**THE FALL OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE:**

**A SPIRITUAL HISTORY (1825-1925)**

Vladimir Moss

***Volume 2. From the 1905 Revolution to the Death of Patriarch Tikhon (1905-1925)***

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# *PART V. COUNTER-REVOLUTION (1905-1914)*

*Thus saith the Lord God: Remove the turban, and take off the crown; things shall not remain as they are; exalt that which is low, and abase that which is high. A ruin, ruin, ruin I will make it; there shall not be even a trace of it until he comes whose right it is; and to him I will give it.*

Ezekiel 21.26-27.

## **46. THE BLACK HUNDREDS**

And so the 1905 revolution was crushed. But the revolutionary spirit remained alive, and the country remained divided. The Empire had struck back; but the bell was tolling for the Empire…

The disturbances, particularly in the countryside, continued well into 1906, and only gradually died down thereafter. Thus in January the Tsar was forced to emphasize to a peasant delegation from Kursk province that the private property of the landlords, no less than that of the peasants themselves, was inviolable.[[1]](#footnote-1) And even after the revolution had been defeated, “between January 1908 and May 1910, 19,957 terrorist attacks and revolutionary robberies were recorded; 732 government officials and 3,052 private citizens were killed, and nearly another 4,000 wounded.”[[2]](#footnote-2)

These murders were carried out mainly by the SRs, who, together with Social Democrats (Bolsheviks and Mensheviks and Trudoviks) disappeared temporarily into the underground, being banned from representation in the first Duma. But the liberals formed a new political party, the Constitutional Democrats, or Cadets, and in the elections to the first Duma in March, they triumphed convincingly over their more rightist opponents.

The first Duma, which was dominated by the Cadets, did not condemn the political assassinations, and even applauded them. “In 1902, after the murder of the Minister of the Interior Sipagin, when Lenin and his group spoke against individual terror, Miliukov [the Cadet leader} went to London to persuade Lenin to enter on the path of political murders. ‘You are making a fatal mistake in opposing terror,’ said the Cadet leader. ‘Think only that a pair of murder would be sufficient to force the Government to give a Constitution.”[[3]](#footnote-3)

The Duma simply continued the revolution by other means. After the Tsar had opened its first session on April 27, the deputies began fiercely attacking him and his ministers, and voted to give an amnesty to all political prisoners, “punishing them by forgiveness” in the words of F.I. Rodichev.[[4]](#footnote-4) The deputies also made political demands: the formation of a ministry responsible to themselves and not to the Tsar and the abrogation of the State Senate (which had a veto power over Duma legislation similar to that of the English House of Lords). They voted for the forcible appropriation of the estates of the landowners – a measure that only incited the peasants to further violence. But at the same time they voted to reduce credit for the starving from 50 million rubles to 15 million![[5]](#footnote-5)

In June, the First Battalion of the elite Preobrazhensky guards mutinied. General Alexander Kireev noted in his diary: “This is it…”[[6]](#footnote-6) For if even the army rebelled, and the regime’s other pillar, the peasantry was also revolting (on the land issue), then the regime itself, it would seem, was doomed…

However, the Tsar now acted with admirable decisiveness. On July 8, 1906 he dissolved the Duma on the grounds of its open call to disobey the authorities. The deputies were caught by surprise, and many of them travelled to Vyborg in Finland, where they issued an openly revolutionary declaration, calling on the people not to pay taxes, to refuse military service and not to recognize loans concluded with the government during the conflict. However, the governor of Vyborg asked them to cut short their session, fearing that it would lead to restrictions on Finland’s autonomy. The deputies returned to Petersburg having achieved nothing; nobody paid any attention to them… So great was the change in mood that a conference of the Cadets in Helsingfors at the end of September even decided to abandon the Vyborg manifesto. The students returned to their studies. The revolutionaries ceased to be lionized…

Although the revolution had been crushed, monarchist thinkers felt that the concessions that the Tsar had given in his October Manifesto should be rescinded. True, in his new version of the Basic Laws published on April 23, 1906, just before the opening of the First Duma, the Tsar appeared to claw back some power: “4. The All-Russian Emperor possesses the supreme autocratic power. Not only fear and conscience, but God himself, commands obedience to his authority... 8. The sovereign emperor possesses the initiative in all legislative matters. The Fundamental Laws may be subject to revision in the State Council and State Duma only on His initiative. The sovereign emperor ratifies the laws. No law can come into force without his approval. . . 9. The Sovereign Emperor approves laws; and without his approval no legislative measure can become law.” However, there were other parts of the law that suggested that the Duma was a legislative and not merely a consultative body: “7. The sovereign emperor exercises power in conjunction with the State Council and the State Duma... 86. No new law can come into force without the approval of the State Council and State Duma and the ratification of the sovereign emperor.”[[7]](#footnote-7) Moreover, according to Article 15 the Tsar reserved for himself the right to declare provinces in a state of emergency, in which case civil rights could be suspended.

In any case, even if it was conceded that the Tsar had surrendered some of his autocratic powers to the Duma, he was clearly not going to take them back again. So on November 8, 1905 a grass-roots monarchist party - “The Union of the Russian People”, was created in order to shore up the monarchy. It was called “the Black Hundreds”, as it was called by its opponents, who reviled it as being the mainstay, not only of monarchism, but also of “anti-semitism” in the Russian people. However, the Union was not so much anti-semitic as anti-Judaist and anti-revolutionary. It soon became very large: during the successful counter-revolution of 1906-07, it had about 11,000 local sections, and their members comprised several hundreds of thousands of people from all walks of life. [[8]](#footnote-8)

Serhii Plokhy writes: “The first rally the Union organized in Moscow attracted close to 20,000 people. In December 1905, Nicholas received a delegation of leaders of the Union and gave his blessing to its activities. Backed by the authorities, the Union played a key role in mobilizing support for the monarchy under the banner of modern nationalism. According to the Union’s statute, ‘the good of the motherland lies in the firm preservation of Orthodoxy, unlimited Russian autocracy, and the national way of life.’ Count Sergei Uvarov’s formula of the 1830s – autocracy, Orthodoxy and nationality – had been revived, now inspiriting not only imperial bureaucrats but also rank-and-file subjects.

“The Russia represented by the Union was not limited to Great Russians. ‘The Union makes no distinction between Great Russians, White Russians, and Little Russians,’ read the statute. In fact, the western provinces, and Ukraine in particular, became the Union’s main base of operations. Its largest branch, located in the Ukrainian province of Volhynia, was centered on the Pochaiv Monastery. According to a report of 1907, the Union counted more than 1,000 chapters in Volhynia, with a membership of more than 100,000. If one trusts the report, compiled by the governor of Volhynia, that province alone accounted for one-quarter of the Union’s membership throughout the empire. Not far behind were other Right-Bank Ukrainian provinces, especially the Kyiv gubernia.

“What accounted for the truly impressive number of Union members in the western provinces was that, as in Volhynia, individual chapters were organized and led by priests, who enlisted their parishioners into the Union…”[[9]](#footnote-9)

The bishops were also enthusiastic. The most prominent exception was the liberal Metropolitan Anthony (Vadkovsky) of St. Petersburg, who was rumoured to be an anemy of St. John of Kronstadt and even a Freemason.[[10]](#footnote-10) But Metropolitan Vladimir of Moscow[[11]](#footnote-11), Archbishop Tikhon (Bellavin) of Yaroslavl, Archbishop Anthony (Khrapovitsky) of Volhynia, Bishop Hermogen of Saratov, St. John of Kronstadt, Elder Theodosius of Minvody and many others joined it without doubting.

St. John of Kronstadt became member no. 200787, and blessed its standards, saying: “As a body without a soul is dead, so Russia without her all-enlightening Autocratic Power is dead”. In his telegram to the Congress of monarchist-black hundredists, he wrote: “I follow with rapture the speeches and actions of the Congress and with all my heart thank the Lord Who has had mercy on Russia and assembled around the cradle of Russian Christianity His faithful children for the unanimous defence of Faith, Tsar and Fatherland.” Again, St. John said: “O Russia, hold firmly onto your faith and Church and Orthodox Tsar, if you want to be unshaken by the people of unbelief and anarchy and do not want to be deprived of the kingdom and the Orthodox Tsar. But if you do fall away from your faith, as many *intelligenty* have already fallen away, then you will no longer be Russia or Holy Rus’, but a mix of all kinds of heterodox striving to exterminate each other. And if there will be no repentance in the Russian people, the end of the world is near. God will take away from them their pious Tsar and will send them a whip in the persons of impious, cruel, self-appointed rulers who will drown the whole earth in blood and tears.”

Thus a great priestly organizer of the Union who emerged was the missionary, future hieromartyr and great friend of St. John of Kronstadt, Fr. John Vostorgov. On Great Friday, March 31, 1906 he said the following in the cathedral of Christ the Saviour: "Our homeland has entered upon a new path of life, before and ahead of us is - a new Russia.

"Forgive us, forgive us, old, thousand-year-old Russia! Before our eyes they have judged you, condemned you and sentenced you to death... Threatening and merciless judges have spat in your face and have found nothing good in you. The judgement was strict, implacable and merciless. Everything has merged into the cry: 'Take her, crucify her!'

"We also know that nothing human was alien to you; we know that you had many faults. But we also know and see that you made Russia holy, and her people - a God-bearing people, if not in actuality, at any rate in the eternal, undying ideal of the people's soul; you gave birth to and raised a mighty people, preserving it in its bitter fate, in the crucible of its historical trials through a whole series of centuries; you gave birth to and raised an array of saints and righteous ones; you did not perish under the blows, the heavy blows of destiny, but became stronger under them, strong in faith; with this faith, this great power of spirit, you endured all the burdens, and yet you created, and entrusted to us and left behind, a great kingdom. For all this we bow down to the earth in gratitude...”

“The monarchist Unions,” wrote Fr. John, “… foresaw the terrible dangers that threatened the Russian religious and popular-state structure and way of life. Others arose in their hundreds after the danger had already appeared, so as to protect the religious and state ideals of Russia and defend the integrity and indivisibility of Russia. Their essence consists in the fact that they are a storehouse of the religiosity and patriotism of the Russian people. At a fateful moment of history, when the ship of the Russian State was listing so far to the left that disaster seemed inevitable, the monarchist patriotic Unions leaned with all their strength to the right side of the ship and saved it from capsizing. The distinguished activists of the right-wing Unions came out onto the field of public work at a time when they could expect nothing except bullets and bombs, killings from round the corner, persecutions from the newspapers, mockery and disdain from the disoriented intelligentsia and even the government itself – that of Witte of sorrowful memory and his comrades and helpers…”[[12]](#footnote-12)

Archbishop Makary (Parvitsky-Nevsky) of Tomsk explained the nature of the struggle: “’For Faith, Tsar and Fatherland!’ – that is the inscription on the banner of the Union of the Russian People. It calls, evidently, for Russian people to be united, so as to stand up for the foundations of the Russian Land. But the banner of unification has at the same time become a banner of altercation. Against the band standing with the banner ‘For Faith, Tsar and Fatherland!’ there stands a horde of people with the red banner, on which is written: ‘Freedom, Equality, Brotherhood’. On this latter banner there remain traces of blood, blood that has already darkened with time. This is not our Russian banner, but has been brought from another country, where it was once steeped in blood. It appeared amongst us only recently. With its inscription, which speaks of freedom, equality and brotherhood, it has drawn the attention of many, not only foreigners who live in the Russian Land, but also Russians, who have not suspected that under this visible inscription there is hidden another meaning, that by this freedom we must understand violence, by equality – slavery, and by pan-brotherhood – fratricide. Between the horde of freedom, equality and brotherhood and the band for Faith, Tsar and Fatherland a struggle for dominance is taking place.”[[13]](#footnote-13)

However, the Union was plagued by schisms and poor leadership that gave it a bad name. Thus the “Union of the Archangel Michael”, led by the deputy V.M. Purishkevich, separated from the “Union of the Russian People” led by A. Dubronin. Dubronin’s views were contradictory: pro-tsarist, but anti-hierarchical. And he wanted to rid the empire of “the Germans”, that is, that highly efficient top layer of the administration which proved itself as loyal to the empire as any other section of the population. When interviewed years later by the Cheka, Dubronin declared: “By conviction I am a *communist monarchist*, that is, [I want] there to be monarchist government under which those forms of government [will flourish] which could bring the people an increase in prosperity. For me all kinds of cooperatives, associations, etc. are sacred.” Fr. John Vostorgov considered Dubronin an enemy of the truth, and stressed that true patriotism can only be founded on true faith and morality: “Where the faith has fallen, and where morality has fallen, there can be no place for patriotism, there is nothing for it to hold on to, for everything that is the most precious in the homeland then ceases to be precious.”[[14]](#footnote-14)

Another major problem was that the monarchist parties turned out to be “more royal than the king”. In the provinces they often criticized the governors for being liberal, while in the Duma they remained in opposition to the government of Stolypin – who, of course, had the confidence of the Tsar.[[15]](#footnote-15) Moreover, the monarchists contradicted themselves in that they conducted party politics on behalf of the monarchy, whose essential idea was that the state, being incarnate in the tsar, should not be the product of party politics, but above all party and class interests… Thus “why,” asked General V.M. Molchanov, “do I not join a monarchist party? Because I am a monarchist. Monarchism is an idea, not a party!”

In spite of this contradiction, the monarchist parties played an important role in shoring up support for the Tsar and Tsarism at a critical time. And that is why the best churchmen of the time supported them, entering into open battle with the leftists. For there could be no real unity between those who ascribed ultimate power to the Tsar and those who ascribed it to the Duma. Moreover, the struggle between the “reds” and the “blacks” was not simply a struggle between different interpretations of the October manifesto, or between monarchists and constitutionalists, but between two fundamentally incompatible world-views - the Orthodox Christian and the Masonic-Liberal-Ecumenist. It was a struggle between two fundamentally opposed views of where true authority comes from – God or the people.

As Bishop Andronicus, the future hieromartyr, wrote: “It is not a question of the struggle between two administrative regimes, but of a struggle between faith and unbelief, between Christianity and antichristianity. The ancient antichristian plot, which was begun by those who shouted furiously to Pilate about Jesus Christ: ‘Crucify Him, crucify Him: His blood be on us and on our children’ - continued in various branches and secret societies. In the 16th century it poured into the special secret antichristian order of the Templars, and in the 18th century it became more definite in the Illuminati, the Rosecrucians and, finally, in Freemasonry it merged into a universal Jewish organization. And now, having gathered strength to the point where France is completely in the hands of the Masons, it – Masonry – already openly persecutes Christianity out of existence there. In the end Masonry will be poured out into one man of iniquity, the son of destruction – the Antichrist (II Thessalonians 2). In this resides the solution of the riddle of our most recent freedoms: their aim is the destruction of Christianity in Rus’. That is why what used to be the French word ‘liberal’, which meant among the Masons a ‘generous’ contributor to the Masonic aims, and then received the meaning of ‘freedom-loving’ with regard to questions of faith, has now already passed openly over to antichristianity. In this resides the solution of the riddle of that stubborn battle for control of the school, which is being waged in the *zemstvo* and the State Duma: if the liberal tendency gains control of the school, the success of antichristianity is guaranteed. In this resides the solution of the riddle of the sympathy of liberals for all kinds of sects in Christianity and non-Christian religions. And the sectarians have not been slumbering – they have now set about attacking the little children… And when your children grow up and enter university – there Milyukov and co. will juggle with the facts and deceive them, teaching them that science has proved man’s origin from the apes. And they will really make our children into beasts, with just this difference, that the ape is a humble and obedient animal whereas these men-beasts will be proud, bold, cruel and unclean….”[[16]](#footnote-16)

In February, 1907 Archbishop Anthony (Khrapovitsky) put the monarchist case as follows: “Perhaps there are countries which are best ruled not by tsars, but by many leaders. But our kingdom, which consists of a multitude of races, various faiths and customs that are hostile to each other, can stand only when at its head there stands one Anointed of God, who gives account to nobody except God and His commandments. Otherwise all the races that inhabit the Russian land would go against each other with knives, and would not be pacified until they had themselves destroyed each other, or had submitted to the power of the enemies of Russia. Only the White Tsar is venerated by all the peoples of Russia; for his sake they obey the civil laws, go into the army and pay their taxes. Our tsars are the friends of the people and preservers of the holy faith, and the present Sovereign Nicholas Alexandrovich is the meekest and quietest of all the kings of the whole world. He is the crown of our devotion to our native land and you must stand for him to your last drop of blood, not allowing anybody to diminish his sacred power, for with the fall of this power, Russia also will fall…

“Russian man, lend your ear to your native land: what does it tell you? ‘From the righteous Princess Olga, from the equal-to-the-apostles Vladimir until the days of Seraphim of Sarov and to the present day and to future ages all the wise leaders of my people think and say the same,’ that is what the land will reply to you… ‘They taught their contemporaries and their descendants one and the same thing: both the princes, and the tsars, and the hierarchs who sat on the Church sees, and the hermits who hid amidst the forest and on the islands of the sea, and the military commanders, and the warriors, and the boyars, and the simple people: they all taught to look on this life as the entrance courtyard into the future life, they all taught to use it in such a way as not to console the flesh, but to raise the soul to evangelical virtue, to preserve the apostolic faith unharmed, to keep the purity of morals and truthfulness of speech, to honour the tsars and those placed in authority by them, to listen to and venerate the sacred monastic order, not to envy the rich, but to compete with the righteous ones, to love to work the land as indicated by God to our race through Adam and Noah, and to turn to other crafts only out of necessity or because of a special talent; not to borrow the corrupt habits of foreigners, their proud, lying and adulterous morals, but to preserve the order of the fatherland, which is fulfilled through chastity, simplicity and evangelical love; to stand fearlessly for your native land on the field of battle and to study the law of God in the sacred books.’ That is what our land teaches us, that is what the wise men and righteous ones of all epochs of our history entrusted to us, in which there was no disagreement between them, but complete unanimity. The whole of Rus’ thinks in the same way. But she knows that only the Anointed of God must preserve this spirit and defend it from enemies visible and invisible by his mighty right hand. And look he hardly stepped back from life when his popular privileges were snatched from him by deception and violence by his enemies and the enemies of the people. Yes, the Russian people thinks and feels one thing: in its eyes public life is a general exploit of virtue, and not the realm of secular pleasures, it is the laborious increase of the Kingdom of God amongst us ourselves and its implanting in the unenlightened tribes, and not the equalisation of all faiths and superstitions. The Orthodox people knows and feels this. It feels that without one ruling royal right hand it is impossible for our land of many tribes to exist. In it are 102 different faiths, 102 tribes that will now nourish malicious enmity against each other immediately they cease to feel the ruling right hand of the White Tsar above them. Let him hear out the reports of the people’s delegates, let him allow them to express their opinions on various matters of the kingdom. But the final decision will be made by him himself, and he will give an account for this only through his conscience before the Lord God. One only submission, one only limitation of his power is necessary to the people: that openly on the day of his crowning he should confess his Orthodox faith to God and the people in accordance with the Symbol of the Fatherland – so that he should not have human arbitrariness, but the evangelical law of God as his unfailing guide in his sovereign decisions and undertakings. That is the kingdom we need, and this is understood not only by Russian people, but also by people of other faiths who live in our land with a healthy people’s reasoning, and not through lies and deceit: both Tatars and Kirgiz and the old Jews who believe in their own way, and the distant Tunguz. All of them know that shaking the Tsar’s Autocracy means beginning the destruction of the whole of Russia…”[[17]](#footnote-17)

## **47. THE PRECONCILIAR CONVENTION AND GEORGIAN AUTOCEPHALY**

As the political situation began to stabilize towards the end of 1905, writes E.E. Alferev, the Tsar “addressed a rescript to Metropolitan Anthony of St. Petersburg in which he wrote: ‘I now recognize that the time is quite right to carry out certain transformations in the structure of our native Church… I suggest that you determine the time for the convening of this Council.’

“On the basis of this rescript a Pre-Conciliar Convention was formed for the preparation of the convening of a Council, which soon set about its work. The convention carried out exceptionally important and valuable work demanding much time and labour, but the world war that broke out hindered the convening of the Council during the reign of Emperor Nicholas II. Instead of the peaceful situation which the Sovereign considered necessary for the introduction of such important reforms, it was convened in very unfavourable circumstances, during a terrible war, after the overthrow of the historical state structure of Russia, when the country was seized by revolutionary madness, and its most important decisions were taken to the sound of cannons during the beginning of the civil war.”[[18]](#footnote-18)

The Pre-Conciliar Convention gathered detailed responses from the bishops and leading theologians on the main issues that were to dominate the history of the Orthodox Church in the coming century. The debates during the Convention brought to the fore several of those churchmen who would play such important roles, both for good and for ill, in the coming struggle with the revolution: on the one side, men such as Metropolitan Vladimir (Bogoyavlensky), Archbishop Anthony (Khrapovitsky), Archbishop Theophan (Bystrov) of Poltava, Archbishop Tikhon (Bellavin) and Bishop Arsenius (Stadnitsky) of Pskov, and on the other, Bishop Antoninus (Granovsky), Archbishop Sergius (Stragorodsky) and Bishop Eulogius (Georgievsky). Thus among the suggestions made to the Convention we find the following one from Archbishop Sergius and his Vyborg clergy on January 18, which clearly looks forward to the renovationist movement of the 1920s:

* On the reform of the liturgical language: the future Council must debate the question of the simplification of the language of the Church, Slavonic, and the right accorded to the parish that wants it to serve the Divine offices in that language.
* It must think of abbreviating and simplifying the Typicon, and suppressing certain ritual actions, such as the breathing and spitting during the sacrament of baptism.
* It must think of abolishing the multiple repetitions of the same litanies during the same service, and replacing them by read aloud the secret prayers during the Liturgy.
* It must think of giving priests [who have been widowed before the age of 45] the right to remarry.”[[19]](#footnote-19)

Sergius also called for another popular aim of the liberals - the complete separation of Church and State.[[20]](#footnote-20) It was logical, therefore, that some years later he should welcome the February revolution and support the Provisional Government. But less logical that he should support the October revolution and the Bolsheviks, who tried to engulf the Church in the State...

The first section of the Convention studied the questions of the composition of the future Council and the transformation of the central administration of the Church. The second section studied the question of the division of Russia into metropolitan districts and the transformation of the local Church administration. In June, the question of Georgian autocephaly also began to be discussed by this section. The third section studied Church courts and reviewed the laws of marriage, divorce and mixed marriages. The fourth section studied the questions of the parish, church schools, church property, diocesan congresses and the participation of clergy in public institutions. The fifth section studied the question of the transformation of spiritual-academic institutions. The sixth section studied the questions of the *yedinoverie*, the Old Ritualists and some other issues. The seventh section analyzed measures necessary to protect the Orthodox Faith from wrong teachings in view of the new principles of religious toleration that had been introduced into the empire.

In May, 1906 a general assembly of the Convention decided that the future Council should be composed of clergy and laity, with a bishop, a priest and a layman being elected from each diocese. But while the clergy and laity were given the right to discuss all questions discussed in Council, the right to compose and confirm conciliar decisions was reserved for the bishops alone. This became the basis of the composition of the Council in 1917-18.[[21]](#footnote-21) However, few other recommendations of the sections were put into practice, and the Convention itself came to an end in December amidst a general waning of interest in it. In fact, according to F.D. Samarin, the results of the colossal amount of work put into the Convention amounted to nothing. There followed a decade in which the wounds of the Church continued to fester, and the authority of both Church and State continued to decline. In the end the much-needed Local Council was convened, in accordance with Divine Providence, only when the Tsar himself had been swept away…

\*

In 1908 an All-Russian Missionary Congress attended by 640 delegates was held in Kiev. It addressed the question of the strengthening of the Old Ritualist movement in Russia, and in its tenth point declared:

“The journal of the First Anti-Sectarian Commission on the *Beglopopovtsy* and their priests who have departed from the Orthodox Church, came to the following conclusions:

“a) to consider the priests who have departed into schism to be immediately deprived of grace, b) to consider the sacraments carried out by them to be invalid, c) that it is possible to receive those returning after repentance in their existing rank, subjecting them to a prior penance, d) if they have not been condemned, or defrocked, to receive them as laymen, e) on the departure of anyone into schism, the bishop must twice summon them to return, and immediately defrock those who do not heed his voice.

“At the suggestion of Archbishop Anthony (Khrapovitsky), the general assembly united itself to the above-cited conclusion of the commission on the question of the fleeing (*beglykh*) priests…”[[22]](#footnote-22)

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One of the problems addressed by the Pre-Conciliar Convention was that of the restoration of the autocephaly of the Georgian Church. As we have seen, a movement to preserve the nation’s heritage and promote the cause of Georgian state independence and ecclesiastical autocephaly came into being under the leadership of the poet, historian and philosopher Ilia Chavchavadze, who was assassinated by revolutionaries in 1907. Georgian *State* independence could not be considered then, since at a time of increasing nationalist and tension, it would only undermine the whole empire. However, *Church* autocephaly was a different matter in view of the undisputed fact that the Georgian Church had once been autocephalous. And on June 2, 1906 this question was reviewed in the Alexander Nevsky Lavra in St. Petersburg during the sessions of the second section of the Preconciliar Convention.

Eugene Pavlenko writes: “The majority of those who spoke supported the state principle of Church division [that is, in one state there should be only one Church administration], but the minority insisted on a national or ethnic point of view. In winding up the second section of the Preconciliar Convention, participants accepted one of the two projects of Protopriest I. Vostorgov on giving the Georgian Church greater independence in the sphere of the use of the Georgian liturgical language, of the appointment of national Georgian clergy, etc., but the project for Georgian autocephaly was rejected.”

The argument between the two sides is important and its conclusions applicable in other Churches striving for autocephaly or autonomy. So we shall follow it in Pavlenko’s exposition: “The most completely phyletistic [nationalistic] argumentation of the supporters of the idea of Georgian autocephaly at the Preconciliar Consistory was sounded in the report of Bishop Kirion [Sadzagelov, of Sukhumi], ‘The National Principle in the Church’.[[23]](#footnote-23)

This report began by proclaiming the principle of nationality in the Church and by affirming its antiquity. In the opinion of the Bishop, Georgia ‘has the right to the independent existence of her national Church on the basis of the principle of nationality in the Church proclaimed at the beginning of the Christian faith.’ What does principle consist of, and when was it proclaimed? ‘It is sufficient to remember,’ writes Bishop Kirion, ‘the descent of the Holy Spirit on the apostles, who immediately began to glorify God in various languages and then preached the Gospel to the pagans, each in their native language.’ But in our [Pavlenko’s] view, references to the preaching of the apostles in connection with the affirmation of the national principle in the Church have no firm foundation. The preaching of the apostles in various languages was necessary in order to unite the peoples in the Truth of Christ, and not in order to disunite them in accordance with the national principle. That is, the principle of nationality is precisely that which Christianity has to overcome, and not that on which the Church must be founded. Since the Bulgarian schism phyletistic argumentation has characteristically sought support in references to the 34th Apostolic canon. ‘The basic canonical rule,’ writes Bishop Kirion, ‘by which the significance of nationality in relation to Church administration is recognised, is the 34th Apostolic canon which is so well known to canonists… According to the direct meaning of this canon in the Orthodox Church, every nationality must have its first hierarch.’ But the 34th Apostolic canon… has in view ‘bishops of every territory’ and not ‘bishops of every people’. The word *ethnos,* which is employed in this canon in the ancient language and in the language of Christian antiquity, is translated in the dictionary of Liddell and Scott first of all as ‘a number of people accustomed to live together’, and only then as ‘a nation’. It is precisely the first sense indicated here that points to the territorial meaning of the Apostolic canon. So references to its national meaning are groundless.

“An incorrect understanding and use of the conciliarity principle – which phyletism has in common with ecumenism – sometimes brings them … to the point of being completely indistinguishable. For the supporters of the division of the Church along tribal lines the principle of conciliarity is only a convenient federal form for the development by each people of its national idiosyncracy. ‘… The federal system,’ in the opinion of Bishop Kirion, ‘gave our Eastern Church significant advantages from a national point of view.’ And the preservation of this idiosyncracy – in his opinion – is prescribed by conciliar decisions (cf. the 39th canon of the Council in Trullo), and acquires a very important significance from the point of view of Church freedom.’ But in the 39th canon of the Council in Trullo not a word is said about ‘national religious-everyday and individual particularities’ and the like, but there is mention of the rights of first-hierarchs over bishops and their appointment. ‘Let the customs of each [autocephalous] Church be observed,’ it says in this canon, ‘so that the bishop of each district should be subject to his president, and that he, in his turn, should be appointed from his bishops, according to the ancient custom.’ The émigré Church of Cyprus, of which mention is made in this canon, did not become the national Church of the Cypriots, but took into herself all the peoples of the Hellespont district where they emigrated. Where is mention made here of a conciliar sanction for the preservation of ‘local ecclesiastical traditions’ with the aid of administrative isolation?

“’Ecclesiastically speaking,’ thinks Bishop Kirion, ‘each people must make use of the freedom of self-determination’ and ‘possesses the right to develop according to the laws of its own national spirit.’ The extent to which the Bishop sees the development of each Church possible ‘according to the laws of its own national spirit’ becomes clear from the following quotation cited by him: ‘The Bulgarian Church, after a period of difficult trials and struggle, is near to the realization of its age-old strivings without disrupting Christian peace and love. The enslaved Syro-Arabic Church is declaring its rights to national idiosyncracy more and more persistently. The Armenian, Syro-Jacobite and Perso-Chaldean Churches, which have, because of regrettable circumstances, been separated from ecumenical unity for a long time, are also seeking reunion, but without the disruption of their national rights which have come into being historically.’[[24]](#footnote-24) By ‘regrettable circumstances’ Professor Kavalnitsky and Bishop Kirion who quotes him apparently have in mind the Council of Chalcedon, which condemned the monophysite heretics. While by ‘reunion’ they have in mind, as becomes clear from the following sentence, the following: ‘Unity between the Churches must take place on the principle of equality, and not of absorption.’[[25]](#footnote-25) Thus both in the schism of the Bulgarians, and in the heresy of monophysitism, there is nothing to prevent union with them, but only, in the opinion of Bishop Kirion, ‘the religious variety of the Christian peoples’! Before our eyes, Bishop Kirion, a defender of Georgian autocephaly at the beginning of the century, is making a path from phyletism to ecumenism, the union of which we have already distinctly observed at the end of the century. This is the classical ‘branch theory’ in action. ‘The peoples who accepted Christianity did not all assimilate its lofty teaching in the same way; each took from it only those elements of Christian life which it was able to in accordance with its intellectual and moral character. The Latin nations (the Catholics) developed a strict ecclesiastical organization and created architecture of high artistic value. The Greeks, who were experienced in dialectical subtleties, worked out a complex and firmly based dogmatic system. The Russians, on accepting Christianity, mainly developed discipline and church rubrics, bringing external beauty to a high level of development. But the Georgians, having christianized their age-old national beliefs [giving their paganism a Christian form? – the author] and being completely penetrated with the spirit of Christianity, attached to it the sympathetic traits of their own character: meekness, simplicity, warmth, self-sacrifice, freedom from malice and persistence. Although all the nations did not receive Christianity, in the sense of assimilate the height and fullness of its heavenly teaching, in the same way, nevertheless, enlightened by Christianity, as members of the one Body of Christ [one must suppose that Latins and Monophysites are included in this number – the author], strive for the one aim that is common to Christian humanity – the realization of the kingdom of God on earth (?!)’. The idea of chiliasm – ‘the kingdom of God on earth’ – is a worthy crown of this union of phyletism and ecumenism. Fitting for a report at the assembly of the World Council of Churches, whose members are expecting the coming of ‘the new era of the Holy Spirit’?

“From Bishop Kirion’s report it is clearly evident that the idea of the national Church, beginning with the division of the Church on national lines, leads to her ‘union’, not on the basis of the patristic faith, but on the basis of the idea of abstract ‘equality’ of separate, including heretical, churches, and through this to the idea of the coming earthly kingdom of the antichrist…”[[26]](#footnote-26)

There are stronger arguments to be made for Georgian autocephaly than those put forward by Bishop Kirion. However, Pavlenko is right to reject his essentially phyletistic argument: one (ethnic) nation – one Church. From the earliest times, the Orthodox Church has been organized on a *territorial* basis, following the demarcation of *states* rather than ethnic groups. In more recent centuries state boundaries have tended to correspond more and more closely to ethnic boundaries, so that we now talk of the Greek Church, the Russian Church, the Serbian Church, etc., as if we are talking about the Churches of the ethnic Greeks, Russians and Serbs exclusively. But this is a misleading way of speaking, and does not alter the essential principle, confirmed both in Holy Scripture and in Canon Law, that a local Church is the Church of all the people, *of all nationalities,* gathered together on one territory.

The attempt to substitute the ethnic principle for the territorial principle led, as we have seen, to a schism between the Greek and the Bulgarian Churches in 1872. It would lead to a schism between the Russian and the Georgian Churches in 1917, when Bishop Kirion and a Council of the Georgian Church re-established Georgian Church autocephaly on the basis of the ethnic principle. It would thereby divide the two Churches at precisely the moment when unity between Orthodox Christians of all races was vital in the face of the international communist revolution…

Not even all the Georgian bishops were in favour of autocephaly. In March, 1917 Archbishop Demetrius of Tauris (formerly Prince David Abashidze), who later became organiser of the Georgian Catacomb Church until his death in Kiev in 1943, protested against the election and enthronement of Bishop Kirion as Georgian Catholicos. Vladyka Demetrius was “more Russian than the Russians” and did not sympathize with the nationalist designs of the leaders of the Georgian Church. During the Moscow Council of 1917-18, he was appointed president of the section on the Orthodox Church in Transcaucasia, and in connection with the Georgians’ declaration of the autocephaly of their Church was elected a deputy member of the Holy Synod.

## **48. THE STOLYPIN REFORMS**

Order after the 1905 revolution was restored largely through the efforts of one of the great servants of the tsarist regime, the Interior Minister and later Prime Minister Peter Arkadyevich Stolypin. A noble landownder from Kovno, highly educated and cultured, as Governor of Sararov he had shown courage and wisdom in pacifying revolutionary passions there in 1905. Arthur Nicolson called him simply “the most remarkable man in Europe”. He introduced military field tribunals, which decreed – with the full support of the Tsar - capital punishment for convicted revolutionaries. These were often criticized. But he replied to one of his critics: “Learn to distinguish the blood on the hands of a doctor from the blood on the hands of an executioner…”[[27]](#footnote-27) And to the Duma he said on May 10, 1907: “The opponents of statehood would like to take the path of radicalism, the path of liberation from the historical path of Russia, of liberation from cultural traditions. They need great upheavals, we need a great Russia!”[[28]](#footnote-28)

“’I can’t tell you,’ Nicky told his mother on 11 October 1906, ‘how much I’ve come to like and respect Stolypin.’ On 20 February 1907, when the second Duma assembled, it was much more radical than the first, containing 118 socialists, in the wake of the decision by Lenin and Martov to allow their parties to participate. Stolypin and Nicholas immediately started to consider its dissolution, ‘but it’s too early for that’, the tsar told his mother; ‘one must let them do something manifestly stupid… Then slap! And they are gone!’ The radicals demanded the confiscation of [all private] land, a measure which neither tsar nor premier would consider...

“Once they had decided to dissolve the Duma, Stolypin planned a political *coup d’état* to change the electoral law. ‘I waited all day long with impatience for notification from you,’ Nicholas wrote to Stolypin. ‘Things are being dragged out. The Duma must be dissolved tomorrow. No delay. Not one moment of hesitation.’

“On 1 June, Stolypin told the Duma to expel its extremists. When the Duma refused, he went into action. On the 3rd, police surrounded the Taurida Palace, arresting many of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Holding new elections, Stolypin narrowed the suffrage (excluding non-Russians) to elect a third Duma dominated by noblemen and businessmen in which the party of 17 October known as ‘Octobrists’, who supported the semi-constitutional autocracy, held a majority. Yet the old convergence between Romanovs and the nobility was long since ruptured: the third Duma lasted for five years, but much of its opposition now came from the gentry. Even this ‘king’s parliament’ defied Stolypin...

“The revolutionary parties were broken. While there had been 150,000 Social-Democrats in 1907, there would soon be fewer than 10,000. Many Bolsheviks quietly retired into normal life and got jobs or went into exile to fulminate and feud, like Lenin in Switzerland and Austria…”[[29]](#footnote-29)

Nevertheless, the election of the Third Duma was the signal for a significant shift to the right in society as a whole: terrorist acts continued around the country, but for the time being the wind had been taken out of the sails of the revolutionaries…

But Stolypin was a great reformer as well as a stern disciplinarian and a great parliamentarian. He succeeded, writes S.S. Oldenburg, “in squaring the circle. Until then, the carrying out of reforms had unfailingly been accompanied by a weakening of the authorities, while the application of severe measures meant a refusal to carry out transformations. Now a government had been found that combined the two tasks; and broad sections of society were found that understood the necessity of this…”[[30]](#footnote-30)

Using Article 87of the Basic Laws, which allowed the government to carry out urgent measures in the intervals between sessions of the Duma, Stolypin introduced a whole series of liberal measures that put into effect the promises made by the Tsar in his October manifesto. But his most important achievement was the land reforms designed to relieve the crushing poverty in the countryside, break the power of the commune over the individual peasant and create a strong, independent peasant class. But his most important achievement was the land reforms designed to relieve the crushing poverty in the countryside, break the power of the commune over the individual peasant and create a strong, independent peasant class. Reginald E. Zelnik writes: “The question, in the new post-1905 context, was whether the solution to land hunger, so vehemently expressed by peasant insurgency in 1905 (and there was much more to come in 1906), should be attained by the compulsory redistribution of gentry land, and if so, whether with compensation (the liberal or Kadet position) or without (the radical position)… [Stolypin’s] central idea was to reallocate not the gemtry lands but *communal* lands…”[[31]](#footnote-31)

“By 1900,” writes Lieven, “massive population growth meant that in some of Russia’s core agricultural provinces land was becoming scarce and rents were growing quickly. As a result, tensions between the peasantry and the landowning class were high. Mass migration to Siberia could be an answer. Much of the area worst affected by overpopulation was in what we would not call Eastern Ukraine. It was here – in the provinces of Chernigov, Kharkov, Poltava and Ekaterinoslav – that the peasant revolt of 1905 was often most serious. Immigration to Siberia of Ukrainians (and Belorussians) might reduce not just the social crisis but also the national one. English, Scots, Welsh, and even sometimes Irish immigrants to the white Dominions to some extent forged a new and unique British identity. Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian immigrants to Siberia might even more easily become ‘New Russians’. By 1900, there was a minimal chance of separatism developing in Siberia, but a specific ‘frontier’ variant of Russian identity did exist. Even in western Siberia, there were no noble landowners, but by 1914 there were many wealthy peasant farmers. Their dairy exports were, for instance, competing strongly with the Danes’ in the British market. Siberia was very much more than the land of ice, convicts, and Rasputin so dear to the Western imagination. It was in fact a new Russia, and amid the many crises they faced, Russia’s rulers were buoyed up when they contemplated its future…”[[32]](#footnote-32)

Now “between 1860 and 1914,” writes S.A. Smith, “the population of the empire grew rapidly from 74 million to 164 million, putting intense pressure on land resources, especially in the central and volga provinces where the black earth was very fertile. The average peasant allotment shrank by one-third between 1861 and 1900. The fact that by 1917 the landed gentry had lost almost half their land – much of it sold to peasants – and rented most of the remaining land to peasants, made little difference to how peasants felt.

“In spite of increasing land hunger, peasant living standards were actually rising very slowly after 1891, although not in the central black-earth provinces. The rapid extension of the market – stimulated by the construction of railways – allowed peasants to supplement their income from farming with work in industry, trade, handicrafts, or on the farms of the well-to-do; it also stimulated commercial production of grain, making Russia the world’s largest grain exporter by 1913. Yet the average peasant lived a life of poverty, deprivation, and oppression, one index of which was that infant mortality was the highest in Europe. Moreover, notwithstanding the expansion of commercial farming, agriculture continued to be technically primitive, based on the three-field system and strip farming, with little use of fertilizer or machinery. In spite of clear signs that agriculture was beginning to commercialize, then, the agrarian system as a whole remained backward...”[[33]](#footnote-33)

Much of the groundwork for reform in the countryside had already been carried out before 1904 - but the revolution had prevented its realization. Now, with the coming of relative peace, Stolypin went ahead…

Through his agrarian reforms, besides strengthening the economy of the whole country, Stolypin was also attempting to achieve the maturing of the peasant to the point where he could take a considered, independent part in civil and political life. “First of all it is necessary to create the citizen,” he said in a newspaper interview, “the peasant-house-owner, the petty landowner, and when this task has been accomplished – citizenship itself will reign in Russia. First the citizen, and then citizenship…”[[34]](#footnote-34)

As Archpriest Lev Lebedev writes, the land reforms were essentially the brain-child of the Tsar himself: “Immersing himself in a study of the matter, his Majesty departed more and more both from his teachers and from the politics of his father, and even from ‘society’. They were all unanimous in striving to preserve the commune, although for various reasons (some of the liberals and democrats considered it [following Herzen] to be ‘embryonic socialism’). Finally, having thought it all through, his Majesty came to the thought of the necessity of abolishing the village commune altogether. The more so, in that the majority of provincial committees created to discuss the land question had expressed themselves in one way or another against the preservation of the commune. He entrusted the carrying out of this idea to a man exceptionally well chosen – P.A. Stolypin, who was appointed President of the Council of Ministers. Stolypin carried out the reforms in constant consultation with his Majesty, from which they received their name, ‘The Stolypin Reforms’. They began with the law of November 9, 1906, which allowed the peasants *freely to leave the commune*… and to have their own private agriculture. Immediately two-and-a-half million petitions to leave were submitted. In order to carry out the exit, 483 special commissions and seven thousand land-surveyors were mobilized. Redemption payments were rescinded. At the same time a new impulse was given to *the resettlement movement* of peasants in the East. Those who wanted were given plots in Siberia, in the Altai and in the Far East at fifteen hectares per person (45 per family), with each family being offered a mortgage at 200 roubles with the opportunity of moving with all their possessions to the new lands *at state expense*. In Siberia previously prepared warehouses of agricultural instruments awaited the re-settlers. They were sold at extremely low prices. For a long time the re-settlers *were freed from all taxes.* His Majesty personally owned forty million desyatins of land in Siberia. All these lands Nicholas II handed into the land fund for free, he simply *gave them away* to the Russian peasantry! Especially valuable gifts were the very extensive fertile lands of the Altai, which had formerly been exclusively the property of the Emperor. In these former possessions of his given away to the peasants his Majesty *at his own expense* constructed new roads, schools, hospitals and churches… Finally, the third component of the reforms were *the enterprises of the State Peasant Bank*, which began to snap up landowners’ lands and sell them to the peasants on extremely advantageous conditions for the peasants. The bank offered them up to 90% of the value of the bought land in credit at a rate of 4.5% at huge instalments. In sum, by 1917 100% of the arable land in the Asiatic part of Russia, and about 90% of it in the European part was either owned or rented by peasants. By 1914 almost all the commune lands had passed into private peasant ownership. The results of the reforms exceeded all expectations. The harvest sharply increased, so that Russia exported up to a quarter of its bread abroad and became the main supplier of bread to Europe. The wheat harvest rose from about two billion poods in 1894 to four billion in 1913 and 1914. In 1913 the wheat harvest in Russia was about one third higher than those in Argentina, Canada and the USA put together! In 1908 a little more than 858 million poods of wheat and flour were exported to England alone, and in 1910 – about three billion. The production of rye rose from two billion poods in 1894 to four billion in 1913. Also *doubled* in this period was the production of cotton, the consumption of sugar and tea per head of population, and other products. *Half* the world’s trade in eggs belonged to Russia. She possessed 80% of the world’s output of flax. Russia had not known such a rapid rise in agriculture as took place from 1907 to 1911 in connection with the reforms, throughout the whole period of her history. ‘Give us twenty more years of internal and external peace,’ said P.A. Stolypin, ‘and you will not know the present Russia!’ By 1914 the country was already unrecognizable in many ways…”[[35]](#footnote-35)

Both friends and foes agreed with Stolypin. The Germans certainly did – fear of Russian growth was their main motive for starting World War One. The French economist Edmond Thierry was of the same opinion. In 1914 he published a detailed report for the French ministers that concluded: “If the affairs of the European nations continue in the same way from 1912 to 1950 as they have done from 1900 to 1912, then Russia by the middle of the present century will dominate Europe, both in the political and in the economic and financial spheres.”[[36]](#footnote-36)

Lenin, plotting the revolution from his Swiss hideaway, also agreed; he later calculated that if Stolypin’s plans for the creation of an independent peasantry had been given some more years in which to come to fruition, thereby reducing the flow of poor, discontented peasants into the cities, the revolution would not have taken place. Even so, enough progress had been made to create one of the toughest nuts for the revolution to crack. The peasants – and especially those who had acquired lands in Siberia under Stolypin – rose up in several vast rebellions in the early years of the revolution, and were finally crushed only by the horrors of dekulakization and collectivization in the 1930s...

