR. The *Securitate* responded with tear gas and water jets, while police beat up rioters and arrested many of them. Around 21:00 the rioters withdrew. They regrouped eventually around the Romanian Orthodox Cathedral and started a protest march around the city, but again they were confronted by the security forces.

"Riots and protests resumed the following day, 17 December. The rioters broke into the district committee building and threw party documents, propaganda brochures, Ceaușescu's writings, and other symbols of Communist power out of windows.

"The military was sent in to control the riots, because the situation was too large for the *Securitate* and conventional police to handle. The presence of the army in the streets was an ominous one: It meant that they had received their orders from the highest level of the command chain, presumably from Ceaușescu himself. The army failed to establish order and chaos ensued, including gunfire, fights, casualties, and burned cars. Transportor Amfibiu Blindat (TAB) armoured personnel carriers and tanks were called in.

"After 20:00, from Piața Libertății (Liberty Square) to the Opera, there was wild shooting, including the area of Decebal bridge, Calea Lipovei (Lipovei Avenue) and Calea Girocului (Girocului Avenue). Tanks, trucks and TABs blocked the accesses into the city while helicopters hovered overhead. After midnight the protests calmed down. Colonel-General Ion Coman, local Party secretary Ilie Matei, and Colonel-General Ștefan Gușă (Chief of the Romanian General Staff) inspected the city. Some areas looked like the aftermath of a war: destruction, rubble and blood

“On the morning of 18 December the centre was being guarded by soldiers and *Securitate* agents in plainclothes. Mayor Moț ordered a party gathering to take place at the university, with the purpose of condemning the "vandalism" of the previous days. He also declared martial law, prohibiting people from going about in groups of larger than two.

“Defying the curfew, a group of 30 young men headed for the Orthodox cathedral, where they stopped and waved a Romanian flag from which they had removed the Romanian Communist coat of arms leaving a distinctive hole, in a manner similar to the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Expecting that they would be fired upon, they started to sing "Deșteaptă-te, române!" ("Awaken thee, Romanian!"), an earlier patriotic song that had been banned since 1947. They were, indeed, fired upon; some died and others were seriously injured, while the lucky ones were able to escape.⁵⁴⁵

“On 19 December, local Party functionary Radu Bălan and Colonel-General Ștefan Gușă visited workers in the city's factories, but failed to get them to resume work. On 20 December, massive columns of workers entered the city. About 100,000 protesters occupied Piața Operei (Opera Square – today Piața Victoriei, Victory Square) and chanted anti-government slogans: "*Noi suntem poporul!*" ("We are the people!"), "*Armata e cu noi!*" ("The army is on our side!"), "*Nu vă fie frică, Ceaușescu pică!*" ("Have no fear, Ceaușescu is falling!")

“Meanwhile, Emil Bobu (Secretary to the Central Committee) and Prime Minister Constantin Dăscălescu were sent by Elena Ceaușescu (Nicolae being at that time in Iran) to resolve the situation. They met with a delegation of the protesters and agreed to free the majority of the arrested protesters. However, they refused to comply with the protesters' main demand (resignation of Ceaușescu) and the situation remained essentially unchanged.

“The next day, trains loaded with workers from factories in Oltenia arrived in Timișoara. The regime was attempting to use them to repress the mass protests, but after a brief encounter they ended up joining the protests. One worker explained, ‘Yesterday our factory boss and a party official rounded us up in the yard, handed us wooden clubs and told us that Hungarians and 'hooligans' were devastating Timișoara and that it is our duty to go there and help crush the riots. But I realised that wasn't the truth.’

“On 18 December, Ceaușescu had departed for a visit to Iran, leaving the duty of crushing the Timișoara revolt to his subordinates and his wife. Upon his return on the evening of 20 December, the situation became even more tense, and he gave a televised speech from the TV studio inside the Central Committee Building (CC Building) in which he spoke about the events at Timișoara in terms of an

⁵⁴⁵ “A mass grave had been discovered there filled by 4,630 bodies of their victims” (Johnson, *Modern Times*, p. 761. (V.M.)

‘interference of foreign forces in Romania's internal affairs’ and an ‘external aggression on Romania's sovereignty.’

“The country, which had no information about the Timișoara events from the national media, heard about the Timișoara revolt from Western radio stations like *Voice of America* and *Radio Free Europe*, and by word of mouth. A mass meeting was staged for the next day, 21 December, which, according to the official media, was presented as a "spontaneous movement of support for Ceaușescu," emulating the 1968 meeting in which Ceaușescu had spoken against the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces.”⁵⁴⁶

Yuval Noah Harari continues the story: “On 21 December 1989, Ceaușescu organised a mass demonstration of support in the centre of Bucharest. Over the previous months the Soviet Union had withdrawn its support from the eastern European communist regimes, the Berlin Wall had fallen, and revolutions had swept Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. Ceaușescu, who had ruled Romania since 1965, believed he could withstand the tsunami, even though riots against his rule had erupted in the Romanian city of Timișoara on 17 December. As one of his counter-measures, Ceaușescu arranged a massive rally in Bucharest to prove to Romanians and the rest of the world that the majority of the populace still loved him – or at least feared him. The creaking party apparatus mobilised 80,000 people to fill the city’s central square, and citizens throughout Romania were instructed to stop all their activities and tune in on their radios and televisions.

“To the cheering of the seemingly enthusiastic crowd, Ceaușescu mounted the balcony overlooking the square, as he had done scores of times in previous decades. Flanked by his wife Elena, leading party officials and a bevy of bodyguards, Ceaușescu began delivering one of his trademark dreary speeches. For eight minutes he praised the glories of Romanian socialism, looking very pleased with himself as the crowd clapped mechanically. And then something went wrong. You can see it for yourself on You-Tube. Just search for ‘Ceaușescu’s last speech’, and watch history in action.

“The You-Tube clip shows Ceaușescu starting another long sentence, saying, ‘I want to thank the initiators and organisers of this great event in Bucharest, considering it as a---’, and then he falls silent, his eyes open wide, and he freezes in disbelief. He never finished the sentence. Somebody in the audience booed. People still argue today who was the first person who dared to boo. And then another person booed, and another, and another, and within a few seconds the masses began whistling, shouting abuse and calling out: ‘Ti-mi-șoa-ra! Ti-mi-șoa-ra!’

“All this happened live on Romanian television, as three-quarters of the population sat glued to the screens, their hearts throbbing wildly. The notorious secret police – the Securitate – immediately ordered the broadcast to be stopped,

⁵⁴⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romanian_Revolution.

but the television crews disobeyed. The cameraman pointed the camera towards the sky so that viewers couldn't see the panic among the party leaders on the balcony, but the soundman kept recording, and the technicians continued the transmission. The whole of Romania heard the crowd booing, while Ceaușescu yelled, 'Hello! Hello! Hello!' as if the problem was with the microphone. His wife Elena began scolding the audience: 'Be quiet! Be quiet!' until Ceaușescu turned and yelled at her – still live on television – 'You be quiet!' Ceaușescu then appeared to the excited crowds in the square, imploring them, 'Comrades! Comrades! Be quiet, comrades!'

"But the comrades were unwilling to be quiet. Communist Romania crumbled when 80,000 people in the Bucharest central square realised they were much stronger than the old man in the fur hat on the balcony..."⁵⁴⁷

The transmission stopped, and with it – the dictator's power. "People everywhere joined the protests, attacking government premises, tearing up official portraits of Ceaușescu and burning his propaganda books. Ceaușescu ordered the Securitate to fight to the last man. Throughout the night they shot at demonstrators, but were unable to stem the tide.

"The following day the army joined the [counter-]revolution. As angry protestors began to lay siege to the party headquarters, Elena and Nicolae Ceaușescu were forced to flee by helicopter, landing in a field outside the capital. Later that day they were hunted down and placed under arrest. On Christmas Day Ion Iliescu, head of the National Salvation Front, a spontaneous organisation formed by communist party members who had turned against their leader, hastily organised a military tribunal to try the Ceaușescus. After the death penalty was delivered, the couple were led to a freezing courtyard next to a toilet block. Ceaușescu apparently sang the Internationale. The First Lady screamed 'Fuck you' as they were lined up against a wall and shot..."⁵⁴⁸

Since supposedly "moderate communists" replaced the Ceaușescu regime, it was not, according to Vali Crețu, "a real revolution, but the replacement of one generation of communists with another, younger one: "This was not a small act of defiance at all, nor was it a spontaneous riot organised by 'the people'. It wasn't an anti-Communist revolution, but a coup d'etat planned in its smallest details by Ceaușescu's younger associates. Among others, Communist Party members like Ion Iliescu, Adrian Năstase, Petre Roman (son of Ernő Neuländer, the Jew who founded the Securitate – the Romanian equivalent of the KGB) etc. rebelled against Ceaușescu, organised the coup, overthrew his regime and assumed power. It was just younger Communists against older Communists, with no respect for the Romanian State or the Romanian people. Many Romanians died in vain thinking they were fighting some liberation war. This power struggle became clear when the Romanians actually tried to oppose Iliescu's new Communist regime and were crushed during the Mineriade, when Iliescu called

⁵⁴⁷ Harari, *Homo Deus*, London: Vintage, 2017, pp. 155-158.

⁵⁴⁸ Frank Dikotter, *Dictators*, London: Bloomsbury, 2020, p. 185.

the miners to come to Bucharest and create havoc in Piața Universității, where Romania's intellectual elite had gathered (back then we still had one). That was our last real cry for freedom and identity and we failed it. The Old Style Orthodox Church remains our only hope and our only contribution to true faith..."⁵⁴⁹

Nevertheless, as Anca Stati writes, there was an attempt to repent of the sins of communism immediately after Ceausescu's fall. Students and many young people went on the streets and occupied the University Square in Bucharest, demanding a strong condemnation of communism and of all the communists. They wanted all communists to be banned from public office. They claimed that the revolution had been confiscated by neo-communists and they were right! They were saying prayers and singing Christian songs. The official Church did not support them at all. Nor did the government. They used the mass media to denigrate people participating to the event. In order to disperse them, President Iliescu, a former communist, called for the mineworkers of Jiu Valley to "re-establish order and discipline". Most of the participants in the movement were beaten and arrested. God knows what happened to many of them..."⁵⁵⁰

"By June 1990," writes Roberts, "a government some believed still to be heavily influenced by former communists had turned on some of its former supporters, now critics, and crushed student protest with the aid of vigilante squads of miners at some cost in [1100] lives and in disapproval abroad."⁵⁵¹

The fall of Ceaușescu not only helped the Romanians by bringing them at any rate the beginning of freedom. It also demonstrated to Gorbachev, if he was watching (which he surely was), that if he was thinking of dictatorship as a solution to his mounting problems in the Soviet Union, it would not work...

⁵⁴⁹ Cretu, *Facebook*, September 8, 2017.

⁵⁵⁰ Stati, personal communication, November 14, 2014.

⁵⁵¹ Roberts, *History of the World*.

48. THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION: (6) THE DISMANTLING OF COMMUNISM

The domestic struggle was hotting up as Gorbachev prepared initiatives in both the political and spheres that definitely went beyond the bounds of Soviet communism even at its most liberal.

Gorbachev had been able to achieve so much so far largely because he was General Secretary of the Communist Party, an immensely powerful position, the seat of the Communist despotism since Stalin's time. At no point did he ever have anything like a majority for his liberal policies in the Politburo (his liberal allies like Yakovlev and Chernyaev all occupied more junior positions). And yet he was able to push through glasnost' and perestroika because the habit of obedience to the General Secretary was deeply engrained among communists. However, as the country collapsed politically and economically, orders from the centre were obeyed less willingly, if at all, and a challenge to his power within the party was bound to emerge eventually. Before that, however, there would be a challenge to the party itself.

For, as Norman Lowe writes, "it was inevitable that sooner or later a major challenge would be mounted to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. At the second session of the Congress of People's Deputies which began on 12 December 1989, Sakharov tried to call for the abolition of Article 6 of the constitution. This was the occasion on which Gorbachev switched off Sakharov's microphone and refused to allow the proposal to be discussed. According to Archie Brown, Gorbachev had accepted, in private, at least since the summer of 1988, that Article 6 would have to go and that the party would have to give up its leading role and take its place within a multi-party system. 'But he wanted to do this at a time of his own choosing when executive power could be transferred from the Communist Party to elected state organs... He wanted to choose the right time... The problem was, however, that when the time was as yet scarcely ripe for the Communist Party establishment - in early 1990 - it was already overripe for a society which had seen Communist Parties removed not only from their constitutionally decreed 'leading role' but from actual power in Eastern Europe in the course of 1989. Nevertheless, Gorbachev pushed ahead with his plans. He prepared a new set of proposals to carry the transfer of power from party to state a further important step: two of the main points were the introduction of a presidential system, and the amendment of Article 6 so that the party abandoned its leading role, accepted a multi-party system and adopted humane, democratic socialism. In February 1990 the proposals were put to a Central Committee plenum. Predictably there was a stormy debate: the conservatives did all they could to wreck the amendments of Article 6; both conservatives and radicals objected to the new role of president, which, they said, would carry too much power. Vladimir Brovnikov, the Soviet ambassador to Poland, put the conservative case forcibly. 'The general secretary and his closest colleagues are trying to shove the Party onto the sidelines of political life, to turn it from a ruling party into a discussion club, or at least into a pawn in a parliamentary game. To let this

happen would be a catastrophe for the country... our leaders are trying to cross out the Party as the leading force in society and to transfer the functions of the Politburo to the President.' However, Gorbachev got his way: the Plenum and the Congress eventually approved the proposals, and in March Gorbachev was elected President of the Soviet Union for a term of five years. Two new bodies came into existence to help the President to function: a Federation Council which consisted of the parliamentary leaders of all 15 republics, and a Presidential Council which consisted of senior ministers and any other advisors whom the President cared to choose. He could, he hoped, now function increasingly independent of the party.

"Gorbachev was soon disappointed once again. The presidency did not give him the power he had hoped for, partly because he had decided to opt for an election by the Congress of People's Deputies [the great majority of whom were communists] instead of by the whole population. His caution was understandable – there must have been considerable doubt as to whether he could have won an election across the entire Soviet Union, given that his popularity was dwindling rapidly, while Boris Yeltsin's was increasing. This meant that Gorbachev's presidency, unlike the Presidency of the United States, somehow lacked legitimacy. Further problems were caused for the new President by the results of the republican and regional elections held in February and March 1990. In the three Baltic republics the elections were won by pro-independence candidates, many of whom were communists; on 11 March Lithuania formally declared itself independent of the USSR, the first of the republics to do so. In elections for the parliament of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR or simply Russia), the official party candidates did badly; worst of all for Gorbachev, on 29 May Yeltsin completed his dramatic comeback when he was elected Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet. Yeltsin now became the focus of attention for all the radical reformers. Although he had no power in the other 14 republics outside the RSFSR, in the political centres of Moscow and Leningrad, where it really mattered, Yeltsin now had an enormous advantage over Gorbachev; he was, in effect, the President of a democratically elected parliament which would become more powerful than the communist party. There were now two presidents, two parliaments and two governments in one country, and even in one capital city – Moscow. On 8 June 1990 the Russian republic announced its sovereignty, which meant, as far as anybody could be certain, that Russian laws took precedence over Soviet ones. Yeltsin's parliament and government would be able to prevent Gorbachev's policies being implemented in Russia, or alternatively, it could implement them in a more radical way than Gorbachev intended. Yeltsin was formally elected president of the Russian Federation on 12 June 1991."⁵⁵²

By the summer of 1990, Gorbachev was also preparing a radical change from the socialist command economy to a market economy. This was only partly out of the realization that the half-measures he called "economic reform" were only making the situation worse. It was also because he desperately needed massive loans to prop up an economy that was now failing to provide even the most basic

⁵⁵² Lowe, *op. cit.*, pp. 420-422.

foodstuffs and other materials – like soap, razor blades, tampons, etc. But even his friend President Bush was refusing to give him the loans he needed until he made more radical economic reforms. For Bush was himself under pressure from Congress. He was demanding that Gorbachev pass a law allowing Soviet citizens to emigrate and renounce his economic blockade against rebellious Lithuania.

A transition to the market economy would also have the major political advantage of bringing Yeltsin onto his side. (Indeed, Yeltsin might introduce such reforms into the RSFSR in any case.) However, that would precipitate the all-out war against the hardliners that Gorbachev had avoided so skilfully for so long.

Norman Lowe writes: “Gorbachev was attracted by the radical ideas of Grigory Yavlinsky, a young economist working for Yeltsin and the Russian government. He saw this as a chance to improve relations with Yeltsin; in August 1990 he persuaded Yeltsin to support the idea of a joint Soviet-Russian team of radical economists to draw up a plan for rapid marketization. The group produced what became known as the ‘500 Days Programme’, an extremely impressive (at least on paper) 240-pge document composed mainly by Stanislav Shatalin with help from Yavlinsky. It was a crash programme involving large-scale privatization, devolution of power to the republics and the setting-up of market institutions. There was no mention of socialism, and there was no way that any country with such an economic system could still be considered communist. Gorbachev signalled his approval of the documents publicly. And yet, as Archie Brown points out, ‘they spelled the end of state socialism and were utterly inconsistent with the idea that Gorbachev was still a Communist in any meaningful sense of the term, even though he was still General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union!’ There was pandemonium when the details of the programme became known. [Prime Minister] Ryzhkov and his supporters felt that it was unworkable, and he threatened to resign and take the entire government with him if Gorbachev tried to adopt it. The economic ministries and most of the party apparatus were opposed to it, and so were the KGB and the army which would both have their funding substantially reduced if the programme was carried out. One of the main points made by the critics was that since the republics would be in control of their own economies, that would deprive the central union authorities of most of their revenue-collecting powers; this would threaten the survival of the Soviet Union or indeed any other kind of union. Ryzhkov argued that it would cause mass unemployment and the closure of thousands of factories.⁵⁵³ Gorbachev himself began to have second thoughts, and invited another economist to prepare a compromise document combining the best aspects of the 500 Days Programme and Ryzhkov’s more cautious plan. It was this compromise – known as ‘Basic Guidelines’ – which in October 1990 was accepted by the Supreme Soviet. However, it was an unsatisfactory crossbreed sort of plan, described by Yeltsin as like ‘trying to mate a hedgehog with a snake’. What it meant in effect was that the conservatives had destroyed any possibility of a swift changeover to a market economy. Should Gorbachev have gambled and

⁵⁵³ Ryzhkov’s fears may have led to the major heart-attack he suffered in the autumn, leading to this retirement. (V.M.)

pressed ahead with the programme? The majority of economists now seem to think that, leaving aside the fierce opposition, the plan was unrealistic and the targets impossible; one economist said that it was the equivalent of Stalin's attempt to complete a Five-Year Plan in three years, and that if it had been implemented, the results would probably have been worse than today.

"Gorbachev's retreat over the 500 Days Programme offended Yeltsin and the radical reformers and ruined the prospect of any further co-operation. Over the next few months – from October 1990 to March 1991 – he took a distinct move towards the right. He was obviously worried by the strength of the right-wing opposition and saw this move as a kind of tactical retreat, or, as he said later, 'an attempt to steer a middle course'. On 7 November 1990, during the usual celebrations to mark the Bolshevik revolution, a man tried to assassinate Gorbachev with a shot-gun. Fortunately, the guards were alert and he was unharmed. But he was deeply shocked by the incident, and it may have helped to convince him that law and order needed to be tightened up. On 18 November his move to the right became unmistakable; he abolished the Presidential Council, the body which included his most radical advisers like his close colleague Yakovlev; he gave himself as President greatly increased powers; and a new Security Council was set up, with seats for the KGB, army and police. Although Gorbachev repeated that he was still in favour of reform, it looked as though he was more interested in strengthening the traditional pillars of the communist state – the KGB, the *nomenklatura* and the threat of force. Yeltsin and the radicals were horrified. On 24 November the first draft appeared of a new Union Treaty, but it was unacceptable by the republics which felt that it was deliberately vague: it mentioned 'joint control' of policy, but the republics felt that in practice the centre would continue to dominate.

"Gorbachev's problem was that as his relations with the republics and the radicals deteriorated, he found himself pushed more closely towards the conservatives. Having already sidelined Yakovlev, early in December he sacked his liberal Minister of the Interior, Vadim Bakatin, and replaced him with Boris Pugo, a hard-liner and former head of the KGB in Latvia. One of Pugo's first actions was to confer with the defence minister, Dmitri Yazov, and the head of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, both hard-liners. It was arranged that the army would set up military patrols on the streets of major cities. Gennady Yanayev was appointed Vice-President: he was another conservative, dedicated to preserving the Union, and he was a man Gorbachev mistakenly felt he could trust. When Ryzhkov suffered a serious heart-attack in December, he too was replaced by the more conservative Valentin Pavlov. The hard-liners were becoming more vociferous in the Congress of People's Deputies; in October 1990 they formed a group called *Soyuz* (Union) which, by the end of the year, numbered about 600 deputies. They were not all communist party members; what united them was the belief that the Soviet Union was worth preserving, that people should be proud of its industrial and cultural achievements, and especially proud of the fact that the USSR had defeated Nazi Germany. They saw Gorbachev as a wrecker who was out to destroy the greatest state in the world. During the session of the Congress which met in December 1990, *Soyuz* speakers called for strong measures

to restore order and maintain the unity of the USSR. Gorbachev replied that he would use all his new presidential powers and if necessary would declare a state of emergency in any republic which tried to break away illegally.

“This was the final straw for Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze [former head of the Georgian KGB], the last liberal member of the government. On 20 December [the KGB’s birthday], in a dramatic and emotional speech to the Congress, he announced his resignation. For months he had been subjected to criticism from the army and the armaments industry, but since October, when the move to the right began, Gorbachev had ceased to support him, and he felt isolated. The army blamed him as the man who had ‘lost’ eastern Europe and allowed German reunification, although they knew perfectly well that these had been Gorbachev’s decision. Now his message to the Congress was that the reforming zeal of the liberals and radicals had been betrayed – by some of the reformers themselves: ‘Comrade democrats, you have run away,’ he told them: ‘Reformers have taken cover. A dictatorship is coming. I am being completely responsible in stating this. No one knows what kind of dictatorship it will be or who will come or what the regime will be like. I want to make the following statement: I am resigning... Let this be my contribution, if you like, against the onset of dictatorship.’ Shevardnadze’s speech caused a sensation; he had not discussed it beforehand with Gorbachev, who was hurt and embarrassed, but most importantly it gave notice, both to the people of the USSR and the rest of the world, of the strong possibility that the conservative backlash would reverse all the changes of the previous few years. Shevardnadze had no concrete evidence of an impending coup at this point, but he sensed, correctly, that sooner or later the conservatives would try to remove Gorbachev...”⁵⁵⁴

⁵⁵⁴ Lowe, *op. cit.*, p. 429-432.

49. THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION: (7) THE SOVIET NATIONALITIES

“For the Soviet military and security establishment, now burdened with the logistics of a hurried, humiliating retreat, Gorbachev’s ‘transformation’ of the international system meant the surrender of all the gains of the Second World War. Eastern Europe’s exit from the Soviet orbit had an equally dramatic impact on the Soviet republics, which Gorbachev had unbound from the Communist Party and planned economy centralism, and placed within the vortex of electoral politics.”⁵⁵⁵

But the process of the liberation of the Soviet national republics had in fact begun earlier. Just as Gorbachev’s abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine, accompanied by *perestroika* and *glasnost* within the Union, had played a vital part in the liberation of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe; so they could not fail to bring into the open suppressed nationalist sentiments within the Soviet Union. Eventually these, stimulated by the liberation of Eastern Europe, led to the break-up and destruction of the whole of the USSR.

The major steps in this process were: (1) the *de facto* independence of the Baltic republics in August, 1989, followed, from March, 1990, (2) by their *de jure* secession, then (3) that of the Russian Republic (RSFSR) in June, 1990, and finally (4) that of Ukraine and the Central Asian republics in 1991.

By renouncing the use of force to preserve the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, Gorbachev, as we have seen, made possible the liberation of those countries from Communism. This was partly the product of democratic idealism, but not entirely. It was partly also the product of miscalculation. He wanted to slow the process by a Law of Secession, thinking that nations not threatened by violence would voluntarily want to stay in the Soviet Union. They did not. This failure to understand would cost Gorbachev dearly...

Landsbergis, future president of Lithuania, explained the situation as follows: “We are an occupied country. To pretend we are grateful for a little democracy, to go through some sort of referendum to prove our commitment to independence, to talk with Mr Gorbachev as anything other than a foreign leader, is to live a lie... We have never considered ourselves a genuine part of the Soviet Union. That is something Gorbachev does not quite understand. We wish his *perestroika* well, but the time has come for us to go our own way.”⁵⁵⁶

In December 1988, writes Norman Lowe, “there were the first disturbing signs that Gorbachev did not understand the strength of nationalist feelings or the delicacy of the relationship between Moscow and some of the republics. He decided to get rid of the 74-year old Dimukhamad Kunayev, who had been leader of Kazakhstan since 1954, who had a reputation for spectacular corruption and

⁵⁵⁵ Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted*, p. 90.

⁵⁵⁶ Landsbergis, in Lowe, *op. cit.*, p. 427.

ran his republic with the help of his numerous family and friends, like a mafia boss. An article in *Izvestiya* claimed that among his other considerable assets, he had control of 247 hotels, 414 guest flats, 84 cottages, 22 hunting lodges and 350 hospital beds. Certainly Kunayev deserved to go, but Gorbachev made the mistake of replacing him with a Russian, Gennady Kolbin, who had just distinguished himself by cleaning up the corruption in Georgia, and who, it was hoped, would repeat the exercise in Kazakhstan. This was insensitive to say the least, Kazakh nationalist feelings were outraged that a Russian should be foisted on them as their next leader. There was a huge protest demonstration in front of communist party headquarters in Alma Ata, the capital, although it was not entirely spontaneous – Kunayev's family and friends had a hand in its organization. Moscow decided that the Kazakhs needed a sharp lesson: troops were brought in to disperse the demonstrators, who seemed to be mostly students. Some were killed, hundreds injured and thousands were arrested. Gorbachev was shocked by the reaction and by its bloodshed, but did not back down, at least not immediately; it was only in 1989 that he replaced Kolbin with a native Kazakh.

“The problem for Gorbachev was that as *glasnost* and *perestroika* came on full stream, with freedom of expression and democratization, further tensions were inevitable. The various nationalities began to demand greater local control and self-determination. Nor was it just as simple case of non-Russians resisting control from Moscow; in each of the republics there were conflicts between minorities and the dominant nationality group. In Georgia, for example, there were two minority groups – the Abkhaz who were Muslims, and the Ossetians – who each had small autonomous regions of their own within Georgia. There were constant clashes between the Abkhaz and the Ossetins on the one hand, who protested that the Georgians were trying to interfere excessively in their regions, and the Georgians on the other hand, who complained that the non-Georgians were expecting too much. The most disturbing development was the emergence of a Russian national movement under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin which aimed to use the Russian republic as an alternative power base from which to challenge the hard-line communists and Gorbachev as well. So although Gorbachev had no intention of causing the break-up of the USSR, it seems that this outcome was almost inevitable if he continued with the democratizing element of *perestroika*. However, Gorbachev believed that it ought to be possible to work out a middle way between the existing Soviet system and a total breakdown, in which every national group, not just the fifteen republics, became completely independent. He hoped, by persuasion and negotiation, to arrive at a system which still preserved a high level of integration and co-operation.

“The first major nationalist test for Gorbachev was a conflict between the republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan over possession of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The population of this area was 80 per cent Armenian but it had been placed under the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan by Stalin in 1923. Armenian resentment had smouldered on and off since then. They had many grievances: they were Christians, whereas the Azeris were mainly Shiite Muslims; they felt that their culture was suppressed and that they were exploited economically by

the Azeri authorities in Baku. The new atmosphere in the USSR encouraged the Soviet of Nagorno-Karabakh to request a transfer to the jurisdiction of Armenia (February 1988). Demonstrations were held in Yerevan, the Armenian capital, in support of this demand, and clashes developed between Azeris and Armenians in other parts of Azerbaijan. The worst violence occurred in the city of Sumgait on the Caspian Sea near Baku: 26 Armenians and 6 Azeris were killed. Moscow's official line was that the request could not be granted, since it would encourage scores of similar demands and clashes; however, Gorbachev did promise a just solution. In June 1988 the Armenian Supreme Court voted to incorporate Nagorno-Karabakh into Armenia, but this was rejected by the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan. As disorders continued, the Supreme Soviet decided to place Nagorno-Karabakh under direct rule from Moscow (January 1989). This did nothing to solve the problem: ominous border clashes occurred, and the two republics were on the brink of civil war.

"In April 1988 a new crisis suddenly erupted in Georgia, where there was a rapidly growing nationalist movement. Its aims were to press for autonomy from the USSR, but at the same time to deny the Abkhaz people their independence from Georgia. Huge demonstrations were organized, stretching over several days, in the capital, Tbilisi, and although they were almost entirely peaceful, the local communist party leaders decided to use troops to disperse the crowds. Twenty of the demonstrators were killed, including several policemen who tried to protect women in the crowd from assault by the troops, and hundreds were injured: but the violence was counter-productive: public opinion in Georgia was outraged and quickly turned against the Georgian Communist Party. There was a rush of support for the nationalists and for complete independence from the USSR. In November the Georgian Supreme Soviet declared sovereignty and decided that the Soviet occupation of Georgia in 1921 violated the treaty signed in 1920 between Georgia and Russia. There was great controversy about who should be held responsible for the Tbilisi tragedy, and for a time there was a tendency to blame Gorbachev. But in fact there is plenty of evidence that he did his best to prevent violence. He stated categorically that the situation must be resolved by political means and through dialogue. A commission of enquiry later put the blame on the local party leadership, and on the general in charge of the troops, who was moved elsewhere..."⁵⁵⁷

The next domino to fall was the Baltic States... Significantly, freedom for the Baltic States followed after they gained a recognition from Moscow that the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 had been illegal... In 1987, writes Mazower, "powerful environmental protest movements gave way in the Baltic states to large unofficial demonstrations commemorating the anniversary of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which had effectively sealed the fate of the inter-war independent republics. Further anniversaries also gathered large crowds, plunging the authorities into disarray and paving the way for the more intense struggle of the following year. At the end of 1988 Estonia proclaimed its sovereignty as an autonomous republic – the first to do so in the USSR – and

⁵⁵⁷ Lowe, *op. cit.*, pp. 424-426.

declared the primacy of republic over federal law. 'National' emblems of the pre-war republics were increasingly visible in demonstrations organized by massively popular pro-autonomy groups which wrested unofficial recognition from the local authorities.

"What weakened the latter and made them hesitate to crack down on the demonstrators were the signs from the Kremlin that it was opposed to a hard line. By early 1989 the popular fronts had scored a resounding success, trouncing the Party in elections to the new USSR Congress of People's Deputies, and they started moving cautiously from demands for 'autonomy' to full independence."⁵⁵⁸

"In the course of 1989," writes Serhii Plokhy, "after declaring the sovereign status of their republics, the Balts (Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians) went into the streets to protest Moscow's planned changes to the Soviet constitution. These changes would have allowed the center to override republican legislation with all-Union laws and unilaterally decide the issue of secession from the Union. In an overwhelming rejection of Soviet sovereignty over their republics, the activists of the Baltic national movements, called national fronts, organized a Baltic Way in August 1989 – a human chain linking their capitals, Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius. The demonstration was organized on the fiftieth anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact...

"With the support of local communist party committees, which had everything to lose from the Baltic revolt, Moscow struck back, mobilizing ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in support of the Union. Feeling threatened by the revival of local languages and cultures, the Russian-speaking population of the region generally supported the International Front in Latvia and the International Movement in Estonia, Moscow-backed political organizations whose task it was to counteract the popular fronts created by the titular nationalists.

"Estonia and Latvia were more vulnerable to pressure from the center than Lithuania. Latvia, with a population of 2.6 million, was in the most precarious position: Latvians constituted only 52 per cent of the population, followed by Russians with 36 percent, Ukrainians with 4.5 percent, and Belarussians with 3.5 percent. In Estonia, Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarussians made up 35 percent of the population. Most of the Russian and East Slavic inhabitants of the Baltic republics were recent migrants working in industrial enterprises established and run by Moscow after World War II. If the popular fronts were pushing for the sovereignty and eventual independence of the Baltic republics, the international fronts were pushing back."⁵⁵⁹

⁵⁵⁸ Mazower, *op. cit.*, p. 387.

⁵⁵⁹ Plokhy, *Lost Kingdom. A History of Russian Nationalism from Ivan the Great to Vladimir Putin*, London: Allen Lane, 2017, pp. 307-310.

"In March 1990 the parliament of Lithuania voted to secede from the Union, 124 to 0 (with 9 abstentions). The Estonian and Latvian parliaments declared 'transitional periods' to independence."⁵⁶⁰

This opened the floodgates. "In June 1990 the *Russian* republic declared its 'sovereignty' – vis-à-vis *Moscow* [seen as the capital of the Soviet Union rather than Moscow] – asserting the primacy of republican laws over Union ones. The parliaments of Ukraine, Belarussia, and newly renamed Moldova (Moldavia) followed Russia's lead to declarations of sovereignty. Armenia, redicalized by Karabakh, followed Lithuania, declaring independence..."⁵⁶¹

"In Russia, the first wave of political mobilization came with semi-free elections to the Soviet super-parliament in the spring of 1989 and continued through the elections of the Russian parliament in 1990. Like the dissident movement of the previous decade, this one had two main ideological poles – liberalism and nationalism. The proponents of the latter were conservative in their economic and social agenda, stressing the wrongs done to the Russians by the communist regime, while at the same time demonstrating loyalty to communism and solidarity with movements of the International Front type in the Baltics.

"The merger of communism and nationalism in Russia received its institutional embodiment in the creation of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation – a process long opposed and disrupted by Gorbachev, who feared that a separate Russian party would spell the end of Soviet communist unity, and thus of the Union as such. Maintaining the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as a de facto Russian party had been a consistent policy since the times of Lenin, who wanted a union of republics but was quite content with Russian dominance over the party. But the Russian communists now demanded a party of their own so as to be on a par with the communists of Ukraine, Belarus, and other republics. They finally got their way in the summer of 1990. The Russian conservatives were now on a collision course with the Union.

"Another aspect of Russian mobilization came into existence not in opposition to the non-Russians but in alliance with them. The leaders of the Russian liberal intelligentsia shared their vision of democratic transformation of their societies with the leaders of the popular fronts and national movements in the Baltics, Ukraine, and some other Soviet republics. In the summer of 1989, they joined forces in the Interregional Group of Deputies at the first semi-democratically elected Soviet super-parliament, the Congress of People's Deputies. The Interregional Group found support in Moscow, Leningrad, and other large industrial cities of Russia and the Soviet Union. The democratically minded deputies all rebelled against the Communist Party's monopoly of power, but their ability to define a positive political agenda was limited, with members from the non-Russian republics putting their ethno-national demands first. Gorbachev and

⁵⁶⁰ Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted*, p. 90.

⁵⁶¹ Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted*, p. 90.

the center, for their part, found support among conservative deputies from the non-Russian republics, especially those of Central Asia.

“Democratic Russia, a coalition of liberal deputies of the Interregional Group, contested the Russian parliamentary elections of March 1990 and won 190 seats, or roughly one-fifth of the total. This made the Russian liberals switch the focus of their activities from the all-Union to the Russian parliament. In May 1989, they were able to elect their leader, the fifty-eight-year-old Boris Yeltsin, a former Moscow party boss who had parted ways with Gorbachev over the pace of democratic reforms, to the all-important post of chairman. A party official by background, a maverick by nature, and an autocrat by inclination, Yeltsin embraced the program of the democratic transformation of society. The Russian reformers then decided to press ahead with democratic and market reforms by using their power in the Russian parliament. In June 1990, with two-thirds of the deputies in favor, a resolution was adopted on the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, officially still titled the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

“The idea appealed to liberals and conservatives alike. Yeltsin told the deputies: ‘For Russia today, the center is both a cruel exploiter and a miserly benefactor, as well as a favourite with no concern for the future. We must put an end to the injustice of these relations.’ Yeltsin gave voice to the emerging liberal Russian nationalism movement. The object of its loyalty was not the idea of a ‘small’ ethnically based Russian nation, or of the big Russian nation of imperial times, but a nation to be formed out of the inhabitants of the Russian Federation. Although the Russian Federation was overwhelmingly Russian (82 percent) in ethnic composition, it included numerous autonomous republics and regions that had not become Union republics for a variety of demographic, geographic, or historical reasons. With the sole exception of the former East Prussia, now constituted as the Kaliningrad region of Russia, the Russian Federation was territorially continuous from Leningrad (soon to be renamed St. Petersburg) on the Baltic to Vladivostok on the Pacific. It was a good candidate to form a nation, but in 1990 there were numerous odds against that proposition.

“In June 1991, Yeltsin won the race for the newly created office of president of the Russian Federation in competition with candidates supported by his onetime protector and then nemesis, the president of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev. Unlike Gorbachev, who had been installed in office in the spring of 1990 by the Soviet parliament, Yeltsin was elected by the voters of Russia. As he took office, Yeltsin pledged his loyalty to the citizens of the Russian Federation, promising to defend the interests of the republic and its peoples.

“Yeltsin and his liberal supporters regarded the Russian Federation as an engine for the political and economic reform of the entire Union. But the nationalists who voted for Yeltsin saw Russian institutions as an instrument for enhancing Russian identity, providing support for Russian culture, and cutting financial support for the Union republics, which they claimed were bleeding the Russian economy white. But no one advocated the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1991, by creating an alliance with leaders of other

republics, Yeltsin forced the embattled Gorbachev to agree to a reform of the Union that would benefit Russia and other well-to-do republics. The new Union treaty negotiated by Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan in July 1991 gave the preponderance of economic and political power to the republican leaders, first and foremost to the leader of Russia.

“The deal was supposed to become the law of the land on August 20, 1991...”⁵⁶²

The new Union treaty was supposed to replace the original one of 1922. So if it passed, the Soviet Union would cease to exist. So those who wanted to save the Union would have to act quickly – before August 20, 1991...

⁵⁶² Plokhy, *Lost Kingdom*, pp. 307-310.

50. THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION: (8) THE AUGUST COUP

Before August, however, Gorbachev had already made his lurch to the right. On 7 January 1991 he sent Soviet paratroops entered into the three Baltic republics "with the excuse that they were searching for deserters. The situation in the republics had become more complicated, since the Russian inhabitants had organized themselves into pro-Moscow, anti-independence parties, opposed to the democratically elected governments of the republics. In Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, supporters of the pro-Russian party (*Yedinstvo*) stormed the parliament building and called on the Lithuanian government to resign. President Landsbergis issued an appeal to all Lithuanians to rally to the support of the republic; a Lithuanian counter-demonstration responded by chasing the Russians out of the parliament. Russian officials on the spot exaggerated the situation, telling Gorbachev that Lithuania was on the verge of civil war, and calling for the imposition of presidential rule. Gorbachev accused the Lithuanian government of trying to 'restore the bourgeois order' and demanded that they reinstate the Soviet constitution. Without waiting for a response from the Lithuanian government, Soviet tanks and troops went into action in Vilnius, occupying key building and seizing the radio and television stations and the television tower, which was surrounded by some 5000 demonstrators; 14 people were killed and 165 injured, some seriously. However, the attack did not take place; the presence of many foreign journalists and the television cameras which had recorded the bloodshed for all the world to see, no doubt made the military think twice before repeating the operation. However, a week later in Riga (Latvia) Soviet troops attacked the Latvian Ministry of Internal Affairs building, killing four people; but again they stopped short of trying to seize parliament."⁵⁶³

Yeltsin supported the Lithuanian rebels. So now the battle-lines were more clearly drawn. On the one side was Gorbachev with his hard-line appointees in the most important government posts, who were fighting to keep the Union intact. They were mainly communists, but not exclusively so. On the other side were Yeltsin, who had renounced his membership of the Communist Party, and the liberals, whose seat of power was now the Russian, not the Soviet administration. The central issue was now the relationship between the centre and the republics, and the need to achieve some kind of consensus on a union treaty.

The political crisis was compounded by the economic one. "On 9 March 1991, someone in Moscow leaked a secret report from Gosplan, the USSR's central planning agency, giving a forecast for 1991. This predicted that, during the year, agricultural production would fall by 5 per cent, industrial production by a staggering 15 per cent and GNP as a whole by 11.5 per cent. It also envisaged what it called 'an imminent collapse' in capital investment, and concluded that the USSR was facing 'an economic catastrophe'."⁵⁶⁴

⁵⁶³ Lowe, op. cit., p. 429-432.

⁵⁶⁴ Johnson, *Modern Times*, p. 768.

On 17 March, 1991 “a referendum was held throughout the USSR on the question: ‘Do you consider necessary the preservation of the USSR as a renewed federation of equal sovereign [*not* Soviet] republics, in which the rights and freedoms of an individual of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?’ Although six republics (the three Baltic states, together with Armenia, Georgia and Moldavia) refused to take part, their share of the population was relatively small, and in fact, over 80 per cent of the Soviet adult population voted. 76.4 per cent were in favour of the Union. The Russian republic added another question to its referendum: ‘Are you in favour of an elected president for Russia?’ Seventy per cent voted ‘yes’. Now both Gorbachev and Yeltsin could claim that they had mandates – Gorbachev to reconstitute the USSR as a free association of sovereign republics, and Yeltsin to hold elections for the president of the Russian republic.”⁵⁶⁵

By the middle of 1991 Yeltsin was President of *Russia*, as opposed to the Soviet Union, and as his power and popularity increased by virtue of his pro-Russian and anti-Soviet stance, so did Gorbachev’s decline. Gorbachev might have buttressed his position by sending in the troops in a more determined manner against the rebellious republics. But he, unlike Milošević in Yugoslavia, was not prepared to use force to preserve the old Union. This was interpreted by the conservatives as a desire to break up the Union, which was in fact far from true...

Paradoxically, the American President George Bush, who arrived in Moscow at the end of July, 1991, still favoured Gorbachev the communist, in spite of his manifestly declining power, over Yeltsin the anti-communist: first, because he had just signed the START treaty with the Soviets, and feared that a breakup of the Union could destroy the gains of that treaty and lead to nuclear proliferation; and secondly, because the break-up of the Union could lead to bloody civil war... Garry Kasparov records meeting several American foreign policy experts in this period. Even at this late stage, they believed in the stability of Gorbachev’s regime, and laughed at Kasparov’s prediction that it would fall in 1991.⁵⁶⁶

After the referendum Gorbachev tacked back towards the centre ground. For in spite of his attempts at compromise with the right during the previous six months (October to March), “the conservatives were not happy with him: how could they be when he was clearly bent on breaking up their multi-national state? He was becoming more impatient with their stubbornness and resistance to reform, and it was obvious to him that the majority of ordinary people were in favour of Yeltsin and reform. Gradually, from March onwards, he began to move away from the hard-liners and turn back to the advisers with whom he felt most comfortable – especially Yakovlev, Shakhnazarov, Chernyaev and Primakov.

A meeting was arranged between Gorbachev Yeltsin, and the leaders of the other eight republics which had taken part in the referendum; it was held in a dacha at Novo-Ogarevo in April 1991, and was the first of a series aimed at

⁵⁶⁵ Lowe, *op. cit.*, p. 432.

⁵⁶⁶ Kasparov, *Winter is Coming*, London: Atlantic, 2014, chapter 1.

producing a constitution for a new federation. The final version was arrived at in August, but it was clear long before then that in the new union, the republics would have sovereign power and the centre would be reduced to dependency on the goodwill of the republics for its revenue. The new union would still be known as the USSR, but now the letters stood for 'Union of Soviet Sovereign States'. Gorbachev came under severe attack in the Congress and at one point he even handed in his resignation. However, the radicals persuaded him to stay on and the conservatives at this point lacked the nerve to give him the final push. On 11 July the Congress approved the general principle of the new union. What have you done, boys?' a member of the Politburo was reported to have asked the Novo-Ogarevo team. 'You have thrown away power, and with it the Union.'"⁵⁶⁷

This harsh judgement was based on the fact, as Figes writes, that "in these negotiations Yeltsin (in a strong position after his election as the Russian President) and Leonid Kravchuk (angling to become the Ukrainian President by reinventing himself as a nationalist) managed to extract from the Soviet President a large number of powers for the republics which had previously belonged to the Kremlin.

"In August, eight of the nine republics had approved the draft treaty – the one exception being the Ukrainians, who had voted for the union on the basis of the 1990 Declaration of State Sovereignty. The draft treaty would have converted the USSR into a federation of independent states, not unlike the European Union, with a single president, foreign policy and military force. The treaty would have renamed it the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics (with 'sovereign' replacing 'socialist'). On 4 August, Gorbachev left Moscow for a holiday in Foros in the Crimea, intending to return to the capital to sign the new union treaty on 20 August.

"Although the treaty was meant to save the Union, the hardliners feared it would encourage its breakup. They decided it was time to act. On 18 August, a delegation of conspirators flew to Foros to demand the declaration of a state of emergency and when Gorbachev refused their ultimatum, placed him under house arrest. In Moscow a self-appointed State Committee of the State of Emergency (which included Yanaev and Pugo in addition to Valentin Pavlov, the Soviet Prime Minister, Vladimir Kriuchkov, the head of the KGB, and Dmitry Yazov, the Defence Minister) declared itself in power. A tired-looking Yanaev, his hands all-an-alcoholic-trembling, announced uncertainly to the world's press that he was taking over as the President.

"The putschists were too hesitant to have any real chance of success. Perhaps even they had lost the will to take the necessary measures to defend the system at its very end. They failed to arrest Yeltsin, who made his way to the White House, the seat of the Russian parliament (the Supreme Soviet), where he organized the defence of democracy against the coup. They failed to give decisive orders to the tank divisions they had brought into Moscow to put down resistance

⁵⁶⁷ Lowe, *op. cit.*, p. 432-433.

to the coup. The senior army commanders were divided in their loyalties in any case. The Tamanskaya Division, stationed outside the White House, declared its allegiance to Yeltsin who climbed on top of one of the tanks to address the crowd. Without a bloody struggle there was no way the putschists could succeed in an attack on the White House. But they did not have the stomach for a fight..."⁵⁶⁸

"Next day more troops and tanks were brought into the city; in one incident three young protestors were run over by a tank and killed. By this time the White House was full of deputies and sympathizers who had come in to lend support to Yeltsin and democracy. The cellist Mstislav Rostropovich was there [he flew in from London], standing guard with an assault rifle outside Yeltsin's office; so was the poet Yevgeni Yevtushenko; Shevardnadze and Yakovlev arrived to offer encouragement. The atmosphere was tense, and it was by no means certain that they would emerge alive. Orders were actually given to storm the White House, but one by one the commanders found excuses to delay action. In the event the members of the state committee lost their nerve; by midday on August 21 they had decided to terminate their coup attempt and Yazov called off the military action. One of the commanders later said that it would have been a simple matter to take the White House; the barricades were flimsy and the tanks could have made short work of them. But he admitted that although it could all have been over in 15 minutes, the casualties would have been heavy. 'It was all up to me,' he said. 'Thank God I couldn't bring myself to do it. It would have been a bloodbath. I refused.' The coup was over, and the main leaders were eventually arrested, except Pugo, who committed suicide [after shooting his wife]. Yeltsin was the hero of the hour, and Gorbachev and his family... were able to return to Moscow."

Some have argued that Gorbachev was playing a double game. But Archie Brown rightly points out: "It is unthinkable that for the sake of some illusory political gain Gorbachev would have subjected his wife to the uncertainty, stress and suffering which she endured between 18 and 21 August 1991, after which her health was never to be as strong again."⁵⁶⁹

What is clear is that the Communists, attempting to prevent the final break-up of the Soviet Union, failed miserably, making it possible for the liberals under Yeltsin to seize power and abolish, not only the Soviet Union, but also the Communist Party...

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"Formally speaking," writes Judt, "Gorbachev resumed his power; but in reality everything had changed for ever. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was terminally discredited – it was not until August 21st that Party spokesmen publicly condemned their colleagues' coup, by which time the

⁵⁶⁸ Figes, *Revolutionary Russia*, London: Pelican, 2014, pp. 401-403.

⁵⁶⁹ Brown, in Lowe, op. cit., pp. 435, 436.

plotters were already in prison and Yeltsin had taken advantage of the Party's fatal hesitations to ban it from operating within the Russian federation. Gorbachev, who seemed dazed and uncertain when seen in public, was understandably slow to grasp the import of these developments. Rather than praise Yeltsin, the Russian parliament or the Russian people for their success, he spoke to the cameras about *perestroika* and the indispensable role the Party would continue to have in renewing itself, promoting reforms, etc.

"This approach still played well in the West, where it was widely assumed (and hoped) that after the abortive coup things would carry on much as before. But in the Soviet Union itself Gorbachev's anachronistic reiterations of failed goals, and his apparent ingratitude to his rescuers, were a revelation. Here was a man who had been overtaken by History and didn't know it. For many Russians the events of August had been a true revolution, a genuinely popular uprising not *for* the reformers and their Party but *against* them: the CPSU, as the demonstrators shouted at Gorbachev on his belated arrival at the Russian Parliament, was 'a criminal enterprise' whose own government ministers had tried to overthrow the constitution. By the time a chastened Gorbachev had got the point, suspended the CPSU and (on August 24th) resigned as its General Secretary, it was too late. Communism was now irrelevant, and so too was Mikhail Gorbachev.

"Of course, the former General Secretary was still President of the Soviet Union. But the relevance of the Union itself was now in question. The failed putsch had been the last and greatest impulse to secession. Between August 24th and September 21st Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Tajikistan and Armenia followed the Baltic republics and declared themselves independent of the Soviet Union – most of them making the announcement in the confused and uncertain days that followed Gorbachev's return. Following Kravchuk's lead in Ukraine, regional First Secretaries like Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, Askar Akaev in Kyrgyzstan, Gaidar Aliiev in Azerbaijan, Stanislav Shushkevich in Belarus and others cannily distanced themselves from their long-standing Party affiliation and re-situated themselves at the head of their new states, taking care to nationalize as quickly as possible all the local Party's assets.

"Gorbachev and the Supreme Soviet in Moscow could do little more than acknowledge reality, recognize the new states and lamely proposed yet another 'new' constitution that would embrace the independent republics in some sort of confederal arrangement. Meanwhile, a few hundred yards away, Boris Yeltsin and the Russian parliament were establishing an independent Russia. By November Yeltsin had taken under Russian control virtually all financial and economic activity on Russian territory. The Soviet Union was now a shell state, emptied of power and resources."⁵⁷⁰

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⁵⁷⁰ Judt, op. cit., pp. 656-657.

Let us look more closely at the fateful day, August 22nd, on which Gorbachev confronted the Russian Duma. First, he was forced to confirm Yeltsin's decree on Russian economic sovereignty, whereby, writes Plokhy, "as of January 1, 1992, all enterprises on Russian territory would be transferred to the jurisdiction and operational control of the Russian Federation. The Russian president also decreed measures to create a Russian customs service, form Russian gold reserves, and subject the exploitation of natural resources to licensing and taxation by Russian authorities. It was a ploy designed to make Gorbachev approve a decree that he would not otherwise have countenanced, as it undermined the economic foundations of the Union...

"That was not all," writes Serhii Plokhy. "A separate decree signed by Yeltsin on August 22, the day on which Gorbachev resumed his functions as president of the USSR, banned the publication of *Pravda* and other newspapers that had supported the coup. Yeltsin clearly overstepped his jurisdiction by firing the general director of the all-Union information agency TASS and establishing Russian government control over Communist Party media outlets on Russian territory. These measures went far beyond the rights ascribed to the Russian Federation by the draft union treaty [agreed between Gorbachev and Yeltsin earlier that month] that had been derailed by the coup. They left no doubt that as far as Russia was concerned, the treaty was dead. But Yeltsin was not content with taking more sovereign rights for Russia. Having saved Gorbachev from the plotters, he was subjecting the Soviet president to a new captivity. Gorbachev's aide Vadim Medvedev referred to Yeltsin's actions in the first days after the coup as a counter-coup..."⁵⁷¹

Whether we call it a counter-coup or not is irrelevant. Leaving aside all constitutional niceties, which were now irrelevant and outdated, the fundamental and joyous fact was: the Soviet Union had ceased to exist *de facto*, if not yet *de jure*. The *coup de grâce* came on August 22, as crowds tore down the statue of Felix Dzerzhinsky outside the KGB's headquarters, and desperate communist officials tried to shred compromising papers (the machine was jammed by a hairpin!).

In the Russian parliament deputies were bombarding Gorbachev "with questions about his own complicity in the coup and demanded that the Communist Party, his real power base, be declared a criminal organization. Gorbachev went on the defensive. 'This is just another way of carrying on a crusade or religious war at the present time,' he told the deputies. 'Socialism, as I understand it, is a type of conviction which people have and we are not the only ones who have it but it exists in other countries, not only today but at other times.'

"Then came a question about the ownership of all-Union property on the territory of the Russian Federation and the decree on Russia's economic sovereignty signed by Yeltsin. 'You today said that you would sign a decree

⁵⁷¹ Plokhy, *The Last Empire. The Final Days of the Soviet Union*, London: Oneworld Publications, 2015, p. 137.

confirming all my decrees signed during that period,' said Yeltsin, referring to the measures he had signed during the coup.

"Gorbachev knew he was in trouble. 'I do not think you have tried to put me in a trap by bringing me here,' he responded. Gorbachev went on to say that he would sign a decree confirming all Yeltsin's decrees of the coup period except the one dealing with all-Union property. 'I will issue such a decree after signing the [union] treaty,' he said to Yeltsin. This was not merely a delaying tactic. Gorbachev was trying to keep Yeltsin on the hook: signature on the union treaty first, property second.

"The Russian president did not like what he heard. His ruse of backdating the decree had failed, but he had a trump card in hand and knew how to use it against Gorbachev. 'And now, on a lighter note,' declared Yeltsin in front of the cameras, 'shall we now sign a decree suspending the activities of the Russian Communist Party?' Yeltsin used the pronoun 'we' to refer to himself. Gorbachev was stunned. All party organizations in Russia were suddenly on the chopping block. Without them, his already dwindling powers would be reduced to almost nothing. After realizing what was going on, he asked his 'ally', 'What are you doing?... I... haven't we... I haven't read this.'

"The Russian president took his time signing the decree temporarily banning Communist Party activity on Russian territory. When Gorbachev told him he could not ban the party, Yeltsin responded that he was only suspending its activities. Welcoming the decree with applause and chants of approval, the Russian deputies went on with their interrogation of the trapped Soviet president. Gorbachev found it hard to recover from Yeltsin's blow. 'At that encounter,' he remembered later, 'Yeltsin was gloating with sadistic pleasure.'..."⁵⁷²

⁵⁷² Plokhyy, op. cit., pp. 143-44.

51. THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION: (9) UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE

The Union could probably have survived the breakaway of, for example, the Baltic republics or Georgia. The real problem was *Ukraine*, the second-largest republic, which, writes Judt, “had a history of independence (albeit chequered), last asserted and promptly lost in the aftermath of World War One. It was also intimately associated with Russia’s own history in the eyes of many Russian nationalists. Kievan ‘Rus’ – the thirteenth-century kingdom based on the Ukrainian capital and reaching from the Carpathians to the Volga – was as integral to the core identity of the empire as Russia itself. But of more immediate and practical consideration were the material resources of the region.

“Sitting squarely athwart Russia’s access to the Black Sea (and the Mediterranean) as well as to central Europe, Ukraine was a mainstay of the Soviet economy. With just 2.7 percent of the land area of the USSR it was home to 18 percent of its population and generated nearly 17 percent of the country’s Gross National Product, second only to Russia itself. In the last years of the Soviet Union Ukraine contained 60 percent of the country’s coal reserves and a majority share of the country’s titanium (vital for modern steel production); its unusually rich soil was responsible for over 40 percent of Soviet agricultural output by value.

“The disproportionate importance of Ukraine in Russian and Soviet history was reflected in the Soviet leadership itself. Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev were Russians who hailed from eastern Ukraine – Khrushchev returning there in the 1930s as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party; Konstantin Chernenko was the son of Ukrainian ‘kulaks’ deported to Siberia, while Yuri Andropov had risen to the top as a consequence of occupying the strategically central post of KGB head in Ukraine. But this close association between the Ukrainian republic and the Soviet leadership did not imply any special regard for its inhabitants.

“Quite the contrary. For much of its history as a Soviet republic, Ukraine was treated as an internal colony: its natural resources exploited, its people kept under close surveillance (and, in the 1930s, exposed to a program of punitive repression that amounted to near-genocide). Ukrainian products – notably food and ferrous metals – were shipped to the rest of the Union at heavily subsidized prices, a practice that continued almost to the end. Following World War Two, the Ukrainian Socialist Republic was considerably enlarged by the annexation from Poland of eastern Galicia and western Volhynia: the local Polish population, as we have seen, was expelled westward in exchange for ethnic Ukrainians forced out of Poland itself.

“These population exchanges – and the wartime extermination of much of the local Jewish community – resulted in a region that was by Soviet standards quite homogeneous: thus whereas the Russian republic in 1990 contained over one hundred minorities, thirty-one of them living in autonomous regions, Ukraine

was 84 percent Ukrainian. Most of the rest of the population were Russians (11 percent), with the remainder comprising small numbers of Moldovans, Poles, Magyars, Bulgarians and the country's surviving Jews. Perhaps more to the point the only significant minority – the Russians – was concentrated in the industrial east of the country and in the capital Kiev.

“Central and Western Ukraine, notably around Lviv, the second city, was predominantly Ukrainian in language and Eastern Orthodox (Greek-Catholic) in religion.⁵⁷³ Thanks to the relative tolerance of the Habsburgs, Ukrainians in Galicia had been allowed to preserve their native tongue. Depending upon district, anything from 78 percent to 91 percent of the local inhabitants used it as their first language in 1994, whereas in the territories once ruled by the Czar even those who identified themselves as Ukrainians often spoke Russian more readily.

“The Soviet constitution.... ascribed national identities to the residents of its separate republics and indeed defined all its citizens by ethnic-national categories. As elsewhere, so in Ukraine – particularly the recently-annexed Western Ukraine – this had self-fulfilling consequences. In earlier times, when the local language was mostly confined to the remote countryside, and the cities were Russian-speaking and Soviet-dominated, the theoretically decentralized and federal character of this union of national republics was of interest only to scholars and Soviet apologists. But with the growing number of urban-dwelling Ukrainian-speakers, Ukrainian-language media, and a political elite now identifying itself with self-consciously ‘Ukrainian’ interests, Ukrainian nationalism was the predictable accompaniment to Soviet fragmentation.

“A non-Party movement – RUKH (the ‘People’s Movement for *Perestroika*’) – was founded in Kiev in November 1988, the first autonomous Ukrainian political organization for many decades. It gathered considerable support, notably in the major cities and from ‘60s-era reform Communists; but in marked contrast to independence movements in the Baltic it could not automatically count on mass backing and did not reflect any groundswell of national sentiment. In elections to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet in March 1990 the Communists secured a clear majority, RUKH won less than a quarter of the seats.

“Thus it was not Ukrainian nationalists who were to seize the initiative but rather the Communists themselves. The Communists in the Ukrainian Soviet voted, on July 16th 1990, to declare Ukrainian ‘sovereignty’ and asserted the republic’s right to possess its own military and the promise of its own laws.”⁵⁷⁴

However, writes Serhii Plokhy, “Boris Yeltsin shared Gorbachev’s stand on Ukraine. Both believed that the second-largest Soviet republic could not be allowed to go its own way. If Gorbachev, in his conversations with Bush, raised the possibility of civil strife and even war involving Ukraine and other Soviet

⁵⁷³ This is a mistake. The Greek-Catholics commemorate the Pope, so they are Catholic, not Orthodox. (V.M.)

⁵⁷⁴ Judt, op. cit., pp. 648-650.

republics, Yeltsin was calmer but no less determined. 'Ukraine must not leave the Soviet Union,' he told the American president during their meeting in Yeltsin's Kremlin office. Without Ukraine, Yeltsin argued, the Soviet Union would be dominated by the non-Slavic republics. His 'attachment' to Ukraine reflected the attitude of the Russian population in general. According to a poll sponsored by the United States Information Agency in February and March 1991, only 22 percent were opposed."⁵⁷⁵

Some of Yeltsin's advisors believed that Russia should now take the place of the Soviet Union as the new imperial masters – an idea that was anathema to the Ukrainians.

In August, 1991, President Bush visited Kiev and delivered his famous "Chicken Kiev" speech, hoping to prevent Ukraine from leaving the Union. "Freedom is not the same as independence", he said. "Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism." Not only were the Ukrainians being exhorted to remain part of "the evil empire": their own government was being called "a local despotism"! As if responding to this thought, on August 24 the Ukrainian parliament voted for independence; the decision would be submitted to a referendum to be held on December 1. And a little later the Ukrainian communist party – Ukraine's "local despotism" – was outlawed...

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Plokhy writes: "August 24 marked a turning point, not only because of the declaration of Ukrainian independence but also because, on the same day, the three Baltic republics, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, received recognition of their independence from Yeltsin himself. The Russian president signed three letters that same day recognizing the independence of Russia's western neighbors without attaching any conditions or questioning the newly independent states' Soviet-era borders. His action left hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians, most of whom had moved to the region after World War II, beyond the borders of Russia and the Union. Their concerns did not seem to be those of Yeltsin's government.

"The new, democratic Russia refused to use force, economic pressure, or legal and diplomatic tricks to keep the Baltics republics in the Soviet Union. Territorial issues and minority rights did not seem to be significant issues at the time. In previous years, many members of Russian communities had opposed independence for the republics they called home. They joined the Moscow-sponsored and communist-run Interfronts, which welcomed Moscow's crackdown on Baltic independence in early 1991. Their leaders, who had openly supported the coup in Moscow, now feared revenge on the part of local majorities. Yeltsin's Russian government largely ignored their worries. Its allies

⁵⁷⁵ Plokhy, *Lost Kingdom*, p. 49.

were national democrats in Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius, not Russian minorities who had sided with the Kremlin conservatives.

“Many in the non-Russian republics of the Union wondered whether the Baltic example set a precedent for Russia’s dealings with other republics. It soon became apparent that it did not. The Baltics held a special place in the hearts and minds of Yeltsin’s democrats, and Russian diplomatic recognition did not extend to all the Soviet republics that had declared their independence before or during the coup. Georgia, which had declared independence on April 9, 1991, much earlier than Estonia or Latvia, was not granted recognition. It was not clear whether Ukraine’s declaration of independence would place it in the same camp as the Baltics or Georgia. Given that Yeltsin’s reaction to Kravchuk’s phone call on the eve of the independence vote in parliament was much calmer than Gorbachev’s, there was some hope that Ukraine’s position would be treated with respect and understanding in Russia. As it turned out, there was only a weekend pause. Kravchuk called Yeltsin with the news on Saturday, which meant that Russian reaction would not come until Monday, August 26, when the session of the Soviet parliament promised by the plotters on the first day of the coup finally convened in Moscow.”⁵⁷⁶

Yeltsin sent Rutskoy to Kiev to reason with the deputies; but he failed. And soon Kazakhstan, too, voted for independence. Yeltsin quickly understood which way the wind was blowing, and withdrew his objections to independence, as also his threat to redraw the boundaries between the two republics so as to include the Crimea and Donbass, with their large Russian populations, within Russia.

Putin would correct these “mistakes” by his invasion of the two regions in 2014...

As the summer of 1991 passed into autumn, it became clear that the Ukrainians were going to vote for independence in the referendum. Only Gorbachev among the major players stood out against independence. For a time he was supported by his friend and admirer President Bush, still worried about nuclear proliferation if the Union should go under, as also by the prospect of civil war between the republics on the model of what was happening in Yugoslavia.

However, by the end of November, under pressure from the Ukrainian lobby and the Defence department under Dick Cheney, he, too, had given in – to Gorbachev’s great mortification. Gorbachev was still in control of the Soviet army and the Union ministries, but by a decree of November 30, Yeltsin withdrew funding for them. Without money, the Union was now all but dead.

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As Soviet power collapsed in Ukraine, so did that of the “Soviet Church” of the Moscow Patriarchate. The collapse was most significant and important in

⁵⁷⁶ Plokhyy, *Lost Kingdom*, pp. 174-175.

Western Ukraine, the most nationalist region, where the MP had recruited many of its clergy since the region's conquest by Stalin at the end of World War Two.

The MP's spiritual impotence was illustrated by its surrender of its western borderlands to the resurgent Uniates. As we have seen, at the council of Lvov in 1946 Stalin integrated the Uniates or Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), who were Catholic by faith, but Orthodox in ritual, into the MP, and forced those Uniates who did not want to become Orthodox to go underground. When Gorbachev came to power, the Uniates began agitating for a restoration of their independence and the legalization of their Church. They were supported, surprisingly, by the chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs, Konstantin Kharchev, who insisted that local authorities keep the law in their dealings with believers and suggested the legalization of the Uniates and the free election of bishops. This roused the MP and others to complain about Kharchev to the Supreme Soviet. Kharchev was removed in June, 1989. But he made a telling comment about those who had removed him: "I suspect that some members of the Synod, from force of habit, have counted more on the support of the authorities than on their own authority in the Church."⁵⁷⁷

The UGCC finally achieved legalization in January, 1990, just after Gorbachev met the Pope in Rome. This represented the second major diplomatic triumph of the Vatican in the communist bloc (after the legalization of Solidarity in Poland) and the beginning of the re-establishment of Catholic power in Russia. However, even before they had recovered their freedom in law, the Uniates started taking over churches in Western Ukraine which they considered to be theirs by right. By December, 1991, 2167 nominally Orthodox parishes had joined the Uniates. Deprived of the help of the local authorities, who showed every sign of being on the side of the uniates, and discredited by its associations with communism, the MP seemed helpless to stop the rot. One reason for this was the fact that for years the MP had been teaching its seminarians, many of whom came from the Western Ukraine, that the Orthodox and the Catholics were "sister churches". 60% of those who joined the uniates graduated from Leningrad theological schools...

They were also helpless to stop the revival of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church... In October, 1989, a retired patriarchal bishop, Ioann Bondarchuk, announced the creation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC). He was immediately placed under ban by the patriarchate. However, the patriarchate decided to make some concessions to Ukrainian nationalist feeling by creating, in January, 1990, a supposedly autonomous but pro-Moscow Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC-MP), led by Metropolitan Philaret (Denisenko) of Kiev. Later, Philaret was defrocked and anathematised by the MP, so he formed a third independent Orthodox Church in the Ukraine - the so-called "Kievan Patriarchate" (UOAC-KP).

⁵⁷⁷ *Ogonek* (Little Fire), No 44, October, 1989; *Keston News Service*, No 339, 30 November, 1989, pp. 16-18; No 341, 11 January, 1990, pp. 13-14.

Meanwhile, relations between the Orthodox and Catholics continued to deteriorate; and in March the Uniates withdrew from quadripartite discussions between Roman Catholics, Uniates, Russian Orthodox and the UOC-MP. Then, in June, the UAOC convened its first All-Ukrainian Council in Kiev, at which Mstyslav (Skrypnyk), who had been the leader of the Ukrainian autocephalists in the USA, was enthroned as the first patriarch in Ukrainian history. The UAOC received a further significant boost after the Ukraine achieved independence at the end of 1991.

In spite of tensions between the Orthodox and the Catholics, and between different Orthodox churches, the process of religious liberalization that was well under way throughout the Soviet Union continued also in Ukraine as the referendum on independence drew nearer.

Thus on November 20, 1991, the presidential candidate Leonid Kravchuk "addressed the first all-Ukrainian religious forum. The former self-described chief atheist of Ukraine (under his supervision, the ideology department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine oversaw the country's religious organizations) asked forgiveness of religious leaders, not on behalf of the defunct party but on that of the state he now represented. As communism and atheism lost their ideological appeal and religion returned to the religious sphere, religious denominations began to play an ever more important role in society. Ukraine, which accounted for two-thirds of all Orthodox Christian parishes in the USSR and was home to most Soviet Protestants, was considered the Bible Belt of the Soviet Union. It had become a religious battleground with the arrival of perestroika and glasnost'. Kravchuk called for interreligious toleration and support for independence. He wanted religious leaders to work towards the independence of their religious institutions but to avoid strife in doing so. On November 20, leaders of sixteen religious organizations in Ukraine pledged their support for government policy on religion. It was, in effect, a gesture of support for independence."⁵⁷⁸

On December 1, 1991 the referendum on the Ukrainian parliament's declaration of independence in August was held. Voters were asked: "Do you support the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine?" The text of the Declaration was included as a preamble to the question. The referendum was called by the Parliament of Ukraine to confirm the Act of Independence, which was adopted by the Parliament on 24 August 1991. Citizens of Ukraine expressed overwhelming support for independence. In the referendum, 31,891,742 registered voters (or 84.18% of the electorate) took part, and among them 28,804,071 (or 92.3%) voted "Yes".⁵⁷⁹

⁵⁷⁸ Plokhyy, *Lost Kingdom*, p. 286.

⁵⁷⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_independence_referendum,_1991. However, some argue that the wording of the referendum question concealed nuances, which meant that some who did not want to leave the Soviet Union could have voted "yes". See https://www.km.ru/ukraina/2011/08/24/istoricheskoe-edinstvo-rossii-i-ukrainy/ukraina-negolosovala-za-vykhod-iz-sssr?fbclid=IwAR0dGEOX9ja1gOfMNqqxofulj9KVVSDf_zZtDrYD7uL_E_-3SM_gRxs6qs4.

The results of the referendum astounded everyone: over 90% of the electorate in a very high turn-out voted for independence. In the Russian-language provinces of Lugansk and Donetsk (the same provinces that in 2014 proclaimed that they were independent republics) the majorities were 83% and 77% respectively. Even in Crimea the majority was 54%. *Every single province of Ukraine, and all its nationalities*, had voted for independence. This result spelled the end of the Soviet Union...

In general, as we have seen, almost all Russians were strongly opposed to the separation of Russia from Ukraine, regarding the Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians as essentially three parts of one Slavic race who should keep together on the basis of their closely related religion, culture and history. However, this was decidedly not the view of many Ukrainians. Orthodox believers felt especially strongly about this. Thus "the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church," said Anatolius Krasikov, "is the expression of the resolute will of the Ukrainian people to finally liberate itself from the imperial [Russian] Orthodox Church which is an instrument of spiritual oppression against the Ukrainian people, aiming at its complete russification and enslavement..."⁵⁸⁰

Armed with the results of the referendum, the newly elected Ukrainian President Kravchuk travelled to the Belavezha hunting lodge in Belarus to meet with his counterparts from Russia and Belarus. The avowed purpose was to sign a new Union treaty proposed by Gorbachev. But Kravchuk rejected that on the first day; in general, he would allow no treaty or agreement that included the word "Union".

On the second day, the three Slavic nations signed an "Agreement on the Establishment of a Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]" containing fourteen articles. "The three leaders agreed to create the Commonwealth and recognize the territorial integrity and existing borders of each now independent republic. They declared their desire to establish joint control over their nuclear arsenals. They also declared their willingness to reduce their armed forces and strive for complete nuclear disarmament. The prospective members of the Commonwealth were given the right to declare neutrality and nuclear-free status. Membership of the Commonwealth was open to all Soviet republics and other countries that shared the goals and principles declared in the agreement. The coordinating bodies of the Commonwealth were to be located not in Moscow - the capital of Russia, the old tsarist empire, and the vanishing USSR - but in Minsk, the capital of Belarus.

"The three leaders guaranteed the fulfilment of the agreements and obligations of the Soviet Union, while declaring Soviet laws null and void on the territory of their states from the moment the agreement was signed. 'The operation of

⁵⁸⁰ Krasikov, "The Exarch vs. the Patriarch", *Novoe Vremia* (New Times), No 26, July, 1992, p. 13; in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, *Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 96.

agencies of the former USSR on the territory of members states of the Commonwealth is terminated,' read the final paragraph of the agreement. It was a natural concluding statement for a document that began with the following declaration: 'We, the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation (RSFSR), and Ukraine, as founding states of the USSR that signed the union treaty of 1922... hereby establish that the USSR as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality ceases its existence.'"⁵⁸¹

The three leaders returned to their respective republics fearful for their own safety. They had reason: Gorbachev was still in charge of the army and the KGB, and could have imprisoned them for treason. However, Gorbachev, though very angry and refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the Belavezha Agreement, did nothing. Most importantly, Shaposhnikov, the Soviet Minister of Defence and *de facto* ruler of the army, decided to support Yeltsin, and soon became *Russian* Minister of Defence.

Then, in the middle of December the American Secretary of State James Baker visited Moscow, received the assurance he needed about nuclear arms, and became convinced that the USSR was no more...

But one major problem remained: the attitude of the non-Slav and non-Baltic republics to the CIS. For various complicated reasons, they all agreed to join this necessary, albeit necessarily weak new centre. These reasons included the need to preserve economic ties between the republics, the need for some protection against Islamic fundamentalism in the non-Slavic republics (and even also in Russia, where trouble was brewing in Chechnya), and the potential for ethnic conflicts in the individual republics on the model of the conflicts that had broken out in Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, or of Moldova in Transnistria.

On December 21 the Presidents of eleven States, but excluding Gorbachev, met in Almaty. They "focused on two big subjects: the dissolution of the USSR and the creation of a new Commonwealth that would now include not three but eleven republics. It took the heads of the post-Soviet states only three and a half hours to agree on the principles of the new international structure, which would include most of what remained of the Soviet Union after the departure of the Balts. By 3:00 p.m. the final drafts of the agreements had been sent to the typists, and two hours later they were signed at an official ceremony. At the insistence of the Central Asian republics, the leaders of the post-Soviet states, including Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, signed the declaration on the formation of the commonwealth anew. Now all present in Almaty were founding members of the Commonwealth.

"Most of the decisions were adopted on the initiative of the Russian delegation. First, the presidents agreed to form two coordinating institutions, the Council of Presidents and the Council of Prime Ministers. They also agreed to abolish all

⁵⁸¹ Plokhyy, *Lost Kingdom*, pp. 308-309.

remaining Soviet ministries and institutions – an issue of paramount importance to Yeltsin in his ongoing struggle with Gorbachev. Russia also received the participants' approval to declare itself the successor to the USSR, which meant, among other things, permanent membership in the Security Council of the United Nations. The agreement on joint control of nuclear arsenals was in full accord with the scheme that Yeltsin had described to Baker a few days earlier in Moscow: only the president of Russia could authorize a launch of nuclear weapons, while the other presidents with a nuclear arsenal would be consulted but would have no technical ability to order a launch. By July, 1992, strategic and tactical nuclear weapons would be moved from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to Russia for disassembly. The leaders of the four nuclear republics, including Kravchuk, Nazarbayev, and Shushkevich, endorsed that solution..."⁵⁸²

⁵⁸² Plokhy, *Lost Kingdom*, pp. 362-363.

52. THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION: (10) THE PROBLEM OF NATO

NATO's aim since its inception in 1949 was famously described as "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down". By the end of 1991 the first aim had been triumphantly achieved, and American troops remained in Europe in continued fulfilment of the second aim. As for the Germans, although since reunification they were more powerful than before, they were still "down" in the sense that they had no intention of violating the terms of their accession to NATO in 1955 – that is, the commitment not to use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons – and remained the most pacifist of nations.

However, now that the Russian bear was, it would seem, no longer a military threat to the West, it was unclear why NATO should continue to exist. As time passed, and NATO continued in being, some speculated that NATO's *raison d'être* was no longer defensive, but aggressive – to absorb Eastern Europe into the western world. And this speculation was reinforced by the rapid expansion of NATO – Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia joined in 1999, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 2004 – and by its operations outside Western Europe in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan.

In 1990, according to Vladimir Putin (speaking at a security conference in 2007), during negotiations over German reunification between Gorbachev, US Secretary of State James Baker and other Western leaders, the West promised that after reunification NATO would not expand eastwards from Germany into Central and Eastern Europe. The West denied this, saying that the only commitment made was that no new NATO forces or structures would be stationed in the former East Germany after reunification – a commitment that was fulfilled. Gorbachev himself has confirmed the western version of events, adding that the question of NATO expansion further east from Germany was never discussed – at that time.⁵⁸³

The possibility that really troubled the Russians was the incorporation of *Ukraine* into NATO, not only because of its crucial political and economic importance to the Union but also because of its nuclear weapons (which was what really troubled the Americans as well). As Serhii Plokhyy and M.E. Sarotte write: "On independence, Ukraine immediately became a direct threat to the West: it was 'born nuclear'. The new state had inherited approximately 1,900 nuclear warheads and 2,500 tactical nuclear weapons. To be sure, Ukraine had physical rather than operational control over the nuclear arms on its territory, since the power to launch them was still in Moscow. But that did not matter much in the long run, given its extensive uranium deposits, impressive technological skills, and production capacities, particularly of missiles; every single Soviet ballistic missile delivered in Cuba in 1962, for example, had been made in Ukraine.

⁵⁸³ Steven Pifer, "Did NATO Promise Not to Enlarge? Gorbachev Says 'No,'" Brookings Institution, November 6, 2014, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/11/06/did-nato-promise-not-to-enlarge-gorbachev-says-no/>.

“Ukraine instantaneously became the world’s third-biggest nuclear power, with an arsenal larger than those of China, France, and the United Kingdom. (Two other countries – Belarus and Kazakhstan – also inherited nuclear weapons, but not nearly as many.) Ukrainian strategic weapons could destroy American cities. Determining who, exactly, would have both launch command and day-to-day control over the weapons became an immediate priority of the Bush administration.

“U.S. Secretary of State James Baker provided a stark assessment of the significance of these developments to Bush. Baker told Bush, ‘Strategically, there is no other foreign issue more deserving of your attention or time’ than the future of the Soviet nuclear arsenal in the wake of the country’s breakup. A Yugoslav-type situation with 30,000 nuclear weapons presents an incredible danger to the American people – and they know it and will hold us accountable if we don’t respond.’

“Baker thought that there was no value, and much risk, for the United States in nuclear rivalries among former Soviet states. Only one nuclear power could be allowed to emerge out of the Soviet Union: Russia. In part, this preference was due to the fact that Washington had a long history of dealing with Moscow on issues of arms control. Better stick with the devil you know, Baker believed, than deal with a whole new set of nuclear powers. As a result, Washington’s and Moscow’s interests suddenly became identical: both wanted all the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union destroyed or relocate to Russia. The Bush administration and its successor worked hard in cooperation with Yeltsin to make that happen, using a series of inducements and diplomatic arm-twisting.

“Scarred by the horrors of the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe – which irradiated sizable areas of Belarus, Ukraine and other European countries – the Ukrainians initially seemed inclined to go along with U.S. and Russian plans for Ukraine’s denuclearization. But the ongoing imperial contest with Russia, particularly over the status of Crimea, led to rethinking in Kyiv. In May 1992, Moscow and Kyiv clashed over the fate of the Soviet Union’s Black Sea Fleet, which was based in Sevastopol. A dispute over the division of the fleet and control of the port would drag on for the next five years. As tensions flared, the Ukrainian parliament began making new demands in exchange for giving up the formerly Soviet missiles: financial compensation, formal recognition of Ukraine’s borders, and security guarantees.

“At an international summit held in Budapest in December 1994, more than 50 leaders were scheduled to create the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe out of a pre-existing conference of the same name. British, Russian, and U.S. leaders used the occasion to offer Kyiv the so-called Budapest Memorandum in an effort to assuage Ukrainian concerns. The memorandum’s goal was to get denuclearization back on track and to finalize the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine. In exchange for parting with all its weapons, Ukraine would get assurances of territorial integrity – not guarantees, a meaningful difference, but

one that seemed not to matter so much in the heady, hopeful post-Cold War world.

“Washington had by then also spearheaded the establishment of a NATO-related security organization called the Partnership for Peace. This partnership was open to post-Soviet states—meaning that it offered a security berth to Ukraine, thus providing it with a further inducement to give up its nukes.

“Ukraine decided to sign the memorandum, despite not getting firmer guarantees. Kyiv did so because it had a weak hand; the country was on the verge of economic collapse. But with the United States and Russia allied against it on this issue, Ukraine faced the prospect of international isolation if it did not sign. Signing the agreement seemed to be a way to escape isolation and get badly needed financial assistance.

“The Budapest Memorandum initially seemed to represent a significant moment of shared triumph and unity between Washington and Moscow. As U.S. President Bill Clinton advised Yeltsin, they were jointly engaged in a worthy cause: ‘We have the first chance ever since the rise of the nation state to have the entire continent of Europe live in peace.’ Clinton rightly emphasized that Ukraine was the ‘linchpin’ of that effort.

“But recently declassified documents show that the triumph was incomplete—something that Ukraine recognized at the time but could do little about. As a Ukrainian diplomat confessed to his U.S. counterparts just before signing the Budapest Memorandum, his country had ‘no illusions that the Russians would live up to the agreements they signed.’ Kyiv knew that the old imperial center would not let Ukraine escape so easily. Instead, the government of Ukraine was simply hoping ‘to get agreements that will make it possible for [Kyiv] to appeal for assistance.. when the Russians violate’ them.

“And in a sign that there was worse to come, Yeltsin blindsided Clinton at the same conference with an attack on U.S. plans to enlarge NATO, saying that Clinton was forcing the world from a Cold War into a ‘cold peace.’ Newly available documents reveal that this broadside triggered a showdown in Washington just before Christmas 1994. U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry insisted on an audience with the president to warn him that a wounded Moscow would lash out in response to NATO expansion and derail strategic arms control talks...

“But Perry’s efforts were to no avail. As the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine resumed after the signing of the Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine became much less of a priority for Washington. Meanwhile, opponents of the Partnership for Peace, who wanted to expand NATO proper as soon as possible to a few select states rather than build another, looser security alliance from the Atlantic to the Pacific, gained new momentum thanks to the midterm election victory of the Republican Party, which was in favour of NATO enlargement, in November, 1994. Despite Perry’s efforts, Clinton made clear to his secretary of

defense that the United States would now proceed with NATO enlargement into central and eastern Europe..."⁵⁸⁴

⁵⁸⁴ Plokhy and Sarotte, "The Shoals of Ukraine", *Foreign Affairs*, November 22, 2019, pp. 84-88.

53. THE MOSCOW PATRIARCHATE

As a result of “glasnost” and “perestroika” a huge pent-up demand for Christian services was released. Religious faith in Russia never grew more intensively than in the past three decades, said Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk in 2019.

“The epoch which we call ‘the second Baptism of Russia’ begun in our Church in 1988. The mass baptism of our population started in Russia in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s,” Metropolitan Hilarion said while relating the history of Orthodoxy in Russia to the Italian guests.

“Today we have 35,000 churches. That means that we have opened 29,000 churches over twenty-eight years, opening more than 1,000 churches per year or three per day... Earlier we had three theological seminaries or academies, and today there are over fifty,” the metropolitan stressed.

In Metropolitan Hilarion’s view, Russian history has “never witnessed such growth in religious faith as we have seen in the past twenty-eight years.”

“More than that, I know no other precedent of this kind anywhere throughout the history of mankind. We are aware that the epoch of St. Constantine the Great in the fourth century was a time when churches were built everywhere and mass baptisms took place. But there are no statistics for that period, while we do have statistics for the epoch we live in,” he added.

Noting that today many say that modern society lives in the post-Christian era, the representative of the Russian Orthodox Church said that it is not felt in Russia.

“With our own eyes we have seen the power of Christianity which enables us to open three churches per day today. We have witnessed how Christianity transforms human lives, to what extent Christ and His teaching are still important nowadays,” Metropolitan Hilarion said in conclusion.”⁵⁸⁵

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But to what extent was this a revival of True Christianity?

The failed coup of August, 1991, which really brought an end to the Soviet Union, took place during the Orthodox Feast of the Transfiguration, when Christ demonstrated the power of His Divinity before His three chosen disciples, Moses and Elijah. This was to remind all those with eyes to see that the fall of the Soviet

⁵⁸⁵ *Russian Faith*, “Russia Built 3 Churches Per Day, 1000 Per Year For 28 Years - A World Record”, September 13, 2019, https://russian-faith.com/church-politics/russia-built-3-churches-day-1000-year-28-years-world-record-n980?fbclid=IwAR0o5HbR0zOsFUilVKR1aTIWpSFYNQcc0P-eHIGi2OPp50Wf4RL7QqsW_Ws.

Union – so unexpected by all except a very few, who included none of the leading politicians – was the work of God, not man. “Some trust in chariots, and some in horses” (Psalm 19.7), and for most of its existence the Soviet Union trusted in tanks and nuclear weapons. But in the end, for all its material power, it was brought down by the right Hand of the Most High...

However, while the Soviet Union and the Communist Party appeared to have been destroyed, there was one part of the Communist apparatus that survived the coup and even extended its influence – the Sovietized Moscow Patriarchate. The survival of this “second administration” of the Red Beast boded ill for the future. It reminds us that while the fall of the Soviet Union was an all-important political event, it was not a *religious* event; and that without true faith and repentance for the sins of the Soviet past, mediated through the True Church, even the outwardly successful counter-revolution remained a house built on sand. As for the house of the MP, for all its external splendour, it remained that rickety house with a false Stalinist foundation, of which the Prophet-King David said: “Except the Lord build the house, in vain do they labour that build it” (Psalm 126.1).

This is clearly seen in the actions of the leader of the MP at that time, Patriarch Alexis (Ridiger) – Agent “Drozdov”, as he was known in the KGB... In June, 1990, the Hierarchical Council of the MP elected Metropolitan Alexis as the new patriarch. This was the man whom the Furov report of 1970 had called the most pro-Soviet of all the bishops, a KGB agent since 1958 who had been prepared to spy to the KGB even on his own patriarch, and who, when he was Metropolitan of Tallinn, had shamelessly said: “In the Soviet Union, citizens are never arrested for their religious or ideological convictions.”⁵⁸⁶

Even more shamelessly, on being elected, Alexis immediately, on July 4/17, 1990, the day of the martyrdom of Tsar Nicholas II, announced that he was praying for the preservation of the communist party! Being a clever man, “Patriarch” Alexis quickly recovered from that gaffe, his sense of which way the wind was blowing; and there was no further overt support of the communists. True, he did attach his signature, in December, 1990, to a letter by 53 well-known political, academic and literary figures who urged Gorbachev to take urgent measures to deal with the state of crisis in the country, speaking of “... the destructive dictatorship of people who are shameless in their striving to take ownership of territory, resources, the intellectual wealth and labour forces of the country whose name is the USSR”.⁵⁸⁷

But the patriarch quickly disavowed his signature; and a few weeks later, after the deaths in Vilnius by Soviet troops, he declared that the killings were “a great political mistake – in church language a sin”. Then, in May, he publicly disagreed with a prominent member of the hardline *Soiuz* bloc, who had said that the resources of the army and the clergy should be drawn on extensively to save the

⁵⁸⁶ *Keston News Service*, No 94, March 21, 1980 p. 1.

⁵⁸⁷ *Keston News Service*, No 369, February 21, 1991, p. 6.

people and the homeland. In Alexis' view, these words could be perceived as a statement of preparedness to use the Church for political purposes. The patriarch recalled his words of the previous autumn: the Church and the Faith should not be used as a truncheon.⁵⁸⁸ By June, the patriarch had completed his remarkable transformation from dyed-in-the-wool communist to enthusiastic democrat, saying to Yeltsin: "May God help you win the election".

Still more striking was his apparent rejection of Sergianism, the doctrine justifying the submission of the Church to militant atheism preached by the first Soviet patriarch, Sergei Stragorodsky. Thus in an interview granted to *Izvestia* on June 6 he said: "This year has freed us from the state's supervision. Now we have the moral right to say that the Declaration of Metropolitan Sergei has disappeared into the past and no longer guides us... The metropolitan cooperated with criminal usurpers. This was his tragedy.... Today we can say that falsehood is interspersed in his Declaration, which stated as its goal 'placing the Church in a proper relationship with the Soviet government'. But this relationship - and in the Declaration it is clearly defined as being the submission of the Church to the interests of governmental politics - is exactly that which is incorrect from the point of view of the Church... Of the people, then, to whom these compromises, silence, forced passivity or expressions of loyalty that were permitted by the Church leadership in those days, have caused pain - of these people, not only before God, but also before them, I ask forgiveness, understanding and prayers."⁵⁸⁹

And yet, in an interview given to *Komsomolskaia Pravda* only two months earlier, he had said: "The most important thing for the Church is to preserve itself for the people, so that they should be able to have access to the Chalice of Christ, to the Chalice of Communion... There is a rule when a Christian has to take on himself a sin in order to avoid a greater sin... There are situations in which a person, a Christian must sacrifice his personal purity, his personal perfection, so as to defend something greater... Thus in relation to Metropolitan Sergei and his successors in the leadership of the Church under Soviet power, they had to tell lies, they had to say that everything was normal with us. And yet the Church was being persecuted. Declarations of political loyalty were being made. The fullness of Christian life, charity, almsgiving, the Reigning icon of the Mother of God were also renounced. Compromises were made."

In other words, Sergianism, though sinful, was justified. It may have "disappeared into the past", but if similar circumstances arise again, the "sacrifice" of personal purity can and should be made again!...

In September, 1991, the patriarch said: "A church that has millions of faithful cannot go into the catacombs. The hierarchy of the church has taken the sin on

⁵⁸⁸ Letter in *Literaturnaia Rossiia* (Literary Russia), June 14, 1991; Oxana Antic, "Patriarch Aleksii II: A Political Portrait", *Report on the USSR*, vol. 3, No 45, November 8, 1991, p. 17.

⁵⁸⁹ "Patriarch Alexis II: I take on myself responsibility for all that happened", *Izvestia*, No 137, June 10, 1991; Bishop Gregory Grabbe, "Dogmatizatsia Sergianstva" (The Dogmatization of Sergianism), *Pravoslavnaia Rus'* (Orthodox Russia), No 17 (1446), September 1/14, 1991, p. 5.

their souls: the sin of silence and of lying for the good of the people in order that they not be completely removed from real life. In the government of the diocese and as head of the negotiations for the patriarchate of Moscow, I also had to cede one point in order to defend another. I ask pardon of God, I ask pardon, understanding and prayers of all those whom I harmed through the concessions, the silence, the forced passivity or the expressions of loyalty that the hierarchy may have manifested during that period.”⁵⁹⁰

This is closer to self-justification than repentance (and was in any case contradicted by later statements). It is similar to the statement of the Romanian Metropolitan Nicholas (Corneanu) of Banat, who confessed to collaborating with the *Securitate* (the Romanian KGB), and had defrocked the priest Fr. Calciu for false political reasons, but nevertheless declared that if he had not made such compromises he would have been forced to abandon his post, “which in the conditions of the time would not have been good for the Church”. In other words, as Vladimir Kozyrev writes: “It means: ‘I dishonoured the Church and my Episcopal responsibility, I betrayed those whom I had to protect, I scandalized my flock. But all this I had to do for the good of the Church!’”⁵⁹¹

The patriarch showed that the poison of sergianism was in him still during the attempted *coup* of August, 1991. When the Russian vice-president, Alexander Rutskoy, approached him on the morning of the 19th, the patriarch pleaded “illness” and refused to see him. When he eventually did issue a declaration – on the evening of the 20th, and again in the early hours of the 21st – the impression made was, in Fr. Gleb Yakunin’s words, “rather weak”.⁵⁹² He called on all sides to avoid bloodshed, but did not specifically condemn the plotters. As Jane Ellis comments: “Though Patriarch Alexis II issued statements during the *coup*, they were bland and unspecific, and he was widely thought to have waited to see which way the wind was blowing before committing himself to issuing them. It was rather the priests in the White House – the Russian Parliament building – itself, such as the veteran campaigner for religious freedom, Fr. Gleb Yakunin, as well as the Christians among those manning the barricades outside, who helped to overthrow the Communist Party, the KGB and the Soviet system.”⁵⁹³

It was not until Wednesday morning that the patriarch sent his representative, Deacon Andrew Kurayev, to the Russian parliament building, by which time several dissident priests were already established there. And it was two priests of the Russian Church Abroad, Fr. Nicholas Artemov from Munich and Fr. Victor

⁵⁹⁰ *30 Dias* (Thirty Days), Rome/Sao Paolo, August-September, 1991, p. 23.

⁵⁹¹ Kozyrev, “[orthodox-synod] Re: The Orthodox Episcopate of the Russian persecuted Church”, orthodox-synod@yahoogroups.com. 28 November, 2002.

⁵⁹² Hieromonk Tikhon (Kozushin), personal communication; Natalia Babisyan, “Sviashchenniki na barrikadakh” (Priests on the Barricades), *Khristianskie Novosti* (Christian News), No 38, August 22, 1991, p. 21.

⁵⁹³ Ellis, “The Russian Church: hopes and fears”, *Church Times*, September 13, 1991. During the 1993 attack on parliament he showed a similar indecisiveness. “He promised to excommunicate the first person to fire a shot, but when shooting... thundered around the ‘White House’, he forgot about his promise.” (Eugene Sokolov, “Tovarisch Drozdov – Vor Hevronskej” (Comrade Drozdov – the Thief of Hebron), *Russkoe Novoe Slovo* (New Russian Word), 18 July, 1997)

Usachev from Moscow, who celebrated the first supplicatory service to the New Martyrs of Russia on the balcony of the White House. Not to be outdone, the patriarchate immediately responded with its own prayer service, and at some time during the same day the patriarch anathematized all those who had taken part in organizing the coup.

By these actions the patriarch appeared to have secured his position vis-à-vis Yeltsin's government, and on August 27, Yeltsin attended a memorial service in the Dormition cathedral of the Kremlin, at which the patriarch hailed the failure of the coup, saying that "the wrath of God falls upon the children of disobedience".⁵⁹⁴ So in the space of thirteen months, the patriarch had passed from a pro-communist, anti-democratic stance to an anti-communist, pro-democratic stance. This "flexibility" should have surprised nobody; for the essence of sergianism, the root heresy of the Moscow Patriarchate, is *adaptation to the world, and to whatever the world believes and praises*. In view of this, it is not surprising that the successful counter-revolution against Communism that took place under Yeltsin in 1991, having no spiritual support in the True Church, quickly ran into severe difficulties. Not being nourished and supported by true religious feeling, it withered and died in the midst of rampant corruption, bloodshed and the disillusion of the people with the "freedom" they had now received.

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After the failure of the *putsch* articles began to appear revealing the links of the Church hierarchy with the KGB. Rattled, the patriarch wrote to Fathers Gleb Yakunin and George Edelstein that their articles were "full of the spirit of unscrupulous blasphemy against the Church."⁵⁹⁵

However, in January, 1992, a Commission of the Presidium of the Russian Supreme Soviet was established, investigating the causes and circumstances of the 1991 *putsch*. It confirmed that for several decades at least the leaders of the Moscow Patriarchate had been KGB agents. Members of the commission - L. Ponomarev, V. Polosin and Fr. Gleb Yakunin - obtained access to the records of the fourth, Church department of the KGB's Fifth Directorate (in which the future president of Russia, Vladimir Putin, had worked), and revealed that Metropolitans Juvenal of Krutitsa, Pitirim of Volokolamsk, Philaret of Kiev and Philaret of Minsk were all KGB agents, with the codenames "Adamant", "Abbat", "Antonov" and "Ostrovsky".

This "news" was hardly unexpected. In 1989 Kharchev, Chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs, confirmed that the Russian Orthodox Church was rigorously controlled by the Central Committee of the Communist Party,

⁵⁹⁴ He said that the Church had not supported the coup (although there is clear evidence that Metropolitans Philaret of Kiev and Pitirim of Volokolamsk supported it), but had "taken the side of law and liberty" (*Report on the USSR*, vol. 3, No 36, September 6, 1991, p. 82)

⁵⁹⁵ *Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarkhii* (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), 1991, No 1

especially its Ideological Department, and by the KGB.⁵⁹⁶ Again, Victor Sheimov, a former KGB major with responsibilities for upgrading the KGB's communications security system until his defection in 1980, described the Fifth Directorate as being "responsible for suppressing ideological dissent, running the Soviet Orthodox Church and laying the groundwork for the First Chief Directorate's subversive promotion of favourable opinion about the country's position and policy."⁵⁹⁷ One of Sheimov's jobs was to draft agents to infiltrate the "Soviet Orthodox Church". Again, in 1992 a former KGB agent, A. Shushpanov, described his experiences working in the Moscow Patriarchate's Department of External Ecclesiastical Relations. He said that most of the people working there were in fact KGB agents.⁵⁹⁸

But it was the Commission's report on March 6 that contained the most shocking revelations: "KGB agents, using such aliases as Sviatoslav, Adamant, Mikhailov, Nesterovich, Ognev and others, made trips abroad, organised by the Russian Orthodox Department of External Relations [which was headed by Metropolitan Cyril (Gundiaev), the future patriarch], performing missions assigned to them by the leadership of the KGB. The nature of their missions shows that this department was inseparably linked with the state and that it had emerged as a covert centre of KGB agents among the faithful."

Again: "The Commission draws the attention of the Russian Orthodox Church leadership to the fact that the Central Committee of the CPSU and KGB agencies have used a number of church bodies for their purposes by recruiting and planting KGB agents. Such deep infiltration by intelligence service agents into religious associations poses a serious threat to society and the State. Agencies that are called upon to ensure State security can thus exert uncontrolled impact on religious associations numbering millions of members, and through them on the situation at home and abroad."⁵⁹⁹

The findings of the Commission included:- (i) the words of the head of the KGB Yury Andropov to the Central Committee sometime in the 1970s: "The organs of state security keep the contacts of the Vatican with the Russian Orthodox Church under control..."; (ii) "At the 6th General Assembly of the World Council of Churches in Vancouver, the religious delegation from the USSR contained 47 (!) agents of the KGB, including religious authorities, clergy and technical personnel" (July, 1983); (iii) "The most important were the journeys of agents 'Antonov', 'Ostrovsky' and 'Adamant' to Italy for conversations with the Pope of Rome on the question of further relations between the Vatican and the Russian

⁵⁹⁶ Kharchev, *Argumenty i Fakty* (Arguments and Facts), 1992, No 8, p. 5.

⁵⁹⁷ Sheimov, *Tower of Secrets*, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1993, p. 418, in "The New Soviet Man", *Orthodox Christian Witness*, June 3/16, 1996.

⁵⁹⁸ Shushpanov, *Moskovskie Novosti* (Moscow News), 12 July, 1992, p. 20, in "The New Soviet Man", *Orthodox Christian Witness*, June 3/16, 1996.

⁵⁹⁹ Fr. George Edelshtein, "Double Agents in the Church", *Moscow News*, August 26, 2005.

Orthodox Church, and in particular regarding the problems of the uniates" (1989).⁶⁰⁰

The Commission also discovered that the patriarch himself was an agent with the codename "Drozdov". This was not made public because, writes Fen Montaigne, "members of the parliamentary commission had told the patriarch that they would not name him as an agent if he began cleaning house in the church and acknowledging the breadth of cooperation between the church and the KGB. 'So far, we have kept silence because we wanted to give the patriarch a chance,' said Alexander Nezhny, a journalist who said his comparison of the archives and church bulletins convinced him that Alexis II is indeed 'Drozdov'."⁶⁰¹

Later investigations confirmed the fact. Thus on March 18, 1996 the Estonian newspaper *Postimees* published the following KGB report from the Estonian SSR: "Agent 'Drozdov', born in 1929, a priest of the Orthodox Church, has a higher education, a degree in theology, speaks Russian and Estonian perfectly, and some limited German. He enlisted on February 28, 1958 out of patriotic feelings in order to expose and drive out the anti-Soviet elements among the Orthodox clergy, with whom he has connections, which represents an overriding interest to the KGB agencies. At the time of enlistment it was taken into consideration that in the future (after securing his practical work) he would be promoted through the available channels to Bishop of Tallinn and Estonia. In the period of his collaboration with the organs of the KGB, 'Drozdov' has proved himself in a positive manner, is accurate in his reports, energetic and sociable. He understands theological matters and international situations well, is eager to carry out tasks given him by us and has already presented a good quantity of worthy material... After securing the agent in practical jobs for the agencies of state security concretely worked out, we intend to use him to further our interests by sending him into the capitalist countries as a member of ecclesiastical organizations."⁶⁰²

⁶⁰⁰ For more details of the parliamentary commission's revelations, see *Priamoj Put'* (The Straight Path), NoNo 1-2, January, 1992, p. 1; No 3, February, 1992, p. 1; February, 1992; Alexander Nezhny, "Tret'e Imia" (The Third Name), *Ogonek* (Little Fire), No 4 (3366), January 25 - February 1, 1992; Iain Walker and Chester Stern, "Holy Agents of the KGB", *The Mail on Sunday*, March 29, 1992; John Dunlop, "KGB Subversion of Russian Orthodox Church", *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 1, No 12, March 20, 1992, pp. 51-53; "Three Leading Moscow Hierarchs Unveiled as KGB Operatives", *Orthodox Life*, vol. 42, No 3, May-June, 1992, pp. 25-29; Protodeacon Herman Ivanov-Trinadtsaty, "A ne nachalo li eto kontsa?" (Is this not the Beginning of the End?), *Pravoslavnaia Rus'* (Orthodox Russia), No 9 (1462), May 1/14, 1992, pp. 609; "Ne bo vragom Tvoim povem..." (I will not give Thy secret to Thine enemy...), *Vestnik Germanskoj Eparkhii Russkoj Pravoslavnoj Tseroki za Granitsej* (Herald of the German Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad), No 1, 1992, pp. 16-22; Fr. Victor Potapov, "Molchaniem predaetsa Bog" ("God is Betrayed by Silence"), Moscow: Isikhia, 1992, pp. 36-39; Joseph Harriss, "The Gospel according to Marx", *Reader's Digest*, February, 1993, pp. 59-63. See also I.I. Maslova, "Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov' i KGB (1960-1980-e gody)" (The Russian Orthodox Church and the KGB (1960s to 1980s), *Voprosy Istorii* (Questions of History), December, 2005, pp. 86-87.