As I.P. Yakoby wrote: “In the course of half a century, through a series of measures undertaken by the state, there was completed a painless transition of lands to those who in reality worked them. Thus the peasants, who during the emancipation of the serfs, owned about 120 million desyatins, acquired, before the war, by means of state agrarian banks, 100 million more, while at the same time the area of privately owned lands was reduced from 100 million to 56 million desyatins. Through the continuation of this policy, fifty years on, almost the whole reserve of exploited lands would undoubtedly have passed to the peasants, and with this every chance of agrarian disturbances would have disappeared. Thus for the revolution there remained only the hope of an unsuccessful war…”[[37]](#footnote-37)

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In 1909 the Tsar vetoed a Naval General Staff bill that would have enabled the Duma to interfere in military matters for the first time. This was an important assertion of his authority; for the question of who controls the army had been the issue that had split the English king and the House of Commons in 1641-42, and the Prussian king and parliament in 1862-63.[[38]](#footnote-38) But it raised again the question of who really ruled Russia: the tsar or the Duma. The October Manifesto and the Basic Laws did not really answer the question because the Tsar tended to ignore those articles that gave legislative power to the Duma while the Duma ignored those articles that kept power in the hands of the Tsar.

In 1911 an interesting debate on this question took place between the revolutionary-turned-monarchist Lev Alexandrovich Tikhomirov and Stolypin. Tikhomirov considered the new order in Russia after 1906 to be “unprincipled” and “neither monarchy nor democracy” “Being ambiguous in concept and deviating from a clear attitude to any Supreme Power, it was formed in such a way that in it everyone can get in everyone else’s way but there is no one who could force the institutions of state to collaborate. His Majesty the Emperor himself can independently only not allow a law to be enforced, but he cannot independently create a law that is necessary for the country. But… the state, on the contrary, has the task of working, and especially in a country that has been so disturbed during the preceding years of woes and troubles.

“This order, which is extremely bad from the point of view of its apparatus, is, in addition to that, complete antinational, that is, it does not correspond either to the character of the nation or to the conditions of the general situation of the Empire. As a result of this, disorganization in the country is being engendered on all sides. Unifying elements are weakening. A friable, bored, discontented mood has appeared. The Russians are losing their spirit, their faith in themselves, they are not inspired by patriotism. Moreover, class and inter-racial quarrels are necessarily becoming sharper.

“Russia constitutes a nation and a state that are great in instincts and means, but also surrounded by great dangers. It was created by Russians and is preserved only by Russians. Only Russian power brings the remaining elements to some solidarity amongst themselves and with the Empire. … We have a huge non-Russian population… The strongest of the other races are foreign to our patriotism. They are eternally quarrelling amongst themselves, but are inclined to rebel against the dominion of the Russians. The unifying element, the general bond is we, the Russians. Without us the Empire will disintegrate, and these other races will perish. Therefore we must remember our mission and support the conditions of our strength. We must remember that our state is a matter not simply of national egoism, but a global duty. We occupy a post that is necessary for all. But in order to keep this post we need a one-person Supreme Power, that is, the Tsar, not as the adornment of a pediment, but as a real state power.

“No combinations of popular representation or elective laws can guarantee the supremacy of the Russians. We must understand ourselves. As a people that is essentially statist, the Russians are not suited to petty political struggles, they can do politics only wholesale, not retail, by contrast with the Poles, the Jews, etc. The aims of the supremacy of such a people (as with the Romans) are attainable only by a one-person Supreme Power that realizes its ideals. With such a power we become stronger and more skilful than all, for no Poles can compare with the Russians in the capacity for discipline and solidarity around a one-person power endowed with a moral character.

“But if it has no centre of unity, the Russian people loses its head and particularist peoples begin to obstruct it. Historical practice has created a Supreme Power in accordance with the Russian character. The Russian people has grown for itself a Tsar in union with the Church. [But] since 1906 that which was proper to the people has been undermined, and it is being forced to live in a way that it is not able to and does not want. This was undoubtedly a huge constitutional mistake, for whatever theoretical preferences there may be, practically speaking state reason requires institutions that conform to the character of the people and the general conditions of its supremacy. In destroying that, 1906 deprived us of that without which the Empire cannot exist – the possibility of creating a dictatorship immediately. Such a possibility was given first of all by the presence of a Tsar having the right to engage in the situation with all his unlimited Supreme Power.

“The consciousness alone of the possibility of an immediate concentration [of power] filled the Russians with confidence in their strength, while inspiring our rivals with fear and dread. Now that has been taken away. And without our watchfulness there is nobody to keep the remaining races in unity…”[[39]](#footnote-39)

Stolypin replied on July 9: “All these fine theoretical considerations would in practice have turned out to be a malicious provocation and the beginning of a new revolution…”[[40]](#footnote-40)

Both men were right. Tikhomirov was right that the post-1906 order in Russia was no longer a true autocracy in the full sense, and that it contained within itself the seeds of its own destruction. But Stolypin was right that there was no real practical alternative, and that through him and his government the Tsar could at any rate carry out part of his autocratic will. However, that presupposed that it was indeed the Tsar’s will that Stolypin was fulfilling, and not his own…

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For a vital five years after the 1905 revolution Stolypin had been the indispensable servant of the Tsar in restoring internal order in the country and in pushing through much-needed reforms. However, by 1909-10, as Lieven writes, his “stock among the elite was falling. Arguments were growing between the Duma, the government and the State Council [which had a veto on all legislation as well as the Tsar] as to whether it was yet safe to rescind the ‘states of emergency’ by which much of Russia was governed. This would allow the civil rights promised in the constitution to come into effect and would thereby reduce the anger of much of Russian educated society against bureaucratic arbitrariness. Some of Stolypin’s proposed reforms were threatening the position of powerful groups and interests. The Orthodox hierarchy denounced efforts to widen and guarantee the rights of other religions and of non-believers. Industrialists complained about new welfare legislation for workers. Above all, the landowning aristocracy attacked Stolypin’s plans to democratize in part local government while at the same time increasing the control over it of the central administration. The landowning class disliked bureaucracy only a little less than democracy. Both were seen as threats to the aristocracy’s power, whose shakiness had just been rudely illustrated in the 1905 revolution. Landowners struggling to make big estates profitable were terrified at the prospect of the increased tax burdens a more democratic local government might impose. The aristocracy’s intransigence was a measure of its weakness. Unlike in nineteenth-century England, the upper class felt itself too poor and too weak to be able to make concessions, buy off opposition and survive. Under the new constitutional system, the aristocracy was far better able to defend its interests than had ever previously been the case. For the first time, the landowners were allowed to organize on a national scale and their pressure group, the United Nobility, became the single most powerful lobby in Russia. Moreover, landowning nobles were now the biggest group in the Duma and were well entrenched in the State Council. They could and did block legislation that offended their interests. The Russian situation was very similar to that of Prussia in the decades after the 1848 revolution. When absolute monarchy gave way to a conservative and very restricted constitutionalism the aristocracy gained greatly in political power in both countries. As the class most trusted by the monarchy, the landowners acquired the predominant weight in parliament in both Petersburg and Berlin. The agrarian lobby was a thorn in the flesh of Wilhelm II’s government. The Russian agrarians helped to wreck Stolypin…”[[41]](#footnote-41)

Now Stolypin was a landowner from Kovno, and took a particular interest in his native land and in the difficult situation of the Russian peasantry there. For in Belorussia especially, although there was a governor appointed from St. Petersburg, political and cultural power belonged to the Poles, and economic power – to the Jews. One of the reasons for the great popularity of the monarchist Unions in these western regions was that the peasantry looked to the Tsar and the monarchist parties as their only protection against these foreign oppressors.[[42]](#footnote-42) “The political balance of forces in pre-war Belorussia,” wrote the émigré Belorussian writer Ivan Solonevich, “was as follows. The region had been comparatively recently joined to the Empire and was populated by Russian peasants. Besides the peasants, there were almost no Russians. Our Belorussian nobles very easily betrayed both the faith of their fathers and the language of their people and the interests of Russia. The Tyshkeviches, the Mitskeviches and the Senkeviches were all approximately as Belorussian as I. But they were traitors. The people remained without a governing class. Without intelligentsia, without bourgeoisie, without aristocracy, even without a proletariat and without craftsmen. The path to economic advancement was simply blocked by the Jews of the cities and hamlets. Count Muraviev… opened for the Belorussian peasant the path at any rate into the lower levels of the intelligentsia. Our newspaper [financed by Stolypin] depended on these *intelligenty*, so to speak, on the Belorussian staff-captains of the time: popular teachers, volost scribes, village priests, doctors, low-ranking officials. Then, as now, we had to fight on two fronts. This mass of people was inclined towards revolution. We had to prove to them that it could defend its political, economic and every other form of life only in a struggle against the Jews and Polonization. The struggle was very difficult. It was very difficult to prove to the readers of Chernyshevsky, Dobroliubov, and the venerators of Aladin, Rodichev and Miliukov the completely obvious fact that if the monarchy retreated, they, these readers, would be eaten up by the Jews and Poles. And that it was only within the bounds of the empire and the monarchy that these people could defend their national being.…”[[43]](#footnote-43)

In the autumn Stolypin moved to strengthen this movement by introducing a bill for the introduction of self-governing *zemstva* in the provinces of Vitebsk, Minsk, Mogilev, Kiev, Volhynia and Podolsk, where the Russian element was stronger than the Polish or Jewish, but not yet in Kovno, Vilna and Grodno, where the Russian element was weaker. However, the bill was fiercely criticized in both the State Council and the State Duma on the grounds that it would violate racial equality in the region. This was doubly ironical, in that Stolypin *both* wanted to bring the position of the Russian peasant to a position of equality with his Jewish and Polish neighbours, *and* was in favour of removing many of the restrictions on the Jews in the region of the Pale. For, on the one hand, these restrictions were extremely complex, sometimes contradictory and difficult to enforce. And on the other hand, the lack of full equality of rights for the Jews gave them and their supporters in the Duma and the press a powerful weapon with which to beat the government…

However, the bill to broaden the rights of the Jews was attacked in the rightist press and vetoed by the Tsar. As for the bill to introduce *zemstva* in the western regions, in May, 1910 the Duma accepted it, but only with significant corrections that modified its anti-Polish character. But in February the State Council rejected it by 92 votes to 68. Moreover, among those who voted against were P.N. Durnovo and V.F. Trepov, rightists of impeccably monarchical principles who were close to the Tsar.

Stolypin immediately left the session of the State Council, suspecting a plot against himself. On March 5, he saw the Tsar and offered his resignation. The Tsar, stunned, asked him to reconsider. Stolypin then suggested suspending both the State Council and the Duma for several days while the law on the western zemstva was passed in accordance with Article 87 of the Basic Laws. He also asked that the Tsar order Durnovo and Trepov to leave St. Petersburg and their work in the State Council for a time. The Tsar was doubtful about these measures, and thought about them for several days. Finally, on March 12, he accepted Stolypin’s conditions. The fact that he had agreed to measures of dubious legality for the sake of keeping him was a vivid witness to how much he valued him.

But Stolypin had misjudged the situation, and almost everybody, including the State Council and Duma, condemned him. The law on the western *zemstva* went through, but it did not give the expected results in the summer elections – the majority of those elected did not belong to any Russian bloc, but were non-party figures. Stolypin now felt himself to be in a position of “semi-retirement”, and went to his daughter’s estate for most of the summer…

At the end of August he travelled to Kiev on the occasion of the opening of a monument to Tsar Alexander II in the present of the Tsar and leading government officials. On September 1 he was present with the Tsar at a performance of Glinka’s opera, “A Life for the Tsar”. That evening, between the acts of the opera, Stolypin gave his life for the Tsar, being shot by the Jew Bogrov. As he fell, he slowly made the sign of the Cross in the direction of the Tsar (his right hand had been shot through), and as he was being carried out of the theatre, he said: “Tell his Majesty that I am glad to die for him and for the Homeland”. He died a few days later.

For five critical years, Stolypin had steered his country out of the storm of revolution and into the relatively calmer water of the Duma Monarchy, at the same time significantly increasing the prosperity and stability of the country. His greatness was generally recognized. The Tsar would never again find a minister like him, and after his death the country again began to turn towards the left and the revolutionary activity of the liberal Masons increased…

In his novel *August 1914* Alexander Solzhenitsyn wrote: “Stolypin’s stand could have been and looked like the beginning of a new period in Russian history. . . . ‘Another ten or fifteen years,’ Stolypin would tell his close collaborators, ‘and the revolutionaries won’t have a chance’.”

But the root causes of the revolution were spiritual, not political, economic or social; and Stolypin’s reforms, while admirable, hardly scratched the surface of the deeper problems of Russia…

## **49. THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION**

Since the beginning of the century, Britain had been gradually coming out of her “splendid isolation”. The fact that Germany and America were catching up with her industrially, that her imperial commitments were creating a huge strain on the exchequer, and that her role in the Boer War was almost universally despised, led her to seek out allies. At first France and Russia were considered, but rejected. There was a brief flirtation with Germany; but the Germans did not respond. Finally, Japan was chosen…[[44]](#footnote-44) Britain’s alliance with Japan set her even more at odds with Russia, who in February, 1904 found herself at war with Japan. In that month there was a dangerous incident in the North Sea when the Russian fleet steaming to the Far East got entangled with a British trawler fleet and killed two men, bringing the two countries to the brink of war.

However, the Japanese, while useful allies in the Far East, were no use to the British in Europe, and especially in countering the rising power of the Germans, who had begun a naval building programme that was quite clearly directed against Britain. So in 1904 the British patched up their quarrels with the French and concluded an *Entente Cordiale*. Since the French were already in alliance with the Russians, it was natural to speculate on the possibility of a *rapprochement* between Britain and Russia in spite of their recent enmity.

However, the Tsar was still smarting from his defeat at the hands of Japan, whose ally was Britain, and was not at first inclined to favour Britain over Germany. And so in July, 1905 he met the Kaiser in secret at Björkö in the Gulf of Finland, and signed a treaty with him which stipulated that each country would come to the other’s aid in the event of an attack by a third country. However, when his advisers saw it, they persuaded the Tsar to make changes to it and therefore in effect abandon it on the not unreasonable grounds that, although the treaty was a defensive one, it would be bound to look different to the French – and the alliance with France was too important to endanger. The Kaiser suffered a similar experience from his ministers, which showed how real one-man-rule was becoming rarer and more difficult in the early twentieth century.[[45]](#footnote-45)

In 1906 Russia supported France as against Germany in the Moroccan dispute, not least because the French offered the Russians a vitally important loan. Russian foreign policy was becoming more anchored in the alliance with France – which made an alliance also with France’s ally, Britain, more likely…

From the British perspective, such a *rapprochement* was made more palatable by Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, and the Tsar’s concession of some elements of a parliamentary system after the abortive revolution of 1905, which combined to soften the image of Russia in British minds: the bear no longer looked quite so powerful or threatening. Moreover, there were powerful geopolitical reasons why the two empires, both over-stretched in their different ways, should seek some kind of accommodation with each other. Both countires feared German expansion: Britain feared Germany’s new dreadnoughts in the North Sea and her new colonies in Eastern and Southern Africa, while Russia feared German interference in her Baltic provinces on behalf of the German minority there. As for the “Great Game”, the rivalry of the two powers in Asia, this was no longer dangerous: talks on Tibet and Afghanistan had started already in 1903, and resumed with much greater hope of success after the crisis years of 1904-05.

And so in 1907, in spite of many misgivings on both sides, but eagerly supported by France, Britain and Russia signed a convention delineating their respective “spheres of influence” in Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia. From the British point of view, the key advantage gained was unhindered access to the recently discovered oil reserves in Southern Persia. This would prove very important in the world war, because the decision had been taken to run the British fleet, not on coal, but on oil… But from the Russian point of view, “the core of the Convention”, as Foreign Minister Izvolsky put it, was the prospect of British support for improved Russian access to the Straits.[[46]](#footnote-46) For Russian foreign policy, having suffered a major defeat in the Far East, was now reorienting itself back towards the Balkans…

The Convention was sealed by a meeting in 1908 between King Edward VII and Tsar Nicholas in Revel[[47]](#footnote-47) and by visits to England by a parliamentary delegation and then the Tsar himself in 1909. This latter visit was accompanied by huge security. Frances Welch explains why: “During the preceding months, there had been outcries in the Commons, where the visit of the Tsar was described as ‘repulsive to multitudes of our people’. The Tsar was repeatedly lambasted for his poor record on civil liberties and for state censorship. Radicals called for his assassination. On the day of his arrival, seventy MPs and two bishops made formal complaints.

“The *Standart* arrived at Cowes [on the Isle of Wight] on schedule, on 2nd August. The *Isle of Wight County Press* reported a fond greeting. ‘The two monarchs embraced with great affection.’ But in private Edward VII had been complaining that the Tsar was ‘deplorably unsophisticated, immature and reactionary’. Meanwhile, the Tsar was visiting under duress, his ministers having warned him that it might antagonize other European leaders. One minister had even insisted that Britain would never be a loyal ally.

“At their last meeting Edward VII had been rather critical of the young Romanovs, tut-tutting that they spoke English with a ‘déclassé accent’. The mortified Tsarina had sacked their tutor, the unfortunate Mr. Epps, forthwith. But the *Isle of Wight County Press* preferred to take a sunnier view: ‘The five beautiful Romanov children formed an interesting portion of a happy domestic picture.’

“Of the royal party the future George V entered best into the spirit of the occasion, writing in his diary. ‘Dear Nicky, Alicky [the Tsarina] and their children received us. Dear Nicky looking so well and Alicky too. I had not seen him for twelve years…’ George’s famously acquisitive wife, the future Queen Mary, was equally enthusiastic, the Tsarina had given her a trinket, ‘which for years I had wanted to have!!!!’.

“The Tsar’s review of the British fleet was hailed as a triumph, the King paid tribute to the biggest gathering of warships he had ever seen, and George wrote in his diary that ‘each ship cheered as we passed her’. In fact, the review had suffered a narrow squeak. At the end of the inspection of the first row of ships, the leading Russian cruiser had almost smashed into a British dreadnought. Lord Suffield, who was on board the King’s ship, wrote of ‘unprecedented turmoil’.”[[48]](#footnote-48)

In fact, the whole visit, while deemed a success, served to underline the fact that the new agreement was still felt to be unnatural by many people on both sides…

Although the Russo-British agreement was a “convention” and not a formal alliance, it had an important psychological and political effect; people now saw Europe as divided into two alliance systems, with the central powers of Germany, Austria and (possibly) Italy on the one side, and England, France and Russia on the other. The effect was especially important in Germany, whose fear of encirclement was strengthened…

Tsar Nicholas was still trying to patch up relations with Germany and “Cousin Willie”. But he could not afford to go too far now for fear of disrupting the important alliances with France and Britain. “For Russia to move towards Germany,” writes Margaret Macmillan, “would mean abandoning the French alliance and, almost certainly, access to French financial markets. It was also certain to be opposed by the liberals who saw the alliance with France, and perhaps in the longer run with Britain, as encouraging progressive forces for change within Russia. And not all conservatives were pro-German; landowners were hurt by Germany’s protective tariffs on agricultural produces and foodstuffs…

“As soon as the Anglo-Russian Convention had been signed, Izvolsky reached out to the Triple Alliance, signing an agreement with Germany on the Baltic and proposing to Austria-Hungary that they work together in the Balkans. Britain, likewise, continued to hope for a winding down of the naval race with Germany. In the end, however, it proved to be beyond the capacity of Russia’s leaders to bridge the growing chasm between Britain and France on the one hand and Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other, or to keep Russia out of the mounting arms race. By 1914, in spite of periodic struggles to escape, Russia was firmly on one side. Bismarck had warned of this many years earlier: in 1885 he had written to Wilhelm’s grandfather that an alliance of Russia, Britain and France would provide the basis for a coalition against us more dangerous for Germany than any other she might have to face’…”[[49]](#footnote-49)

Meanwhile, writes Carter, “British attitudes to Russia had shifted. By 1912 the country had become fascinated by its would-be ally. In January 1912 *The Times* published a ‘Russian number’, and a group of liberal MPs visited Russia, a trip which Sir Charles Hardinge described as ‘the pilgrimage of love’. Russian literature was everywhere – not just Tolstoy but Dostoevsky, Chekhov and Turgenev had all been recently translated into English. Beef Stroganov had insinuated itself on to fashionable British menus. The Ballets Russes had brought a fantasy of Russian exoticism, wildness and modernity to London; [King] George went to see them on the eve of his coronation in 1911. But cultural fascination was not matched by political sympathy…”[[50]](#footnote-50)

“Russian high life,” writes Max Hastings, “exercised a fascination for Western Europeans. That genteel British magazine *The Lady* portrayed Nicholas II’s empire in romantic and even gushing terms: ‘this vast country with its great cities and arid steppes and extremes of riches and poverty, captures the imagination. Not a few Englishmen and Englishwomen have succumbed to the fascinations and made it their home, and English people, generally speaking, are liked and welcomed by the Russians. One learns that the girls of the richer classes are brought up very carefully. They are kept under strict control in the nursery and the schoolroom, live a simple, healthy life, are well taught several languages including English and French… with the result that they are well-educated, interesting, graceful, and have a pleasing, reposeful manner.’”[[51]](#footnote-51)

Personal sympathies at the highest level helped: the Tsar and Tsarina got on much better with their English relatives than with their German ones. “Nicky” and “Georgie” not only looked alike: they seemed genuinely to like each other. And they both detested “Cousin Willie”, the German Kaiser.

Moreover, the English ambassador in St. Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan, was “wonderfully devoted” to the tsar, declaring that “His Majesty had such a wonderful charm of manner that when he received me in audience he almost made me feel that it was as a friend, and not the Emperor, with whom I was talking. There was, if I may say so without presumption, what amounted to a feeling of mutual sympathy between us.”[[52]](#footnote-52) And yet it was precisely Sir George’s embassy that would turn out to be the nest of the February revolution; for cultural fascination and personal sympathies were swept away by the most powerful and enduring force in world politics – differences in faith, the fundamental collision between Orthodox Christianity and the democratic-socialist revolution.

The reason for the lack of political, as opposed to cultural sympathy was twofold: first, the increasing democratization of British society, as witnessed by the huge struggle for Lords reform, and secondly, the wildly inaccurate reporting of Russian affairs by the Jewish press inside Russia and their western followers. The fact was – which very few recognized – that Russia was far from being a despotic country. [[53]](#footnote-53) Moreover, while some restrictions on the Jews remained, it was by no means true that they were being foully and unjustly persecuted in Russia. The vast wave of *anti-Russian* pogroms, with thousands of Jewish political murders, was not reported objectively. All this defamation and slander would bear evil fruit in the future, in 1917…

In retrospect, the new European alliances created in 1904-07 - the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 - seemed to some commentators (for example, the French diplomat Maurice Paleologue) to foreshadow and even cause the subsequent aggressiveness of the Triple Alliance and hence the cataclysm of 1914. However, as Clark writes: “It was still far from clear in 1907 that the new alliances would take Europe to war. The weakness of Russia after the disaster of 1904 obliged the policy-makers in St. Petersburg in the first instance to seek good relations with Germany, and it was widely accepted in St. Petersburg, for the time being at least, that Russia’s domestic frailty ruled out any focus of international adventurism. It was hard to imagine the circumstances in which France might be willing to chance its arm for the Russians in the Balkans and even harder to imagine Russians marching to Berlin for the sake of Alsace and Lorraine. In 1909, Paris underscored its independence by signing an accord in Morocco with Germany, a ‘striking instance of the crossing of lines’ between the Alliance blocs. Then, in November 1910, Russian and German leaders met in Potsdam and Berlin to reconcile German and Russian interests in Turkey and Persia. There was no question of loosening the Franco-Russian bond, to be sure, but this was a significant gesture in the direction of détente. As for the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, it may have muted the tensions between Russia and Britain but it did not remove their cause, and right through until 1914 there were voices in the Foreign Office warning of the Russian threat to Britain’s far-flung empire…”[[54]](#footnote-54)

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Another very important foreign policy issue was the Straits, through which most of Russia’s vital exports of grain had to pass. Russia had to control the Black Sea and the Straits, which logically implied friendship with Turkey and Turkey’s new ally, Germany. A too aggressive support for the Balkans Slavs would endanger this vital Russian interest…

In this context an important contrary view to the prevailing pro-French, anti-German view was presented by the diplomat Alexander Giers. At the core of Giers’s thinking, writes Dominic Lieven, “was his concern to avoid war, above all because of Russia’s internal political instability and the danger of revolution. Most Russian policy makers shared this commitment to some degree, though for diplomats it was easy to forget the domestic context in the midst of negotiations with foreign power. Internal political concerns were after all not supposed to intrude on the Realpolitik of a great power. Giers was exceptional among diplomats not just in placing domestic politics and the need to avoid war at the very centre of his thinking but also in allowing this concern to influence his views on how decisions in Russian foreign policy should be made.

“In the winter of 1910, Giers urged on Foreign Minister Sazonov the crucial importance of fully including the Council of Ministers in foreign policy decision making, because the international context was vital for Russian internal development. Predictably, Sazonov thoroughly disliked the idea of allowing ‘outsiders’ to stick their noses into his department’s professional concerns. A year later, Giers returned to the charge. Nicholas II had now permitted discussion of foreign policy in the council, and advantage must be taken of this permission so that ministers could be properly educated about the realities of the international context and the principles on which Russian foreign policy must be based. Above all, this was crucial because it would allow the ministers to understand the links between domestic and foreign policy, and thereby to support Russia’s overriding need and goal, namely the avoidance of war. Giers’s desire to bring the council into foreign policy making no doubt owed something to the fact that the council’s chairman, Kokovtsev, both was a close friend and shared his view on the priorities of Russian foreign policy.

“Already in the summer of 1911, Giers was writing that the crises looming on the horizon in the Balkans and Constantinople could easily combine to unleash a flood that would sweep everything away. Rather than allowing all these waters to build up into a single huge tidal wave, Giers urged the need to differentiate between the Balkans and the Straits issues and to find ways to resolve key aspects of each potential crisis individually and in good time. He increasingly stressed that Russia’s key priority had to be the Black Sea basin and the Straits, rather than concern for the Balkans and the Slavs. Almost from the moment that the Young Turks came to power in 1908, he criticized the widespread illusion that they would be a force for democracy or ethnic tolerance. On the contrary, he wrote, they were Turkish nationalists whose goals would inevitably push them into conflict with their Christian subjects and with Russia and into reliance on Germany. Given the present rules that barred Russia from sending warships through the Straits, the Turks’ decision to buy dreadnought battleships from England was a major threat to Russian security in the Black Sea region. By 1913, Giers had come round to the view that the only way to meet this threat without risking war was to change the rules governing the passage of warships through the Straits. Neutralizing the region under an international guarantee supported by all the great powers would also increase this minimalist goal, it could win the support of the French and British allies, and even probably of the other great powers, and would thereby avoid the risks of a more aggressive stance….”[[55]](#footnote-55)

## **50. THE REPENTANCE OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA**

In 1909 a group of disillusioned ex-Marxists published a highly influential collection of essays under the title *Vekhi* (Landmarks), which criticized the revolutionary credo of the intelligentsia from several points of view. The contributors included some names that were to become famous in the Paris emigration: Nicholas Berdyaev, Sergei Bulgakov and Simeon Ludwigovich Frank.

Perhaps the profoundest essay was by Frank, who wrote: “The Symbol of Faith of the Russian *intelligent* is the good of the people, the satisfaction of the needs of ‘the majority’. The service of this aim is for him the highest and in general the only duty of man, and what is more than this is of the evil one. It is precisely for this reason that he not only simply denies or does not accept other values – he even directly fears and hates them. One cannot serve two gods at the same time, and if God, as Maxim Gorky had already openly made known, was ‘the essence of the people’s soul’, then all the other gods were false gods, idols or devils. Activity guided by love for science or art, life overshadowed by a religious light in the direct sense, that is, communion with God, all this distracts from service to the people, weakens or destroys moralistic enthusiasm and signifies, from the point of view of the intelligent’s faith, a dangerous hunting after mirages. Therefore all this is rejected, partly as stupidity or ‘superstition’, partly as an immoral direction of the will. This, of course, does not mean that the Russian intelligentsia is in fact alien to scientific, aesthetic and religious interests and experiences. It is impossible to kill the spirit and its inveterate demands, and it is natural that living people who have clothed their soul in the moral uniform of the ‘intelligent’ should retain in themselves all the feelings intrinsic to man. But these feelings live in the soul of the Russian *intelligent* in approximately the same way as the feeling of pity for an enemy lives in the soul of a warrior, or as the striving for the free play of fantasy in the consciousness of a strictly scientific thinker: they live precisely as an unlawful, albeit ineradicable weakness, as something in the best case merely tolerable. Scientific, aesthetic and religious experiences are always referred here, so to speak, to the private, intimate life of a man; more tolerant people look on them as a luxury, an amusement for hours of leisure, as a sweet eccentricity; the less tolerant condemn them in others and hide them with shame in themselves. But the *intelligent*, as an *intelligent*, that is, in his conscious faith and public activity, must be alien to them – his world-view and his ideal are hostile to these sides of human life. From science he takes several popularized, distorted or ad hoc positions, and although he often prides himself in the ‘scientificness’ of his faith, he also rejects scientific criticism with annoyance, as well as all the pure, disinterested work of scientific thought; while aesthetics and religion are completely unnecessary for him. All this – pure science, and art, and religion – is incompatible with moralism, with the service of the people; all this relies on love for objective values and, consequently, is alien, and for that reason also hostile, to that utilitarian faith which the Russian *intelligent* confesses. The religion of the service of earthly needs and the religion of the service of ideal values strike against each other, and however complex and varied their irrational psychological interweaving in the soul of the *intelligent*, in the sphere of the *intelligent*’s consciousness their conflict leads to the complete annihilation and expulsion of ideal demands in the name of the integrity and purity of the moralistic faith.

“Nihilistic moralism is the fundamental and most profound trait of the spiritual physiognomy of the Russian *intelligent*: from the denial of objective values there proceeds the deification of the subjective interests of one’s neighbour (‘the people’), hence there follows the recognition that the highest and only task of man is the service of the people, and hence in its turn there follows ascetic hatred for everything that hinders or even merely does not assist the realization of this task. Life has no other objective, inner meaning; its only good is to be materially provided for, to be satisfied in one’s subjective demands; therefore man is bound to devote all his strength to the amelioration of the lot of the majority, and everything that distracts from this is evil and must be mercilessly rooted out – that is the strange, logically badly founded, but psychologically strongly welded together chain of judgements that rules the whole behaviour and all the valuations of the Russian intelligent. Nihilism and moralism, lack of faith and a fanatical severity of moral demands, and a lack of principle in a metaphysical sense – for nihilism is also the denial of principled demands, it is an idiosyncratic, rationally unfathomable and at the same time in real life a strong merging together of antagonistic motives into a powerful psychical force. And it is that frame of mind which we call nihilistic moralism.”[[56]](#footnote-56)

If we look more closely at the nature and origins of this atheistic but moralistic, rationalistic and at the same time quasi-mystical faith of the Russian intelligentsia, we may find it in the Jewish chiliasm of the early Christian centuries.

Thus L.A. Tikhomirov, a revolutionary who repented and became a monarchist, wrote: “In spite of the seeming irreligiousness of the 19th century, in its most passionate dreams it is reminiscent of a moment not so much of cold unbelief, as of *an error of religious thought,* Jewish messianism or the Christian *chiliasm* that was born from it. The idea of earthly all-blessedness, whether it is expressed in the expectation of ‘the sensible kingdom of Christ’ or of a sorrowless ‘future order’ in the most various of philosophies, grows on the soil of one and the same psychology. The new chiliasm has *consciously* abandoned religion. But this difference is not as decisive as it seems. The very dreams about an *earthly* blessedness are already a rebuke to the weakness of spiritual feeling. On the other hand, the unconscious feeling which makes our rationally unbelieving revolutionaries, not simple epicureans, but fanatical dreamers about their future sorrowless order, bear unmistakeable signs of the spiritual strivings of an erring religious quest…

“One may even now foresee some features of a future *mystical* anarchism, which is still thought now by the revolutionaries to be sick and illogical, but – as in Count L. Tolstoy, for example, - is already making itself talked about, and not only in Russia…

“It is not the inadequacies of the old order, but an insuperable dream about the new order that was and will remain the moving power of the revolution…

“There is nothing that can be done against further corruption until people understand the source of the mistake.

“This mistake consists in the concept of the autonomy of the personality. The false teaching of its supposed autonomy appears first of all as a result of its rebellion against God. Being left without God, and in this condition feeling itself to be autonomous, the personality at first tries to find a full satisfaction of its strivings in this earthly world. But this is impossible. The world is not capable of that. From here there begins the renunciation of the world in the form that it is according to these earthly laws. One after another there appear dreams of ‘the future order’. Trying these orders, the autonomous personality rejects them one after the other, intensifying its rejection of the real world more and more…”

“Among us revolutionary destruction constitutes the faith, hope and duty of every good radical. Everything that is rebellion, protest, overthrow is looked upon as something useful, containing the seed of progress. Destruction is considered still more useful if it is directed against the preservation of the existing order.”[[57]](#footnote-57)

Frank also saw the desire for autonomy as lying at the root of the revolution: “Socialism is at the same time the culmination and the overthrow of liberal democracy. It is ruled by the same basic motive that rules the whole modern era: to make man and mankind the true master of his life, to present him with the possibility of ordering his own destiny on his own authority...”

“Socialism is the last stride in the great rebellion of mankind and at the same time the result of its total exhaustion - the complete spiritual impoverishment of the prodigal son in the long centuries of his wandering far from his father's home and wealth."[[58]](#footnote-58)

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Utopianism-chiliasm is based also on a false anthropology that denies the fall of man. For utopia on earth is possible only on the assumption that the men who live in the utopia are sinless and passionless, full of perfect love and humility. To suppose that any class of men, once delivered from injustice and poverty, will automatically behave like angels, is a myth. Still more mythical is the idea that the kingdom of love and brotherhood can be ushered in by hatred and fratricidal war. The means do not justify the ends; and the employment of evil means leads unfailingly to evil ends.

As Solzhenitsyn wrote in *The Gulag Archipelago*, “If only it were all so simple! If only there were evil people somewhere insidiously committing evil deeds and it were necessary only to separate them from the rest of us and destroy them. But the dividing line between good and evil cuts through the heart of every human being, and who is willing to destroy his own heart?”

If the line between good and evil passes, not between classes or nations, but down the middle of each human heart, it follows that the triumph of good over evil is possible only through the purification of the human heart, *every* human heart. And that is a spiritual task which is accomplished by spiritual, not material or political means, by confession of the faith and repentance of sin, not by rebellion against the king and the redistribution of property.

This brings us to a still deeper flaw of utopianism – its materialism. For while the heresy of chiliasm at any rate recognized the existence of God and the spiritual nature of man, utopianism reduces everything to the blind determinism of insensate matter. For the ancient heretics, utopia could only be introduced by God, and was awarded to the righteous in response to the right use of their freewill. For the moderns, there is neither God nor freewill – but utopia will come in any case, as the result of the iron laws of necessity. And this fatalistic faith both gives the revolution its frightening power – for men acquire extraordinary self-confidence when they know that they must win in the end – and guarantees its terrifying cruelty – for without freewill there is no responsibility, and, as one of Dostoyevsky’s characters said, following Nietzsche, “if there is no God, everything is permitted”.

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The arguments of *Vekhi* had their effect. But still more important in quenching the self-confidence of the intelligentsia was the obvious success of the Tsar’s government in raising Russia’s standard of living and general effectiveness. For example, in St. Petersburg a congress of teachers – traditionally among the most revolutionary layers of the population – passed without any political demands or demonstrations. It even became fashionable to love your country and believe in it again… For “the intelligentsia,” writes Oldenburg, “had lost faith in their former ideals. They already had doubts about materialism, about the ideas of the 18th and 19th centuries, even about the all-saving significance of the revolution, but they had as it were not decided to admit this to themselves. Moreover, this disillusion went very deep, it was reflected in the younger generation, among the students, even among the adolescents who were only beginning to live consciously. ‘The authority of the older generation has been lowered still more in the eyes of the younger than is usual among fathers and sons…‘ wrote Professor V.I. Vernadsky in the Cadet *Ezhegodnik* of the newspaper *Rech’* for 1914.

“The fall of the old *intelligenty* beliefs engendered, in the period around 1910, a wave of suicides among the young students. This wave then began to fall and be converted into religious searchings. In higher education, where politics had completely died out – not so much because of the energetic repressive measures of L.A. Kasso, but rather as a result of the change in mood among the students themselves, - various religious conversation circles began to appear – a hitherto unheard-of phenomenon…

“Russian society began to depart from the well-beaten track; it no longer preached atheism, materialism and socialism with its former fanatical conviction. But this change did not reach the broad, semi-intellectual masses. There, on the contrary, the sowing of the 19th century had only just put forth shoots; there the old dogmas were still considered unquestionable, and with the growth of literacy they quickly spread among the people…”[[59]](#footnote-59)

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Moreover, there were still many *intelligenty* who still clung stubbornly to the old, well-beaten track of rationalism. The most famous of these was Lev Tolstoy, who blasphemously mistranslated the beginning of St. John’s Gospel as follows: “In the beginning was reasoning. And reasoning replaced God…”

In 1908 there was great celebrations at his eightieth birthday. As Bartlett writes, “Journalists gushed that there had never been a cultural celebration in Russia like it ever before, and that while the Pushkin Statue festivities had captured the national imagination back in 1880, this was an event on an international scale. Merezhkovsky proclaimed the Tolstoy celebration as a ‘celebration of the Russian revolution’, and declared that Tolstoy had against his will ‘turned out to be the radiant focal point of Russian freedom’.”[[60]](#footnote-60)

Hailed by Lenin as “the mirror of the Russian revolution”, his significance was also seen by the authors of *Vekhi*. Thus “in a 1918 article Nikolay Berdyaev argued that the Russian Revolution was in its way a victory for Tolstoyanism, while Dmity Merezhkovsky declared that Bolshevism was the ‘suicide’ of Europe: ‘Tolstoy began it, and Lenin finished it off.’ Berdyaev argued that spiritual regeneration would entail overcoming Tolstoyanism.’”[[61]](#footnote-61)

In 1910, Tolstoy died, still unreconciled with God and the Church… To his sister, who was a nun in St. Ambrose of Optina’s foundation at Shamordino, his voluntary rejection of the truth was revealed in a vision: “When I returned from the burial of my brother Sergius to my home in the monastery, I had some kind of dream or vision which shook me to the depths of my soul. After I had completed my usual cell rule, I began to doze off, or fell into some kind of special condition between sleep and waking, which we monastics call a light sleep. I dropped off, and beheld... It was night. There was the study of Lev Nikolayevich. On the writing desk stood a lamp with a dark lampshade. Behind the desk, and leaning with his elbows on it, sat Lev Nikolayevich, and on his face there was the mark of such serious thought, and such despair, as I had never seen in him before... The room was filled with a thick, impenetrable darkness; the only illumination was of that place on the table and on the face of Lev Nikolayevich on which the light of the lamp was falling. The darkness in the room was so thick, so impenetrable, that it even seemed as if it were filled, saturated with some materialisation... And suddenly I saw the ceiling of the study open, and from somewhere in the heights there began to pour such a blindingly wonderful light, the like of which cannot be seen on earth; and in this light there appeared the Lord Jesus Christ, in that form in which He is portrayed in Rome, in the picture of the holy Martyr and Archdeacon Laurence: the all-pure hands of the Saviour were spread out in the air above Lev Nikolayevich, as if removing from invisible executioners the instruments of torture. It looks just like that in the picture. And this ineffable light poured and poured onto Lev Nikolayevich. But it was as if he didn't see it... And I wanted to shout to my brother: Levushka, look, look up!... And suddenly, behind Lev Nikolayevich, - I saw it with terror, - from the very thickness of the darkness I began to make out another figure, a terrifying, cruel figure that made me tremble: and this figure, placing both its hands from behind over the eyes of Lev Nikolayevich, shut out that wonderful light from him. And I saw that my Levushka was making despairing efforts to push away those cruel, merciless hands...

“At this point I came to, and, as I came to, I heard a voice speaking as it were inside me: 'The Light of Christ enlightens everyone!’”[[62]](#footnote-62)

## **51. THE BEILIS TRIAL**

In 1911, a Christian boy, Andrew Yuschinksy, was killed. In connection with this, in 1913, the trial took place in Kiev of a Jew named Beilis, which became an international *cause célèbre*. The verdict of the court was that the boy had been ritually murdered - but Beilis himself was acquitted.[[63]](#footnote-63)

In order to understand the significance of this trial, it is necessary briefly to return again to the roots of “the Jewish question” in Russia and of the so-called Jewish “blood libel”.