⁶⁰¹ Montaigne, *The Philadelphia Inquirer* on May 3, 1992; quoted in "The Church of the KGB", *Living Orthodoxy*, vol. XIV, No 2, March-April, 1992, pp. 22-23.

⁶⁰² *Estonian State Archive*, record group 131, file 393, pp. 125-126; James Meek, "File links church leader to KGB", *The Sydney Morning Herald*, February 13, 1999; Seamus Martin, "Russian Patriarch

Nevertheless, what had been revealed was so shocking that the parliamentary commission was closed down by Ruslan Khasbulatov, the President of the Supreme Soviet, at the insistence, according to Ponomarev, of Patriarch Alexis and the head of the KGB, Yevgeny Primakov. Again, one of the commission's members, Fr. Gleb Yakunin, was accused of betraying state secrets to the United States and threatened with a private prosecution. Fr. Gleb remained defiant. He wrote to the Patriarch in 1994: "If the Church is not cleansed of the taint of the spy and informer, it cannot be reborn. Unfortunately, only one archbishop – Archbishop Chrysostom of Lithuania – has had the courage publicly to acknowledge that in the past he worked as an agent, and has revealed his codename: RESTAVRATOR. No other Church hierarch has followed his example, however.

"The most prominent agents of the past include DROZDOV – the only one of the churchmen to be officially honoured with an award by the KGB of the USSR, in 1988, for outstanding intelligence services – ADAMANT, OSTROVSKY, MIKHAILOV, TOPAZ AND ABBAT. It is obvious that none of these or the less exalted agents is preparing to repent. On the contrary, they deliver themselves of pastoral maxims on the allegedly neutral character of informing on the Church, and articles have appeared in the Church press justifying the role of the informer as essential for the survival of the Church in an anti-religious state. The codenames I discovered in the archives of the KGB belong to the top hierarchs of the Moscow Patriarchate."

After citing this letter, Vasily Mitrokhin, former chief archivist of the KGB, and Professor Christopher Andrew of Cambridge University comment: "The letter to Aleksii II was unprecedented in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church – for, as the Patriarch must surely have been aware, DROZDOV, the most important of the KGB agents discovered by Father Gleb in the KGB archives, was in fact himself..."⁶⁰³

In April, 1992, Archbishop Chrysostom of Vilnius admitted the charges against him: "I cooperated with the KGB... but I was not a stool-pigeon.... Yes, we – or, at any rate, I, and I am saying this in the first place about myself – cooperated with the KGB. I cooperated, I gave my signature, I had regular meetings, I gave reports. I have my pseudonym or nickname, as they say – 'Restavrator'. I cooperated with them consciously so as insistently to pursue my own church line – a patriotic line, too, as I understood it, with the help of these organs. I was never a stool-pigeon, I was not an informer... But together with those among us hierarchs, there are still more among the priests, there is a mass of unworthy, immoral people. It was this immorality, in the absence of a church court among

was (is?) a KGB agent, files say Patriarch Alexej II received KGB 'Certificate of Honour'", *Irish Times*, September 23, 2000; Arnold Beichman, "Patriarch with a KGB Past", *The Washington Times*, September 29, 2000.

⁶⁰³ Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, London and New York: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1999, p. 661.

us, that the KGB used. They defended them from us, the ruling bishops, so that we could not punish them.”⁶⁰⁴

As he said to the Council of Bishops: “In our Church there are genuine members of the KGB, who have made head-spinning careers; for example, Metropolitan Methodius of Voronezh. He is a KGB officer [code-name PAUL], an atheist, a liar, who is constantly advised by the KGB. The Synod was unanimously against such a bishop, but we had to take upon us such a sin. And then what a rise he had!” According to ex-KGB Lieutenant-Colonel Konstantin Preobrazhensky, Methodius was in fact not a KGB agent, but “a regular officer of the GRU, the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Defence Ministry”. In the KGB they call such people ‘officers of deep cover’. There are quite a few of them in today’s Moscow Patriarchate.”⁶⁰⁵

At the same Council, a commission of eight MP bishops headed by Bishop Alexander of Kostroma was formed to investigate the charges of collaboration with the KGB. This commission has up to now produced absolutely nothing!

In view of the lack of a clear-out of KGB hierarchs, it remained true that, as the saying went, the MP was “the last surviving department of the KGB” or “the second administration of the Soviet state”.

Writing in 1995, John Dunlop concluded that “the overwhelming majority of the current one hundred and nineteen bishops of the Moscow Patriarchate were ordained to the episcopacy prior to August of 1991. This suggests that each of these bishops was carefully screened and vetted by both the ideological apparatus of the Communist Party and by the KGB.”⁶⁰⁶

In fact, according to Preobrazhensky, “*Absolutely all* [my italics – V.M.] the bishops and the overwhelming majority of the priests worked with the KGB. After all, the Church was considered to be a hostile medium, and it had to be controlled through agents. Even the very mechanism of appointing bishops allowed only agents there.

“Bishops were put into the nomenklatura of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and so each one was confirmed by the Ideological department. And what department sent documents there for important personnel appointments? You’re right: the KGB. The certificate on the future bishop was prepared by the Fifth administration, which carried out a general watch over the Church, together with the spy service, if he had been even once abroad. Each of the certificates ended with the same phrase: ‘He has been cooperating since such-and-such a year’.

⁶⁰⁴ *Rossijskaia Gazeta*, 1992, No 52, p. 7.

⁶⁰⁵ Preobrazhensky, “Ecumenism and Intelligence”.

⁶⁰⁶ Dunlop, “The Moscow Patriarchate as an Empire-Saving Institution”, in Michael Bourdeaux, M.E. Sharp (eds.), *The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, 1995, Armonk, NY, p. 29. Keston College came to the same conclusion.

“This was precisely the most important thing for the Central Committee of the CPSU! This phrase witnessed to the fact that the future bishop was not only loyal to Soviet power, but was hanging from it by a hook: after all, there are unfailingly compromising materials on every agent! And this means that no dissident outbursts were to be expected from this bishop...”⁶⁰⁷

Other leading hierarchs in the Soviet bloc were communist agents. Patriarch Ilia of Georgia, as we have seen, had been an agent since 1962. Metropolitan Savva of Poland, later head of the Polish Church, was recruited by the Polish communist security forces in 1966, with the codename “Yurek”.⁶⁰⁸

Being unrepentant KGB agents, it was impossible for these hierarchs to repent of their sergianism. In September, 1991, Patriarch Alexis said, in justification of the Moscow Patriarchate’s cooperation with Stalin in the 1920s and 30s: “A church that has millions of faithful cannot go into the catacombs. The hierarchy of the church has taken the sin on their souls: the sin of silence and of lying for the good of the people in order that they not be completely removed from real life. In the government of the diocese and as head of the negotiations for the patriarchate of Moscow, I also had to cede one point in order to defend another. I ask pardon of God, I ask pardon, understanding and prayers of all those whom I harmed through the concessions, the silence, the forced passivity or the expressions of loyalty that the hierarchy may have manifested during that period.”⁶⁰⁹

This is closer to self-justification than repentance (and was in any case contradicted by later statements). It is similar to the statement of Metropolitan Nicholas (Corneanu) of Banat of the Romanian Patriarchate, who confessed that he had collaborated with the *Securitate*, the Romanian equivalent of the KGB, and had defrocked the priest Fr. Calciu for false political reasons, but nevertheless declared that if he had not made such compromises he would have been forced to abandon his post, “which in the conditions of the time would not have been good for the Church”. In other words, as Vladimir Kozyrev writes: “It means: ‘I dishonoured the Church and my Episcopal responsibility, I betrayed those whom I had to protect, I scandalized my flock. But all this I had to do for the good of the Church!’”⁶¹⁰

In another interview in 1997 Patriarch Alexis said, referring to the Church in the time of Patriarch Tikhon: “The Church could not, did not have the right, to go into the catacombs. She remained together with the people and drank to the

⁶⁰⁷ Preobrazhensky, *KGB v russkoj emigratsii* (The KGB in the Russian emigration), New York: Liberty Publishing House, 2006, p. 41.

⁶⁰⁸ See also “World Orthodoxy: Savva of Poland admits collaboration with Secret Police”, <http://newsnftu.blogspot.com/2009/05/world-orthodoxy-sava-of-poland-admits.html>.

⁶⁰⁹ *30 Dias* (Thirty Days), Rome/Sao Paolo, August-September, 1991, p. 23.

⁶¹⁰ Kozyrev, “[orthodox-synod] Re: The Orthodox Episcopate of the Russian persecuted Church”, orthodox-synod@yahoogroups.com. 28 November, 2002.

dregs the cup of sufferings that fell to its lot."⁶¹¹ Patriarch Alexis here forgot to mention that Patriarch Tikhon specifically blessed Michael Zhizhilenko, the future Hieromartyr Maximus of Serpukhov, to become a secret catacomb bishop if the pressure on the Church from the State became too great. As for his claim that the sergianists shared the cup of the people's suffering, this must be counted as conscious hypocrisy. It is well known that the Soviet hierarchs lived a life of considerable luxury, while lifting not a finger for the Catacomb Christians and dissidents sent to torments and death in KGB prisons!

On November 9, 2001, the patriarch threw off the mask of repentance completely, stating in defence of the declaration: "This was a clever step by which Metropolitan Sergei tried to save the church and clergy. In declaring that the members of the Church want to see themselves as part of the motherland and want to share her joys and sorrows, he tried to show to those who were persecuting the church and who were destroying it that we, the children of the church, want to be loyal citizens so that the affiliation of people with the church would not place them outside the law."⁶¹²

So the greatest act of betrayal in Russian history was "a clever step", which did not destroy the Judas and those who followed him but "saved the church and clergy"!

In October, 2002 Alexis had a frightening vision, news of which the MP immediately tried to suppress. St. Theodosius of the Kiev Caves (+1054) appeared to him and said: "You have fallen away from God - you and many of your brothers - and have prostrated yourself before the devil. And the rulers of Russia are not real rulers, but crooks [there is a pun here: "*ne praviteli, a kriviteli*"]. And the church is pandering to them. And you will not stand at the right hand of Christ. And there await you the torments of gehenna, the gnashing of teeth, endless sufferings, if you accursed ones do not come to your senses. The mercy of our Lord is boundless, but your path to salvation through the redemption of your countless sins is too long for you, the hour of reckoning is near." Then he disappeared. The patriarch was in shock, he had never experienced anything of the sort before, and always responded with scepticism to such miracles. Shortly after this he felt ill. Those who gave him first aid affirm that the sick man was whispering, scarcely audibly: "It can't be, it can't be!"⁶¹³

⁶¹¹ Ridiger, in Anatoly Krasikov, "'Tretij Rim' i bolsheviki (bez grifa 'sovershenno sekretno')" (The Third Rome and the Bolsheviks), in Filatov, S.B. (ed.), *Religia i prava cheloveka* (Religion and Human Rights), Moscow: Nauka, 1996, p. 198.

⁶¹² <http://www.ripnet.org/besieged/rparocora.htm?>

⁶¹³ *Agenstvo Russkoj Informatsii*, <http://www.ari.ru/doc/?id=1410#555>.

54. THE TRUE ORTHODOX CHURCH

The apparent fall of communism throughout most of the Soviet bloc in 1989-91 raised hopes of a restoration of True Orthodoxy in Russia, which, if they seem naïve in retrospect, were nevertheless very real at the time. In retrospect, we can see that the changes introduced by *glasnost'* and *perestroika* were less fundamental than at first appeared, and that the spirit and power of communism was far from dead after 1991. If some of the economic ideas of the revolution were discredited, its fundamental concepts – the replacement of the Church by the State, God by the people, Tradition by science, Spirit by matter – remained as firmly entrenched as ever.

Nevertheless, the changes were significant enough to indicate the beginning of a new era. If we seek for historical parallels, then perhaps the closest is that presented by the Edict of Milan in 313, when the Emperor St. Constantine the Great came to an agreement with the pagan emperor Licinius whereby the persecution of the Christians in the Roman empire was brought to an end. The problem for the Christians of the 1990s was: no Constantine was in sight, and what leadership there was squandered the opportunities presented to it.

Russian Orthodox Christians reacted to these changes in three different ways. The True Orthodox Christians of the Catacomb Church were cautious, fearing a deception. They were not convinced that the leopard had not changed its spots (Jeremiah 13.23), believing that the communists had merely assumed the mask of “democrats”, the wolves had simply put on sheep’s clothing while remaining inwardly as ravenous as before (Matthew 7.15). In general, therefore, they remained in the underground, not seeking to register their communities or acquire above-ground churches in which to worship.

Outside Russia, on the other hand, most believers were displaying signs of “war weariness”; they wanted to believe, and many did believe, that the Soviet Union had miraculously changed into a normal State overnight, that the KGB had disappeared, that the communists had repented, that the Moscow Patriarchate had been transformed from an adulteress into a pure virgin...

Meanwhile, the Moscow Patriarchate (MP) was fearful that its monopoly position in church life under the Soviets would be lost in the new democracy. Nevertheless, it took the opportunity presented by the new legislation to receive all the money budgeted for church restoration by the Russian parliament and open many churches (1830 were opened in the first nine months of 1990 alone).

The third force in Orthodox life, the Russian Church Outside Russia (ROCOR), which throughout the Soviet period had taken a public position against the MP and in support of the True Orthodox Church, decided to open parishes on Russian soil and thereby provide an alternative for believers who on the one hand did not want to join the MP, but on the other hand were not prepared for the rigours of catacomb life.

However, the first question that had to be answered by all sides was: how were the political changes to be evaluated? Was the collective Antichrist really dead? If so, then had the end times, paradoxically, come to an end? Or was this only a temporary “breathing space” in which the Antichrist was preparing a new, subtler, and more deadly onslaught?

There were certainly important benefits to be gained from democratization. Thus the fall of communism came not a moment too soon for the beleaguered Catacomb Church, which was scattered and divided and desperately short of bishops and priests of unquestioned Orthodoxy and apostolic succession. The fall of the iron curtain enabled ROCOR to enter Russia and regenerate the hierarchy of the True Church.

Again, the introduction of freedom of speech enabled millions of Soviet citizens to learn the truth about their state and church for the first time. On the basis of this knowledge, they could now seek entrance into the Church without the fear of being sent to prison or the camps. In the wave of disillusion with post-Soviet democracy that followed in the mid-1990s, it was pointed out – rightly – that freedom is a two-edged weapon, which can destroy as well as give life, and that “freedom” had brought Russia poverty and crime as well as interesting newspapers. However, for the soul thirsting for truth there is no more precious gift than the freedom to seek and find; and that opportunity was now, at last, presented to the masses.

On the other hand, only a minority of Russians used this freedom to seek the truth that makes one truly, spiritually free. And so if the fall of communism in 1989-91 was a liberation, it was a liberation strangely lacking in joy. Orthodoxy was restored neither to the state nor to the official church, and the masses of the people remained unconverted. Ten years later, a priest of the MP could claim that “the regeneration of ecclesiastical life has become a clear manifestation of the miraculous transfiguration of Russia”.⁶¹⁴ But behind the newly gilded cupolas reigned heresy and corruption on a frightening scale.

Thus Fr. Paul Adelheim, an MP priest who was killed in mysterious circumstances in the early 2000s, wrote: “Spiritual life is being destroyed and annihilated – moreover, it is being annihilated deliberately, of course, by the Moscow Patriarchate itself. It is destroying what it is possible to destroy in the Church... Our faith in the Church has been substituted by ideology. The Church has taken the place of the former Politburo of the USSR. That is what they call it now. They say that Russia is headed by chekists [KGB agents] and churchmen.

“It turns out in fact that there is no place in this Church for Christ.”

⁶¹⁴ Fr. Andrej Rumyantsev, “Kesariu – Kesarevo” (To Caesar what is Caesar’s), *Vecherniaia Moskva* (Evening Moscow), 21 September, 2000, p. 1.

Moreover, surveys showed that although the numbers of those confessing themselves to be Orthodox Christians had risen⁶¹⁵, the correctness and depth of belief of these new Christians was open to question⁶¹⁶... More people called themselves "Orthodox" than confessed to believing in God! As time passed, the corrupting and divisive effects of Russian "democracy" became more and more evident. Pornography and crime of all kinds increased dramatically; and in the opinion of many it was now more difficult to bring up children in true Christian piety than it had been in the Soviet period. The general level of culture also declined; and the freedom given to religion turned out to be more to the advantage of all kinds of sects and false religions than to True Orthodoxy...

In fact, it was not so much a real religious renaissance as what Bishop Theophan the Recluse had prophesied over a century before: "Although the Christian name will be heard everywhere, and everywhere will be visible churches and ecclesiastical ceremonies, all this will be just appearances, and within there will be true apostasy. On this soil the Antichrist will be born..."⁶¹⁷

It is little wonder that in many churches the prayer to be delivered "from the bitter torment of atheist rule" continued to be chanted...

That the return of democracy would not bring with it a real cleansing of political life became evident when none of the communist persecutors of the previous seventy years throughout Eastern Europe were brought to trial for their crimes. As in other East European countries, there was no lustration process, no "decommunization" analogous to the denazification that took place in Germany in 1945. The Soviet Communist Party itself was even "acquitted" in what was a new kind of "show trial" in 1992.⁶¹⁸ An example is the Soviet school system, which remained unreformed. As Maxim Mirovich writes: "The Soviet schools were almost the most backward and archaic in the whole of Europe, and out of the children there they prepared, not independently thinking personalities for life in a free state, but personnel for work within the Soviet system – stuffing them with Soviet myths and propaganda. Far from the least significant role in the 'crisis of the 90s' (which the fanatics for the USSR love to talk about) was played precisely

⁶¹⁵ However, according to Vladimir Rozanskij ("Rome and Moscow: a willing separation?" *Asia News*, 3 June, 2004), the "Moscow" authorities confirmed that 'for Easter [2004] less than 1% of the population attended any kind of religious service'. In the last ten years, there are twenty times more churches than there were under communism, with buildings being built or reopened. Yet in relation to the immediate post-communism years, only one third of people now attend the services".

⁶¹⁶ Kimmo Kaariainen, *Religion in Russia after the Collapse of Communism*, Lewiston-Queenston-Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 1998; Tatiana Senina, "Ty nosish' imia, budto zhiv, no ty mertv" (You have the name of being alive, but you are dead), *Vertograd-Inform*, September-October, 2000, pp. 46-72.

⁶¹⁷ Bishop Theophan, *Tolkovanie na Vtoroe Poslanie sv. Apostola Pavla k Soluniam* (Interpretation of the Second Epistle of the Holy Apostle Paul to the Thessalonians), 2.3-5.

⁶¹⁸ Vladimir Bukovsky, *Moskovskij Protsess* (Moscow Trial), Moscow, 1996.

by the Soviet school, which taught the children to worship Lenin, but did not teach them how to live in the real world.”⁶¹⁹

“In March 1993, 63 per cent of Russians said they regretted that the Soviet Union had collapsed. By the end of 2000, the figure had risen to 75 per cent.”⁶²⁰

In view of this lack of “decommunization” or “desovietization”, there was no recovery as there had been in Germany after 1945. Instead, one group of “repentant” communists, sensing the signs of the political times, seized power in 1991 in a “democratic” coup and immediately formed such close and dependent ties with its western allies that the formerly advanced (if inefficient) economy of Russia was transformed into a scrap-heap of obsolescent factories, on the one hand, and a source of cheap raw materials for the West, on the other.⁶²¹

Another group, playing on the sense of betrayal felt by many, formed a neo-Soviet, nationalist opposition – but an opposition characterized by hatred, envy and negativism rather than a constructive understanding of the nation’s real spiritual needs and identity.

Still others, using the contacts and dollars acquired in their communist days, went into “business” – that is, a mixture of crime, extortion and the worst practices of capitalism. It is little wonder that True Orthodox churches felt it necessary to retain the prayer to be delivered “from the bitter torment of atheist rule”...

However, these politico-economic explanations of Russia’s failure to recover in the 1990s are superficial. If the people had thoroughly *repented* of the evils they had committed, individually and collectively, since the revolution, God could have nullified these material factors. Let us now turn to *spiritual* causes, to asking why internal *perestroika*, that is, *repentance*, failed to take place on a sufficient scale to draw God’s mercy back to the people...

The ROCOR philosopher Ivan Alexandrovich Ilyin (+1954) said: “Russia will be regenerated only when in the soul of the Russian man there will again appear an altar for God and a throne for the Tsar”. These two conditions required the removal of two obstacles or spiritual mountains in the way of the building of God’s Temple (Zechariah 4.7): (1) the Moscow Patriarchate, that KGB-controlled mockery of an Orthodox church, enabling a true altar to be erected to the true God, and (2) the ideology of democracy, enabling a truly autocratic (i.e. Orthodox, not western-style absolutist or constitutional) monarchism to take its place.

⁶¹⁹ Mirovich, “Sovietskie shkoly – chto tam bylo na samom dele” (Soviet Schools – what was there in actual fact), December 4, 2019, https://maxim-nm.livejournal.com/551641.html?fbclid=IwAR3-TjChy3lphH_86QpZWY43D_h_yW3wpqvpiL_Q_7RiivAOSgrgMHsQkm8

⁶²⁰ Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁶²¹ Mikhail Nazarov, *Tajna Rossii* (The Mystery of Russia), Moscow: “Russkaia Idea”, 1999.

As the Soviet Union began to collapse under the onslaught of Gorbachev's reforms, a movement began within the Moscow Patriarchate to regenerate the Church with the help of ROCOR, the part of the Russian Church that was based outside Russia and remained openly opposed to Communism.

The story really began at the end of 1988, when the layman Boris Kozushin (now Hieromonk Tikhon) went to New York, handed Metropolitan Vitaly a mass of documents and asked him to open parishes of ROCOR inside Russia and accept his own parish under his omophorion.⁶²² According to another source, however, this idea goes back to a correspondence initiated during the *perestroika* period between the dissident Russian layman (and later priest) Stefan Krasovitsky and Bishop Gregory (Grabbe).⁶²³

In March, 1990 ROCOR issued the following guidelines for its Church in Russia, to be known as the "Free Russian Orthodox Church" (FROC): "I. The free Russian Orthodox parishes are neither an independent nor a new hierarchal structure; they are in eucharistic communion with and in the jurisdiction of and subject to the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, which is headed by its first hierarch, Metropolitan Vitaly, and is the preserver of unadulterated Orthodoxy and the traditions of the Russian Orthodox Church.

"II. The clergy are not to join in eucharistic communion with the Moscow Patriarchate until it renounces the declaration of Metropolitan Sergei, until it repents of the errors which followed this uncanonical declaration, and removes those ruling bishops who have compromised themselves by uncanonical and immoral acts, who have been involved in corruption and the embezzlement of church funds, who have been placed in power through the interference of the secular authorities, and who have allowed distortions in the services of the Russian Orthodox Church.

"III. The parishes may not pray for the government as long as the controlling and guiding power remains the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which has a militantly atheistic and anti-Church program. In addition, prayer is allowed for apostates only during the prayer, 'that Thou mightest appear to them who have fallen away,' but not during the *proskomedia*.

⁶²² Kozushin, Open Letter to Bishop Victor of Western Europe, November 2/15, 2009, <http://ftrikhon.livejournal.com> "A few words about who I am. It is now 50 years I am an orthodox layman, 40 years a monk and 28 years a priest-monk. Presently a hegumen of ROCOR in retirement and informally concelebrate in the Montenegrin Church. I joined ROCOR in 1988 during my first visit to the US, and never wavered in following her traditions and course. In 1988 I went to the ROCOR headquarters in NY to meet with Metr. Vitaly of thrice blessed memory and handed over to him a formal request from my followers in Russia to open parishes under ROCOR jurisdiction as an alternative to the corrupted and uncanonical red church of MP."

⁶²³ Wojciech Zalewski, "Vozvrashchenie Russkoj Zarubezhnoi Tserkvi na Rodinu. Vzgliad Episkopa Grigorija (Grabbe). Iurii Pavlovich Grabbe's (Bishop Grigorii) Vision of the Return of the Orthodox Church to the Homeland in the Post- Soviet Era" (MS, in English mainly).

"IV. The reasons for the establishment of free parishes: The free Russian Orthodox parishes have opened due to the absolutely paralyzed, unrepentant state of the hierarchy and clergy of the Moscow Patriarchate, who have fallen away from pure Orthodoxy through the acceptance of the declaration by Metropolitan Sergei (who usurped the power of the Church in Russia) in 1927 of loyalty to the militantly atheistic communist Soviet power.

"The main errors of the Moscow Patriarchate after the declaration of 1927 are as follows:

"1. The excommunication of those hierarchs, clergy, monastics and laymen who did not accept the declaration, which was followed by mass terror and murder of those who did not accept the atheistic government.

"2. The desecration of the memory of the Holy New Martyrs and Confessors.

"3. The collaboration with the atheistic government even in the business of closing churches. Devoted service to the government and public prayer to strengthen its power, which in turn fights against faith and the Church.

"4. The distortion of the sacraments, rites, sermon, and carelessness in the spreading of the Word of God. Refusal to catechize, which has led masses of laypeople into ignorance and a superficial acceptance of Christianity.

"5. The participation and membership in the World Council of Churches and the ecumenical movement, for the creation of a worldwide "church", that would unite all heresies and religions.

"6. Submission to secular, atheistic authorities and allowing them to rule the inner life of the church even to the extent of direct control, with the ultimate goal of destroying faith.

"7. The alienation of the hierarchy and clergy from the flock, and a careless, proud relationship towards the laypeople in direct violation of the apostolic injunction to clergy to be an example and not exercise power over others.

"8. The wide-spread moral depravity and mercenariness among the uncanonical clergy.

"9. Uncanonical and capricious transferring of diocesan bishops."⁶²⁴

This was a good manifesto. The problem was: it was not adhered to consistently. And this failure, together with personnel and administrative failures, constituted the main reason for the collapse of ROCOR's mission in

⁶²⁴ "The Position of ROCOR on the Free Russian Orthodox Church", adopted by the Council of Bishops of the Russian Church Abroad, 2/15 March 1990.

Russia in the 1990s. The momentous event of the return of the exiles to Russia was undertaken almost casually, without a clearly defined strategy. Hence difficult problems arose, problems that ROCOR in the end found insuperable...

The first problem was one of self-definition: how could the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad continue to call herself the Church *Abroad* if she now had parishes *inside* Russia? After all, her Founding Statute or *Polozhenie* stated that ROCOR was an autonomous part of the Autocephalous Russian Church, that part which existed (i) *outside* the bounds of Russia on the basis of Ukaz № 362 of November 7/20, 1920 of Patriarch Tikhon and the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, and (ii) *temporarily* until the fall of communism in Russia. With the fall of communism and the creation of ROCOR parishes inside Russia in 1990, it would seem that these limitations in space and time no longer applied, and that ROCOR had ceased to exist as a canonical organisation in accordance with her own definition of herself in the *Polozhenie*. The solution to this problem was obvious: change the *Polozhenie*! And this was in fact the solution put forward by Bishop Gregory (Grabbe), who had been Chancellor of the Synod from 1931 until his forced retirement by Metropolitan Vitaly in 1986.

However, the ROCOR episcopate declined his suggestion, probably because a change in the *Polozhenie* that removed the spatial and temporal limitations of ROCOR's self-definition would have had the consequence of forcing the ROCOR episcopate to: (i) remove the centre of her Church administration from America to Russia, (ii) proclaim herself (alongside any Catacomb Church groups that she might recognise) as part of the Russian Orthodox Church *inside* Russia and distinguished from the other parts only by its possessing dioceses and parishes abroad, and (iii) enter into a life-and-death struggle with the MP for the minds and hearts of the Russian people.

However, the ROCOR bishops could not accept these consequences. After all, they were well-established abroad, increasingly dependent economically on foreign converts to Orthodoxy, and with few exceptions were not prepared to exchange the comforts and relative security of life in the West for the privations of life in Russia. Thus even after the fall of communism, ROCOR's first-hierarchy, Metropolitan Vitaly, never set foot on Russian soil, in spite of numerous invitations from believers. Of course, the whole *raison d'être* of ROCOR was to return to her homeland in Russia (she was previously called the Russian Church *in Exile*, and exiles by definition want to return to their homeland); and it was in anticipation of such a return that she had steadfastly refused to endanger her Russian identity by merging with other Local Orthodox Churches or by forming local jurisdictions identified with specific western countries (e.g. the Orthodox Church of America). But generations had passed since the first emigration, the descendants of that first emigration had settled in western countries, learned their languages, adopted their ways, put down roots in foreign soil. The exiles were no longer exiles from, but strangers to, their native land...

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A second problem concerned ROCOR's relationship to the Catacomb Church. Since 1927, when ROCOR had broken communion with Metropolitan Sergei at the same time as the Catacomb Church, she had looked upon the Catacomb Church as the True Church inside Russia with which she remained in mystical communion, even if such communion could not be realised in face-to-face meeting and concelebration. Indeed, after the death, in 1937, of Metropolitan Peter, the last universally recognised leader of the Russian Church, ROCOR commemorated "the episcopate of the persecuted Russian Church" – that is, the episcopate of the Catacomb Church. After the war, however, a change began to creep in, at first almost imperceptibly, but then more and more noticeably. On the one hand, news of Catacomb bishops and communities became more and more scarce, and some even began to doubt that the Catacomb Church existed any longer. On the other hand, as we have seen, some Catacomb priests inside Russia, having lost contact with, and knowledge of, any canonical bishops there might still be inside Russia, began commemorating Metropolitan Anastasy, first-hierarch of ROCOR.

These tendencies gave rise to the perception that the leadership of True Orthodoxy had now passed from inside Russia to outside Russia. Moreover, the significance of the Catacomb Church began to be lost, as the struggle was increasingly seen to be between the "red church" inside Russia (the MP) and the "white church" outside Russia (ROCOR).

In order to understand ROCOR's attitude to the Catacombs, we need to go back to the crushing of the dissident movement in the Soviet Union in the early 1980s, and the temporarily sobering effect this had on the liberals in ROCOR, leading to a very important ecclesiastical act: the canonization of the Holy New Martyrs of Russia, headed by Tsar-Martyr Nicholas II, in New York in November, 1981. News of this event seeped into the Soviet Union, and ROCOR's icon and service to the new martyrs became more and more widely used even among members of the MP. It was these prayers to the holy new martyrs, more than the support of the Pope for anti-communists in Poland, that was the real catalyst for *glasnost'* and *perestroika*, and hence the fall of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as a whole.

The weakening of communism raised hopes of a mass movement out of the MP into the True Church. But this raised the question: which Church – the Catacomb Church inside Russia, or ROCOR? In either case, the question of the relationship between ROCOR and the Catacomb Church needed to be clarified.

For some years, the ROCOR Synod had continued to have contacts with Catacomb clergy, some of whom began to commemorate Metropolitan Philaret while others were actually received under his *omophorion*. Thus in 1977, after the death of their Catacomb archpastor, Archbishop Anthony (Galynsky-

Mikhailovsky), fourteen of his clergy were received “at a distance” into ROCOR.⁶²⁵

The presence of a sizeable group of Catacomb clergy under the omophorion of ROCOR naturally led to the raising of the question of the consecration of a bishop for the Catacomb Church. Vitaly Shumilo writes: “The question of the reestablishment of the episcopate of the Catacomb Church was raised at the Hierarchical Synod of ROCOR [in 1981]. It was decided secretly to tonsure and ordain to the episcopate a clergyman of the West European diocese whose sister lived in the USSR [Hieromonk Barnabas (Prokofiev)], thanks to which he could more easily obtain a visa. The Council entrusted this secretly ordained bishop to secretly ordain Fr. Lazarus to the episcopate in order that he should lead the catacomb clergy and their communities.”⁶²⁶

According to Matushka Anastasia Shatilova, the daughter of Bishop Gregory Grabbe, the decision was made by Metropolitan Philaret, Archbishop Vitaly and Archbishop Anthony of Geneva, and she, as being the person who printed the documents, was the only other person who knew about it. In the next year, 1982, Archbishop Anthony and Bishop Mark of Berlin consecrated Hieromonk Barnabas as Bishop of Cannes.⁶²⁷

⁶²⁵ Metropolitan Epiphany (Kaminsky), personal communication, May, 1995. The text of the resolution of the ROCOR Synod was as follows: “There were discussions on the question of the fourteen clerics accepted into communion of prayer from the Catacomb Church who submitted their petitions to the Hierarchical Synod through Archimandrite Misael of the monastery of St. Panteleimon on the Holy Mountain, which were received on November 26 / December 7, 1977. At that time the Hierarchical Synod of the ROCOR in its session of November 26 / December 7, 1977 accepted the following resolution:

“Trusting the witness of the fourteen priests that their reposed leader, Archbishop Anthony (Galynsky) was correctly ordained to the episcopate, and carried out his service secretly from the civil authorities, it has been decided to accept them into communion of prayer, having informed them that they can carry out all those sacred actions which priests can carry out according to the Church canons, and also giving the monastic clerics the right to carry out monastic tonsures. They are to be informed of this in the same way as their address was received.”

⁶²⁶ Shumilo, “Kratkaia Spravka o Istorii RIPTs” (A Short Note on the History of the Russian True Orthodox Church), 2008; “Godovschina vosstanovlenia apostol’skoj preemstvennosti v Russkoj Katakombnoj Istinno-Pravoslavnoj Tserkvi” (The Anniversary of the Restoration of Apostolic Succession in the Russian Catacomb True Orthodox Church), http://catacomb.org.ua/modules.php?name=Pages&go=print_page&pid=677.

⁶²⁷ The official ROCOR account was published on August 1/14, 1990: “In 1982 his Eminence Anthony, Archbishop of Geneva and Western Europe, together with his Eminence Mark, Bishop of Berlin and Germany, on the orders of the Hierarchical Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, secretly performed an Episcopal ordination on Hieromonk Barnabas (Prokofiev), so that through the cooperation of these archpastors the Church life of the Catacomb Orthodox Church in Russia might be regulated. Since external circumstances no longer compel either his Eminence Bishop Lazarus in Russia, or his Eminence Bishop Barnabas in France to remain as secret Hierarchs of our Russian Church Abroad, the Hierarchical Synod is now officially declaring this fact.” (“Zaiavlenie Arkhierejskago Sinoda Russkoj Pravoslavnoj Tserkvi Zagranitsej” (Declaration of the Hierarchical Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad), *Pravoslavnaia Rus’* (Orthodox Russia), No 18 (1423), September 15/28, 1990, p. 16.

He then travelled secretly to Moscow and ordained Fr. Lazarus as Bishop of Tambov in his flat on May 10.⁶²⁸ In May, 1990, when Lazarus was able to travel to New York, *cheirothesia* was performed on him by ROCOR bishops in order to correct his original *cheirotomia* at the hands of one bishop only.

Although there were dissenters from the choice of Lazarus, in general the Russian faithful accepted him; for in a vision the well-known Chilean, Jose Munoz, keeper of the Montreal Iveron icon of the Mother of God, had heard him “a pillar of Orthodoxy”. Jose, who was later brutally murdered in Athens, made a copy of the Montreal icon and sent it to Bishop Lazarus. It remains in his possession of RTOC, and is fragrant...

And so, “after Vladyka Lazarus’ secret ordination,” writes Shumilo, “many catacomb communities of the TOC in the Kuban, Ukraine, in the Central Black Earth region of Russia, the Northern Caucasus, Belorussia, Siberia, Kazakhstan, Bashkiria and other regions, united around him.

“From the moment of the reestablishment of a canonical hierarchy in the Catacomb Church in the Homeland there began its gradual regeneration and building up. The secret Bishop Lazarus in a self-sacrificing way, in spite of the great risk for his own life, tirelessly went round the catacomb communities of the TOC scattered throughout the whole boundless expanse of Holy Russia, which had been turned by the God-fighters into the atheist USSR, serving secretly at night, preaching, confessing, communing and ordaining new catacomb priests. In the period from 1982 to 1990 alone Bishop Lazarus ordained about 20 new catacomb clergy for the TOC. Many catacomb priests who accepted ordination from the uncanonical catacomb hierarchies of the ‘Sekachites’ and the ‘Alfeyevites’ were united to him through correction of their ordinations.”⁶²⁹

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⁶²⁸ “In a Gramota of the ROCOR Synod dated May 3/16, 1990 the following was said about this: ‘Archimandrite Lazarus (Zhurbenko) is elected by the Russian Orthodox Church that is in the Catacombs and is confirmed and established as bishop of the God-saved city of Tambov by the Sacred Hierarchical Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad in accordance with the rite of the Holy Apostolic Eastern Church, with the aid of the all-accomplishing and all-holy Spirit, in the year of the incarnation of God the Word 1982, on the 27th day of April, in the city of Moscow, being ordained by hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad by order of the Hierarchical Council of 1981. The ordination of His Grace Lazarus took place in the special circumstances elicited by the difficulties of the present time, which is why the ordination was carried out in secret.’

“In another Synodal document, no. II/35/R, it was confirmed: ‘Bishop Lazarus (Zhurbenko) has been ordained by order of the Hierarchical Council of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad as BISHOP for the regeneration and leadership of the Church in Russia.’ (Shumilo, op. cit.)

“Also, in the witness dated September 22 / October 5, 1989 signed by the First Deputy of the First-Hierarchy of ROCOR it says: ‘His Grace Bishop Lazarus has been canonically ordained by the episcopate of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and is appointed to serve the Orthodox Christians of the Russian Church Catacombs.’”

⁶²⁹ Shumilo, “Kratkaia Spravka”, op. cit. In fact, Sekachite clergy were reordained...

A third, critical problem for ROCOR concerned the status of the Moscow Patriarchate. ROCOR's position here was tragically double-minded: the bishops proved themselves incapable of making up their minds whether the MP was their bitterest enemy or their most beloved mother, whether it was necessary to fight her or unite with her!⁶³⁰ This double-mindedness bore bitter fruit that was to lead to schism and the collapse of ROCOR's mission inside Russia and the eventual fall of the main body of ROCOR herself.

The roots of this double-mindedness go back to the post-war period, when large numbers of Christians fleeing towards Western Europe from Soviet Russia were joined to ROCOR. In receiving these Christians, little difference was made between those who had belonged to the Catacomb Church, and those who had belonged to the MP. Some, even including bishops, turned out to be KGB agents, and either returned to the MP or remained as "moles" to undermine ROCOR. Others, while sincerely anti-Soviet, were not sufficiently "enchurched" to see the fundamental ecclesiological significance of the schism in the Russian Church.

Thus a certain "dilution" in the quality of those joining ROCOR in the second emigration by comparison with the first – and the problem was to get worse with the third and fourth emigrations – which began to affect the confessing stance of the Church as a whole. Even members of the first emigration were proving susceptible to deception. Thus over half of the Church in America and all except one diocese in China (that of Shanghai, led by St. John Maximovich) were lured back into the arms of the Soviet "Fatherland" and its Soviet "Church".

Another reason for this diminution in zeal was ROCOR's continuing communion with the Local Orthodox Churches of "World Orthodoxy" even after all of these (except Jerusalem) sent representatives to the local Councils of the MP in 1945 and 1948. The reasons for this continuation of communion depended on the Church in question. Thus communion continued with the Serbian Church because of the debt of gratitude ROCOR owed to it because of the hospitality shown by the Serbian Church to ROCOR in the inter-war years. Communion continued with the Jerusalem Patriarchate because all churches in the Holy Land, including ROCOR monasteries, were required, under threat of closure, to commemorate the Patriarch of Jerusalem. Communion also continued, albeit intermittently, with the Greek new calendarist churches, because the Patriarchate of Constantinople was powerful in the United States, the country to which ROCOR moved its headquarters after the war.

This ambiguous relationship towards "World Orthodoxy" inevitably began to affect ROCOR's zeal in relation to the MP in particular. For if the MP was recognised by Serbia and Jerusalem, and Serbia and Jerusalem were recognised by ROCOR, the conclusion was drawn that the MP, while bad, was still a Church. And this attitude in turn affected ROCOR's attitude towards the Catacomb

⁶³⁰ Fr. Timothy Alferov, "O polozhenii rossijskikh prikhodov RPTsZ v svete itogov patriarkhijnogo sobora" (On the Position of the Russian Parishes of the ROCOR in the Light of the Results of the Patriarchal Council), *Uspenskij Listok* (Dormition Leaflet), No 34, 2000.

Church, which was no longer seen by many, including several of the bishops, as the only true Church in Russia, but rather as a brave, but not entirely canonical organisation or collection of groupings which needed to be “rescued” by ROCOR before it descended into a form of sectarianism similar to that of the Old Believers.

This pro-Muscovite tendency in ROCOR was led by the powerful Archbishop Mark of Berlin, who argued that ROCOR should return into communion with the patriarchate now that communism had fallen.⁶³¹

As ROCOR began to lose confidence in herself and the Catacomb Church as the *only* bearers of true Russian Orthodoxy, the accent began to shift towards the preservation, not of Orthodoxy as such, but of *Russianness*. But for a foreign Church, however Russian in spirit, to claim to be more Russian than the Russians inside Russia was bound to be perceived as arrogant and humiliating (especially in the mouth of an ethnic German such as Archbishop Mark of Berlin!). And so, after the need to display a specifically Soviet patriotism fell away in the early 90s, the MP was able to mount a successful counter-attack, claiming for itself the mantle of “Rusianness” as against the “American” church of ROCOR.

As a result, at the very moment that ROCOR was called to enter into an open war with the MP for the souls of the Russian people on Russian soil, she found herself unprepared, hesitant, unsure of her ability to fight this enemy, unsure even whether this enemy was in fact an enemy and not a potential friend, sister or even “mother”.

In consequence, ROCOR found itself “moving in two directions”, as the brother-priests Dionysius and Timothy Alferov put it. “The first was that of establishing [ROCOR] parishes in Russia. The second was working to enlighten the clergy of the very MP itself, and had as its goal the passing on to the [Russian] Homeland of the riches of the [Russian] Abroad’s spiritual and ecclesio-social experience. The adherents and supporters of both these courses of action argued amongst themselves from the start, although it cannot be said that these two approaches would have been completely and mutually exclusive, the one of the other.”

This double-mindedness eventually led to the collapse of the mission. For “if the trumpet gives an uncertain sound, who will prepare for battle?” (I Corinthians 14.8). Looking more at her enemies than at the Lord, ROCOR began, like the Apostle Peter, to sink beneath the waves. And the MP which, at the beginning of the 90s had been seriously rattled, recovered her confidence. By the middle of the 90s she had recovered her position in public opinion, while ROCOR lost ground.⁶³²

⁶³¹ See, for example, his article “Sila Tserkvi v edinenii very i liubvi” (The Strength of the Church is in Unity of Faith and Love), *Vestnik Germanskoj Eparkhii Russkoj Tserkvi za Granitsej* (Herald of the German Diocese of the Russian Church Abroad), No 4, 1997.

⁶³² See table 10.7 in Kimmo Kaariainen, *Religion in Russia after the Collapse of Communism*, Lewiston-Queenston-Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, Kaariainen, p. 153.

This doublemindedness can be seen in ROCOR Synod's statement of May 3/16, 1990, which was written by Archbishop Anthony of Geneva. In general it was strongly anti-MP, declaring that sergianism would not come to an end "until it renounces the declaration of Metropolitan Sergei, repents of the errors that followed from it, removes from its administration the hierarchs that have compromised themselves by anticanonical and amoral acts, have been involved in corruption and theft from the state through the mediation of secular authorities, and have also permitted distortions in the Divine services of the Russian Orthodox Church." But it contained the qualification that there *might* be true priests dispensing valid sacraments in the patriarchate.

The idea that there can be true priests in a heretical church is canonical nonsense (Apostolic Canon 46), and Bishop Gregory (Grabbe) immediately obtained the removal of the offending phrase. But the damage had been done; the fatal disunity we have already observed within ROCOR about the status of its main enemy, the MP, now infected and weakened her mission within Russia. In fact, the very existence and legitimacy of ROCOR's mission within Russia was opposed by many within ROCOR...

Thus Nun Cassia (Tatiana Senina) wrote: "Already at the beginning of the 1990s far from all the clergy of ROCOR supported the creation of canonical structures of our Church in Russia. This, for example, is what Fr. Alexander Mileant (now Bishop of Buenos-Aires and South America) wrote in 1991, officially addressing the believers of the MP in the name of his parish: '... Many write to us from Russia about the problems in the Russian Church (Moscow Patriarchate), about the presence in it of unworthy clergy who co-operated with the God-fighting power... Their presence in the Church is one more inherited illness which we must begin to cure with the help of God. However, we are disturbed by the move of some parishes dissatisfied with the Moscow Patriarchate into the spiritual care of the Russian Church Abroad, and also by the consecration of bishops for Russia. This can lead to a splintering of the Russian Church into a multitude of jurisdictions warring with each other and to the strengthening of sectarianism. Apparently the most appropriate thing to do now would be to convene an All-Russian Church Council as soon as possible with the participation of the bishops of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Russian Church Abroad and if possible of other Orthodox Churches in order to discuss the problems of the Orthodox Church in Russia and for the rapprochement or even merging of the Church Abroad with the mother Russian Church. I pray God to enlighten all the archpastors to find the way to correct the problems and instil peace in the Church. On my part I wish success to his Holiness Patriarch Alexis and all the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church in the strengthening of faith in the Russian people!'"⁶³³

⁶³³ Senina, "The Angel of the Philadelphian Church", *Vertograd-Inform* (English edition), No 15, January, 2000, pp. 6-24.

Nevertheless, the mission provided hungry believers in Russia with two priceless assets: a canonical hierarchy (three bishops inside Russia by February, 1991), and correct doctrine.

On April 7, 1990 Metropolitan Vitaly received from the MP the parish of St. Constantine the Great in Suzdal under Archimandrite Valentine (Rusantsov), who, according to his own account, had left his ruling bishop after refusing to spy on foreign tourists.⁶³⁴ Valentine was received by the metropolitan through a simple phone call, in spite of the fact that he had a very tarnished past. Many believed he had been a KGB agent, arguing that he could not have attained such a “cushy” post in the MP without being one.

Whether or not he had been an agent⁶³⁵, and whether or not, if he had, he had repented of that, Valentine soon proved himself to be a good administrator, actively receiving priests and parishes, and providing legal registration for them within the Suzdal diocese. However, some parishes distrusted him precisely for

⁶³⁴ As Fr. Valentine told the story: “In the Vladimir diocese I served as dean. I was a member of the diocesan administration, was for a time diocesan secretary and had responsibility for receiving guests in this diocese. And then I began to notice that I was being gradually, quietly removed. Perhaps this happened because I very much disliked prayers with people of other faiths. It’s one thing to drink tea with guests, and quite another... to pray together with them, while the guests, it has to be said, were of all kinds: both Buddhists, and Muslims, and Satanists. I did not like these ecumenical prayers, and I did not hide this dislike of mine.

“And so at first they removed me from working with the guests, and then deprived me of the post of secretary, and then excluded me from the diocesan council. Once after my return from a trip abroad, the local hierarch Valentine (Mishchuk) summoned me and said: ‘Sit down and write a report for the whole year about what foreigners were with you, what you talked about with them, what questions they asked you and what answers you gave them.’ ‘Why is this necessary?’ ‘It’s just necessary,’ replied the bishop. ‘I don’t understand where I am, Vladyko – in the study of a hierarch or in the study of a KGB operative? No, I’ve never done this and never will do it. And remember that I am a priest and not a “stooge”.’ ‘Well if you’re not going to do it, I will transfer you to another parish.’

“And so the next day came the ukaz concerning my transfer to the out-of-the-way place Pokrov. I was upset, but after all I had to obey, it was a hierarch’s ukaz. But suddenly something unexpected happened – my parishioners rebelled against this decision, people began to send letters to the representatives of the authorities expressing their dissatisfaction with my transfer: our parishioners even hired buses to go to the capital and protest.

“The patriarchate began to admonish them, suggested ‘a good batyushka’, Demetrius Netsvetaiev, who was constantly on trips abroad, in exchange. ‘We don’t need your batyushka,’ said the parishioners, ‘we know this kind, today he’ll spy on foreigners, tomorrow on the unbelievers of Suzdal, and then he’ll begin to reveal the secret of parishioners’ confessions.’ In general, our parishioners just didn’t accept Netsvetaiev. They didn’t even let him into the church. The whole town was aroused, and the parishioners came to me: ‘Fr. Valentine, what shall we do?’ At that point I told them that I had passed my childhood among the ‘Tikhonites’ [Catacomb Christians], and that there is a ‘Tikhonite Church’ existing in exile. If we write to their first-hierarch, Metropolitan Vitaly, and he accepts us – will you agree to be under his omophorion? The church people declared their agreement. However, this attempt to remove me did not pass without a trace, I was in hospital as a result of an attack of nerves. And so, at the Annunciation, I receive the news that our parish had been received into ROCA.” (“Vladyka Valentin raskazyvaet” (Vladyka Valentine tells his story), *Pravoslavnaia Rus’* (Orthodox Russia), No 17 (1446), September 1/14, 1991, pp. 9-10).