By 1914 there were about seven million Jews in the Russian empire – the largest non-Slavic ethnic minority. Most of them lived in the Pale of Settlement, a very large area in the west of Russia approximately the size of France and Germany combined. Russian law, very loosely observed, confined them to this area, but on religious, not racial grounds - the sacred book of the Jews, the Talmud, is so hostile to Christ and Christians that those who follow it were deemed to be a threat to the lives and livelihoods of Christians. That these restrictions were indeed religious and not racial is proved by the fact that the Karaite Jews, who did not accept the Talmud, the Mountain Jews of the Caucasus, who were strongly tainted with paganism, and Jews who became Christians of any denomination, were given equal rights with the rest of the population.[[64]](#footnote-64)

Moreover, permission to live outside the Pale was given to various categories of Jews: Siberian colonists, domestic servants, artisans, university graduates (one-fifth of the students of Kharkov university were Jews), businessmen, industrialists, bankers and others. This meant that in spite of the discriminatory laws there were considerable colonies of Jews throughout the empire and even in the capital, which enabled them to play a prominent role in the cultural and commercial life of pre-revolutionary Russia. In all, Jews made up about a third of Russia’s total trading community.

In spite of the considerable opportunities thus presented to Jews in the Russian Empire, the traditionalist, rabbi-dominated Talmudic Jews of the Pale continued to think of Christians and Christian society as unclean and despicable. “The eminent Jewish-Russian lawyer, Genrikh Sliozberg," write Kyril Fitzlyon and Tatiana Browning, "never forgot the 'real grief' of his family and relations when they discovered that his father had sent him to a Russian grammar school. His school uniform they found particularly irritating, sinful even. It was, they thought, 'an apostate's garb', and his mother and grandmother cried bitterly every time they saw him in it.' Again, 'the Russian-Jewish revolutionary, Lev Deutsch, writing in 1923, clearly remembered the time when the Jews 'considered it sinful to learn Russian, and its use was allowed only if absolutely essential and, of course, only for speaking to Christians (the *goyim*).'"[[65]](#footnote-65)

It was in this fanatical atmosphere that both Communist and Zionist propaganda made inroads into Jewish youth. As Chaim Weitzmann recalled in his *Autobiography*, zealots of both types were to be found in his own family, being united only in their hatred of Orthodox Russia.[[66]](#footnote-66) Such sentiments were bound to lead to a reaction on the part of the surrounding population. Moreover, Jewish money-lenders exploited Russian peasants who wished to buy their freedom after Alexander II’s emancipation of the serfs in 1861. The government tried to help with generous, low-interest loans, and on several occasions cancelled the debts outright; but the remaining need was filled by less generous Jews, who stepped in with much tougher, high-interest loans.

The pogroms of the oppressed Ukrainian peasantry against the oppressor Jewish money-lenders provided the excuse which international Jewry, together with its “Christian” front, the secularised intelligentsia of Russia and the West, needed. Soon a vast campaign was being whipped up against “the sick man of Europe”, the so-called “prison of the peoples”. Jewish and Socialist propaganda distorted the significance of these events, obscuring their causes, hiding the extremely provocative behaviour of Jewish gangs, and quite unjustly accusing the Church and the State, and in particular the Tsar, of complicity in these crimes.

The innocence of the government and Tsar is illustrated by their reaction to the assassination by the Jewish revolutionary Bogrov of Prime Minister A.A. Stolypin in Kiev Opera House in 1911. Robert Massie writes: “Because Bogrov was a Jew, the Orthodox population was noisily preparing a retaliatory pogrom. Frantic with fear, the city’s Jewish population spent the night packing their belongings. The first light of the following day found the square before the railway station jammed with carts and people trying to squeeze themselves on to departing trains. Even as they waited, the terrified people heard the clatter of hoofs. An endless stream of Cossacks, their long lances dark against the dawn sky, rode past. On his own, Kokovtsev had ordered three full regiments of Cossacks into the city to prevent violence. Asked on what authority he had issued the command, Kokovtsev replied: ‘As head of the government.’ Later, a local official came up to the Finance Minister to complain, ‘Well, Your Excellency, by calling in the troops you have missed a fine chance to answer Bogrov’s shot with a nice Jewish pogrom.’ Kokovtsov was indignant, but, he added, ‘his sally suggested to me that the measures which I had taken at Kiev were not sufficient… therefore I sent an open telegram to all governors of the region demanding that they use every possible means – force if necessary – to prevent possible pogroms. When I submitted this telegram to the Tsar, he expressed his approval of it and of the measure I had taken in Kiev.’”[[67]](#footnote-67)

In 1906 the future Hieromartyr Fr. John Vostorgov said: “The Jews are restricted in their rights of residence not as a confessional unit, but as a predatory tribe that is dangerous in the midst of the peaceful population because of its exploitative inclinations, which… have found a religious sanction and support in the Talmud… Can such a confession be tolerated in the State, when it allows its followers to practise hatred and all kinds of deceit and harm towards other confessions, and especially Christians? … The establishment of the Pale of Settlement is the softest of all possible measures in relation to such a confession. Moreover, is it possible in this case not to take account of the mood of the masses? But this mood cannot be changed only by issuing a law on the complete equality of rights of the Jews. On the contrary, this can only strengthen the embitterment of the people…”[[68]](#footnote-68)

Now stories of ritual murder of Christian children by Jews have surfaced in many countries, leading to many formal trials and convictions. These are routinely dismissed by western authors as the Jewish “blood libel”. However, in 2007 the Israeli Professor Ariel Toaff, the son of the Chief Rabbi of Rome, published *Confirming Judaic Ritual Murder,* in which he confirms the practice in medieval Italy.[[69]](#footnote-69)

Moreover,the Orthodox Church has come to the same conclusion, having canonized at least one victim of such a murder, Child-Martyr Gabriel of Zverki, Belorussia, to whom Archbishop Anthony (Khrapovitsky) wrote a service in 1908.[[70]](#footnote-70)

In 1855 Bishop Porphyrius (Uspensky) of Chigirinsk wrote to the director of the Department of foreign confessions, Khrushchev: “Just as the Christian peoples have retained many pagan superstitions, so the Jews – it goes without saying, not all of them – continue to shed the blood of children and youths who are not of their tribe according to very ancient tradition, which points to the redemption of their whole race in a bloody human sacrifice… In the East everyone is convinced that the killing of Christian boys by the Jews is ordered in such a way that this evil is accomplished in one year in Thessalonica, for example, in another in Damascus, in a third in Spain, or Russia, or Wallachia, etc., and that the towels soaked in the blood of the unfortunate victim are burned, and their ashes are scattered to all the synagogues so that they can be baked into the paschal bread… Judge, after this, how difficult it is to catch the terrible crime… I sorrow over the existence of such a horror among the Jews… And Jews have penetrated onto Athos, and one of them in the rank of hieromonk and spiritual father killed monks coming to him for confession, and hid their corpses under his floor…”[[71]](#footnote-71)

It is the tendency of pro-semite authors to dismiss all this as “anti-semitic lies”. However, even if all the historical evidence of Jewish atrocities could be dismissed, it would be surprising indeed if a religion steeped in such hatred against Christ and Christians as Talmudic Judaism did not produce *acts* of hatred. As long as incitement to such acts exists in the “sacred” book of the Judaistic religion, there must be a presumption that some of its followers may be tempted to carry them out.

On the other hand, it cannot be denied that Christians also acted with hatred and committed atrocities, as in the pogroms in the Rhineland in 1096 or in Spain leading to the expulsion of all the Jews from Spain in 1492, or in Russia before the revolution. Hatred of enemies is forbidden by the Gospel of Christ; so such acts, whether or not they were provoked by hatred on the Jews’ side, cannot be condoned. But the justified horror at Christian antisemitism which has become so *de rigeur* in the modern world, must always be balanced by a similar horror at the antigentilism and antichristianity of the Talmud, the most hateful of all “sacred” books.

Over a hundred well-documented cases of the murder of Christian children by the Jews for ritual purposes in various countries are cited by Oleg Platonov. Especially important is the evidence of Monk Neophytus, who was until the age of 38 a Jewish rabbi but then joined the Greek Church. He exposed, not only the real existence of this horrific practice, but also the religious rationale behind it. His book, entitled *A Refutation of the Religion of the Jews and their Rites from the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments*, originally appeared in Moldavian in 1803 and was translated into Russian in 1913, the year of the Beilis trial.

Archbishop Anthony (Khrapovitsky)’s expressed his attitude to these events in an interview he gave to A. Chizhevsky. After reminding his readers of how, at the request of Rabbi Skomorovsky, he had twice, in 1903 and 1905, spoken up against the antisemite pogroms in Zhitomir, he went on: “But in both of the above-mentioned cases of my conversation with the rabbi, I decisively refused to say that I did not recognize the existence of ritual murders carried out by Jews, but on the contrary I expressed to my interlocutor my conviction that these murders exist, perhaps as belonging to one or another sect of the Jewish religion, perhaps as a secret of the highest spiritual government of the Jews, but there undoubtedly have been cases of ritual murders both in recent times and in antiquity.

“When my Jewish academic acquaintances pointed to the fact that Jewish law forbids the drinking of the blood even of animals, so that the thought of their mixing Christian blood with the paschal matsa was absurd, I replied that what seemed more probable to me was the link between the ritual killings and, not the Jewish feast of Pascha, but the feast that precedes it of ‘Purim’, in which the story of Esther, Haman and Mordecai is remembered, when the Persian king, having executed the enemy of the Jews, Haman, allowed them, who had not long before been condemned to general killing, to kill their enemies themselves. Purim in 1911 [the year of the ritual killing of Andrew Yuschinsky] took place on March 14 and 15, while the Jewish Pascha was from March 15-18…

“Already in deep antiquity the Jews were causing various disorders against various symbols hostile to them during this feast. Thus in 408 and 412 the Byzantine emperor issued two special decrees forbidding the Jews from celebrating Purim and mocking Christian crosses instead of Haman. I think that Christian children were also killed on this feast…”[[72]](#footnote-72)

The Beilis trial polarized Russian society and, through the Jewish press, had international ramifications. Liberal opinion throughout the world pilloried Russia, which was now the country, supposedly, not only of the cruellest tyranny and retrograde religion, but also of systematic persecution and slander of the Jews. Unfortunately, these criticisms, though unjust, helped to create the very phenomenon they decried. Racial anti-semitism, as opposed to religious anti-Judaism and anti-Talmudism, had been rare in Russia – rarer than in most western countries. But in the decade that followed the Beilis trial, under the stress of war and revolution and the undoubted fact that the revolution was led mainly by Jews, real, racial anti-semitism took root in Russia, with massacres far exceeding anything seen in the times of the tsars…

## **52. SYMBOLISTS AND FUTURISTS**

The last years before the Great War were a period of revolutionary change, not only in political ideas, but also in art, science and philosophy. In Russia, this revolutionary spirit took a particular form, often religious and esoteric. Just as the ascetic name-worshippers of Mount Athos wished to identify the Divinity with a created name, so the decadent artists of the Symbolist movement in Russia wanted to capture the Divinity in artistic symbols. For them, symbolism took the place of religion; it was a new kind of religion, the religion of symbol-worshipping. “In the Symbolist aesthetic,” as J.W. Burrow writes, “the intense focusing on the thing taken as a symbol, the perception of its numinous aura, gave access to another, as it were, parallel, invisible world of light and ecstasy.”[[73]](#footnote-73)

This “parallel, invisible world of light and ecstasy” was demonic. Thus the Symbolist painter Michael Vrubel achieved fame with a large mosaic-like canvas called “Seated Demon” (1890), and went mad while working on the dynamic and sinister “Demon Downcast” (1902).[[74]](#footnote-74)

Symbolist ideas are most vividly expressed in the music and thought of the composer Alexander Scriabin, who in his *First Symphony* praised art as a kind of religion. *Le Divin Poème* (1902-1904) sought to express the evolution of the human spirit from pantheism to unity with the universe. *Poème de l'extase* (1908) was accompanied by the elaborately selected colour projections on a screen. In Scriabin's synthetic performances music, poetry, dancing, colours, and scents were used so as to bring about *supreme, final ecstasy.* In 1909, after a spell in Paris with the impresario Diaghilev, Scriabin returned to Russia permanently, where he continued to compose, working on increasingly grandiose projects. For some time before his death he had planned a multi-media work to be performed in the Himalayas, that would bring about Armageddon, "a grandiose religious synthesis of all arts which would herald the birth of a new world."[[75]](#footnote-75)

Similar ideas to Scriabin’s on the stage fusion of all arts were elaborated by the poet Andrej Bely and the painter Vassily Kandinsky. [[76]](#footnote-76)

Another of Diaghilev’s composer-protégés, Sergei Prokofiev, was also influenced by Symbolism - and Mary Baker Eddy’s Christian Science. Among the propositions of his theory of creative action were: “1. I am the expression of Life, i.e. of divine activity. 2. I am the expression of spirit, which gives me power to resist what is unlike spirit… 9. I am the expression of perfection, and this leads me to the perfect use of my time…”[[77]](#footnote-77)

These strivings for mangodhood – in defiance of the only God-Man - among Russia’s creative intelligentsia were associated by them with a revolutionary future that rejected the past more or less totally. Hence the brief fashion for the European movement of Futurism with its radical rejection of the past and all past and present ideas of what is beautiful and tasteful - as Rosamund Bartlett writes, in 1913 “the Futurists declared in their manifesto *A Slap in the Face of Public Taste* that they wished to throw ‘Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy etc. etc.’ overboard from the ship of modernity” [[78]](#footnote-78) - and its glorification of war. “War,” said the Italian Futurist and future fascist Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, “is the sole hygiene of the world.”[[79]](#footnote-79)

The futurist obsession with the imagery of restless, continual movement was akin to Trotsky’s idea of permanent revolution - early Soviet culture was similarly obsessed with machine imagery. As Nicholas Berdiaev wrote: “Just as pious mystics once strove to make themselves into an image of God, and finally to become absorbed in Him, so now the modern ecstatics of rationalism labour to become like the machine and finally to be absorbed into bliss in a structure of driving belts, pistons, valves and fly-wheels…”[[80]](#footnote-80)

Fr. George Florovsky described this aesthetic-revolutionary experience as utopian and a kind of “cosmic possession”: “The feelings of unqualified dependence, of complete determination from without and full immersion and inclusion into the universal order define utopianism’s estimate of itself and the world. Man feels himself to be an ‘organic pin’, a link in some all-embracing chain – he feels unambiguously, irretrievably forged into one whole with the cosmos… From an actor and creator, consciously willing and choosing, and for that reason bearing the risk of responsibility for his self-definition, man is turned into a thing, into a needle, by which someone sews something. In the organic all-unity there is no place for action – here only movement is possible.”[[81]](#footnote-81)

In reality, however, these strivings were as unoriginal as the revolution itself proved to be. They were rather a sign that Russia’s future would consist, not in producing a radically new civilization, but in a catastrophic regression to her pre-Christian, pagan past. Indeed, some Russian Futurists, such as Vladimir Mayakovsky and Kazimir Malevich, joined Soviet Agritprop after the revolution.[[82]](#footnote-82)

The pagan essence of Futurism is evident in the most shocking of all Russian art-works of the period: Igor Stravinsky’s ballet, *The Rite of Spring.*[[83]](#footnote-83) As Oliver Figes writes, “the idea of the ballet was originally conceived by the painter Nikolai Roerich… a painter of the prehistoric Slavs and an accomplished archaeologist in his own right. He was absorbed in the rituals of neolithic Russia, which he idealized as a pantheistic realm of spiritual beauty where life and art were one, and man and nature lived in harmony. Stravinsky approach Roerich for a theme and he came to visit him at the artists’ colony of Talashkino, where the two men worked together on the scenario of ‘The Great Sacrifice’, as *The Rite of Spring* was originally called. The ballet was conceived as a re-creation of the ancient pagan rite of human sacrifice. It was meant to *be* that rite – not to tell the story of the ritual but (short of actual murder) to re-create that ritual on the stage and thus communicate in the most immediate way the ecstasy and terror of the human sacrifice…

“Artistically, the ballet strived for ethnographic authenticity. Roerich’s costumes were drawn from peasant clothes in Tenisheva’s collection at Talashkino. His primitivist sets were based on archaeology. Then there was Nijinsky’s shocking choreography – the real scandal of the ballet’s infamous Paris première at the Théâtre des Champs-Elysées on 29 May 1913. For the music was barely heard at all in the commotion, the shouting and the fighting, which broke out in the auditorium when the curtain first went up. Nijinsky had choreographed movements which were ugly and angular. Everything about the dancers’ movements emphasized their weight instead of their lightness, as demanded by the principles of classical ballet. Rejecting all the basic positions, the ritual dancers had their feet turned inwards, elbows clutched to the sides of their body and their palms held flat, like the wooden dolls that were so prominent in Roerich’s mythic paintings of Scythian Russia. They were orchestrated, not by steps and notes, as in conventional ballets, but rather moved as one collective mass to the violent off-beat rhythms of the orchestra. The dancers pounded their feet on the stage, building up a static energy which finally exploded, with electrifying force, in the sacrifical dance. This rhythmic violence was the vital innovation of Stravinsky’s score. Like most of the ballet’s themes, it was taken from the music of the peasantry. There was nothing like these rhythms in Western art music (Stravinsky said that he did not really known how to notate or bar them) – a convulsive pounding of irregular downbeats, requiring constant changes in the metric signature with almost every bar so that the conductor of the orchestra must throw himself about and wave his arms in jerky motions, as if performing a shamanic dance. In these explosive rhythms it is possible to hear the terrifying beat of the Great War and the Revolution of 1917…”[[84]](#footnote-84)

## **53. THE ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA**

In 1897 Russia and Austria-Hungary had come to an agreement to preserve the status quo in the Balkans. However, this agreement came under threat in 1903, when a group of military conspirators, upset at King Alexander of Serbia’s pro-Austrian orientation and proposed cuts to the military budget, killed him and Queen Draga in Belgrade.[[85]](#footnote-85) This murder brought the Karadjordjević dynasty back to power in the person of King Peter I, who had been in exile in France and Switzerland since 1858.

The reaction of the Serbs to the murder of the Lord’s Anointed was extraordinarily indifferent. The day after the murder was celebrated as a holiday; the streets were decorated with flags. The conspirators were not only not prosecuted, but feted. They filled the senior posts in the new government, and their leader, “Apis” Dragutin Dmitrijević, was even thanked for his work by the parliament and became a national hero. The leader of the largest, Radical Party, Nikola Pašić, wanted to limit the influence of the regicides; but even he was forced to recognize the legitimacy of the coup and oppose efforts to bring the regicides to trial.[[86]](#footnote-86)

In fact, the murder, and the shameless reaction to it, was a symptom of a wider revolutionary malaise in contemporary Orthodox Christendom as a whole. This malaise took on a predominantly nationalist character in the Balkans, and an internationalist character in Russia. Soon it was soon to bring down upon it the wrath of God and the end of the whole “Sardian” period of the Orthodox Christian Empire from St. Constantine the Great to Tsar Nicholas II… For, as Rebecca West writes, “when Alexander and Draga fell from that balcony the whole of the modern world fell with them. It took some time to reach the ground and break its neck, but its fall started then…”[[87]](#footnote-87) Belgrade 1903 led to Sarajevo 1914, which led to Petrograd 1917. For God is not mocked; He does not allow anyone to touch His anointed.

The new King was surrounded by conspirators. Even if he had wanted to resist the irredentist mood in Serbia[[88]](#footnote-88), it is doubtful that he could have done so. For he was not only surrounded by a nationalist coterie: he reigned but did not rule in a country ruled, not by the king, but by elected politicians.

This was evident from the very first day of his reign, when the Prime Minister Avvakumović pointedly introduced him to the Russian minister *before* the Austrian minister. "That formally signified," wrote the Belgrade *Daily Chronicle,* "that Austria-Hungary has no relations with the present cabinet."[[89]](#footnote-89) This was because under the old Obrenović dynasty Serbia had been in a subservient position to Austria, an economic colony of the great Catholic empire of the West. But introducing the king first to the Russian minister was equivalent to saying that the old pro-Austrian orientation of Serbian foreign policy was over, and that Serbia's Great-Power patron was now the great Orthodox empire of the East. And this in turn signified that Serbia was no longer going to take such a passive attitude towards Austria's occupation of Bosnia with its large Serb population...

The next day the king swore an oath to "maintain inviolate the Constitution". And on June 25 he made a proclamation peppered with references to the Constitution: "I will be a true constitutional King of Serbia. For me all constitutional guarantees of freedom and popular rights, which are the basis of all regular and prosperous development as well as of all national progress and constitutional life, are sacred trusts which I will always carefully respect and guard. I expect everyone to do the same."[[90]](#footnote-90) This meant that the real rulers of Serbia would remain the elected politicians... Then he went on: "Imbued with these sentiments, to the past I consign the past, and I leave it to history to judge each according to his deeds..." In other words, the murderers of the King Alexander would not be threatened by him. Nor would he undermine the policy of trying to gather all Serbs under one political roof...

Under the Obrenovićes a secret treaty had given Austria-Hungary a virtual veto over Serbian foreign policy. But now Serbia became more independent both politically and economically of her Catholic neighbour. Thus in 1904 Serbia signed a secret treaty with Bulgaria whose contents were communicated to the Russians, but not the Austrians.

Again, as Clark writes, “after the regicide of 1903, Belgrade stepped up the pace of irredentist activity within the [Austrian] empire, focusing in particular on Bosni-Herzegovina. In February 1906, the Austrian military attaché in Belgrade, Pomiankowski, summarized the problem in a letter to the chief of the General Staff. It was certain, Pomiankowski declared, that Serbia would number among the empire’s enemies in the event of a future military conflict. The problem was less the attitude of the government as such than the ultra-nationalist orientation of the political culture as a whole: even if a ‘sensible’ government were at the helm, Pomiankowski warned, it would be in no position to prevent the ‘all-powerful radical chauvinists’ from launching ‘an adventure’. More dangerous, however, thatn Serbia’s ‘open enmity and its miserable army’ was the ‘fifth-column work of the [Serbian] Radicals in peacetime, which systematically poisons the attitude of our South Slav population and could, if the worst came to the worst, create very serious difficulties for our army…’”[[91]](#footnote-91)

“During 1905-6, a crisis unfolded in which trade policy, armaments orders, high finance and geopolitics were closely intertwined. Vienna pursued a threefold objective: to secure a commercial treaty with Serbia, to ensure that Serbian armaments orders would continue to be placed with Austrian firms, and to contract a major loan to Belgrade.

“The failure to achieve agreement on any of these questions produced a drastic cooling of relations between the two neighbours, and the outcome was an unmitigated disaster for Vienna. The Serbian armaments orders went to the French firm Schneider-Creusot instead of to the Austrian rival, Škoda of Bohemia. The Austrians reacted by closing the border to Serbian pork, triggering a customs conflict that came to be known as the ‘pig war’ (1906-9). But this was a counter-productive measure, since Serbia quickly found other export markets (especially in Germany, France and Belgium) and at last began to build slaughterhouses on a substantial scale, thus emancipating itself from its long-standing dependence on Austro-Hungarian processing facilities. Finally, Belgrade secured a major loan against not from Vienna, but from Paris (offered in return for the placement of armaments orders with French firms).”[[92]](#footnote-92)

As nationalist passions mounted in Serbia, the question arose: in their quest for a Greater Serbia on whom could they rely among the Great Powers now that Austria was no longer an ally? Possibly France, with whom the Serbs were now closely linked financially and militarily. Obviously Russia…

And yet there were two major problems with regard to Russia. First, Russia’s main client in the Balkans was Bulgaria, which she had liberated in 1877-78 – and the Bulgars were the Serbs’ fierce rivals for control over Macedonia, a situation not changed fundamentally by the secret treaty of 1904. Secondly, the Russians, always more conscious of the wider geopolitical picture than the other Orthodox states, did not support Serbia's nationalist irredentism, which had its roots, not in Orthodoxy or Slavdom, but in the French revolution, and was abhorrent to the Tsar. As the leader of a multi-national empire, he resisted nationalism and irredentism both within Russia’s borders and outside them. The suspicion was, therefore, that Serbia now, under the Karadjeordjevićes, would not so much *follow* Russia as the leader of the Orthodox world as *use* her to protect herself when her aggressive foreign policy would bring her into inevitable conflict with the more powerful states of Austria-Hungary or Ottoman Turkey...

Much would depend on whether Serbia’s monarchy could regain control over the nationalist passions of the people and begin really to rule rather than simply reign. The heir to the throne, Prince George, was unlikely to help in this respect, being an admirer of Apis. However, Divine Providence removed him from the succession after he killed his valet… The next in line, Prince Alexander, was a much more promising prospect. A godson of Tsar Alexander III, he "was enrolled in the St. Petersburg Page School, an Imperial Russian institute where well-born boys prepared for careers in military and court service. There he was described as a hard­working if somewhat solitary boy. His background admitted him to close relationship with Tsar Nicholas II and his family."[[93]](#footnote-93) This close relationship of Alexander with Orthodox Imperial Russia, which continued through the world war and into the inter-war period, when he invited the Russian Church Abroad to set up its headquarters in Serbia, was to be a vital influence on the world-view of the young Prince. The more purely Orthodox monarchism and universalism of the Tsar counter-balanced to some degree the constitutionalism and extreme nationalism of his native land.

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The year 1908 was critical because of two events: the Young Turks’ coup in Constantinople, and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. These two revolutionary events effectively cancelled the good work of the Russian counter-revolution and made world war much more likely. The internationalist revolution had been checked for the time being; but its terrible twin, the nationalist revolution, was now on the cusp of victory against the forces of law and order.

In Turkey, the old system of Islamic Sharia law combined with the Sultan’s personal decrees was being undermined by a new liberal legal system, introduced under pressure from the Western powers, whose main idea was the equality of all citizens, both Muslim and Christian. The liberal legislation, which was incorporated into the Constitution in 1876, was displeasing to Muslims and Christians alike. For, on the one hand, the Muslims felt that they were losing their superiority to the “infidel”. And on the other hand, the Christians were worried about losing some of the exemptions they enjoyed under the old *millet* system. For “in some ways,” as Taner Akçam writes, “Christians were better off than the average Turkish peasant, given their exemption from military service, and often the support of a foreign consulate, which excluded them from Ottoman courts, protected their homes from being searched by the authorities and freed them from Ottoman taxes. ‘The maligned Turkish peasant, at the other end of the social scale, was generally no better off than the ordinary non-Muslim and as much oppressed by maladministration… He was as much in need of reformed government as the Church, but [h]e had neither treaty, foreign power, nor patriarch to protect him, and his lot was generally unknown in Europe.’”[[94]](#footnote-94)

Defeat at the hands of Russia in 1877-78, and the gradual liberation of their European Christian subjects, increased the sense of grievance and frustration among the Turks. Massacres of Christians began, notably of Armenians (200,000 in 1894-96, nearly two million in 1915). And a new nationalist ideology began to be worked out on the basis that the empire’s Muslim Turks were the “*millet-i Hakime*”, or “ruling nation”.

In 1908 a modernizing group called “The Committee for Union and Progress” (CUP), or “The Young Turks”, seized power in Constantinople. The CUP’s stronghold was the Army in Macedonia, which had learned much from the discipline and conspiratorial techniques of the Bulgarian and Macedonian guerrillas. In fact, some of the rebel soldiers in Macedonia formed pacts with the Albanians, and with the Bulgarian and Serbian guerrillas they were supposed to be fighting.[[95]](#footnote-95)

The result was a stunning victory for the revolution. In 1909 the Sultan was deposed. By 1913 the government had come under the complete control of the CUP. The Young Turks were thought to be liberals, but in fact were nationalists. Thus they declared: “We can compromise with the Christians only when they accept our position of dominance.” One of their leaders, Namik Kemal, spoke of the Turks as “occupying the pre-eminent position in the Ottoman collective… on account of their great numbers and abilities, excellent and meritorious qualities such as ‘breadth of intelligence’, ‘cool-headedness’, ‘tolerance and repose’”. Another leader, Ali Suavi, declared that “the Turkish race [is] older and superior… on account of its military, civilizing and political roles”. [[96]](#footnote-96)

However, at first the Young Turks renounced nationalism so as to bring members of other nationalities of the multi-national empire onto their side. Similarly, they were secularists at heart, but concealed this in order not to alienate the fervently religious Turkish masses. And so in Constantinople Muslims joined with Armenians in requiem services for the massacres of 1896. And on July 23, “Salonika’s gendarmerie commander observed how ‘[o]n the balcony of the Konak [town hall], Greek and Bulgarian bishops and the mufti shook hands and then in the name of fraternity, they invited their co-religionists to follow suit… A cry of joy burst from every lung in the crowd and you could see Muslims, Greeks and Bulgarians, the old mortal enemies, falling into one another’s arms. An indescribable delirium ensued as the reconciliation of the races and religions was consecrated underneath an immense flag emblazoned with the words ‘Long Live the Constitution’…”[[97]](#footnote-97)

It was indeed an extraordinary moment, comparable only to the frenzied joy that accompanied the overthrow of the Tsar only nine years later. Like Herod and Pilate, bitter rivals abandoned their enmity in joy at the overthrow of one-man-rule recognizing its authority as coming, not from men, but from God. Instead, a new god, “the Constitution”, was erected and worshipped by all. Meanwhile, the priests of the new religion, the Masons, took over the reins of government – men such as Mehment Talaat Pasha, Grand Master of the Turkish Grand Orient, and Kemal Ataturk, who had been initiated into an Italian lodge in Macedonia.On July 23, 1908, the same day as the celebrations in Salonika, they restored the Midhat constitution on the empire…

However, the new government soon cast off its liberal mask. “Over three years of counterrevolution and restoration, revolutionary idealism turned into a regime whose brutality surpassed that of [Sultan] Abdulhamid. ‘The old espionage had returned, the extortion had never ceased, the oppression against non-Moslems had now acquired a fresher and more sinister vigour, for the measure of freedom that each nationality had once enjoyed was now being ruthlessly crushed by a heretofore unknown chauvinism.’”[[98]](#footnote-98)

For “while the Young Turk revolution had temporarily spread the gospel of harmony among the Empire’s constituent peoples, it had had no such effect on Macedonia’s neighbours in the Balkans – Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. On the contrary, they saw the success of the revolution as a sign of the Empire’s extreme weakness and it galvanized their expansionist ambitions.

“The most immediate blow to the movement for reconciliation in the Ottoman Empire was delivered by Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary and Greece. In October, Prince Ferdinand exploited the political chaos in the Ottoman Empire by declaring Bulgaria fully independent – until then it had been nominally under the suzerainty of the Empire. Within days, Austria-Hungary followed suit by announcing the full annexation of the occupied territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina and before long Greece proclaimed *enosis* with Crete. These events, in particular Vienna’s annexation of Bosnia, set alarm bells ringing in the Ottoman military barracks, the real power behind the CUP. Henceforth, any Christian demands which smacked of secessionism would be rejected. In response, the guerrillas in Macedonia – Serb, Bulgarian, Greek and, significantly, Albanian – took to the hills once more. The military establishments of Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire had taken their first steps along the road that ended with the First and Second Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913.”[[99]](#footnote-99)

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Tsar Nicholas knew better than anyone the true significance of the events of 1908, and the great danger they posed for Orthodoxy. On the one hand, the Ottoman empire, the age-old enemy of Russia and Orthodoxy, had been seized by agents of the internationalist, Masonic revolution who were linked with their brother Mason-conspirators inside Russia, such as A.I. Guchkov... On the other hand, the Serbs, the Bulgarians and the Greeks, in spite of their recent rejoicing *with* the Turks over their revolution, were now gripped by a mad nationalist enthusiasm for war *against* them that might well trigger a wider war between the great powers. But Russia was not ready for war… The Tsar wanted to work with Austria in order to cool passions and avert world war. But then the second important event of the year took place – Austria’s annexation of Bosnia, which transformed the political landscape. For the annexation had involved a trick played by the Austrian Foreign Minister, Baron Aehrenthal, on the Russian Foreign Minister, A.P. Izvolsky, that humiliated Russia and stirred Serbian and Russian public opinion to a frenzy of anti-Germanism.

The story is told by S.S. Oldenburg: “On September 3/16, in Buchlow castle, A.P. Izvolsvky met Baron Aehrenthal. There are various versions of the details of this meeting. The German State-Secretary for Foreign Relations, von Schen, referring to the conversation with A.P. Izvolsky, wrote to Bülow on September 13/26 that in Buchlow Aehrenthal had put forward the following plan: Austria would limit herself to annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, but would forbear from moving on Salonika and would take her armies out of the Novi-Pazar Šandjak and would support Russia’s demand that her fleet be given free passage through the Straits. At the same time Turkey’s sovereignty over Bulgaria, which had for long been a pure formality, would be proclaimed to be annulled.

“Izvolsky evidently approved this plan in its general form. We have to bear in mind that already in 1876, at the Reichstag agreement, and then in a special clause of the Austro-German-Russian agreement of June 18, 1881, Russia had declared her consent to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: ‘Austro-Hungary,’ declared this clause, ‘retains for herself the right to annex both these provinces at a time when she considers it necessary’. So the hands of the Russian minister were tied, and it was a matter only of this or that compensation. A.P. Izvolsky thought that Austria’s renunciation of the Šandjak, the freedom of travel through the Straits for Russia and the independence of Bulgaria (together with a profitable trade agreement for Serbia) represented enough compensation. Evidently he also counted on these changes to the Berlin congress agreement being accepted at the same time – perhaps with the help of a new international conference.

“But already on September 24 / October 7 Baron Aehrenthal told the delegations of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, explaining this step on the grounds of the necessity of giving these provinces representative organs, so that the local population should not turn out to be at a disadvantage by comparison with the Turkish domains.

“At the same time, Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria proclaimed the complete independence of Bulgaria and took the title of tsar.

“Both these acts were undoubtedly a rejection of the obligations undertaken at the Berlin congress, although in essence they only confirmed a situation that had existed *de facto* for a long time.

“In international relations, ‘*c’est le ton qui fait la musique*’, and public opinion in Russia and especially in Serbia reacted badly to these steps. In Belgrade they deemed Austria’s declaration as the first step towards the establishment of her hegemony in the Balkans. Bulgaria’s decision was seen as ‘the acceptance of independence from the hands of Austria’, while the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina – as Austria’s self-willed appropriation of Slavic lands”.[[100]](#footnote-100)

It is difficult to understand why the Austrians acted as they did (they were in fact divided on the move – Archduke Franz Ferdinand was strongly against), seeing that they had already controlled the provinces for thirty years, and nobody had suggested changing the status quo. Noel Malcolm suggests that they acted at this moment because the revolution of the Young Turks “looked as if it would create a regime in Istanbul which might possibly reclaim Turkey’s rights over Bosnia, by offering a more democratic constitution to the Bosnians than the one they enjoyed under Austro-Hungarian rule”.[[101]](#footnote-101) Clark agrees with this suggestion and continues: “Hoping to capitalize on these uncertainties, an opportunist Muslim-Serb coalition emerged in Bosnia calling for autonomy under Turkish suzerainty. There was now the danger that an ethnic alliance within the province might join forces with the Turks to push the Austrians out…”[[102]](#footnote-102)

The Serbs reacted with fury. “The announcement,” writes Clark, “created an ‘unparalleled outburst of resentment and national enthusiasm’, both in Belgrade and in the provinces… The Russian liberal Pavel Miliukov, who visited Serbia in 1908, was shocked by the intensity of the public emotion. The anticipation of war with Austria, he recalled, became ‘a readiness to fight, and victory seemed both easy and certain’. These views were universal and so unquestioned that ‘to get into an argument over [them] would have been totally useless.’ [[103]](#footnote-103)

“The mental maps that informed elite and popular understandings of Serbia’s policy and purpose were once again in evidence. The only way to understand the intensity of the feeling aroused in Serbia by the annexation, the British minister in Belgrade explained in a report of 27 April 1909, was to recall that ‘Every patriotic Servian who takes any interest or active part in politics, thinks of the Servian nation not as merely including the subjects of King Peter, but as consisting of all those who are akin to them in race and language. He looks forward, consequently, to the eventual creation of a Greater Servia, which shall bring into one fold all the different sections of the nation, at present divided under Austrian, Hungarian and Turkish dominion… From his point of view, Bosnia is both geographically and ethnographically the heart of Great Servia.’

“In an almost contemporary tract on the crisis, the celebrated ethnographer Jovan Cvijic, Nikola Pašić’s most influential adviser on the nationality question, observed that ‘it [was] plain that Bosnia and Herzegovina, by… their central position in the ethnographical mass of the Serbo-Croat race,… hold the key to the Serb problem. Without them, there can be no Great Serb state’. From the perspective of pan-Serb publicists, Bosnia-Herzegovina belonged to the ‘Serb lands under foreign domination’ – its population was ‘entirely Servian in face and language’, consisting of Serbs, Serbo-Croats and ‘Serb-Mohammedans’, except, of course, for the minority of ‘temporary inhabitants’ and ‘exploiters’ installed by the Austrians over the previous thirty years.”[[104]](#footnote-104)

It is striking that Orthodox Christianity here does not count as one of the criteria of Serbness, only race and language…

Tensions continued to rise in Belgrade. As Noel Malcolm writes, “Serbia was restrained from declaring war on Austria-Hungary by the Russian Minister, Izvolsky, who, though he himself was smarting at the way he had been wrong-footed by von Aehrenthal, still advised Belgrade: ‘Serbia must remain quiet, and should do nothing which could provoke Austria and provide an opportunity for annihilating Serbia.’ The Austro-Hungarian and Turkish governments eventually signed an agreement in February, 1909, under which the former would acquire full rights over Bosnia, withdraw from the Sandžak of Novi Pazar, guarantee full freedom of religion for Bosnian Muslims and pay 2,500,000 Turkish pounds to Istanbul; but still the diplomatic crisis rumbled on for months. The interaction of great power rivalry and Balkan small-state nationalism which this incident displayed was an ominous foreboding of the events of August 1914…”[[105]](#footnote-105)

In the spring of 1909, “the German government decided to act. It sent what amounted to an ultimatum to St. Petersburg to say that the Russian government must recognise the annexation. If Germany received ‘any evasive, conditional, or unclear response’, it would take that as a refusal on Russia’s part: ‘We would then withdraw and let events take their course.’”[[106]](#footnote-106) The offensive manner of this intervention stirred up a huge wave of anti-German feeling in Russia; and while the Russians were too weak, so soon after the Russo-Japanese war and the 1905 revolution, to take decisive action at this point, their humiliation strengthened their determination not to allow the Austrians to get away with it the next time. As the tsar wrote to his mother: “It is true that the form and method adopted by the Germans in their treatment of us was rude, and that we won’t forget. I think that once again they were seeking to split us from France and England but once again did not succeed. Such methods generally lead to the opposite…”[[107]](#footnote-107)

On March 31, 1909 the Serbian government was forced by the Great Powers officially to renounce her claims on Bosnia-Herzegovina. But that was only the official position. A new nationalist organization, *Srpska Narodna Odbrana* (Serbian National Defence)*,* also known as “Black Hand”, sprang up with hundreds of committees throughout Serbia and a network of auxiliaries within Bosnia and Herzegovina. For, as Malcolm writes: “the ferment of Serbian nationalism, stirred up after the annexation, was spreading among parts of the Bosnian Orthodox population – or at least, among a few hundred schoolboys and students. Anti-Austro-Hungarian feeling was growing stronger in Croatia too, and in the period 1907-10 it increasingly took the form of cooperation with Serbs in the prospect of establishing a common South Slav state. One marvellously cumbersome expression of this new attitude was the name of a students’ organization which operated in universities outside Bosnia, presided over by the young Bosnian write Ivo Andrić: it called itself ‘The Croat-Serb or Serb-Croat or Yugoslav Progressive Youth Movement’. Inside Bosnia, the Serb students began soon after 1910 to change their position from a narrow Serb nationalism to a broader, pro-Yugoslav campaign. One loose grouping of schoolboys and students, ‘Mlada Bosna’ (‘Young Bosnia’) adopted this stance, which was the simplest common position on which all anti-Habsburgs could unite; and their membership could thus include Croats and even some Muslims as well. As the most famous member of Mlada Bosna, Gavrilo Princip, put it at his trial in 1914: ‘I am a Yugoslav nationalist, aiming for the unification of all Yugoslavs, and I do not care what form of state, but it must be free from Austria.

“Much has been written about the political philosophy of these young activists – perhaps too much, as there is a limit to the amount of philosophically interesting material to be found in the heads of a loose assortment of idealistic but ill-educated teenagers. They were fiercely anti-clerical; they wanted social revolution just as much as national liberation; they were especially keen on the writings of anarchists or anarcho-socialists such as Bakunin, Herzen and Kropotkin, and above all they wanted to be heroes…”[[108]](#footnote-108)

In March 1911 a group of veterans from the Macedonian struggle, five of whom were officer-regicides founded a new secret organization under the leadership of Apis. “The constitution of *Ujedinjenje ili smrt!* [Union or Death!] opened with the unsurprising declaration that the aim of the new association was the ‘unification of Serbdom’. Further articles stated that the members must strive to influence the government to adopt the idea that Serbia was the ‘Piedmont’ of the Serbs, and indeed of all the South Slav peoples – the journal founded to expound the ideals of Ujedinjenje ili smrt! duly bore the title *Pijemont.* The new movement assumed an encompassing and hegemonic concept of Serbdom – Black Hand propaganda did not acknowledge the separate identity of Bosnian Muslims and flatly denied the existence of Croats. In order to prepare Serbdom for what would be a violent struggle for unity, the society would undertake revolutionary work in all territories inhabited by Serbs. Outside the borders of the Serbian state, the society would also combat by all means available the enemies of the Serbian idea.

“In their work for the ‘national cause’ these men increasingly saw themselves as enemies of the democratic parliamentary system in Serbia and especially of the Radical Party, whose leaders they denounced as traitors to the nation…

“The movement thrived on a cult of secrecy. Members were inducted by means of a ceremony devised by Jovanović-Čupa, a member of the founding council and a freemason. New recruits swore and oath before a hooded figure in a darkened room pledging absolute obedience to the organization on pain of death…

“… Young Bosnia’s great hour arrived in 1910, when one of their number launched a suicide attack on the Austrian governor of Bosnia. On 3 June 1910, on the occasion of the opening of the Bosnian parliament, Bogdan Žerajić, a Serbian student from Herzegovina, fired five shots at Governor Marijan Varešanin. When all his bullets went wide, Žerajić emptied the sixth and last round into his own head. He was buried anonymously in a section of Sarajevo cemetery reserved for criminals and suicides, but his grave soon became a shrine for the Serb underground movement and his deed was celebrated by the nationalist press in Belgrade…”[[109]](#footnote-109)

## **54. THE BALKAN WARS**

The murder of Stolypin in September, 1911 introduced a dangerous element of instability and indecision into Russian foreign policy. Stolypin had stood for a policy of avoidance of war and the rapid building up of Russia’s financial and economic resources. His successor as prime minister, Kokovtsov, followed the same line, but lacked Stolypin’s authority in keeping his ministers in order – especially the War Minister Sukhomlinov, who, together with important military figures such as the Tsar’s uncle, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievich, and some diplomats, advocated a belligerent, anti-German and pro-Serbian foreign policy. The Tsar himself, with his foreign minister Sazonov, wavered between the parties of peace and war (for that is what they amounted to). On the one hand, he recognized the enormous risks of allowing the extreme nationalism of the Balkan Orthodox to express itself unchecked. On the other hand, his sympathies were with Serbia, and the humiliation suffered at the hands of the Austrians in 1908-09 was still fresh in his mind. Indeed, it was just after that humiliation, in 1909, that a passionate nationalist, Nicholas Hartwig, was appointed Russian ambassador in Belgrade. “Hartwig, who was still there in 1914, was both forceful and energetic and rapidly won for himself a position of considerable influence in Serbia which he used to encourage Serbian nationalists in their aspirations to a Greater Serbia…”[[110]](#footnote-110)

Between 1907 and 1914, writes Lieven, “the outlines of a coalition between sections of Russia’s economic, political and intellectual élites based on a combination of liberal and nationalist ideas began to emerge. It encompassed a number of leading Moscow industrialists, some of Russia’s greatest liberal intellectuals and many Duma leaders. By 1914 this shadowy coalition had important friends in both the army and the bureaucracy. Prince Grigori Trubetskoy, who ran the Foreign Ministry’s department of Near Eastern and Balkan affairs, was closely linked to the Moscow industrialists and to Peter Struve, the leading intellectual spokesman for the coalition of the liberal-conservative and nationalist elites. Even Alexander Krivoshein, the Minister of Agriculture, was a potential ally of this coalition. His ministry, and indeed he himself, maintained cordial relations with the Duma and the zemstva. On the whole, they enjoyed a good press. And Krivoshein was not merely inclined towards pro-Slav nationalist sympathies, he had also married a daughter of one of Moscow’s leading industrialist families [the Morozovs]. It needs to be stressed that this coalition was still in embryo in 1907-9 and that Germany’s own aggressive policies played a role in bringing it to life in later years. Nevertheless the Germans were not wrong to watch Russian domestic developments with great concern in the pre-war era. The idea that the liberal-nationalist, anti-German and pro-Slav coalition represented the wave of the future was not unreasonable and was widely believed both in Russia and abroad…”[[111]](#footnote-111)

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In the same fateful month of September, 1911 the long-expected carve-up of the Ottoman empire, “the sick man of Europe”, began. Italy, which had resented Austria’s annexation of Bosnia, decided to claim her share by invading Libya and the Dodecanese islands. Montefiore writes: “When the Sultan temporarily closed the Straits, Russian exports were choked and Nicholas’s ministers panicked, recommending the seizure of the Straits before it was too later.

”The Italian conquest of Libya was the starter-pistol for war, escalating the carve-up of Ottoman Europe. The belligerent Balkan Slavs, armed with new weapons[[112]](#footnote-112) and frenzied nationalism, planned to redeem long-lost lands in an attack on the vulnerable Ottomans. The tsar and foreign minister Sazonov encouraged their appetites and co-ordinated their creation of a Balkan League around Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro, hoping to control this bloc and use it as a barrier against Austro-German expansion southwards.

“Nicholas and Sazonov tried to turn their ungrateful, trigger-happy Slav brothers into obedient, responsible allies, but they all wanted the same territories. Serbia, guided by a powerful Russian ambassador [Hartwig] and military aid, wanted a Greater Serbia including modern Albania, Bosnia and Macedonia. Nikola of Montenegro, promoting himself a king, aspired to the same Greater Serbia but ruled by himself. The tsar sent Nikolasha and the Crows [his daughters, both married to Russian princes] to Nikola’s coronation and gave him 600,000 roubles a year in return for Russian command of his army. Foxy Ferdinand [king of Bulgaria] aspired to the medieval Bulgar Empire including Macedonia and Thrace. Hoping to gain influence, Nicholas paid off Foxy’s debts of a million francs.”[[113]](#footnote-113)

The Russians were prepared to support a defensive alliance among the Balkan states in order to prevent an Austrian advance towards Salonica, and in order to keep the Straits open for the Russian export trade. But they were not prepared to support an offensive alliance that would finally destroy the Ottoman empire and lead, in all probability, to a general European war (and probably a Middle Eastern one as well, if the Arabs also rebelled). The problem was, as Macmillan writes, that “politicians who had ridden to power by playing on nationalism and with promises of national glory found that they were in the grip of forces they could not always control. Secret societies, modelling themselves on an eclectic mix which included Freemasonry, the underground Carbonari, who had worked for Italian unity, the terrorists who more recently had frightened much of Europe, and old-style banditry, proliferated throughout the Balkans, weaving their way into civilian and military institutions of the states. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) talked about Macedonia for the Macedonians but was widely suspected of working with Bulgarian nationalists for a great Bulgaria which would include Macedonia. In Serbia, the government and the army were riddled with supporters of Narodna Odbrana (National Defence), which had been set up during the Bosnian crisis, and its even more extreme offshoot the Black Hand. In the First Balkan War, officers disobeyed their own government on several occasions, seizing, for example, the town of Monastir (which Serbia had promised to Bulgaria in a secret treaty) in the hopes that it would then be impossible to hand it over. Although the Ottoman and Austrian-Hungarian authorities did their best to suppress all revolutionary and indeed most political activity among their own South Slav or Albanian subjects, they faced an uphill battle, especially since much of the home-grown conspiracies and terrorism were supported from outside…”[[114]](#footnote-114)

Now not only the Balkan Orthodox, but also the Muslim Albanians, stirred by similar nationalist dreams, were in more or less open rebellion against the Turks. Nor did any of the Balkan powers pay much attention to the Great Powers. “Balkan leaders complained openly that they could no longer trust the great powers to protect the Christians under Ottoman rule and hinted that they might have to take action. Why maintain the status quo in the Balkans, a leading politician in Serbia asked Trotsky. ‘Where was the status quo when Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina? Why didn’t the powers defend the status quo when Italy seized Tripoli?’ And why should the Balkan states be treated as though they were somehow not European but like Morocco? There was the chance, the Foreign Minister of Serbia admitted to the British ambassador in Belgrade, that Austria-Hungary would intervene if any of the Balkan nations moved to seize Ottoman territory but, as far as he, Milovan Milovanović, was concerned, it was better for Serbia to die fighting. If Austria-Hungary itself expanded further southwards into the Balkans, Serbia was finished anyway as an independent kingdom…”[[115]](#footnote-115)

The coolest and wisest heads remained the emperors of the multi-national empires – Tsar Nicholas and Emperor Franz Joseph. On October 8, 1912, the Tsar persuaded all the European Great Powers to send a warning to the Balkan States and Turkey that if war should break out, the Powers would not agree to any change in the territorial *status quo*. But as if cocking a snoop at all the Great Powers, tiny Montenegro under her warmongering King Nikolai declared war on Turkey the very next day, invading Albania, and besieging the fortress of Shkodra (Scutari).

Edvard Radzinsky writes: “The tsar understood how that impudent disruption of the *status quo* in the Balkans would ignite an explosion of indignation among the great powers. The minister of foreign affairs was instructed to persuade Montenegro to end its occupation of the fortress. But [King Nikolai] knew of the bellicose mood in Petersburg and of the support of [his son-in-law] Grand Duke Nikolai, the ‘dread uncle’, and he callously continued the siege of Scutari.”[[116]](#footnote-116)

On October 18, Serbia and Bulgaria entered the war against Turkey; Greece joined them on October 19. The Orthodox forces outnumbered the Turks, and were soon, contrary to expert military opinion, advancing on all fronts. The Greeks got to Salonika before the Bulgarians, but Bulgarian forces were approaching Constantinople… There was wild rejoicing in Russia; the age-old dream that “Constantinople will be ours” and that the Cross would be raised over Hagia Sophia appeared close to fulfilment. There were calls for Russia to enter the war, including from M.V. Rodzianko, the president of the Fourth Duma. On November 10 Grand Duke Nicholas reported excitedly to the tsar in Spala in Russian Poland (where the Tsarevich Alexei was gravely ill). On November 12, Prince Gregory Trubetskoy, head of the Near Eastern department in the Foreign Ministry, issued a detailed memorandum explaining why Russia should take control of Constantinople and the Straits. However, the head of the Navy, Admiral Lieven rejected Trubetskoy’s arguments in a counter-memorandum dated December 8.[[117]](#footnote-117)

But it was the Bulgars, not the Russians, who were now at the gates of Constantinople – and Russia was determined to stop Bulgaria gaining too much. For, as Alexander Bokhanov writes, she “was not interested that Bulgaria, whose ruling classes supported a pro-German orientation, should take control of Stambul and the Black Sea straits. Petersburg demanded from Sophia in harsh expressions that she stop her advance. Austria and Germany, which stood behind her, refused to be reconciled with Serbia’s increased strength, and Austrian armies began to concentrate on the frontier…”[[118]](#footnote-118)

The Serbs, too, were making great gains – but also at great cost to their moral reputation. Misha Glenny writes: “As the Serb soldiery moved to Skopje and beyond, they visited destruction and murder on the local Albanian population. Fired by tales of atrocities committed on Christian peasants during the unrest in the Albanian territories, the Serbs unleashed the full force of nationalist hatred against defenceless villages. A Serb Social Democrat, serving as a reservist, described how ‘the horrors actually began as soon as we crossed the old frontier. By five p.m. we were approaching Kumanovo. The sun had set, it was starting to get dark. But the darker the sky became, the more brightly the fearful illumination of the fires stood out against it. Burning was going on all around us. Entire Albanian villages had been turned into pillars of fire… In all its fiery monotony this picture was repeated the whole way to Skopje… For two days before my arrival in Skopje the inhabitants had woken up in the morning to the sight, under the principal bridge over the Vardar – that is, in the very centre of the town – of heaps of Albanian corpses with severed heads. Some said that these were local Albanians, killed by the *komitadjis* [četniks], others that the corpses had been brought down to the bridge by the waters of the Vardar. What was clear was that these headless men had not been killed in battle.’ In Skopje, the chief instigator of the massacres was the Black Hand, which set up its headquarters close to the Russian consulate in a building soon known as the Black House. The Black Hand, with its network of agents, had escaped the control of the military authorities and was increasingly assuming the role of an informal government of ‘liberated Old Serbia’. After several weeks, the government in Belgrade started to appoint civilian administrators to these territories, but those who refused to submit to the demands of the Black Hand and the *četniks* were scared. Branislav Nušić, the writer who had welcomed the war with such enthusiasm, resigned as governor of Bitola in fear and disgust at the activities of these units.”[[119]](#footnote-119)

In mid-November the Bulgarians were halted in their march on Tsargrad by desperate Turkish resistance and dysentery in their own ranks. “The point of crisis,” writes Lieven, now “shifted to the Albanian provinces on the Adriatic coast that the Serbs (and Montenegrins) were determined to seize. In the typical language of prewar Europe, the Serbian premier, Nikola Pašić, claimed that without an Adriatic coastline ‘the country’s existence is unthinkable’. The Austrians, on the other hand, were determined to establish a client Albanian state in their own strategic backyard and to block further Serbian expansion. Some circles in Vienna still hoped to turn Serbia into an economic dependency and saw Serb possession of an Adriatic port as a fatal blow to this goal. The fear existed that a Serbian port ight one day become a Russian naval base. If failure to acquire an Adriatic port encouraged the Serbs to demand more territory in Macedonia and thereby come into conflict with the Bulgarians, Vienna could only rejoiced in having helped to split the hatred Balkan League. Fairly enough, the Austrians took delight in pointing out the fact that Serbian and Montenegrin demands to swallow the Albanian-speaking territories flew in the face of their proclaimed allegiance to the ethno-nationalist principle. Because Serb and Montenegrin troops were committing widely reported and numerous atrocities against Albanian civilians as they marched toward the Adriantic coast, pious claims that the two countries’ constitutions guaranteed the rights of minorities were greeted throughout Europe with what might politely be described as scepticism. The retort by Nikolai Harwig, the Russian ambassador in Belgrade, that the Serbs were behaving no worse than the Greeks and the Bulgarians was probably true but did not help matters.

“Initially, Sazonov backed the Serbian claim at least for a small stretch of the Adriatic coast and a port. Once he realised that not just the Austrians but also the Italians and the Germans flatly opposed this, he changed tack and allowed that secure commercial access through Albanian territory would suffice. In support of his more moderate line, the foreign minister submitted a memorandum to Nicholas II on November 12 pointing out that all members of the Triple Alliance were determined to create an autonomous Albanian polity controlling the whole Adriatic coastline and were willing ‘to defend their point of view by extreme methods’. Because neither the British nor the French would back Serb claims to the hilt, the foreign minister wrote that both and the chairman of the Council of Ministers believed it would be foolish to push further on this issue, in the process ‘sharpening the dispute to a degree that creates the danger of a European war’. As Sazonov’s letter implies, the Balkan crisis had now sucked his premier, Vladimir Kokovtsov, into foreign affairs, and the foreign minister was very happy to seek his support against any impetuous action by the emperor and his military advisers.

“Unfortunately, Nicholas II did not agree, writing on the memorandum, ‘I am against an autonomous Albania’. This goes far to explain why Sazonov’s support for Serbia then stiffened once again, much to the alarm of Austrian and other diplomats. Only when further efforts to secure a compromise more favourable to the Serbs had failed and the danger of war loomed increasingly large did Sazonov revert to his earlier line and attempt againt to bring Belgrade to order. Inevitably, his attempts to do so were not aided by his zigzags…”[[120]](#footnote-120)

On November 20, Austria-Hungary increased its war readiness in Bosnia and Dalmatia, and also on the border with Russia in Galicia. On November 22 Tsar Nicholas responded by ordering mobilisation in the Kiev district and preparations for mobilisation in the Odessa and Warsaw districts. The next day Kokovtsov and Sazonov persuaded him to shelve these plans, but the number of active troops was increased…

The Germans were also threatening the Russians. For, as Hew Strachan writes, they “saw it as a war fought by Russia by proxy, and on 2 December 1912 Bethmann-Hollweg announced in the Reichstag that, if Austria-Hungary was attacked by a third party while pursuing its interests, Germany would support Austria-Hungary and fight to maintain its own position in Europe. Britain responded on the following day: it feared that a Russo-Austrian War would lead to a German attack on France and warned the Germans that if that happened it would not accept a French defeat. The Kaiser was furious, and summoned a meeting of his military and naval chiefs on 8 December. He said that, if Russia came to Serbia’s aid, Germany would fight. He assumed that in such a war Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and Turkey would all side with the Triple Alliance [Germany, Austria and Italy], and take the main role against Serbia, so leaving Austria-Hungary to concentrate against Russia…”[[121]](#footnote-121)

On December 3, an armistice between the Balkan states and Turkey was agreed; but the situation remained very tense. The British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey organized a conference of ambassadors in London, which continued until August, 1913. The main result was to legitimize the substantial territorial gains made by the Balkan Orthodox; the Serbs gave up their claim for an Adriatic port, while the Turks remained in control of a small corner of Europe close to Constantinople. As for the other losers, the Albanians, on December 20, the Great Powers, under Austrian pressure, agreed to create an independent principality of Albania. The Russians accepted this only reluctantly, and in exchange secured most ofKosovo and its mixed Serb and Albanian population for Serbia.

But the Montenegrins were refusing to give up their corner of Albania – which placed the whole agreement in jeopardy. “And then,” writes Radzinsky, “the tsar suddenly demonstrated character: he resolutely moved against public opinion. He demanded that the minister of foreign affairs put pressure on Montenegro. And on 21 April 1913 the Montenegrin king, after many hours of persuasion, consented to withdraw from Scutari in return for monetary indemnification. And the Russian foreign minister, Sergius Sazonov, announced with relief, ‘King Nikola was going to set the world on fire to cook his own little omelette.’ This was in reply to the constant reproaches that Russia had once again betrayed its Balkan brothers.”[[122]](#footnote-122)

Radzinsky attributes the tsar’s sudden firmness to the fact that Rasputin and the Empress were against the war. “And the tsar was forced to submit,” he writes. However, we must not forget Sazonov’s tenacious peace-making efforts in the face of a rabidly belligerent press and the open disobedience of his subordinate in Belgrade, Hartwig. His contribution was acknowledged on June 18, 1913, “when an unprecedented official statement by Tsar Nicholas praised Sazonov and stressed the tsar’s grateful public recognition of his minister’s sterling work throughout the Blakan crisis, as well as Nicholas’s strong support for solving all disputes through peaceful compromise with the European great powers.”[[123]](#footnote-123)

In any case, whatever the views and influence of ministers and diplomats, the final decision rested with the tsar, whose final decision in favour of peace – in spite of partial mobilization on the Galician border - was perfectly consistent with his expressed belief that it was not in Russia’s interests to go to war to defend the territorial ambitions of the Balkan Slavs. Only in 1914 would he be forced to submit to the call for war. But the situation then, as we shall see, was different: Russia was not called to help the Serbs in some madcap aggression, but to *defend* them from annihilation in a just war…

There was another problem… While the Bulgarians had been advancing on Constantinople, the Serbs had taken large areas in Macedonia, including Bitola (Monastir), that had been reserved for the Bulgarians in the secret treaty of 1912. When the Bulgarians asked for these territories back, the Serbs refused. On June 30, 1913 Bulgaria suddenly attacked Greece and Serbia without declaring war. This led to the outbreak of the Second Balkan War, which ended on July 29 with the victory of Greece, Serbia, Romania and Turkey over Bulgaria.

The Treaty of Bucharest brought peace, but Bulgaria remained deeply and dangerously resentful… They had some cause: although they had fought well in the First Balkan War, suffering huge casualties, they ended up with little – thanks to the deception of the Serbs, the fears of the Russians, and the opportunism of the Romanians, their fellow-Orthodox. It has been customary to blame the Second War on the Bulgarian King Ferdinand, a wily and ambitious man[[124]](#footnote-124), who was heartily disliked by his allies. But these allies must take part of the blame for the desertion of the Bulgarians to the Triple Alliance in the First World War…

Robert Cooper writes that “while the first Balkan war was mostly a military-to-military affair, in the second the target was often the civilian population. If you could establish that a piece of territory was inhabited by your people – Serbs, Bulgarians or Greeks, - then you could claim it as a part of your national territory. This was therefore a war about people as well as territory: whether a village was Serb or Bulgarian might decide whether its inhabitants lived or died…”[[125]](#footnote-125)

As Tim Judah, writes, “ethnic cleansing” was common during the Second War: “The Carnegie Endowment’s account of the crushing of the Albanian revolt in Kosovo is also important because in 1913 as in 1941 or the 1990s it was quite clear to all involved what the purpose of ethnic cleansing was: ’Houses and whole villages are reduced to ashes, unarmed and innocent populations massacred *en masse*, incredible acts of violence, pillage and brutality of every kind – such were the means which were employed by the Serbo-Montenegrin soldiery, with a view to the entire transformation of the ethnic character of regions inhabited exclusively by Albanians.

“’We thus arrive at the second characteristic feature of the Balkan wars, a feature which is the necessary correlative of the first. Since the population of the countries about to be occupied knew, by tradition, instinct and experience, what they had to expect from the armies of the enemy and from the neighbouring countries to which these armies belonged, they did not await their arrival, but fled. Thus generally speaking, the army of the enemy found on its way nothing but villages which were either half deserted or entirely abandoned. To execute the orders for extermination, it was only necessary to set fire to them. The population, warned by the glow from these fires, fled all in haste. There followed a veritable migration of peoples, for in Macedonia, as in Thrace, there was hardly a spot that was not, at a given moment, on the line of march of some army or other. The Commission everywhere encountered this second fact. All along the railways interminable trains of carts drawn by oxen followed one another; behind them came emigrant families and, in the neighbourhood of the big towns, bodies of refugees were found encamped.’

“Just as conversion had been accepted as a means to escape death in earlier times, in some places it once again became an issue. When the Montenegrins captured the village of Plav, Rebecca West, whose pro-Serbian bent somewhat undermines her otherwise masterly account of Yugoslavia in the 1930s, characteristically dismisses a major massacre as an ‘unfortunate *contretemps*’. During this little misunderstanding a former Muslim cleric, now converted to Orthodoxy and a major in the Montenegrin Army, demanded that his former congregation convert. They refused and so 500 of them were shot. In another incident, some Macedonian villagers had their church surrounded by Serbian soldiers during the Sunday service. On emerging they found that a table had been set up on which was a piece of paper and a revolver. Either they could sign that they were Serbs rather than Bulgarians – or they could die. They chose the former option.”[[126]](#footnote-126)

This latter incident shows that rivalry and hatred among the Orthodox, especially in Macedonia and especially between Greeks and Bulgarians, had by no means been removed by their alliances against the Turks.

A Carnegie Endowment report describes the hatred between the Greeks and Bulgarians at this time:- “Day after day the Bulgarians were represented as a race of monsters, and public feeling was roused to a pitch of chauvinism which made it inevitable that war, when it should come, should be ruthless. In talk and in print one phrase summed up the general feeling of the Greeks towards the Bulgarians. ‘Dhen einai anthropoi!’ (They are not human beings). In their excitement and indignation the Greeks came to think of themselves as the appointed avengers of civilization against a race which stood outside the pale of humanity.

“… Deny that your enemies are men, and presently you will treat them as vermin. Only half realizing the full meaning of what he said, a Greek officer remarked to the writer, ‘When you have to deal with barbarians, you must behave like a barbarian yourself. It is the only thing they understand.’ The Greek army went to war, its mind inflamed with anger and contempt. A gaudily coloured print, which we saw in the streets of Salonika and the Piraeus, eagerly bought by the Greek soldiers returning to their homes, reveals the depth of the brutality to which this race hatred had sunk them. It shows a Greek *evzone* (highlander) holding a living Bulgarian soldier with both hands, while he gnaws the face of the victim with his teeth, like some beast of prey. It is entitled *Bulgarophagos* (Bulgar-eater), and is adorned with the following verses:

*The sea of fire which boils in my breast*

*And calls for vengeance with the savage waves of my soul,*

*Will be quenched when the monster of Sofia is still,*

*And thy life blood extinguishes my hate*.”[[127]](#footnote-127)

It is sometimes asserted that the Christian commandment to love our enemies cannot be applied in a war situation. Certainly, it is necessary to obey lawful authorities and fight the enemies of the State. At the same time, personal hatred and unnecessary cruelty are forbidden both in war and peace. Even in the Old Testament, and even in relation to non-Jews, cruelty was forbidden: “You shall not wrong a stranger or oppress him, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt. You shall not afflict any widow or orphan. If you do afflict them, and they cry out to Me, I will surely hear their cry, and My wrath will burn, and I will kill you with the sword, and your wives shall become widows, and your children fatherless” (Exodus 22.21-24).

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In ten weeks’ fighting during the two Balkan wars of 1912-13 about 200,000 soldiers were killed, together with an unknown number of civilians. This constituted a political and military victory for the Balkan Orthodox, but a major spiritual defeat for Orthodoxy. Russia had managed to avoid a world war while not betraying her co-religionists; but internal as well as external factors were making it increasingly difficult for the Tsar to hold the twin monsters of revolutionary nationalism and internationalist revolution at bay.

As Bokhanov writes, “in spite of the fact that the Balkan wars did not grow into a pan-European conflict, the tension in the international arena did not abate. Germany and France had already for several years been carrying out rearmament programmes. Russia was also drawn into this world arms race. Nationalist tendencies increased. In the spring of 1913 the German chancellor Bethmann-Holweg, while arguing in the Reichstag for the necessity of new credits for the army, declared that Germany was threatened by ‘a Slavic wave’. But he was only repeating his Kaiser, who declared after the First Balkan War that he thought ‘a struggle between the Slavs and Germans’ inevitable.

“By contrast with ‘dear Willy’, the Russian tsar was of another opinion and did not consider a large-scale military conflict to be inevitable. In May 1913 Nicholas II arrived in Berlin for the wedding of the Kaiser’s daughter, Princess Victoria-Louise, who was marrying the duke of Braunstein. The tsar was intending to come to an agreement with William II about improving Russian-German relations. He conducted negotiations with the Kaiser and told him that Russia was ready to renounce her claims on the Black Sea straits and agreed to leave Turkey in the role of ‘gate-keeper’ if Germany, on her part, would keep Austria from an expansionist policy in the Balkans. There was no reaction to these suggestions in Berlin, and William confined himself only to talking about generalities…”[[128]](#footnote-128)

The Balkan Wars, writes Niall Ferguson, “had revealed both the strengths and the limits of Balkan nationalism. Its strength lay in its ferocity. Its weakness was its disunity. The violence of the fighting much impressed the young Trotsky, who witnessed it as a correspondent for the newspaper *Kievskaia mysl*. Even the peace that followed the Balkan Wars was cruel, in a novel manner that would become a recurrent feature of the twentieth century. It no longer sufficed, in the eyes of nationalists, to acquire foreign territory. Now it was peoples as well as borders that had to move. Sometimes these movements were spontaneous. Muslims fled in the direction of Salonika as the Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians advanced in 1912; Bulgarians fled Macedonia to escape from invading Greek troops in 1913; Greeks chose to leave the Macedonian districts ceded to Bulgaria and Serbia by the Treaty of Bucharest. Sometimes populations were deliberately expelled, as the Greeks were from Western Thrace in 1913 and from parts of Eastern Thrace and Anatolia in 1914. In the wake of the Turkish defeat, there was an agreed population exchange: 48,570 Turks moved one way and 46,764 Bulgarians the other across the new Turkish-Bulgarian border. Such exchanges were designed to transform regions of ethnically mixed settlement into the homogeneous societies that so appealed to the nationalist imagination. The effects on some regions were dramatic. Between 1912 and 1915, the Greek population of (Greek) Macedonia increased by around a third; the Muslim and Bulgarian population declined by 26 and 13 per cent respectively. The Greek population of Western Thrace fell by 80 per cent; the Muslim population of Eastern Thrace rose by a third. The implications were distinctly ominous for the many multi-ethnic communities elsewhere in Europe…”[[129]](#footnote-129)

The major political result of the Balkan Wars was that the Balkan Orthodox states now regarded themselves as completely independent of their Russian protector. *Formally speaking,* this was certainly not envisaged by, for example, the Serbian-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912, which ascribed to Russia the role of arbiter in all disputes.[[130]](#footnote-130) But the reality was quite different… As a French diplomat in St. Petersburg put it: “For the first time in the history of the Eastern question the small states have acquired a position of such independence of the Great Powers that they feel able to act completely without them and even to take them in tow…”[[131]](#footnote-131) This independence was revealed in the way in which the Serbs remained on Albanian territory for a full six months after agreeing to withdraw from it, leaving only after the Austrians issued an ultimatum on October 17.

But this independence came at a price – a price that would be paid in 1914. For it convinced the Austrians, first, that the only way they could exert any influence over the Serbs was through ultimatums. And secondly, as Clark writes, “that Serbia would only ever ultimately understand force…”[[132]](#footnote-132)

Max Hastings writes that “western statesmen regarded [Serbia] with impatience and suspicion. Its self-assertiveness, its popular catchphrase ‘Where a Serb dwells, there is Serbia’, destabilized the Balkans. Europe’s chancelleries were irritated by its ‘little Serbia’, proud-victim culture. Serbs treated their own minority subjects, especially Muslims, with conspicuous and often murderous brutality. Every continental power recognised that the Serbs could achieve their ambition to enfold in their own polity two million brethren still under Habsburg rule only at the cost of bringing down Franz Joseph’s empire.”[[133]](#footnote-133)

A certain Bulgarian statesman told the journalist Leon Trotsky soon after the First Balkan War: “We must, of course, say this in all politeness to all the other diplomats from Europe, as they labour in the sweat of their brows for our happiness. ‘Neither honey nor thorns,’ dear sirs! We ourselves will settle with Turkey, without any interference from Europe, and all the more firmly and satisfactorily. Europe puts on an air of being afraid that we shall be excessively demanding. And this from Europe – that is to say, from Austria-Hungary, who annexed Bosnia; from Italy, who seized Tripolitania; from Russia, who never takes her eyes off Constantinople… This is the Europe that comes to us preaching moderation and restraint. Truly, a sight for the gods on Olympus!... Your diplomats are sulking. They would not be averse to freezing the Balkans for another ten years, in expectation of better days sometime. How is it that they cannot understand that less and less is it possible in our epoch to direct the destinies of the Balkans from the outside? We are growing up, gaining confidence, and becoming independent… In the very first years of our present phase of existence as a state, we told our would-be guardians: ‘Bulgaria will follow her own line.’… And so Messrs. Privy Councillors of all the diplomatic chanceries would do well to get used to the idea that the Balkan Peninsula ‘will follow its own line’…”[[134]](#footnote-134)

This was the fundamental problem of Balkan politics, and the reason why it was precisely in the Balkans that the fuse was lit that led to the First World War. The Balkan States of Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Romania were Orthodox, but they did not recognize the guidance of Russia, the senior and most powerful Orthodox state. In spite of the fact that Russia, over the centuries, had expended millions of lives and vast financial resources in order to protect and eventually liberate the Balkans from the oppression of Muslim and Catholic powers, they did not feel obliged to show gratitude to “the Third Rome” or submit to her leadership in any way. They were determined to go their own, egotistical ways and expand their territories regardless of the consequences for world peace or the interests of the Orthodox commonwealth as a whole, let alone the interests of the other Orthodox states in the region.

As for the Tsar, in his Divinely-appointed role as Autocrat of the Third Rome and the protector of the whole of Orthodoxy he was bound to have the interests of the Orthodox commonwealth as a whole at heart. But he was faced with a very difficult dilemma. On the one hand, he could not ignore the majority nationalist opinion in Russia, which wanted him to support the Orthodox Balkan states when they came into conflict with Ottoman Turkey or Austria-Hungary. Nor was he personally unsympathetic to this “war party”, which is why he tended to support the Defence Secretary Sukhomlinov in his requests for increased military spending, and was quick to order a partial mobilisation in November, 1912.[[135]](#footnote-135) But on the other hand, he knew that defending the interests of one Balkan state risked alienating another - which is precisely what happened when he came down on the side of Serbia as against Bulgaria.[[136]](#footnote-136) Still more serious, because of the new system of alliances in which the Entente supported Serbia while the Triple Alliance supported Bulgaria, any serious involvement on the side of Serbia threatened to ignite a wider conflict between the two alliance blocs. And this would most likely bring down Russia herself and with her the whole of the Orthodox commonwealth – which, again, is precisely what happened…

The tsar’s dilemma was well understood by the diplomat Alexander Giers, who had first-hand knowledge of the situation through his posting to Montenegro during the Balkan wars and belonged to the “peace party”. According to Dominic Lieven, Giers “wrote in 1913 that the Russian public misled itself about events in the Balkans. It was driven by moods and sentiment, as well as by the distortions of the Russian press. Giers denounced King Nikita of Montenegro, one of the Russian public’s heroes, as a wholly cynical and unreliable partner intent on manipulating Russian public opinion and driven by no higher loyalty than concern to save and promote his own dynasty. Firsthand experience of Montenegro was often a cold shower even for Russians initially sympathetic to the Slav cause. Major General Nikolai Potapov, the long-serving head of Russia’s military mission to the kingdom, wrote that Nikita was shameless, his envoys were usually liars, and the dominant characteristics of Montenegrins were ‘lying, breaking their word, laziness, self-publicity, boasting, greed for money, and arrogance.’ This truly colonialist diatribe was strengthened by Potapov’s opinion that the Montenegrins were savages. The general was a Guards officer, and his reports sometimes reflect the traditional disdain of the old ‘court’ faction for Balkan primitives. They also reflect Potapov’s humanity. He describes the Montenegrins’ mutilation of Turkish prisoners, who were then carefully hidden from visiting Red Cross missionaries, and their ‘barbarous treatment’ even of Orthodox Serb civilians in areas they overran.

“If the Montenegrins and their king were an extreme case, for Giers they were not that untypical of the Balkan peoples. He once wrote to Serge Sazonov that there was little to choose between the Serbs, the Greeks, the Bulgarians, and the Romanians: ‘They all hate each other and show little inclination to settle the accounts accumulated between them over the centuries by means of reasonable compromises.’ In April 1913, he wrote that not merely were the Balkan peoples at each other’s throats as always but their attitude to Russia was also entirely manipulative. They wanted the backing of Russian power but had no genuine loyalty to Russian culture or ideals, let alone any inclination to follow Russian advice. The Serbs were most dangerous because Russia was being pushed into the position of acting as the defender of the Serbian national cause. In Giers’s opinion, the nationalist project of uniting all Serbs, let alone all southern Slavs, was in itself ‘very doubtful’, because even the Serbs in the Habsburg Empire differed substantially from their co-ethnics in the Serbian kingdom. Far greater still was the gap between Belgrade and the Croats, Slovenes, and other Slav subjects of the Habsburgs. It was, however, very dangerous that ‘the Serbs of the kingdom have become convinced in recent times that whatever paths their struggle with Austria might take, they would find in the Russian government both sympathy and support.’ With increasing frequency, Belgrade had sought to draw Russia into Serbia’s struggle with Austria.

“In Giers’s opinion, this was wholly contrary to Russian interests. Austria could be an important ally for Russia in achieving a tolerable compromise on the question of the Straits. Above all, Russia risked being sucked into a European war caused by the Austrian dispute with Serbia. Even in 1911, before the Balkan Wars revealed the full danger of Austro-Russian confrontation over Serbia, Giers was arguing that it was in neither Russia’s interests nor its power to defend the Serbian cause against Austrian expansion southward. The more Serbs the Habsburgs absorbed into their empire, the less likely it was to become a mere cat’s-paw of Berlin and its Austro-German allies. In Giers’s view, this latter development was the greatest danger both for Russia and for Austria itself. The Habsburg monarchy in his opinion had two options: either it could evolve in the direction of a federation offering Slavs an equal weight to Germans and Magyars, or it could become a mere appendage of greater Germandom and its expansionist ambitions. It was in Russian (and Habsburg) interests that it took the former path. Russia had to back the Austrian Slavs who were in any case far more reasonable and civilized than their Balkan equivalents. Above all else, the Czechs and other Austrian Slavs feared a European war because it would unleash all the pressures for Germanic domination of the empire and of central Europe. Russia had to respect this opinion, which also served its own urgent need for peace. It had to seek to recast its whole relationship with the Habsburg monarchy and in so doing contribute to Europe’s evolution away from an international system divided rigidly into two hostile blocs…”[[137]](#footnote-137)

But this was not to be. The tsar read Giers’s memorandums “and sometimes requested that ministers consider Giers’s suggestions and report back to him. It is certainly arguable that Giers’s priorities of peace, reconciliation with Austria and minimalist ambitions in the Straits would have served Russian interests better than the policy pursued by Serge Sazonov. Of course, because we know that Sazonov’s policies ended in war, revolution, and catastrophe for Russia, there is a natural bias in favour of Giers’s alternative strategy… The one certain point is that the policy suggested by Aleksander Giers would have angered the military and naval leadership and outraged wide sections of Russsian public opinion…”[[138]](#footnote-138)

Probably for that reason the tsar did not adopt Giers’s suggestions. He could not afford to alienate the army and nationalist public opinion… And so God allowed the *hubris* of the Balkan states to result in *nemesis* for the Orthodox world as a whole. Judgement was about to descend upon the whole European world. But it would begin at the House of God, the Orthodox Church (I Peter 4.17)…

## **55. THE POLISH AND UKRAINIAN QUESTIONS**

A critical western border province during the 1905 revolution had been that of Kholm, where the neighbouring Polish rebellion combined with the April manifesto on religious freedom elicited disturbances. It was feared that many nominal Orthodox would be tempted to become uniates, and the Bishop of Kholm, Evlogy (Georgievsky), wrote to Pobedonostsev: “The very credit of our priests has been undermined. For thirty years they repeated to the people that the Kholm-Podliaschie country will always be Orthodox and Russian, and now the people see, on the contrary, the complete, willful takeover of the enemies of the Orthodox Russian cause in that country.”

“Soon after he sent the letter,” writes Serhii Plokhy, “Evlogii and his supporters went to St. Petersburg to meet with Pobedonostsev and discuss how to deal with the threat to Russian interests in the region. They wanted to redraw the borders of the imperial provinces, dividing the Kholm region from the lands of the former Kingdom of Poland. The new Kholm province was to have a ‘Russian’ core consisting of more than 300,000 ethnic Ukrainians – those who had said Little Russian was their native language in the 1897 census. Officials in the Ministry of the Interior got busy planning for the administrative change. The bill was sent to the Duma. Debates on the measure continued until 1912, leading eventually to the creation of a new province and mobilizing Russian nationalist forces in parliament and beyond.

“The Kholm debate brought together Ukrainophiles and proponents of Russia, one and indivisible, in common cause against Polish influence, but their alliance was situational and limited to a single goal. In almost every other case, Ukrainophiles and Russian nationalists found themselves engaged in a life-or-death struggle for the future of a land that both considered their own. The language issue had traditionally been central to the Ukrainophile agenda. In December 1904, with the war against Japan going badly and social discontent rising precipitously, the imperial government had agreed to revisit the question of the prohibitions imposed on Ukrainian-language publications by the Edict of Ems [in 1876]. Once again, discussion focused on translation of the Gospels, but this time the atmosphere was different. The president of the Imperial Academy of Sciences himself, Grand Duke Konstantin Konstantinovich, advocated the abolition of the ban on publishing the Scriptures in Ukrainian.

“In March 1905, a commission of the Academy of Sciences also discussed the issue of ending the ban on Ukrainian-language publications generally. The discussion was held at the behest of the government, which also solicited the opinions of the universities of Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa. All found institutions advised lifting the restrictions, with the Academy of Sciences making the strongest statement. Its memorandum, prepared by the philologists Aleksei Shakhmatov and Fedor Korsh and signed by many other liberal academicians in April 1905, not only recommended doing away with the ban but also opened the door to the recognition of Ukrainian as a separate language.

“The authors of the Academy of Sciences memorandum did not say explicitly that Ukrainian was a separate language, but their reasoning left little doubt that it was on a par with Russian. They achieved that effect by discarding the notion of an ‘all-Russian language’. The academics claimed that the efforts of Russian authors to bring their literary language closer to the vernacular ‘had already made the all-Russian literary language fully Great Russian by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and our literary speech, the speech of the educated classes and written language of every kind, should be considered fully Great Russian.’ The authors of the memorandum used not only historical and linguistic but also political arguments to make their case. ‘A state that does not know how to guarantee one of the most elementary civil rights – the right to speak and publish in one’s mother tongue – arouses neither respect nor love in the citizen but a nameless fear for his existence,’ wrote Shakhmatov and Korsh before delivering their ultimate warning: ‘That fear gives rise to dissatisfaction and revolutionary aspirations.’ Their timing was perfect: shocked by the revolutionary upheaval of the previous few months, the government was prepared to listen.

“The memorandum was published in a limited number of copies (exclusively for government use) in April 1905 and immediately had a major impact on political debates within the Russian Empire and beyond its borders. The lifting of restrictions on Ukrainian-language publications began in February 1905, with permission to publish religious texts in Ukrainian, for which Grand Duke Konstantin Konstantinovich had lobbied. All prohibitions were abolished with the introduction of new censorship regulations in the spring of 1906. By that time the abolition was a mere formality, given that the prohibitions on Ukrainian-language newspapers had been done away with in October 1905, the month that also saw the publication of the tsar’s manifesto granting his subjects basic civil rights, including ‘freedom of the word’. By the end of the year, three Ukrainian-language newspapers were being published in the empire, one in Kyiv and two in Poltava province.

“Among the beneficiaries of the changes in official language policy were Belarussian activists. In September 1906, the first Belarussian daily, *Nasha dolia* (Our Destiny), began publication in Vilnius. After being closed for its radical leftist content, it was replaced in November 1906 by the more centrist newpaper *Nasha niva* (Our Field), which would continue publication until 1915. It formed a new Belarussian literary canon and helped popularize Belarussian-language literature. Between 1906 and 1915, the number of books published in Belarussian increased from almost zero to 80 titles, attaining a cumulative print run of 220,000 copies.

“Although these figures represented a breakthrough for the Belarussian language and literature, they were very modest in comparison to publications in other languages of the empire. In 1911 alone there were 25,526 titles published in Russian, 1,664 in Polish, and 965 in Yiddish and Hebrew. The Ukrainians trailed those front-runners with 242 items. The Belarussians, who had never waged a prolonged struggle against the discrimination of their language or mobilized around that issue, were even further behind…”[[139]](#footnote-139)

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Although Russia’s conflict with Austria-Hungary in 1914 centred on Serbia, there were other issues between the neighbouring empires that were perhaps even more important, if not quite so acute. After all, Serbia was an independent state with no border contiguous with Russia. But Poland was part of the Russian empire and bordered on Austria-Hungary. And so was the Ukraine. Moreover, there were substantial minorities of Poles and Ukrainians on both sides of the border, making the area fertile ground for nationalist agitation.

From the strategic military point of view, Poland was vital to Russia because it was on the road to Germany; while Ukraine was, if possible, still more important, not so much from a military, as from a cultural and religious point of view. For the Ukrainians were not only Slavs, but also, unlike the Poles but like the Serbs, Orthodox Slavs. They were Eastern Slav Orthodox, which meant that they were as close as it was possible to be to the Russians themselves – no less than “Little Russians”, as the Great Russians rather condescendingly called them.

There was also an important difference in the way in which Ukraine and Poland became parts of the Russian empire. Ukraine was not “on the periphery” (as its name suggests) of the original Russian state, but at its very core; for St. Vladimir, the Baptizer of Russia and the real founder of the state, ruled from Kiev, simultaneously “the mother of Russian cities” and the capital of Ukraine. Kievan Rus’ at its greatest extent in the twelfth century included the whole of what is now Ukraine, including Galicia in the West.