⁶³⁵ The present writer put that question directly to Valentine in a Moscow flat in 1998. The answer was: “A monk does not justify himself...”

his success in this respect. The parishes in Voronezh and Chernigov had the disconcerting experience of being told that they would be refused registration unless they passed under the *omophorion* either of the local MP hierarch or of Valentine of Suzdal.⁶³⁶ Was Valentine simply using his contacts in the MP with skill, or was there, as many suspected, a more sinister reason for his success? In spite of these doubts, Valentine was made Bishop of Suzdal in February, 1991, having gained the support of Bishop Gregory (Grabbe).⁶³⁷

Bishop Valentine was an above-ground pastor with above-ground churches and parishes registered by the state as belonging to his diocese. So the question arose: should all ROCOR bishops and priests in Russia now come out of the catacombs? Bishop Lazarus' attitude towards the creation of above-ground parishes, and to the whole idea of a ROCOR mission in Russia, was described by Vitaly Shumilo as follows: "Being placed before the alternative: to remain a secret catacomb hierarch or come out of hiding and lead Church construction in Russia, he chose the latter, although he did not agree to it immediately. Before taking this decision, Vladyka Lazarus in the same year of 1990 conducted a Conference of the catacomb clergy at which he took counsel with them on this question. And since almost everyone expressed their desire that he remain in a catacomb position, he agreed with their demand that he ordain a catacomb bishop for them. The candidate put forward in a conciliar manner was Hieromonk Benjamin (Rusalenko), who came from a family of born catacombniks and had been the

⁶³⁶ "Chernigovskomu prikhodu RIPTs-RPTsZ - 15 let" (15 Years of the Chernigov Parish of RTOC-ROCOR), http://karlovtschanin.com/inex.php?module=pages&act=print_page&pid=109&SSID.

⁶³⁷ Thus on September 17/30 he wrote to the Synod that Suzdal was "a base sent from God". And he continued: "S.K. [probably Stefan Krasovitsky] writes to me on the question of the development of our mission in Russia: 'A very great brake is the fact that Vladyka Lazarus has not the right, as he claims, to receive clergy from all round the country into our Church, but only in Tambov province. It would be necessary for him to have such a right. It is also necessary that Archimandrite Valentine should have such a right, and I hope he will return to us in the rank of a bishop. The point is that at present many priests are going both to Vladyka Lazarus and to Fr. Valentine. All the papers, as Vl. Lazarus says, he sends to America. While things are going from here to there, parishes can disperse, be closed in cooperation with the authorities, etc.

"Fr. Germanus Ivanov-Trinadtsaty, after staying in Russia and getting to know the situation on the spot, writes that keeping Fr. Valentine in the rank of archimandrite without consecrating him while there were three of our bishops in Russia has elicited perplexity: 'I see,' he writes, 'all the "faults" (in inverted commas) of Fr. Valentine, everything that makes him not the typical abroad cleric, but I can WITNESS that he himself sees this and is trying to change. He is precisely that person who has fallen on our heads from the sky, who can get things moving. He is capable of changing the situation in Russia radically in our favour. For this he needs a hierarchical mitre.

"I personally have talked for quite a long time with Fr. Valentine and did not notice in him any of those faults about which Vl. Mark writes. Evidently, life and work in our Church in the course of the past months has not passed in vain for him.

"Fr. Germanus also talked with great veneration about Vladyka Lazarus... but thinks that he is not capable of being a leader. He does not have that firm juridical position which, but a miracle of God, Fr. Valentine has and which we could use. If we want to carry out missionary work in Russia, there is simply no other way out for us." (*Tserkovnie Novosti* (Church News), No 4 (105), May, 2002, p. 7).

On October 13/26, 1990, Bishop Gregory wrote to Archbishop Anthony of San Francisco: "Vladyka Lazarus is a fine person, but too accustomed to the catacombs, while he does not have the right to live in Moscow. He is not capable of heading open work. I hope that you, Vladyko, as a member of the Synod will help poor Valentine" (Zalewski, op. cit., p. 4).

spiritual son of the catacomb elder well-known in Belorussia, Hieromonk Theodore (Rafanovich (+1975). The catacombniiks invited an official representative of ROCOR to the meeting and through him petitioned the Synod to ordain one more catacomb bishop for the TOC. The request was granted, and on November 28, 1990 Bishop Benjamin (Rusalenko) was ordained to look after the catacombniiks by the ROCOR Synod. He was appointed Bishop of Gomel, a vicar of Archbishop Lazarus."

Bishop Benjamin remains the oldest surviving true bishop in Russia today, being subordinate to the Synod of the Russian True Orthodox Church under Archbishop Tikhon of Omsk, the successor of Archbishop Lazarus.

As the Soviet Union came to an end in December, 1991, it was an open question whether the Russian people, newly awakened to religion and now, through *glasnost'*, in principle capable of learning the terrible truth about the Moscow Patriarchate, would leave it and seek to join the only canonical Russian Orthodox hierarchy still in existence.

They would fulfil their vocation if, and only if, they fully accepted the truth of the words of the Catacomb Bishop Michael (Yershov): "The current patriarchs and the priests made the church a place of theatre, completely abandoned the path of the Orthodox faith, do not fulfil the seven Mysteries of the Lord of the Holy Catholic Apostolic Church and have violated His commandments. But they cannot and will not be able to bury the ray that shines unto salvation and which illuminates the path through darkness in order to save the remnant of the Christian people.

"The Lord will find for Himself sons, faithful witnesses, both true and firm; they will not be ashamed to serve their faithful Father and Creator and will denounce those who are great upon the earth who have perverted and twisted the commandments of our Lord Jesus Christ. Such children of God will fulfil everything that the Lord has entrusted to them."

55. THE ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION OF CHINA

Mao died in 1976. "There was one problem with Mao as a living god," writes Frank Dikötter: "*he died*. When that happened, in 1976, the country went into shock. Some people were thrilled – finally, the tyrant was gone – but many were crushed. Tears flowed, and the country ground to a halt. With traditional religion decimated and Mao dead, people were unsure how to channel their hopes and fears.

"Even before he died, large parts of the countryside had already abandoned the planned economy. It was to be one of the most enduring legacies of a decade of chaos and entrenched fear. No communist party would have tolerated organised confrontation, but cadres in the countryside were defenceless against a myriad of daily acts of quiet defiance and endless subterfuge, as people tried to sap the economic dominance of the state and replace it with their own initiative and ingenuity.

"Deng Xiaoping, assuming the reins of power a few years after the death of Mao, briefly tried to resurrect the planned economy. In April 1979 he even demanded that the villagers who had left the collectives rejoin the people's communes. But soon he realised that he had little choice but to go with the flow. By 1980, tens of thousands of local decisions had placed 40 percent of Anhui production teams, 50 percent of Guizhou teams and 60 percent of Gansu teams under household contracts. The people's communes, backbone of the collectivised economy, were dissolved in 1982.

"Not only did the vast majority of people in the countryside push for greater economic opportunities, but they also escaped from the ideological shackles imposed by decades of Maoism. Endless campaigns of thought reform during the Mao era produced widespread scepticism even among party members themselves. The very ideology of the party was gone and its legitimacy lay in tatters. But political freedoms were not to follow. The leaders now lived in fear of their own people, terrified of allowing them to speak again, determined to suppress their political aspirations..."⁶³⁸

In December 1978, at the Third Plenum of the 11th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, the decision was taken, at Deng's instigation, to orientate China's economy towards the market. "Getting rich is glorious!" Deng is reported to have said...

"Mao's Great Leap Forward by means of state-led industrialization had been a Great Leap Backward that had as many as thirty million lives. Deng's strategy for a real leap forward was to break up communal control of agriculture and encourage the development of Township and Village Enterprises. Within a few years such rural businesses accounted for nearly a third of total industrial

⁶³⁸ Dikötter, "The Cultural Revolution: A People's History", *History Today*, September, 2016, p. 19. (Italics mine – VM.)

production. The other vital ingredient was a Chinese diaspora that had continued to operate within the capitalist system even as the mainland languished under Mao's tyranny. From Hong Kong to Kuala Lumpur, from Singapore to San Francisco, an experienced and wealthy capitalist elite was ready to be wooed..."⁶³⁹

So was America. In 1979 Deng was invited to Washington, ensuring that "as China industrialized, its exports would have access to the vast American market. It also ensured that, when Deng created free-trading Special Economic Zones along the Chinese coast, American firms would be first in line to invest directly there, bringing with them vital technological know-how. For their part, American companies saw Chinese liberalization as a perfect opportunity to 'out-source' production of goods for American consumers."

Deng's visit to America was successful. In 1980, China was granted "most favoured status", an enormous concession. Thus was laid the foundation of the vast growth in Chinese exports to the US and the West, and the extraordinary "Chimerican" trade relationship, in which the two countries became economically dependent on each other.⁶⁴⁰

According to Antony Sutton, some in the American secret establishment (specifically, the Skull and Bones Society, of which President George W. Bush was an enthusiastic member) hoped to build up China in this way against the Soviet Union. "By about the year 2000 Communist China will be a 'superpower' built by American technology and skill. It is presumably the intention of the Order to place this power in a conflict mode with the Soviet Union..."⁶⁴¹

However, whatever hopes may have been entertained in this regard, they were crushed in 2000, when Putin came to power in Russia and immediately signed a comprehensive alliance with the Chinese known as "the Beijing Declaration" ...

From 1981 to 1986 China's GNP grew at the astonishing annual rate of about 10%.⁶⁴² It did not need a prophet to foresee that at this rate, provided no wars or revolutions took place, China was destined to become in the not-so-distant future, not merely a superpower, but the world's hegemon in the place of the existing superpowers...

There was also some liberalization in the religious and cultural spheres. "In 1982, as part of a more general accounting of the destruction wrought by the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese Communist Party issued a 20-page paper entitled 'The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question During Our Country's Socialist Period'. Better known as Document 19, it featured an astoundingly candid analysis of China's religious crisis - and provided the legal basis for the religious revival now under way. The document stated that for 19 of

⁶³⁹ Ferguson, *The War of the World*, pp. 636-637.

⁶⁴⁰ Ferguson, *The War of the World*, p. 657.

⁶⁴¹ Sutton, *America's Secret Establishment*, Billings, Montana: Liberty House Press, 1986, p. 181

⁶⁴² Kennedy, *op. cit.*, p. 584.

Mao's 27 years in power, 'leftist errors' took hold – a surprising admission of how badly the party had fumbled religious policy during its first three decades in power. It conceded that Maoist radicals had 'forbade [*sic*] normal religious activities', 'fabricated a host of wrongs and injustices against religion that forced religious movements underground'. The document went on to described religion in sympathetic language, arguing forcefully that it would disappear – but only very gradually. In the meantime, the party's policy would be 'respect for and protection of the freedom of religious belief'. Places of worship could reopen, and a new generation of clergy could receive training."⁶⁴³

Deng also faced the major problem of an impending population explosion. In Moscow in 1957 Mao had declared that he was not afraid of nuclear war because China had such a large population that the loss of several hundred millions in a war would be quite tolerable. "I'm not afraid of nuclear war," he said. "There are 2.7 billion people in the world; it doesn't matter if some are killed. China has a population of 600 million; even if half of them are killed, there are still 300 million people left. I'm not afraid of anyone."

However, "by 1976," as Isobel Hilton writes, Mao was dead and China's population had leapt from just over 500 million in 1949 to 970 million. In 1979, concerned that population expansion might outpace economic development, the Party swung rapidly in the other direction, introducing a coercive 'one child' policy,"⁶⁴⁴ - a policy that was terminated only in 2015. The leaders called it a population war: in fact, it was a war against the Chinese people, costing hundreds of millions of lives by abandonment and abortion... It was a long time since St. John Maximovich, Russian Bishop of Shanghai, would collect abandoned babies from the slums and put them in his own orphanage... Such a drastic solution to the problem was bound to create another, no less serious one in later years: a drastic imbalance in the proportion of males to females.

Another problem concerned the political effects of Friedmanism. As Klein writes, the government "was obsessed with avoiding a repeat of what had just happened in Poland, where workers had been allowed to form an independent movement that challenged the party's monopoly hold on power. It was not that China's leaders were committed to protecting the state-owned factories and farm communes that formed the foundation of the Communist state. In fact, Deng was enthusiastically committed to a corporate-based economy – so committed that, in 1980, his government invited Milton Friedman to come to China and tutor hundreds of top-level civil servants, professors and party economists in the fundamentals of free-market theory. 'All were invited guests, who had to show a ticket of invitation to attend,' Friedman recalled of his audiences in Beijing and Shanghai. His central message was 'how much better ordinary people lived in capitalist than in communist countries'. The example he held up was Hong Kong, a zeon of pure capitalism that Friedman had long admired for its 'dynamic, innovative character that has been produced by personal liberty, free trade, low

⁶⁴³ Ian Johnson, "China's Great Awakening", *Foreign Affairs*, March / April, 2017, p. 89.

⁶⁴⁴ Hilton, "Will China's Demography be its Downfall?", *Unherd*, June 15, 2018.

taxes, and minimal government intervention.' He claimed that Hong Kong, despite having no democracy, was freer than the United States, since its government participated less in the economy.

"Friedman's definition of freedom, in which political freedoms were incidental, even unnecessary, compared with the freedom of unrestricted commerce, conformed nicely with the vision taking shape in the Chinese Politburo. The party wanted to open the economy to private ownership and consumerism while maintaining its own grip on power – a plan that ensured that once the assets of the state were auctioned off, party officials and their relatives would snap up the best deals and be first in line for the biggest profits. According to this version of 'transition', the same people who controlled the state under Communism would control it under capitalism, while enjoying a substantial upgrade in lifestyle. The model the Chinese government intended to emulate was not the United States but something much closer to Chile under Pinochet: free markets combined with authoritarian political control, enforced by iron-fisted repression.

"From the start Deng clearly understood that repression would be crucial. Under Mao, the Chinese state had exerted brutal control over the people, dispensing with opponents and sending dissidents for re-education. But Mao's repression took place in the name of the workers and against the bourgeoisie; now the party was going to launch its own counterrevolution and ask workers to give up many of their benefits and security so that a minority could collect huge profits. It was not going to be an easy task. So, in 1983, as Deng opened up the country to foreign investment and reduced protections for workers, he also ordered the creation of the 400,000-strong People's Armed Police, a new, roving riot squad charged with quashing all signs of 'economic crimes' (i.e., strikes and protests). According to the China historian Maurice Meisner, 'The People's Armed Police kept American helicopters and electric cattle prods in its arsenal.' And 'several units were sent to Poland for anti-riot training' – where they studied the tactics that had been used against Solidarity during Poland's period of martial law.

"Many of Deng's reforms were successful and popular – farmers had more control over their lives⁶⁴⁵, and commerce returned to the cities. But in the late eighties, Deng began introducing measures that were distinctly unpopular, particularly among workers in the cities – price controls were lifted, sending prices soaring; job security was eliminated, creating waves of unemployment; and deep inequalities were opening up between the winners and losers in the

⁶⁴⁵ According to J.M. Roberts, China's rulers "were helped by the persistence of the old Chinese social disciplines, by the relief felt by millions that the cultural revolution had been left behind, and by the policy (contrary to that of Marxism as still expounded in Moscow until 1980) that economic rewards should flow through the system to the peasant. This built up rural purchasing power, and made for contentment in the countryside. There was a major swing of power away from the rural communes, which in many places practically ceased to be relevant, and by 1985 the family farm was back as the dominant form of rural production over much of China." (*History of the World*, Oxford: Helicon, 1992, p. 911). (V.M.)

new China. By 1988, the party was confronting a powerful backlash and was forced to reverse some of its price deregulation. Outrage was also mounting in the face of the party's defiant corruption and nepotism. Many Chinese citizens wanted more freedom in the market, but 'reform' increasingly looked like code for party officials turning into business tycoons, as many illegally took possession of the assets they had previously managed as bureaucrats.

"With the free-market experiment in peril, Milton Friedman was once again invited to pay a visit to China – much as the Chicago Boys and the piranhas had enlisted his help in 1973, when their program had sparked an internal revolt in Chile. A high-profile visit from the world-famous guru of capitalism was just the boost China's 'reformers' needed.

"When Friedman and his wife, Rose, arrived in Shanghai in September 1988, they were dazzled by how quickly mainland China was beginning to look and feel like Hong Kong. Despite the rage simmering at the grass roots, everything they saw served to confirm 'our faith in the power of free markets'. Friedman described this moment as 'the most hopeful period of the Chinese experiment'.

"In the presence of official state media, Friedman met for two hours with Zhao Ziyang, general secretary of the Communist Party, as well as with Jiang Zemin, then party secretary of the Shanghai Committee and the future Chinese president. Friedman's message to Jiang echoed the advice he had given to Pinochet when the Chilean project was on the skids: don't bow to the pressure and don't blink. 'I emphasized the importance of privatization and free markets, and of liberalizing at one fell stroke,' Friedman recalled. In a memo to the general secretary of the Communist Party, Friedman stressed that more, not less, shock therapy was needed. 'China's initial steps of reform have been dramatically successful. China can make further dramatic progress by placing still further reliance on *free private markets*.' ...

"Friedman's trip did not have the desired results. The pictures in the official papers of the professor offering his blessing to party bureaucrats did not succeed in bringing the public onside. In subsequent months, protests grew more determined and radical. The most visible symbols of the opposition were the demonstrations by student strikers in Tiananmen Square. These historic protests were almost universally portrayed in the international media as a clash between modern, idealistic students who wanted Western-style democratic freedoms and old-guard authoritarians who wanted to protect the Communist state. Recently, another analysis of the meaning of Tiananmen has emerged, one that challenges the mainstream version while putting Friedmanism at the heart of the story. This alternative narrative is being advanced by, among others, Wang Hui, one of the organizers of the 1989 protests, and now a leading Chinese intellectual of what is known as China's 'New Left'. In his 2003 book, *China's New Order*, Wang explains that the protesters spanned a huge range of Chinese society – not just elite university students but also factory workers, small entrepreneurs and teachers. What ignited the protests, he recalls, was popular discontent in the face of Deng's 'revolutionary' economic changes which were lowering wages, raising prices and

causing 'a crisis of layoffs and unemployment'. According to Wang, 'These changes were the catalyst for the 1989 social mobilization'.

"The demonstrations were not against economic reform per se; they were against the specific Friedmanite nature of the reforms – their speed, ruthlessness and the fact that the process was highly antidemocratic. Wang says that the protesters' call for elections and free speech were intimately connected to this economic dissent. What drove the demand for democracy was the fact that the party was pushing through changes that were revolutionary in scope, entirely without popular consent. There was, he writes, 'a general request for democratic means to supervise the fairness of the reform process and the reorganization of social benefits.'"⁶⁴⁶

J.M. Roberts takes up the story again: "Posters and rallies began to champion calls for greater 'democracy'. The regime's leadership was alarmed, refusing to recognize the [newly formed and unofficial Student] Union which, it was feared, might be the harbinger of a new Red Guards movement. There were demonstrations in many cities and as the seventieth anniversary of the May 4th Movement approached the student activists invoked its memory so as to give a broad patriotic colour to their campaign. They were not able to arouse much support in the countryside, or in the southern cities, but, encouraged by the obviously sympathetic attitude of the general secretary of the CCP, Zhao Ziyang, began a mass hunger strike. It won widespread popular sympathy and support in Peking. It started only shortly before Mr. Gorbachev arrived in the capital; his state visit, instead of providing further reassuring evidence of China's international standing, only served to remind people of what was going on in the USSR as a result of policies of liberalization. This cut both ways, encouraging the would-be reformers and frightening the conservatives. By this time the most senior members of the government, including Deng Xiaoping, seem to have been thoroughly alarmed. Widespread disorder might be in the offing; they believed China faced a major crisis. Some feared a new cultural revolution if things got out of control (and Deng Xiaoping's own son, they could have remarked, was still a cripple as a result of the injuries inflicted on him by Red Guards). On 20 May martial law was declared.

"There were signs for a moment that the government might not be able to impose its will, but the army's reliability was soon assured. The repression which followed was ruthless. The student leaders had move the focus of their efforts to an encampment in Peking in Tiananmen Square, where, thirty years before, Mao had proclaimed the foundation of the People's Republic. From one of the gates of the old Forbidden City a huge portrait of him looked down on the symbol of the protesters: a plastic figure of a 'Goddess of Democracy', deliberately evocative of New York's Statue of Liberty. On 2 June the first military units entered the suburbs of Peking on their way to the square. There was resistance with extemporized weapons and barricades. They forced their way through. On 4 June the students and a few sympathizers were overcome by rifle-fire, teargas, and a

⁶⁴⁶ Klein, op. cit., pp. 184-188.

brutal crushing of the encampment under the treads of tanks which swept into the square. Killing went on for some days, mass arrests followed (perhaps as many as ten thousand in all). Much of what happened took place before the eyes of the world, thanks to the presence of film-crews in Peking which had for days familiarized television audiences with the demonstrators' encampment. Foreign disapproval was almost universal..."⁶⁴⁷

"For Deng and the rest of the Politburo, the free-market possibilities were now limitless. Just as Pinochet's terror had cleared the streets for revolutionary change, so Tiananmen paved the way for a radical transformation free from fear of rebellion. If life grew harder for peasants and workers, they would either have to accept it quietly or face the wrath of the army and the secret police. And so, with the public in a state of raw terror, Deng rammed through his most sweeping reforms yet.

"Before Tiananmen, he had been forced to ease off some of the more painful measures: three months after the massacre, he brought them back; and he implemented several of Friedman's other recommendations, including price deregulation. For Wang Hui, there is an obvious reason why 'market reforms that had failed to be implemented in the late 1980s just happened to have been completed in the post-1989 environment'; the reason, he writes, 'is that the violence of 1989 served to check the social upheaval brought about by this process, and the new pricing system finally took shape.' The shock of the massacre, in other words, made shock therapy possible.

"In the three years immediately following the bloodbath, China was cracked open to foreign investment, with special export zones constructed throughout the country. As he announced these new initiatives, Deng reminded the country that 'if necessary, every possible means will be adopted to eliminate any turmoil in the future as soon as it has appeared. Martial law, or even more severe methods, may be introduced.'

"It was the wave of reforms that turned China into the sweatshop of the world, the preferred location for contract factories for virtually every multinational on the planet. No country offered more lucrative conditions than China: low taxes and tariffs, corruptible officials and, most of all, a plentiful low-wage workforce that, for many years, would be unwilling to risk demanding decent salaries or the most basic workplace protections for fear of the most violent reprisals.

"For foreign investors and the party, it has been a win-win arrangement. According to a 2006 study, 80 percent of China's billionaires (calculated in Chinese yuan) are the children of Communist Party officials. Roughly twenty-nine hundred of these party scions – known as 'the princelings' – control \$260 billion. It is a mirror of the corporatist state first pioneered in Chile under Pinochet: a revolving door between corporate and political elites who combine

⁶⁴⁷ Roberts, *History of the World*, Oxford: Helicon, 1992, pp. 911-912. About 2000 were killed in Peking, unknown numbers in other cities.

their power to eliminate workers as an organised political force. Today, the collaborative arrangement can be seen in the way that foreign multinational media and technology companies help the Chinese state to spy on its citizens, and to make sure that when students do Web searches or phrases like 'Tiananmen Square Massacre', or even 'democracy', no documents turn up. 'The creation of today's market society was not the result of a sequence of spontaneous events,' writes Wang Hui, 'but rather of state interference and violence'."⁶⁴⁸

⁶⁴⁸ Klein, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-190.

56. YUGOSLAVIA DISINTEGRATES

Yugoslavia collapsed at approximately the same time as the Soviet Union. But whereas the Soviet collapse took place relatively peacefully and quickly (between the years 1985 and 1991), the Yugoslav collapse was bloody and prolonged, beginning in 1980, when the communist dictator Tito died, and continued until the end of the war in Kosovo in 1999. It showed that there was another path out of Communist despotism besides European-style democracy: rabid nationalism.

Tito himself was an evil dictator who had murdered hundreds of priests and thousands of laymen⁶⁴⁹, and effectively destroyed the Serbian Orthodox Church by making it, like the Moscow Patriarchate in Russia, a tool of the Communists. However, by cleverly manoeuvring between East and West, he provided a fairly decent standard of living for those who did not oppose the regime (although some republics, like Kosovo, remained poor). He allowed Yugoslavs to travel and even work abroad; and he allowed some limited experiments in worker self-management and cultural expression – while always, through the secret police, making sure such developments did not go too far and undermine his and his party's power. This control is what distinguished his regime from that of Dubček's Czechoslovakia, making him "the last Habsburg", as he was called, perhaps the only genuinely popular communist leader in Eastern Europe.

Tony Judt writes: "The Yugoslavia [Tito] had reassembled in 1945 had a real existence. Its constituent republics were separate units in a federal state whose presidency comprised representatives from all six republics, as well as two autonomous regions (the Vojvodina and Kosovo) within Serbia. The different regions had very different pasts. Slovenia and Croatia in the north were primarily Catholic and had once been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as too, albeit for a shorter time, had Bosnia. The southern part of the country (Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia) was for centuries under Ottoman Turkish rule, which accounts for the large number of Muslims in addition to the predominantly Orthodox Serbs.

"But these historical differences – though genuine enough and exacerbated by the experience of World War Two – had been attenuated in subsequent decades. Economic change brought hitherto isolated rural populations into sometimes uneasy contact in towns like Vukovar or Mostar; but the same changes also accelerated integration across old social and ethnic boundaries.

"Thus although the Communist myth of fraternal unity required turning a blind eye and a deaf ear to wartime memories and divisions – the history textbooks of Tito's Yugoslavia were prudently unforthcoming about the bloody civil wars that had marked the country's common past – the benefits of such official silences were real. The rising post-war generation was encouraged to

⁶⁴⁹ Daniel Goldhagen writes that "Tito's communist regime during its consolidation of power after 1944 killed on the order of 100,000 to 200,000 people" (*Worse than War. Genocide, Eliminationism and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity*, London: Abacus, 2012, p. 51).

think of itself as 'Yugoslav', rather than 'Croat' or 'Macedonian'; and many – especially the young, the better educated and the burgeoning number of city-dwellers – had adopted the habit. Younger intellectuals in Ljubljana or Zagreb were no longer much interested in the heroic or troubled past of their ethnic forebears. By 1981 in cosmopolitan Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, 20 percent of the population described themselves as 'Yugoslav'.

“Bosnia had always been the most ethnically variegated region of Yugoslavia and was thus perhaps not typical. But the whole country was an interwoven tapestry of overlapping minorities. The 580,000 Serbs living in Croatia in 1991 were some 12 percent of the population of that republic. Bosnia in the same year was 44 percent Muslim, 31 percent Serb and 17 percent Croat. Even tiny Montenegro was a mix of Montenegrins, Serbs, Muslims, Albanians and Croats – not to speak of those who opted to describe themselves to census-takers as 'Yugoslavs'. Residents of ethnically mixed regions often had little sense of their friends' or neighbours' nationality or religion. 'Inter-marriage' was increasingly common...”⁶⁵⁰

In other words, Tito's Yugoslavia had followed the same general pattern of evolution as the rest of Europe: peaceful integration, but on the basis of Mammon rather than God, economic self-interest rather than real spiritual unity... For, as we have seen, Orthodoxy, and religion in general, had declined sharply in the country, not so much as the result of physical persecution - from the 1960s that was no longer necessary, for the Church had been tamed by the UDB, Yugoslavia's equivalent of the KGB - as through State-imposed atheist education and ecumenism. Thus whereas in 1931 barely 0.1% of the population of Yugoslavia declared itself to be without religious affiliation, and only about 12.5% in 1953, the figure was 31.6% in 1987. The phenomenon of religious non-affiliation was particularly striking precisely in the Serb territories. Thus 54% were non-affiliated in Montenegro⁶⁵¹, and a 1985 survey put the proportion of believers in Bosnia at 17 per cent...⁶⁵²

As the Orthodox writer Jim Forest pointed out in 1995, “Serbia is one of Europe's most secularised societies. Tito's anti-religious policies were more effective than those of Stalin, Khrushchev or Brezhnev. Few Serbs are even baptized (the usual estimate is five per cent) and far fewer are active in church life.”⁶⁵³ Baptisms in the Serbian Church are now usually only pourings, not full immersions. As for marriages, in the diocese of Rashka and Prizren, “for 50 long years almost no one was married and all those families lived in a state of adultery”, until the appointment of Bishop Artemije, when “very slowly and with

⁶⁵⁰ Judt, *Postwar*, London: Pimlico, 2007, pp. 666-668.

⁶⁵¹ Sergej Flere, "Denominational Affiliation in Yugoslavia, 1937-1987", *East European Quarterly*, XXV, No 2, June, 1991, pp. 145-165.

⁶⁵² Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia. A Short History*, London: Papermac, 1996, p. 222.

⁶⁵³ Forest, "An Orthodox Response to the War in Former Yugoslavia", *Orthodox Outlook*, vol. VIII, No 6, 1995, p. 32.

difficulty, people got used to this requirement of the Church and the amount of those who marry increases with each year.”⁶⁵⁴

But once Tito’s iron hand had been removed this secularist idyll was shattered by passions he had helped suppress but not extirpate, and by memories of wartime wrongs that refused to disappear. These passions were ethnic, not religious, even if the belligerents clothed their causes in religious flags and sought the aid of co-religionists in other countries. It was not for or against Orthodoxy; it was for and against the glory and territorial strength of individual Yugoslav nations – but also of politicians trying to hang on to power...” As one Bosnian Croat explains, ‘We lived in peace and harmony because every hundred meters we had a policeman to make sure we loved each other very much.’ He might have added that once communism’s policemen were gone, political leaders pushed, the simmering hatred and murderous desires became activated, and all hell broke loose...”⁶⁵⁵

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It all started when it was decided to reopen the historical archives... Dejan Djokić writes: “As Yugoslavia entered the post-Tito era, there were increasing calls for the pursuit of the... ideal of finding what really happened in Yugoslavia in the Second World War. The official history [which minimized the ethnic elements and called it a ‘national liberation war and a socialist revolution’] was bound to be challenged in the more relaxed political atmosphere which eventually emerged following the death of Tito in 1980, when the so-called ‘hidden’, unofficial, accounts of the war years began to appear. During what one Serbian weekly described as ‘the burst of history’, the official interpretation of Yugoslavia’s recent past was questioned by every engaged intellectual. To many observers in the late 1980s, it must have seemed that the Second World War had broken out for the second time in Yugoslavia – verbally, for the time being...”

“The most controversial and most debated issue was that of Croatian genocide against Serbs during the Second World War. Both the Ustaša-directed project to rid the Independent State of Croatia of its almost two million Serbs (and also Jews and Roma) and the nature and scope of the genocide have been the subject of scholarly works. The issue remains a bone of contention between Serbs and Croats... Moreover, some Serbs argue that anti-Serbianism has always been present among Croats and that the Ustaša genocide was merely the last phase of a long process...”

“The nationalist discourse in Yugoslavia, but especially in Serbia and Croatia in the late 1980s and early 1990s, sought a reconciliation between victors and losers of the Second World War who belonged to the same nation; between Partisans and Cetniks in the case of Serbs, and Partisans and Ustašas in the case

⁶⁵⁴ *Church News* (the English translation of *Tserkovnie Novosti*), vol. 9, No 8 (64), August, 1997, p. 7.

⁶⁵⁵ Goldhagen, op. cit., p. 212.

of Croats. In Yugoslavia at the time 'reconciliation' meant a homogenisation of the nation by reconciling ideological differences within the nation..."⁶⁵⁶

Reconciliation between communists and anti-communists also took place in the ecclesiastical sphere. In 1991, communion was restored between the Serbian Patriarchate and most of the Free Serbs.⁶⁵⁷ Paradoxically, however, this process of "reconciliation" in the long run worked in the opposite direction. For as the differences between Communists and non-Communists became less important, with the result that the vital task of freeing the country from Communism was put aside, the ethnic quarrels dating from the Ustaša genocide became more important. Moreover, a deliberate blurring of labels took place: "četniks", for example, no longer denoted Orthodox monarchists as in the Second World War, but rather Serbian nationalists who as often as not supported Titoism and were neither Orthodox nor monarchist.

Another issue was the economy. "From the end of the Seventies," writes Judt, "the Yugoslav economy began to unravel. Like other Communist states, Yugoslavia was heavily indebted to the West; but whereas the response in Warsaw or Budapest was to keep borrowing foreign cash, in Belgrade they resorted to printing more and more of their own. Through the course of the 1980s the country moved steadily into hyper-inflation. By 1989 the annual inflation rate was 1,240 percent and rising.

"The economic mistakes were being made in the capital, Belgrade, but their consequences were felt and resented above all in Zagreb and Ljubljana. Many Croats and Slovenes, Communists and non-Communists alike, believed that they would be better off making their own economic decisions free of the corruption and nepotism of the ruling circles in the Federal capital. These sentiments were exacerbated by a growing fear that a small group of *apparatchiks* around Slobodan Milošević, the hitherto obscure President of the League of Communists in his native Serbia, was making a bid for power in the political vacuum that followed Tito's death – by arousing and manipulating Serb national emotions.

"Milošević's behaviour was not inherently unusual for Communist leaders in these years. In the GDR the Communists... sought to curry favour by invoking the glories of eighteenth-century Prussia; and 'national Communism' had been on display for some years in neighboring Bulgaria and Romania. When Milošević ostentatiously welcomed a patriotic Memorandum from the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1986, or visited Kosovo the following year to show his sympathy for Serb complaints about Albanian 'nationalism', his calculations were not very different from those of other East European Communist leaders of the time. In the era of Gorbachev, with the ideological legitimacy of Communism and

⁶⁵⁶ Djokić, "Coming to Terms with the Past: Former Yugoslavia", *History Today*, vol. 54 (6), June, 2004, pp. 18-19.

⁶⁵⁷ See *Pravoslavlje*, June 1, 1991; *Keston News Service*, No 379, 11 July, 1991, p. 4; *Anglican and Eastern Churches Association*, December, 1991, pp. 29-31.

its ruling party waning fast, patriotism offered an alternative way of securing a hold on power.

“But whereas in the rest of eastern Europe this resort to nationalism and the attendant invocation of national memories only risked arousing anxiety among *foreigners*, in Yugoslavia the price would be paid at home...”⁶⁵⁸

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From 1986, the writing was on the wall for the old-style communists throughout Eastern Europe. They had a choice if they wanted to stay in power: either become European-style social democrats, or take the nationalist road. In practice they adopted a mixture of both courses. In Yugoslavia the nationalist path was adopted – with a superficial covering of democracy.

At the same time, democratization stimulated nationalism. As Samuel P. Huntington writes, “The first fairly contested elections in almost every former Soviet and former Yugoslav republic were won by political leaders appealing to nationalist sentiments and promising vigorous action to defend their nationality against other ethnic groups. Electoral competition encourages nationalist appeals and thus promotes the intensification of fault line conflicts into fault line wars. When, in Bogdan Denitch’s phrase, ‘ethnos becomes demos,’ the initial result is *polemos* or war.”⁶⁵⁹

“Balkan communist regimes,” writes Bernard Simms, “co-opted nationalism as a new legitimating ideology. In Romania, Nicolae Ceaușescu sought confrontation with the substantial Hungarian minority, whose Transylvanian and Banat villages were singled out for particular attention in the campaign of rural ‘systematization’. In Bulgaria, the regime turned on the local Turkish population in late 1984 and forced them to change their names, restricted their use of the Turkish language, and closed down mosques, all in the name of stamping out an alleged ‘fifth column’ of ‘terrorists’ and ‘separatists’. In Yugoslavia, the Serb leader, Slobodan Milošević, rose to power through the articulation of a Serb nationalist agenda.”⁶⁶⁰

As Niall Ferguson writes, “it is clear that Milošević’s principal motive in playing the Serbian nationalist card was to avoid the fate of Communist leaders in other East European countries. While they had been swept away by the post-1989 wave of nationalism, Milošević was able to ride it; indeed, to whip it up. And for ten years his strategy worked...”⁶⁶¹

“In 1988,” continues Tony Judt, “Milošević, the better to strengthen his position within the Serbian republic, began openly encouraging nationalist

⁶⁵⁸ Judt, op. cit. p. 671.

⁶⁵⁹ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, p. 262.

⁶⁶⁰ Simms, *Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy*, London: Allen Lane, 2013, pp. 481-482.

⁶⁶¹ Ferguson, *The War of the World*, London: Penguin, 2007, pp. 630-631.

meetings at which the insignia of the wartime Chetniks were on public display for the first time in four decades – a reminder of a past that Tito had suppressed and a move calculated to arouse real disquiet among Croats in particular.

“Nationalism was Milošević’s way of securing a hold over Serbia – confirmed in May 1989 with his election to the Presidency of the Serbian republic. But to preserve and strengthen Serbia’s influence over Yugoslavia as a whole he needed to transform the federal system itself. The carefully calculated balance of influence between the various constituent republics had been fostered first by Tito’s charismatic leadership and then by a revolving presidency. In March 1989 Milošević set out to topple this arrangement.

“By forcing through an amendment to Serbia’s own constitution he ‘absorbed’ the hitherto autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina into Serbia proper – while allowing them to retain their two seats in the federal presidency. Henceforth Serbia could count on four of the eight federal votes in any dispute (Serbia, Kosovo, Vojvodina and the compliant pro-Serbian republic of Montenegro). Since Milošević’s goal was to forge a more unitary (Serb-led) state, something that the other four republics would naturally resist, the federal system of government was effectively stalemated. From the perspective of Slovenia and Croatia especially, the course of events pointed to only one possible solution: since they could no longer expect to preserve or advance their interests through a dysfunctional federal system, their only hope was to take their distance from Belgrade, if necessary by declaring complete independence.”⁶⁶²

The change was immediately discernible. As Garry Kasparov writes, “When Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger visited his old friend Milošević in Belgrade in February 1990, he was shocked to find there was no common ground to be found. There was so much good news coming from Europe at the time that the Balkan powder keg was pushed to the background even after Eagleburger returned from his trip warning that ‘it’s much worse than anybody thought and it’s going to be much bloodier than we thought.’...”⁶⁶³

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Let us now look more closely at the main focus of Serbian nationalism – the province of Kosovo, which had been part of Serbia in the late Middle Ages, but whose majority population since the Turkish conquest had been Albanian.

The aim of the nationalists was to destroy the Albanian majority, by mass expulsion (what came to be called “ethnic cleansing”) and/or slaughter. With the rise of Milošević, this aim became a practical possibility... For before Milošević, Serbian nationalism had been kept in check in Kosovo. As Misha Glenny writes, “The atmosphere in Kosovo in the early eighties was heavy with tension, secret policemen were ubiquitous. Nonetheless, the local state apparatus, including the

⁶⁶² Judt, op. cit., pp. 671-672.

⁶⁶³ Kasparov, *Winter is Coming*, London: Atlantic, 2014, p. 37.

police force, was staffed mainly by Albanians, and they had no interest in provoking the Kosovars. Life was not easy, but it was free from nationalist violence. A minority of communists in Serbia, aided at times by the Belgrade media, claimed that the Serb and Montenegrin minority in Kosovo (roughly 10 per cent of the population) were subjected to systematic terrorism at the hands of the Albanian 'irredentists'. They based these claims on the number of Serbs moving from the province to Serbia proper. There was an indeed an exodus of Serbs in the early eighties, but they were economic migrants, not refugees. The stories of rape, murder and intimidation were without foundation."⁶⁶⁴

However, an economic crisis in the mid-1980s coincided with important political changes...

In the autumn of 1985, writes Noel Malcolm, a local Kosovan activist, Kosta Bulatović, who was originally from Montenegro, organized a petition "which became known as 'petition 2,016', after the number of signatures it attracted: the text contained not only demands for protection, but also a gross historical claim about the presence of 300,000 Albanians who had crossed into Kosovo from Albania since 1941 (the implication being that they should all be sent back). In February 1986 a group of 160 Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo presented their complaints to the federal assembly in Belgrade...

"In April 1987 news came from Kosovo that the group of Serb and Montenegrin activists round Bulatović was intending to bring another large protest in Belgrade. They asked the Serbian Party president, Stambolić, to come and speak to them first in the town of Kosovo Polje; reluctant to enter such a hostile bear-pit (he had already made several speeches criticizing Serbian nationalism), he sent his deputy, Slobodan Milošević, instead. As Stambolić later recalled, Milošević had never shown any interest in Kosovo, and had even said to him on one occasion: 'Forget about the provinces, let's get back to Yugoslavia'. But the events in Kosovo Polje on 24 April 1987 were to change all that. While Milošević listened to angry speeches by local spokesmen in the 'House of Culture', fighting broke out between the large crowd of Serbs outside and the police, who responded with their batons. The fighting had been carefully planned by one of the local Serb leaders, Miroslav Šolević (local, at least, in the sense that he lived there: he had moved to Kosovo from the Serbian city of Niš): as he later admitted, he had arranged for a truck full of stones to be parked outside the building, to give the Serbs a copious supply of ammunition. Milošević broke off the meeting and came out to speak to the crowd, where he uttered – luckily for him, on camera – the words on which his entire political future would be built: 'No one should dare to beat you!' The crowd, enraptured by these words, began chanting 'Slobo, Slobo!' With a skill which he had never displayed before, Milošević made an eloquent speech in defence of the sacred rights of the Serbs. From that day, his nature as a politician changed; it was as if a powerful new drug had entered his veins.

⁶⁶⁴ Glenny, *The Balkans 1804-1999*, London: Granta Books, 2000, pp. 624-625.

“By exploiting the issue of Kosovo Milošević quickly turned himself into a ‘national’ leader, a role which enabled him to quell all opposition to his takeover of the Communist Party machine...”⁶⁶⁵

“The situation in Kosovo became the main focus for the revival of Serbian nationalism. As early as 1968, Serbian nationalist Communists such as Dobrica Ćosić were complaining about the reversal of policy in Kosovo after Ranković’s fall. ‘One could witness even among the Serbian people a re-ignition of the old historical goal and national idea – the unification of the Serbian people into a single state,’ he said. This statement, phrased as a warning but issued in the spirit of a threat, caused Ćosić to be expelled from the Central Committee... The Serbian Orthodox Church also saw its opportunity to revive the sense of religious identity in the literary and political culture of the country; and the Serbs’ obsessively possessive claims about Kosovo were indeed partly based on the fact that some of the Serbian Orthodox Church’s oldest monasteries and church buildings, including the patriarchate itself [at Peć], were located in the province.

“Together with a revival of [ecumenist] Orthodoxy, there was also a revival of interest in the forbidden topic of the Četniks during the second world war. And just as – indeed, because – the Communist policy had been to damn all the Četniks uncritically as fascist collaborators, so now the reaction of Serb nationalists was to praise them almost equally uncritically. The regime would have reason to regret its long-lasting suppression of objective historical studies of the war. Dobrica Ćosić published a novel in 1985 which featured a sympathetic portrait of the Četnik ideologist, Dragiša Vasić; and in the same year a book about the Četniks by the historian Veselin Djuretić was launched at a party hosted by the Serbian Academy of Sciences. This event was an important turning-point, a signal that Serbian nationalism could now be openly embraced by the intellectual establishment in Belgrade. In January of the following year two hundred prominent Belgrade academics and writers signed a petition which referred in hysterical terms to the ‘Albanian aggression’ and ‘genocide’ in Kosovo. All the old Serbian resentments now came to the surface: ‘a rigged political trial of the Serbian nation and its history has been going on for decades’, it complained.

“Later in 1986 a ‘Memorandum’ was drawn up by the Serbian Academy of Sciences (or at least, by a committee of it, whose membership is known to have included Ćosić), in which grievances about Kosovo were combined with the open accusation that Tito’s policies had aimed at the weakening of Serbia. ‘Nationalism’, it complained, had been ‘created from above’. This was a reference not to Serbian nationalism, of course, which these writers were busily helping to create from their own vantage-point, but to the national identities of Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Bosnian Muslims. The Memorandum claimed that a sinister programme of assimilation was under way in Croatia, designed to turn the Serbs there into Croats, and it also complained that ethnic Serb writers in places such as Montenegro and Bosnia were being described as writing not Serbian literature but ‘Montenegrin’ or ‘Bosnian’ literature instead.

⁶⁶⁵ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, London: Papermac, 1998, pp. 339, 341-342.

The fundamental argument of the Memorandum was that the 'Serb people' throughout Yugoslavia was a kind of primary entity, possessing a unitary set of rights and claims which transcended any mere political or geographical divisions: 'The question of the integrity of the Serb people and its culture in the whole of Yugoslavia poses itself as a crucial question for that people's survival and development.' It was the pursuit of that 'integrity' which would eventually destroy Yugoslavia..."⁶⁶⁶

Vasa Čubrilović, a member of the Academy, had been acting and speaking in the cause of Serbian revolutionary nationalism since 1914.

As Mark Almond writes, he "complained that the Serb authorities had been too weak and 'Western'. Serbia ought to learn from her old enemy: 'Turkey brought to the Balkans the customs of the Sheriat... Even the Balkan Christians learned from the Turks that not only state power and dominion, but also home and property are won and lost by the sword.' He argued that since the Albanians still outbred the effects of Serbian recolonisation, 'the only way and the only means to cope with them is the brute force of an organized state, in which we [Serbs] have always been superior to them.' The necessary precondition for a mass expulsion of Albanians from their ancestral homes was 'the creation of a suitable psychosis'.

"In order to create an atmosphere of fear and a willingness to leave, the Serbian state ought to use very un-Balkan tactics: 'The law must be enforced to the letter... fines and imprisonments, the ruthless application of all police dispositions, such as the prohibition of smuggling, cutting forests, damaging farmland, leaving dogs unchained, compulsory labour and any other measures that an experienced police force can contrive.' In addition, property titles should be questioned and business permits withdrawn. Islam should be harrassed and the daughters of Muslims forced into school with boys. But all of these measures were only the background to state-sponsored terror: 'We should distribute weapons to our colonists. The old forms of Chetnik action should be organized and secretly assisted.' The Montenegrins should be unleashed on the Albanians - 'This conflict should be prepared by... our trusted people' - and then once the Albanians replied to force with force, 'the whole affair should be presented as a conflict between clans.' Čubrilović recognized the need to pacify Western opinion with the argument that any violence was just an old-fashioned tribal war. He therefore preferred to keep the Serbian Army out of action except when it was 'secretly burning down Albanian villages and city quarters'. Chetniks should be used to suppress the Albanians whenever the action was under scrutiny so that the tribal nature could be emphasized."⁶⁶⁷

Čubrilović's remarks about the need to copy the Turks were both cynical and insightful. As Almond comments, "in order to rid oneself of the domination and even the legacy of the hated 'Turk', his worst features must be assimilated into

⁶⁶⁶ Malcolm, *Bosnia*, pp. 205-207.

⁶⁶⁷ Almond, *Europe's Backyard War*, London: Mandarin, 1994, pp. 195-196.

the Serbian character. Ottoman brutality had to be matched or even surpassed in order to save Serbdom from the Turkish legacy of an Albanianised Kosovo.”⁶⁶⁸

Moreover, Ćubrilović was prescient in seeing how useful the argument that “any violence was just an old-fashioned tribal war” would be to Serbian politicians. It was used for years by western diplomats as an excuse for their inactivity in relation to the Serbs’ implementation of the ideology of Greater Serbia.

The Serbian nationalists gave wildly exaggerated figures for the supposed emigration or expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo. In this they were supported by the Serbian Church, notably the leading archimandrite (now metropolitan), Atanasije Jevtić. The nationalists claimed that the main reason for Serbian emigration from Kosovo had been Albanian atrocities, particularly, according to Atanasije Jevtić, the rape of girls and old women in villages and convents...

“As one Albanian writer later noted, the impression given by many Serbian publications was ‘that Albanians rape anyone they can get hold of, old women, children, married women, teenagers, and that they rape them in houses, in public places, in the street...’ The only serious study of this issue was carried out by an independent committee of Serbian lawyers and human rights experts in 1990. Analysing all the statistics on rape and attempted rape for the 1980s, they found first of all that the frequency of this crime was significantly lower in Kosovo than in other parts of Yugoslavia: while inner Serbia, on average, had 2.43 cases per year for every 10,000 men in the population, the figure in Kosovo was 0.96. They also found that in the great majority of cases in Kosovo (71 per cent) the assailant and the victim were of the same nationality. Altogether the number of cases where an Albanian committed or attempted the rape of a Serbian woman was just thirty-one in the whole period from 1982 to 1989; an average of fewer than five per year...”⁶⁶⁹

The main cause of Serbian emigration was economic. “Official reports on the reasons given for emigration from Kosovo by the 14,921 Serbs who left in the period 1983-7 give a very different picture. In 95 per cent of all cases the emigrants cited either economic or family reasons; in only eleven individual cases (less than 0.1 per cent) were pressures from Albanians given as the main cause of emigration.”⁶⁷⁰

By 1991 the Serb-Montenegrin element in the Kosovan population had dwindled to 11 per cent, while the Albanian proportion had risen to 82 per cent. It would rise still further to 90 per cent before the Kosovan war of 1999.⁶⁷¹

⁶⁶⁸ Almond, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

⁶⁶⁹ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, p. 339.

⁶⁷⁰ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, p. 331.