Poland, on the other hand, was a conquered land – and definitely a foreign one, however Slavophiles or Pan-Slavists might wish to emphasize the Poles’ kinship with the Russians. As Lieven writes, “historically the tsars ruled non-Russians largely by co-opting aristocracies into the imperial ruling elite. The one major failure of this strategy was the Poles. Members of the Polish Catholic nobility were the ancestral enemies of Russia and Orthodoxy. They bore proud memories of their nation’s former power and independence, which only disappeared finally in 1815. In 1830 and 1863, they attempted to regain this independence through widespread rebellions against Russian rule. The revolts were crushed, but right down to 1914 most Russian statesmen were convinced the Poles would seize any moment of Russian weakness to rebel again. Poland’s geographic position across the main invasion routes from the west into the Russian heartland made that fear particularly acute, especially after German unification in 1871 and the Austro-German dual alliance of 1879.

“In 1914, the Poles were still seen in Petersburg as the most disloyal and dangerous of the empire’s nationalities, apart from the Jews. Because most Jews lived in former Polish territory annexed by Russia, the Polish and Jewish danger overlapped in Petersburg’s eyes. But in the Russian empire as elsewhere, new nationalisms were emerging among peoples who had in many cases never previously shown any sign of disloyalty. This was happening in Finland, the Baltic Provinces, Ukraine, the Caucasus region, and among many of the tsar’s Muslim subjects. To be sure, even in 1914 most of these new nationalisms were not yet as developed as in the Habsburg monarchy or western Europe. Russia was less modern, so most of the tsar’s subjects were still semiliterate peasants immune to nationalism’s call. Constraints on civil society and political propaganda also slowed the spread of nationalism. Nevertheless, in Russia as elsewhere, rulers of empire faced the reality that subject populations could no longer be ruled just by co-opting their aristocracies. As societies modernized, the landowning class was losing power to businessmen, professional groups, and intellectuals. The new nationalism often attracted these groups’ support. Concessions to nationalist currents might well take the empire down the road to federalism. Most Russian statesmen believed that this would be an instant recipe for weakening the empire and in time probably dooming it to destruction. They saw Austria’s travails as an example of what happened when the growing weakness of government allowed national conflicts free rein: rulers were paralyzed, an empire’s military power declined, and its many enemies and potential predators began to circles in increasing hope of a kill.

“From the Russian perspective, among the new nationalism the Ukrainian movement was potentially much the most dangerous. This was partly because of the region’s immense economic importance. In 1914, the eight Ukrainian provinces (a smaller area than today’s Ukrainian republic) produced one-third of the empire’s wheat, most of its exported grains, and 80 percent of its sugar. Without this, it would be hard to support the empire’s positive balance of trade on which the government’s strategy of economic development depended. Supplying Russian cities in the much less fertile northern zone would also become a problem. Even more crucial was Ukraine’s role in heavy industry and mining in 1914. 70 percent of the empire’s coal, 68 percent of its cast iron, and 58 percent of its steel came from the region, as did a large share of its engineering products. Until the 1930s, when Stalin developed the Urals and West Siberian industrial region, if Russia had lost Ukraine, it would have ceased to be a great power.

“The idea of a separate Ukrainian national identity also undermined all the calculations on which tsarist nationalities policy was based as well as the way in which educated Russians understood the country they lived in. in 1897, although only 44 percent of the empire’s population was Russian, a further 22.5 percent was at least east Slav – in other words, Ukrainian or Belorussian (White Russian). The great majority of these Ukrainians or Belorussians were Orthodox in religion, which had historically been a much more important marker of identity and political loyalty than questions of language. Ukrainians outnumbered Belorussians by more than four to one, and their region was richer and more developed. There was therefore every chance that if Ukrainian nationalism failed to develop, the same would be true in Belorussia. If Ukrainians and Belorussians could be counted as Russians in political terms, then two-thirds of the empire’s population was ‘Russian’. In this era of high imperialism, it was widely assumed that numerically small peoples could neither defend themselves nor sustain a high culture on their own. Their only choice therefore was between rival empires. The Russian government correctly believed that Georgians, Armenians, and the ‘small peoples’ of the Baltic region would prefer the tsar’s rule to that of the German Kaiser or the Ottoman sultan. Much of the Muslim population, on the other hand, was deemed too backward to be vulnerable to nationalist ideas…”[[140]](#footnote-140)

But what of a numerially large people such as the Ukrainians? Was it conceivable that they would prefer to be within the German or Austrian rather than the Russian empires? Or even acquire the thirst for complete independence from any empire that was manifest among the neighbouring Poles?

As we have seen, Ukrainian nationalist sentiment was not well developed among the semiliterate peasant masses, being mainly confined to intellectuals. However, the Austians were stirring up trouble next door… For, as Oliver Figes writes, the Ukrainian nationalists “took inspiration from the Ukrainian national movement in neighbouring Galicia. As part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Galicia had been granted relatively liberal rights of self-government. This had allowed the Ukrainians, or ‘Ruthenians’ (dog-Latin for ‘Russians’) as they were known by the Austrians, to promote their own Ukrainian language in primary schools and public life, to publish native-language newspapers and books, and to advance the study of Ukrainian history and folk culture. Galicia became a sort of ‘Ukrainian Piedmont’ for the rest of the national movement in tsarist Ukraine: a forcing-house of national consciousness and an oasis of freedom for nationalist intellectuals. Lviv, its capital, also known as Lemberg (by the Germans) and as Lvov (by the Russians), was a thriving centre of Ukrainian culture. Although subjects of the Tsar, both the composer Lysenko and the historian Hrushevsky had found their nation in Galicia. The nationalist intellectuals who pioneered the Ukrainian literary language in the middle decades of the nineteenth century all borrowed terms from the Galician dialect, which they considered the most advanced, although later, as they tried to reach the peasantry with newspapers and books, they were forced to base it on the Poltavan folk idiom, which, as the dialect of the central Ukraine, was the most commonly understood. The seminal texts of this national literary renaissance were published by the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius prior to its dissolution by the tsarist authorities in 1847. The romantic poetry of Taras Shevchenko, which played the same role as Mickiewicz’s poetry in Poland in shaping the intelligentsia’s national consciousness, was the most important of these. Ukrainian-language publications continued to appear, despite the legal restrictions on them. Many were published by the Kiev section of the Russian Geographical Society, whose nationalist members devoted themselves to the study of Ukrainian folk culture, language and history.”[[141]](#footnote-141)

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Austrian Galicia was a thorn in the side of the Russian empire not only because it was a seedbed of nationalist discontent, but also because it was a centre of Catholic persecution of the Orthodox. Of course, the struggle between Orthodoxy and Catholicism in East-Central Europe was a long-running story. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Catholics, led by the Poles and the Jesuits, had been on the offensive. But as the Russian empire expanded westwards in the nineteenth century, millions of Catholic uniates had returned to the faith of their fathers. The Pochaev Lavra in Galicia had been a stronghold of Orthodoxy in a sea of uniatism.

Now, in the early twentieth century, Archbishop Anthony (Khrapovitsky) of Volhynia was the main defender of Orthodoxy against the Catholic heretics both within his own diocese and also further west, in Austrian Galicia, where the Hungarian government and the uniates tried by all means to prevent the return of the Carpatho-Russians to their ancestral Orthodox faith.

The Tsar’s friend General Vladimir Voeikov wrote: “One of the symptoms for the openly aggressive politics of Austro-Hungary against Russia was the following incident: In the middle of February, 1914, Hieromonk Alexis Kabaliuk was sentenced, according to newspaper reports, by a Marmarosh-Sagetsky court to four and a half years in prison and a fine of a thousand crowns for, in the words of the sentence, spreading Russian Orthodox teaching, praising the Russian tsar and Russia and thereby inciting hatred against the Hungarian authorities, supposedly encroaching on the rights of the Hungarian king.”[[142]](#footnote-142) There were even martyrdoms, such as that of the priest Maximus Sandovich, who had been ordained by Vladyka Anthony.

“Vladyka Anthony struggled with the unia and both by the printed word and in his sermons he often addressed this theme. He tried by all means to destroy the incorrect attitude towards the unia which had been established in Russia, according to which it was the same Orthodoxy, only commemorating the Pope of Rome. With profound sorrow and irritation he said: ‘They can in no way accept this simple truth, that the unia is a complete entry into the Roman Catholic church with the recognition of the Orthodox Church as a schism.., with the recognition of all the Latin saints and with a condemnation of the Orthodox saints as having been schismatics outside the true Church…’

“… Vladyka Anthony also laboured much to establish in Russian society an Orthodox attitude towards Catholicism. In educated Russian society and in ecclesiastical circles in the Synodal period of the Russian Church the opinion was widespread that Catholicism was one of the branches of Christianity which, as V.S. Soloviev taught, was bound at the end of time to unite into one Christianity with the other supposed branches – Orthodoxy and Protestantism, about which the holy Church supposedly prayed in her litanies: ‘For the prosperity of the Holy Churches of God and for the union of all’.

“The correct attitude towards Catholicism as an apostate heresy was so shaken that the Holy Synod under the influence of the Emperor Peter I and with the blessing of his favourite, the protestantising Metropolitan Theophan Prokopovich, allowed Swedish prisoners-of-war in Siberia to marry Russian girls without the obligatory conversion to Orthodoxy. Soon this uncanonical practice of mixed marriages became law and spread, especially in the western regions. In his diocese Vladyka Anthony strictly forbade the clergy to celebrate mixed marriages.

“Vladyka Anthony well knew that Catholic influence in the midst of the Russian clergy was introduced through the theological schools: ‘We have lost (an Orthodox attitude towards Catholicism) because those guides by which we studied in school and which constitute the substance of our theological, dogmatic and moral science, are borrowed from the Catholics and Protestants; we are left only with straight heterodox errors which are known to all and have been condemned by ecclesiastical authorities…’

“Seeing the abnormal situation of church life in subjugated Carpathian Rus’, Vladyka Anthony turned to the Ecumenical Patriarch Joachim III with a request to accept the Orthodox Galicians and Carpatho-Russians under his omophorion, since the Russian Synod for political reasons was unable to spread its influence there. The patriarch willingly agreed and appointed Vladyka Anthony as his exarch for Galicia and Carpathian Rus’. The Galicians, after finishing work in the fields and in spite of the great obstacles involved in crossing the border, sometimes with a direct danger to their lives, made pilgrimages in large groups to the Pochaev Lavra. Many Carpatho-Russians and Galicians entered the Volhynia theological seminary.

“Under the influence of all these undertakings, the Orthodox movement in these areas began to grow in an elemental manner with each year that passed. This elicited repressions on the part of the Austro-Hungarian government, which tried to suppress the movement. The persecution grew and soon Vladyka was forced to speak out in defence of the persecuted Christians. In August, 1913 he published an encyclical letter in which he eloquently portrayed all the woes and persecutions of the Orthodox population of the western regions. In going through the various instances of Catholics humiliating Orthodox, he cited the following example of the firmness of the persecuted and the cruelty of the persecutors: ‘Virgins who had gathered together to save their souls in fasting and prayer were stripped in winter and driven out onto a frozen lake, like the 40 martyrs of Sebaste, after which some of them soon died. Thus do they torture our Russians in Hungary and Austria in broad daylight in our civilized age…’

“But when massive arrests and tortures of the Orthodox began, and there was a trial of 94 Orthodox in Sihet, Vladyka Anthony composed a special prayer and petitions in the litanies, which were read in all the churches of the Volhynia diocese in the whole period of the trial, which lasted for two months.

“This was the only voice raised in defence of the persecuted, not only in Russia but also throughout Europe.

“The Austro-Hungarian political circles, in agreement with the Vatican, took decisive measures to suppress the incipient mass return to Orthodoxy of the Carpatho-Russians and Galicians. It seems that they undertook diplomatic negotiations in St. Petersburg in order to remove the main cause of the movement that had arisen, Vladyka Anthony, from his Volhynia see.”[[143]](#footnote-143)

On May 20, 1914 Archbishop Anthony was duly transferred to Kharkov…

## **56. THE LAST YEARS OF PEACE**

In 1912 and 1913 a number of important anniversaries were celebrated to commemorate the historical triumphs of the Romanov dynasty. Providentially gave an important boost to the healthy, Orthodox and patriotic forces of Russian society.

The first was the centenary of the victory over Napoleon in 1812. As Lubov Millar writes, “A solemn ‘Te Deum’ was held in the presence of the Imperial Familyat the Kazan Cathedral in St. Petersburg, where General Field Marshal Koutouzov, commander of the Russian forces in the 1813 Patriotic War, was buried… The Tsar was also present at Borodino, site of the decisive battle against the French. A special train was arranged for this purposeand remained standing on the railway tracks near Borodino throughout the ceremonies. The final part of the jubilee festivities was the arrival of the Tsar in Moscow from Borodino. On the day of his arrival in the ancient capital, a Divine Liturgy was celebrated in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, built to commemorate Russia’s victory over Napoleon.

“In May 1913, there took place the solemn glorification of Patriarch Hermogenes of All Russia, who had been martyred by the Poles during the Time of Troubles [in 1612],” [[144]](#footnote-144) and had stirred up the nation to fight a successful war of liberation.

If the Borodino celebration commemorated the military might of Russia, which had built up the greatest land empire in history, the glorification of St. Hermogenes remined the people that the liberation of Russia from foreign invaders both in 1612 and again in 1812, had been critically dependent on the support and spiritual leadership of the Church, without whose loyalty to the Throne the Empire would have perished a long time ago. Both lessons were very appropriate in 1912, when Russia stood on the eve of the First World War and amother foreign invasion. Would the Church continue to support the Tsar in the hour of his greatest need? And would the people again remain faithful to the Tsar and the Church? These were the critical questions on which the survival of Russia depended.

“Later that same year, 1913, saw yet another significant anniversary, the Tercentenary of the House of Romanov. It was in 1612, after the Time of Troubles, that the first of the Romanovs, Michael, was elected Tsar of Russia. To mark this anniversary, the Emperor gave orders to draw up an important program of festivities throughout the land. A special jubilee coin – a silver ruble with the heads of two rulers, Michael and Nicholas II – was minted and circulated throughout the country.

“The Imperial Family visited various cities, driving through streets lined with troops, school children and enthusiastic crowds. A thanksgiving service was held in the Kazan Cathedral of St. Petersburg. In order to attend the services, Elizabeth Feodorovna left the administration of her Convent to her deputy and, entrusting its well-being to the mercy of God, took a train for St. Petersburg. She joined the Imperial Family in their trips to various ancient cities, centers where national consciousness had grown: NIzhni Novgorod, Vladimir, Kostroma, Yaroslavl and Rostov…

“The tour had considerable importance. Everywhere, fitting ceremonies and religious services marked the visits of the Imperial Family. Popular enthusiasm throughout the Sovereign’s trip was so spontaneous, so universal, that one would have thought that Monarchy, Orthodoxy and all the Russian people were closely united and would form an unbreakable union for many years to come. But such was not the case. Revolutionary activity was already widespread…”[[145]](#footnote-145)

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Moreover, the international situation was also threatening… “The Balkan wars of 1912-13,” writes Dominic Lieven, “had greatly enlarged Serbian and Rumanian territory, together with the ambitions and self-confidence of Serbian and Rumanian nationalists. The Habsburg Monarchy contained large and discontented Serbian and Rumanian minorities. In 1914 Vienna feared that it would soon lose all its influence over the independent Balkan states, which in turn would contribute to its inability to control the Slav and Rumanian populations of the Monarchy. In more general terms, the rulers of the Habsburg state believed that a reassertion of the empire’s power and vitality was essential in order to overawe its potential foreign and domestic enemies, and to contradict the widely prevalent assumption that the Monarchy was moribund and doomed to disappear in the era of nationalism and democracy.”[[146]](#footnote-146)

The problem of the persecution of Orthodox minorities in the Hungarian dominions was becoming an important source of tension. Thus the Romanians of the Romanian kingdom complained that the Romanian inhabitants of Transylvania were being maltreated by their Hungarian overlords. “Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister, recognised the problem and tried to appease the Rumanian nationalists, who were mainly concentrated in Transylvania, by offering them autonomy in such areas as religion and education but this was not enough for the Rumanians within Hungary and negotiations broke off in February 1914…”[[147]](#footnote-147)

The other hotspot, as we have seen, was Galicia. Providentially, however, the outbreak of the First World War, and the success of the Russian offensive in Galicia in 1915, removed many of the dangers that Archbishop Anthony had warned about. Patriotic emotion and reverence for the Tsar revived, and concern for the fate of the Orthodox Christians in Serbia and Galicia made the struggle, in the minds of many, into a holy war in defence of Orthodoxy against militant Catholicism and Protestantism.

Relations between Vienna and Belgrade continued to be tense. As Clark writes, “Austrian hostility to Belgrade’s triumphant progress was reinforced from the autumn of 1913 by dark tidings from the areas conquered by Serbian forces. From Austrian Consul-General Jehlitschka in Skopje came reports in October 1913 of atrocities against the local inhabitants. One such spoke of the destruction of ten small villages whose entire population had been exterminated. The men were first forced to come out of the village and shot in lines; the houses were then set on fire, and when the women and children fled from the flames, they were killed with bayonets. In general, the consul-general reported, it was the officers who shot the men; the killing of the women and children was left to the enlisted men. Another source described the behaviour of Serbian troops after the taking of Gostivar, one of the towns in an area where there had been an Albanian uprising against the Serbian invaders. Some 300 Gostivar Muslims who had played no role in the uprising were arrested and taken out of the town during the night in groups of twenty to thirty to be beaten and stabbed to death with rifle butts and bayonets (gunshots would have woken the sleeping inhabitants of the town), before being thrown into a large open grave that had been dug beforehand for that purpose. These were not spontaneous acts of brutality, Jehlitschka concluded, but rather ‘a cold-blooded and systematic elimination or annihilation operation that appeared to have been carried out on orders from above.’

“Such reports, which accord… with those of the British officials in the area, inevitably affected the mood and attitude of the political leadership in Vienna. In May 1914, the Serbian envoy in Vienna, Jovanović, reported that even the French ambassador had complained to him about the behaviour of the Serbs in the new provinces; similar complaints were forthcoming from Greek, Turkish, Bulgarian and Albanian colleagues, and it was to be feared that the damage to Serbia’s reputation could have ‘very bad consequences’. The glib denials of Pašić and his ministers reinforced the impression that the government was either itself behind the atrocities or unwilling to do anything to prevent or investigate them. The Austro-Hungarian minister in Belgrade was amused to see leader articles in the Viennese press advising the Serbian government to go easy on the minorities and win them over by a policy of conciliation. Such advice, he observed in a letter to Berchtold, might well be heeded in ‘civilised states’. But Serbia was a state where ‘murder and killing have been raised to a system’. The impact of these reports on Austrian policy is difficult to measure – they were hardly surprising to those in Vienna who already subscribed to a grossly stereotypical view of Serbia and its culture. At the very least, they underscored in Vienna’s eyes the political illegitimacy of Serbian territorial expansion.

“Nevertheless: a war between Austria and Serbia did not appear likely in the spring and summer of 1914. The mood in Belgrade was relatively calm in the spring of that year, reflecting the exhaustion and sense of satiation that followed the Balkan Wars. The instability of the newly conquered areas and the civil-military crisis that racked Serbia during May gave grounds to suspect that the Belgrade government would be focusing mainly on tasks of domestic consolidation for the foreseeable future. In a report on 24 May 1914, the Austro-Hungarian minister in Belgrade, Baron Giesl, observed that although Serbian troop numbers along the Albanian border remained high, there seemed little reason to fear further incursions. And three weeks later, on 16 June, a dispatch from Gellinek, the military attaché in Belgrade, struck a similarly placed note. It was true that officers on holiday had been recalled, reservists asked not to leave their current addresses and the army was being kept at a heightened state of readiness. But there were no signs of aggressive intentions towards either Austro-Hungary or Albania. All was quiet on the southern front…”[[148]](#footnote-148)

Meanwhile, on May 4/16, 1914 there took place, as N.Yu. Selishchev writes, “the signing of the document widely known in Greece as ‘the Corfu protocol’. The Corfu protocol gave the Orthodox Greeks a broad autonomy and sealed their religious, civil and social rights. The international control commission of the great powers (Russia was represented by the consul-general M. Petriaev) acted as a mediator in the quarrel and became the trustee of the fulfilment of the Corfu accord. In Russia the Corfu protocol… was known as the ‘Epirot-Albanian accord’. That is, the question of Epirus was not reduced to the level of an ‘internal affair’ of the newly created Albania, but was raised to the significance of an international agreement when the Orthodox Greek Epirots and the Mohammedan Albanians were recognized as parties to the agreement having equal rights. Our [Russian] press at that time – *Pravitel’stvennij Vestnik, Sankt-Peterburgskia Vedomosti* and the conservative *Novoe Vremia* – looked at the events in Epirus in precisely this way.”

Later, in the spring of 1915 the government of Albania was entrusted to an International Commission of Control. They appointed the German Prince Wilhelm of Wied as ruler. But an uprising by the Muslims of Central Albania drove him out in September…

“Unfortunately,” continues Selishchev, “to this day the protocol of Corfu has not been fulfilled and was not being fulfilled by the Albanian side, neither in the part relating to the religious, nor in the part relating to the civil and educational rights of the Greek Epirots. In this sense the unchanging character of Albanian hostility is indicative. In 1914 the Albanian prime-minister Turkhan Pasha declared to the Rome correspondent of *Berliner Tageblatt* that ‘there can be no discussion’ of the autonomy of Epirus, and ‘for us there are no longer any “Epirots”, but there are only the inhabitants of provinces united to us by the London conference.’ Decades later, in 1967, another Albanian tyrant, Enver Khodja, proclaimed Albania to be the first officially atheist country in the world, where the Orthodox Church was banned and destroyed. The Serbs talk about the destruction of 2000 Orthodox churches.”[[149]](#footnote-149)

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For the Russian aristocrats, as Douglas Smith writes, “Nineteen fourteen would prove to be society’s last season and, even if only in retrospect, its brightest. Baroness Meyendorff later recalled that she had seen many sparkling social seasons, but ‘the *last* one, in 1914, ‘was by far the most brilliant’. Princess Marie Gagarin remembered that last season as one of wild partying. ‘As if foreseeing the approach of catastrophe and striving to stifle a growing apprehension, all Petersburg nervously indulged in amusement and merrymaking.’ It was a time of ‘unprecedented luxury and eloquence’; everywhere were champagne and fresh roses, lilacs and mimosas imported from the south of France. The highlight of the season was the black and white ball at the home of Countess Betsy Shuvalov, with the officers of the Chevaliers Gardes resplendent in their uniforms. Six months later, nearly all these young men lay dead, killed in the first battles of the First World War. Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich cast these days in florid tones: ‘The gypsies cried, the glasses clinked, and the Romanian violinists, clad in red, hypnotized inebriated men and women into a daring attempt to explore the depths of vice. Hysteria reigned supreme...’”[[150]](#footnote-150)

“The atmosphere,” writes Montefiore, “was now overshadowed by a wild foreboding. The poets, playboys, dilettantes and aesthetes of the Silver Age – Blok called them ‘the children of Russia’s dreadful years’ – sensed the coming apocalypse and reacted in doom-laden carnival of reckless if morbid hedonism, seeking the essence of salvation, art and freedom in opium, Satanism and the transformative orgasm. The Symbolish poet-novelist Andrei Belyi warned ‘great will be the strife, strife the likes of which has never been seen in this world. Yellow hordes of Asiatics… will encrimson the fields of Europe in oceans of blood’, while Petersburg ‘will sink’. As strikes spread and war-clouds darkened, Blok felt the rumblings of a volcano:

*And over Russia I see a quiet*

*Far-spreading fire consume all.*”[[151]](#footnote-151)

But outside the salons, the mood was different. Many informed people understood that nothing good could come from the rapid growth of armaments on all sides. The nationalists wanted war to uphold the power and glory of their nation; while some internationalists wanted it in order to overthrow the thrones of kings and introduce universal democracy…

The mood was particularly belligerent in Berlin, from where President Woodrow Wilson’s emissary, Colonel Edward House, wrote to him: “The situation is extraordinary. It is militarism run stark mad. Unless someone acting for you can bring about a different understanding there is some day to be an awful cataclysm…”[[152]](#footnote-152) Prussianism had penetrated the whole of Germany, and especially its ruling elite. As Tsarina Alexandra – herself, of course, a German princess, said in 1914: “Prussia has destroyed the unique character of Germany, and German citizens have been led astray. People have had feelings of hatred and vengefulness instilled into them. [[153]](#footnote-153)

But the mood was belligerent across Europe. “There is no doubt,” writes Clark, “that, viewed from across the Atlantic, pre-war Europe presented a curious spectacle. Senior statesmen, emperors and kings attended public occasions wearing military uniform; elaborate military reviews were an integral part of the public ceremonial of power; immense illuminated naval displays drew huge crowds and filled the pages of the illustrated journals; conscript armies gew in size until they became male microcosms of the nation; the cult of military display entered the publica and the private life of even the smallest communities…”[[154]](#footnote-154)

There was not only a certain fatalistic acceptance of the probability of war in both Germany and Russia. The Germans had been preparing to start one for a long time. Thus as early as 1905 they had already decided on the Schlieffen campaign plan, involving the violation of Belgium’s neutrality, the conquest of France and then the attack on Russia.This was in fact a very stupid plan, because the invasion of Belgium was the one event guaranteed to bring Britain into the war against Germany in defence of a country it had a specific treaty with. But, as Barbara Tuchman writes, “A hundred years of German philosophy went into the making of this decision in which the seed of self-destruction lay embedded, waiting for its hour. The voice was Schlieffen’s, but the hand was the hand of Fichte who saw the German people chosen by Providence to occupy the supreme place in the history of the universe, of Hegel who saw them leading the world to a glorious destiny of compulsory *Kultur,* of Nietzsche who told them that Supermen were above ordinary controls, of Treitschke who set the increase of power as the highest moral duty of the state, of the whole German people, who called their temporal ruler the ‘All-Highest’…

“[This] body of accumulated egoism… suckled the German people and created a nation fed on ‘the desperate delusion of the will that deems itself absolute’.”[[155]](#footnote-155)

However, apart from such “desperate delusions”, the Germans had eminently pragmatical reasons for believing that now was the best time to fight Russia; for Russia’s “Great Programme” of military reconstruction still had three years to run. Moreover, as Stolypin had said some years earlier, if Russia were given just twenty years of peace she would become unrecognizable – that is, unrecognizably stronger…

Indeed, seen from Germany’s point of view, the growth in Russia’s military power was both impressive and threatening. As Hew Strachan writes, “between 1908 and 1913 [Russia’s] industrial production increased by 50 per cent, an expansion that was largely fuelled by defence-related output. Russia’s army was already the biggest in Europe. By 1917 it would be three times the size of Germany’s…”[[156]](#footnote-156) That is why the chief of the German general staff, von Moltke, who had a healthy respect for Russia’s improving military capabilities,[[157]](#footnote-157) was in favour of a preventive war against her…

In May, 1914, while the Tsar was visiting Romania, the German Kaiser met the heir to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Colonel Vladimir Voeikov, a close friend of the Tsar and commendant of the Guard at Tsarskoye Selo, wrote: “At this meeting, the question was supposedly discussed of the necessity of beginning a war against Russia and the Entente in 1914, on the presupposition that the Russian army would grow significantly with each year and the struggle would become more difficult. They said that the only voice that sounded out against the war at that time belonged to Archduke Franz Ferdinand...”[[158]](#footnote-158)

The Archduke was also against a war against Serbia, which made his murder by Serbian terrorists only a few weeks later both ironic and tragic. He didn’t like the Serbs, and thought that the Austrians could easily defeat them. “But what then?” he asked in 1913. “First of all Europe would fall on us and see us as disturber of the peace. And God help us if we annex Serbia…”[[159]](#footnote-159)

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The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 began to look fragile in the period 1912-14. On the one hand, after the Germans threw in the towel in the Naval Arms Race, their perceived threat to the British became smaller, so some in London began to think about a possible alliance with Berlin instead of St. Petersburg. And on the other hand, the Russians began expanding their zones of influence in Persia, in Tibet and on the Russo-Chinese border, which threatened to reignite the fires of Anglo-Russian global rivalry.[[160]](#footnote-160)

The fragility of the Convention was exposed in a different way in December, 1913, when the Ottomans appointed the German Lieutenant-General Liman von Sanders to oversee the whole of the training of the Ottoman army, and to be in charge of the First Army Corps, making him responsible for the defence of the Straits and of Constantinople itself. The Russians were thoroughly alarmed: free passage through the Straits was a priority of their foreign policy in view of its importance for the vital grain export trade. But neither the French nor the British responded as the Russians had hoped to the appointment of von Sanders. For neither the French, with their huge financial investment in the Ottoman empire, nor the British with their traditional desire to control all major seaways (a British admiral was in charge of the training of the Ottoman navy), wanted to replace the Ottomans with the Russians as the masters of the Straits…[[161]](#footnote-161)

So it began to dawn on some of the Russian elite that perhaps it would e more natural to rejoin the power they had been in alliance with in the 1870s and 1880s, Germany, in preference to perfidious Albion. Thus in February, 1914 the interior minister Peter Nikolayevich Durnovo sent a memorandum to the Tsar in which he feared that the face-off between the two continental blocs could well lead to a war that would certainly not benefit Russia and might well lead to revolution. He counselled an alliance with Germany instead of England, but without breaking the alliance with France.[[162]](#footnote-162)

However, the French under their hawkish President Poincaré put pressure on the Russians to remain in the Entente, offering the tantalizing bait of generous loans to build strategic railways to the German frontier. (In 1915 the British and French added the promise of the Straits and Constantinople.) And although, according to Witte, 90% of Russians did not want to go to war[[163]](#footnote-163), the remaining 10% included most of the decision-making elites. For them, Russia was obliged to intervene on Serbia’s side in any Austro-Serbian war… Durnovo and his like argued that “official policy exaggerated the importance of the Straits and Russia’s supposed ‘mission’ to lead the Slavs at a time when its overriding priorities needed to be peace and good relations with its German and Austrian neighbours. But the options open to Russia were difficult, and there were powerful and rational arguments to justify the foreign policy adopted by Petersburg.”[[164]](#footnote-164)

So for the time being the unnatural Entente between the autocratic Russia and democratic France and Great Britain remained in existence. The Russians sought a stronger, military alliance with their traditional enemies, France and Britain, in order to defend themselves against their traditional ally, Germany, whose boorish intervention in the Bosnian crisis was still deeply resented and who would most likely support Austria in any war between Russia and Austria over Serbia. And while the British under their canny Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey never committed themselves to the French and Russians as much as the French and Russians did to each other, there was never any real question about whose side they were on. [[165]](#footnote-165)

The Tsar himself was far from wanting war with Germany, and made several attempts to mend fences with the Emperors of Germany and Austria in the pre-war years. But he was not swayed by Durnovo’s arguments. Especially important for him was the question of the Straits. Turkey was rearming, and Enver Pasha had ordered two new battleships from Germany that would dominate the Black Sea. But “Russia could not risk the choking off of 50 per cent of the exports through the Straits. It had hoped to postpone any action until it was fully rearmed, but time was running out. Enver’s two battleships were about to arrive…”[[166]](#footnote-166) “In a conversation with [British] Ambassador Buchanan at the beginning of April 1914,” writes Clark, the Tsar “observed that ‘it was commonly supposed that there was nothing to keep Germany and Russia apart.’ This, however, ‘was not the case: there was the question of the Dardanelles,’ where the Tsar feared that the Germans were working to shut Russia into the Black Sea. Should Germany attempt such a thing, it was essential that the three powers of the Entente unite together more closely to make it clear to Berlin that ‘all three would fight together against German aggression.’”[[167]](#footnote-167)

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Meanwhile, the Masons were preparing to use the war to overthrow the dynasty… At the beginning, however, national loyalties proved stronger than Masonic ties. Thus Oleg Platonov points out “that all the main Masonic orders of the warring countries were in favour of war: the Great national lodge of England, the Grand Orient of France, the Grand Orient of the nations of Russia, the Old Prussian lodges and the Great lodge of Hamburg. The latter was the foundation of the Great Serbian lodge, members of which were involved in the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo.”[[168]](#footnote-168)

However, whatever their personal nationalism, the Masons of different countries were united in their desire to destroy the monarchy in its traditionally Orthodox, autocratic form.

The man to watch here was A.I. Guchkov the Old Ritualist industrialist and Masonic leader of the Octobrist facion in the Duma. “Armis”, a pseudonym for a Duma delegate and a former friend of Guchkov, wrote: “Already in 1909, in the Commission of State Defence, its president, the well-known political and social activist Guchkov declared that it was necessary to prepare by all means for a future war with Germany.

“In order to characterize this activist it is necessary to say that in order to achieve his ends he was never particularly squeamish about methods and means. In the destruction of Russia he undoubtedly played one of the chief roles.

“In the following year, 1910, the newspaper *Novoe Vremia* became a joint-stock company, and a little later Guchkov was chosen as president of its editorial committee. From this moment there began on the columns of *Novoe Vremia* a special campaign against the Germans and the preparation of public opinion for war with Germany.

“Guchkov wrote to the workers of *Novoe Vremia, Golos Moskvy* and *Golos Pravdy*, which were unfailingly ruled by his directives:

“’Rattle your sabres a little more, prepare public opinion for war with the Germans. Write articles in such a way that between the lines will already be heard peals of weapon thunder.’

“People who know Guchkov well say that in his flat, together with the well-known A. Ksyunin, he composed articles of the most provocative character in relation to Germany.

“In 1912, during a reception for an English military mission, Guchkov turned to those present with the following toast:

“’Gentlemen! I drink to the health of the English army and fleet, who are not only our friends, but also our allies.’

“And within the close circle of the members of the Commission of State Defence, he declared: ‘Today Germany has suffered a decisive defeat: war is inevitable, if only the Tsar does not stop it.’

“In March, 1914, Guchkov at one dinner warned his acquaintances that they should not go abroad in the summer, and in particular – not to Germany.

“’I don’t advise you to go abroad. War will unfailingly break out this summer: it has been decided. Germany can turn as she wants, but she cannot turn away from war.’ And at these words Guchkov smiled.

“To the question of one of those present: who needed a war?, Guchkov replied:

“’France must have Alsace-Lorraine and the Rhine; Russia – all the Slavic lands and an exit from the Black Sea; England will lap up the German colonies and take world trade into her hands.’

“To the objection that the Russian and German emperors would hardly enter such a dangerous world war, there followed Guchkov’s bold reply:

“’We have foreseen this… and we shall arrange it so that both of them will find themselves before a *fait accompli*.

“Then it was pointed out to Guchkov that the Triple Alliance represented a formidable military power, to which Guchkov objected:

“’Italy, in accordance with a secret agreement with England, will not be on the side of Germany and Austria, and if the war goes well can stab them in the back. The plan of the future war has already been worked out in detail by our allied staffs (English, French and Russian), and in no way will the war last for more than three months.’

“Then Guchkov was asked: ‘Tell us, Alexander Ivanovich, don’t you think that the war may be prolonged contrary to your expectations? It will require the most colossal exertion of national nerves, and very possibly it will be linked with the danger of popular discontent and a coup d’etat.’

“Smiling, Guchkov replied: ‘In the extreme case, the liquidation of the Dynasty will be the greatest benefit for Russia…’”[[169]](#footnote-169)

The accuracy of Guchkov’s prognosis leads us to conclude that war in Europe and revolution in Russia were, if not “inevitable”, as many thought, at any rate to a large degree already decided upon by the Masonic solidarity of the elites in all the combatant powers. Only one human actor, as Guchkov admitted, could have stopped the war – the Tsar; and only the one Divine Actor could have prevented it if the peoples had been worthy of it – He Who said of Himself: “I am He Who makes peace and creates wars…” (Isaiah 45.7)[[170]](#footnote-170)

## **57. ORTHODOXY AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR**

By the summer of 1914 the Orthodox commonwealth of nations had reached its zenith from an external, political and economic point of view. The great Russian empire, in which the majority of Orthodox Christians lived, stretched from the Baltic to the Pacific, and its influence spread more widely still, from the *de facto* protectorate it exercised over the Orthodox of the Balkans and the Middle East, to its important ecclesiastical missions in Persia, China, Japan, and the United States. It was making mighty strides economically, and was modernizing and strengthening its military capacity to a significant degree. Meanwhile, the Orthodox Balkan states had just driven the Turks out of Europe (almost), and Serbia, Romania and Greece had reached their greatest territorial extent since their foundation as states in the previous century. Serbia's population growth, in particular, was remarkable: from 2.9 million subjects before the Balkan Wars to 4.4 million after them.

However, this was a bubble that was about to burst. All the Orthodox states had very serious internal problems. Anti-monarchism had taken over the minds and hearts of the wealthier classes in Russia and other Orthodox countries, and western heresies, spiritualism and even atheism were making deep inroads into the Church. In the Balkans, the recent victories over the Turks caused over-confidence and an increase in militarism and nationalism, with the military establishments ascendant over the civil administrations. In Serbia, in particular, the military contested control with the government over the newly-acquired territories in Macedonia, and “Apis”, Colonel Dragutin Dmitrijevich, the leading regicide of 1903 and inspirer of the terrorist “Black Hand” organization, was in charge of military intelligence…

In June, 1914 the Austro-Hungarians were holding military manoeuvres in Bosnia, and Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who in addition to being heir to the Habsburg throne was also Inspector General of the Armed Forces of the Empire, came to observe them with his wife. “With overwhelming stupidity,” as Noel Malcolm writes, “his visit to Sarajevo was fixed for 28 June, the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo and therefore the most sacred day in the mystical calendar of Serb nationalism.”[[171]](#footnote-171)

Christopher Clark writes: “The commemorations across the Serb lands were set to be especially intense in 1914, because this was the first St. Vitus’s Day since the ‘liberation’ of Kosovo during the Second Balkan War in the previous year. ‘The holy flame of Kosovo, which has inspired generations [of Serbs] has now burst into a mighty fire,’ the Black Hand journal *Pijemont* announced on 28 June 1914. ‘Kosovo is free! Kosovo is avenged!’ For Serb ultra-nationalists, both in Serbia itself and across the Serbian irredentist network in Bosnia, the arrival of the heir apparent in Sarajevo on this of all days was a symbolic affront that demanded a response.”[[172]](#footnote-172)

Seven assassins from *Mlada Bosna* were waiting for the Archduke and his wife. The first attempt to kill them failed, but the second, by Gavrilo Princip, was successful. By an extraordinary coincidence, on the very same day Rasputin was stabbed in the stomach by a mad woman and so separated from the Russian Tsar for the rest of the summer. Thus were the two men who might have prevented their respective emperors from going to war removed from the scene. Evidently it was God’s will: exactly one month later, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, followed soon after by Russia’s mobilization in defence of her ally. And a few days after that, all the Great Powers of Europe were at war…

Many thought that war would be averted as it had been averted at similar moments of crisis several times in recent years. But it was different this time, because Austria-Hungary *wanted* war this time. “In October 1913,” writes Dominic Lieven, “the Austro-Hungarian Common Ministerial Council had agreed that Serbia had to be destroyed as an independentstate in order to restore Austria’s position in the Balkans and stope the danger which South Slav nationalism’s undermining Habsburg authority within the empire’s borders. As Berchtold explained at that time, the key difficulty was to obtain German support for this policy. The Austrian premier, Count Karl von Stürgkh, added that the precondition for success had to be ‘that we have been clearly injured by Serbia, because that can lead to a conflict which entails Serbia’s execution’. Without such a pretext and without Berlin’s support, military action against Serbia was impossible, which explains why in early June 1914 the Austrian Foreign Ministry’s key ‘strategy paper’ outlining future short-term policy in the Balkans confined itself to advocating not military but purely diplomatic measures. But the circumstances surrounding Franz Ferdinand’s assassination provided exactly the scenario that the October 1913 ministerial conference had desired…”[[173]](#footnote-173)

As David Stevenson writes: “… Although in summer 1914 international tension was acute, a general war was not inevitable and if one had not broken out then it might not have done so at all. It was the Habsburg monarchy’s response to Sarajevo that caused a crisis. Initially all it seemed to do was order an investigation. But secretly the Austrians obtained a German promise of support for drastic retaliation [on 6 July]. On 23 July they presented an ultimatum to their neighbour, Serbia. Princip and his companions were Bosnians (and therefore Habsburg subjects), but the ultimatum alleged they had conceived their plot in Belgrade, that Serbian officers and officials had supplied them with their weapons, and that Serbian frontier authorities had helped them across the border. It called on Serbia to denounce all separatist activities, ban publications and organizations hostile to Austria-Hungary, and co-operate with Habsburg officials in suppressing subversion and conducting a judicial inquiry. The Belgrade government’s reply, delivered just within the forty-eight hours deadline, accepted nearly every demand but consented to Austrian involvement in a judicial inquiry only if that inquiry was subject to Serbia’s constitution and to international law. The Austrian leaders in Vienna seized on this pretext to break off relations immediately, and on 28 July declared war. The ultimatum impressed most European governments by its draconian demands…”[[174]](#footnote-174)

The Serbs had some plausible alibis. Though a Great Serbian nationalist, the Serbian Prime Minister Pašić, as Max Hastings writes, “was an inveterate enemy of Apis, some of whose associates in 1913 discussed murdering him. The prime minister and many of his colleagues regarded the colonel as a threat to the country’s stability and even existence; internal affairs minister Milan Protić spoke of the Black Hand to a visitor on 14 June as ‘a menace to democracy’. But in a society riven by competing interests, the civilian government lacked authority to remove or imprison Apis, who was protected by the patronage of the army chief of staff.”[[175]](#footnote-175)

Although there is evidence that Pašić was trying to control the Black Hand, he had not succeeded by 1914. Moreover, being himself a Great Serbian nationalist, at no point in his career did he make a determined effort to quench that nationalist-revolutionary *mentality* which ultimately led to the shots in Sarajevo. The very fact that he warned the Austrians about the plot shows that he knew what Apis was planning. As for Apis himself, besides taking part in the regicide of 1903, he confessed to participation in plots to murder King Nicholas of Montenegro, King Constantine of Greece, Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany and King Ferdinand of Bulgaria![[176]](#footnote-176) That such a murderous fanatic should be in charge of Serbia’s military intelligence tells us much about the influence within Serbia of the nationalist-revolutionary heresy.

“In fact,” as Stevenson writes, “Serbia’s army and intelligence service were out of control”[[177]](#footnote-177) – at least until 1917, when Apis was executed…

The terrorists were given four pistols and six bombs by Major Vojin Tankosić of the Black Hand, and were guided into Bosnia by “a Serbian government informer, who passed word about their movements, and about the bombs and pistols in their luggage, to the Interior Ministry in Belgrade. His report, which the prime minister read and summarized in his own hand, made no mention of a plot against Franz Ferdinand. Pašić commissioned an investigation, and gave orders that the movement of weapons from Serbia to Bosnia should be stopped; but he went no further. A Serbian minister later claimed that Pašić told the cabinet at the end of May or the beginning of June that some assassins were on their way to Sarajevo to kill Franz Ferdinand. Whether or not this is true – no minutes were taken of cabinet meetings – Pašić appears to have instructed Serbia’s envoy in Vienna to pass on to the Austrian authorities only a vague general warning, perhaps because he was unwilling to provide the Habsburgs with a fresh and extremely serious grievance against his country.”[[178]](#footnote-178) According to Margaret Macmillan, Pašić “got wind of what was up but was either unable or unwilling to do anything. In any case it was probably too late; the conspirators had arrived safely in Sarajevo and linked up with local terrorists…”[[179]](#footnote-179)

As Malcolm writes, while “many theories still circulate about Apis’s involvement and his possible political motives, … the idea that the Serbian government itself had planned the assassination can be firmly rejected.

“Even the Austro-Hungarian government did not accuse Serbia of direct responsibility for what had happened. Their ultimatum of 23 July complained merely that the Serbian government had ‘tolerated the machinations of various societies and associations directed against the monarchy, unrestrained language on the part of the press, glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, participation of officers and officials in subversive agitation’ – all of which was essentially true.”[[180]](#footnote-180)

The Austrians saw the assassination as a good reason or excuse for dealing with the Serbian problem once and for all. As Stevenson admits, “the summary time limit gave the game away, as did the peremptory rejection of Belgrade’s answer. The ultimatum had been intended to start a showdown…”[[181]](#footnote-181)

“The Serbian evidence,” continues Stevenson, “confirms that Austria-Hungary had good grounds for rigorous demands. But it also shows that the Belgrade government was anxious for a peaceful exit from the crisis whereas the Austrians meant to use it as the pretext for violence. Austria-Hungary’s joint council of ministers decided on 7 July that the ultimatum should be so stringent as to ‘make a refusal almost certain, so that the road to a radical solution by means of a military action should be opened’. On 19 July it agreed to partition Serbia with Bulgaria, Albania, and Greece, leaving only a small residual state under Habsburg economic domination. Yet previously Vienna had been less bellicose: the chief of the general staff, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorff, had pressed for war against Serbia since being appointed in 1906, but his appeals had been rejected. The Emperor Franz Joseph was a cautious and vastly experienced ruler who remembered previous defeats. He and his advisers moved to war only because they believed they faced an intolerable problem for which peaceful remedies were exhausted.”[[182]](#footnote-182)

Austria’s aggressiveness was reinforced by Germany; on July 6 the Kaiser gave the Austrians the famous “blank cheque” promising them support whatever they did. Later in the month, however, the Kaiser hesitated. Thus Jonathan Glover writes: “On 28 July the Kaiser said that the Serbian response contained ‘the announcement *orbi et urbi* of a capitulation of the most humiliating kind and as a result, *every excuse for war*  falls to the ground.’On the 30th Bethmann Hollweg cabled Vienna: ‘We are, of course, ready to fulfill the obligations of our alliance, but we must decline to be drawn wantonly into a world conflagration by Vienna, without having any regard paid to our counsel.’ At the same time, however, the German Chief of Staff, General Helmut von Moltke, was telling the Austrian army not to risk any delay in mobilizing.”[[183]](#footnote-183)

On this reading, the primary responsibility for the outbreak of war must lie with the military establishments of the two German-speaking nations, especially Germany. As David Fromkin writes: “The generals in Berlin in the last week of July were agitating for war – not Austria’s war, one aimed at Serbia, but Germany’s war, aimed at Russia… Germany deliberately started a European war to keep from being overtaken by Russia…”[[184]](#footnote-184) Malcolm confirms this verdict: “It is now widely agreed that Germany was pushing hard for a war, in order to put some decisive check on the growing power of Russia”.[[185]](#footnote-185) Again, as J.M. Roberts points out, it was Germany that first declared war on France and Russia when neither country threatened her. And by August 4 Germany had “acquired a third great power [Britain] as an antagonist, while Austria still had none… In the last analysis, the Great War was made in Berlin…”[[186]](#footnote-186)

As for Russia, according to Lieven, her rulers “did not want war. Whatever hankering Nicholas II may ever have had for military glory had been wholly dissipated by the Japanese war. That conflict had taught the whole ruling elite that war and revolution were closely linked. Though war with Germany would be more popular than conflict with Japan had been, its burdens and dangers would also be infinitely greater. Russian generals usually had a deep respect for the German army, to which on the whole they felt their own army to be inferior. Above all, Russian leaders had every reason to feel that time was on their side. In strictly military terms, there was good reason to postpone conflict until the so-called ‘Great Programme’ of armaments was completed in 1917-18. In more general terms, Russia already controlled almost one-sixth of the world’s land surface, whose hitherto largely untapped potential was now beginning to be developed at great speed. It was by no means only Petr Stolypin who believed that, given 20 years of peace, Russia would be transformed as regards its wealth, stability and power. Unfortunately for Russia, both the Germans and the Austrians were well aware of all the above facts. Both in Berlin and Vienna it was widely believed that fear of revolution would stop Russia from responding decisively to the Austro-German challenge: but it was also felt that war now was much preferable to a conflict a decade hence.

“In fact, for the Russian government it was very difficult not to stand up to the Central Powers in July 1914. The regime’s legitimacy was at stake, as were the patriotism, pride and self-esteem of the key decision-makers. Still more to the point was the conviction that weakness would fatally damage Russia’s international position and her security. If Serbia became an Austrian protectorate, that would allow a very significant diversion of Habsburg troops from the southern to the Russian front in the event of a future war. If Russia tamely allowed its Serbian client to be gobbled up by Austria, no other Balkan state would trust its protection against the Central Powers. All would move into the latter’s camp, as probably would the Ottoman Empire. Even France would have doubts about the usefulness of an ally so humiliatingly unable to stand up for its prestige and its vital interests. Above all, international relations in the pre-1914 era were seen to revolve around the willingness and ability of great powers to defend their interests. In the age of imperialism, empires that failed to do this were perceived as moribund and ripe for dismemberment. In the judgement of Russian statesmen, if the Central Powers got away with the abject humiliation of Russia in 1914 their appetites would be whetted rather than assuaged. At some point in the near future vital interest would be threatened for which Russia would have to fight, in which case it made sense to risk fighting now, in the hope that this would deter Berlin and Vienna, but in the certainty that if war ensued Serbia and France would fight beside Russia, and possibly Britain and certain other states as well.”[[187]](#footnote-187)

In order to understand why Russia went war, it is necessary, according to Lieven, “to grasp the values and mentality of the Russian ruling elites… In old regime Europe the nobleman was brought up to defend his public reputation and honour at all costs, if necessary with sword in hand. The ethic of the duel still prevailed in aristocratic and, in particular, military circles. No crime was worse than cowardice. Kings, aristocrats and generals were not used to being pushed about or humiliated. In contemporary parlance, they had a short fuse. In pre-1914 Europe, war was still widely regarded not only as honourable and even romantic, but also as a sometimes necessary and legitimate means by which great powers could defend their interests and achieve national goals unobtainable by peaceful measures. Victory was a meaningful concept even as regards wars between great powers in a way that makes little sense in the nuclear age. The catastrophe of 1914 is incomprehensible unless these underlying realities are taken into account.”[[188]](#footnote-188)

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Not only most European governments at the time, but also most historians since then, have accepted the account outlined in the last section. But there are some “revisionists” who would spread the blame more evenly. Among these is Professor Christopher Clark (like Dominic Lieven, a historian of Cambridge University), who points out, first, that the news of the assassination of the Archduke was greeted with jubilation in Serbia. Nor did the Serbian government led by Pašić do anything to calm Serbian passions or reassure Austrian opinion – quite the reverse.[[189]](#footnote-189) So whatever judgement one forms of the Austrian actions, there is no doubt that they were sorely provoked… The Russians also – with the partial exception of the Tsar himself - incurred guilt at this point in that they did little to rein in the nationalist passions of the Serbs, but rather supported them…[[190]](#footnote-190)

Secondly, Clark argues that the Germans’ famous “blank cheque” of July 6 was based on the false assumption that the Russians would not intervene on the side of the Serbs - first of all, because they were not yet ready for war (their “Great Programme” of rearmament was not due for completion until 1917), and secondly because, as the Kaiser repeatedly said, he could not imagine that the Tsar would side “with the regicides” against two monarchical powers. The other possibility considered by the Germans was that the Russians *wanted* to mobilize and start a European war. If that was the case, thought the Germans (there was some evidence for the hypothesis in the French and Russian newspapers), then so be it - better that the war begin now rather than later, when the advantage would be with the Russians.[[191]](#footnote-191) So an element of *miscalculation* entered into the German decision of July 6.

Thirdly, the Germans blessed the Austrians to invade Serbia - but not start a world war. In fact, both of the German-speaking nations wanted to *localize* the conflict. This is not to deny the weighty evidence that the German military had been planning a preventive war against Russia and France for years. But in July, 1914, the German civilian leadership, and in particular the Chancellor Bethmann – and even the Kaiser himself – were counting on the Austrians dealing with the Serbs and *leaving it at that*. They wanted them to act *quickly* in the hope that a quick Austrian victory would present the other Great Powers with a fait accompli that would deter them from further military action. Unfortunately, the Austrians for various reasons dithered and delayed…

The fact that the Austro-Serbian conflict did not remain localized, but spread to engulf the whole of Europe was the result, according to Clark, of the structure of the alliance between Russia and France, in which an Austrian attack on Serbia was seen as a “tripwire” triggering Russian intervention on the side of Serbia, followed immediately by French intervention on the side of Russia. (Britain was also in alliance with France and Russia, but more loosely. For Britain, as it turned out, the tripwire was not Austria’s invasion of Serbia but Germany’s invasion of Belgium.) Clark produces considerable evidence to show that important figures in both the French, the Russian and the British leadership did not want the conflict to be localized, but *wanted* the trigger to be pulled because they thought war was inevitable and/or that this was the only way to deal with the perceived threat of German domination of Europe. This was particularly the position of the French President Poincaré, who travelled to Russia in the fourth week of July in order to stiffen the resolve of the Russians, but was also true of Russian Agriculture Minister Krivoshein and British First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, who rejoiced on hearing that the Austrians had declared war on the Serbs on July 28.[[192]](#footnote-192)

In fact, Russia was not fully committed to the tripwire scenario. In 1912 Tsar Nicholas had been playing a waiting game – that is, waiting for the death of the Emperor Franz Josef, after which, it was believed, Austrian power would decline. And as recently as October, 1913 “St. Petersburg had been willing to leave Belgrade to its own devices… when the Austrians had issued an ultimatum demanding [the Serbs’] withdrawal from northern Albania.”[[193]](#footnote-193) However, some important personnel changes had taken place in the intervening months. First, Prime Minister Kokovtsov, an opponent of intervention in the Balkans, had been forced out by the nationalists in the government. Then, in January, 1914, when the Tsar offered the vacant post to Pyotr N. Durnovo, - in Clark’s words “a forceful and determined man who was adamantly opposed to Balkan entanglements of any kind”[[194]](#footnote-194), - Durnovo turned it down, and the post passed to Goremykin, a much weaker character. With this change there probably also passed the last chance for the Russian government to abandon the “tripwire” policy of the nationalists.

One could argue that the Tsar should have imposed his will on the foreign policy establishment whether they liked it or not. But times had changed greatly since the reign of the absolutist Tsar Peter the Great. Tsar Nicholas, though far from being the weak man that western historians almost invariably make him out to be, was not in a position simply to ignore what his ministers thought and impose his will on them. Like all European monarchs in this, the beginning of the age of democracy and the common man, he simply could not afford to ignore public opinion. In any case, he was running out of wise and loyal men to place in the higher reaches of government. As Lieven points out, “he could not find a prime minister competent to do the job who would obey his orders and pursue the line he required. Talented officials were no longer willing to simply assume public responsibility for executing the tsar’s commands.”[[195]](#footnote-195)

Montefiore, although in general highly (and not always justly) critical of the Tsar, sums up his dilemma sympathetically and well. On the eve of his final reluctant order to mobilize, “[the Tsar] was holding out alone against his entire military command, his civilian government and parliamentary and public opinion, which the tsar needed behind him. Given our pre-set Western view that the war was caused by autocrats and aristocrats, it is useful to remember that the Russian parliamentarians, from Guchkov to Rodzianko, had long been the most vociferous warmongers calling for intervention on behalf of the Serbs.

“Could Nicholas have refused to mobilize? It was nearly impossible for him to do so. It would have required the total reversal of foreign policy not just since 1905 but since 1892, to end the French and British alliances and suddenly join Germany… This sould have infuriated every section of society and have led to deposition, if not worse…”[[196]](#footnote-196)

The Tsar did not want war, and fully understood that it might destroy Russia in the end - which it did. But he was determined to defend the Serbs, come what may. And the other foreign policy considerations outlined by Lieven above also played their part in his thinking – especially, as we know for certain, his fears that the Dardanelles could be cut off for the Russian navy and Russian exports (as they had been briefly when Italy invaded Libya)… That is why the Tsar and his cabinet decided to defend the Serbs on July 24, a decision confirmed on July 25, leading to the beginning of preparations for war on July 26…

Evidence of the Tsar’s sincere desire to avert war by all honourable means is contained in the telegrams exchanged between Tsar Nicholas and the Serbian regent, Prince Alexander in the last days before the catastrophe. The prince, who had commanded the First Serbian Army in the Balkan wars and later became king, wrote to the Tsar: “The demands of the Austro-Hungarian note unnecessarily represent a humiliation for Serbia and are not in accord with the dignity of an independent state. In a commanding tone it demands that we officially declare in *Serbian News,* and also issue a royal command to the army, that we ourselves cut off military offensives against Austria and recognize the accusation that we have been engaging in treacherous intrigues as just. They demand that we admit Austrian officials into Serbia, so that together with ours they may conduct the investigation and control the execution of the other demands of the note. We have been given a period of 48 hours to accept everything, otherwise the Austro-Hungarian embassy will leave Belgrade. We are ready to accept the Austro-Hungarian demands that are in accord with the position of an independent state, and also those which would be suggested by Your Majesty; everyone whose participation in the murder is proven will be strictly punished by us. Certain demands cannot be carried out without changing the laws, and for that time is required. We have been given too short a period… They can attack us after the expiry of the period, since Austro-Hungarian armies have assembled on our frontier. It is impossible for us to defend ourselves, and for that reason we beseech Your Majesty to come as soon as possible to our aid…”

To this the Tsar replied on July 27: “In addressing me at such a serious moment, Your Royal Highness has not been mistaken with regard to the feelings which I nourish towards him and to my heart-felt disposition towards the Serbian people. I am studying the present situation with the most serious attention and My government is striving with all its might to overcome the present difficulties. I do not doubt that Your Highness and the royal government will make this task easier by not despising anything that could lead to a decision that would avert the horrors of a new war, while at the same time preserving the dignity of Serbia. All My efforts, as long as there is the slightest hope of averting bloodshed, will be directed to this aim. If, in spite of our most sincere desire, success is not attained, Your Highness can be assured that in no case will Russia remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia.”

Although the Tsar knew that resisting popular national feeling could lead to revolution, as Sazonov warned, he also knew that an unsuccessful war would lead to it still more surely. So the decisive factor in his decision was not popular opinion, but Russia’s ties of faith with Serbia. And if one good thing came out of the First World War it was the strengthening of that religious bond both during and after it.

For as Prince Alexander replied to the Tsar: “Difficult times cannot fail to strengthen the bonds of deep attachment that link Serbia with Holy Slavic Rus’, and the feeling of eternal gratitude for the help and defence of Your Majesty will be reverently preserved in the hearts of all Serbs.”

The Tsar proved to be a faithful ally. In 1915, after being defeated by the Germans, the Serbian army was forced to retreat across the mountains to the Albanian coast. Tens of thousands began to die. Their allies looked upon them with indifference from their ships at anchor in the Adriatic. The Tsar informed his allies by telegram that they must immediately evacuate the Serbs, otherwise he would consider the fall of the Serbs as an act of the greatest immorality and he would withdraw from the Alliance. This telegram brought prompt action, and dozens of Italian, French and English ships set about evacuating the dying army to Corfu, and from there, once they had recovered, to the new front that the Allies were forming in Salonika.

As the great Serbian Bishop Nicholas (Velimirovich) of Zhicha, wrote: “Great is our debt to Russia. The debt of Serbia to Russia, for help to the Serbs in the war of 1914, is huge – many centuries will not be able to contain it for all following generations. This is the debt of love, which without thinking goes to its death, saving its neighbour. ‘There is no greater love than this, that a man should lay down his life for his neighbour.’ These are the words of Christ. The Russian Tsar and the Russian people, having taken the decision to enter the war for the sake of the defence of Serbia, while being unprepared for it, knew that they were going to certain destruction. The love of the Russians for their Serbian brothers did not fear death, and did not retreat before it. Can we ever forget that the Russian Tsar, in subjecting to danger both his children and millions of his brothers, went to his death for the sake of the Serbian people, for the sake of its salvation? Can we be silent before Heaven and earth about the fact that our freedom and statehood were worth more to Russia than to us ourselves? The Russians in our days repeated the Kosovo tragedy. If the Russian Tsar Nicholas II had been striving for an earthly kingdom, a kingdom of petty personal calculations and egoism, he would be sitting to this day on his throne in Petrograd. But he chose the Heavenly Kingdom, the Kingdom of sacrifice in the name of the Lord, the Kingdom of Gospel spirituality, for which he laid down his own head, for which his children and millions of his subjects laid down their heads…”[[197]](#footnote-197)

The Austrians rejected the Serbs’ reply to their ultimatum on July 25, began mobilization on the same day, and declared war on the Serbs on July 28. Russia then mobilized the districts adjoining Austria (Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, Kazan) on the evening of July 29. Lieven points out that “so long as the Petersburg and Warsaw military districts were not mobilized, Russian preparations of war against Germany could not get very far.”[[198]](#footnote-198) But the Germans appeared to pay no attention to this fact – perhaps because their intelligence about Russian troop movements was faulty or confused. In any case, “as early as July 26, the Russian naval attaché in Berlin, Captain Evgenii Behrens, believed that the Germans had gone so far that that it would be impossible for them to withdraw now. Having served in Berlin throughout the Balkan Wars and the Liman von Sanders crisis, he reported that the Germans’ expectation of war was far greater now than at any time in the two previous years. Alexander Benckendorff, the Russian ambassador in London, believed the same by July 29.”[[199]](#footnote-199)

There was now only one hope for the prevention of war: that the Emperors of Russia and Germany get together and work out some compromise. It nearly happened. For in 1914 Europe was a family of nations united by a single dynasty and a cosmopolitan elite confessing what most considered to be a single Christianity, albeit divided into Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant varieties.[[200]](#footnote-200) The European royal family was German in origin, being made up of branches of the Saxe-Coburg dynasty.[[201]](#footnote-201) Thus even the matriarch of the family, Queen Victoria of England, once told King Leopold of the Belgians: “My heart is so German…”[[202]](#footnote-202) For many generations, the Russian tsars and princes had taken brides from German princely families; Nicholas II, though thoroughly Russian in spirit, had much more German blood than Russian in his veins; and the Tsaritsa Alexandra and her sister Grand Duchess Elizabeth were Hessian princesses with an English mother.[[203]](#footnote-203) However, a disunifying factor within the family was the fact that Alexandra and Minnie, the wives of King Edward VII of England and Tsar Alexander III of Russia, were sisters from the Danish dynasty; for the Danes nurtured an intense dislike of the Prussians, who had invaded their country in 1864, and so moved their husbands, and later their sons, King George V and Tsar Nicholas II, closer to each other and further away from Germany, thereby weakening the traditional hostility that existed between Russia and England and turning them against Germany. Meanwhile, the German Kaiser Wilhelm II reacted strongly against the liberalism of his English mother, and was attracted towards the militarist and fiercely anti-English monarchism of the Prussian aristocracy. In some ways, this also attracted him to autocratic Russia; but the developing alliance between Russia, Britain and France engendered in him and his circle a fear of “encirclement” and hostility against them all.

Nevertheless, in the summer of 1914 many hoped that the family links between the Kaiser and the Tsar would prevent war. For, as the London *Standard* had observed in 1894, “the influence of the Throne in determining the relations between European Power has never been disputed by those at all familiar with modern politics, it is sometimes lost sight of or ignored by the more flippant order of Democrats…”[[204]](#footnote-204)

And the emperors did talk*,* even after the outbreak of war. But by this time talking was to no avail. In the last resort family unity (and the avoidance of world war) counted for less for the Kaiser than nationalist pride and solidarity with the Austrians, and less for the Tsar than solidarity in faith and blood with the Serbs…

On the morning of July 29 the Tsar received a telegram from the Kaiser pleading with him not to undertake military measures that would undermine his position as mediator with Austria. “Saying ‘I will not be responsible for a monstrous slaughter’, the Tsar insisted that the order [for general mobilization] be cancelled. Yanushkevich [Chief of the Russian General Staff] reached for the phone to stay Dobrorolsky’s hand, and the messenger was sent running to the telegraph to explain that an order for partial mobilization was to be promulgated instead.”[[205]](#footnote-205)

However, as Sazonov hastened to tell the Tsar, the reversal of the previous order was impractical for purely military and logistical reasons. (The Kaiser encountered the same problem when, to the consternation of the German Chief of Staff von Moltke, he tried to reverse German mobilization a few days later; this was the “railway timetables problem.”) Moreover, Sazonov advised the Tsar to undertake a full mobilization because “unless he yielded to the popular demand for war and unsheathed the sword in Serbia’s behalf, he would run the risk of a revolution and perhaps the loss of his throne”.

The Tsar made one last appeal to the Kaiser: “I foresee that very soon I shall be overwhelmed by the pressure brought upon me and forced to take extreme measures which will lead to war.” On July 30 the Kaiser replied that he was neutral in the Serbian question (which he was not). And he reiterated the warning issued by the German Ambassador Pourtalès the previous day to the effect that “Germany favours the unappeasable attitude of Austria”. The Tsar now “abandoned any hope that a deal between the cousins could save peace and returned to the option of general mobilization…”[[206]](#footnote-206)

“The emperor is sometimes accused,” writes Lieven, “of ‘caving in’ to his generals in 1914 and thereby bringing on the descent into war. This is unfair. Nicholas was forced by the united pressure not just of the generals but also of the Foreign Ministry, the de facto head of the domestic government, and the spokemen of the Duma and public opinion. In many ways, the surprise is that the emperor held out on his own for so long…”[[207]](#footnote-207)

Grand Duchess Elizabeth said that the Tsar had not wanted war. She blamed her cousin, the Kaiser, “who disobeyed the bidding of Frederick the Great and Bismarck to live in peace and friendship with Russia.”[[208]](#footnote-208) However, if Clark is right, the situation was both more complicated and more finely balanced than that. In the last analysis, both monarchs had cold feet about war. But both were pushed into it by the pressure of their subordinates and the logic of the opposing alliances to which they willingly ascribed at least to some degree.

This logic had been built up on both sides over the course of generations, and the monarchs were neither solely responsible for it nor able on their own to free themselves from its gravitational force… This is not to equate them from a moral point of view: as we shall see, the Kaiser and the Tsar were far from equal in terms of moral stature. But it does help us to understand a little better why they both acquiesced in a war that was to destroy both their kingdoms and the very foundations of European civilization…

In any case, the die was now cast; war between Russia and Germany could no longer be prevented. The Tsar gave the order for general mobilization on July 31, and the Germans declared war on the next day, August 1, the feast of St. Seraphim of Sarov, the great prophet of the last times…

On that first day, as Lubov Millar writes, “large patriotic crowds gathered before the Winter Palace, and when the Emperor and Empress appeared on the balcony, great and joyful ovations filled the air. When the national anthem was played, the crowds began to sing enthusiastically.

“In a sitting room behind this balcony waited Grand Duchess Elizabeth, dressed in her white habit; her face was aglow, her eyes shining. Perhaps, writes Almedingen, she was thinking, ‘What are revolutionary agents compared with these loyal crowds? They would lay down their lives for Nicky and their faith and will win in the struggle.’ In a state of exaltation she made her way from the Winter Palace to the home of Grand Duke Constantine, where his five sons – already dressed in khaki uniforms – were preparing to leave for the front. These sons piously received Holy Communion and then went to the Romanov tombs and to the grave of Blessed Xenia of Petersburg before joining their troops.”[[209]](#footnote-209)

The great tragedy of the war from the Russian point of view was that the truly patriotic-religious mood that was manifest at the beginning did not last, and those who rapturously applauded the Tsar in August, 1914 were baying for his blood less than three years later…

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Turning from the narrow legal question of war guilt to more fundamental moral issues and the overarching role of Divine Providence, we must first acknowledge that the fatal passions of pride and nationalist vainglory were common to all the combatants to some degree. Typical of the spirit of the time were the words of the Austrian chief of staff, Conrad von Hőtzendorff, on hearing of the assassination in Sarajevo: they now had to fight Serbia (and probably Russia) “since an old monarchy and a glorious army must not perish without glory”.[[210]](#footnote-210)

“Bethmann used what was perhaps the most revealing phrase of all when he said that for Germany to back down in the face of its enemies would be an act of self-castration. Such attitudes came in part from the German leaders’ social class and their times but Bismarck, who came out of the same world, had been strong enough to defy its code when he chose. He never allowed war to be forced upon him. It was Germany’s tragedy and that of Europe that his successors were not the man he was…”[[211]](#footnote-211)

But important distinctions need to be made between the quality, intensity and consequences of the different nationalisms… Clark summarises these as follows: “In Austria, the story of a nation of youthful bandits and regicides endlessly provoking and goading a patient elderly neighbour got in the way of a cool-headed assessment of how to manage relations with Belgrade. In Serbia, fantasies of victimhood and oppression by a rapacious, all-powerful Habsburg Empire did the same in reverse. In Germany, a dark vision of future invasions and partitions bedeviled decision-making in the summer of 1914. And the Russian saga of repeated humiliations at the hands of the central powers had a similar impact, at once distorting the past and clarifying the present. Most important of all was the widely trafficked narrative of Austria-Hungary’s historically necessary decline, which, having gradually replaced an older set of assumptions about Austria’s role as a fulcrum of stability in Central and Eastern Europe, disinhibited Vienna’s enemies, undermining the notion that Austria-Hungary, like every other great power, possessed interests that it had the right robustly to defend…”[[212]](#footnote-212)

However, an important qualification needs to be made to this analysis: the German variety of nationalism was distinguished from the others by its highly philosophical content that made it more poisonous and dangerous in the long term (that is, the term that ended in 1945). The German variety of the illness had developed over more than a century since the national humiliation suffered at the hands of Napoleon at Jena in 1806. It continued through the German victory over the French at Sedan in 1871 and into the building of the Second Reich. And it was exacerbated by Treitschke’s glorification of war and Nietzsche’s glorification of the Superman, not to mention Hegel’s glorification of the Prussian State as the supreme expression of the World Spirit...

To these false and idolatrous philosophies must be added a belief that was common in the German-speaking countries - Social Darwinism. Thus in 1912 Friedrich von Bernhardi wrote: “Either Germany will go into war now or it will lose any chance to have world supremacy… The law of nature upon which all other laws are based is the struggle for existence. Consequently, war is a biological necessity.”[[213]](#footnote-213) Again, von Hötzendorff considered the struggle for existence to be “the basic principle behind all the events on this earth”. Militarism was the natural consequence of this philosophy (if the philosophy was not an attempt to justify the militarism): “Politics consists precisely of applying war as method”, said von Hötzendorff.[[214]](#footnote-214)

Thus the most fundamental ideological divide between the antagonists, according to Bishop Nicholas Velimirovich, was the struggle between the All-Man, Christ, and the Superman of Nietzsche, between the doctrine that Right is Might and the opposite one that might is right. For German Christianity with its all-devouring scientism and theological scepticism had already surrendered to Nietzscheanism: “I wonder… that Professor Harnack, one of the chief representatives of German Christianity, omitted to see how every hollow that he and his colleagues made in traditional Christianity in Germany was at once filled with the all-conquering Nietzscheanism. And I wonder… whether he is now aware that in the nineteen hundred and fourteenth year of our Lord, when he and other destroyers of the Bible, who proclaimed Christ a dreamy maniac [and] clothed Christianity in rags, Nietzscheanism arose [as] the real religion of the German race.”[[215]](#footnote-215)

Nietzsche had been opposed to the new Germany that emerged after 1871. However, many of his nihilist ideas had penetrated deep into the German consciousness. What drove him, writes Macmillan, “was a conviction that Western civilisation had gone badly wrong, indeed had been going wrong for the past two millennia, and that most of the ideas and practices which dominated it were completely wrong. Humanity, in his view, was doomed unless it made a clear break and started to think clearly and allow itself to feel deeply. His targets included positivism, bourgeois conventions, Christianity (his father was a Protestant minister) and indeed all organized religion, perhaps all organization itself. He was against capitalism and modern industrial society, and ‘the herd people’ it produced. Humans, Nietzsche told his readers, had forgotten that life was not orderly and conventional, but vital and dangerous. To reach the heights of spiritual reawakening it was necessary to break out of the confines of conventional morality and religion. God, he famously said, is dead… Those who embraced the challenge Nietzsche was throwing down would become the Supermen. In the coming century, there would be a ‘new party of life’ which would take humanity to a higher level, ‘including the merciless destruction of everything that is degenerate and parasitical’. Life, he said, is ‘appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity…’ The young Serbian nationalists who carried out the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and so precipitated the Great War were deeply impressed by Nietzsche’s views…”[[216]](#footnote-216)

In another place Bishop Nicholas spread the blame more widely on Europe as a whole: “The spirit was wrong, and everything became wrong. The spirit of any civilization is inspired by its religion, but the spirit of modern Europe was not inspired by Europe’s religion at all. A terrific effort was made in many quarters to liberate Europe from the spirit of her religion. The effort-makers forgot one thing, i.e. that no civilization ever was liberated from religion and still lived. Whenever this liberation seemed to be fulfilled, the respective civilization decayed and died out, leaving behind barbaric materialism in towns and superstitions in villages. Europe had to live with Christianity, or to die in barbaric materialism and superstitions without it. The way to death was chosen. From Continental Europe first the infection came to the whole white race. It was there that the dangerous formula [of Nietzsche] was pointed out: ‘Beyond good and evil’. Other parts of the white world followed slowly, taking first the path between Good and Evil. Good was changed for Power. Evil was explained away as Biological Necessity. The Christian religion, which inspired the greatest things that Europe ever possessed in every point of human activity, was degraded by means of new watchwords: individualism, liberalism, conservatism, nationalism, imperialism, secularism, which in essence meant nothing but the de-christianization of European society, or, in other words, the emptiness of European civilization. Europe abandoned the greatest things she possessed and clung to the lower and lowest ones. The greatest thing was – Christ.

“As you cannot imagine Arabic civilization in Spain without Islam, or India’s civilization without Hinduism, or Rome without the Roman Pantheon, so you cannot imagine Europe’s civilization without Christ. Yet some people thought that Christ was not so essentially needed for Europe, and behaved accordingly without Him or against Him. Christ was Europe’s God. When this God was banished from politics, art, science, social life, business, education, everybody consequently asked for a God, and everybody thought himself to be a god… So godless Europe became full of gods!

“Being de-christianized, Europe still thought to be civilized. In reality she was a poor valley full of dry bones. The only thing she had to boast of was her material power. By material power only she impressed and frightened the unchristian (but not antichristian) countries of Central and Eastern Asia, and depraved the rustic tribes in Africa and elsewhere. She went to conquer not by God or for God, but by material power and for material pleasure. Her spirituality did not astonish any of the peoples on earth. Her materialism astonished all of them… What an amazing poverty! She gained the whole world, and when she looked inside herself she could not find her soul. Where has Europe’s soul fled? The present war will give the answer. It is not a war to destroy the world but to show Europe’s poverty and to bring back her soul. It will last as long as Europe remains soulless, Godless, Christless. It will stop when Europe gets the vision of her soul, her only God, her only wealth.”[[217]](#footnote-217)

A disciple of Bishop Nicholas, Archimandrite Justin (Popovich), followed his teacher in attributing the cause of God’s wrath against Christian Europe to its betrayal of True Christianity and its embracing an antichristian humanistic metaphysics of progress that was in fact regression. The end of such a nihilist metaphysic could only be death, death on a massive scale, death with no redeeming purpose or true glory, no resurrection in Christ: “It is obvious to normal eyes: European humanistic culture systematically blunts man’s sense of immortality, until it is extinguished altogether. The man of European culture affirms, with Nietzsche, that he is flesh and nothing but flesh. And that means: I am mortal, and nothing but mortal. It is thus that humanistic Europe gave itself over to the slogan: man is a mortal being. That is the formula of humanistic man; therein lies the essence of his progress.

“At first subconsciously, then consciously and deliberately, science, philosophy, and culture inculcated in the European man the proposition that man is completely mortal, with nothing else left over… Humanistic man is a devastated creature because the sense of personal immortality has been banished from him. And without that sentiment, can man ever be complete?

“European man is a shrunken dwarf, reduced to a fraction of man’s stature, for he has been emptied of the sense of transcendence. And without the transcendent, can man exist at all as man? And if he could, would there be any meaning to his existence? Minus that sense of the transcendent, is he not but a dead object among other objects, and a transient species among other animals?

“… [Supposedly] equal to the animals in his origin, why should he not also assimilate their morals? Being part of the animal world of beasts in basic nature, he has also joined them in their morals. Are not sin and crime increasingly regarded by modern jurisprudence as an unavoidable by-product of the social environment and as a natural necessity? Since there is nothing eternal and immortal in man, ethics must, in the final analysis, be reduced to instinctive drives. In his ethics, humanistic man has become equal to his progenitors, monkeys and beasts. And the governing principle of his life has become: *homo homini lupus*.

“It could not be otherwise. For an ethic that is superior to that of the animals could only be founded on a sentiment of human immortality. If there is no immortality and eternal life, neither within nor around man, then animalistic morals are entirely natural and logical for a bestialized humanity: let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die (cf. I Corinthians 15.32).

“The relativism in the philosophy of European humanistic progress could not but result in an ethical relativism, and relativism is the father of anarchism and nihilism. Wherefore, in the last analysis, the practical ethic of humanistic man is nothing but anarchy and nihilism. For anarchy and nihilism are the unavoidable, final and apocalyptic phase of European progress. Ideological anarchism and nihilism, ideological disintegration, necessarily had to manifest themselves in practical anarchism and nihilism, in the practical disintegration of European humanistic man and his progress. Are we not eyewitnesses to the ideological and practical anarchism and nihilism that are devastating the European continent? The addenda of European progress are such that, no matter how they might be computed, their sum is always anarchism and nihilism. The evidence? Two world wars (actually European wars).

“European man is stupid, catastrophically stupid, when, while disbelieving in God and the immortality of the soul, he still professes belief in progress and life’s meaning and acts accordingly. What good is progress, if after it comes death? What use are the world, the stars, and cultures, if behind them lurks death, and ultimately it must conquer me?”[[218]](#footnote-218)

But how different was Slavic Orthodox man from European man at this juncture, and was there any difference in how the First World War affected the Orthodox East by contrast with the heterodox West?

We may agree that the teachings of the Nietzschean Superman or the Darwinian Apeman had not yet penetrated as deeply into the Orthodox East as into the heterodox West. And yet we know that the Bosnian Serb terrorists who fired the shots at Sarajevo had been infected with Nietzscheanism, and that the mass of the Serbian people applauded their act. Moreover, terrorism of a more openly atheist, internationalist kind had already counted thousands of innocent victims in Russia and would soon produce many millions more….

In accordance with the principle that “to whom much is given, much is asked”, the Orthodox nations to whom had been entrusted the riches of the Orthodox faith must be considered to bear a major share of the responsibility for the catastrophe. Both faith and morals were in sharp decline in the Orthodox countries. Moreover, when war broke out, the Orthodox nations did not form a united front behind the Tsar, the emperor of the Third Rome, in spite of the fact that the defeat of Russia was bound to have catastrophic effects on Orthodoxy. For, as Dominic Lieven points out, if there had been no First World War there would have been no Hitler or Stalin, with all the terrible destruction that those two dictators brought to the whole of the Orthodox commonwealth…[[219]](#footnote-219)Thus the Bulgarians, who owed their independence almost entirely to the Russians, decided to join the Germans. [[220]](#footnote-220) Again, the Romanians (who resented the Russian takeover of Bessarabia in 1878) and the Greeks (who had a German king) were for the time being neutral…

For all these reasons, the judgement of God fell hardest on the Orthodox, “the household of God”. Thus the Russians, having murmured and plotted against their Tsar, were deprived of victory by revolution from within, and came to almost complete destruction afterwards; the Serbs, whose blind nationalism, as we have seen, was a significant cause of the war, suffered proportionately more than any other country, even though they were on the winning side; the Romanians were crushed by the Germans before also appearing on the winning side; and the Bulgarians, while adding to their huge losses in the Balkan Wars, still appeared on the losing side. Only the Greeks emerged from the war relatively unscathed – but their judgement would come only a few years later, in the Asia Minor catastrophe of 1922-23. So the First World War was a judgement on the whole of European civilization, but first of all on the Orthodox nations who had allowed Europeanism gradually to drive out their God-given inheritance…

The unprecedented destructiveness of the war had been predicted by Engels as early as 1887: “Prussia-Germany can no longer fight any war but a world war; and a war of hitherto unknown dimensions and ferocity. Eight to ten million soldiers will swallow each other up and in doing so eat all Europe more bare than any swarm of locusts. The devastation of the Thirty Years War compressed into the space of three or four years and extending over the whole continent; famine, sickness, want, brutalizing the army and the mass of the population; irrevocable confusion of our artificial structure of trade, industry and credit, ending in general bankruptcy; collapse of the old states and their traditional statecraft, so that crowns will roll by dozens in the gutter and no one can be found to pick them up. It is absolutely impossible to predict where it will end and who will emerge from the struggle as victor. Only *one* result is absolutely certain: general exhaustion and the establishment of conditions for the final victory of the working class.”[[221]](#footnote-221)

And truly: after the war, everything was different. The Russian empire was gone, and with its disappearance all the islands of Orthodoxy throughout the world began to tremble and contract within themselves. Also gone were the German and Austrian empires. The very principle of monarchy was fatally undermined, surviving in a feebler, truncated form for a short time only in Orthodox Eastern Europe. Christianity as a whole was on the defensive; in most places it became a minority religion again, and in some it was fiercely persecuted, as if the Edict of Milan had been reversed and a new age of the catacombs had returned. The powerful, if superficial *pax Europaica* had been succeeded by a new age of barbarism, in which nations were divided within and between themselves, and neo-pagan ideologies held sway. The nature of the war itself contributed to this seismic change. It was not like most earlier European wars – short, involving only professional armies, with limited effects on the civilian population. It was (with the possible exception of the Napoleonic wars) the first of the *total* wars, involving the *whole* of the people and taking up *all* its resources, thereby presaging the appearance of *the totalitarian age*.

The war’s length, the vast numbers of its killed and wounded, the unprecedented sufferings of the civilian populations, and the sheer horror of its front-line combat deprived it, after the patriotic élan of the first few months, of any chivalric, redemptive aspects – at any rate, for all but the minority who consciously fought for God, Tsar and Fatherland. Indeed, the main legacy of the war was simply *hatred* – hatred of the enemy, hatred of one’s own leaders – a hatred that did not die after the war’s end, but was translated into a kind of universal hatred that presaged still more horrific and total wars to come.

Thus the Germans so hated the English that Shakespeare could not be mentioned in Germany. And the English so hated the “Huns” that Beethoven could not be mentioned in England. And the Russians so hated the Germans that the Germanic-sounding “St. Petersburg” had to be changed to the more Slavic “Petrograd”…[[222]](#footnote-222)

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So were there no redeeming features for the Orthodox in this, the great watershed in modern European history? Were there not some who loved God at this time? And do not “all things work together for good for those who love God” (Romans 8)?

One possible reason why God should have allowed it is that it was not so much a war between Slavdom and Teutonism, as between Orthodoxy and Protestantism, on which the future of Orthodoxy depended. Divine Providence allowed it to save the Orthodox, according to this argument, from *peaceful*, ecumenist merging with those of another *faith*. This is how many Russians understood the war. In 1912 the country had celebrated the one hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Borodino, and in 1913 – the three-hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the Romanov dynasty. These were patriotic celebrations, but also religious ones; for both the commemorated events had taken place on the background of great threats to the Orthodox Faith from western nations. So when the Tsar went to war in 1914, this was again seen as the beginning of a great patriotic *and religious* war.

As Archbishop Anthony (Khrapovitsky) put it: “Germany and Austria declared war on us, for which the former had already been preparing for forty years, wishing to extend its control to the East. What then? Should we quietly have submitted to the Germans? Should we have imitated their cruel and coarse manners? Planted in our country in place of the holy deeds of Orthodoxy piety the worship of the stomach and the wallet? No! It would be better for the whole nation to die than to be fed with such heretical poison!

“We have swallowed enough of it since the time of Peter the Great! And without that the Germans have torn away from the Russian nation, from Russian history and the Orthodox Church its aristocracy and intelligentsia; but in the event of a total submission to the German governmental authority, at last the simple people would have been corrupted. We already have enough renegades from the simple people under the influence of the Germans and of German money. These are above all those same Protestants who so hypocritically cry out for peace. Of course, they were not all conscious traitors and betrayers of their homeland, they did not all share in those 2.000,000 marks which were established by the German government (and a half of it from the personal fortune of the Kaiser) to be spent on the propagation of Protestant chapels in Russia…”[[223]](#footnote-223)

Again, a disciple of Archbishop Anthony, Archimandrite Hilarion (Troitsky), regarded the war as “liberational in the broadest meaning of the word”, and called on his students at the theological academy to resist German influence in theology with books and words.[[224]](#footnote-224)

Protestant chapels were indeed prevented from being built in Russia, and the influence of Protestant ecumenist theology was checked for the time being. But another, still more destructive product of German culture, the Marxist doctrine of dialectical materialism, was planted very firmly in Russian soil – with absolutely catastrophic results for Russian Orthodoxy…

However, there is no doubt that one definitively positive result of the war and of the revolution that followed closely upon it was that it forced many people to reconsider the emptiness of the lives they had been leading and return to God. For while defeat and revolution had a deleterious effect on the external position of the Church, her spiritual condition improved, and her real as opposed to formal membership swelled considerably in the post-war period. The fruits of this were twofold: the spreading of Russian Orthodoxy throughout the world through the emigration, and within Russia - the emergence of a mighty choir of holy new martyrs and confessors, the positive effects of whose salutary intercession for the Russian people have yet to be clearly seen but will undoubtedly be seen one day...