⁶⁷¹ Anatol Lieven, “Divide and Survive”, *Prospect*, May, 1999, p. 26. Lieven continues: “In Bosnia, the Muslim proportion rose from 31 per cent in 1948 to 43.7 per cent in 1991, while the Serbs fell from 44 per cent to 31 per cent. In both cases, the nations concerned resorted to arguments about

But the main reason for this was neither Serbian emigration nor Albanian immigration, but “the very high rate of abortion among the Serbs. By 1994 it was reported that Serbia had the highest abortion rate in the whole of Europe. For every 100 live births in inner Serbia there were 214 abortions; the equivalent figure for the whole population of Kosovo... was just twenty. While Albanian women were hostile on religious and cultural grounds to abortion, it had become an accepted part of cultural normality among the Serbs. On this point, at least, it could be said that they had only themselves to blame...”⁶⁷²

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On June 28, 1989, the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, Milošević organized a jamboree at the Gazimestan shrine near Pristina, noting that “the current anniversary was being held at a time when Serbia had finally regained its ‘state, national, and spiritual integrity’, and that the Serbian defeat of the fourteenth century, as well as later Serbian failures including those during the Tito period, had occurred owing to discord within the ranks of the Serb elite and political compromises by Serbia’s leaders. ‘Six centuries ago,’ Milošević pointed out, Serbia had fought the Turks and served as a ‘bulwark defending European culture, civilization and religion.’ Alluding to a perennial theme of Serbian culture, Milošević observed that although some might claim the Serbian nation had been defeated at the Battle of Kosovo, the episode could also be regarded as ‘heroic’ because of the Serbs’ valiant performance, and the fact that the victorious Turkish Sultan had been stabbed to death – the first Ottoman ruler to be killed in war – by a Serbian commander. Milošević was well aware that, although the 1389 battle had been technically a military defeat, most Serbs regarded the event and its aftermath as emblematic of how such a defeat can engender a stubbornness and fortitude to struggle against non-Serb control. He left it to his audience to ponder over the clear implication that perhaps the very traits that had allowed Serbs to overcome the tribulations of Ottoman rule might also assist them in dealing with their current concerns regarding Kosovo. Tactfully in view of his position as a high official in a multinational federation, Milošević urged toleration among the various nations and nationalities of socialist Yugoslavia, and also carefully avoided referring by name to the Albanians of Kosovo (who had boycotted the ceremony) or any other specific ethnic group. But near the end of his speech he reminded the gathering that six centuries after the Battle of Kosovo Serbs were ‘again today engaged in battles and facing battles’. Indeed he observed ominously that although the struggles presently involving the Serbs were ‘not armed battles... such things cannot be excluded. But no matter what their character, battles can’t be won without decisiveness, bravery and a readiness to sacrifice.’ Milošević had put his fellow Serbs on notice regarding what measures he might take, and what might be expected of them. In the excitement

which community had been there first and had originally been the largest. In these circumstances, trying to solve ethnic disputes by majoritarian democracy at a given moment is inadequate”.

⁶⁷² Malcolm, *Kosovo*, p. 333.

of the historical celebration, his audience appeared wildly eager to follow their determined new leader. ..."⁶⁷³

In January-February, 1990, Belgrade put tanks around the building of the Kosovo provincial assembly and shut it down...

"The course of events in the far south of the country," continues Judt, "directly affected decisions made in the northern republics. At best mildly sympathetic to the Albanians' plight, Ljubljana and Zagreb were far more directly concerned at the rise of Serbian authoritarianism. At the Slovene elections of April 1990, although a majority of the voters still favoured remaining in Yugoslavia they gave their backing to non-Communist opposition candidates openly critical of existing federal arrangements."⁶⁷⁴

In May, 1990 Franjo Tuđman, a former general in the Yugoslav army who defended Croatia's wartime Ustashi regime, won Croatia's first democratic election as head of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). And in December won Serbia's first democratic election as head of the Serbian Socialist Party (SPS). Thus did these former suddenly became democrats, winning real elections. But they continued to act like communists, stirring up murderous passions on both sides. Thus the liars and proagandists in the media on both sides engendered fear and hatred in their opponents, making war inevitable...

Also in December 1990 "the Serbian leadership in Belgrade seized without authorization 50 percent of the entire drawing rights of the Yugoslav federation to cover back pay and bonuses for federal employees and state enterprise workers. The Slovenes – whose 8 percent of the population contributed one-quarter of the federal budget – were especially incensed. The following month the Slovene Parliament announced that it was withdrawing from the federal fiscal system and proclaimed the republic's independence, though without initiating any moves to secede. Within a month, the Croat Parliament had done likewise (the Macedonian Parliament in Skopje duly followed suit)."⁶⁷⁵

However, Milošević was not yet securely in power. In March 100,000 took to the streets in Belgrade to protest against his aggressive nationalism, chanting "Slovo, Saddam". They were dispersed by force. Then in August Milošević made overtures to the Soviet Defence Minister Dmitri Yazov, attempting to buy weapons, only two days before Yazov took part in the failed Moscow coup.⁶⁷⁶ This showed the close psychological links between Milošević's Serbian Socialists and the Russian Communist putschists...

"Tudjman's new constitution," writes Glover, "which ignored the Serbian minority, defined Croatia as the nation-state of the Croats. This alarmed Serbs,

⁶⁷³ Leonard J. Cohen, "The Milošević Dictatorship: Institutionalizing Power and Ethno-Populism in Serbia", in Bernd J. Fischer, *Balkan Strongmen*, London: Hurst, 2006, pp. 429-430.

⁶⁷⁴ Judt, op. cit., p. 673.

⁶⁷⁵ Judt, op. cit., pp. 673-674.

⁶⁷⁶ Glenny, op. cit., p. 61.

who found they had to take loyalty oaths. Some lost their jobs. Some suffered attacks on their houses."⁶⁷⁷

The consequences of this heightening of tension were especially serious in Krajina, a long-established Serbian enclave in Croatia. A Serb assembly in Krajina, writes Glover, "declared a referendum on Serbian independence: only Serbs were to vote. Croatian helicopters, sent to stop the referendum, were turned back by Yugoslav army jets. Krajina, armed by Milošević's government, was now out of Croatia's control. The Krajina Serb leaders declared independence. Armed clashes followed. The Yugoslav national army was sent in. Serbia recognized the independence of Krajina and promised help. In clashes, Serbian villagers killed Croatian police. Tudjman said this was war against Croatia, while the Serbian government said Croatia was attacking the entire Serb nation."⁶⁷⁸

In June, 1991 US Secretary of State James Baker arrived in Belgrade and declared his support for a "democratic and unified Yugoslavia". But it was too late. Five days later, both Slovenia and Croatia had declared their secession. Both countries were recognized by the European Community. The Serb-dominated Yugoslav army invaded Slovenia, but after some skirmishes withdrew.

In August the Serbs made overtures to the Soviet Defence Minister Dmitri Yazov, attempting to buy weapons, only two days before Yazov took part in the failed Moscow coup.⁶⁷⁹ This showed the close psychological links between Milošević's Serbian Socialists and the Russian Communist putschists...

The Serbs now turned their attention to Croatia, and, as Glover writes, "For eighty-six days they surrounded, besieged and bombarded Vukovar. When the army finally captured it, they let the women of the town choose to go to Serbia or Croatia. But the men were held, often to be ill-treated or killed. The Yugoslav army then besieged Dubrovnik. They had reached a stalemate, with the Croatian army growing stronger. Milošević accepted international mediation. UN peace-keepers were sent and the Yugoslav army withdrew. Serbs and Croats were then to co-operate in the destruction of Bosnia..."⁶⁸⁰

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We have seen that Milošević, Čubrilović and the Serbian Academy of Sciences had stirred up nationalist feeling in the 1980s, so it could be said that the Serbs had started the violence. However, this violence was then fully reciprocated, with no less hatred, by the Croats. Indeed, the Serb and Croat nationalisms were, from a psychological point of view, mirror-images of each other, pointing to a common origin in the pathology of nineteenth-century Balkan nationalism that we have already described in earlier volumes.

⁶⁷⁷ Glover, *Humanity. A Moral History of the Twentieth Century*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1999, p. 125.

⁶⁷⁸ Judt, op. cit., pp. 673-674.

⁶⁷⁹ Glenny, op. cit., p. 61.

⁶⁸⁰ Glover, op. cit., p. 126.

As Misha Glenny writes, “the most striking manifestation” of “the complete collapse of rational politics in Yugoslavia and its constituent republics” “was the homogenization of [nationalist] consciousness among Croats and later among Serbs (although in Serbia the process was never as complete as it was in Croatia). This was fascinating to observe, if ultimately incomprehensible and distressing. Croats and Serbs argued endlessly with me as to why Serbs and Croats, respectively, were congenital monsters. They would cite history, religion, education and biology as reasons, but nobody could ever convince me why a Serb or Croat was *per se* good or *per se* bad. Throughout the campaign, nobody was able to convince me either that Serbian aggression against Croatia was justified or that the Croatian leadership had acted properly in deciding to leave Yugoslavia without taking into account the needs and fears of its Serb minority. Because of my belief that both Milošević and Tuđman were responsible for the war, I was accursed in both republics. In Serbia, unknown people telephoned me at my hotel at three in the morning and screamed at me for ‘supporting the irredentists and the Ustashas’. They have also never forgiven me for what I have written about Kosovo in the past. In Croatia I was denounced as a ‘Chetnik-lover upon whom revenge would be wrought’. On the whole, Croatia’s case was presented with considerable sympathy in the West European media. Those of us who were not uncritical of Tuđman’s programme were subject to ever more poisonous attacks as the war spread. Most shocking of all were the people I had known for many years from left and liberal circles in the United Kingdom who had fallen under the spell of Croatian nationalism. These people demonstrated their consistent solidarity with a small-minded, right-wing autocrat as a consequence of losing the ability to argue rationally. In extreme situations, nationalism appears to neutralize that part of the mind which is able to fathom complex equations. Indeed, action is motivated by a single Leninist principle: ‘Those who are not for us, are against us.’ Or as George Orwell paraphrased it in *Animal Farm* – ‘Four legs good. Two legs bad.’”⁶⁸¹

Nevertheless, in large parts of the country there was still friendship between different nations, which continued right up to the beginning of actual war; the very recent feeling of being all Yugoslavs together remained strong. For example, the great majority of those Serbs who lived in Croatia – mainly city-dwellers – had no problems there until ambitious former Communist politicians on both sides – Milošević and Babić on the Serb side, Tuđman on the Croat side – began exploiting grievances and accentuating national differences for their own personal political gain.

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John Ralson Saul has argued that Europe’s leaders could hardly believe in this outbreak of “negative nationalism” because they were imbued with globalist assumptions. “By the early 1990s, there were growing signs of people exploring

⁶⁸¹ Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, London: Penguin, 1996, third edition, pp. 85-86.

their sense of alienation in a world of abstract global assumptions by falling back on old-fashioned nationalism.

“I’m not suggesting that the monsters of the Yugoslav civil war were the products of Globalization. But nothing happens in isolation. You have to ask yourself why Europeans were so exceptionally unprepared for what happened in 1991, when Slovenia and Croatia decided to separate and the Yugoslav army intervened.

“It wasn’t simply that European leaders were mentally unprepared to take the military action necessary to prevent this human tragedy. They were ethically unprepared. Politically unprepared. They appeared unable to focus on the reality of full-blown negative nationalism at work. Perhaps it felt to them like a nightmare out of their own recent past. Perhaps they hoped to wake up and find it gone. They seemed so convinced that the world – Europe in particular – no longer acted in such a way, that they could not bring themselves to think and act.

“The reality was that Europe’s leadership and administration had been distracted for years, deep as they were in their well-intentioned but technocratic approach to building a continental system. On a broader plane, they were convinced that the world responded above all to economic mechanisms, sometimes to administrative mechanisms or eventually to political negotiations of the most basic sort...”⁶⁸²

Perhaps, then, there was a silver lining to the very black cloud of the Yugoslav civil war. It reminded the West that man does not live by bread alone, and that providing for his material needs while eliminating the nation-state will not remove the dark passions hidden in his heart. At the time of writing this lesson has still not been learned: the construction of the European Union as a socialist paradise has continued apace, and protests against this globalist dream, even when expressed far more peaceably than in Yugoslavia, are dismissed as “populism” or “negative nationalism”. The fact is that a place has to be found for legitimate national loyalties and feelings – “positive” rather than “negative” nationalism – in contemporary politics. Otherwise, the ugly explosions we saw in Yugoslavia in the 1990s will be repeated in other parts of Europe...

⁶⁸² Saul, *The Collapse of Globalism*, London: Atlantic Books, 2018, pp. 118-119.

57. THE GULF WAR

The Iran-Iraq war cost about £1.2 billion and between 500,000 and 1 million lives on each side... A ceasefire – but no peace treaty – was agreed on 8 August 1988.

However, writes Paul Johnson, Saddam Hussein, “far from disarming, actually increased the size of his armed forces, which by 1990 were the fourth-largest in the world. With Western agreement, he had been subsidized militarily during the war by the Sunni-dominated Gulf oil states, in addition to Iraq’s own enormous oil revenues (by the end of the 1980s it was the second largest oil producer, after Saudi Arabia, in the Middle East); virtually all these huge sums, amounting during the 1980s to something approaching \$100 billion, went on creating a war machine. The Israelis did not share the West’s indifference to Iraq’s growing military power, especially when their intelligence sources revealed that a French-built nuclear reactor, near Baghdad, was being used to produce material for nuclear bombs. On 7 June 1981 Israeli aircraft destroyed the reactor. But Saddam continued to scout the world for weapons of mass destruction and the means to make them; by the end of the 1980s he had acquired both a chemical and a biological warfare capability, and indeed in 1989 he killed over 5,000 Kurds, alleged to be rebels, by dropping chemical bombs on their villages.

“Saddam was well-known to Western governments as a man of exceptional depravity, from a clan of professional brigands. He had acquired his first gun at the age of ten (and committed his first murder, it was claimed, two years later). As head of the secret police from 1968, and as president from 1979, his career had been punctuated both by the slaughter of his colleagues and rivals, often by his own hand, and by atrocities on the largest possible scale, not least mass public hangings of Jews. A tract he published testified to his ambition to extend Iraq’s borders on the model of the ancient Babylonian empire. Nonetheless, while American and British military assistance tapered off in the 1980s, France continued to supply modern weapons, West Germany provided hi-tech military expertise (some of it illegally), and the Russians not only poured in arms but kept over a thousand military experts in Iraq to train Saddam’s armed forces in their use, and in tactics and strategy...”⁶⁸³

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied its neighbour, the emirate of Kuwait. The reason, writes David Reynolds, was that, “faced with vast war debts and growing internal discontent, Saddam reckoned that invading Kuwait was the best way to increase his regional power, enhance his oil revenues and shore up domestic support. Personalities aside, Iraq – hacked by the British in 1921 out of the ruins of the Ottoman empire – was virtually landlocked, having only fifteen miles of coastline through which its exports (mostly oil) could flow into the Gulf. Territorial disputes with neighbouring Iran and Kuwait were features of its national history.

⁶⁸³ Johnson, *Modern Times*, pp. 712-713.

“So Iraqi war-making in 1990 was the act of a fragile state as well as a megalomaniac leader, but it was only possible because the West had built up Saddam as a major power. From 1983, as the war against Iran went decisively against him, the US and Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, came to his aid to prevent victory for the Islamic revolutionaries in Teheran. In 1983-4 Baghdad’s trade with Washington was three times the value of its trade with Moscow, officially its main patron. Saddam was receiving top-quality US intelligence as well as credits to build an oil pipeline to Jordan. Britain and other NATO states helped further to expand Saddam’s arsenal – often using a spurious distinction between military and non-military equipment to sell machine weaponry. The lack of Western condemnation of Saddam’s brutal methods of war in Iran (including the use of chemical weapons) encouraged him to expect similar indifference when he attacked Kuwait.

“The outcry that greeted Saddam’s attack – from Bush in Washington to Hosni Mubarak in Cairo – was partly anger at having been deceived and surprised, but there was far more at stake than amour-propre. Although Kuwait was an autocratic monarchy, it was also a small country brutally overwhelmed by a big neighbour. Moreover, there was a real threat that Saddam would invade, not only Kuwait, but also Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states, which would give him control of most of the world’s oil reserves and immense power.

“By effectively promising to liberate Kuwait, the president was going against the firm advice of the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Colin Powell – the first black American to hold that post. Bush had been goaded by the media but he was also expressing gut instinct, and what stuck in his gut was Hitler.

“‘Half a century ago, the world had the chance to stop a ruthless aggressor and missed it,’ he told a conference of war veterans later in August. ‘I pledge to you: We will not make that mistake again.’ As reports of Saddam’s atrocities in Kuwait kept coming in, the president’s anger mounted. ‘We’re dealing with Hitler revisited, a totalitarianism and a brutality that is naked and unprecedented in modern times. And that must not stand. We cannot talk about compromise when you have that kind of behaviour going on this very minute. Embassies being starved, people being shot, women being raped – it is brutal. And I will continue to remind the rest of the world that this must not stand.’

“By occupying Kuwait, Saddam had doubled his control over world oil reserves to 20 per cent; if he also invaded Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, then the proportion would rise to over half. It is not clear that he planned to do so but, having been wrong-footed over Kuwait, US policy makers lurched from complacency to alarm. Within days the Saudis had acceded to American pressure and asked for US troops to help defend their kingdom. So began Operation Desert Shield.

“General Powell and Secretary of State James Baker still hoped that international sanctions might be enough to persuade Saddam to pull out of Kuwait, but Bush and Brent Scowcroft, his national security adviser, were gearing

up for war. On 30 October, Powell gave a White House briefing on his recent trip to the Middle East, using a series of flip-charts to illustrate US plans. He reported that the first phase of the mission was virtually accomplished. 'We'll soon be in a position to defend Saudi Arabia.' Then Powell flipped on to explain how America could 'go on the offensive to kick the Iraqis out of Kuwait'...

"The die was cast, but Bush was still careful to proceed by consent. On 29 November the US secured a resolution in the UN Security Council authorizing member states to 'use all necessary means to uphold and implement' previous resolutions about Kuwait and to 'restore international peace and security in the area' if Iraq was not out of the country by 15 January 1991. This gave Bush the legitimacy he needed for war.

"The following day the president praised what he called the 'historic UN resolution'....

"... With the undeclared war in Vietnam in mind, Bush was at pains to obtain congressional approval, though the vote was close in the Senate. The White House offered various justification for the impending war – from stopping Hitlerite aggression to securing Western oil, from safe-guarding American jobs to denying Saddam a nuclear arsenal – but increasingly another slogan too precedence. As Bush told Americans on the day the war began in January 1991, 'We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order – a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations. When we are successful – and we will be – we have a real chance at this new world order, an order in which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfil the promise and vision of the U.N.'s founders.'" ⁶⁸⁴

The Americans were supported on the battlefield not only by the ever-faithful British, but also by the usually-but-not-this-time-obstructive French. The Russians cooperated fully. With their help, the five permanent members were united for the first time since the beginning of the Cold War; in effect, it proved that the Cold War was now over. "The resolutions were negotiated beforehand with Russia, and indeed on 19 November George Bush and Gorbachev met privately in Paris to discuss the whole strategy in detail. Russia did not contribute to the Allied forces building up in the Gulf, but it was a consenting party to their use, and it actively assisted the process of UN authorization; it also privately provided various forms of military intelligence about the capability, siting and command-structures of Iraqi weapons systems which Russia had itself supplied to Saddam's forces. The operation was thus the first positive result of the new relationship between the former Cold War powers." ⁶⁸⁵

⁶⁸⁴ Reynolds, op. cit., pp. 532-533, 534, 535.

⁶⁸⁵ Johnson, *Modern Times*, p. 771.

“Among the Arab states, not merely Egypt and Saudi Arabia – long-standing American allies – were supportive but also inveterate foes such as Syria.

“So, when the defensive Operation Desert Shield became the offensive Desert Storm in mid-January 1991, it was a war waged by a unique international alliance. The mood in America, however, remained somber. Playing on these fears, Saddam promised ‘a second Vietnam and the mother of all battles’.

“On 17 January the coalition began intensive bombing against Iraq’s air defence and command systems, and then against similar targets in occupied Kuwait. Ground operations started five weeks later. The Allied commander, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, controlled 540,000 US troops and 250,000 from the Allies, of whom the Saudis comprised the largest contingent. Schwarzkopf planned a classic encirclement. Feint attacks north against Kuwait City would suck in the enemy, while the bulk of the US armoured and mechanized units plus a British and a French division, would sweep hundreds of kilometres west and then east to cut off the Iraqi forces.

“Execution was almost perfect. The ground war began on 24 February and lasted only 100 hours before Bush called a halt to avoid what seemed on TV to be a massacre. Later estimates range from 35,000 to 80,000 Iraqi dead. The coalition lost 240 killed in action, of whom 148 were Americans...

“For Bush, victory vindicated his new rhetoric. ‘Until now, the world we’ve known has been a world divided – a world of barbed wire and concrete block, conflict, and cold war. Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order.’

“Diplomatically, however, the impact of the war was less definitive. Bush deliberately stopped fighting when Kuwait was liberated; he did not invade Iraq or seek to topple Saddam, though he hoped and assumed that after such a disaster there would be a coup in Iraq. In the aftermath, as Saddam recovered, there was much criticism of US restraint, but Bush remained unrepentant. Defending his actions seven years later he argued that, in order to seek out and eliminate Saddam, ‘we would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed.’ Furthermore, he went on, ‘we had been self-consciously trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-Cold War world. [Violating the UN mandate] would have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression that we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion route, the United States could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land.’ Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the United Nations...”⁶⁸⁶

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⁶⁸⁶ Reynolds, *op. cit.*, pp. 536, 537.

But this was false reasoning. The UN mandate had been fulfilled. So those nations that considered it wrong to wage war independently – that is, as sovereign states without the UN’s blessing – were free to abstain from going on to Baghdad to finish off a very necessary job. But the United States and Britain – to name just two members of the coalition – had never agreed to give up their sovereignty in this way (and have not to the present day). As it was, the failure to follow up on victory to enter Baghdad and depose the tyrant had very bad consequences. The opponents of Saddam inside Iraq had been encouraged to rise up against him, and now “brigades from the 5th Motorised Division of the Iraq Republican Guard brutally surprised the Shi’ite uprisings in Basra and An-Nasiriyah and then joined with units from Baghdad to crush the Kurdish revolt in the north of the country. Saddam was in control and in no mood to forgive those who had risen against him...”⁶⁸⁷

Moreover, Bush’s fear that “the United States could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land” was fulfilled in any case in 2003, when his son, President George W. Bush, had to occupy what was now a bitterly hostile land in far less favourable circumstances than in 1991.

Now the UN’s founders had included the Soviet Union as well as the United States, and Bush’s success in obtaining the UN’s approval of this venture was largely owing to the fact that the Soviet Union under Gorbachev and Shevardnadze did not apply the usual Soviet veto on western-led undertakings. This was the more surprising in that the USSR had been Saddam’s main supporter, while the highly repressive regime of Saddam, an admirer of Stalin, could be regarded as a Middle Eastern outpost of Communism. So, as Gary Kasparov points out, “the joint US-USSR statement condemning his invasion was another signal that the Cold War was fading...”⁶⁸⁸

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In fact, it was over in the form it had assumed since the late 1940s... Not that the temptation to see in the power of the state the solution of all man’s problems, which we may call the totalitarian temptation, had disappeared. That temptation, the original sin of politics since the time of Nimrod’s Babylon (the ruler and the state that Saddam Hussein had sought to emulate), will probably never disappear before the Second Coming of Christ.

“But whereas,” writes Johnson, “at the time of the Versailles Treaty of 1919, most intelligent people believed that an enlarged state could increase the sum total of human happiness, by the 1990s this view was held by no one outside a small, diminishing and dispirited band of zealots, most of them academics. The experiment had been tried in innumerable ways; and it had failed in nearly all of them. The state had proved itself an insatiable spender, an unrivalled waster. It had also proved itself the greatest killer of all time. By the 1990s, state action had

⁶⁸⁷ Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 567.

⁶⁸⁸ Kasparov, *Winter is Coming*, London: Atlantic, 2014, p. 33.

been responsible for the violent or unnatural deaths of some 125 million people during the century, more perhaps than it had succeeded in destroying during the whole of human history up to 1900. Its inhuman malevolence had more than kept pace with its growing size and expanding means.

“The fall from grace of the state likewise, by the early 1990s, had begun to discredit its agents, the activist politicians, whose phenomenal rise in numbers and authority was one of the most important and baleful developments of modern times. It was Jean-Jacques Rousseau who had first announced that human beings could be transformed for the better by the political process, and that the agency of change, the creator of what he termed the ‘new man’, would be the state, and the self-appointed benefactors who controlled it for the good of all. In the twentieth century his theory was finally put to the test, on a colossal scale, and tested to destruction. As we have noted, by the year 1900 politics was already replacing religion as the chief form of zealotry. To archetypes of the new class, such as Lenin, Hitler and Mao Tse-tung, politics – by which they meant the engineering of society for lofty purposes – was the one legitimate form of moral activity, the only sure means of improving humanity. This view, which would have struck an earlier age as fantastic, even insane, became to some extent the orthodoxy everywhere diluted in the West, in virulent form in the Communist countries and much of the Third World. At the democratic end of the spectrum, the political zealot offered New Deals, Great Societies and welfare states; at the totalitarian end, cultural revolution; always and everywhere, Plans. These zealots marched across the decades and hemispheres: mountebanks, charismatics, *exaltes*, secular saints, mass murderers, all united by their belief tht politics was the cure for human ills: Sun Yat-sen and Ataturk, Stalin and Mussolini, Khrushchev, Ho Chi Minh, Pol Pot, Castro, Nehru, U Nu and Sukarno, Peron and Allende, Nkrumah and Nyerere, Nasser, Shah Pahlevi, Gadafy and Saddam Hussein, Honecker and Ceausescu. By the 1990s this new ruling class was rapidly losing ground, and power, in many parts of the world. Most of them, whether alive or dead, were now execrated in their own homelands, their grotesque statues toppled or defaced, like the sneering head of Shelley’s Ozymandias. Was it possible to hope that ‘the age of politics’, like the ‘age of religions’, was now drawing to a close?

“Certainly, by the last decade of the century, some lessons had plainly been learned. But it was not yet clear whether the underlying evils which had made possible its catastrophic failures and tragedies – the rise of moral relativism, the decline of personal responsibility, the repudiation of Judeo-Christian values, not least the arrogant belief that men and women could solve all the mysteries of the universe by their own unaided intellects – were in the process of being eradicated. On that would depend the chances of the twenty-first century becoming, by contrast, an age of hope for mankind...”⁶⁸⁹

⁶⁸⁹ Johnson, *Modern Times*, pp. 783-784.

58. THE EUROPEAN UNION: FROM ROME TO MAASTRICHT

Europe since Charlemagne has always tended towards the creation of despotic regimes at its heart that claimed dominion over the whole, or most of, the continent. The first such empire was Spain, then Louis XIV's France, then Napoleon's France, then the Kaiser's Germany, then Hitler's Germany, then Lenin's Soviet Union. Today such a despotism, or would-be despotism, is the European Union. There are many who would deny this hotly: in fact, Francis Fukuyama declared that in 1991, not only in Europe, but in the world, the "End of History" had been attained – i.e. the final triumph of liberal democracy.

In the past, European despots have usually been overcome by combined action from the east and the west – from Britain and Russia in 1815, from Britain, America and the Soviet Union in 1945. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the relative weakness of Britain (still entangled in Europe while its "Celtic Fringe" was falling away) and the traditional disinclination of America to get involved in European conflicts, combined with the eagerness of the newly liberated states of Central and Eastern Europe to join their western neighbour, combined to create a great opportunity for the nascent European Union.

The result was disappointing... Europe's proud claim to be a haven and defence against nationalism sounded very hollow after their complete failure to solve the Yugoslav problem on and over their doorstep. Moreover, while the formerly socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe were at first eager to join the Union, more recently some of them have had doubts whether the EU is simply a softer version of the old Soviet Union, a cartel with socialist trappings.

The dissident Vladimir Bukovsky has argued persuasively that the European Union is a socialist union ruled in the main by socialist politicians who see in the European Union the only means of bringing about their socialist aims and principles.⁶⁹⁰ That is why these leaders – Mitterand, Brandt, Gonzales, Blair, Barroso, Delors – were so tolerant of the Soviet Union, and even after its fall tried hard – and successfully – to prevent Yeltsin from carrying out a thorough lustration and trial of communists in Russia. The European Union is ruled by an unelected commission that issues vast numbers of "directives" to member states in a manner very similar to the Soviet Politburo... Europe, I have lived in your future, and I did not like it..."

And yet this was the vision of the real founder of the European Union, Jean Monnet, which, significantly, he thought should be *kept secret* from the Europeans themselves: "The nations of Europe must be guided towards a Superstate without their peoples understanding what is happening. This can be carried out in successive stages, each camouflaged as having an economic goal, but which will end up by leading them irreversibly into a federation."

⁶⁹⁰ Bukovsky o yevrosovke", <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TH498vnrR5U>.

Gorbachev, supported by his European socialist colleagues, wanted a “Common European Home” from the Atlantic to the Urals, a free trade area that abolished tariff barriers and transcended national boundaries, but with the necessary supranational bureaucracy and ministries to police the free market (cartel) and provide the welfare safety-net that all Europeans, East and West, had come to see as indispensable. But for many of its supporters this was seen as only the first step towards a global socialist state. For the original motivation for the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), the embryonic European Union (EU), in the 1950s was eminently globalistic.

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The main stages in this development and actualization of this idea until the Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 have been outlined by Roger Bootle as follows:-

“In 1957, the Treaty of Rome established the EEC.

“In 1965, the Brussels Treaty streamlined European institutions, laid down the composition of the Council and set out which institutions would be located in the three Community centres – Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg.

“In 1986, the Single European Act marked the watershed, since it extended qualified majority voting in council, making it harder for a single country to veto proposed legislation.”⁶⁹¹

However, at this stage the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who had been one of the architects of the Single European Act, had a change of heart and mind: she began to see in the EU a threat both to democracy and to national sovereignty. As she said in her famous Bruges speech of September, 1988: “We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain only to see them re-imposed at a European level, with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels.” As Norman Stone writes, “she said, about the tired metaphor of not taking the European train as it was leaving the station, that ‘people who get on a train like that deserve to be taken for a ride’.”⁶⁹²

Moreover, Thatcher was inclined to believe the undiplomatic remark of her minister Nicholas Ridley that the European Rate-Exchange Mechanism (ERM), the proposed first step to European monetary union, was “a German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe”. Such a rebellion against the supra-nationalist ethos of the Europeans could not be tolerated, and in 1990 Thatcher was duly ousted by her own, now predominantly Europhile party supported by the European leaders, whose hatred of her was proverbial....⁶⁹³

⁶⁹¹ Bootle, *The Trouble with Europe*, London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2015, pp. 12-13.

⁶⁹² Stone, *The Atlantic and its Enemies*, London: Penguin, 2010, p. 596.

⁶⁹³ President Mitterand said she had the mouth of Marilyn Monroe and the eyes of a Caligula.

The critical point in the development of the European Union towards a single super-state came in 1992, with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, more precisely “The Treaty on the European Union”, by the member-states of the EEC (now the EU) on February 7, 1992. As the Europeans themselves summarized it, this Treaty “represents a new stage in European integration since it opens the way to political integration. It creates a European Union consisting of three pillars: the European Communities, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (JHA). The Treaty introduces the concept of European citizenship, reinforces the powers of the European Parliament and launches economic and monetary union (EMU). Besides, the EEC becomes the European Community (EC)...

“The Maastricht Treaty represents a key stage in European construction. By establishing the European Union, by creating an economic and monetary union and by extending European integration to new areas, the Community has acquired a political dimension...”⁶⁹⁴

But it was precisely this political dimension, this openly declared drive to abolish the European nation-states and unite them into a single super-state, that caused the trouble. A referendum in Denmark refused to ratify the Treaty. However, alterations were made to the Treaty that enabled a second referendum to come to a more positive verdict. So the Treaty came into legal effect in Denmark after the royal assent was granted in June, 1993. A referendum in France in September, 1992 supported ratification of the Treaty - but only just (50.8% in favour). Although the United Kingdom did not hold a referendum on the Treaty, its passage through the House of Commons was very rough - in spite of the fact that the country had obtained several opt-outs from the Treaty, including acceptance of the euro. This was important because, in the opinion of experts such as the American Fed’s Alan Greenspan, a common currency can be effectively managed only by a single political government. It showed that the British eurosceptics - correctly - saw the Treaty as a threat to British sovereignty.

In order to pacify so-called “nationalists” like the British, the Treaty contained a “principle of subsidiarity”, which “specifies that in areas that are not within its exclusive powers the Community shall only take action where objectives can best be attained by action at Community rather than at national level.”

“This word,” writes Sir Roger Scruton, “incorporated into the Maastricht Treaty and ostensibly guaranteeing local sovereignty, was given its current sense in an encyclical of Pope Pius XI in 1931, describing the decentralization of power as a fundamental item of the social doctrine of the Church. According to Pius XI, ‘subsidiarity’ means that decisions are taken always at the lowest level compatible with the overarching authority of government. The term was appropriated by Wilhelm Ropke, the German economist who, exiled from Nazi Germany to Switzerland, was amazed and encouraged to discover a society which is the opposite in so many ways to the one from which he had escaped. He

⁶⁹⁴ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:xy0026>

saw that Swiss society is organised from the bottom up, and resolves its problems at the local level, through the free association of citizens in those 'little platoons' to which Edmund Burke had made such a passionate appeal when decrying the top-down dictatorship of the French Revolution. Subsidiarity, in Ropke's understanding of the term, refers to the right of local communities to take decisions for themselves, including the decision to surrender the matter to a higher forum. Subsidiarity places an absolute brake upon centralizing powers, by permitting their involvement only when requested. It is the way to reconcile a market economy with the local loyalties and public spirit that it might otherwise erode.

"In the EU as it is today, the term 'subsidiarity' denotes not the means whereby powers are passed up from the bottom, but the means whereby powers are allocated from the top. It is the EU and its institutions that decides where subsidiary powers begin and end, and by purporting to grant powers in the very word that removes them, the term 'subsidiarity' wraps the whole idea of decentralized government in mystery. For the Eurocrats, national governments are autonomous only at the 'subsidiary' level, with the European institutions uniquely empowered to determine which level that is. It is hardly surprising if the Swiss people observing the effects of this, have, in defiance of their political class, persistently refused to join the European Union."⁶⁹⁵

However, to this day this principle, even as interpreted by the EU, has proved to be a dead letter: the movement towards ever-greater centralization of powers in the EU has continued unabated. And in view of the weakness of the democratic principle in the Union – the Treaty's provisions to strengthen the power of the European parliament have proved as ineffective as the subsidiarity principle – fears were heightened that the European Union was gradually turning more into a more sophisticated, less violent version of the Soviet Union than a democratic federation of states. For instead of the Soviet Politburo there was the unelected European Commission; instead of unfree Soviet republics – increasingly powerless European member-states; instead of the corrupt Soviet bureaucracy – the no less corrupt European bureaucracy. And the black cloud of atheism and cultural Marxism hung over both...

On the loss of sovereignty entailed by the Treaty, Wynne Godley wrote: "A lot of people throughout Europe have suddenly realised that they know hardly anything about the Maastricht Treaty while rightly sensing that it could make a huge difference to their lives. Their legitimate anxiety has provoked Jacques Delors to make a statement to the effect that the views of ordinary people should in future be more sensitively consulted. He might have thought of that before.

"Although I support the move towards political integration in Europe, I think that the Maastricht proposals as they stand are seriously defective, and also that public discussion of them has been curiously impoverished. With a Danish

⁶⁹⁵ Scruton, *How to be a Conservative*, London: Bloomsbury, 2015, pp. 109-110.

rejection, a near-miss in France, and the very existence of the ERM in question after the depredations by currency markets, it is a good moment to take stock. The central idea of the Maastricht Treaty is that the EC countries should move towards an economic and monetary union, with a single currency managed by an independent central bank. But how is the rest of economic policy to be run? As the treaty proposes no new institutions other than a European bank, its sponsors must suppose that nothing more is needed. But this could only be correct if modern economies were self-adjusting systems that didn't need any management at all.

"I am driven to the conclusion that such a view – that economies are self-righting organisms which never under any circumstances need management at all – did indeed determine the way in which the Maastricht Treaty was framed. It is a crude and extreme version of the view which for some time now has constituted Europe's conventional wisdom (though not that of the US or Japan) that governments are unable, and therefore should not try, to achieve any of the traditional goals of economic policy, such as growth and full employment. All that can legitimately be done, according to this view, is to control the money supply and balance the budget. It took a group largely composed of bankers (the Delors Committee) to reach the conclusion that an independent central bank was the only supra-national institution necessary to run an integrated, supra-national Europe.

"But there is much more to it all. It needs to be emphasised at the start that the establishment of a single currency in the EC would indeed bring to an end the sovereignty of its component nations and their power to take independent action on major issues. As Mr Tim Congdon has argued very cogently, the power to issue its own money, to make drafts on its own central bank, is the main thing which defines national independence. If a country gives up or loses this power, it acquires the status of a local authority or colony. Local authorities and regions obviously cannot devalue. But they also lose the power to finance deficits through money creation while other methods of raising finance are subject to central regulation. Nor can they change interest rates. As local authorities possess none of the instruments of macro-economic policy, their political choice is confined to relatively minor matters of emphasis – a bit more education here, a bit less infrastructure there. I think that when Jacques Delors lays new emphasis on the principle of 'subsidiarity', he is really only telling us we will be allowed to make decisions about a larger number of relatively unimportant matters than we might previously have supposed. Perhaps he will let us have curly cucumbers after all. Big deal!

"Let me express a different view. I think that the central government of any sovereign state ought to be striving all the time to determine the optimum overall level of public provision, the correct overall burden of taxation, the correct allocation of total expenditures between competing requirements and the just distribution of the tax burden. It must also determine the extent to which any gap between expenditure and taxation is financed by making a draft on the central bank and how much it is financed by borrowing and on what terms. The way in

which governments decide all these (and some other) issues, and the quality of leadership which they can deploy, will, in interaction with the decisions of individuals, corporations and foreigners, determine such things as interest rates, the exchange rate, the inflation rate, the growth rate and the unemployment rate. It will also profoundly influence the distribution of income and wealth not only between individuals but between whole regions, assisting, one hopes, those adversely affected by structural change.

“Almost nothing simple can be said about the use of these instruments, with all their inter-dependencies, to promote the well-being of a nation and protect it as well as may be from the shocks of various kinds to which it will inevitably be subjected. It only has limited meaning, for instance, to say that budgets should always be balanced when a balanced budget with expenditure and taxation both running at 40 per cent of GDP would have an entirely different (and much more expansionary) impact than a balanced budget at 10 per cent. To imagine the complexity and importance of a government’s macro-economic decisions, one has only to ask what would be the appropriate response, in terms of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy, for a country about to produce large quantities of oil, of a fourfold increase in the price of oil. Would it have been right to do nothing at all? And it should never be forgotten that in periods of very great crisis, it may even be appropriate for a central government to sin against the Holy Ghost of all central banks and invoke the ‘inflation tax’ – deliberately appropriating resources by reducing, through inflation, the real value of a nation’s paper wealth. It was, after all, by means of the inflation tax that Keynes proposed that we should pay for the war.

“I recite all this to suggest, not that sovereignty should not be given up in the noble cause of European integration, but that if all these functions are renounced by individual governments they simply have to be taken on by some other authority. The incredible lacuna in the Maastricht programme is that, while it contains a blueprint for the establishment and modus operandi of an independent central bank, there is no blueprint whatever of the analogue, in Community terms, of a central government. Yet there would simply have to be a system of institutions which fulfils all those functions at a Community level which are at present exercised by the central governments of individual member countries.

“The counterpart of giving up sovereignty should be that the component nations are constituted into a federation to whom their sovereignty is entrusted. And the federal system, or government, as it had better be called, would have to exercise all those functions in relation to its members and to the outside world which I have briefly outlined above.

“Consider two important examples of what a federal government, in charge of a federal budget, should be doing.

“European countries are at present locked into a severe recession. As things stand, particularly as the economies of the USA and Japan are also faltering, it is very unclear when any significant recovery will take place. The political

implications of this are becoming frightening. Yet the interdependence of the European economies is already so great that no individual country, with the theoretical exception of Germany, feels able to pursue expansionary policies on its own, because any country that did try to expand on its own would soon encounter a balance-of-payments constraint. The present situation is screaming aloud for co-ordinated reflation, but there exist neither the institutions nor an agreed framework of thought which will bring about this obviously desirable result. It should be frankly recognised that if the depression really were to take a serious turn for the worse – for instance, if the unemployment rate went back permanently to the 20-25 per cent characteristic of the Thirties – individual countries would sooner or later exercise their sovereign right to declare the entire movement towards integration a disaster and resort to exchange controls and protection – a siege economy if you will. This would amount to a re-run of the inter-war period.

“If there were an economic and monetary union, in which the power to act independently had actually been abolished, ‘co-ordinated’ reflation of the kind which is so urgently needed now could only be undertaken by a federal European government. Without such an institution, EMU would prevent effective action by individual countries and put nothing in its place.

“Another important role which any central government must perform is to put a safety net under the livelihood of component regions which are in distress for structural reasons – because of the decline of some industry, say, or because of some economically-adverse demographic change. At present this happens in the natural course of events, without anyone really noticing, because common standards of public provision (for instance, health, education, pensions and rates of unemployment benefit) and a common (it is to be hoped, progressive) burden of taxation are both generally instituted throughout individual realms. As a consequence, if one region suffers an unusual degree of structural decline, the fiscal system automatically generates net transfers in favour of it. *In extremis*, a region which could produce nothing at all would not starve because it would be in receipt of pensions, unemployment benefit and the incomes of public servants.

“What happens if a whole country – a potential ‘region’ in a fully integrated community – suffers a structural setback? So long as it is a sovereign state, it can devalue its currency. It can then trade successfully at full employment provided its people accept the necessary cut in their real incomes. With an economic and monetary union, this recourse is obviously barred, and its prospect is grave indeed unless federal budgeting arrangements are made which fulfil a redistributive role. As was clearly recognised in the MacDougall Report which was published in 1977, there has to be a quid pro quo for giving up the devaluation option in the form of fiscal redistribution. Some writers (such as Samuel Brittan and Sir Douglas Hague) have seriously suggested that EMU, by abolishing the balance of payments problem in its present form, would indeed abolish the problem, where it exists, of persistent failure to compete successfully in world markets. But as Professor Martin Feldstein pointed out in a major article in the *Economist* (13 June), this argument is very dangerously mistaken. If a

country or region has no power to devalue, and if it is not the beneficiary of a system of fiscal equalisation, then there is nothing to stop it suffering a process of cumulative and terminal decline leading, in the end, to emigration as the only alternative to poverty or starvation. I sympathise with the position of those (like Margaret Thatcher) who, faced with the loss of sovereignty, wish to get off the EMU train altogether. I also sympathise with those who seek integration under the jurisdiction of some kind of federal constitution with a federal budget very much larger than that of the Community budget. What I find totally baffling is the position of those who are aiming for economic and monetary union without the creation of new political institutions (apart from a new central bank), and who raise their hands in horror at the words 'federal' or 'federalism'. This is the position currently adopted by the Government and by most of those who take part in the public discussion."⁶⁹⁶

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The Maastricht Treaty was signed in the aftermath of the momentous events of 1989-91, when Central and Eastern Europe shook off its communist chains, and Germany was reunified.

1991 was, of course, America's hour; but the Europeans were determined not to be placed in the shade by their mighty rival across the ocean. They thought they were superior to the Americans in some spheres – for example, in economic philosophy, where the destructiveness of the Anglo-Saxon model, i.e. the Chicago School's shock therapy, was widely derided by the Europeans, who preferred their Social Democratic model. In other respects, however, – for example, in democracy – they perhaps felt themselves to be inferior. But the "democratic deficit" that was most obvious in the unelected European Commission was felt to be largely compensated by the (albeit toothless) European Parliament and was in any case thought to be justified by the need to create supra-national institutions of regulation.

Now a great prize was set before the two western superpowers: their joint participation in the reshaping and regeneration of the vast territory stretching from Berlin to Vladivostok as it struggled to get out from under the rubble of communism and the nationalist wars that in some areas were only just beginning.

However, from a political point of view, it was the Europeans that took the lead – and the Americans, who had been in favour of the European project from the beginning, did not seem to mind...

"In 1993," writes Timothy Snyder, "the EU began to sign association agreements with east European states, beginning with a legal relationship. Three principles of membership were established in the 1990s: market economies able to handle competition; democracy and human rights; and the administrative capacity to implement European laws and regulations.

⁶⁹⁶ Godley, "Maastricht and All That", *London Review of Books*, October 8, 1992.

“In 2004 and 2007, seven post-communist states (Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia) and three former Soviet republics (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) joined the European Union. In 2013 Croatia also joined the EU... In 2013, twenty years after its western neighbours, Ukraine was negotiating an association agreement with the EU.”⁶⁹⁷

As Ramon Duran reported in 2001, the entry of the new states into the EU had to be paid for with a definite loss of sovereignty: “In the countries of the East, the enthusiasm for incorporation into the EU has dramatically fallen in recent years. This is undoubtedly related to the repeated delays in the proposed calendar, which originally proposed integration by the year 2000. The structural adjustment policies of the IMF, to enable payment of the debt and the transition to the free market, and the hard conditions which the countries had to fulfil so as to adapt their economies to joining the Union are all pressures which operate in the same direction. They are beginning to cause people to lose their faith in ‘Europe’ and the market economy. Before joining the EU the aspiring countries must incorporate more than 20,000 directives and regulations, unmodified, into their legal frameworks. Additionally, they will have to accept what was already decided in Nice, as well as all the future agreements of the Treaty of 2004. This clearly reduces them to having the role of peripheral countries, without any leverage in shaping the future of the EU. They will also have to abolish their currencies and bow down to the monetary dictatorship of the ECB [European Central Bank], whose policies will serve the interests of Germany (and the old area of the mark), and to a lesser extent, those of France. In fact, they are becoming ‘colonies’ of western European interests, having to open up land tenure and natural and productive resources to market dynamics. And they will also have to co-operate in establishing impermeable borders with Russia, Belorussia and the Ukraine, countries they have been interrelated with for centuries. A new Iron Curtain, in this case erected by Western Europe, in the name of the free market...

“Much is being done to try and give an appearance of democratic normality to the process of broadening the current European parliament to more than seven hundred members. However, this institution lacks political weight and has little social support. The representatives of the countries which join will be marginalized (both as a bloc, and much more so as individual countries) with respect to the countries currently in the EU.”⁶⁹⁸

The Europeans felt that they would have to reshape and deepen the EU’s institutions, not only in order to accommodate a fresh influx of member-states, but also in order to fulfil the aim of “ever-increasing unity”, that is, full political integration, that had been envisaged in the original Treaty of Rome in 1957. So the British eurosceptics’ hope that the entry of new members would loosen the despotic grip of the European Commission was not fulfilled.

⁶⁹⁷ Snyder, *The Road to Unfreedom*, London: Vintage, 2018, p. 73.

⁶⁹⁸ Duran, “The eastern countries – a mouth watering morcel for the EU to choke on”, in Kolya Abramsky, *Restructuring and Resistance*, resresrev@yahoo.com, 2001, pp. 365, 367.

In fact, the reverse happened: in 2007 the Treaty of Lisbon put into law what was in effect the same new constitution for Europe that the globalist Giscard d'Estaing had devised and several European referenda had rejected only shortly before. The British Prime Minister Gordon Brown had tried to disguise the fact that he signed the Treaty by coming late and not being photographed with the other leaders. But the fact remained: Britain, too, had signed away her sovereignty. There was only one consolation. Article 50 of the new treaty allowed member states to start a process of exiting the EU if their peoples voted for it...

By a profound irony the price of the liberation of *Eastern* Europe from the yoke of the Soviet Union turned out to be the strengthening of the yoke of the European Union over *Western* Europe and beyond; one supra-nationalist socialist dream was replaced by another – gentler, perhaps, for the time being, but potentially still more powerful (especially if and when it acquired an army). For, for the sake of dispelling the spectre of the resurrection of German national power, French President Mitterand had returned to his socialist, supra-national principles, tying the whole of Germany ever more tightly into the (as he hoped) French-controlled Union. At the same time, – that is, just when the socialist world revolution of the Soviets had fallen apart, and the peoples of Eastern Europe were celebrating their liberation from it, – socialist thinking on a *global* scale, the creation of a single world government, became very much the talk of “the global village”.

The unification of Germany had been a victory for the globalists. But the hope now (among democrats) was that the European Union project would step into an altogether higher gear, both increasing the depth of political (and not merely economic) union among existing members, but also widening it to include the countries of Eastern Europe. This was a crucial test for the globalists because Europe represented an exceptionally “hard nut” to crack: many old, proud nation-states with many different cultures and languages, and a history of violent conflicts, including recent and bloody conflicts (in Bosnia, in particular). So if this “hard nut” could be cracked, if Europe could be united, then it boded well for the overall global project. Conversely, if it failed, it might undermine it irreparably. Therefore *it could not be allowed to fail*; the stages of “ever-increasing unity” stipulated in the Treaty of Rome had to be completed...

After Maastricht, two things were lacking to the European Union without which it could not be called a unitary state in the full sense: a common currency, which had been agreed on in principle, and a single army, which had not. The army was not seen as a priority by many, who did not see the ability to defend oneself as necessary in a globalizing world – and in any case, America and NATO were seen as sufficient to supply Europe's defence needs. But it was a different matter with the currency.

In March, 1964 General de Gaulle sent his finance minister, Giscard D'Estaing to Bonn to propose an immediate currency union with the Germans. The Germans ignored the request; they were quite happy with the prosperity the American-controlled Bretton Woods system had given them – and the whole of

Europe. However, that system collapsed in 1971; and in 1978, in Aachen, the capital of Charlemagne's original pan-European state, the German chancellor Helmut Schmidt signed a bilateral agreement with the same Giscard, now French President, to create a European Monetary System (EMS) – the forerunner of the euro – to be a kind of mini-Bretton Woods.

Although both men were advocates of a European federal state, of which the common currency would be an integral part, their federalism was not their real motive in agreeing this step. The motive on both sides, paradoxically, was nationalism, as Yanis Varoufakis explains: "Lacking the economic might to subdue German industry and the Bundesbank in a straight tussle, France was to offer its hand in monetary matrimony instead.

"France had always envisaged a monetary union against, rather than with, Germany. That this was not just one of de Gaulle's fixations has been confirmed repeatedly. Possibly the best example occurred on 18 September 1992, soon after France and a reunited Germany agreed by the Maastricht Treaty to create the euro. The French conservative daily *Le Figaro* had this to say on its front page: 'In the 1920s it was said that Germany would pay reparations. Now Germany is paying. The Maastricht Treaty is a Versailles Treaty without war!' German officials knew this in 1964 and knew it in 1992. For the French elites, a common currency with Germany was an attempt to neutralize Germany, indeed to conquer the Bundesbank without firing a shot. German decision makers, especially Bundesbank officials, have never allowed themselves to forget that.

"But why did Germany eventually agree to a monetary union knowing full well that it was part of a French strategy aimed against it? Conventional wisdom has it that Chancellor Helmut Kohl bowed to French demands for monetary union as the price of German reunification. Though this was not an insignificant consideration, the answer lies elsewhere: in the naked truth that Germany's export-led economy could never afford its own genuinely free-floating currency. The reason is simple: if the Deutsche Mark's international value were to be determined freely by the money markets, Germany's surpluses would create demand for its money, which would push up its value until German goods became so expensive abroad that German surpluses would create demand for its money, which would push up its value until German goods became so expensive abroad that German surpluses would disappear. The ambition to remain a surplus nation could not be served by a free-floating Deutsche Mark.