At the head of this choir stood the Tsar, whose truly self-sacrificial support for Serbia in August, 1914 constituted a legacy of *love*. The intercessions of the Royal Family and of the great choir of holy new martyrs and confessors that followed them to torments and death for Christ constitute the long-term basis for hope in the resurrection of Russia and Orthodoxy as a whole. And it may be hoped that in the grand scheme of Divine Providence this legacy of love and faithfulness will prove stronger than death…

However, if look at 1914 from the perspective of a century later, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the decision to go to war was catastrophic, not only for Russia but for Orthodoxy as a whole and for the whole world. If the Tsar had known its consequences, would he not have regretted his decision, just as he came to regret his decision to abdicate in February, 1917? Perhaps…

And yet “there is a tide in the affairs of men”, and there is no question that the tide in European politics, all over the continent, was towards war. The Tsar might have resisted the tide for a while, as he resisted it in 1912. But it is difficult to avoid the further conclusion that the Tsar felt he had no real alternative but to go to war *eventually*. The best he could do was choose a time when honour and loyalty (to the Serbs) provided at any rate a certain moral justification for the war. And that time certainly came in July, 1914.

Moreover, the Tsar’s famed “fatalism” – a better word would be “providentialism” - may have played a part here. [[225]](#footnote-225) He certainly believed in the proverb: “Man proposes, but God disposes”. And even more in the proverb: “The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord. Like the rivers of water, He turns it wherever He wishes” (Proverbs 21.1). The Tsar sincerely wanted peace, knowing the terrible consequences of war. But he also knew that it is God Who controls the destinies of nations. Who was he – who was any man – to resist the will of God if He wanted to punish His people and all the nations in accordance with His inscrutable judgements?

# *PART VI. THE FALL OF THE AUTOCRACY (1914-1917)*

*You deserve to die, because you have not guarded your master, the Lord’s Anointed.*

I Samuel (I Kings) 26.16**.**

*Thus saith the Lord God: Remove the turban, and take off the crown; things shall not remain as they are; exalt that which is low, and abase that which is high. A ruin, ruin, ruin I will make it; there shall not be even a trace of it until he comes whose right it is; and to him I will give it.*

Ezekiel 21.26-27*.*

## **58. THE TSAR AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF**

The war, writes S.A. Smith, “had a devastating effect on the empire. Over 14 million men were mobilized; about 67 million people in the western provinces came under enemy occupation; over 6 million were forcibly displaced, of whom half a million were Jews expelled from front-line areas. The eastern front was less static than the western, but neither side was able to make a decisive breakthrough and offensives proved hugely costly. Perhaps 3.3 million died or were lost without trace – a higher mortality than any other belligerent power (although Germany had a higher number of counted dead) – and the total number of casualties reached over 8 million…

“Russian soldiers fought valiantly and generally successfully against Turks and Austrians, but proved no match for the German army in matters of organization, discipline, and leadership.”[[226]](#footnote-226)

This became clear in the very first campaign of the war… On hearing of the successful German advance into France in August, 1914, Grand-Duke Nicholas, the commander-in-chief of the Russian armies, reversed the entire Russian strategic plan and, disregarding the incomplete concentration of his armies and woeful preparations in general, ordered a full-scale advance into East Prussia. At first he was successful, and the Germans were forced to transfer troops from the Western front at a critical stage, with the result that Paris and France were saved. As the French General Cherfils remarked in *La Guerre de la Déliverance,* “The spirit in which this offensive was undertaken is something which demands the greatest attention. It was conceived as an intervention, a diversionary operation, to assist and relieve the French Front. As Russian Commander-in-Chief, the Grand Duke behaved more like an ally than a Russian and deliberately sacrificed the interests of his own country to those of France. In these circumstances his strategy can be termed as ‘anti-national’.”[[227]](#footnote-227)

Unfortunately, Grand-Duke Nicholas’ “anti-nationalism” led to the complete destruction of the Russian Second Army at the Battle of Tannenburg and the loss of 100,000 prisoners. General Samsonov committed suicide. This was followed, in the spring of 1915, by a series of heavy defeats caused mainly by a continuing catastrophic lack of munitions.

“On January 25 1915,” writes Sebastian Sebag Montefiore, “Nikolasha and Yanushkevich ordered a ‘cleansing’ of the entire theatre of operations through the expulsion of ‘all Jews and suspect individuals’… The Jews, who spoke the Germanic Yiddish, were suspected of treason. Nikolasha took Jewish hostages and executed suspects. Around 500,000 Jews were expelled in scenes of such desperate misery that even interior minister Maklakov complained, ‘I’m not Judaeophile but I disapprove’.”[[228]](#footnote-228) The irony was that this took place in the Pale of Settlement, where the Jews had been restricted in order that they should not infect the interior provinces with their revolutionary spirit. But now the Jews were forced to flee eastwards, to the major cities of Central Russia, where they swelled the ranks of the revolutionaries…

The revolutionaries and their liberal supporters were counting on Russia losing the war and therefore stirred up defeatist sentiments in the population. This extended even into the Council of Ministers. Thus on June 16, 1915, the new Minister of War Polivanov, a protégé of Guchkov who had replaced the loyalist Sukhumlimov, said that the Homeland was in danger. Meanwhile, voluntary organizations, such as the Union of Zemstva and Towns, and Guchkov’s Military-Industrial Committee, were indeed putting the Homeland in danger by using the money they received from the state for anti-state purposes.

In August, 1915, after a series of heavy defeats involving the loss of Poland and Lithuania to the enemy, the Tsar announced that he was taking control of the Russian army as Supreme Commander. There was general outrage; the leftists because they had wanted to put their own, red general, at the head of the army. Even many of the tsar’s supporters, such as Prime Minister I.L. Goremykin, were unhappy, because it meant that if things went badly on the battlefield the Tsar would be blamed as being directly responsible. But “God’s will be done,” wrote the Tsar to the Tsaritsa after arriving at headquarters. “I feel so calm” – like the feeling, he said, “after Holy Communion”. He considered this his duty as Tsar, and told Goremykin that he could not forgive himself for not having placed himself at the head of the army during the Russo-Japanese War.[[229]](#footnote-229)

Goremykin bowed to the Tsar’s will, declaring to the other ministers: “I am a man of the old school, for me the command of his Majesty is law. When there is a catastrophe on the front, his Majesty considers it the sacred duty of the Russian Tsar to be with the army and either conquer with them or die. You will not by any arguments dissuade his Majesty from the step he had decided on. No intrigue or any influence has played any role in this decision. It remains for us only to bow before the will of our Tsar and help him…”

In the same month of August, as Yakoby writes, “at the house of A.I. Konovalov in Moscow, a conference of the leaders of the opposition took place. It was decided to take immediate decisive steps to seize power. To this end it was necessary first of all to force the Government toretire and obtain from his Majesty the appointment of a new ministry under the presidency either of Rodzianko or of Prince Lvov, while giving the portfolio of foreign affairs to Milyukov, of war to Guchkov, of trade and industry to Konovalov, and of justice to Maklakov. At the same time, they would have to fight with all their powers against the decision of his Majesty to take upon himself the Supreme Command. And if the Monarch remained unbending in his decision, then it was necessary, for the sake of propaganda, to present this measure in the eyes of public opinion as unkindness and ingratitude to Great Prince Nicholas Nikolayevich, and turn him into a national hero who would be constantly contrasted with the Tsar. A strange turn in the ardent campaign that the opposition had conducted until then against the Great Prince!”[[230]](#footnote-230)

On August 20 a session of the Council of Ministers under the presidency of the Tsar took place in Tsarskoye Selo, at which the Tsar made it clear he was not changing his mind.

The debate now heated up. Goremykin and Justice Minister A.S. Khvostov spoke against the demands of the Moscow conference. But A.D. Samarin insisted on the government’s capitulation. The leftist ministers – joined now by foreign minister Sazonov – wanted to force the Tsar to yield under the threat of the collective resignationof all the ministers. Goremykin replied that this was in effect an ultimatum to the Tsar, and that the demand that Nikolasha become Supreme Commander was simply the means to a purely political intrigue against the Tsar.

Goremykin showed that he was a true monarchist, and what the attitude of all the ministers should hav been by declaring: “In my conscience his Majesty the Tsar is the Anointed of God, the bearer of supreme power. He personifies Russia. He is 47 years old. It is not since yesterday that he has reigned and disposed of the destinies of the Russian people. When the will of such a person is defined and the path of action determined, his subjects must obey, whatever the consequences. Beyond that, it is the will of God. That is what I think and I will die with that conviction.”

Eventually eight ministers sent a collective letter to the Tsar, demanding the recall of Nikolasha as commander-in-chief, pointing to their disagreement with Goremykin and ending with the words: “Being in such conditions, we are losing faith and the possibility of serving you and the Homeland with the consciousness of being of use.”

On September 16 the Tsar summoned the Council of Ministers to himself at Stavka, tore up their letter in fron of their eyes, and said: “This is child’s play. I do not accept your resignations, and I have faith in Ivan Longinovich [Goremykin].”

“In the autumn,” writes Robert Massie, “the Tsar brought his son, the eleven-year-old Tsarevich, to live with him at Army Headquarters. It was a startling move, not simply because of the boy’s age but also because of his haemophilia. Yet, Nicholas did not make his decision impetuously. His reasons, laboriously weighed for months in advance, were both sentimental and shrewd.

“The Russian army, battered and retreating after a summer of terrible losses, badly needed a lift in morale. Nicholas himself made constant appearances, and his presence, embodying the cause of Holy Russia, raised tremendous enthusiasm among the men who saw him. It was his hope that the appearance of the Heir at his side, symbolizing the future, would further bolster their drooping spirits. It was a reasonable hope, and, in fact, wherever Alexis appeared he became a center of great excitement…”[[231]](#footnote-231)

In August, 1915, 33 delegates from various left socialist parties met in Zimmerwald in Switzerland. By this time the patriotic surge that had made Lenin so isolated the year before had receded and his defeatism was becoming popular again. And so his call for immediate peace and the turning of the imperialist war into a civil one was passed, and strengthened revolutionary sentiment inside Russia.

On September 7, taking advantage of the Tsar’s absence at Stavka, the liberals formed a “progressive bloc” constituting most of the Duma and several members of the State Council, which claimed that in order to bring the war to a successful conclusion, the authorities had to be brought into line with the demands of “society”. By “society” they meant the social organizations that had come into existence during the war – the Zemstvo Union, the Union of Cities and the Military-Industrial Committee. The progressive bloc also put forward several political demands: a broad political amnesty and the return of all political exiles: Polish autonomy; reconciliation with Finland; the removal of repressive measures against the Ukrainians and the removal of restrictions on the Jews; equal rights for the peasants; the reform of zemstvo and city self-administration, etc. All these were questions that the Tsar considered “important, state matters, but not vital for the present moment”. He wanted all attention to be concentrated for the moment on winning the war.[[232]](#footnote-232)

Paradoxically, during the war parliaments in the West European countries had less influence on their governments as all major decisions were taken in small war cabinets, whereas in Autocratic Russia the parliamentarians demanded – and got – more and more of a voice.[[233]](#footnote-233) The progressive bloc led by Guchkov now demanded “a ministry of trust” and “a government endowed with the country’s trust”. Essentially, it was an attempt to seize power from the autocrat…

However, the Tsar decisively rejected the demands of the progressive bloc. He ordered the Prime Minister to suspend the Duma and sacked the ministers who supported the bloc. The liberals continued their agitation, but gradually the mood in the country turned against them… As the Tsar wrote to his wife on September 22: “The behaviour of some of the ministers continues to amaze me! After all that I told them… I thought that they understood me and the fact that I was seriously explaining what I thought. What matter? – so much the worse for them! They were afraid to close the Duma – it was done! I came away here and replaced N, in spite of their advice; the people accepted this move as a natural thing and understood it as we did. The proof – numbers of telegrams which I receive from all sides, with the most touching expressions. All this shows me clearly one thing: that the ministers, always living in town, know terribly little of what is happening in the country as a whole. Here I can judge correctly the real mood among the various classes of the people: everything must be done to bring the war to a victorious ending, and no doubts are expressed on that score. I was told this officially by all the deputations which I received some days ago, and so it is all over Russia. Petrograd and Moscow constitute the only exceptions – two minute points on the map of the fatherland.”[[234]](#footnote-234)

Things were getting better at the front. Under the Tsar’s command, the fortunes of the Russian armies revived, and in the autumn of 1915 the retreat was halted. As Hindenburg, the German commander, wrote: “For our GHQ the end of 1915 was no occasion for the triumphal fanfare we had anticipated. The final outcome of the year’s fighting was disappointing. The Russian bear had escaped from the net in which we had hope to entrap him, bleeding profusely, but far from mortally wounded, and had slipped away after dealing us the most terrible blows.”[[235]](#footnote-235)

In June the Russians launched a highly successful offensive under General Brusilov against the Austrians in Galicia. “The consequences of this victorious operation,” writes Goulévitch, “were at once manifest on the other theatres of war. To relieve the Austrians in Galicia the German High Command took over the direction of both armies and placed them under the sole control of Hindenburg. The offensive in Lombardy was at once abandoned and seven Austrian divisions withdrawn to face the Russians. In addition, eighteen German divisions were brought from the West, where the French and British were strongly attacking on the Somme. Further reinforcements of four divisions were drafted from the interior as well as three divisions from Salonica and two Turkish divisions, ill as the latter could be spared. Lastly, Romania threw in her lot with the Allies...”[[236]](#footnote-236)

“The news of Romania’s entry into the war, writes Adam Tooze, “‘fell like a bomb. William II completely lost his head, pronounced the war finally lost and believed we must now ask for peace.’ The Habsburg ambassador in Bucharest, Count Ottokar Czernin, predicted ‘with mathematical certainty the complete defeat of the Central Powers and their allies if the war were continued any longer.’”[[237]](#footnote-237)

In his *Memoirs* Hindenburg wrote that “the only solution to relieve a desperate state of affairs” was “a policy of defence on all fronts, in the absence of some unforeseen and untoward event”[[238]](#footnote-238) – like a revolution…

“Few episodes of the Great War,” writes Sir Winston Churchill, “are more impressive than the resuscitation, re-equipment and renewed giant effort of Russia in 1916. It was the last glorious exertion of the Czar and the Russian people for victory before both were to sink into the abyss of ruin and horror. By the summer of 1916 Russia, which eighteen months before had been almost disarmed, which during 1915 had sustained an unbroken series of frightful defeats, had actually managed, by her own efforts and the resources of her allies, to place in the field – organized, armed and equipped – sixty Army Corps in place of the thirty-five with which she had begun the war. The Trans-Siberian railway had been doubled over a distance of 6,000 kilometres, as far east as Lake Baikal. A new railway 1,400 kilometres long, built through the depth of winter at the cost of unnumbered lives, linked Petrograd with the perennially ice-free waters of the Murman coast. And by both these channels munitions from the rising factories of Britain, France and Japan, or procured by British credit from the United States, were pouring into Russia in broadening streams. The domestic production of every form of war material had simultaneously been multiplied many fold.

“The mighty limbs of the giant were armed, the conceptions of his brain were clear, his heart was still true, but the nerves which could transform resolve and design into action were but partially developed or non-existent [he is referring to the enemy within, the Duma and the anti-monarchists]. This defect, irremediable at the time, fatal in its results, in no way detracts from the merit or the marvel of the Russian achievement, which will forever stand as the supreme monument and memorial of the Empire founded by Peter the Great.”[[239]](#footnote-239)

By the autumn of 1916 the Russian armies were clearly increasing in strength – a fact confirmed by several sources. Thus the British military attaché in Russia said that Russia’s prospects from a military point of view were better in the winter of 1916-17 than a year before. This estimate was shared by Grand Duke Sergius Mikhailovich, who was at Imperial Headquarters as Inspector-General of Artillery. As he said to his brother, Grand Duke Alexander: “Go back to your work and pray that the revolution will not break out this very year. The Army is in perfect condition; artillery, supplies, engineering, troops – everything is ready for a decisive offensive in the spring of 1917. This time we will defeat the Germans and Austrians; on condition, of course, that the rear will not deprive us of our freedom of action. The Germans can save themselves only if they manage to provoke revolution from behind…”[[240]](#footnote-240)

As. F. Vinberg, a colonel of a regiment in Riga, wrote: “Already at the end of 1916 and the beginning of 1917 many knew that, insofar as it is possible to calculate the future, our victories in the spring and summer of 1917 were guaranteed. All the deficiencies in the material and technical sphere, which had told so strongly in 1914 and 1915, had been corrected. All our armies had every kind of provisions in abundance. While in the German armies the insufficiency in everything was felt more strongly every day…”[[241]](#footnote-241)

“By 1916,” writes David Stevenson, “Russia, exceptionally among the belligerents, was experiencing a regular boom, with rising growth and a bullish stock exchange: coal output was up 30 per cent on 1914, chemicals output doubled, and machinery output trebled. Armaments rode the crest of the wave: new rifle production rose from 132,844 in 1914 to 733,017 in 1915, and 1,301,433 in 1916; 76mm field guns from 354 to 1,349 to 3721 in these years; 122mm heavy guns from 78 to 361 to 637; and shell production (of all types) from 104,900 to 9,567,888 to 30,974,678. During the war Russia produced 20,000 field guns, against 5,625 imported; and by 1917 it was manufacturing all its howitzers and three-quarters of its heavy artillery. Not only was the shell shortage a thing of the past, but by spring 1917 Russia was acquiring an unprecedented superiority in men and *materiel*.”[[242]](#footnote-242)

“The price of this Herculean effort, however, was dislocation of the civilian economy and a crisis in urban food supply. The very achievement that moved the balance in the Allies’ favour by summer 1916 contained the seeds of later catastrophe.”[[243]](#footnote-243)

Fr. Lev Lebedev cites figures showing that military production equalled production for the non-military economy in 1916, and exceeded it in 1917.[[244]](#footnote-244) This presaged complete economic collapse in 1918. So if Russia was to win the war, she had to do it *now*, while the supply situation was still good and the tsar still ruled…

Nevertheless, from a purely military point of view there were good reasons for thinking that Russia could defeat her enemies in 1917. Thus Dominic Lieven denies that there was “any military reason for Russia to seek a separate peace between August 1914 and March 1917. Too much attention is usually paid to the defeats of Tannenburg in 1914 and Gorlice-Tarnow in 1915. Russia’s military effort in the First World War amounted to much more than this. If on the whole the Russian army proved inferior to the German forces, that was usually true of the French and British as well. Moreover, during the Brusilov offensive in 1916 Russian forces had shown themselves quite capable of routing large German units. Russian armies usually showed themselves superior to Austrian forces of comparable size, and their performance against the Ottomans in 1914-16 was very much superior to that of British forces operating in Gallipoli, Egypt and Mesopotamia. The Russian defence industry performed miracles in 1916 and if there were legitimate doubts as to whether this level of production could be fully sustained in 1917, the same was true of the war economies of a number of other belligerents. It is true that Rumania’s defeat necessitated a major redeployment of troops and supplies to the southern front in the weeks before the revolution and that this, together with a particularly severe winter, played havoc with railway movements on the home front. Nevertheless, in military terms there was absolutely no reason to believe that Russia had lost the war in February 1917.

“Indeed, when one raised one’s eyes from the eastern front and looked at the Allies’ overall position, the probability of Russian victory was very great, so long as the home front could hold. Although the British empire was potentially the most powerful of the Allied states, in 1914-16 France and Russia had carried the overwhelming burden of the war on land. Not until July 1916 on the Somme were British forces committed en masse against the Germans, and even then the British armies, though courageous to a fault, lacked proper training and were commanded by amateur officers and generals who lacked any experience of controlling masses of men. Even so, in the summer of 1916 the combined impact of the Somme, Verdun and the Brusilov offensive had brought the Central Powers within sight of collapse. A similar but better coordinated effort, with British power now peaking, held out excellent prospects for 1917. Still more to the point, by February 1917 the German campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare made American involvement in the war in the immediate future a near certainty: the Allied superiority in resources would thereby become overwhelming.

“Once stalemate set in on the battlefield in 1914, the First World War became as much as anything a contest over which belligerent’s home front would collapse first. This fate befell Russia in large part because even its upper and middle classes, let alone organized labour, were more hostile to the existing regime and less integrated into the legal political order than was the case even in Italy, let alone in France, Germany or Britain in 1914. In addition, opposition to the regime was less divided along ethnic lines than was the case in Austria-Hungary, and Russia was more geographically isolated from military and economic assistance from its allies than was the case with any of the other major belligerents. Nevertheless, unrest on the domestic front was by no means confined to Russia. The Italian home front seemed on the verge of collapse after the defeat of Caporetto in 1917 and the French army suffered major mutinies that year. In the United Kingdom the attempt to impose conscription in Ireland made that country ungovernable and led quickly to civil war. In both Germany and Austria revolution at home played a vital role in 1918, though in contrast to Russia it is true that revolution followed decisive military defeats and was set off in part by the correct sense that the war was unwinnable.

“The winter of 1916-17 was decisive not just for the outcome of the First World War but also for the history of twentieth-century Europe. Events on the domestic and military fronts were closely connected. In the winter of 1915-16 in both Germany and Austria pressure on civilian food consumption had been very severe. The winter of 1916-17 proved worse. The conviction of the German military leadership that the Central Powers’ home fronts could not sustain too much further pressure on this scale was an important factor in their decision to launch unrestricted submarine warfare in the winter of 1916-17, thereby (so they hoped) driving Britain out of the war and breaking the Allied blockade. By this supreme piece of miscalculation and folly the German leadership brought the United States into the war at precisely the moment when the overthrow of the imperial regime was preparing Russia to leave it…” [[245]](#footnote-245)

## **59. THE ACTORS IN THE REVOLUTION: (1) THE JEWS**

If, as the writers of *Vekhi* believed, the root of the revolution was a nihilistic-messianic-chiliastic kind of faith built out of many strands of European and Jewish thought, the actual composition of forces that brought about the revolution was no less varied. We need to distinguish between three levels at which the revolution took place. First was the level of the out-and-out revolutionaries, often *intelligenty* who were supported by many from the industrial proletariat and the revolutionary-minded peasantry. They were aiming to destroy Russian tsarism and Russian Orthodox civilization completely before embarking on a world revolution that would dethrone God and traditional authority from the hearts and minds of all men everywhere. This level was led by Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin; its ethnic composition was mainly Jewish, but there were also Russians, Latvians, Georgians, Poles and others. They were possessed by the revolutionary faith to the greatest extent, and owed no allegiance to any nation or traditional creed or morality.

Secondly, there was the level of the Freemasons, mainly aristocratic and middle-class Duma parliamentarians and their supporters in the country at large, who were not aiming to destroy Russia completely, but only to remove the tsar and introduce a constitutional government on the English model. This level was led by Guchkov, Rodzyanko and Kerensky; it was composed mainly of Russians, but also contained most of the intelligentsia of the other nations of the empire. They believed in the revolutionary faith, but still had moral scruples derived from their Christian background.

Thirdly, there were the lukewarm Orthodox Christians, the great mass of ordinary Russians, who did not necessarily want either world revolution or a constitutional government, but who lacked the courage and the faith to act openly in support of Faith, Tsar and Fatherland. It is certain that if very many Russians had not become lukewarm in their faith, God would not have allowed the revolution to take place. After the revolution, many from this level, as well as individuals from the first two levels, seeing the terrible devastation that their lukewarmness had allowed to take place, bitterly repented and returned to the ranks of the confessing Orthodox Christians.

The extraordinary prominence of Jews in the revolution is a fact that must be related, at least in part, to the traditionally anti-Russian and anti-Christian attitude of Jewish culture, which is reflected in both of its major political offspring – Bolshevism and Zionism. The theist Jews who triumphed in Israel in 1917, and especially in 1948 after the foundation of the State of Israel, came from the same region and social background – the Pale of Settlement in Western Russia – as the atheist Jews who triumphed in Moscow in 1917, and sometimes even from the same families. One such family was that of Chaim Weitzmann, the first president of Israel, who in his *Autobiography* wrote that his own mother was able to witness her sons’ triumph both in Bolshevik Moscow and Zionist Jerusalem…[[246]](#footnote-246)

The simultaneous triumph of the Jews in Russia and Palestine was indeed an extraordinary “coincidence”: Divine Providence drew the attention of all those with eyes to see this sign of the times when, in one column of newsprint in the London *Times* for November 9, 1917, there appeared two articles, the one announcing the outbreak of revolution in Petrograd, and the other – the promise of a homeland for the Jews in Palestine (the Balfour declaration). M. Heifetz also points to the coincidence in time between the October revolution and the Balfour declaration. “A part of the Jewish generation goes along the path of Herzl and Zhabotinsky. The other part, unable to withstand the temptation, fills up the band of Lenin and Trotsky and Stalin.” “The path of Herzl and Bagritsky allowed the Jews to stand tall and immediately become not simply an equal nation with Russia, but a privileged one.”[[247]](#footnote-247)

Indeed, the Russian revolution may be regarded as one branch of that general triumph of Jewish power which we observe in the twentieth century in both East and West, in both Russia and America and Israel. The mainly Jewish nature of the world revolution cannot be doubted.

Thus Winston Churchill wrote: “It would almost seem as if the Gospel of Christ and the gospel of anti-Christ were designed to originate among the same people; and that this mystic and mysterious race had been chosen for the supreme manifestations, both of the Divine and the diabolical… From the days of ‘Spartacus’ Weishaupt to those of Karl Marx, and down to Trotsky (Russia), Bela Kun (Hungary), Rosa Luxembourg (Germany) and Emma Goldman (United States), this worldwide conspiracy for the overthrow of civilization and for the reconstitution of society on the basis of arrested development, of envious malevolence and impossible equality, has been steadily growing. It played, as a modern writer, Mrs. Nesta Webster, has so ably shown, a definitely recognizable part in the tragedy of the French Revolution. It has been the mainspring of every subversive movement during the nineteenth century; and now at last this band of extraordinary personalities from the underworld of the great cities of Europe and America have gripped the Russian people by the hair of their heads and have become practically the undisputed masters of that enormous empire. There is no need to exaggerate the part played in the creation of Bolshevism and in the bringing about of the Russian Revolution by these international and for the most part atheistical Jews. It is certainly a very great one; it probably outweighs all others.”[[248]](#footnote-248)

Liberals ascribed the revolutionary character of the Jews to antisemitism, and, in the Russian case, to pogroms and the multitude of restrictions placed on the Jews by the Russian tsars. However, as we have seen, far fewer Jews died in the pogroms than Russian officials in terrorist attacks (1845 by the year 1909), while the restrictions were placed on the Jews in order to protect the Russian peasant, who was ruthlessly exploited by them. As the future Hieromartyr John Vostorgov said in 1906: “The Jews are restricted in their rights of residence not as a confessional unit, but as a predatory tribe that is dangerous in the midst of the peaceful population because of its exploitative inclinations, which… have found a religious sanction and support in the Talmud… Can such a confession be tolerated in the State, when it allows its followers to practise hatred and all kinds of deceit and harm towards other confessions, and especially Christians? … The establishment of the Pale of Settlement is the softest of all possible measures in relation to such a confession. Moreover, is it possible in this case not to take account of the mood of the masses? But this mood cannot be changed only by issuing a law on the complete equality of rights of the Jews. On the contrary, this can only strengthen the embitterment of the people…”[[249]](#footnote-249)

“Let us remember,” writes Solzhenitsyn: “the legal restrictions on the Jews in Russia were never racial [as they were in Western Europe]. They were applied neither to the Karaites [who rejected the Talmud], nor to the mountain Jews, nor to the Central Asian Jews.”[[250]](#footnote-250)

In other words, restrictions were placed only on those Jews who practised the religion of the Talmud, because of its vicious anti-Christianity and double morality. Moreover, the restrictions were very generously applied. The boundaries of the Pale (a huge area twice the size of France) were extremely porous, allowing large numbers of Jews to acquire higher education and make their fortunes in Great Russia.

Indeed, so great was the Jewish domination of Russian trade and, most ominously, the Russian press by the time of the revolution that Stolypin wanted to remove the restrictions on the Jews. But in this case the Tsar resisted him, as his father had resisted Count Witte before him…[[251]](#footnote-251)

This was not because the Tsar felt no responsibility to protect the Jews; he spoke about “my Jews”, as he talked about “my Poles”, “my Armenians” and “my Finns”. And his freedom from anti-semitism is demonstrated by his reaction to the murder of Stolypin by a Jewish revolutionary, Bogrov, in Kiev on September 1, 1911. As Robert Massie writes: “Because Bogrov was a Jew, the Orthodox population was noisily preparing a retaliatory pogrom. Frantic with fear, the city’s Jewish population spent the night packing their belongings. The first light of the following day found the square before the railway station jammed with carts and people trying to squeeze themselves on to departing trains. Even as they waited, the terrified people heard the clatter of hoofs. An endless stream of Cossacks, their long lances dark against the dawn sky, rode past. On his own, Kokovtsev had ordered three full regiments of Cossacks into the city to prevent violence. Asked on what authority he had issued the command, Kokovtsev replied: ‘As head of the government.’ Later, a local official came up to the Finance Minister to complain, ‘Well, Your Excellency, by calling in the troops you have missed a fine chance to answer Bogrov’s shot with a nice Jewish pogrom.’ Kokovtsev was indignant, but, he added, ‘his sally suggested to me that the measures which I had taken at Kiev were not sufficient… therefore I sent an open telegram to all governors of the region demanding that they use every possible means – force if necessary – to prevent possible pogroms. When I submitted this telegram to the Tsar, he expressed his approval of it and of the measure I had taken in Kiev.’”[[252]](#footnote-252)

In the end, the Pale of Settlement was destroyed, not by liberal politicians, but by right-wing generals. In 1915, as the Russian armies retreated before the Germans, some Jews were accused of spying for the enemy and were shot, while the Jewish population in general was considered unreliable. And so a mass evacuation of the Jews from the Pale was ordered by the authorities. But the results were disastrous. Hordes of frightened Jews fleeing eastwards blocked up vital roads along which supplies for the front were destined. Landing up in large cities such as Moscow and Petrograd where there had been no large Jewish population before, these disgruntled new arrivals only fuelled the revolutionary fires. And so was created precisely the situation that the Pale of Settlement had been designed to avert. As the Jews poured from the western regions into the major cities of European Russia, they soon acquired prominent executive positions in all major sectors of government and the economy…

## **60. THE ACTORS IN THE REVOLUTION: (2) THE FREEMASONS**

If the October revolution was largely engineered by Bolshevik Jews, the February revolution which preceded it and made it possible was engineered by Masonic Russians under the directions of the Grand Orient of Paris.

The Bolsheviks were not in general Masons (after the revolution they suppressed Masonry in Russia), but played the same role as the Illuminati in the French revolution – that of ultimate victors. But the question arises: were any of the leading Bolsheviks also Masons? According to Subdeacon Konstantin Preobrazhensky, formerly a lieutenant-general of the KGB: “One of the leaders of the KGB Intelligence, Colonel Lolliy Zamoisky, was also a famous journalist and writer. He was studying masons on his own. Once I invited him to read a lecture on them for us, less then ten officers, members of Group ‘A’ of Directorate ‘T’ of the KGB First Directorate. Group ‘A’ was a group of assistants to the head of scientific and technical intelligence, Major General Leonid Zaitsev. Zamoisky told as lot of interesting things. In particular, he said that Lenin has left his signature in the visitors book of one of the Masonic lounges in Switzerland, introducing himself as ‘brother-visitor’.”[[253]](#footnote-253)

I.L. Solonevich sees the Masonic aristocracy as no less guilty of the revolution than the Jews: “The whole of the nineteenth century was filled with the struggle of the autocracy against the aristocratic elite. In this struggle both warring sides perished. However, the monarchy perished with some chance of resurrection, but the aristocracy – with absolutely no chance (I am speaking of the destruction of the aristocracy as a ruling class).

“The roots of this struggle go deep into the past – perhaps as far as Kalita and the Terrible one. But we shall not descend to the depths of the ages. We shall only recall that while the mystical beginning of the Russian revolution is usually ascribed to the Decembrists, there were no Jews among them. Then there came Belinsky and Chernyshevsky and Bakunin and Herzen and Plekhanov and Lavrov and Milyukov and Lenin and many other sowers of ‘the rational, the good and the eternal’. In the course of a whole century they shook and undermined the building of Russian statehood. All this work was covered by the moral authority of Prince Peter Alexeyevich Krapotkin, who had not been bought by the Jews, and Count Leo Nikolayevich Tolstoy, who, although taking no bribes from the Jews, undermined both the State and the Church and even the family very thoroughly.

“And any Berdichev chemist from the [Jewish] Bund or from the Bolsheviks, in his struggle again the order created by history, could have taken me by the lapel and said: ‘Listen, are you an intelligent person? Can’t you see that I am walking in the steps of the best lights of Russian thought?’

“And what could I as ‘an intelligent person’ reply to this chemist? Truly he was walking in their steps! And Chernyshevsky really was a ‘light’…

“If we, out the whole of this extraordinarily complicated combination of factors that was making and supporting the revolution, concentrate our fire only on one – on Jewry, - then we have lost the plot. It’s all not so simple. They say: the Jew Jacob Schiff gave money for the Russian revolution. Yes, he did. But [the Old Ritualist] Savva Morozov also gave money for the same revolution. And Germany gave more than any – not the Germany of Weimar and Ebert, and still less Hitler, but the Germany of the Hohenzollerns… It’s no secret for anybody that all these ‘entrenched truths’ were published on German money, while in the Kseshinskaya palace German marks were valued above all… But if you simplify the matter to such a degree that one can make a revolution in the world with money, then the October revolution was made on German money. *Á la guerre comme á la guerre*. However, it was with the closest and most powerful participation of almost the whole of Russian Jewry…

“And so: the elite of the aristocracy laid the main weight of the struggle against the monarchy on their own shoulders. Then they were joined by the ‘*raznochintsy*’, and by the very last decades of the past century this anti-monarchist front received powerful support from the whole of Russian Jewry.”[[254]](#footnote-254)

Fr. Lev Lebedev writes: “Soon after the manifesto of October 17, 1905 which gave certain freedoms, legal Masonic lodges, which before had been banned, began to appear. And although, practically speaking, secret Masonry never ceased to exist in Russia, the absence of legal lodges was for the Masons a great obstacle… A ‘reserve’ was being prepared in France by the ‘Grand Orient’. Already in the 60s some Russians had entered French Masonry in Paris. Among them was the writer I.S. Turgenev, later – Great Prince Nicholas Mikhailovich (the ‘Bixiot’ lodge), and then the philosopher V. Vyrubov, the psychiatrist N. Bazhenov, the electrophysicist P. Yablochkov, the historian M. Kovalevsky. In 1887 the ‘Cosmos’ (no. 288) lodge was founded for Russians – the writer A. Amphiteatrov, the *zemstvo* activist V. Maklakov and the activist of culture V.N. Nemirovich-Danchenko. From 1900 the Masonic Russian School of social sciences began its work in Paris, and there arose yet another Russian lodge, ‘Mount Sinai’.[[255]](#footnote-255) At the beginning of 1906, with the agreement of the ‘Grand Orient of France’, M. Kovalevsky opened a lodge of French obedience in Russia. The first such lodge was joined by the already mentioned Kovalevsky, Bazhenov, Maklakov, Nemirovich-Danchenko, and also new people such as S. Kotlyarovsky, E. Kedrin (the jurist), the historian V.O. Klyuchevsky, Prince S. Urusov, the Jewish doctor and lawyer M. Margulies, the diplomat I. Loris-Melikov and others. This lodge had two main affiliates: in Moscow – ‘Regeneration’, and in St. Petersburg – ‘Polar Star’. They were ‘opened’ by two high-ranking Masons, Senchole and Boulet, who came specially from France. Later, in 1908, they gave ‘Polar Star’ the right to open new lodges in Russia without the prior agreement of the French. Many lodges with various names appeared [such as ‘the Iron Ring’ in Nizhni], but the leading role continued to be played by ‘Polar Star’, which was led by Count A. Orlov-Davydov, and only Masons of no lower rank than the 18th degree were admitted into it. The Masons were also joined by the Cadet A. Kolyubakin, Prince Bebutov, Baron G. Maidel, the public library worker A. Braudo, the historians N. Pavlov-Silvansky and P. Schegolev, the lawyers S. Balavinsky and O. Goldovsky, the Octobrist A.I. Guchkov, his comrade in the party M.V. Rodzyanko, the Cadet N.V. Nekrasov, the workers’ party A.F. Kerensky (in 1912, through the ‘Ursa Minor’ lodge[[256]](#footnote-256)), the Mensheviks A. Galpern, Chkheidze, the Bolsheviks Trotsky, Lunacharsky, Skvortsov-Stepanov, Krasin, Boky, Sereda, Chicherin, the millionaires N.I. Tereschenko, A. Konovalov, P.P. Ryabushinsky (with his two brothers), Prince V. Obolensky, Countess S.V. Panina, Baron V. Meller-Zakomelsky (not to be confused with the general), M. Gorky, his wife E. Peshkova, his godson the Jew Zenobius Peshkov (the brother of Ya. Sverdlov), their friend E.D. Kuskova (a female Mason of the higher degrees), her husband S. Prokopovich, Prince G. Lvov (president of the Zemstvo and City Unions), Prince A. Khatistov (the city commandant of Tiflis), Prince P. Dolgorukov, Major-General P. Popovtsev (of the 33rd degree), Mark Aldanov, Fyodorov, Chelnokov, the Menshevik G. Aronson, the artist Mark Chagall, the cadet V. Velikhov and very many other prominent activists of that time. The lists of Russian Masons do not contain the name of the Cadet historian P. Milyukov (he even concealed his Masonry), but only because he had for a long time been in purely French Masonry… Masonic lodges appeared and functioned also, besides Moscow and Petersburg, in Kiev, Odessa, Nizhni-Novgorod, Minsk, Vitebsk, Tver, Samara, Saratov, Tiflis, Kutaisi and other cities. In the words of Kuskova, before 1917 the whole of Russia was covered by a net of Masonic lodges of which many thousands of people were members.”[[257]](#footnote-257)

The Mason Boris Telepneff wrote: “The existence of Masonic Lodges was discovered by the Russian Government in 1909; it also became known to the authorities that they were of French origin. It was then decided by the Russian Lodges to suspend work… This was done accordingly until 1911, when some of their members decided to renew their activities with due prudence. One would not call these activities Masonic in any sense, as their chief aim was purely political – the abolition of the autocracy, and a democratic regime in Russia; they acknowledged allegiance to the Grand Orient of France. This political organization comprised about forty Lodges in 1913. In 1915-1916 disagreements arose between their members who belonged to two political parties (the constitutional democrats and the progressives) and could not agree on a common policy. Ten Lodges became dormant. The remaining thirty Lodges continued to work, and took part in the organization of the 1917 March revolution and in the establishment of the Provisional Government. Their political aim being attained, the organisation began to decay; twenty-eight Lodges existed on the eve of the Bolshevik revolution, and since then most of their members have left Russia.”[[258]](#footnote-258)

Lebedev continues: “Besides lodges of the ‘Polar Star’ structure there also existed lodges of a mystical tendency. Among them were the *Martinists*(old-style) headed by a ‘Great Master’, Count Musin-Pushkin, which was joined by many from the aristocracy and even from the Imperial Family – Great Princes Nicholas Nikolayevich [supreme commander of the Russian armed forces in 1914-15], Peter Nikolayevich and George Mikhailovich.[[259]](#footnote-259) Among them at one time was the noted Mason and occultist Papius, who was very active. Papius even hoped to draw his Majesty Nicholas II, but was not successful! Among the mystics were the Masons *Philaletes*, who were joined by Great Prince Alexander Mikhailovich (the brother of George) and a string of aristocrats, about one thousand people in all. Their main occupation was spiritist séances (supposed ‘communion’ with the spirits and souls of the dead), which quite a lot of the intelligentsia were interested in at that time.[[260]](#footnote-260) Finally, there was the directly ***Satanist*** lodge ‘Lucifer’, which included many from the ‘creative’ sort, basically decadents such as Vyacheslav Ivanov, V. Bryusov and A. Bely...

“On the direct *orders*of the ‘Grand Orient of France’, Masonry extended its tentacles into the State apparatus, into the diplomatic corps. Thus according to the data of N. Verberova in her book, *People and Lodges*[[261]](#footnote-261), the Masons in the diplomatic service were: K.D. Nabokov (England), A.D. Kandaurov (France), G.P. Zabello (Italy), A.V. Nekludov (Sweden), I.G. Loris-Melikov (Norway), K.M. Onu (Switzerland), B.A. Bakhmetev (USA), N.A. Kudashev (China), A.I. Scherbatsky (Brazil), etc.

“*All* the Masonic lodges in Russia were linked and communicated with each other and with foreign centres, first of all with the ‘Grand Orient of France’. And all of them together were ruled by the *purely Jewish* community (called sometimes a ‘lodge’ and sometimes an ‘order’) *Bnai Brith*, which was at the head of united world Zionism, with its centre in the USA.

“For the western centres, the most important thing from a political point of view was Russian ***political Masonry*** of the ‘Polar Star’ structure. In 1909 it declared that it was liquidating itself. This was a manoeuvre, well-known from the times of [the Decembrist] P. Pestel, whose aim, on the one hand, was to get rid of ‘ballast’ and spies that had penetrated into its midst, and on the other hand, to create a new secret union for the political struggle that would not be subject to the suspicion and danger its legal ‘brothers’ were in. Thus in the same year of 1909 a deeply conspiratorial ‘Military lodge’ was formed headed by A.I. Guchkov, and in 1910 – the ‘Ursa Minor’ lodge for work with ‘state’ society, in which the main roles gradually came to be played by Prince G. Lvov [the Grand Master of the Russian lodges], M.V. Rodzyanko, A.F. Kerensky, N.V. Nekrasov, P.P. Ryabushinsky, M.I. Tereschenko and A. Konovalov… Over them, that is, over the whole of Russian Masonry of this tendency, there weighed the Masonic *oath of fidelity* to the ‘Grand Orient of France’, which was given already in 1908 in the form of a special document called ‘Obligation’. This oath-obligation was kept faithfully both before and after the ‘self-liquidation’ and the emergence of a new leadership and a new structure. In 1910 this leadership declared its formal *independence* from Russian Masonry – but with the *agreement* of the French of the ‘Grand Orient’. The new leadership significantly simplified the reception of new members, it rejected (for conspiratorial reasons) many elements of Masonic symbolism and ritual, and thereby became, in the language of the Masons, ‘unlawful’. But all this was part of the conspiracy (so that in the event of something World Masonry could declare its complete ‘non-involvement’ in the conspirators and the conspiracy). In actual fact the whole course of the conspiracy was led and controlled precisely through *foreign Masons* (through the embassies of Germany, England and France in Russia). In 1910 Guchkov, a long-time member of the State Council and the Third State Duma, became the president of the Duma. However, in 1911 he voluntarily resigned from this post, which was immediately taken by his ‘brother’ Rodzyanko. In 1913 Guchkov and other ‘brothers’ created a secret ‘Supreme Council of Peoples of Russia’, which was joined by up to 400 members. But the presidents of the lodges knew only its secretaries – Nekrasov, Kerensky, Tereschenko. Each new lodge consisted of no more than 12 members. The Council and its ‘Convent’ coordinated the actions of the ‘Military Lodge’ and the structures of ‘Ursa Minor’. At this time Guchkov headed the military committee of the State Duma, and was in charge of defence questions. ‘In accordance with service obligations’, he was linked with the General Staff, and the most prominent military men, diplomats and industrialists. Gradually, one by one, Guchkov attracted into his ‘Military Lodge’ Generals N.N. Yanushkevich, A.S. Lukomsky, A.A. Polivanov, A.Z. Myshlayevsky, V.I. Gurko, Colonel Baron Korf, and then Generals A.V. Alexeyev, N.V. Ruzsky, A.M. Krymov, L.G. Kornilov, A.A. Brusilov, A.A. Manikovsky, V.F. Dzhunkovsky and many other eminent officers.