"While the mark was embedded in America's global plan, its value fixed within the Bretton Woods international monetary system, German leaders and officials could behave like the managers of Europe's gleaming factory. They could concentrate solely on making sturdy cars and impressive gadgets, letting America mind global capitalism – exactly as the United States had planned things in the late 1940s. Alas, once the United States jettisoned Bretton Woods, and Europe along with it, German leaders could no longer treat the global environment as they treated the weather – as a natural system impervious to their actions and beliefs. They had to concede that the international economic environment was no

longer divinely ordered and independent of what they decided. They had, in other words, to do something to shape that international environment in ways consistent with Germany's continued economic success.

"Reluctant to think globally, or to try to shape the world in their image, German officials took the minimalist position: they surmised that a European Bretton Woods might suffice as a substitute for the American original. And if such a European monetary system could be made to work in the interests of German industry, the common currency that Paris was going on and on about might, eventually, become acceptable to them. But only after they had crushed France's ambitions to remain in the coachman's seat while Germany industry did all the pulling."⁶⁹⁹

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In 1981 the Socialist François Mitterand became President of France. This seemed to portend a Left-wing revanche, the opposite of the Right-wing Thatcherite correction just beginning in Britain. But in fact Mitterand proceeded to preside over a modest, but important move to the right. His move was mainly dictated by a perceived need to stay within the EMS. For this required a strong franc to remain pegged to the German mark, and therefore the austerity measures that were the price the Bundesbank demanded for cooperating with the strategy... "France's ambitions to remain in the coachman's seat" were crushed by the fact that the Bundesbank always insisted on certain rules of financial good behaviour that France (like most other economies in the EU) was unable to carry out without inflicting debilitating austerity on its population, weakening it in relation to Germany. In the twenty-two-year period before the euro was created, various mechanisms were invented such as the EMS or the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) – whose aim was to make the different countries' exchange rates as fixed as possible. These failed because speculators were able to bet against the weaker currencies, thereby creating huge currency flows that threatened to destroy the weaker economies.⁷⁰⁰

Varoufakis explains: "The 1980s and early 1990s were not kind to Europe's monetary system. The decade kicked off with a major global recession (1979-82), complicating the task of keeping Europe's currencies pegged to each other, and by the time some stability had returned, causing Europe to attempt to tighten its monetary union, a fresh recession in the early 1990s devastated it. After almost two decades of trying and failing to fix their exchange rates, to create a European Bretton Woods following the Nixon Shock, a stark choice was imposed on Europe's leaders: abandon monetary union altogether, or go all out, turning a system of many currencies with quasi-fixed exchange rates into a single currency: the euro.

⁶⁹⁹ Varoufakis, *And the Weak Suffer What They Must?* London: Vintage, 2017, pp. 67-68.

⁷⁰⁰ The most famous case was "Black Wednesday", 1992, when George Soros bet against the pound, which caused the Bank of England to raise its interest rate to 15%, only to be forced to leave the ERM on the same day. Soros won about £1 billion in one day on his gamble.

“At that juncture, between 1991 and 1993, it was Giscard and Schmidt’s direct successors, President François Mitterand of France and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany who were the driving force behind the euro project. Mitterand’s former finance minister, Jacques Delors, by then the all-powerful president of the European Commission, warned Mitterand that a proper monetary union required more than rules and Brussels-based committees. At the very least, it required some common public debt (as Alexander Hamilton, the first secretary of the treasury, argued at the founding of the USA) and a common investment policy (as the New Dealers knew well).”⁷⁰¹

The project of European Monetary Union “was already to hand,” writes Timothy Garton Ash, “ – the Delors report on economic and monetary union was presented in April 1989 – and there was a certain momentum behind it in the counsels of the EU. But the decisive impulse came from one particular aspect of the end of the cold war: German reunification. President Mitterand and the formidable French political and administrative elite – those super-smooth products of the *grandes écoles* – were already committed to trying to regain control of their own currency and to tie Germany still more closely to France, by monetary union. But the sudden prospect of Germany becoming larger, more eastern, and fully sovereign, gave it a new urgency. Having initially tried to slow down German unification, which he viewed with quite as much alarm as Margaret Thatcher, François Mitterand turned round and agreed – for a price. The price was nicely summed up by a German wit. The deal, he said, was ‘half the Deutschmark for Mitterand, the whole of Deutschland for Kohl.’

“Yet this was a price Kohl was ready to pay, although he did insist that there should be something described as a ‘political union’ to complement the economic and monetary one. Kohl, ‘Adenauer’s grandson’, wanted to see Germany tied firmly to the European mast, like Odysseus, so it would resist the siren calls of the country’s terrible past. In a conversation I had with Kohl in 1992, soon after Maastricht, he delivered one of the most breathtaking remarks I have ever heard. ‘Do you realise,’ he said, ‘that you are sitting opposite the direct successor to Adolf Hitler?’ What he meant, he explained, was that he was the first chancellor of a united Germany since Hitler. Conscious of this responsibility, he proposed to put a European roof over Germany, whereas Hitler had tried to put a German roof over Europe.”⁷⁰²

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The Europeans’ ambition to create a mini-Bretton Woods on a European scale failed. Even after the euro was launched in 2000, the flaws inbuilt into the system meant that it failed to weather the global financial crisis of 2008 and is still, today, in the doldrums. Even after 2000, Germany continued to amass surpluses while most of the other economies languished. For the euro, unlike the American Bretton Woods system, had no supranational mechanism for the redistribution of

⁷⁰¹ Varoufakis, op. cit., pp. 91-92.

⁷⁰² Ash, “Ten Years in Europe”, *Prospect*, July, 1999, p. 26.

surpluses. Even the European Central Bank was forbidden by its charter to bail out individual national economies – the Bundesbank had made sure of that. Moreover, as the strongest economy, Germany could impose the industrial standards and interest rates that suited her but not necessarily the other economies. So the suspicion remained that the European Union was, after all, “a German racket” ...

The invariable response of Europe’s leaders to the problems of Europe is to decry “nationalism” (Britain is usually targeted as the main culprit here) and demand “more Europe”, more centralization, more power for the Commission and the Council of Ministers to impose yet more regulation from the centre upon the periphery – with even less examination of the unelected government of Europe than before. (For instance, just recently France’s Emmanuel Macron has suggested – with the muted approval of Angela Merkel – the appointment of a European finance minister who would have the power to regulate the budgets of the member states.) In other words, they are demanding the suppression of national sovereignties and the creation of political union in the form of a Superstate. This state would not be a democracy, but, as Varoufakis says, a *despotism*.

Now this had *not* been part of the Americans’ plan for Europe in the 1950s. But it *had* been in the Europeans’ plan from the beginning. As we have seen, Jean Monnet put this aim forward as early as 1952: “The nations of Europe must be guided towards a Superstate without their peoples understanding what is happening. This can be carried out in successive stages, each camouflaged as having an economic goal, but which will end up by leading them irreversibly into a federation.”

Monnet’s words were prophetic: during the course of the twentieth century as the European Superstate’s powers increased inexorably, being sanctified through a series of treaties signed by the heads of the Union’s national governments, including the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the Single European Act of 1985, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the introduction of the single currency in 1999 and the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. But these acquisitions of power by the supranational Union were not democratically debated or ratified in any real sense; and the lack of democratic consensus and of sustained economic growth in later decades has caused serious problems, leading to Britain’s decision to withdraw from the Union in 2016.

As the present writer commented in 1995, “Stealthily, unnoticed even by the great majority of its own citizens, a totalitarian monster has been born in the heart of Western Europe. Although this monster, the European Union is the creation of a group of democratic states and is situated in the heartland of modern democracy, it has already to a large extent superseded the process of democratic decision-making in the member states and replaced it by an unelected body, the European Commission, which, together with the equally unelected European Court, has the power to issue directives that override all national legislation and which is steadily penetrating every nook and cranny of the political, economic,

social and religious life of the member states, from the permitted shape of cucumbers to the date of Pascha. Moreover, the Maastricht treaty of 1992 legislated that by 1997 a single European Currency would be created run by a single (again unelected) European Bank – an institution the creation of which, in the opinion of the president of the American Federal Reserve Bank, Alan Greenspan, must necessarily be accompanied by irreversible political union and the creation of a single European state.

“When national sovereignty has gone and national parliaments become emasculated talking shops (a process that is already far advanced), only the European Parliament may perhaps have the power to withstand the power of the Commission-Politburo. However, all the indications are that the European Parliament, like the Soviet Central Committee, will be a toothless institution populated by people who have already imbibed the socialist spirit of the European institutions and enthusiastically accepted the ideology of the European super-state. The only real function of the European parliament, according to the well-known Anglo-French industrialist and politician, Sir James Goldsmith, ‘is to provide cover for the Commission’; and he argues that ‘at the moment the work of the European Parliament is overwhelmingly either a waste of time or downright destructive.’

“Like all socialist revolutions, the modern European revolution claims to be democratic while actually working against the people and in secret from it. Thus Goldsmith writes: ‘The European Union was built in secret: not through carelessness or casualness, but in a deliberately planned and skilfully executed manner. Claude Cheysson, the former French Minister of Foreign Affairs and a member of the European Commission from 1985 to 1989, described the mechanism in an interview in *Le Figaro* on 7 May 1994. He explained proudly that the European Union could only have been constructed in the absence of democracy, and he went on to suggest that the present problems were the result of having mistakenly allowed a public debate on the merits of the Treaty of Maastricht.

““The British newspaper *The Guardian* lodged a case before the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg complaining of the secrecy in which European decisions were taken. Lawyers for the European Council of Ministers responded by stating to the judges that “there is no principle of community law which gives citizens the right to EU documents.” They went on to make the astounding claim that although heads of government had repeatedly called for more openness in EU affairs, their declarations “were of an eminently political nature and not binding on the community institutions”. So they asked the judges to ignore the repeated declarations at EU summit meetings in the past two years in favour of greater openness. Statements by the twelve heads of government were no more than “policy orientations” and had no binding effect.

“‘This belief that the *nomenklatura* knows best and that the public is no more than a hindrance explains why there now exists a profound and dangerous divorce between European societies and their governing elites.’”⁷⁰³

So what *is* the European Union? Robert Skidelsky described it well as “diluting both the democratic and the national principles in the interest of a wide union of people.”⁷⁰⁴ In other words, it is a *disguised empire masquerading as a democracy* but with despotic and anti-national tendencies. It is not a totalitarian state now, but the tendency is undoubtedly towards despotic totalitarianism.

Cui bono? The eternal question must be asked with regard to the European Union. And the answer is: Germany. “A remarkable recent study by a German think-tank estimated that EU membership since 2000 had cost every Frenchman on average 56,000 euros, and every Italian 74,000, whereas every German had gained 25,000.”⁷⁰⁵

The relative success of the European Superstate until today has been guaranteed by the fact that its totalitarian essence has been masked by the *gradualness* and *non-violence* of its rise, by contrast with the violence of the Soviet and Nazi Superstates of the first half of the century. Moreover, it has managed to preserve for its citizens a high level of material comfort – always the most important attraction in the Age of Mammon. This has enabled it to hide from the majority of its citizens the gradual loss of many freedoms, and the enormous power of the atheist state (there is no mention of God in the Constitution, in spite of pleas from the Pope) over almost every aspect of their lives from the cradle to the grave. Only a few nations on the periphery of the Union have shown any serious sign of discontent: Britain, because of its attachment to real democracy and national sovereignty (since 2020 it is independent again), Greece, because its economy has been destroyed by the Franco-German Politburo, and Poland and Hungary, because the Christian feelings of their peoples have been deeply offended by the attempt to impose on them uncontrolled immigration and Islamization. It remains to be seen what will now happen (this was written in 2021), what will come first: the final closing of the door on the last vestiges of national sovereignty (this is what the Brexit negotiations were all about⁷⁰⁶), and the pulling up of the drawbridge on Fortress Europe, or disintegration and the twilight of the gods as the barbarian hordes (not only from ISIS and the like, but also from Putin’s Russia) finally overwhelm this last, most sophisticated, most “reasonable” attempt to rebuild the Tower of Babel.

⁷⁰³ V. Moss, “The European Union: A New Totalitarianism?” *Orthodox Life*, vol. 45, No 2, March- April, 1995; translated into Russian in *Pravoslavnaia Tver’*, NN 5-6, May-June, 1995.

⁷⁰⁴ Skidelsky, *New Statesman*, 26 January, 2004, p. 20.

⁷⁰⁵ Robert Tombs, “This Brexit deal is the end of the beginning”, *Unherd.com*, December 25, 2020.

⁷⁰⁶ Although most of the arguments have been about economics, the true Brexiteers, as the historian Niall Ferguson, a “Remainer”, has ruefully come to recognize, are quite prepared for their country to take a “hit” in terms of economics so long as it retains true sovereignty, that is, real independence from the European Commission,

“The crisis,” writes Scruton, “to which the institutions of Europe were a first response was the result of one thing above all – the centralized and dictatorial approach to politics exemplified in the Nazi Party’s warmongering, in the Communist Party’s totalitarian control, and the in the fascist grip on Italy and Spain. The EU has benign origins and noble intentions that can bear no comparison with those vanished agendas. Yet it is this same dictatorial approach that has been built into the European process, which has one and only one way forward, namely ‘more laws, more rules, more government, more power to the centre’. The dangers attendant on this concentration of powers are not aggressive, military or totalitarian. They are subtle and insidious: the dangers of civic alienation, of a loss of economic competitiveness, and of the domination of decision-making by an increasingly unaccountable elite.

“National sovereignty is a precondition of democracy. And national sovereignty involves the right to determine who resides within the national borders, who controls the nation’s assets, and who is entitled to the advantages of citizenship. It presupposes a ‘we’ from which our bargaining begins and whose interests that bargaining serves. Treaties between sovereign states need not involve a loss of autonomy, any more than a contract between individuals involves a loss of freedom. On the contrary, contract and treaty are both expressions of sovereignty, and the axiom that *pacta sunt servanda* (agreements are to be honoured) is, like Kant’s categorical imperative, a law expressing the freedom of those who are bound by it.

“The Treaty of Rome could, if interpreted in the spirit in which it was originally signed, still function as a willed expression of the sovereignty of its signatories. For if individual autonomy is a precondition of the free market, so it national sovereignty a precondition of free trade. As now interpreted, however, the Treaty goes beyond any conventional interpretation of how treaties operate, and has become an irreversible surrender, more akin to a marriage than a contract. When regulations can penetrate into the very heart of economic competitors, extinguishing the customs that make each the individual that it is, then what you have is not free trade between them. This is perhaps what Jean Monnet intended: but it is not how the European project was sold to the people. Globalization has not diminished people’s sense of nationhood: under its impact the nations have become the chosen and prime receptacles of citizens’ trust, and the indispensable means to understand and enjoy the new condition of our world.

“... it is no longer at all clear whether trade between the nation states of Europe has been furthered or hampered by the regulative regime. All that is certain is that the economic life of Europe is increasingly controlled from the centre. And the process damages the real interests of all the European peoples, by making Europe as a whole less and less competitive with the wider world...”⁷⁰⁷

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⁷⁰⁷ Scruton, op. cit., pp. 110-111.

In 2012 the European Union was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace (by itself, for Stockholm is an EU capital). Peter Frankopan's acerbic comment on this supposed peak of European greatness is not inapposite: "How wonderful that Europe, which had been responsible for almost continuous warfare not just for its own continent but across the world for centuries, had managed to avoid conflict for several decades. In late antiquity, the equivalent would have been giving the prize to Rome a century after its sack by the Goths, or perhaps to the Crusaders after the loss of Acre for toning down anti-Muslim rhetoric in the Christian world. The silence of the guns, perhaps, owed more to the reality that there was nothing left to fight for than to the foresight of a succession of supposedly brilliant peace-makers in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, or to the wonders of an unwieldy international organization of European states whose accounts have not been signed off by its own auditors for years..."⁷⁰⁸

⁷⁰⁸ Frankopan, *The Silk Roads*, London: Bloomsbury, 2015, p. 398.

59. WHO WON THE COLD WAR?

On December 25, 1991, while the Americans were celebrating Western Christmas, the Soviet flag came down over the Kremlin and the red, white and blue of Russia, which had also been Russia's pre-revolutionary flag, was raised in its stead. "As the clock on the Kremlin's Saviour Tower struck midnight at the turn of the New Year, 1992, the famous chimes were drowned out by the sound of fireworks. The champagne flowed and people sang; everyone believed they had a right, now, to what they had begun to call a normal life.

"What they got was hardship and uncertainty. The list of problems that the new republic faced would have challenged a far stronger and more deeply rooted regime. From environmental degradation and low productivity to the collapse of public infrastructures, the Soviet legacy was crippling enough on its own. But the new state's headlong economic reforms added further stress, precipitating high rates of mortality and record levels of crime, hyper-inflation, and shortages of everything from food to anti-cancer drugs. The Russian Ministry of the Interior estimated that by 1993, 85 per cent of the new private banks had links to organized crime. So did almost half the country's businesses, which was not surprising when even an honest trader could not survive without paying for protection (colloquially known as a 'roof') and following underworld rules. The official murder rate in Moscow increased eight-fold between 1989 and 1993; the true figure was probably blacker still. Unsurprisingly, almost no-one was prepared to gamble on the new republic's future prosperity. The 1990s saw a massive haemorrhage of capital from Russia to safe havens such as London and New York. Since most of it was exported illegally, the figures are hard to establish, but estimates for the period 1990-1995 vary between 65 and 406 billion US dollars..."⁷⁰⁹

In his State of the Union address, President Bush "referred to the implosion of the Soviet Union in a year that had seen 'changes of almost biblical proportions,' declared that 'by the grace of God, America won the Cold War,' and announced the dawning of a new world order. 'A world once divided into two armed camps,' Bush told the joint session of the US Senate and House of Representatives, 'now recognizes one sole and preeminent power, the United States of America.' The audience exploded in applause..."⁷¹⁰

For the third time in seventy-three years the United States bestrode the globe like a colossus. All three victories – those of 1918, 1945 and 1991 – can plausibly be claimed to have been victories of American democracy over one or another species of totalitarianism. But the differences between them were important. In 1918 the proto-totalitarian state of Germany had been defeated, but it had been the Europeans who had borne the main brunt of the war, while Germany herself had been neither occupied, nor purged of her totalitarian spirit, which went on to

⁷⁰⁹ Catherine Merridale, *Red Fortress*, New York: Picador, 2013, pp. 370-371.

⁷¹⁰ Serhii Plokhy, *The Last Empire. The Final Days of the Soviet Union*, London: Oneworld Publications, 2015, pp. xxvii-xxviii.

grow in fierceness under Hitler, necessitating a second world war. Moreover, a new totalitarian empire, that of Soviet Russia, had been growing with equal speed and ferocity... In 1945 America's share in the final victory was much larger, and the demons of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were finally exorcised. But Germany's loss had been the Soviet Union's gain; and that empire was now at the height of its powers and more than ever dangerous, making the Cold War inevitable (the only alternative was a hot war, which thankfully was avoided). In that war, America's share in the victory was larger still: the other western powers had contributed a much smaller share of the burden, and (with the exception of Britain) were not always faithful to the western alliance. Moreover, by 1991 none of the old totalitarian powers was left standing; only China, which had nipped the democratic virus in the bud on Tiananmen Square, appeared as a possible future rival of the all-conquering American colossus.

But there were disturbing resemblances between 1918 and 1991. Once again, the defeated power had not been occupied, nor its totalitarian spirit exorcised. As in 1918, so in 1991, the defeated power felt that it had been "stabbed in the back", betrayed by foreign and domestic enemies. To make things worse, it was still a nuclear power. In December, 1994 Russia, Ukraine, the United States and the United Kingdom signed "the Budapest Memorandum", thereby guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Ukraine, Belarus' and Kazakhstan in exchange for giving their nuclear weapons to Russia. This solved the problem of nuclear proliferation that had so worried the Americans. But it gave Russia still more power to blackmail its neighbours. And, as events in 2014 were to prove, Ukraine's territorial guarantees (like Czechoslovakia's in 1938) were not worth the paper they were written on...

Scott D. Sagan writes: "In 1947, the American diplomat George Kennan outlined a strategy for the 'patient but firm and vigilant containment' of the Soviet Union... He predicted that such a policy would eventually lead to 'either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.' He was right."⁷¹¹

But was he really right? The Soviet Union "mellowed" in its later years in that it killed and tortured fewer people (at home, if not abroad); but from the perspective of 2021 it is difficult to say that Sovietism has really disappeared. In fact, the evil spirit laid in it at its very foundation has not only not disappeared, but appears to have mutated into a new, but no less virulent power akin to Fascism. Nor could it be otherwise. For evil spirits do not "mellow", nor can they be "contained" indefinitely: if they are not to break out again they must be *exorcised*...

This is indicated by the failure of repeated efforts to get the central idol of the Soviet Union – the mummified body of Lenin in its pagan mausoleum – removed. In fact, the body should be not only removed, but also destroyed. For, as Demetrius Kolesnichenko writes: "To this day the image of Lenin has a mystical link with the devil; for the dragon gave him his power, and his seat, and great

⁷¹¹ Sagan, "The Korean Missile Crisis", *Foreign Affairs*, November/December, 2017, p. 82.

authority (Revelation 13.2)... It is curious that the people's artist Shukin fell ill and died after performing the role of Lenin on the stage. Undoubtedly a demon entered into him because he shared the experiences of the image. It is not surprising that reception into the Octobrists, the Pioneers, the Komsomol, and the Party, and marriages, conferences and other Soviet enterprises are unfailingly carried out in front of the idol of the leader, and have a magical influence on the masses." These words were written thirty years ago. But today there are still many millions who worship Lenin - and the supposedly Christian government of Russia does nothing to stop it.

The Soviet Union *appeared* to be dead... But could "the Long War", in Philip Bobbitt's phrase, between democracy and totalitarianism really be over? Was there not a final battle still to be fought, whose consequences this time would surely be a nuclear holocaust wiping out most of humanity? As President Bush soberly noted, the prospects for such a war had dramatically receded, but they had not gone away completely... They had not gone away, fundamentally, because of the wrath of man, on the one hand: those still imbued with the spirit of Soviet Russia were burning to avenge its defeat in the Cold War. And on the other hand, because the wrath of God had not been expiated through repentance for the terrible, unprecedented sins of the Soviet period...

In the euphoria of this great, but incomplete and inevitably temporary triumph over evil, it was necessary to recall the words of the Apocalypse concerning the red beast: "And I saw one of his heads as if it had been mortally wounded, and his deadly wound was healed. And all the earth marvelled and followed the beast" (Revelation 13.3). The beast has been wounded, but it is not yet dead...

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It could be even argued that the communist revolution, thanks to a radical image makeover since 1991, is now close to victory in the West.

"Think about it," writes J.R. Nyquist: "The Communists could never come to power in this country marching under a Communist flag. The trick was, on Christmas Day 1991, to take the Communist flag down from the Kremlin. That is what kicked things off. After that happened a new kind of 'conservative' appeared - of a different stripe: friendly to Russia and/or China, naïvely believing that America's universities were 'the last refuge of the Marxists.'

"The new post-Cold War conservative was, as Newt Gingrich explained in 1995, a 'cheap hawk.' And that is how our defense build-down began. We pulled apart our nuclear weapon industry. We stopped making warheads. Our hawks, no longer vigilant, joined the ranks of the economic optimists. At first, it was all about the 'peace dividend.' Then came 9/11 and our 'diversionary wars' in Iraq and Afghanistan, Libya and Syria.

"The Communists were clever. They disguised themselves as liberals. They pretended to like capitalism. They pretended to help us after 9/11. They denied

the value of socialism. They admitted the crimes of Communism, though almost no one was punished for those crimes. We should recall an old proverb: A tiger does not change its stripes. Why, after all, would Communism disappear of its own accord and admit defeat? The whole thing was too convenient by half, yet we were ready to believe it.

“After 1991 we lived through a time of unprecedented obliviousness and asininity, in which America was thought to be the ‘lone superpower.’ For three decades smart people talked like idiots. Our leading ‘statesmen’ proved themselves incompetent. Meanwhile, experts prattled on about the threat of climate change and the importance of letting children choose their gender. The mainstream media was clueless as it served up enemy disinformation time and time again. Our intellectuals mindlessly toadied to cultural Marxism. And now Russia and China have surpassed us militarily. Do you want to say all this was an accident? No. It was strategy – *a thing our people know nothing about*.

“To paraphrase a line from Senator Joseph McCarthy, the silence of the American establishment regarding the Communist conspiracy to rule the world has been deafening throughout. From 1991 to the present, we have seen nearly three decades of self-deception, self-congratulations and self-sabotage. How many years did we go without one official word about the communist threat? Did we really believe that Communism was gone?”

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Final victory can never be defined in purely material terms. In our materialist age, it is tempting to see economic or technological factors as the causes of victory in war. Certainly, there is no denying that technological factors have been important in past wars. We think of the “Greek fire” used so successfully by the Byzantines against the Persians and Muslims; and the horsemanship displayed by the Mongols against the Russians in the thirteenth century; and the long bow used by the English against the French in the Hundred Years’ War; and the heavy cannon invented by the Hungarian Urban and equally successfully used by the Muslims against the Byzantines in 1453; and the copper plating giving extra speed to the British ships in the Napoleonic Wars; and the railways used so effectively by Bismarck against the French at Sedan; and the Maxim gun used by the British to slaughter the Sudanese at Omdurman; and the German use of tanks in World War Two; and the British use of radar and Turing’s computer to crack the German enigma code in the same war...⁷¹²

⁷¹² Andrew Roberts writes: “While the English-speaking peoples have kept the technological edge on the invention and development of weaponry, they have managed to retain the hegemony of the world. The machine-gun, the tank, the Spitfire, the Lancaster, B-29 and B-52 bombers, the H-bomb and the A-bomb, Agent Orange, the F-16 fighter, stealth aircraft, the ‘daisy-cutter’ bomb – each were ground-breaking weapons and all were first deployed by the English-speaking peoples, and to devastating effect” (*A History of the English-Speaking Peoples since 1900*, London: Penguin, 2015, p. 104).

Nevertheless, material factors are never as important as spiritual or psychological ones – morale, patriotism and faith. For “some trust in chariots, and some in horses, but we will call upon the name of the Lord our God” (Psalm 19.7). The Vietnamese, while lacking that faith, defeated the Americans largely through their superior discipline and morale, in spite of being far inferior in technological and economic resources.

The root of the American failure was *hubris*, pride. As Michael Howard puts it: “there was in the US... an enormous self-confidence and pride not unlike that of the Germans before 1914; a consciousness of national greatness seeking an outlet, a searching for an appropriate challenge to their powers, a refusal to believe that any problem was beyond their capacity to solve...”⁷¹³ Closely related to this pride was forgetfulness of Kennan’s warning in 1947 that victory over the Soviets had to be won, not just on foreign battlefields or in foreign diplomacy, but also, and first of all, on the domestic front: “Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit - Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.”⁷¹⁴

The Americans might build their capital to look like ancient Rome; but they have neither the discipline of Old Rome, nor the faith of the New Rome. Against the supreme evil of Communism, only real *morale* - in the sense, not only of courage and determination, but also of *morality* and true faith - can prevail. National victory in any war against a foreign enemy depends ultimately on the health and vigour of our own society. In the 1970s American faith, morality and patriotism flagged, allowing the Soviets to gain a series of victories in the Third World. But the West recovered confidence under Reagan and Thatcher, and in the late 1980s the Soviets began to lose faith in their own system...

So it was not that the Americans won in 1991: the Soviets lost.

World communism is like a malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. God did not give the Americans victory in the 1970s in Vietnam, and it may be doubted that He gave them real, conclusive victory in 1991. Since then American morale and inner unity has declined at an alarming rate, and today, in 2021, the fall of America, the most powerful state the world has ever seen, is predicted by many...

Material advantages create the opportunity, and morale consolidates that advantage, or even reverses the material deficit. But final victory in war is attained only in two ways: either by completely destroying the enemy’s military and/or economic resources, and together with that his will to continue fighting,

⁷¹³ Howard, in Hastings, *Vietnam*, p. 226.

⁷¹⁴ <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116178.pdf>.

or by converting him to your side. There is no third way: a victory attained in any other way is no real victory, but only a battle won, which may end in final victory – or in defeat. The victory of the West over the Soviet Union in the Cold War in 1989-91 was one such inconclusive victory, a battle won that may yet end in final defeat in the long war that began in 1917, but has not come to an end yet...

The victories won by annihilation of the enemy are many. One of the most famous in ancient times was Rome's victory over Carthage. The Romans so respected their enemies, who had dealt them their worst ever defeat at Carrhae that they did not stop at reversing that defeat and defeating them at Zama in 202 B.C., but declared: *Carthago delenda est*, "Carthage must be destroyed". And Carthage was destroyed – completely – in 146 B.C. It never rose again.

Another victory by annihilation was the Allies' conquest of Germany in 1945. The victory over the Kaiser's Germany in 1918 had been incomplete. No Allied army stepped foot in Germany; its economic and war-making potential, though damaged, was not destroyed. Most important, the Germans did not *feel* defeated; they felt they had been "stabbed in the back". Reparations were insufficient to repay the losses suffered by the Western powers, especially France. By the time Hitler came to power, they had been remitted completely. So the still living snake was able to rise again because the seat of its power – its head – had not been crushed. That took place only in 1945, when Nazi power was crushed utterly, as was its capital. This was a real "twilight of the gods". The false gods of German nationalism had been truly destroyed. And the population was converted to a new god – democracy.

Victories by conversion are much rarer and, of course, much greater from a moral point of view. Such a victory was the triumph of the Anglo-Saxon King Alfred the Great over the pagan Danes under King Guthrum in 878. Alfred defeated the Danes in battle at Ethandune; but, knowing that his victory could not be final, and that his enemy still occupied the whole of East Anglia, he offered him something quite different: baptism into the Orthodox Church (Alfred became Guthrum's sponsor), followed by a twelve-day baptismal feast – and the present of the whole of East Anglia as a baptismal gift. Nor was this a superficial charade. The Danes remained Christian, and were fully integrated into an Anglo-Danish Orthodox England...

In the Cold War the enemy was neither crushed nor converted. It was a very long war, beginning soon after World War Two, in which many millions died around the globe. And yet the main antagonists – the United States and the Soviet Union – fired few shots against each other in anger, preferring instead to fight by proxy and by the threat of mutually assured destruction. Nor did the supposed victors ever set foot on Soviet soil. The Communist enemy simply melted away, changing his name and his ideology at the same time... However, the change in ideology was only apparent. Thus Soviet Communism became "Russian Sovereign Democracy" under Putin. But "Sovereign" Democracy is not the same as Democracy in the West's understanding, but rather despotism under the mask of democracy...

Not having occupied the communist homeland, the victors were able to make only a feeble attempt to convert them. By contrast, the Germans after 1945 were subjected to a denazification programme which took time to produce the necessary good fruits – real repentance for the horrors of Nazism – but eventually did produce them. Moreover, they were given a vast sum of money in the Marshall Plan that helped them rebuild their economy and become again a prosperous and peaceful nation. By contrast, there was no decommunization programme in Eastern Europe after 1991, and the people, after making a fitful start at repentance for the unprecedented crimes of the Soviet period after the fall of communism, very soon began indulging in an orgy of self-justification, which allowed the establishment of neo-Sovietism under Putin. Not a single Communist leader or Gulag commandant was brought to trial for his crimes.

As for economic aid, there was some of it, but – with the exception of the aid given to the former East Germany by West Germany – it came nowhere near the levels needed or asked for – and so generously provided by the Americans in 1948.

Thus, as Simon Jenkins writes, “There was no lowering of tariffs or other barriers to trade with the east, and therefore little stimulus to growth in the post-communist economies. Brussels lobbyists opposed any inrush of low-cost produce, especially food, into the EEC’s protected markets. Despite initial pleas from Gorbachev, there was no new Marshall Aid, nor substantial inward investment, at least until former communist states joined the EU. At the same time there was a torrent of low-cost labour migrating westwards, bleeding the east of talent and further aiding the west’s economies.

“More dangerous was an instant NATO welcome to Russia’s former Warsaw Pact allies. Those republics closest to Russia, such as Belarus, Ukraine and the central Asian ‘stans’, formed a Commonwealth of Independent State under Moscow’s aegis. But the Baltic states together with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary turned their backs on the east and began negotiations with NATO as guarantor of their future security. There is no doubt this is what these countries wanted, but the alacrity with which NATO seemed ready to advance its frontier eastwards rubbed salt into the gaping wound of Russia’s national pride. Yeltsin pleaded with the west to hold back, describing NATO’s expansion as ‘a major political mistake’. He warned that ‘the flames of war could burst out across the whole of Europe’. He was ignored. In this respect, there was an ominous sense of the cold war’s demise replicating the casual triumphalism of Versailles...”⁷¹⁵

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In 1991 the Russian dissident Vladimir Bukovsky was granted access to the archives of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union. What he discovered there about Soviet penetration of the elites of the western world, together with his

⁷¹⁵ Jenkins, *A Short History of Europe*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2018, pp. 288-289.

observations of contemporary life in the Union, convinced him that the victory of the West in the Cold War was illusory:

“Thus has this war come to an end, the most terrible, probably, of all the wars in our history. It began without a declaration, and ended without fireworks. We do not even know the exact dates of its beginning and end, and although it may have swept away more lives than the Second World War, we do not want to calculate how many. No monuments were erected to it, no eternal flame was lit on the grave of its unknown soldier. Although the destiny of the whole of humanity was decided in it, its soldiers were not accompanied by orchestras or met with flowers. Evidently it was the most unpopular war of all that we know. At least, on the side that supposedly won. But there was no rejoicing even at its end. Those who lost did not sign a capitulation, those who won did not receive awards. On the contrary, it is precisely those who supposedly lost who are now dictating the terms of peace, it is they who are writing its history, while those who supposedly won are silent in embarrassment. Yes, and do we know who won and who lost?

“Every event in our life, even that which is not too significant, is unfailingly investigated by some kind of commission. The more so if people died. Whether a plane crashed, or a train-crash or some accident at an enterprise – and the experts are already quarrelling, and analyses are being conducted, and the degree of guilt of constructors, builders, service personnel, controllers and inspectors is being clarified, or else the government if it had the slightest relationship to it. And every armed conflict between states will unfailingly be investigated. But a conflict that lasted, at the very least, for 45 years (and perhaps all of 75), which affected practically all the countries of the world, and cost tens of millions of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars, and which, as has been asserted, brought us to the very of the destruction of the earthly globe, has not been investigated by a single state, or by a single inter-state organization.

“In our world, any crime, even the smallest, is subject to investigation, judgement and punishment. War crimes are no exception. I’m not talking about the Nuremburg tribunal and all the trials that followed it, right until our days, that were obliged to review the crimes of fifty years ago. But here is a fresher example: the war in Bosnia has not yet come to an end, and an international court has already been created to investigate the crimes committed in this war. And again the only exception is our strange war which you don’t understand whether it has come to an end or not, whether we won or lost.

“Meanwhile, in many cases there is not even the need to create a special court: let us say, the shooting of the Polish officers captured at Katyn had already been recognized as a crime against humanity in Nuremburg. But the man who signed the order for the shooting – the former head of one of the administrations of the NKVD Peter Soprunenko – lives out his life in great tranquillity in Moscow, receiving a good pension. Everybody knows about this very well, Muscovites will willingly point out for you the house on Sadovoj ring and the windows of the flat where he lives. The MGB investigator Daniel Koneliansky is also alive; he

interrogated Raul Wallenberg. And the organizer of Trotsky's murder, General Pavel Sudoplatov. But neither Poland nor Sweden nor Mexico is demanding the giving up of these criminals. A fresher example is former KGB general Oleg Kalugin, who by his own admission, organized the murder in London of the political emigrant the Bulgarian Georgy Markov in 1978; this was the famous murder by poisoned umbrella. In 1993 Kalugin even wrote about this in a mass-circulation English newspaper, *The Mail on Sunday*, in an article with the loud title, 'I organized the execution of Markov'. He communicated some amusing details: it turns out that the grateful Bulgarian brothers gave him as a present a hunting rifle. Now he often goes abroad, advertising his book and giving interviews to the press. But it has never occurred to anyone to arrest him or interrogate him, although the case of the Markov murder has not yet been closed. (In 1994 General Kalugin came to England, was detained at London's Heathrow airport, interrogated and released the following day.)"⁷¹⁶

The uncomfortable and disturbing fact is: too many people, in both East and West, not only made their peace with Communism but even cooperated with the Communists during the Cold War to make a thorough or even superficial investigation of the crimes of the period desirable to the powers that be. So when Bukovsky agreed with KGB chief Bakatin to undertake such an investigation, and Yeltsin gave an order to hand over the necessary materials, somehow they were spirited away or destroyed – and Bakatin himself remained only 107 days in office. At Nuremberg at least some of the crimes of the Nazis were investigated and the criminals punished, even if those of the victors were not. At the end of the Cold War no crimes were punished – which makes one wonder who won the war, or whether the question makes any sense...

One thing is clear: the refusal to investigate these crimes, with the collusion of many in both East and West, made a revival of Communism much more likely. Very soon the KGB, after some renaming and reorganizing, came back to power, after spending the 1990s in fruitful collaboration with the Russian Mafia. And then "in 1999," writes Simon Jenkins, "Yeltsin anointed a former Leningrad KGB boss, Vladimir Putin, as his successor. The contrast was total. Putin was the epitome of a tough, communist-era apparatchik. The ex-intelligence officer had no time for the niceties of democracy, but a keen sense of the need to restore Russian pride. He would issue pictures of himself hunting and bare-chested on horseback. His court of oligarchs made sure he secured as much overseas wealth as they had [Putin is now probably the richest man in the world]. Putin's policies, endorsed at increasingly rigged elections, made no mention of civil rights or market economics. He was a populist and a nationalist, his pledge merely to restore Russia's integrity and self-confidence. Opponents were bribed, imprisoned or killed. The west might have felt able to humour and torment Yeltsin. It now faced the pastiche tsar of a macho state. That Russia's economy was debilitated was irrelevant. Dictatorship thrives on poverty."⁷¹⁷

⁷¹⁶ Bukovsky, *Moskovskij Protsess* (Moscow Trial), Paris and Moscow: "MIK", 1996, pp. 37-38.

⁷¹⁷ Jenkins, op. cit., p. 293.

Putin has openly declared his intent to avenge Russia's defeat in the Cold War, just as Hitler set out to avenge Germany's defeat in World War One. He is able to say this because Communism was not truly defeated in the Cold War. Its leaders were not tried and punished, its ideology was not exposed for the fraud it undoubtedly is.

As for Putin's new ideology of "Sovereign Democracy", it is even admired in the West, even by many Orthodox Christians, who mistake his Communist Christianity mixed with neo-Soviet patriotism for the real thing and regard Putin himself as "the new Constantine". Putin's secret service agents have retained their stranglehold over the Orthodox Church and Russia's foreign embassies and very many of her emigres. Thus the Church under Patriarch Cyril (KGB "Agent Mikhailov") glorifies the victory of Stalin's militant atheism in 1945 as something to be celebrated on a par with Christ's Resurrection!

Just as the incomplete and mismanaged victory celebrated at Versailles in 1919 led to the rise of an avenging angel in the form of Hitler, so the incomplete and mismanaged victory over Communism in 1991 has given birth to another avenging angel in the form of Putin, whose murderous desires only a truly useless idiot can fail to see. But he knows that he can achieve final victory only by completely *annihilating* his opponent. That is why he gives full rein to his propagandist, Alexander Dugin (who likes to say: "Putin is *all!*"), when he calls for "the closing down of America" as "our religious duty".⁷¹⁸ Dmitri Kiselev, another Putinist propagandist, appeared to rejoice on TV when speaking about the reduction of the West to ashes. These men know that their and their master's goal – final victory over the West – can only be achieved by the West's complete destruction. Putin himself has made it quite clear that he is prepared to use the nuclear option if he feels threatened – although it is he, of course, that is the real threatener. The only way in which he could achieve final victory over the West without an annihilatory war is by destroying its last values (although, it must be admitted, there are few of those left) and the last remnants of its will to live through his hidden support for Cultural Marxism, that deadly mutant of Leninist Marxism which is well on the way to destroying America today (in 2021).

So we may well be witnessing the fulfilment of the prophecy of Elder Ignaty of Harbin (+1958): *What began in Russia will end in America.*

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All this leads us to believe that the Cold War was only a phase in a long, still-uncompleted struggle, the final resolution of which is still in the future. And it is by no means certain who will win. For it is possible to win all the battles in a war while losing the last, ultimately decisive one...

Even if Communism in its new, Fascist mutation under Putin loses the final battle of this war, a deep and long-lasting peace is guaranteed only if the whole

⁷¹⁸ Dugin, *Absoliutnaia Rodina* (The Absolute Homeland) Moscow: Arktogetia, 1999, p. 658.

Enlightenment philosophy that gave birth not only to Communism, but also to Fascism and Democracy, is renounced by both victors and losers. The only teaching which does not simply oppose this triple-headed monster but *conquers* and *destroys*, providing a real, life-giving alternative, is the Orthodox Christian Faith. For “this is the victory that has overcome the world – our faith” (I John 5.5). It was the renunciation of that faith by Russia in 1917 that set in motion the long cycle of extremely bloody and inconclusive wars that we have witnessed over the last century. Only the resurrection of that faith, and the true repentance of the Russian people for having abandoned it, will bring the final victory and true peace on earth – that is, God’s good will among men...

At the time of writing, we are still waiting for that resurrection. We must continue waiting; for “in your patience you will possess your souls” (Luke 21.19). We must wait as Boris Pasternak exhorted us to wait: “Many years will go by. Many great years. I shall then no longer be alive. There will be no return to the times of our fathers and grandfathers. This would, indeed, be both undesirable and unnecessary. But at last there will appear once more things that have long lain dormant: noble, creative and great things. It will be a time of final accounting. Your life will be rich and fruitful as never before...”⁷¹⁹

⁷¹⁹ Pasternak, in Anna Pasternak, *Lara*, London: William Collins, 2017, p. 261.

CONCLUSION. DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN NATURE

"By the end of 1991," writes David Reynolds, 'the USSR had disintegrated as economic reform undermined the command economy, democratization hollowed out the one-party state and devolution to the republics undermined the union.'⁷²⁰ Combined with the other successful anti-communist revolutions that took place in the years 1989-91, this presaged an era of extraordinary optimism. Communism had been a formidable foe, a terrible enemy of both the souls and bodies of men. Its defeat in the Cold War could only be a cause of rejoicing for all "men of good will", both believers and unbelievers. An extraordinary opportunity for reconstruction and regeneration now presented itself. The question was: was mankind wise enough to take that opportunity and come closer to what Hegel had once called "the End of History" – that is, the end of the usual cycle of oppression and bloodshed that has marred every historical epoch to the present day?

The epoch that ended at the end of 1991 also marked the end of a period of five hundred years since Columbus' discovery of America, in which one European power after the other had dominated the European continent and, increasingly, all the other continents as well. The Spanish, French, British, Nazi and Soviet empires succeeded each other as European hegemonies; the Portuguese, Dutch, Belgian and Italian empires also played their part. But from 1992 there was only one major power left standing in its former eminence, one undisputedly global super-power – the United States. The era of European imperialism was virtually over by 1945, but the uncertain outcome of the Cold War had delayed the proclamation of America's global victory. However, from 1992 a new era of globalization, under the aegis of American military and economic might and a slew of multinational organizations such as NATO, the World Bank, the IMF and the United Nations, had dawned, promising ever-widening and deepening peace and prosperity.

But what was to be the ideology of this new era?

J.R. Nyquist writes: "Americans believe in communism's doom because they believe that democracy is 'the only way to go'. America has faith in the hackneyed slogans of its demagogues. Democracy, Americans say, will triumph everywhere. It is only a matter of time. But this is a pathetic faith, which cannot possibly survive the shock of what is coming. For we will not find wisdom or virtue in the masses. We will only find those sheep-like qualities that call forth a leader..."⁷²¹

This is not to deny the real achievements of American democracy. In the forty-five years from Roosevelt's New Deal to 1970, American democracy had given the world, to use an American expression, "its best shot". First, as a result of the

⁷²⁰ Reynolds, "Security in the New World Order", *New Statesman*, March 29 – April 4, 2019, p. 33.

⁷²¹ Nyquist, *Origins of the Fourth World War*, Chula Vista, Co.: Black Forest Press, 1999, p. 64.

application of Keynesian theory and the huge economic boost provided by World War Two, it had pulled America itself out of a devastating depression. Then it had defeated Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Then it had given Western Europe and Japan the opportunity to recover both politically and economically, and in general, as the prophecy of St. Aristocles of Moscow had predicted, had "fed the world". Finally, it had contained, if not permanently defeated, the terrible menace of Soviet Communism, and provided refuge for millions of refugees from communist oppression. Then it had forced the self-liquidation of the Soviet Union in 1991. Had not American democracy proved itself to be the best kind of government?

Not quite... For, for all her achievements, America had a major weakness: the State had no symphonic "partner", no Church that proclaimed the immutable truth to its own people and the world. Of course, it had many "churches", Protestant sects and other things, especially Masonry - a lot of religiosity. But Americanism rested on several huge lies which, even if they had created peace and prosperity on earth - which, of course, they failed to do, - could not have provided men with that "happiness" that the American Constitution proclaimed as their "inalienable right", still less salvation in the age to come. Americanism, and still more the Social Democracy that succeeded it as the most popular form of democratism in Europe and elsewhere, adopted the blatantly illogical and deceitful theories of scientism and religious ecumenism, which were flimsy and treacherous supports in the great task America had set herself: her "manifest destiny" of protecting the world against the collective Antichrist of Soviet communism. How could the "soft" atheism of the USA or the European Union prevail in the long run against the "hard" atheism of the USSR?

So the real possibility remains that the victory of the West in 1989-91 was a pyrrhic and specious one that only laid the foundations of another world war...

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The little, semi-independent territory of the Isle of Man, lying at the centre of the British Isles, has a symbol: three legs, and a motto: "Wherever you throw it, it will stand." Similarly, Enlightenment humanism will stand on whichever leg it is thrown: the evolutionary humanism of fascism, the collective humanism of communism, or the individualist humanism of liberal democracy. And yet evolutionary humanism seemed to have been destroyed in 1945, and collective humanism was, if not completely destroyed, at any rate discredited and defeated in 1991. Which left humanism standing on only one leg: liberalism. Is it destined to stand forever? Has history reached its end in the triumph of liberal democracy?

That was the thesis of an article called "The End of History?" (1989) by the Harvard-trained political scientist Francis Fukuyama, which demonstrated the continuing vitality of Hegelian modes of thinking in the context of an argument for the supposed final victory of the American concept of democracy over all other political systems.

Even more successful, it seemed, was the related doctrine of neo-liberal economics. As the *Financial Times* put it in 1993: "Never in 2,000 years has the doctrine of the free market spread so widely across the globe. Communism had been buried, socialism is in deep retreat, and even the hardest proponents of social democracy are beset by doubt. Adam Smith has vanquished Marx, immobilized Keynes, and turned many thoughts away from Jesus... [The capitalist] system of wealth creation... is now everywhere regarded as the most effective that humanity has yet devised."⁷²²

Fukuyama argued that "liberal democracy represented 'the end point of mankind's ideological evolution' and 'the final form of human government,' and as such constituted 'the end of history'. That is, while earlier forms of government were characterized by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their eventual collapse, liberal democracy was arguably free from such fundamental internal contradictions. This was not to say that today's stable democracies, like the United States, France, or Switzerland, were not without injustice or serious social problems. But these problems were ones of incomplete implementation of the twin principles of liberty and equality on which modern democracy is founded, rather than flaws in the principles themselves. While some present-day countries might fail to achieve stable liberal democracy, and others might lapse back into other, more primitive forms of rule like theocracy or military dictatorship, the *ideal* of liberal democracy could not be improved on."⁷²³

Fukuyama's thesis received rapid and dramatic support from the collapse both of East European communism and of Saddam Hussein's quasi-communistic Baathism almost immediately after. Thus by 2000 the only major country outside the Islamic Middle East and Africa not to have submitted to the ballot box was China - and the Tiananmen massacre showed that democracy had sown seeds there as well. However, as Fukuyama admitted, he neither predicted this outcome, nor, only a few years before, had the great majority of western political scientists anticipated the fall of communism and the triumph of democracy in Eastern Europe any time soon.

Nor, if we consider more recent events, was this Fukuyama's only failure in prediction: "Everything that has happened since," wrote the military historian Max Hastings in 2016, "shows that Fukuyama was as wrong as could be. Across large swathes of the globe, authoritarian regimes flourish like the green bay tree. Democracy has never looked rockier, even in the United States."

Among other recent events that Fukuyama failed to predict, noted Hastings, were "the dramatic rise of Muslim extremism; the 9/11 attacks in New York and 7/7 bombings in London; the global banking disaster of 2007-8; the break up of the Middle East that began with the 2003 Iraq invasion."⁷²⁴

⁷²² *Financial Times*, editorial, 'Capitalism at Christmas', December 24, 1993.

⁷²³ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, London: Penguin Books, 1992, p. x

⁷²⁴ Hastings, "Could this Lead to War in Europe?" *The Daily Mail*, March 19, 2016, p. 16.

Fukuyama's failures in prediction are explained by Andrew Marr on the basis of the fact, as he sees it, that "democracy, it turns out, is not a system. It is a culture. It is based on habits, attitudes, long-established divisions of power, ingrained belief in law and absence of systemic corruption and cynicism. You can import a system and set it up, and get it working. You cannot import a culture. This does not mean most of the world is doomed to life under tyrannies or kleptocracies. It just means that it is a little early to declare the game over..."⁷²⁵

But this explanation sounds a little too pat. Could it be that there is some systemic fault in democracy that prevents its "culture" from taking deep root widely? Could it be that, as Charles Murray has argued (see chapter 12), democracy fails to answer any but the crudest demands of the human spirit? Could it even be, on the contrary, that, whatever the advantages of democracy, "Monarchies conform best to human nature, and therefore constitute the most durable form of state", as Gianbattista Vico wrote in the eighteenth century? Since Fukuyama's argument attempts to justify democracy on the grounds of the nature of human nature, let us examine his argument more closely...

1. Reason, Desire and Thymos

Why, according to Fukuyama, is History moving towards world-wide democracy? We may summarize his answer under two headings: *the logic of scientific advance*, and *the logic of human need*, in particular *the need for recognition*. Let us look briefly at each of these.

First, the survival of any modern State militarily and economically requires that *science and technology* be given free rein, which in turn requires the free dissemination of ideas and products both within and between States that only political and economic liberalism guarantees. "The scientific-technical elite required to run modern industrial economies would eventually demand greater political liberalization, because scientific inquiry can only proceed in an atmosphere of freedom and the open exchange of ideas. We saw earlier how the emergence of a large technocratic elite in the USSR and China created a certain bias in favor of markets and economic liberalization, since these were more in accord with the criteria of economic rationality. Here the argument is extended into the political realm: that scientific advance depends not only on freedom for scientific inquiry, but on a society and political system that are as a whole open to free debate and participation."⁷²⁶

Moreover, it is not reasonable to expect that the advance of science can be halted or reversed for an indefinite period. Even the destruction of civilization through a nuclear or ecological catastrophe, and the demand for a far more careful evaluation of the effects of science and technology that such a catastrophe would elicit, would not alter this. For it is inconceivable that the principles of scientific method should be forgotten as long as humanity survives on the planet;

⁷²⁵ Marr, *A History of the World*, London: Pan, 2012, p. 473.

⁷²⁶ Fukuyama, op. cit., p. 117.

and any State that eschewed the application of that method would be at an enormous disadvantage in the struggle for survival.

Fukuyama admits that the logic of scientific advance does not by itself explain why most people in advanced, industrialized countries prefer democracy. "For if a country's goal is economic growth above all other considerations, the truly winning combination would appear to be neither liberal democracy nor socialism of either a Leninist or democratic variety, but the combination of liberal economics and authoritarian politics that some observers have labelled the 'bureaucratic authoritarian state,' or what we might term a 'market-oriented authoritarianism.'"⁷²⁷

Interestingly, as an example of such a "winning combination" of liberal economics and authoritarian politics, Fukuyama mentions "the Russia of Witte and Stolypin" - in other words, of Tsar Nicholas II... And in our own time the premier example is, of course, China...

Since the logic of scientific advance is not sufficient in itself to explain why most people and States choose democracy, Fukuyama has resort to a second, more powerful argument based on a Platonic model of human nature. According to this model, there are three basic components of human nature: *reason*, *desire* and the force denoted by the almost untranslatable Greek word *thymos*. Reason is the handmaid of desire and thymos; it is that element which distinguishes us from the animals and enables the irrational forces of desire and thymos to be satisfied in the real world. Desire includes the basic needs for food, sleep, shelter and sex. Thymos is usually translated as "anger" or "courage"; but Fukuyama defines it as that desire which "desires the desire of other men, that is, to be wanted by others or to be *recognized*".⁷²⁸ We might call it pride or vainglory.

Now most liberal theorists in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, such as Hobbes, Locke and the founders of the American Constitution, focused on desire as the fundamental force in human nature because on its satisfaction depends the survival of the human race itself. They have seen thymos, or the need for recognition, i.e. *ambition*, as an ambiguous force which should rather be suppressed than expressed; for it is ambition that leads to tyrannies, wars and all those conflicts which endanger "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness". The American Constitution with its system of checks and balances was designed above all to prevent the emergence of tyranny, which is the clearest expression of what we may call *megalothymia*. Indeed, for many the prime merit of democracy consists in its prevention of tyranny.

A similar point of view was expressed by the Anglican writer, C.S. Lewis: "I am a democrat because I believe in the Fall of Man. I think most people are democrats for the opposite reason. A great deal of democratic enthusiasm descends from the ideas of people like Rousseau, who believed in democracy

⁷²⁷ Fukuyama, op. cit., p. 123.

⁷²⁸ Fukuyama, op. cit., p. 146.

because they thought mankind so wise and good that everyone deserved a share in government. The danger of defending democracy on those grounds is that they are not true. And whenever their weakness is exposed, the people who prefer tyranny make capital out of the exposure. I find that they're not true without looking further than myself. I don't deserve a share in governing a henroost, much less a nation. Nor do most people - all the people who believe in advertisements, and think in catchwords and spread rumours. The real reason for democracy is just the reverse. Mankind is so fallen that no man can be trusted with unchecked power over his fellows..."⁷²⁹

But this argument is deficient on both logical and historical grounds. Let us agree that Man is fallen. Why should giving very many fallen men a share in government reverse that fall, making it virtuous? In moral and social life, two minuses do not make a plus. Democratic institutions may inhibit the rise of tyranny in the short term; but they also make it almost certain that democratic leaders will be accomplished demagogues prepared to do almost anything to please the electorate. One man's ambition may check the full expression of another's (which is why Rome had *two* consuls); but the combination of many contradictory wills can only lead to an unsatisfactory compromise and, eventually, to despotism (as in Rome). In fact, if wisdom in politics, as in all else, comes from God, "it is much more natural to suppose," as Vladimir Trostnikov says, "that divine enlightenment will descend upon the chosen soul of an Anointed One of God, as opposed to a million souls at once".⁷³⁰ The Scripture does *not* say *vox populi - vox Dei*, but: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; he turns it wherever He will" (Proverbs 21.1). Such an Anointed Autocrat, whose functions and rights have been such a central part of history - would have theoretically unchecked power in the secular realm, but would in practice be checked by the institution that anointed him, the Orthodox Church, and the dogmas and traditions of the Orthodox Faith.

In spite of his being a democrat, Lewis was very perceptive about the evil uses to which the word "democracy" could be put. Thus his Screwtape (an imaginative incarnation of the devil) writes: "*Democracy* is the word with which you must lead them by the nose. The good work which our philological experts have already done in the corruption of human language makes it unnecessary to warn you that they should never be allowed to give this word a clear and definable meaning. They won't. It will never occur to them that *democracy* is properly the name of a political system, even a system of voting, and that this has the most remote and tenuous connection with what you are trying to sell them. Nor of course must they ever be allowed to raise Aristotle's question: whether 'democratic behaviour' means the behaviour that democracies like or the behaviour that will preserve a democracy. For if they did, it could hardly fail to occur to them that these need not be the same.

⁷²⁹ Lewis, "Equality", *The Spectator*, CLXXI (27 August, 1943), p. 192; *The Business of Heaven*, London: Collins, 1984, p. 186.

⁷³⁰ Trostnikov, "The Role and Place of the Baptism of Rus' in the European Spiritual Process of the Second Millenium of Christian History", *Orthodox Life*, vol. 39, No 3, May-June, 1989, p. 34.

"You are to use the word purely as an incantation; if you like, purely for its selling power. It is a name they venerate. And of course it is connected with the political ideal that men should be equally treated. You then make a stealthy transition in their minds from this political ideal to a factual belief that all men *are* equal. Especially the man you are working on. As a result you can use the word *democracy* to sanction in his thought the most degrading (and also the most enjoyable) of all human feelings... The feeling I mean is of course that which prompts a man to say *I'm as good as you*. The first and most obvious advantage is that you thus induce him to enthrone at the centre of his life a good, solid, resounding lie.

"Now, this useful phenomenon is in itself by no means new. Under the name of Envy it has been known to the humans for thousands of years. But hitherto they always regarded it as the most odious, and also the most comical, of vices. Those who were aware of feeling it felt it with shame; those who were not gave it no quarter in others. The delightful novelty of the present situation is that you can sanction it - make it respectable and even laudable - by the incantatory use of the word *democracy*."⁷³¹

Lewis admits that not democracy, but *monarchy* "is the channel through which all the *vital* elements of citizenship - loyalty, the consecration of secular life, the hierarchical principle, splendour, ceremony, continuity - still trickle down to irrigate the dustbowl of modern economic Statecraft".⁷³²

In any case, has democracy really been such a defence against tyranny? Let us take the example of the first and most famous democracy, Athens... In the sixth century BC, Athens had been ruled by Solon, one of the wisest and most benevolent of autocrats, who showed his superiority to personal ambition by retiring into voluntary exile at the height of his fame. Later, in the fifth century, Athenian democracy was led by a good leader, Pericles. But by the end of the century Socrates, the state's most distinguished citizen, had been executed; Melos had been reduced and its population cruelly butchered; and a futile and morale-sapping war against Sparta had been lost.

The lessons were not lost on the philosophers of the next century: Plato turned from democracy to the ideal of the philosopher-king; while Aristotle distinguished between "democratic behaviour" meaning "the behaviour that democracies like" and "democratic behaviour" meaning "the behaviour that will preserve a democracy" - the two do not coincide.

The behaviour that democracies like is peaceful money-making and pleasure-seeking. There is no doubt that that aim has been achieved in our democratic age. Thus Marian Topy writes: "According to the World Bank, for the first time in

⁷³¹ Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-191.

⁷³² Lewis, "Myth and Fact", in *God in the Dock: Essays on Theology*, edited by Walter Hopper, Fount Paperbacks, 1979.

human history, 'less than 10 percent of the world's population will be living in extreme poverty by the end of 2015.'

"The bank has 'used a new income figure of \$1.90 per day to define extreme poverty, up from \$1.25. It forecasts that the proportion of the world's population in this category will fall from 12.8 percent in 2012 to 9.6 percent.'

"As scholars have noted, historically speaking, grinding poverty was the norm for most ordinary people. Even in the most economically advanced parts of the world, life used to be miserable.

"To give one example, at the end of the 18th century, ten million of France's twenty-three million people relied on some sort of public or private charity to survive and three million were full-time beggars.

"Thanks to industrial revolution and trade, economic growth in the West accelerated to historically unprecedented levels. Over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, real incomes in the West increased fifteen-fold. But the chasm that opened up as a result of the Western take-off is now closing.

"The rise of the non-Western world is, unambiguously, a result of economic growth spurred by the abandonment of central-planning and integration of many non-Western countries into the global economy. After economic liberalization in China in 1978, to give one example, real incomes rose thirteen-fold.

"As Princeton University Professor Angus Deaton notes in his book *The Great Escape*, 'The rapid growth of average incomes, particularly in China and India, and particularly after 1975, did much to reduce extreme poverty in the world. In China most of all, but also in India, the escape of hundreds of millions from traditional and long established poverty qualifies as the greatest escape of all.'"⁷³³

However the behaviour that will *preserve* a democracy is not peaceful money-making, but restraint and strict discipline, in which the rights of the pleasure-seeking individual must be subordinated to the will of the state. Moreover, in order to *attain* democracy, the rights of individuals must be not only subordinated, but *destroyed*, sometimes on a massive scale. As Shakespeare put it in *Julius Caesar* (II, 1):

Ligarius. *What's to do?*

Brutus. *A piece of work that will make sick men whole.*

Ligarius. *But are not some whole that we must make sick?*

Thus it is a striking fact that all the greatest tyrants of modern times have emerged on the back of violent democratic revolutions: Cromwell - of the English revolution; Napoleon - of the French revolution; Lenin - of the Russian revolution.

⁷³³ Tupy, "The End of Extreme Poverty", *Foundation for Economic Education*, <https://fee.org/articles/the-end-of-extreme-poverty-and-the-great-fact/>

And was not Hitler elected by the German democracy with more than a hint of threatened violence? Again, democracies have been quite prepared to throw whole peoples to the lions of tyranny for ephemeral gains. We think of the Helsinki Accords of 1975, by which the West legitimized the Soviet conquest of Eastern Europe; or Taiwan's expulsion from the United Nations at the insistence of Red China and with the complaisance of the world's premier democracy, the United States.⁷³⁴

So thymos, or ambition, is an aspect of human nature that the Anglo-Saxon liberal tradition has difficulty in accommodating. Liberals approve of the use of thymos in overthrowing tyrannies, but are short of ideas on how to tame it within an existing democracy.

Recognizing this weakness in the Anglo-Saxon model, Fukuyama turns to the German idealist tradition, as represented by Hegel, who attributed a more positive value to thymos. Hegel agreed with the Anglo-Saxons that democracy was the highest form of government, and therefore that the triumph of democracy - which for some mysterious reason he considered to have been attained by Napoleon's victory at Jena in 1806 - was "the End of History". But democracy was the best, in Hegel's view, not simply because it attained the aim of self-preservation better than any other system, but also, *and primarily*, because it gave expression to thymos in the form of *isothymia* - that is, it allowed each citizen to express his thymos to an equal degree. For whereas in pre-democratic societies the satisfaction of thymos in one person led to the frustration of thymos for many more, thereby dividing the whole of society into one or a few masters and a great many slaves, as a result of the democratic revolutions of the eighteenth century the slaves overthrew their masters and achieved equal recognition in each other's eyes. Thus *through the winning of universal human rights everyone, in effect, became a master and was able to satisfy his thymos*.

Hegel's philosophy was an explicit challenge to the Christian view of political freedom and slavery. Christians regard slavery as an evil in itself but one that can be exploited by Christian slaves for their good, for the salvation of their souls. "For he that is called in the Lord, being a servant, is the Lord's freeman: likewise also he that is called, being free, is Christ's servant" (I Corinthians 7.22; Onesimus). So "live as free men, yet without using your freedom as a pretext for evil; but live as servants of God" (I Peter 2.16). St. Augustine asserted that if slaves "cannot get freedom from their masters, they can make their slavery into a kind of freedom, by performing this service not in deceitfulness and fear but in faithfulness and love, until injustice passes away and all dominion and human power are brought to nothing and God is all in all..."⁷³⁵

But this doctrine offended Hegel's pride, his thymos. So without arguing in detail against it, he rejected it as unworthy of the dignity of man. And he rejected

⁷³⁴ President Carter accepted the idea that there is only one China - Red China - in 1979.

⁷³⁵ St. Augustine, *The City of God*, XIX, 15; translated by Maurice Wiles and Mark Santer, *Documents in Early Christian Thought*, Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 241-242.

Anglo-Saxon liberalism for similar reasons, insofar as he saw placing self-preservation as the main aim of life and society as effete and degrading.

Thus Hegel would have agreed with Shakespeare's words in *Hamlet*, IV, 4:

*What is a man,
If his chief good and market of his time
Be but to sleep and feed? A beast, no more.*⁷³⁶

The essence and glory of man consists in his love of glory and honour:

*Rightly to be great
Is not to stir without great argument,
But greatly to find quarrel in a straw
When honour's at the stake.*

For the greatness of man lies in his *transcendence* of self-preservation, in his capacity for self-sacrifice. And this is a manifestation of thymos.

Fukuyama develops this critique: "It is precisely the moral primacy accorded to self-preservation or comfortable self-preservation in the thought of Hobbes and Locke that leaves us unsatisfied. Beyond establishing rules for mutual self-preservation, liberal societies do not attempt to define any positive goals for their citizens or promote a particular way of life as superior or desirable to another. Whatever positive life may have has to be filled by the individual himself. That positive content can be a high one of public service and private generosity, or it can be a low one of selfish pleasure and personal meanness. The state as such is indifferent. Indeed, government is committed to the tolerance of different 'lifestyles', except when the exercise of one right impinges on another. In the absence of positive, 'higher' goals, what usually fills the vacuum at the heart of Lockean liberalism is the open-ended pursuit of wealth, now liberated from the traditional constraints of need and scarcity.

"The limitations of the liberal view of man become more obvious if we consider liberal society's most typical product, a new type of individual who has subsequently come to be termed pejoratively as the *bourgeois*: the human being narrowly consumed with his own immediate self-preservation and material well-being, interested in the community around him only to the extent that it fosters or is a means of achieving his private good. Lockean man did not need to be public-spirited, patriotic or concerned for the welfare of those around him; rather, as Kant suggested, *a liberal society could be made up of devils, provided they were rational* [italics added]. It was not clear why the citizen of a liberal state, particularly in its Hobbesian variant, would ever serve in the army and risk his

⁷³⁶ Shakespeare was the favourite author of the German idealists. But a careful reading of his plays demonstrates that he was no democrat, but rather a convinced defender of the hierarchical order in society. See *Richard II* and *Henry V*.

life for his country in war. For if the fundamental natural right was self-preservation of the individual, on what grounds could it ever be rational for an individual to die for his country rather than trying to run away with his money and family? Even in times of peace, Hobbesian or Lockean liberalism provided no reason why society's best men should choose public service and statesmanship over a private life of money-making. Indeed, it was not clear why Lockean man should become active in the life of his community, be privately generous to the poor, or even make the sacrifices necessary to raise a family.

"Beyond the practical question of whether one can create a viable society in which all public-spiritedness is missing, there is an even more important issue as to whether there was not something deeply contemptible about a man who cannot raise his sights higher than his own narrow self-interests and physical needs. Hegel's aristocratic master risking his life in a prestige battle is only the most extreme example of the human impulse to transcend merely natural or physical need. Is it not possible that the struggle for recognition reflects a longing for self-transcendence that lies at the root not only of the violence of the state of nature and of slavery, but also of the noble passions of patriotism, courage, generosity, and public spiritedness? Is recognition not somehow related to the entire moral side of man's nature, the part of man that finds satisfaction in the sacrifice of the narrow concerns of the body for an objective principle that lies beyond the body? By not rejecting the perspective of the master in favor of that of the slave, by identifying the master's struggle for recognition as somehow at the core of what is human, Hegel seeks to honor and preserve a certain moral dimension to human life that is entirely missing in the society conceived of by Hobbes and Locke.

"Hegel, in other words, understands man as a moral agent whose specific dignity is related to his inner freedom from physical or natural determination. It is this moral dimension, and the struggle to have it recognized, that is the motor driving the dialectical process of history."⁷³⁷

There is an inner contradiction in this critique. There may be something profoundly repellent in the bourgeois liberal's selfish pursuit of comfortable self-preservation, but the struggle for recognition is hardly more noble. For what is self-transcending in the pure affirmation of self? Patriotism, courage and generosity are indeed noble passions, but if we attribute them to the simple need for recognition, are we not reducing acts of selflessness to disguised forms of selfishness? And so if Anglo-Saxon liberalism panders to the ignoble passion of lust, does not Hegelian liberalism pander to the satanic passion of pride?

It follows from Fukuyama's analysis that the essential condition for the creation of a perfect or near-perfect society is the rational satisfaction both of desire and of thymos. But the satisfaction of thymos is the more problematic of the two requirements. For while the advance of science and open markets can be trusted to deliver the goods that desire requires in sufficient quantities for all, it

⁷³⁷ Fukuyama, op. cit., pp. 160-161.

is a very tricky problem to satisfy everyone's thymos without letting any individual or group give expression to *megalothymia*.

However, democracy has succeeded by replacing megalothymia by two things. "The first is a blossoming of the desiring part of the soul, which manifests itself as a thorough-going *economization* of life. This economization extends from the highest things to the lowest, from the states of Europe who seek not greatness and empire, but a more integrated European Community in 1992, to the college graduate who performs an internal cost-benefit analysis of the career options open to him or her. The second thing that remains in place of megalothymia is an all pervasive isothymia, that is, the desire to be recognized as the equal of other people."⁷³⁸ In other words, democracy rests on the twin pillars of greed and pride: the rational (i.e. scientific) manipulation of greed developed *without* limit (for the richer the rich, the less poor, eventually, will be the poor, the so-called "trickle down" effect), and pride developed *within* a certain limit (the limit, that is, set by other people's pride).

There are now no checks on fallen human nature except *laws* – the laws passed by fallen human beings – and the state's apparatus of law-keeping. That may be preferable to *lawlessness*, as Solzhenitsyn pointed out in the 1970s, comparing the West with the Soviet Union; but it means that within the limits of the laws the grossest immorality and lawlessness is permitted. Truly a house built on sand!

2. Democracy and Nationalism

Now there are two "thymotic" phenomena that have to be controlled if the democrat's ideal of a satisfied, isothymic citizenry is to be achieved: religion and nationalism. Nationalism is a threat because it implies that all men are not equal, which in turn implies that it is right and just for one group of men to dominate another. As Fukuyama admits, "Democracy is not particularly good at resolving disputes between different ethnic or national groups. The question of national sovereignty is inherently uncompromisable: it either belongs to one people or another – Armenians or Azerbaijanis, Lithuanians or Russians – and when different groups come into conflict there is seldom a way of splitting the difference through peaceful democratic compromise, as there is in the case of economic disputes. The Soviet Union could not become democratic and at the same time unitary, for there was no consensus among the Soviet Union's nationalities that they shared a common citizenship and identity. Democracy would only emerge on the basis of the country's breakup into smaller national entities. American democracy has done surprisingly well dealing with ethnic diversity, but that diversity has been contained within certain bounds: none of America's ethnic groups constitutes historical communities living on their traditional lands and speaking their own language, with a memory of past nationhood and sovereignty."⁷³⁹

⁷³⁸ Fukuyama, op. cit., p. 190.

⁷³⁹ Fukuyama, op. cit, p. 119.

Since democracy cannot give expression to nationalism without contradicting its own egalitarian principles, it has to undermine it - not by force, of course, but in the democratic way, that is, by sweet reason and material inducements. However, sweet reason rarely works when passions run high and deep, so in the end the warring nations have to be *bribed* to keep the peace. This works up to a point, but experience shows that even economically advanced countries whose desire is near to being satisfied cannot control the eruption of thymotic nationalist passions. Thus "economic development has not weakened the sense of national identity among French Canadians in Quebec; indeed, their fear of homogenization into the dominant Anglophone culture has sharpened their desire to preserve their distinctness. To say that democracy is more functional in societies 'born equal' like the United States begs the question of how a nation gets there in the first place. Democracy, then, does not necessarily become more functional as societies become more complex and diverse. In fact, it fails precisely when the diversity of a society passes a certain limit."⁷⁴⁰

In spite of this, the ideologues of democracy continue to believe that nationalism is a threat that can only be contained by building ever-larger supranational states. The European Union was founded in 1957 on the premise that, besides the economic rewards to be reaped from the Union, it would prevent the recurrence of nationalistic wars between the European states in general and France and Germany in particular. Of course, the bloody breakdown of supranational states such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia does not speak in support of this argument. But the democrats response is that it is not supranationalism as such that was to blame for these breakdowns, but rather the communist system, which suppressed the thymotic aspirations of its citizens and so fuelled nationalism instead of sublimating it.

What about the democratic model of supranationalism represented by the European Union? Has this solved the problem of nationalism? The evidence seems to point in the opposite direction. Thus as the moment of the irreversible surrender of national sovereignties, i.e. monetary union, drew nearer, resistance stiffened in several countries, as witnessed by the majorities against it in many national polls. And as this resistance became stronger, so the sweet reason of the Eurocrats turned into the harsh language of threatened coercion. Thus the French Prime Minister proposed that those countries who decided not to join the monetary union (he had in mind especially Great Britain, the most sceptical of the Union's nation states) should be subject to economic penalties. And the German Chancellor said (again, his remarks were aimed particularly at Britain) that the result of a failure to unite in Europe would mean *war*. This is in spite of the fact that there had been no war or even threat of war in Western Europe for the past fifty years! When the UK finally voted unambiguously to leave the EU in 2016, the head of the EU Commission denounced it as "nationalism" and future French President Emmanuel Macron called it a "crime". So much for the "voluntary" union of states in the spirit of democracy and brotherhood! If you don't surrender

⁷⁴⁰ Fukuyama, op. cit., p. 121.

your sovereignty, we will crush you! This is the language of nationalist hatred in supra-national guise.

This points to a central paradox or contradiction in democracy, which consists in the fact that while democracy prides itself on its spirit of peace and brotherhood between individuals and nations, the path *to* democracy, both within and between nations, actually involves an unparalleled destruction of personal and national life. For much has been said, and truly said, about the destructive power of nationalism; but much less about how it protects nations and cultures and people *from* destruction (as, for example, it protected the Orthodox nations of Eastern Europe from destruction under the Turkish yoke). Again, much has been said, and truly said, about how democracy creates a culture of peace which has prevented the occurrence of major wars between democratic states; but much less about how democracy has drastically weakened the bonds created by societies other than the state, from the ethnic group and the church to the working men's club and the mother's union, with the result that, deprived of community identities, atomized, democratic man has found himself in a state of undeclared war against, or at any rate alienation from, his neighbour. This may explain why, at the moment when democracies seem to have solved all major internal contradictions and inequalities, new nationalisms are appearing - the Basque, the Catalanian, the North Italian and the Scottish, for example, - in the European Union.⁷⁴¹

For men must feel that they *belong to a community*, and not just huge, amorphous communities like "the European Union" or "the International Community". But to create a community means to create partitions - not hostile partitions, not impermeable partitions, but partitions nevertheless, partitions that show who is inside and who is outside the community, criteria of membership

⁷⁴¹ Of these, however, only Scottish nationalism appears close to achieving its goal in 2016. Scotland had been solidly conservative (with a small "c") and unionist until the early 1960s; the Scottish Nationalist Party, founded only in 1934, was seen as a curiosity rather than a serious contender for power. But the decision by the US and UK governments to locate a nuclear submarine base on the Clyde without consulting the Scottish people probably contributed to the election of Winnie Ewing as the first Scottish Nationalist MP (for Hamilton) in 1967. The deindustrialization, increasing unemployment and strike culture of the 1970s helped to bring the Labour Party to dominance in Scotland; but in the longer term these factors benefited the Scottish Nationalists even more, as the myth was spread (not least by Scottish Labour politicians) that the UK Westminster government did not represent Scots, that it "did not have a mandate" to introduce its policies north of the border. Another important factor favouring the Nationalists was the discovery of oil in large quantities under the North Sea. Now for the first time the economic argument that Scotland was too poor to live as an independent country began to lose its edge...

The New Labour government of Tony Blair gave Scotland their own parliament and a substantial devolution of powers in 1999, which, contrary to the government's expectations, led to a collapse of the Labour Unionist vote in Scotland. And so in 2007 the SNP formed a minority government, and in 2011 - a majority one. In 2014 the Nationalists lost a referendum vote to take Scotland out of the United Kingdom altogether. But in 2016, in the "Brexit" vote on taking the United Kingdom out of the European Union, a sharp difference between England and Scotland emerged: while England voted to leave the EU, the Scots voted to remain. This raises the real possibility that there will be a second referendum on Scotland's leaving or remaining within the United Kingdom in the near future...

which *not* everyone will be able to meet. The resilience of nationalism in both its positive and negative modes is a sign of the perennial need for *community*, a need which democracy has abysmally failed to satisfy.

However, while Fukuyama fully accepts the existence and seriousness of this lack in democratic society, he still seems to think that the most important and powerful sources of community life, religion and nationalism, are either already out or on the way out. Thus in an uncharacteristically bold and unqualified statement he declares that "contrary to those who at the time believed that religion was a necessary and permanent feature of the political landscape, *liberalism vanquished religion in Europe* [his italics]."⁷⁴² In 2021, when Islam looks set to dominate Europe within a generation, this remark looks simply stupid...

As for nationalism, Fukuyama does not see it disappearing any time soon. And indeed: in the 1990s, nationalism and nationalist wars were on the increase: in Chechnya and Yugoslavia, in Rwanda and Zaire and Liberia, in Guatemala and Sri Lanka and East Timor... But in the end, he thinks, nationalism, too, is destined to "wither away".

Thus the rise of nationalism in the highly cultured, democratic and advanced Germany of the 1920s and 30s was, in his opinion, "the product of historically unique circumstances". "These conditions are not only not latent in most developed societies, but would be very hard (though not impossible) to duplicate in other societies in the future. Many of these circumstances, such as defeat in a long and brutal war and economic depression, are well known and potentially replicable in other countries. But others have to do with the special intellectual and cultural traditions of Germany at the time, its anti-materialism and emphasis on struggle and sacrifice, that made it very distinct from liberal France and England. These traditions, which were in no way 'modern', were tested by the wrenching social disruptions caused by Imperial Germany's hothouse industrialization before and after the Franco-Prussian War. It is possible to understand Nazism as another, albeit extreme, variant of the 'disease of the transition', a byproduct of the modernization process that was by no means a necessary component of modernity itself. None of this implies that a phenomenon like Nazism is now impossible because we have advanced socially beyond such a stage. It does suggest, however, that fascism is a pathological and extreme condition, by which one cannot judge modernity as a whole."⁷⁴³

However pathological and extreme Nazism may be, it cannot be dismissed as simply an ugly but easily excised wart on the superbly toned body of Modernity. Hitler was democratically elected, and Nazism was the product of a fundamental contradiction inherent to democracy, the fact that while promising fraternity, it nevertheless destroys real brotherhood among men, making them feel that life is a jungle in which every man is essentially alone. Sovietism was also a product of democracy, and an exposure of another of its internal contradictions - that

⁷⁴² Fukuyama, op. cit., p. 271.

⁷⁴³ Fukuyama, op. cit., p. 129.

between freedom and equality. These "deviations" to the right and left do not point to the righteousness of a supposed "royal way" in between. Rather, they are symptoms, warning signs pointing to the inner pathological nature of the ideal they both professed and to which they both owed their existence – democracy, the rule of the people.

As we have seen, the European Union gives as its main justification the avoidance of those nationalistic wars, especially between France and Germany, whose rivalry has so disfigured the region's history. But even if France and Germany are friends now, most of the old nationalisms show no sign of dying. Moreover, the crisis in the Eurozone has reanimated traditional antipathy towards the most powerful state in it, Germany.

For pious exhortations are as useless in the face of nationalist fervour as exhortations to chastity in the face of aroused lust; in both cases *grace* is required to give power to the word. The problem is that when the grace that holds apparent opposites in balance is absent, it is very easy for a nation, as for an individual person, to swing from one extreme to the other, as the history of the twentieth century, characterised by lurches from nationalist Fascism to internationalist Communism shows.

Constantine Leontiev saw that the nationalism of the states of Europe could lead to a no less dangerous internationalist abolition of states: "A state grouping *according to tribes and nations* is... nothing other than the preparation - striking in its force and vividness - for the transition to a cosmopolitan state, first a pan-European one, and then, perhaps, a global one, too! This is terrible! But still more terrible, in my opinion, is that fact that so far in Russia nobody has seen this or wants to understand it..."⁷⁴⁴ "A grouping of states," he said, "according to pure nationalities will lead European man very quickly to the dominion of internationalism."⁷⁴⁵

More recently, Gabriel Robin has written: "The two ideologies, of Communism and of Europe, have much more in common that they [the Euroenthusiasts] like to admit... One had its apparatchiks, the other its Eurocrats... Their respective credos come together [in] the inevitable withering away of the nation-state..."⁷⁴⁶

But all the indications are that human beings *want* to live in nation-states, which mitigates the atomization of society and gives them a focus of unity, community and loyalty...

3. Democracy and Religion

⁷⁴⁴ Leontiev, "Tribal Politics as a Weapon of Global Revolution", letter 2. Constantine Leontiev, *Selected Works*, edited and with an introductory article by I.N. Smirnov, Moscow, 1993, p. 314.

⁷⁴⁵ Leontiev, "On Political and Cultural Nationalism", letter 3, *Selected Works*, p. 363.

⁷⁴⁶ Robin, in Bernard Connolly, *The Rotten Heart of Europe*, London: Faber, 2012, p. xlvii.

Let us return to what, according to Fukuyama, is the second main threat to democracy: religion. Religion is a threat because it postulates the existence of absolute truths and values that conflict with the democratic-ecumenist idea that it doesn't matter what you believe – so long as you believe what most other people believe. For “Today's concept of democracy,” writes Daniel Barenboim, is “this horrible political correctness that so marks Western society: the people can do anything they want, but they don't trust themselves to think independently.”⁷⁴⁷ That is why, as Alexei Khomyakov pointed out, religion always declines under democracies.⁷⁴⁸

Fukuyama writes: “Like nationalism, there is no inherent conflict between religion and liberal democracy, *except at the point where religion ceases to be tolerant or egalitarian.*”⁷⁴⁹ It is not surprising, therefore, that the flowering of liberal democracy should have coincided with the flowering of the ecumenical movement in religion, and at approximately the same time; and that England, the birthplace of liberal democracy, should also have supplied, in the form of the Anglican Church, the model and motor for the creation of the World Council of Churches. For ecumenism is, in essence, the application of the egalitarian principles of liberal democracy to religious belief, making relations between religious faiths an essentially political matter. Thus when comparing, for example, Christianity and Islam, the superficial differences – their monotheism, for example – are asserted while their radical differences are passed over. Thus for Christian ecumenist Mohammed is a true prophet in spite of the fact that his teachings contradict those of Christ in several ways.

Paradoxically, Fukuyama, following Hegel, recognizes that the idea of the unique moral worth of every human being, which is at the root of the idea of human rights, is Christian in origin. For, according to the Christian view, “people who are manifestly unequal in terms of beauty, talent, intelligence, or skill, are nonetheless equal insofar as they are moral agents. The homeliest and most awkward orphan can have a more beautiful soul in the eyes of God than the most talented pianist or the most brilliant physicist. Christianity's contribution, then, to the historical process was to make clear to the slave this vision of human freedom, and to define for him in what sense all men could be understood to have dignity. The Christian God *recognizes* all human beings universally, recognizes their individual human worth and dignity. The Kingdom of Heaven, in other words, presents the prospect of a world in which the isothymia of every man – though not the megalothymia of the vainglorious – will be satisfied.”⁷⁵⁰

⁷⁴⁷ Barenboim, *Everything is Connected: The Power of Music*, 2009.

⁷⁴⁸ However, there are marked differences in the degree of decline. Thus Americans are much more religious in general than Europeans. In the U.S., 22 percent of people go to church on Sundays. In France it's 15 percent, in Britain it's around 10 percent and in the Netherlands it's less than 6 percent. More than half of all Americans think that to be moral, you need to believe in God. But only 20 percent of people in France, Britain and Spain agree with this idea.

⁷⁴⁹ Fukuyama, *op. cit.*, p. 216. Italics added.

⁷⁵⁰ Fukuyama, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

Leaving aside for the moment the question whether this is an accurate representation of the Christian understanding of freedom and equality, we may note that, however useful this idea has been in bringing the slave to a sense of his own dignity, it has to be rejected by the democrat because it actually reconciles him with his chains rather than spurring him to throw them off. For Christianity, as Hegel - and, it would seem, Fukuyama, too - believes, is ultimately an ideology of slaves, whatever its usefulness as a stepping stone to the last ideology, the ideology of truly free men, Democracy. If the slaves are actually to become free, they must not be inhibited by the ideas of the will of God (which, by definition, is of greater authority than "the will of the people") and of the Kingdom of Heaven (which, by definition, cannot be the kingdom of this world). The Christian virtues of patience and humility must also go, and for very much the same reason. For the revolution needs *proud* men, *greedy* men, *impatient* men, not ascetic hermits - even if, after the revolution, they have to limit their pride and impatience (if not their greed) for the sake of the stability of democracy.

But this last point leads Fukuyama to a still more important admission: that religion is useful, perhaps even necessary, to democratic society even *after* the revolution. For "the emergence and durability of a society embodying rational recognition appears to *require* the survival of certain forms of irrational recognition."⁷⁵¹ One example of such a survival is the "Protestant work-ethic", which is the recognition that work has a value in and of itself, regardless of its material rewards.

The problem for the democrats is that while the thymotic passions necessary to overthrow the aristocratic masters and create democratic society tend to fade away when the victory has been won, the fruits of the victory still have to be consolidated and defended. It is a profound and important paradox that men are much more likely to give their lives for unelected hereditary monarchs than for elected presidents or prime ministers, even though they consider the latter more "legitimate" than the former. The reason for this is that very powerful religious and patriotic emotions attach to hereditary monarchs that do not attach to democratic leaders precisely because, whether consciously or unconsciously, they are perceived to be kings *not* by the will of the people, but by the will of God, Whose will the people recognizes to be more sacred than its own will.

Fukuyama struggles bravely with this problem: "The liberal state growing out of the tradition of Hobbes and Locke engages in a protracted struggle with its own people. It seeks to homogenize their variegated traditional cultures and to teach them to calculate instead their own long-term self-interest. In place of an organic moral community with its own language of 'good and evil', one had to learn a new set of democratic values: to be 'participant', 'rational', 'secular', 'mobile', 'empathetic', and 'tolerant'. These new democratic values were initially not values at all in the sense of defining the final human virtue or good. They were conceived as having a purely instrumental function, habits that one had to acquire if one was to live successfully in a peaceful and prosperous liberal society.

⁷⁵¹ Fukuyama, op. cit., p. 207.

It was for this reason that Nietzsche called the state the 'coldest of all cold monsters' that destroyed peoples and their cultures by hanging 'a thousand appetites' in front of them.

"For democracy to work, however, citizens of democratic states must forget the instrumental roots of their values, and develop a certain irrational thymotic pride in their political system and way of life. That is, they must come to love democracy not because it is necessarily better than the alternatives, but because it is *theirs*. Moreover, they must cease to see values like 'tolerance' as merely a means to an end; tolerance in democratic societies becomes the defining virtue. Development of this kind of pride in democracy, or the assimilation of democratic values into the citizen's sense of his own self, is what is meant by the creation of a 'democratic' or 'civic culture'. Such a culture is critical to the long-term health and stability of democracies, since no real-world society can long survive based on rational calculation and desire alone."⁷⁵²

Quite so; but is it rational to believe that telling the people to believe in an ideology just because it is *their* ideology is going to fire them more than the ideas of Islamic Jihad or "The Mystic Union of the Aryan race"? The widespread disillusion with democracy that we are witnessing today suggests otherwise. In any case, is not loving the ultimate irrationality? The fact is that an ideology - any ideology - that appeals to a Being greater than itself is going to have greater emotional appeal than such infantile narcissism. Moreover, the "purer" a democracy, the more serious the problem of injecting warmth into "the coldest of all cold monsters", as Nietzsche called it, becomes. For what "democratic" or "civic culture" can replace, from a psychological point of view, full-blooded religion - believing in absolute truths and values that are not just projections of our desires?

Fukuyama discusses at some length how democratic society allows its megalothymic citizens to harmlessly "let off steam" - that is, excess thymos - through such activities as entrepreneurialism, competitive sport, intellectual and artistic achievement, ecological crusading and voluntary service in non-democratic societies. He has much less to say about how thymos is to be *generated* in relation to the central values and symbols of democratic society when that society is becoming - in this respect, at any rate - distinctly anaemic and "microthymic". Why, for example, should I go to war to make the world safe for democracy? To defend the good of "tolerance" against the evil of "intolerance"? Doesn't tolerance itself declare that one man's values are just as good as any other's? Why should I kill him just because, by an accident of birth, he hasn't reached my level of ecumenical consciousness and remains mired in the fanaticism of the pre-millennial, non-democratic age? The fact is that whereas democracy wages war on "bigoted", "intolerant", "inegalitarian" religion, it desperately needs some such religion itself...

4. The Dialectics of Democracy: (i) The Leftist Threat

⁷⁵² Fukuyama, op. cit., pp. 214-215.

In the last section of his book, entitled "The Last Man", Fukuyama examines two threats to the survival of democracy, one from the left of the political spectrum and the other from the right. From the left comes the challenge constituted by the never-ending demand for equality based on an ever-increasing list of supposed inequalities. "Already, forms of inequality such as racism, sexism, and homophobia have displaced the traditional class issue for the Left on contemporary college campuses. Once the principle of equal recognition of each person's human dignity - the satisfaction of their isothymia - is established, there is no guarantee that people will continue to accept the existence of natural or necessary residual forms of inequality. The fact that nature distributes capabilities unequally is not particularly just. Just because the present generation accepts this kind of inequality as either natural or necessary does not mean that it will be accepted as such in the future...

"The passion for equal recognition - isothymia - does not necessarily diminish with the achievement of greater de facto equality and material abundance, but may actually be stimulated by it...

"Today in democratic America there is a host of people who devote their lives to the total and complete elimination of any vestiges of inequality, making sure that no little girl should have to pay more to have her locks cut than a little boy, that no Boy Scout troop be closed to homosexual scoutmasters, that no building be built without a concrete wheelchair going up to the front door. These passions exist in American society because of, and not despite, the smallness of its actual remaining inequalities..."⁷⁵³

The proliferation of new "rights", many of them "ambiguous in their social content and mutually contradictory", threatens to dissolve the whole of society in a boiling sea of resentment. Hierarchy has all but disappeared. Anyone can now refuse obedience to, or take to court, anyone else - even children their parents. The very concept of degrees of excellence as something quite independent of race or sex is swept aside as all children are deemed to be equally intelligent, while Shakespeare's claim to pre-eminence in literature is rejected because he had the unfair advantage of being "white, male and Anglo-Saxon".

Still more alarming is the idea that all points of view are equal. As Tom Nichols writes, "Too few citizens understand democracy to mean a condition of political equality in which all get the franchise and are equal in the eyes of the law. Rather, they think of it as a state of actual equality, in which every opinion is as good as any other, regardless of the logic or evidentiary base behind it."⁷⁵⁴

Fukuyama points out that the doctrine of rights springs directly from an understanding of what man is. But the egalitarian and scientific revolutions undermine the Christian concept of man which the founders of liberalism, both Anglo-Saxon and German, took for granted, denying that there is any essential

⁷⁵³ Fukuyama, op. cit., pp. 294, 295.

⁷⁵⁴ Nichols, "How America Lost Faith in Expertise", *Foreign Affairs*, March/April, 2017, p. 73.

difference between man and nature because "man is simply a more organized and rational form of slime". It follows that essential human rights should be accorded also to the higher animals, like monkeys and dolphins, who can suffer pain as we do and are supposedly no less intelligent.⁷⁵⁵

"But the argument," writes Fukuyama, "will not stop there. For how does one distinguish between higher and lower animals? Who can determine what in nature suffers, and to what degree? Indeed, why should the ability to experience pain, or the possession of higher intelligence, become a title to superior worth?⁷⁵⁶ In the end, why does man have more dignity than any part of the natural world, from the most humble rock to the most distant star? Why should insects, bacteria, intestinal parasites, and HIV viruses not have rights equal to those of human beings?"⁷⁵⁷

The paradox is that this new understanding of life is in fact very similar to that of Hinduism, which has evolved, in the form of the Indian caste system, probably the most stubbornly unequal society in history!

Fukuyama concludes his examination of the challenge from the Left: "The extension of the principle of equality to apply not just to human beings but to non-human creation as well may today sound bizarre, but it is implied in our current impasse in thinking through the question: What is man? If we truly believe that he is not capable of moral choice or the autonomous use of reason, if he can be understood entirely in terms of the sub-human, then it is not only possible but *inevitable* that rights will gradually be extended to animals and other natural beings as well as men. The liberal concept of an equal and universal humanity with a specifically human dignity will be attacked both from above and below: by those who assert that certain group identities are more important than the quality of being human, and by those who believe that being human constitutes nothing distinctive against the non-human. The intellectual impasse in which modern relativism has left us does not permit us to answer either of these attacks definitively, and therefore does not permit defense of liberal rights traditionally understood..."⁷⁵⁸

5. The Dialectics of Democracy: (ii) The Rightist Threat

Fukuyama goes on to examine "a still greater and ultimately more serious threat" coming from the Right. This amounts to the accusation that when

⁷⁵⁵ On December 27, 1995, British Television (Channel 4) screened "The Great Ape Trial", a quasi-legal debate on the question whether apes should have human rights - that is, the rights to life, liberty and freedom from torture. Evidence was heard from a variety of academic "experts" from around the world who spoke about the apes' similarity or otherwise to human beings in tool-using and making, language, social relations, emotionality, and genetic makeup. The conclusion reached by the "jury" (with the exception of a journalist from *The Catholic Herald*) was that apes should indeed have human rights since they belong to "a community of equals" with us.

⁷⁵⁶ Cf. Joanna Bourke, *What It Means to be Human*, London: Virago, 2011.

⁷⁵⁷ Fukuyama, op. cit., pp. 297-298.

⁷⁵⁸ Fukuyama, op. cit., p. 298.

democratic man has won all his universal human rights, and become totally free and equal, he will be, to put it crudely, *a worthless nonentity*.

For individuals striving for something that is purer and higher are more likely to arise "in societies dedicated to the proposition that all men are *not* created equal. Democratic societies, dedicated to the opposite proposition, tend to promote a belief in the equality of all lifestyles and values. They do not tell their citizens how they should live, or what will make them happy, virtuous, or great. Instead, they cultivate the virtue of toleration, which becomes the *chief* virtue in democratic societies. And if men are unable to affirm that any particular way of life is superior to another, then they will fall back on the affirmation of life itself, that is, the body, its needs, and fears. While not all souls may be equally virtuous or talented, all bodies can suffer; hence democratic societies will tend to be compassionate and raise to the first order of concern the question of preventing the body from suffering. It is not an accident that people in democratic societies are preoccupied with material gain and live in an economic world devoted to the satisfaction of the myriad small needs of the body. According to Nietzsche, the last man has 'left the regions where it was hard to live, for one needs warmth.'

"One still works, for work is a form of entertainment. But one is careful lest the entertainment be too harrowing. One no longer becomes poor or rich: both require too much exertion. Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both require too much exertion.

"No shepherd and one herd! Everybody wants the same, everybody is the same: whoever feels different goes voluntarily into a madhouse.'

"It becomes particularly difficult for people in democratic societies to take questions with real moral content seriously in public life. Morality involves a distinction between better and worse, good and bad, which seems to violate the democratic principle of tolerance. It is for this reason that the last man becomes concerned above all for his own personal health and safety, because it is uncontroversial. In America today, we feel entitled to criticize another person's smoking habits, but not his or her religious beliefs or moral behavior. For Americans, the health of their bodies - what they eat and drink, the exercise they get, the shape they are in - has become a far greater obsession than the moral questions that tormented their forbears."⁷⁵⁹

"Modern education... stimulates a certain tendency towards relativism, that is, the doctrine that all horizons and value systems are relative to their time and place, and that none are true but reflect the prejudices or interests of those who advance them. The doctrine that says that there is no privileged perspective dovetails very nicely with democratic man's desire to believe that his way of life is just as good as any other. Relativism in this context does not lead to the liberation of the great or strong, but of the mediocre, who were now told that they had nothing of which to be ashamed. The slave at the beginning of history

⁷⁵⁹ Fukuyama, op. cit., pp. 305-306.

declined to risk his life in the bloody battle because he was instinctively fearful. The last man at the end of history *knows* better than to risk his life for a cause, because he recognizes that history was full of pointless battles in which men fought over whether they should be Christian or Muslim, Protestant or Catholic, German or French. The loyalties that drove men to desperate acts of courage and sacrifice were proven by subsequent history to be silly prejudices. Men with modern educations are content to sit at home, congratulating themselves on their broadmindedness and lack of fanaticism. As Nietzsche's Zarathustra says of them, 'For thus you speak: "Real are we entirely, and without belief or superstition." Thus you stick out your chests - but alas, they are hollow!'"⁷⁶⁰

"A dog is content to sleep in the sun all day provided he is fed, because he is not dissatisfied with what he is. He does not worry that other dogs are doing better than him, or that his career as a dog has stagnated, or that dogs are being oppressed in a distant part of the world. If man reaches a society in which he has succeeded in abolishing injustice, his life will come to resemble that of the dog. Human life, then, involves a curious paradox: it seems to require injustice, for the struggle against injustice is what calls forth what is highest in man."⁷⁶¹

For a man is more than a dog or a log. Even when all his desires have been satisfied, and even when all injustice has been eradicated, he wants, not to sleep, but to *act*. For he has a free will that depends on nothing outside itself, as described by Dostoyevsky's underground man: "one's own free, unrestrained choice, one's own whim, be it the wildest, one's own fancy, sometimes worked up to a frenzy... And where did these sages pick up the idea that man must have something which they feel is a normal and virtuous set of wishes? What makes them think that man's will must be reasonable and in accordance with his own interests? All man actually needs is *independent* will, at all costs and whatever the consequences..."⁷⁶²

Here we come to the root of the problem. Democracy's *raison d'être* is the liberation of the human will through the satisfaction of his most basic desires. But the problem is that the will, thus satisfied, has only just *begun* to manifest itself. For the will is not essentially a will *to* anything - not a will to eat, not a will to power; it is simply will tout court. "I *will*, therefore I *am*. And if you will otherwise, to hell with *you*! And if I will otherwise, to hell with *me*!" So perhaps *war* (and suicide) must be permitted in the society whose purpose is "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"? Of course, this was not the Founding Fathers' intention. They were reasonable men. But perhaps they did not pursue their reasoning through to its logical conclusion. Perhaps they did not understand that those bloody Roman dictators were not stupid when they defined the desires of the mob as bread and circuses, in which "circuses" had to include gladiatorial *murder*.

⁷⁶⁰ Fukuyama, op. cit., pp. 306-307.

⁷⁶¹ Fukuyama, op. cit., p. 311.

⁷⁶² Dostoyevsky, *Notes from Underground*, New York: Signet Classics.

In this connection, George Orwell writes some wise things on the roots of Hitler's appeal: "Certainly all progressive thought has assumed tacitly that human beings desire nothing beyond ease, security and avoidance of pain. In such a view of life there is no room, for instance, for patriotism and military virtues. The Socialist who finds his children playing with soldiers is usually upset, but he is never able to think of a substitute for the soldiers; tin pacifists somehow won't do. Hitler, because in his own joyless mind he feels it with exceptional strength, knows that human beings don't only want comfort, safety, short working-hours, hygiene, birth-control and, in general, common sense; they also, at least intermittently, want struggle and self-sacrifice, not to mention drums, flags and loyalty-parades."⁷⁶³

Hegel, unlike the Anglo-Saxons, did have a place for violence and war in his system - not war for war's sake, but war for democracy's sake. "A liberal democracy that could fight a short and decisive war every generation or so to defend its own liberty and independence would be far healthier and more satisfied than one that experienced nothing but continuous peace. Hegel's view of war reflects a common experience of combat: for while men suffer horribly and are seldom as frightened and miserable, their experience if they survive has the tendency of putting all things in a certain perspective."⁷⁶⁴

But for men who believe in nothing beyond themselves, there is nothing ennobling about war. It simply debases them still further. That became the fate of those Russian soldiers, who, on returning from the war in Chechnya, continued the war in mindless murders of their own people. For such men, war has become an end in itself. In a world in which all objective values have been radically undermined, killing is the only way they have to prove to themselves that they exist, that they can make a difference.

For "supposing", continues Fukuyama, "that the world has become 'filled up', so to speak, with liberal democracies, such that there exist no tyranny and oppression worthy of the name against which to struggle? Experience suggests that if men cannot struggle on behalf of a just cause because that just cause was victorious in an earlier generation, then they will struggle *against* the just cause. They will struggle for the sake of struggle. They will struggle, in other words, out of a certain boredom: for they cannot imagine living in a world without struggle. And if the greater part of the world in which they live is characterized by peaceful and prosperous liberal democracy, then they will struggle *against* that peace and prosperity, and against that democracy."⁷⁶⁵

As examples of this phenomenon, Fukuyama cites the événements in France in 1968, and the scenes of patriotic pro-war enthusiasm repeated in Paris, Petrograd, London, and Vienna in August, 1914. And yet there is a much better

⁷⁶³ Orwell, "Review of *Mein Kampf* by Adolf Hitler", 1940, in *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*, edited by Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1968.

⁷⁶⁴ Fukuyama, op. cit., pp. 329-30.

⁷⁶⁵ Fukuyama, op. cit., p. 330.

example much closer to home - the *crime* that has become such a universal phenomenon in modern democracies from London to Johannesburg, from Bangkok to Sao Paolo, from Washington to Moscow. It is as if Dostoyevsky's underground man has now become a whole class - the underclass of the metropolitan octopuses, whose tentacles extend ever wider and deeper into the major institutions and governments of the world.

And so we have come to the period before the coming of the Antichrist as described by St. Paul. For "know this," he said, "that in the last times perilous times will come: for men will be lovers of themselves, lovers of money, boasters, proud, blasphemous, disobedient to parents, unthankful, unholy, unloving, unforgiving, slanderers, without self-control, brutal despisers of good, traitors, headstrong, haughty, lovers of pleasure rather than lovers of God, having a form of godliness but denying its power... For the time will come when they will not endure sound doctrine, but according to their own desires, because they have itching ears, will heap up for themselves teachers, and they will turn their ears away from the truth, and be turned aside to fables" (II Timothy 3.1-5, 4.3-4).

Democrats ascribe the causes of sin and crime to poverty or unemployment, to a lack of education or a lack of rights. But most modern criminals are not hungry, nor are they struggling for rights; there is no *need* as such in most modern crime, no *idealism*, however misguided. Their motive may sometimes be revenge, or sex, or money; but in general their deeds are not "crimes of passion" in the conventional sense. Rather, their motive, as often as not, is that of Dostoyevsky's Underground Man, the desire to express their own, "independent will, at all costs and whatever the consequences". This expresses itself above all in the infallible index of misery and failure - *suicide*, which has multiplied just as other forms of violent death have declined. Thus in 2002, "Out of 57 million dead, only 172,000 people died in war and 569,000 died of violent crime (a total of 740,000 victims of human violence). In contrast, 873,000 people committed suicide..."⁷⁶⁶

Thus the logical consequence of the attainment of full democracy is *nihilism*, the universal war of every man against every man, *including himself*, for the sake of no man and no thing. For "modern thought raises no barriers to a future nihilistic war against liberal democracy on the part of those brought up in its bosom. Relativism - the doctrine that maintains that all values are merely relative and which attacks all 'privileged perspectives' - must ultimately end up undermining democratic and tolerant values as well."⁷⁶⁷

To fallen man's way of thinking, the only way of preventing the universal war of every man against every man is the imposition of a single world government. Whatever the cost... For, as Zbigniew Brzezinski said in 2009: "This crisis will end neither in August, nor in September, nor in October, nor in November, not in 2010, nor in 2012, nor in 2015. This crisis will never end until we attain our ends. You very well know what our ends are: a single world government. That is what

⁷⁶⁶ Harari, op. cit., p. 411.

⁷⁶⁷ Fukuyama, op. cit., p. 332.

is needed. And it will be formed, whether people like the idea or not. You yourselves will ask us about this, because in the future it will get worse and worse, worse and worse. For this much more than economic paralysis is needed. We need wars and epidemics throughout the world."

Thus democracy both leads to globalism, and must be destroyed by it. And those who, like Harari, believe that the one global superstate can be still be democratic, are deluding themselves. Such a state can be nothing but despotic and communistic...

6. The Ultimate Demise of Democracy

Fukuyama's argument could and should have concluded: "Democracy is doomed; we must find some other truths and values - *absolute* truths and values, or we shall all perish in a morass of relativism and nihilism." But at this point the limitations of his democratic education lead him to make his only act of *mauvaise foi*.

For in spite of the defects in the system that Fukuyama has himself exposed, he still declares his faith that democracy will win out in the end, if only because all other systems are dead or dying. And in an aptly American metaphor he compares the progress of democracy to a wagon train that, having crossed the Rockies in a raging blizzard and having withstood all the assaults of wild Indians and howling coyotes, comes to rest in - smog-filled, drug-addicted, crime-infested Los Angeles... Only in the very last sentence does he - very tentatively - recover somewhat and look over the parapet of democracy's last stand: "Nor can we in the final analysis know, provided a majority of the wagons eventually reach the same town, whether their occupants, having looked around a bit at their new surroundings, will not find them inadequate and set their eyes on a new and more distant journey..."⁷⁶⁸

Fukuyama may have his doubts - but these are overridden by his conviction that democracy, with human rights, represents "the end of history", the final, and best, political, economic, moral and spiritual system. But the end of history did not come... Democracy spread in the 1990s, but quantity did not always mean quality - according to Aga Khan, in 2004 nearly 40% of UN member states were *failed* democracies. Then, in 2008, came the great financial crash, and in 2020, as democracies declined and authoritarian regimes, especially China, strengthened, so did the grip of the globalists through their opportunistic use of the Covid-19 pandemic. Thus at the beginning of 2021 Andrew Neil wrote: "The decade ahead will be a continuing struggle between democrats and authoritarians. It is by no means certain democracy will win..."⁷⁶⁹

Lord Sumption, Supreme Court Justice, and a "main-stream liberal", says: "Democracy is inherently fragile. We have an idea that it's a very robust system.

⁷⁶⁸ Fukuyama, op. cit., p. 339.

⁷⁶⁹ Neil, "Yes, Britain can Spring Back!", *Daily Mail*, January 2, 2021.

But democracies have existed for about 150 years. In this country, I think you could say that they existed from the second half of the 19th century — they are not the norm. Democracies were regarded in ancient times as inherently self-destructive ways of government. Because, said Aristotle, democracies naturally turn themselves into tyranny. Because the populace will always be a sucker for a demagogue who will turn himself into an absolute ruler...

“Now, it is quite remarkable that Aristotle’s gloomy predictions about the fate of democracies have been falsified by the experience of the West ever since the beginning of democracy. And I think one needs to ask why that is. In my view, the reason is this: Aristotle was basically right about the tendencies, but we have managed to avoid it by a shared political culture of restraint. And this culture of restraint, which because it depends on the collective mentality of our societies, is extremely fragile, quite easy to destroy and extremely difficult to recreate...”⁷⁷⁰

Precisely. Moreover, the experience of western democracy since the Second World War must convince us that if “the culture of restraint” ever truly existed in modern times (which is doubtful), it is now in ruins as the Divine Restrainer removes His restraining power...

Ruin must be the ultimate lot of any system built, not on absolute truth, but on the relativisation of all opinions through the ballot box, and not on the eradication, or even the restraint of man’s fallen passions, but on their management and manipulation. For liberal democracy is designed, not to restrain, but to indulge the passions.

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The only system that is *radically* different from liberal democracy is Orthodox Autocracy. It sets itself a quite different goal: not the maximum of pleasure and happiness in this life, but salvation in the next, not the kingdom of this world but the city that is to come. So even if it could be proved that liberal democracy satisfied the earthly needs of men better than any other, this in no way invalidates Autocracy, insofar as the true subjects of Autocracy would gladly exchange happiness and prosperity in this life for salvation in the next. For while the purpose of democracy is the fullest satisfaction of man’s *fallen* nature, the purpose of Autocracy is the recreation of man’s original, *unfallen* nature in Christ; democracy seeks *satisfaction*: Autocracy – *salvation and deification*.

But it may be doubted that liberal democracy will achieve even its own base and thoroughly secular ends. For the cult of reason and liberalism, as L.A. Tikhomirov writes, “very much wants to establish worldly prosperity, it very much wants to make people happy, but it will achieve nothing, because it approaches the problem from the wrong end. It may appear strange that people

⁷⁷⁰ Freddie Sayers, “Lord Sumption: Civil Disobedience has Begun”, *Unherd*, March, 2021, https://unherd.com/2021/03/lord-sumption-civil-disobedience-has-begun/?fbclid=IwAR3YE-1rODkCp0rxuWSNHRj5K_YonrEhviL_eDDhYluQJwFTXn8dHZIqII.

who think only of earthly prosperity, and who put their whole soul into realising it, attain only disillusionment and exhaustion. People who, on the contrary, are immersed in cares about the invisible life beyond the grave, attain here, on earth, results constituting the highest examples yet known on earth of personal and social development! However, this strangeness is self-explanatory. The point is that *man* is by his nature precisely the kind of being that Christianity understands him to be *by faith*; the aims of life that are indicated to him *by faith* are precisely the kind of aims that he has in reality, and not the kind that reason divorced from faith delineates. Therefore in educating a man in accordance with the Orthodox world-view, we conduct his education *correctly*, and thence we get results that are good not only in that which is most important [salvation] (which unbelievers do not worry about), but also in that which is secondary (which is the only thing they set their heart on). In losing *faith*, and therefore ceasing to worry about the most important thing, people lost the possibility of developing man in accordance with his true nature, and so they get distorted results in earthly life, too.”⁷⁷¹

Thus even the most perfectly functioning democracy will ultimately fail, for the simple reason that while man is fallen, he is not *completely* fallen. He is still made in the image of God, so that even when all his fallen desires have been satisfied there will still be an unsatisfied longing for something higher, something to fill the God-shaped hole at the centre of his being (St. Augustine). “Happiness” (Mammon) – the supreme “right” of man, according to the American Constitution – is unattainable as long as only our own, and not other people’s happiness, our own glory, and not God’s glory, is the goal; and even if it is attained on earth, it will only be brief and entail inevitable ennui and the dust of death; for its attainment will bring the frustration of the desire for the infinitely greater happiness of heaven, eternal joy in God.

The romantic/revolutionary age that followed the age of reason highlighted this truth, albeit in a perverted, demonic way; for it showed that there is more in heaven and earth and in the soul of man – far greater heights, but also far more abysmal depths – than were ever dreamed of in the complacent psychology of the liberal philosophers. It is time – high time – to return to the Age of Faith – if not materially and technologically, at any rate morally and philosophically – when right-believing kings and bishops, governed by “the faith once delivered to the saints” (Jude 3), laboured in harmony to bring the bodies and souls of men to the City “whose founder and builder is God” (Hebrews 11.10). “For here we have no continuing city, but we seek the one to come” (Hebrews 13.14)...

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These last words encapsulate the main lesson we derive from our survey of universal history down the millenia. For all the cities and civilizations and empires we have surveyed have perished, and the one we live in now must soon

⁷⁷¹ Tikhomirov, “Dukhovenstvo i obshchestvo v sovremennom religioznom dvizhenii” (“The Clergy and Society in the Contemporary Religious Movement”), in *Khristianstvo i Politika* (Christianity and Politics), Moscow, 1999, pp. 30-31.

perish too. For, as St. Nikolai Velimirovich writes: "Were not Babylon and Nineveh great cities, my brethren? Today lizards bask in the dust of their towers. Were not Memphis and Thebes the pride of Pharaohs and the princes of the earth? It is difficult today to ascertain precisely where they were located.

"But let us leave aside critics of brick and stone; let us look at cities of flesh and bone. Men build the cities of their bodies more slowly and carefully than they do fortresses and cathedrals. Men build their bodies for eighty or a hundred years, and see in the end that their labour is vain. That which took decades to build with care and constant anxiety disintegrates into grave-dust in the twinkling of an eye. Whose body does not get destroyed and turned to dust? No-one's.

"But let us leave aside cities of the body; let us look at the pleasure-cities that men have built generation after generation. The materials from which these cities are built are merriment, ease, possessions, power, honour and glory. Where are these cities? As a cobweb, they enfold a man for a moment and, like a cobweb, they fall apart and disappear, making happiness the greatest of griefs.

"Indeed, we have here no continuing city – and therefore we seek one to come. This is the city built of spirit, life and truth. This is the city whose one and only Builder is the Lord Jesus Christ. This city is called the Kingdom of Heaven and life immortal, the court of the angels, the haven of the saints, the refuge of the martyrs. In this city there is no duality of good and evil, but only good. All that is built in this city is built forever. Every brick in this city remains and endures without end, for the bricks are living angels and men. The risen Lord Jesus Christ sits and reigns on the throne of this city.

"O risen Lord, deliver us from beneath the ruins of time, and lead us in Thy mercy to Thine eternal city in heaven. To Thee be glory and praise for ever. Amen."⁷⁷²

⁷⁷² Velimirovich, *The Prologue from Ochrid*, Birmingham: Lazarica Press, 1086, volume II, April 12, pp. 48-49.

POSTSCRIPT. FROM GLOBAL DEMOCRACY TO GLOBAL DESPOTISM

In 1492 Columbus discovered America while trying to encompass the world. Following his example, in 1553 Sebastian Cabot in London formed the “Mysterie and company of the Merchant Adventurers for the discoverie of Cathay and divers other lands”. The plan was to reach Cathay by the northern route around the North Cape. An expedition of three ships, which “discovered” Russia for these, the original globalists, was fitted out with the blessing of King Edward VI and furnished with a letter of introduction to all rulers “in all places under the universal heaven” which elegantly linked commerce between nations to a Divine Plan for universal accord: “The God of heaven and earth greatly providing for mankind would not that all things should be found in one region, to the ende that one should have neede of another, that by this meanes friendship might be established among all men, and every one seek to gratifie all.”⁷⁷³

This was, as it were, the original charter for globalization. Unfortunately, its Christian idealism had long since petered out by the twentieth century, when the main motive of globalization was not commerce plus Christianity but commerce plus totalitarian rule. For, as Hannah Arendt once wrote: “The struggle for total domination of the total population of the earth, the elimination of every nontotalitarian reality, is inherent in the totalitarian regimes themselves; if they do not pursue global rule as their ultimate goal, they are only too likely to lose whatever power they have already seized.”⁷⁷⁴

Arendt was referring to Fascism and Communism. But there is an important sense in which Liberalism, the first of the three offspring of the French Revolution, is also totalitarian. It seeks to impose global democracy in the political sphere, and capitalism in the economic sphere. Thus if, as Mark Mazower writes, “the real victor in 1989,” writes Mark Mazower, “was not democracy but capitalism”⁷⁷⁵, we must accept that it was a new kind of capitalism – globalistic capitalism. For “after the fall of the Iron Curtain the pace of globalization intensified markedly, the result in no small measure of the explosion of technological change and the rapid spread of the internet, especially after the World Wide Web (invented in 1989) became widely available from 1991 onwards...”⁷⁷⁶

Not that globalization was really new. As Peter Frankopan writes, “We think of globalization as a uniquely modern phenomenon; yet 2000 years ago too, it was a fact of life, one that presented opportunities, created problems and prompted technological advance...”

⁷⁷³ Benson Bobrick, *Ivan the Terrible*, Edinburgh: Canongate, 1987, pp. 147-148.

⁷⁷⁴ Arendt, *Totalitarianism*, p. 90.

⁷⁷⁵ Mazower, *Dark Continent. Europe's Twentieth Century*, London: Penguin, 1999, p. 405.

⁷⁷⁶ Ian Kershaw, *Roller-Coaster. Europe 1950-2017*, London: Penguin, 2019, pp. xxv-xxvi.

“Two millennia ago, silks made by hand in China were being worn by the rich and powerful in Carthage and other cities in the Mediterranean, while pottery manufactured in southern France could be found in England and in the Persian Gulf. Spices and condiments grown in India were being used in the kitchens of Xinjiang, as they were in those of Rome. Buildings in northern Afghanistan carried inscriptions in Greek, while horses from Central Asia were being ridden proudly thousands of miles away in the east.”⁷⁷⁷

What was new after 1989 was the width and depth of the new wave of globalization that had begun in the 1950s under the aegis of America, and became consolidated after the victory of America, the world’s only remaining superpower, in 1989-91, enabling Eastern Europe and other formerly communist regions to take part in its formerly forbidden delights.

During the Cold War, there had been two very different worlds, Capitalism and Communism, and a third world that swayed from one side to the other. By the end of the millennium there was essentially only *one world*, the world of globalization. Even Russia and China became partially globalized: only North Korea and to some extent Iran remained outside the new global civilization.

“I believe,” wrote Thomas L. Friedman, “that if you want to understand the post-Cold War world you have to start by understanding that a new international system has succeeded it – globalization. This is ‘The One Big Thing’ people should focus on. Globalization is not the only thing influencing events in the world today, but to the extent that there is a North Star and a worldwide shaping force, it is this system. What is new is the system. What is old is power politics, chaos, clashing civilizations and liberalism. And what is the drama of the post-Cold War world is the interaction between this new system and these old passions.”⁷⁷⁸

This was an exaggeration: the old world was by no means dead, neither its “passions” nor its political structures. But there can be no arguing about the importance of globalization. But what is it? *Investopedia* defines it as “the tendency of investment funds and businesses to move beyond domestic and national markets to other markets around the globe, thereby increasing the interconnection of the world. Globalization has had the effect of markedly increasing international trade and cultural exchange.”⁷⁷⁹ But it has eroded the power of national governments and increased those of multi-national corporations (150 MNCs now control two-thirds of the world economy). If national governments do not cooperate with the MNCs and the globalization process, they risk seeing factories and jobs removed to other, lower-wage-paying countries. This causes unemployment in some industries and therefore social unrest.

⁷⁷⁷ Frankopan, *The Silk Roads*, London: Bloomsbury, 2016, pp. 12, 25.

⁷⁷⁸ Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*; in M.J. Cohen and John Major, *History in Quotations*, London: Cassell, 2004, p. 944.

⁷⁷⁹ <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/globalization.asp#ixzz4ZuLDrfAT>.

Moreover, while *trade* liberalization may provide comparative advantage, especially in a period when tariffs are initially high (as in the post-war period), it is quite another matter with *financial* liberalization. For, as Mazower writes, “the globalization of financial makes it increasingly difficult for nation-states to preserve autonomy of action, yet markets – as a series of panics and crashes demonstrates – generate their own irrationalities and social tensions. The globalization of labour, too, challenges prevailing definitions of national citizenship, culture and tradition.”⁷⁸⁰

While true globalists welcome these tensions and disruptions as creating the perceived need for a world government, the shorter-term consequences are undoubtedly bad. Thus Dani Rodrik writes in 2018: “Perhaps the hyper-globalisers’ most egregious mistake after the 1990s was to promote financial globalization. They took the textbook argument and ran amok with it. Free flow of finance across the world would, it was confidently predicted, set money to work where it could do most good. With free-flowing capital, savings would be automatically channelled to countries with higher returns; with access to the world markets, economies and entrepreneurs would have access to more dependable finance; and, ordinary individual savers would benefit, too, as they’d no longer be compelled to put all their nest eggs in one national basket.

“These gains, by and large, simply never materialized; sometimes, the effect was the opposite of what was promised. China became an exporter of capital, rather than an importer of it, which is what the theory implied young and poor countries should be. Loosening the chains of finance produced a string of extremely costly financial crises, including that in East Asia in 1997. There is, at best, a weak correlation between opening up to foreign finance and economic growth. But there is a strong empirical association between financial globalization and financial crises over time, as there have been since the 19th century, when freely moving international capital would flow with gusto into the Argentinian railways or some far-flung corner of the British Empire one minute, only to flee away from it the next.

“Modern financial globalization went furthest in the Eurozone. Monetary unification aimed at complete financial integration, by removing all transaction costs associated with national borders. The introduction of the euro in 1999 did indeed drive down risk premiums in countries such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal, as borrowing costs converged. But what was the effect? To enable borrowers to run large current account deficits, and accumulate problematic amounts of external debt. Money flowed into those parts of the debtor economies that couldn’t be traded across borders – above all, construction – at the expense of tradable activities. Credit booms eventually turned into the inevitable busts, and sustained slumps in Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland followed amid the global credit crunch.

⁷⁸⁰ Mazower, op. cit., p. 405.

“Today, the economics profession’s view on financial globalization is ambivalent at best. It is well understood that market and government failures – asymmetric information, bank runs, excess volatility, inadequate regulation – are endemic to the financial markets. Globalisation often accentuates these failures. Indeed, in the 1997 East Asian crisis those economies that kept more control of foreign capital survived with less damage. In sum, unconditional openness to foreign finance is hardly ever a good idea...”⁷⁸¹

Globalization, then, has both pros and cons... Samuel Huntingdon made an important distinction between two different things that were becoming global: modernization and westernization.⁷⁸² Globalization in the sense of the modernization and integration of the whole world is not evil in itself. It could even work to the furtherance of the good - and not only economic good - in certain circumstances. If, for example, the True Faith could be preached globally, using global means of communication, as it was in the time of the apostles. Thus would the Lord’s prophecy be fulfilled: “This Gospel of the Kingdom will be preached in all the world as a witness to all the nations, and then the end will come” (Matthew 24.14). What is evil is the globalization of *westernization*, the spreading of the apostate culture of the western world.⁷⁸³

It is easy to see that a global republic or kingdom would have no place in it for Orthodoxy except as a kind of cultural museum, an exhibition of East European folklore, and could very quickly turn the propaganda of freedom into the reality of a tyranny that could be worse than any that has gone before it.

Opinions on globalization are thus sharply divided. Indeed, the debate between the globalists and anti-globalists is probably the sharpest debate in the contemporary world. Christians tend to believe that since the Tower of Babel, different languages and nations have been created by God to *slow down* the spread of evil, and as refuges against it; but for atheist globalists individual, sovereign nations *are* the evil.

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Globalization leads logically to the demand for a world government that will regulate the process of globalization, facilitating it and removing the supposed obstacles to the prosperity of the global community, such as global warming or the spread of pandemics or over-population (to mention only secular dangers).

There is no longer any secret about the fact that many of the world’s richest and most powerful men are working towards a world government. This was being spoken about openly already by Bush and Gorbachev at the end of the Cold War; they saw it as a natural product of the new international situation brought

⁷⁸¹ Rorik, “The Great Globalisation Lie”, *Prospect*, January, 2018, p. 33.

⁷⁸² Huntingdon, *The Clash of Civilizations*, London: Touchstone, 1996.

⁷⁸³ Bandar bin Sultan: “We Saudis want to modernize, but not necessarily westernize”, *New York Times*, July 10, 1994.

about by perestroika and the end of the Cold War. Bush went further, using what for many was a code word for something more sinister: “the new world order”. For Bush this appeared to refer to the rule of international law administered by the United Nations in close cooperation with the United States as the world’s only surviving superpower and executed most successfully by the international alliance assembled for Operation Desert Storm against Saddam Hussein. President Bush’s reference to a “new world order” was rich in connotations for conspiracy theorists, who have seen in this phrase the code-name for an age-old conspiracy at world domination, going back to Weishaupt’s *Illuminati* of the late eighteenth century.

Thus Mike Hanson writes: “Many believe that a powerful group of *Illuminati* Freemasons manipulated and won the War of Independence in 1776 and then took control of the new United States of America. They believe that this Secret Brotherhood has never conceded that control to this day. It is interesting to note the design for the Great Seal of the United States, which contains magical symbols dating to ancient Egypt and beyond, including the pyramid and all-seeing eye of Horus. Above and below this symbol are two Latin phrases, *Annuit Coeptis* and *Novus Ordo Seclorum*. These translate as ‘Announcing the birth, creation, or arrival’ of ‘A Secular [Non-Religious] New Order of Ages’. In other words, they were announcing the creation of the New World Order.

“The founding of the United States was a massive step in the plan for centralized global power. Today, this part of the Great Seal can be found on the back of every US dollar bill, which seems appropriate, given that the Secret Brotherhood controls the American economy. The decision to put the Pyramid and *Novus Ordo Seclorum* symbol on the dollar was made by the 33rd degree Freemason, Franklin D. Roosevelt, in 1935, with the full support and encouragement of his vice president, Henry Wallace, another 33rd degree Mason. The American flag was also designed to reflect Brotherhood symbolism, and the Statue of Liberty [representing Isis] was given to American Freemasons by a French Grand Orient (*Illuminati*) Masonic Order.

“Today, the Secret Brotherhood’s conspiratorial network includes the mysterious Bilderberg Group; Yale University’s prestigious Skull & Bones Society, the clandestine Black Lodges of Freemasonry, and the secretive Knights of Malta. Its diabolical influence reaches into the corridors of power at the White House, the CIA, the Federal Reserve, even the Vatican...”⁷⁸⁴

“According to Neil Wilgus in *The Illuminati*, George Washington had read [John Robinson’s] *Proofs [Proofs of a Conspiracy against All the Religions and Governments of Europe, carried out in the Secret Meetings of the Free Masons, Illuminati, and Reading Societies]* and felt that the allegations contained therein deserved further investigation. Washington’s own correspondence with fellow Masons clearly indicates that he was well aware of subversive forces at work within rival branches of masonic lodges in Europe, and expressed concern that

⁷⁸⁴ Hanson, *Bohemian Grove: Cult of Conspiracy*, Austin, Texas: RiverCrest Publishing, 2012, p. 44.

the curse had spread to American lodges. Wilgus also writes that Thomas Jefferson was at least somewhat familiar with Weishaupt's works and felt an admiration for him. It appears Jefferson disagreed with Washington's point of view that the Illuminati had infiltrated American Freemasonry; Jefferson believed that such a thing could not possibly happen in America, since our freedom of speech would have made secrecy unnecessary. Obviously, Jefferson was either a member of the secret brotherhood, or else he was just painfully misguided in this belief, for the Illuminati continues to secretly guide American foreign and domestic policy to this very day..."⁷⁸⁵

Hanson's argument is not convincing. It is highly unlikely that the Illuminati were numerous enough to engineer any revolution as early as 1776 and as far away as America... Moreover, there is no evidence for any continuity between the eighteenth-century Illuminati and any twentieth-century American government. Certainly, some American presidents, such as Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman, were high-ranking Masons, and Roosevelt may have influenced or even decreed the introduction of the Masonic symbols on the American dollar bill, including the inscription *Novus Ordo Seclorum*. And they may have identified this New World Order with the universal triumph of the American foreign policy aims of democracy, free trade and universal human rights. But there was no secrecy or conspiracy about these aims: they were openly proclaimed from Woodrow Wilson in 1919 to George H. W. Bush in 1991. Conspiracy implies a certain malevolence that needs to be hidden from public view; and such a conspiracy in the highest reaches of American power in that period has yet to be demonstrated.

But this is not to say that some other organization, not directly descended from the *Illuminati*, and not necessarily governmental, but having essentially the same conspiratorial aims, may not exist. For conspiracies *do* exist; and it would be foolish to deny that there may be other non-governmental organizations or global cabals with serious dreams of world domination. The Rothschilds and the Rockefellers are astonishingly rich, as are other famous globalists such as Bill Gates and George Soros; and at the time of writing (2021) these men, all globalists, between them control a large number of the world's most powerful institutions.⁷⁸⁶

One of these institutions is the highly secretive Bilderbergers, founded by a Rothschild ally, Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands. In June, 1991, at the Bilderberger meeting in Baden-Baden, Germany, David Rockefeller said: "We are grateful to the *Washington Post*, the *New York Times*, *Time Magazine* and other great publications whose directors have attended our meetings and respected their promises of discretion for almost forty years. It would have been impossible for us to develop our plan for the world if we had been subjected to the lights of publicity during those years. But, the world is [now] more sophisticated and prepared to march towards a world government. The supranational sovereignty

⁷⁸⁵ Hanson, op. cit., p. 63.

⁷⁸⁶ See the March, 2020 youtube film, "The Fall of the Cabal",
<https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL18vrD9EPjAC7cQGB9flzJcziJg4xwZkT>

of an intellectual elite and world bankers is surely preferable to the national autodetermination practiced in past centuries." ⁷⁸⁷This was proof – by a man who should have known – that there did indeed exist a powerful plutocracy, “an intellectual elite and world bankers” striving to create a world government that would be at the expense of “national autodetermination”, that is, the sovereignty of individual national states. From Rockefeller’s remarks, we can see that this plan for a world government had been in the making for nearly sixty-five years, that is, since the early 1950s. (It should be remembered that the plot of land in New York where the United Nations building was built was bought from the Rockefeller family.) We also see from his remarks that the promise of secrecy which the Bilderbergers had felt to be necessary in the early 1950s was now no longer believed to be so pressing at the time of Rockefeller’s speech – presumably because that year, 1991, the year of the West’s seemingly final victory in the Cold War, seemed to betoken “the End of History” and the final triumph of that system of political and economic governance – liberal democracy and the free market – which the Bilderbergers knew well how to manipulate. Again, at the Bildeberger meeting in May, 1992 Henry Kissinger said: "Today Americans would be outraged if U.N. troops entered Los Angeles to restore order; tomorrow they will be grateful! This is especially true if they were told there was an outside threat from beyond, whether real or promulgated, that threatened our very existence. It is then that all peoples of the world will pledge with world leaders to deliver them from this evil. The one thing every man fears is the unknown. When presented with this scenario, individual rights will be willingly relinquished for the guarantee of their well being granted to them by their world government."

President George H.W. Bush saw in a revamped United Nations the core of global unity: "I see a world of open borders, open trade and, most importantly, open minds; a world that celebrates the common heritage that belongs to all the world's people.... I see a world building on the emerging new model of European unity. ... The United Nations is the place to build international support and consensus for meeting the other challenges we face.... the threats to the environment, terrorism... international drug trafficking... refugees.... We must join together in a new compact -- all of us -- to bring the United Nations into the 21st century."

The Americans under Truman had created the United Nations in 1945, so it was logical for Truman’s successor to want to relaunch it in 1991.

However, all confederations of sovereign or quasi-sovereign states are extremely difficult to hold together, as the history of the last days of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia – and probably, in our generation, of the European Union after the departure of Britain – clearly shows. Moreover, the freer and more democratic the members of the confederation are, the more difficult it becomes to achieve consensus, and the greater the temptation to turn these free confederations into less free, more despotic federations. In the case of today’s

⁷⁸⁷ See also N. Rockefeller’s speech in 1962: <http://streitcouncil.org/uploads/PDF/F&U-%201962-%20May-%20Rockefeller-%20federalism%20and%20free%20world%20order.pdf>.

“international community”, the difficulties are multiplied many times, while the temptation to form a world government that will *impose* its will on all the nations of the world – through technological means and/or technological created crises, such as the coronavirus - increases proportionately. Unless such a world government can be guaranteed to follow Christian rather than secular and atheist principles, it is likely that it will become the most despotic state in history. Hence we can see how the victory of even the most enlightened democracy can easily lead to the victory of the most evil and totalitarian despotism – the despotism of the Antichrist himself...

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We have seen how world leaders were already receptive of the argument for a world government in 1989-92. Let us now turn to the argument put forward by the Israeli philosopher Yuval Noah Harari, who writes: “Since around 200 BC, most humans have lived in empires. It seems likely that in the future, too, most humans will live in one. But this time the empire will be truly global. The imperial vision of dominion over the entire world could be imminent.

“As the twenty-first century unfolds, nationalism is fast losing ground. More and more people believe that all of humankind is the legitimate source of political authority, rather than the members of a particular nationality, and that safeguarding human rights and protecting the interests of the entire human species should be the guiding light of politics. If so, having close to 200 independent states is a hindrance rather than a help. Since Swedes, Indonesians and Nigerians deserve the same human rights, wouldn’t it be simpler for a single global government to safeguard them?

“The appearance of essentially global problems, such as melting ice caps, nibbles away at whatever legitimacy remains to the independent nation states. No sovereign state will be able to overcome global warming on its own. The Chinese Mandate of Heaven was given by Heaven to solve the problems of mankind. The modern Mandate of Heaven will be given to humankind to solve the problems of heaven, such as the hole in the ozone layer and the accumulation of greenhouse gases. The colour of the global empire may well be green.

“As of 2014, the world is still politically fragmented, but states are fast losing their independence. Not one of them is really able to execute independent economic policies, to declare and wage wars as it pleases, or even to run its own internal affairs as it sees fit. States are increasingly open to the machinations of global markets, to the interference of global companies and NGOs, and to the supervision of global public opinion and the international judicial system. States are obliged to conform to global standards of financial behavior, environmental policy and justice. Immensely powerful currents of capital, labour and information turn and shape the world, with a growing disregard for the borders and opinions of states.

“The global empire being forged before our eyes is not governed by any particular state or ethnic group. Much like the Late Roman Empire, it is ruled by a multi-ethnic elite, and is held together by a common culture and common interests. Throughout the world, more and more entrepreneurs, engineers, experts, scholars, lawyers and managers are called to join the empire. They must ponder whether to answer the imperial call or to remain loyal to their state and people. More and more choose the empire...”⁷⁸⁸

“The empire”... Yes indeed; for one thing is clear: a world government or empire is highly unlikely to be democratic, however much lip-service may be paid to democracy. And if it is not democratic, then it will be despotic. This is the whole pathos of the position of the Brexiteers who led Britain out of the European Union in January, 2020. Although most of the arguments have been about economics, the true Brexiteers, as the historian Niall Ferguson, a former “Remainer”, has ruefully come to recognize, are quite prepared for their country to take a “hit” in terms of economics so long as it retains true sovereignty, that is, real independence from the European Commission, that is, the despotic Politburo of the European Union. However, the “Remainers” retort that this is not so, that the admitted “democratic deficit” is being overcome, that the European parliament is – or, at any rate one day will be – the real sovereign power in Europe and the true expression of the democratic will of the European peoples.

The argument between globalists and anti-globalists in Europe is a vitally important one, which neither side can afford to lose. For, as we have seen the European Union is seen by many as a kind of microcosm of world government, and the acid test of its real feasibility.⁷⁸⁹ For if, it is argued, globalism can triumph on the European continent, which is a kaleidoscope of so many different languages, cultures and historical traditions whose lack of unity has engendered so many of the most destructive wars in human history, then it can triumph anywhere and everywhere. If, on the other hand, even such a modern country as Britain, which has been historically at the forefront of almost every modernist wave in politics, economics and culture, succeeds in her bid for freedom, then she will become a beacon for the so-called “populists” or anti-globalists everywhere. Moreover, it is argued, Europe *must* hold off the British challenge insofar as Europe is the original homeland of democracy, claims to promote democracy as one of its core values, and admits only democracies among its member-states (that is, democracies prepared to surrender their freedom to the new despotism).

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It used to be thought, even by very intelligent men such as Winston Churchill and C.S. Lewis, that in spite of all its manifest flaws, Democracy was still the best

⁷⁸⁸ Harari, Sapiens. *A Brief History of Humankind*, London: Vintage, 2011, pp. 231-232.

⁷⁸⁹ See, for example, the emotional pleading for the EU as a model of World Government, combined with mocking of Brexit, by Ullrich Fichtner, “From Brussels to the Rest of the World. How Europe Became a Model for the 21st Century”, *Der Spiegel*, February 4, 2021.

system of government. Not because it was particularly good in itself, but because it was the least bad. And because it prevented the worst – Despotism.

Orthodox thinkers from St. Gregory the Theologian to Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow did not buy this argument. And the history of politics has provided many serious grounds for their scepticism since the time of Socrates – the best of Athenians, who was executed by Athenian democracy. Perhaps the most vivid recent proof that Democracy by no means prevents Despotism, but, as Socrates' disciple Plato warned, prepares the way for it, is to be found in the period 1917 to 1945, when the two worst despots in world history came to power through, - or were at any rate confirmed in power by, - democratic elections: Lenin in 1917 and Hitler in 1933.

The most recent period of history, since the beginning of the third Christian millennium, has provided further evidence for this scepticism. For in 2000 Putin – a despot for all those with eyes to see – came to power on the back of the democratic regime of his patron, Yeltsin. And the United States of America, the most democratic state in the world, now appears to be descending into despotism, not the conventional one-man despotism of the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany, but the anarchy and paralysis of institutions combined with anti-democratic coercion from above whose source we shall call, following the Berlin Committee on Coronavirus, “Mr. Global”.

A recent article in *Foreign Affairs* by Fiona Hill, deputy assistant to President Trump and senior director for European and Russian affairs on the National Security Council, confirms this analysis.⁷⁹⁰ Hill's article provides some brilliant insights; but it also has some serious flaws (for example, that the present disaster is mainly the fault of Trump and can be put right by Biden). And its proposed remedy – more democracy – is very far from flawless...

Hill's essential insight is correct: that Russia and America, politically speaking, are not so different, and that it is not Russia that is moving closer to America, but the other way round: America is moving closer to Russia – that is, towards despotism: “In the very early years of the post-Cold War era, many analysts and observers had hoped that Russia would slowly but surely converge in some ways with the United States. They predicted that once the Soviet Union and communism had fallen away, Russia would move toward a form of liberal democracy. By the late 1990s, it was clear that such an outcome was not on the horizon. And in more recent years, quite the opposite has happened: the United States has begun to move closer to Russia, as populism, cronyism, and corruption have sapped the strength of American democracy. This is a development that few would have foreseen 20 years ago, but one that American leaders should be doing everything in their power to halt and reverse.

⁷⁹⁰ Hill, “The Kremlin's Strange Victory. How Putin Exploits American Dysfunction and Fuels American Decline,” *Foreign Affairs*, November/December, 2021.

“Indeed, over time, the United States and Russia have become subject to the same economic and social forces. Their populations have proved equally susceptible to political manipulation. Prior to the 2016 U.S. election, Putin recognized that the United States was on a path similar to the one that Russia took in the 1990s, when economic dislocation and political upheaval after the collapse of the Soviet Union had left the Russian state weak and insolvent. In the United States, decades of fast-paced social and demographic changes and the Great Recession of 2008–9 had weakened the country and increased its vulnerability to subversion. Putin realized that despite the lofty rhetoric that flowed from Washington about democratic values and liberal norms, beneath the surface, the United States was beginning to resemble his own country: a place where self-dealing elites had hollowed out vital institutions and where alienated, frustrated people were increasingly open to populist and authoritarian appeals. The fire was already burning; all Putin had to do was pour on some gasoline...”

This analysis is confirmed in spades by the latest political, or rather geopolitical, global crisis: the covid-19 “pandemic”. Hill misses the point when she writes: “Partisan spectacles during the global covid-19 pandemic have undermined the country’s international standing as a model of liberal democracy and eroded its authority on public health”. America’s “standing as a model of liberal democracy” has been undermined, not by the right-left stand-off, but because *it has closed down democracy during the crisis*; and it has “eroded its authority on public health” because *it has destroyed the nation’s public health* by obeying a new global master.

For the transformation that has taken place during the covid crisis has been not so much from American democracy into Russian despotism, but of both countries *into a new global despotism*. For in both countries, and throughout the world, governments have, in a strikingly coordinated manner, ridden roughshod over democratic and ecclesiastical institutions in their determination to control their populations politically, economically, financially, judicially, culturally - and medically. Traditional, effective methods of controlling the virus have been banned; essentially untested and harmful experimental vaccines have been introduced and more or less forced on the populations; open discussion of what these so-called “vaccines” are (they are in fact modes of genetic manipulation), and whether they should be introduced, has been banned, even among scientists. And the most surprising and alarming aspect of the whole crisis is the degree to which governments appear to be coordinating their actions, singing from the same hymn-sheet, as if on the instructions of some “Mr. Global”. As to who “Mr. Global” is, this remains a mystery for the time being; but the at any rate partial participation in the New World Order of the United Nations, which is now a largely Marxist or neo-Marxist organization, seems undoubted⁷⁹¹; and it seems clear that not only the American government under Biden, but also the Russian government under Putin appear to be obeying “Mr. Global’s” instructions....

⁷⁹¹ <https://youtu.be/l9NvYfQ1sd4>.

Hill does not discuss this subordination of both the American and the Russian leaders to the behind-the-scenes global government. She seems to believe that the solution to the complete dissolution of democracy in the world today is – more democracy, and that American democracy can be revived through a clean-up of American institutions by President Biden. But it is too late. Democracy is destroyed, not only in the East but also in the West. The prophecy of the great Russian elder Ignaty of Harbin in the 1930s has been fulfilled: “What began in Russia will be completed in America...” Lenin always insisted that the revolution would fail if it was not global. It seemed to have failed in 1991 with the fall of the Soviet Union; but now, in an increasingly global and socialized world, it looks again like a real possibility.

According to Alex Newman, both Russia and America are regional parts of the New World Order. “Despite the saber rattling, globalists on both sides of the East-West divide refer to their goal as the creation of a ‘New World Order.’ This ‘order’ they speak of, as we shall show, represents, essentially, a global system of political and economic control over humanity. And Putin, a former KGB boss, is following precisely the strategies toward world order outlined openly by the same Western establishment he purportedly stands as a bulwark against. He often refers to his vision as the imposition of a new, ‘multi-polar’ world order. But a growing amount of evidence shows that it is exactly the same order sought by globalist Western powerbrokers.

“One of the keys to understanding Putin’s crucial role in imposing the ‘New World Order’ on humanity is a grasp of how its proponents plan to build it. Rather than aiming to foist a full-blown totalitarian global government on the world all at once, top globalists around the world have outlined a different strategy. In essence, the plot aims to divide the planet’s people and nations into massive ‘regions’ ruled by supranational institutions – such as the European Union, which is now responsible for the bulk of European laws – virtually free of public control or oversight. The outline of that plan is now in full public view.

“Indeed, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger – one of the most visible and outspoken globalist ‘New World Order’ schemers – has explained the strategy openly on numerous occasions. Most recently, writing in the *Wall Street Journal* on August 29, Kissinger, using opaque and rather unexciting writing, explained how the process should work. ‘The contemporary quest for world order will require a coherent strategy to establish a concept of order *within* the various regions and to relate these regional orders to one another,’ he explained in the op-ed, headlined ‘Henry Kissinger on the Assembly of a New World Order.’

“But the strategy is nothing new. In 1995, fellow globalist and ex-National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, architect of David Rockefeller’s infamous Trilateral Commission, outlined essentially the same plan. ‘We do not have a New World Order.... We cannot leap into world government in one quick step,’ he said in 1995 at the ‘State of the World Forum,’ convened by former Soviet dictator Mikhail Gorbachev and backed by the Rockefellers and other establishment

forces in the West. 'In brief, the precondition for eventual globalization — genuine globalization — is progressive regionalization, because thereby we move toward larger, more stable, more cooperative units.'

"Among the most obvious examples highlighting the trend is the European Union, which is further along than any other regional regime in crushing national sovereignty and ruling over diverse nations by bureaucratic decree. Former Soviet dictator Gorbachev, an outspoken proponent of the 'New World Order,' approvingly referred to the Brussels-based super-state as 'the new European Soviet' — under communism, of course, a 'Soviet' 'was a governmental council used to control the people and prevent counterrevolution. Gorbachev was correct in more ways than one.

"While the Sovietesque EU serves as a model for other areas of the world, it is hardly alone. Closer to home in North America, top globalists such as former general and CIA chief David Petraeus, a member of the globalist-minded Council on Foreign Relations and the shadowy Bilderberg group, openly acknowledged what comes next earlier this year. 'After America comes North America,' Petraeus said confidently in answering the question about what comes after the United States, the theme of a panel discussion he participated in. 'Are we on the threshold of the North American decade, question mark? I threw that away — threw away the question mark — and boldly proclaimed the coming North American decade, says the title now.' As in Europe, the foundation of it all was a misnamed 'free trade' agreement....

"The other key element of globalist strategy, also outlined in the recent *Wall Street Journal* piece written by Kissinger in late August, involves the imposition of what he described as a 'structure of international rules and norms' that 'must be fostered as a matter of common conviction.' In other words, alongside the "regionalization" approach to global governance, truly global structures must be built in tandem to eventually run the emerging 'New World Order' as the regional blocs become integrated.

"A crucial component of the globalist New World Order is the eventual creation of truly global monetary and financial governance. On both fronts, Putin has helped lead the charge. In 2009, the Kremlin even published a statement outlining its priorities ahead of the G20 summit, demanding the creation of a 'supranational reserve currency to be issued by international institutions as part of a reform of the global financial system.' The IMF, the Kremlin statement said, should consider using its proto-global currency known as 'Special Drawing Rights,' or SDRs, as a 'super-reserve currency accepted by the whole of the international community.' The basket of national currencies undergirding the SDR would be expanded, too.

"The same year, Putin protégé Dmitry Medvedev, then serving as Russia's 'president,' pulled what he called a 'united future world currency' coin out of his pocket at a G8 summit. The coin featured the words 'unity in diversity.' Then, he explained to the audience that it 'means they're getting ready. I think it's a good

sign that we understand how interdependent we are.’ In June of 2010, Medvedev was at it again. ‘We are making plans for the future,’ he gushed at an international economic forum in St. Petersburg, Russia. ‘We are talking about creating other reserve currencies, and we are counting on other countries to understand this.’

“Unsurprisingly, other ‘countries’ — Western governments and politicians, really — did understand that. Then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy, for instance, said at the same forum that world powers ‘should think together about a new international currency system’ at the upcoming G20 summit. He also said the world’s financial system was ‘outdated’ and should be replaced. ‘We all need to think about the foundations for a new international financial system,’ Sarkozy urged. ‘We’ve been based on the Bretton Woods institutions of 1945, when our American friends were the only superpower. My question is: Are we still in 1945? The answer here is, “no.”’

“What about American globalists? They are fully on board, too. Former Fed boss and then-chairman of Obama’s ‘Economic Recovery Advisory Board’ Paul Volcker, for example, has long been a strong proponent of a global fiat currency and a global central bank. He is widely reported to have said, ‘A global economy needs a global currency.’ And he has repeatedly called for such a system, hoping to see it emerge during his lifetime.

“In China, George Soros’ proposed leader of the world order, the ‘people’s’ central-bank boss Zhou Xiaochuan has also frequently called for a new reserve currency — in addition to frequent calls by the communist regime in Beijing for a ‘de-Americanized’ New World Order. In a 2009 report published on the central bank’s website entitled ‘Reform the International Monetary System,’ Xiaochuan explained that ‘the desirable goal of reforming the international monetary system, therefore, is to create an international reserve currency that is disconnected from individual nations and is able to remain stable in the long run, thus removing the inherent deficiencies caused by using credit-based national currencies.’

“When asked about the Communist Chinese regime’s idea at a Council on Foreign Relations event, Obama’s tax-dodging U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy ‘TurboTax’ Geithner, a regular proponent of global regulation and an important globalist, after acknowledging that he had not read it yet, said, ‘We’re actually quite open to that.’”⁷⁹²

So the whole world is moving from the regime of democratic nation-states that became the norm after 1991 to a world divided up into regional administrations, of which the European Union, really formed in 1992, is the model, to a single world government with a single global currency. Only this global government will, of course, not be democratic, but despotic... This could have been predicted — and was predicted — centuries ago. The Founding Fathers of the American Constitution recognized that their Constitution could not operate without a minimum level of Christian faith and morality in the American people. As

⁷⁹² Newman, “Putin: Key Player in the ‘New World Order’”, *New American*, May 8, 2021.

President John Adams said: *"We have no government capable of contending with human passions, unbridled by morality and religion... Our constitution was made only for a moral and religious people..."*

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Globalism is certainly the main trend in geopolitics. But whether globalism is truly irresistible is another matter...

Martin Wolf points out that "globalization is not destined, it is chosen. It is a choice made to enhance a nation's economic well being – indeed, experience suggests that the opening of trade and of most capital flows enriches most countries."⁷⁹³ But if globalization is freely chosen, it can also be freely rejected. Suppose a nation decides to put other values above economic well-being? Is it free to do so? If the will of the people is strong enough to endure relative poverty, it is free, and it will retain its freedom so long as certain critical instruments – for example, control of its own currency and taxation and borders – remain within its power. But once it gives these up to a supra-national union, it loses that freedom.

Suppose a nation decides to put its religion above all, seeing it as threatened by the global religion of ecumenism or the various New Age cults that accompany it? This is what Putin's Russia claims to be doing. It openly rejects western liberalism and LGBT-ism, is planning (with China and Iran) to introduce a new reserve currency to replace the dollar, and wants to create a Eurasian space to rival and eventually replace America's global sphere of influence.

However, as more and more people both inside and outside of Russia are coming to realize, Putin's plans are unrealistic and not succeeding. First, as Stephen Kotkin points out, while Putin may be dreaming of a Eurasian sphere of influence, it is China that is actually creating it; meanwhile, Russia becomes weaker and weaker by comparison with China and more dependent on it. Secondly, while opposing the global new order, Putin still wants to be part of it for the simple reason that he and his criminal Mafiosi colleagues depend on participation in it to make the huge ill-gotten gains they are now addicted to. Thirdly, in the moral-religious sphere Putin's Russia is displaying gigantic hypocrisy. What is the use of opposing LGBT if most of your bishops are homosexuals? Or of denigrating western religions by comparison with Orthodoxy if you still belong to the World Council of Churches and the ecumenical movement, and hob-nob with the leaders of all the world's false religions?

So what is the solution? There is no shortcut to good governance. A restoration of Democracy will not deliver from Despotism when an excess of Democracy, and consequent deficit of faith and morality, has been the enslavement of all.

⁷⁹³ Wolf, "Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization?" *Foreign Affairs*, January/February, 2001, p. 182.

Orthodox Christians will long for a return of the Orthodox Autocracy. But it must be remembered why we lost the Autocracy in the first place – because of the drastic decline in faith and morality in the pre-revolutionary Russian people, who were seduced by democratism and socialism because they no longer understood or believed in Christianity... So we come back to the basics: “Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness, and all things shall be added to you” (Matthew 6.33) – including good governance, peace, justice and true (which is not the same as democratic) freedom.

In principle, the attempt to escape the globalistic new world order is not only praiseworthy for an Orthodox nation but *absolutely necessary* if its people are to achieve, not only good governance in a secular sense, but what is infinitely more important – the salvation of the soul in eternity. However, for such an attempt to succeed, which is possible only with God’s help, it is necessary that the confession of the nation and its leaders must be *truly Orthodox*, which is certainly not the case now. In the view of the Holy Fathers of the Russian Church Abroad (ROCOR), “the nation” here can only be Russia: if Holy Russia is not resurrected, they affirmed, then the end of the world and the reign of the Antichrist is near.

According to many saints and prophets of the Orthodox Church both before and after the revolution of 1917, such a resurrection *will* happen. Viewing the contemporary extreme degradation of Russia, most even among Orthodox Christians remain sceptical. However, “despise not prophecies”, says St. Paul (I Thessalonians 5.19). The fact is: such a resurrection *is* possible. For with God *all* things are possible...