“In essence, in the years 1909-1913 Guchkov had already prepared a general plan of action, which he borrowed from the ‘Young Turk’ Masons in 1908 in Turkey, where he went specially to study the experience of the Turkish revolution. The essence of the plan consisted in the higher military officers, including those in the Tsar’s closest entourage, being able, at the necessary moment, to *isolate* their Monarch from all the levers of administration and *force*himto whatever deed or word the conspirators needed at that moment.

“As we can see, Masonry contained prominent activists and members of the leadership of almost *all the parties* and major organizations. Kerensky later recalled that in Masonry they almost never allowed themselves to violate the unity of the ‘brotherhood’ by party disagreements. But ‘in public’ a sharp polemic between the parties went on, a struggle that sometimes seemed irreconcilable to the public (the ‘profanes’)! So that whatever party came to power in the event of the revolution, there would *in any case* be ‘brother-masons’ at the helm of this power!”[[262]](#footnote-262)

Yana Sedova writes: “This group of Masons – about 300 people – had absolutely no interest in the aims of Masonry and rituals. They had their own clearly defined aim – to gain political power in the Russian Empire…”[[263]](#footnote-263) Their numbers were too small to effect a revolution on their own; but they were hoping that a coming Great War would make their task easier…

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Shtormakh considers that the main Masonic plotters were A.I. Guchkov, Prince G.E. Lvov, N.V. Nekrasov and M.I. Tereshchenko, all of whom became ministers in the Provisional Government.[[264]](#footnote-264)

Let us look more closely at probably the most important of these plotters: the industrialist and conservative (supposedly monarchist) parliamentarian, Alexander I. Guchkov. After fighting with the Boers against the British in South Africa, he considered himself, and was considered, a military expert. But his military-industrial committee was, with the Union of Zemstvos and Municipal Councils, one of the social organizations that, far from really helping the war effort, siphoned off state funds for the purposes of anti-state propaganda and agitation.

“The views of Guchkov,” writes Voeikov, “were a secret for nobody: already in 1908 he had shown enthusiasm for the work of the Young Turks, and he found it necessary to correct the mistake of the fighters for freedom in 1905, who before their planned movement had not paid enough attention to the army, whose faithfulness at that time they had not succeeded in shaking.”[[265]](#footnote-265)

Yana Sedova writes: “Already in 1906, after a meeting with the Emperor, A.I. Guchkov came to the unexpected conclusion: ‘We are in for still more violent upheavals’. Then he wanted ‘simply to step aside’. But already in those years he began to talk about a ‘coup d’état’.

“In the next few years Guchkov’s attention was temporarily occupied by work in the State Duma. But in 1911 after the murder of Stolypin, as he later recalled, there arose in him ‘an unfriendly feeling’ towards the Emperor Nicholas II.

“At the beginning of 1913, at a meeting in his Petersburg flat, Guchkov talked about a military coup in Serbia. The discussion moved to a coup in Russia. At this point one of the participants in the meeting said that ‘the party of the coup is coming into being’.

“Several months later, at a congress of his [Octobrist] party in Petersburg, Guchkov proclaimed the principle by which he was governed in the next four years: ‘the defence of the monarchy against the monarch’.

“The next year, during the ‘great retreat’, Guchkov created the Military-Industrial Committee, an organization whose official task was to help provide the army with ammunition. In fact, however, the committees turned out to be an instrument for the preparation of a coup.

“However, Guchkov would probably have continued to the end of his life only to ‘platonically sympathize’ with the coup, and do nothing himself, if once there had not appeared in his flat the leader of Russian masonry, N.V. Nekrasov.

“The two of them became the ‘initiators’ of a plan: ‘a palace coup, as a result of which his Majesty would be forced to sign his abdication passing the throne to his lawful Heir’.

“Soon another Mason, M.I. Tereshchenko, joined the plot, and, as Guchkov recalled, ‘the three of us set about a detailed working out of this plan’.”[[266]](#footnote-266)

On September 8, 1915 a “Committee of National Salvation” issued “Disposition Number 1”. “It affirmed,” writes N. Yakovlev, “that there were two wars going on in Russia – against a stubborn and skilful enemy from outside and a no less stubborn and skilful enemy from inside. The attainment of victory over the external enemy was unthinkable without a prior victory over the internal enemy. By the latter they had in mind the ruling dynasty. For victory on the internal front it was necessary… immediately to appoint a supreme command staff, whose basic core consisted of Prince G.E. Lvov, A.I. Guchkov and A.F. Kerensky.”[[267]](#footnote-267)

Some of the plotters considered regicide. Thus Shtormakh writes: “’In 1915,’ recounts the Mason A.F. Kerensky in his memoirs, ‘speaking at a secret meeting of representatives of the liberal and moderate conservative majority in the Duma and the State Council, which was discussing the Tsar’s politics, V.A. Maklakov, who was to the highest degree a conservative liberal, said that it was possible to avert catastrophe and save Russia only by repeating the events of March 11, 1801 (the assassination of Paul I).’ Kerensky reasons that the difference in views between him and Maklakov came down only to time, for Kerensky himself had come to conclude that killing the Tsar was ‘a necessity’ ten years earlier. ‘And besides,’ continues Kerensky, ‘Maklakov and those who thought like him would have wanted that others do it. But I suggested that, in accepting the idea, one should assume the whole responsibility for it, and go on to execute it personally’. Kerensky continued to call for the murder of the Tsar. In his speech at the session of the State Duma in February, 1917 he called for the ‘physical removal of the Tsar, explaining that they should do to the Tsar ‘what Brutus did in the time of Ancient Rome’.”[[268]](#footnote-268)

According to Guchkov, they worked out several variants of the seizure of power. One involved seizing the Tsar in Tsarskoye Selo or Peterhof. Another involved doing the same at Headquarters. This latter plan would have had to involve some generals who were members of the military lodge, such as Alexeyev or Ruzsky. However, this might lead to a schism in the army, which would undermine its capability for war. So it was decided not to initiate the generals into the plot – although, as we shall see, they played a very important role quite independently of Guchkov’s band, prevented loyal military units from coming to the aid of the Tsar, and themselves demanded his abdication.

(Sedova, after arguing that the generals were never initiated into Guchkov’s plot, goes on: “Finally, nevertheless, Guchkov revealed his plan to Ruzsky. But this took place already after the coup. On learning of the plot, Ruzsky cried out: ‘Ach, Alexander Ivanovich, if you had told me about this earlier, I would have joined you.’ But Guchkov said: ‘My dear, if I had revealed the plan, you would have pressed a button, and an adjutant would have come and you would have said: “Arrest him”.’” [[269]](#footnote-269))

A third plan, worked out by another Mason, Prince D.L. Vyazemsky, envisaged a military unit taking control of the Tsar’s train between Military Headquarters and Tsarskoye Selo and forcing him to abdicate in favour of the Tsarevich.

Yet another plan was to seize the Tsar (on March 1) and exile him abroad. Guchkov claims that the agreement of some foreign governments to this was obtained.

The Germans got wind of these plans, and not long before February, 1917 the Bulgarian Ambassador tried to warn the Tsar about them. The Germans, according to one version of events, were looking to save the Tsar in order to establish a separate peace with him. But the Tsar, in accordance with his promise to the Allies, rejected this out of hand.

Yet another plan was worked out by Prince G.E. Lvov. He suggested forcing the Tsar to abdicate and putting Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolayevich on the throne in his place, with Guchkov and Lvov as the powers behind the throne. The Mason A.I. Khatisov, a friend of the Grand Duke, spoke with him and his wife about this, and they were sympathetic to the idea. Sedova claims that Lvov actually offered the throne to Nikolasha…[[270]](#footnote-270)

At a meeting between members of the Duma and some generals in the study of Rodzyanko in February, 1917 another plot to force the Tsar to abdicate was formed. The leading roles in this were to be played by Generals Krymov and Ruzsky and Colonel Rodzyanko, the Duma leader’s son.

Finally, the so-called naval plot was formed, as Shulgin recounts, according to which the Tsaritsa (and perhaps also the Tsar) was to be invited onto a warship and taken to England.[[271]](#footnote-271)

Besides the formal conspirators, there were many others who helped them by trying to undermine the resolve of the Tsar. Thus “before the February coup,” writes Yana Sedova, “in the Russian empire there were more and more attempts on the part of individual people to ‘open the eyes of his Majesty’ to the internal political situation.

“This ‘search for truth’ assumed a particularly massive character in November, 1916, beginning on November 1, when Great Prince Nicholas Mikhailovich arrived at Stavka to have a heart-to-heart conversation with his Majesty…

“Very many considered it their duty to ‘open the eyes of his Majesty’: Grand Dukes Nicholas and Alexander Mikhailovich, Nicholas Nikolayevich and Paul Alexandrovich, the ministers Ignatiev and Pokrovsky, Generals Alexeyev and N.I. Ivanov, the ambassadors of allied governments Buchanan and Paléologue, the president of the Duma M. Rodzyanko, Protopresbyter of the army and navy G. Shavelsky, the court commandant V.N. Voejkov, the chief representative of the Red Cross P.M. Kaufmann-Turkestansky, the official A.A. Klopov, the dentist S.S. Kostritsky…

“This is far from a complete list. It includes only conversations, but many addressed his Majesty in letters or tried to influence the Empress (Great Prince Alexander Mikhailovich both spoke with his Majesty and sent him a very long letter and spoke with the Empress). ‘It seemed,’ wrote Rodzyanko later, ‘that the whole of Russia was beseeching his Majesty about one and the same thing, and it was impossible not to understand and pay heed to the pleas of a land worn out by suffering’.

“But what did ‘the whole of Russia’ ask about? As a rule, about two things: the removal of ‘dark powers’ and the bestowing of ‘a ministry of confidence’. The degree to which the boundaries between these two groups was blurred is evident from the fact that the Duma deputy Protopopov at first considered himself a candidate for the ‘responsible ministry’, but when his Majesty truly appointed him a minister, the name of Protopopov immediately appeared in the ranks of the ‘dark powers’. By the ‘dark powers’ was usually understood Rasputin and his supposed protégés. Few began to think at that time that ‘the Rasputin legend’ was invented, and not invented in vain.

“It was less evident what the ‘responsible ministry’ was. For many this term had a purely practical meaning and signified the removal from the government of certain ministers who were not pleasing to the Duma and the appointment in their place of Milyukov, Rodzyanko and other members of the Duma.

“But the closer it came to the February coup, the more demands there were in favour of a really responsible ministry, that is, a government which would be formed by the Duma and would only formally be confirmed by his Majesty. That a responsible ministry was no longer a real monarchy, but the end of the Autocracy was not understood by everyone. Nobody at that time listened to the words of Scheglovitov: ‘A monarchist who goes with a demand for a ministry of public confidence is not a monarchist’.

“As for the idea of appointed people with no administrative experience, but of the Duma, to the government in conditions of war, this was evidently thought precisely by those people. All these arguments about ‘dark forces’ and ‘a ministry of confidence’ first arose in the Duma and were proclaimed from its tribune. Evidently the beginning of the mass movements towards his Majesty in November, 1916 were linked with the opening of a Duma session at precisely that time. These conversations were hardly time to coincide with the opening of the Duma: rather, they were elicited by the Duma speeches, which were distributed at the time not only on the pages of newspapers, but also in the form of leaflets. ‘We,’ wrote Shulgin later, ‘ourselves went mad and made the whole country mad with the myth about certain geniuses, ‘endowed with public confidence’, when in fact there were none such…’

“In general, all these conversations were quite similar and usually irrelevant. Nevertheless, his Majesty always listened attentively to what was expressed in them, although by no means all his interlocutors were easy to listen to.

“Some of them, like many of the Great Princes and Rodzyanko, strove to impose their point of view and change his political course, demanding a ministry endowed with confidence or even a responsible ministry. His Majesty listened to them in silence and thanked them for their ‘advice’.

“Others, like General Alexeyev or S.S. Kostritsky, were under the powerful impression (not to say influence) of the Duma speeches and political agitation, which the truly dark forces who had already thought up the February coup were conducting at the time. Those who gave regular reports to his Majesty and whom he trusted were subjected to particularly strong pressure. If they began a heart-to-heart conversation, his Majesty patiently explained to them in what he did not agree with them and why.

“There existed a third category which, like P.M. Kaufmann, got through to his Majesty, even though they did not have a report to give, so as to tell him ‘the whole bitter truth’. They did not clearly know what they wanted, and simply said ‘everything that had built up in their souls’. Usually they began their speeches with the question: could they speak to him openly (as if his Majesty would say no to such a question!), and then spoke on the same two subjects, about the ‘dark powers’ and the government, insofar as, by the end of 1916, the same things, generally speaking, had built up in all their souls. The speech of such a ‘truth-seeker’ usually ended in such a sad way (Kaufmann just said: ‘Allow me: I’ll go and kill Grishka!’) that his Majesty had to calm them down and assure them that ‘everything will work out’.

“One cannot say that his Majesty did not listen to his interlocutors. Some ministers had to leave their posts precisely because of the conversations. For example, on November 9, 1916 his Majesty wrote to the Empress that he was sacking Shturmer since nobody trusted that minister: ‘Every day I hear more and more about him. We have to take account of that.’ And on the same day he wrote in his diary: ‘My head is tired from all these conversations’.

“From the beginning everyone noticed his tiredness, and his interlocutors began more often to foretell revolution to him. Earlier he could say to the visitor: ‘But you’ve gone out of your mind, this is all in your dreams. And when did you dream it? Almost on the very eve of our victory?! And what are you frightened of? The rumours of corrupt Petersburg and the babblers in the Duma, who value, not Russia, but their own interests?’ (from the memoirs of Mamantov). And then the conversation came to an end. But now he had to reply to the most senseless attacks. And he replied. To the rumours of betrayal in the entourage of the Empress: ‘What, in your opinion I’m a traitor?’ To the diagnosis made by the Duma about Protopopov: ‘When did he begin to go mad? When I appointed him a minister?’ To the demand ‘to deserve the confidence of the people’: ‘But is it not that my people has to deserve my confidence?’ However, they did not listen to him…”[[272]](#footnote-272)

At the end of December came the murder of Rasputin. Whether or not it was really planned by the plotters, it suited them well. “It was truly a master stroke,” according to Yakobi: “to impel a ‘representative of the people’ [Purishkevich] and a relative of the Royal Family [Yusupov] to the crime: counting on the impunity of the murderers, the plotters arranged a pan-national demonstration of the open rebellion by the upper classes and the helplessness of the government.

“If Miliukov’s speech was the first blow and the tolling of the bell for the revolution, Prince Yusupov’s shot was the second blow on the bell. The third and final one had to sound out in Pskov, as a signal for the dark forces to tear apart unhappy Russia, covered in blood…”[[273]](#footnote-273)

## **61. THE ACTORS IN THE REVOLUTION: (4) THE CLERGY AND MONASTICS**

Long before the Jews began to join terrorist organizations, or the intelligentsia to weave plots against the tsar, the Russian people began to fall away from the faith. This was mentioned by Saints Seraphim of Sarov and Tikhon of Zadonsk; and St. Ignaty Brianchaninov spoke about “hypocrisy”, “scribes and Pharisees” and “the salt losing its savour”. By the eve of the revolution this decline was still more noticeable. “Are many Orthodox Christians firm in the faith which they confess?” asked St. Joseph of Optina. “Do not the greater portion of them have something of a weak faith, like a tiny spark which might be extinguished at any moment?”[[274]](#footnote-274)

The Church hierarchy was corrupted by renovationists such as Archbishop Sergius (Stragorodsky) and Bishop Antoninus (Granovsky). There were few bishops who spoke out openly against the revolutionary madness…

In the monasteries it was the same story. In the years 1908-13 there was a series of rebellions against the abbots and elders of some of the best monasteries in Russia: Optina, Solovki, Glinsk. These were usually linked with monks who had entered the monasteries during the revolutionary years 1905-07. Thus the future Elder Gabriel of Seven Lakes was warned by St. Ambrose of Optina “to go wherever he please, so as only not to live in Moscow”, where monasticism was at such a low level.[[275]](#footnote-275) A generation later, in 1909, Archbishop Nicon (Rozhdenstvensky) pointed to many serious failings of contemporary monasticism at an All-Russian Monastic Conference.[[276]](#footnote-276) In the same year, St. Barsanuphius of Optina said: “Contemporary monasticism strives in all things to fulfil its own will. Abba Dorotheus says: ‘I know of no other fall for a monk than as a consequence of his own will.’”[[277]](#footnote-277)

The contagion spread even outside Russia, into the Russian monastery and sketes of Mount Athos. Here it manifested itself especially in the so-called name-worshipping heresy. The ignorance and superstition of the name-worshipping monks did not grow on an empty place; and pseudo-elders such as Rasputin and Iliodor could not have flourished in a more truly pious society…

In 1907, a Russian Athonite, Schema-monk Hilarion, published a book on the Jesus prayer entitled *On the Mountains of the Caucasus*. This book was at first well-received and passed the spiritual censor; but later its claim that the name of God *is* God - more precisely, that the Name of God as uttered in the Jesus prayer is not only holy and filled with the grace of God, but is holy *in and of itself*, being *God Himself -* elicited criticism. Although both the Greek and Russian Churches condemned the heresy[[278]](#footnote-278), the name-worshippers rose up and expelled their Orthodox abbots and spiritual leaders. Finally, in 1913, after every attempt at peaceful persuasion had failed, the Tsar authorized a warship to be sent to Athos. The rebellious monks were transported to Odessa and then sent to different places of exile (for example, Novy Afon in Abkhazia).

Soon monastic opinion in Russia was polarised between those who, like the monks of the Kiev Caves Lavra, approved of the book and its name-worshipping thesis (*imiabozhie* in Russian), and those, like the monks of the Pochaev Lavra and the Optina Desert, who rejected it. However, as Gubanov writes, “the illiterate G.E. Rasputin interceded for the heretical name-worshippers and even tried to incite the empress to attack the fighters against the heresy of name-worshipping.”[[279]](#footnote-279) In 1914 the leading name-worshippers, including Hieroschemamonk Anthony (Bulatovich), author of *An Apology of Faith in the Name of God and the Name of Jesus* (1913), were justified by the Moscow Diocesan Court, which declared: “… The Synodal Office has found that in *the confessions of faith in God and in the Name of God* coming from the named monks, in the words, ‘I repeat that in naming the Name of God and the Name of Jesus as God and God Himself, I reject both the veneration of the Name of God as His Essence, and the veneration of the Name of God separately from God Himself as some kind of special Divinity, as well as any deification of the very letters and sounds and any chance thoughts about God’ – there is contained information allowing us to conclude that in them there is no basis for leaving the Orthodox Church for the sake of the teaching on the Names of God.’ (decree № 1443 of May 8, 1914)”.

Of course, this decree did not constitute a “justification” of the name-worshippers’ teaching, especially in view of the fact that *on the same day* the Office, led by Metropolitan Macarius, affirmed that name-worshipping – *“the new false-teachings on the names of God proclaimed by Schema-Monk Hilarion and Anthony Bulatovich”* – was a heresy (decree № 1442 of May 8, 1914). Moreover, in rejecting “any deification of the very letters and sounds and any chance thoughts about God”, Bulatovich was obliged also to renounce his words in the *Apology*: “Every mental representation of a named property of God is the Name of God [and therefore, according to the name-worshippers, God Himself]”, “the contemplation of the His name is God Himself”, “the conscious naming of God is God Himself”, “Every idea about God is God Himself”, “we call the very idea of God – God”.

Unfortunately, the repentance of the name-worshippers turned out to be fictional. Bulatovich concealed his heresy behind ambiguous words and phrases. Thus on May 18, 1914, in a letter to Metropolitan Macarius, Bulatovich thanked him for his “justification”, and nobly deigned to declare that he was now ready to return into communion with the Orthodox Church (!). And he added: “Concerning the Name of God and the Name of Jesus Christ, we, in accordance with the teaching of the Holy Fathers, confessed and confess the Divinity and the Divine Power of the Name of the Lord, but we do not raise this teaching to the level of a dogma, for it has not yet been formulated and dogmatised in council, but we expect that at the forthcoming Council it will be formulated and dogmatised. Therefore we, in accordance with the teaching of the Holy Fathers, in the words of the ever-memorable Father John of Kronstadt said and say that the Name of God is God Himself, and the Name of the Lord Jesus is the Lord Jesus Christ Himself, understanding this not in the sense of a deification of the created name, but understanding it spiritually, in the sense of the inseparability of the God-revealed Truth, Which is the Action of the Divinity.” These words of Bulatovich show that he was not sincere in his signature below his *Confession*, but deceived Metropolitan Macarius (who was probably under pressure from the Over-Procurator Sabler, who was in turn under pressure from the fervent name-worshipper Gregory Rasputin). “Mixing truth with unrighteousness” (Rom. 1.18), Bulatovich mixed Orthodoxy with heresy. Thus Orthodoxy recognises that there is a “Divine Power” in the name of Jesus, but does *not* recognise that it *is* “Divinity”. Again, Orthodoxy recognises that in prayer the name of God is indeed inseparable from God, but it does not *confuse* the two, as does Bulatovich. For while a shadow is inseparable from the body that casts it, this is not to say that the shadow *is* the body. Finally, Bulatovich’s “dogma” is still not “formulated and dogmatised in council” – because it is *not* a dogma, but heresy!

The Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church accepted that Bulatovich and his fellows had not really repented, so they set aside the decree of the Moscow Synodal Office, and confirmed the sentences against the name-worshippers (decree № 4136 of May 10-24, 1914), which confirmation was again confirmed by decree № 2670 of March 10, 1916. “In this decree of the Most Holy Synod,” wrote the future Hieromartyr Bishop Basil (Zelentsov), “we find a confirmation of the basic rule that the name-worshippers must be received into ecclesiastical communion and admitted to the sacraments of the Church only on the unfailing condition that they reject the false teaching of name-worshipping and witness to their faithfulness to the dogmas and teaching of the Church and to their obedience to Church authority.”

Although name-worshipping was on the agenda of the 1917-18 Council and a subcommission to study it under the leadership of Archbishop Theophan of Poltava and Fr. Sergius Bulgakov was formed, the subcommission did not have time to complete its work before the Council was terminated by the Bolsheviks. However, on October 8/21, 1918, Patriarch Tikhon and the Most Holy Synod declared: “The Most Holy Synod does not change its former judgement on the error itself [of name-worshipping]… and has in no way changed its general rule, according to which the name-worshippers, as having been condemned by the Church authorities, can be received into Church communion… only after they have renounced name-worshipping and have declared their submission to the Holy Church… The petition of Hieroschemamonk Anthony to allow him to serve is to be recognised as not worthy of being satisfied so long as he continues to disobey Church authority and spread his musings which have been condemned by the Church hierarchy to the harm of the Church”.

After this decision, the leading name-worshipper, Anthony Bulatovich, broke communion for the second time with the Russian Church and was shortly afterwards killed by robbers.

The name-worshipping movement survived in the Caucasus and South Russian region (where the Tsar had transported the rebellious monks); and the sophianist heretics Florensky and Bulgakov also confessed name-worshipping in the inter-war period. In modern times the heresy has enjoyed a revival in intellectualist circles in Russia, especially in the works of Bishop Gregory (Lourié), who supports the heretical views of Bulatovich, considers him to be a saint, and those who oppose his ideas, including several hieromartyrs of the Russian Church to be “enemies of the Name”!

Reasons for the failure to stamp out the heresy included the comparatively weak defence of the truth produced by the Greek and Russian theologians[[280]](#footnote-280), the aura of martyrdom which was attached to the name-worshippers as a result of their forcible expulsion from Mount Athos to Russia on a Russian cruiser, and the fact that the heresy coincided with the end of the Balkan wars and the transfer of Mount Athos from Turkish to Greek dominion after the Treaty of Bucharest, which meant that mutual suspicions between the Greeks and the Russians concerning the status of Athos hindered a united and thorough approach to the problem. Many took up the cause of the name-worshippers as part of their general attack on the “paralytical” Russian Holy Synod. Soon the debate acquired political overtones: democrats and socialists generally took the side of the name-worshippers, and the monarchists – that of the Orthodox.[[281]](#footnote-281) Bulatovich himself was a left social revolutionary.[[282]](#footnote-282)

Elder Gerasimus of Alaska relates how Elder Joasaph of St. Tikhon’s monastery, Kaluga province, would often say in those pre-revolutionary years: "Misha, you see how monks are complaining - either the food is bad or something else is not good enough! Misha, grumbling is a frightful sin. For grumbling, God punished the chosen Israelite people not just once. Palestine is not far from Egypt, but the Lord led the Jews a whole forty years, and not many of them reached the Promised Land. See what a terrible sin it is - grumbling against God. And why should monks grumble? They usually have a warm cell, decent food, and enough bread to eat any time they want it. They have both shoes and clothing. While our peasant, having a family, often lacks those things, and then there are crop failures, and they have to pay taxes. And yet many of them are bearing this horrendous burden. Oh Misha, you'll see, the Lord will send terrible trials. He will take everything away from us, and then we will say, “Bad times have come; we have nothing to eat.” Misha, this will inevitably take place if we do not repent; for such a sin God will not spare either our luxurious temples or the beautiful belfries, or the bells, or even the whole of our brotherhood - everything, everything will be taken away for our sinful grumbling.”[[283]](#footnote-283)

Churchmen were particularly guilty of failing to support the monarchical principle. Thus in May, 1913, the Holy Synod took the important decision to forbid clergy from taking part in political movements. However, since most clergy affected by this decree were working in the monarchist “Black Hundreds” movement, this was, in effect, an anti-monarchist move; it was hardly consistent with the Epistle that the Synod issued in February, 1913 on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the Romanov dynasty, in which they declared that “only in an unbroken union of the Church with the state is the strength and might of our native Rus’”. As a result of the May decree, such prominent monarchist clergy as Archimandrite Vitaly (Maximenko) and Protopriest John Vostorgov were forced to abandon the “Black Hundreds” movement. As a result, the movement went into a sharp decline…

Again, in 1916 all 45 priests who were deputies in the Duma and were considered “rightists” presented the Tsar with a petition to re-establish “conciliarity” in the Church and stop using the clergy “as an instrument of the government’s internal politics”. At such a critical moment in the country’s life such a petition was more than a little misplaced… When the liberal “Progressive Bloc” had been formed in 1915, more than half of these priests joined it.

All this demonstrated how the revolutionary spirit had penetrated even into the very heart of Holy Rus’.[[284]](#footnote-284)

## **62. THE ACTORS IN THE REVOLUTION: (3) THE LAITY**

A particular characteristic of the pre-revolutionary period – and a propaganda gift for the revolutionaries - was the extravagance of the rich and their flagrant immorality. The Romanovs – with the shining exceptions of the Tsar and Tsarina, Great Princess Elizabeth and some others – were among the worst sinners. Thus, as Nils Johanssen writes, there was the Tsar’s uncle, Great Prince Alexei Alexeyevich – General-Admiral and head of the whole fleet. “His lover, the French dance Eliza Baletta, quickly became one of the richest women in Russia. Thus the money that had been assigned to buy new cruisers in England was spent by the prince on diamonds… After the Tsusima catastrophe the theatre public whistled both at him and at his passion. ‘Prince Tsusima!’ they cried at the courtier. ‘The blood of our sailors is on your diamonds!’ – this was directed at the Frenchwoman. On June 2, 1905 Alexis Alexeyevich was forced to go into retirement. He took his stolen capital and together with Baletta set off for France.”[[285]](#footnote-285)

The increasing hard-heartedness of wealthy Russian Christians to the poor was bewailed by many leading churchmen, such as St. John of Kronstadt. Almost the only thing shared by St. John and his ideological opposite, Lev Tolstoy, was their condemnation of the rich. Thus Tolstoy wrote already in 1886 in *What Then Must We Do?:* “The hatred and contempt of the oppressed masses are increasing, and the physical and moral forces of the wealthy classes are weakening; the deception on which everything depends is wearing out, and the wealthy classes have nothing to console themselves with in this mortal danger.

“To return to the old ways is not possible; only one thing is left for those who do not wish to change their way of life, and that is to hope that ‘things will last my time’ – after that let happen what may. That is what the blind crowd of the rich are doing, but the danger is ever growing and the terrible catastrophe draws near…”[[286]](#footnote-286)

Both rich and poor tended to forget the Christian teaching on social inequality, namely, that it is an opportunity for the rich to show compassion and for the poor to display patience. For, as Bishop Nikolai Velimirovich wrote, “it is God’s desire that men be unequal in externals: riches, power, status, learning, position and so forth. But he does not recommend any sort of competitiveness in this. God desires that men compete in the multiplying of the inner virtues.” [[287]](#footnote-287)

But the rich in every age have been corrupt. What of the poor?...

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In the villages and factories, as we have seen, revolutionary propaganda made deep inroads. Although only a minority of peasants took part in the burning of landowners’ estates in the 1905 revolution, by 1917 the experience of the war and the lying propaganda directed against the Tsar and his family had increased the numbers of deserters, thieves and arsonists. In the elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1918 no less than ***80%*** of the population voted for socialist deputies.[[288]](#footnote-288) Moreover, support for the Bolsheviks in the elections, as Richard Pipes writes, “came not from the region of Jewish concentration, the old Pale of Settlement, but from the armed forces and the cities of Great Russia, which had hardly any Jews”.[[289]](#footnote-289) So blame for the Russian revolution must fall on Russians as well as Jews, and not only on the aristocratic or Masonic Russians, but on large swathes of the Christian working population.

What of “the vanguard of the revolution”, the industrial workers? In 1917, writes Smith, “there were still only 3.6 million workers in Russia’s factories and mines, yet their concentration in particular regions and in relatively large enterprises gave them a political clout out of all proportion to their numbers, Mainly recruited from the peasants – ‘snatched from the plough and hurled into the factory furnace’ in L.D. Trotsky’s memorable phrase – they varied considerably in the extent to which they were tied to the land, involved in urban culture, educated, and skilled. There were big differences, for example, between the skilled metalworkers of Vyborg district in Petrograd, the textile-workers of the Moscow industrical region, and the workers from the mining settlements of the Urals. Nevertheless the proportion of workers who had severed their ties with the village and who were becoming socialized into the urban industrial environment was increasing. Towns provided workers with cultural opportunities, such as evening classes, clubs, libraries, theatres, and mass entertainment, and exposed them to the subversive political ideas of Social Democrats and Socialits Revolutionaries. The wretched conditions in which workers lived, the drudgery of their work and their pitiful wages heightened their sense of separateness not only from the government but from privileged society in general.

“Following the general strike of 1905, the autocracy conceded limited legalization of trade unions, but employers showed little desire to reform the authoritian system of industrial relations. Moreover, since the response of the authorities to strikes and demonstrations was to send in police and Cossacks, workers were easily politicized, seeing in the state and capitalists a single mechanism of oppression. Deprived the change to pursue improvement by gradualistic means, Russian workers became the most strike-prone in Europe: in 1905-06 and again in 1912-14, the annual number of strikers was equivalent to almost three-quarters of the factory workhouse…”[[290]](#footnote-290)

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The Tsar was blamed for everything, although, as we have seen, he did much to help the peasants, and did his best for the workers with good labour legislations. However, the problems associated with rapid industrialization were virtually insoluble in all countries, and were hardly the Tsar’s fault. He just had the extra problem of very rapid demographic expansion, shortage of funds (income tax was not introduced until 1916) and a constant barrage of anti-tsarist propaganda from all classes at home and from the Jewish press abroad…

The fact is, as F. Vinberg writes: “Everyone was guilty! Both the higher circles of the nobility, and the major and minor merchants, and the representatives of science, and the servant classes, and in particular the adulterers of the word, the corrupters of thought, many Russian writers of the last decades, lawyers and professors: for all these categories of Russian citizens there can be no forgiveness for the great crime they committed.”[[291]](#footnote-291)

And so Ivan Solonevich’s words applied to all sections of the Christian population: “With the substitution of faith in absolute Good with faith in relative sausages, everything else also begins to take on a relative character, including man. With the loss of faith in God, loss of faith in man is also lost. The Christian principle, ‘love your neighbour as yourself’, for your neighbour is *also* a part of absolute Good, is exchanged for another principle: ‘man is a means for the production of sausages’. The feeling of absolute morality is lost… Consequently faith ceases to exist not only in man generally, but also in one’s ‘neighbour’ and even in the neighbour himself. And then begins mutual extermination…”[[292]](#footnote-292)

A particular vice of the simple people was drunkenness. The future hieromartyr Bishop Herman (Ryashentsev) of Vyazniki wrote: “The most evil infirmity of our countryside and the strongest brake on all real enlightenment and spiritual growth is alcohol. If in antiquity ‘Rus’ used to drink with gladness’, now it has turned into a passion and a chronic illness, and our people not only drinks away its last substance, an excess of which destiny never spoiled them with, but, what is worst of all, it drinks away its mind, its conscience, its soul, the man himself. On the soil richly watered with alcohol there develop card games, interspersed with pearls of foul language, and there grow quarrels and fights, those eternal companions of drunkenness.

“And new infirmities are added to these: the sowing of our political innovators brings forth abundant shoots: they develop lack of respect to the person and to parents, an easy attitude to other people’s property. Instances of thievery and violence become more frequent. Add to that a distorted manifestation of an incorrectly understood notion of the freedom of the personality, which is reflected in the fall of morality among the young, and you receive quite a full picture of the spiritual life in the countryside…”[[293]](#footnote-293)

The general condition of the Russian Christian people on the eve of the Great War was described by Dmitri Merezhkovsky as follows: “If you asked me what is the main characteristic of Russian people in our days, I would reply: loneliness. Never and nowhere have there been so many lonely people as now in Russia. Even those who not long ago were sociable, have suddenly become solitary. People are dispersing like iron filings bound together by a magnet when the magnet has lost its strength: they are falling out of society like a fish out of a holy sweepnet…”[[294]](#footnote-294)

And the loneliest of all was the Tsar, upon whom fell the whole weight of the preservation of the Orthodox commonwealth and the lives of tens of millions of people. While he might consult with many, very few, if any, could comprehend the huge complexity of the questions that faced him. And only he could take the momentous decisions: to fight or not to fight, to rule or not to rule…

## **63. THE ACTORS IN THE REVOLUTION: (5) RASPUTIN**

Kerensky said that “without Rasputin, there could have been no Lenin”… This is a gross exaggeration: God would not have allowed the greatest Christian empire in history to fall because of the sinfulness of one man! Nevertheless, slanderous stories about the “elder’s” supposed sexual relationship with the Empress, and of his control of the Russian government through her, undoubtedly had a particularly corrosive influence on the reputation of the monarchy during the war and hastened its demise.

Since the early 1990s there have been attempts to rehabilitate the reputation of Rasputin, notably by the historians Oleg Platonov and Alexander Bakhanov.[[295]](#footnote-295) We can sympathize with these attempts insofar as they are motivated by a desire to protect the reputation of the Tsar and Tsarina, which suffered so much because of their (especially her) credulity in relation to Rasputin. Moreover, it is right to point out that many of those who attacked Rasputin in the dying days of the empire were motivated not so much by a desire to save the empire as by mercenary, egoistic and unpatriotic considerations that make their testimony highly dubious.

However, even after discounting these evilly-motivated testimonies, and taking into account the anti-monarchical bias of such “champions of the truth” about Rasputin as Guchkov and Rodzyanko, the evidence against Rasputin is too great and too varied to dismiss wholesale. In 1995 the historian and dramatist Edvard Radzinsky came into possession of the long-lost file of testimonies to the Extraordinary Commission set up by the Provisional Government in March, 1917 to investigate the truth or otherwise of accusations against the Royal Couple and those close to them.[[296]](#footnote-296) These testimonies, which include some by close friends of Rasputin, such as his publisher Filippov, as well as by others whose integrity and devotion to the Royal Couple cannot be doubted, and by several of his female victims, force us to the conclusion that, barring some of the wildest accusations, Rasputin was “guilty as charged”.

Also impossible to reject wholesale are the very extensive police reports on Rasputin’s immoral behaviour. While Bakhanov among others has tried to dismiss even this evidence, Alexander Khitrov is right in pointing out that the police were, after the Tsar himself, the very first victims of the February revolution, and so cannot be accused of simply making up the whole story.[[297]](#footnote-297)

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The Siberian peasant Gregory Rasputin emerged on the scene at the same time as a new, more subtle and sinister threat replaced the revolutionary threat in 1906: theosophy, occultism, spiritism and pornography flooded into Russia.[[298]](#footnote-298) “So many upper-class people were drawn into the pursuit of truth through metarational means, outside the Orthodox faith; attending séances, studying the Cabbala, reading journals called *From There* and *The Spiritualist,* visiting mediums and acquiring obscure books of hermetic wisdom. Self-proclaimed spiritual teachers sprang up in Petersburg, gathered worshipful followers into cultlike societies, and made fortunes offering advice, healing and the cachet of possessing hidden learning.

“Within the imperial family itself, Nicky’s relative Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich was, in the words of the highly skeptical Count Witte, ‘one of the chief, if not the chief iniator of that abnormal mood of Orthodox paganism and searching for miracles, into which they obviously strayed in the highest circles.’”[[299]](#footnote-299)

Of course, there is no such thing as “Orthodox paganism”. There is only anti-Christian paganism, which was penetrating music and the arts, as we see, or example, in Stravinsky’s famous ballet, *The Rite of Spring* (1913).[[300]](#footnote-300) Also sharply on the rise, especially among the peasantry, were Protestant sects, as well as sectarian movements that hid among the Orthodox peasantry like the *khlysty*. Rasputin was symbolic of this trend, which undermined the foundations of Holy Rus’ just as surely as the anti-monarchism of the revolutionaries.

After a debauched youth, Rasputin repented and spent some years on pilgrimage, going from monastery to monastery, and also to Athos and Jerusalem, becoming highly religious in a rather supercharged way. In 1899 he married and had children, but in 1902 was recommended by Bishop Chrysanthus of Kazan to the rector of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, Bishop Sergius (Stragorodsky, the future patriarch}. “The latter, in his turn, presented Rasputin to the professor, celibate priest Veniamin, and to the inspector of the Academy, Archimandrite Theophan.” [[301]](#footnote-301)

In November, 1905, or July, 1906[[302]](#footnote-302), Rasputin met the Tsar for the first time (probably through the Montenegrin Grand Duchesses Militsa and Anastasia). The Royal Couple, and especially the Tsarina, had already shown their vulnerability to religious quacks in the affair of the French charlatan, “Monsieur Philippe” of Lyons. At that time Grand Duchess Elizabeth, the Tsarina’s sister had tried to open her eyes to the deception, but without success – she attributed her failure to her sister’s inability to distinguish between the true faith and the condition of religious exaltation.[[303]](#footnote-303) Philippe falsely prophesied that the Empress would have a son – it turned out to be a phantom pregnancy. But he did give one piece of good advice: he advised her to pray to St. Seraphim of Sarov, though whose prayers the Tsarevich Alexis was born in 1904. But he also, fatefully, said that after his death, which took place in 1905, his soul would enter the body of another “Friend” of the Royal Family…

St. Elizabeth Fyodorovna would also become a strong opponent of her sister’s “second Friend”, Rasputin. But the second Friend had a powerful weapon – his apparent ability to heal the symptoms of the Tsarevich Alexei’s haemophilia, a closely guarded secret and a cause of great anguish to his parents. As Pierre Gilliard, the Tsarevich’s tutor, said: “The illness of the Tsarevich cast a shadow over the whole of the concluding period of Tsar Nicholas II’s reign, and… was one of the main causes of his fall, for it made possible the phenomenon of Rasputin and resulted in the fatal seduction of the sovereigns who lived in a world apart, wholly absorbed in a tragic anxiety which had to be concealed from the eyes of all.”

As Archpriest Michael Polsky writes, Rasputin was “a simple man, uneducated, coarse but clever, he possessed a hypnotic power of suggestion and some clairvoyance. He cloaked his words and actions in a religious and Orthodox form. He was kind to all who sought his help, but dissolute in his personal life. The literature about him is full of conjecture, and the man remains an enigma. In the guileful environment of the court, he was able to have an influence on the pure, truth-loving and piour Royal couple… [But] this relationship was founded only on a mother’s noble and heart-felt feelings for her seriously ill child…”[[304]](#footnote-304)

General V.N. Voeikov, commendant of the palace at Tsarskoye Selo and a close friend of the Royal Couple until the end, was sceptical about Rasputin from the beginning. But he witnessed to his healing power: “From the first time Rasputin appeared at the bed of the sick heir, alleviation followed immediately. All those close to the Royal Family were well acquainted with the case in Spala, when the doctors found no means of helping Alexis Nikolayevich, who was suffering terribly and groaning from pain. As soon as a telegram was sent to Rasputin on the advice of Vyrubova, and the reply was received, the pains began to decrease, his temperature began to fall, and soon the heir got better.

“If we take the point of view of the Empress-mother, who saw in Rasputin a God-fearing elder who had helped her sick son by his prayers – much should be understood and forgiven by every Russian devoted to the throne and the Homeland.

“The help he gave to the heir strengthened the position of Rasputin to such a degree at court that he no longer had need of the support of the [Montenegrin] Great Princesses and clergy. As a completely uneducated man, he was not able or did not want to hide this, and simply turned his back on his benefactors. Then there began denunciations against him; in the Synod they began a case to investigate the life and activity of Rasputin with the aim of demonstrating that he was a sectarian preaching principles harmful to Orthodoxy; while in society they began to speak about him as about a debauchee who cast a shadow on the empress by his appearances at court. The excuse for these conversations was disillusionment in Rasputin, who did not justify the hopes laid upon him.

“The stronger the campaign of denunciation against the Rasputin coming from the Duma, the more there developed in her Majesty the feeling that it was necessary to protect the man who was irreplaceable for the health of the heir: the influence of the empress on certain appointments can be explained by her desire to distance people who were dangerous to Rasputin from power.

“Taking full account of all this, Rasputin put on the mask of a righteous man at court, but outside it did not disdain to use the privileges of his position and to satisfy his sometimes wild instincts...”[[305]](#footnote-305)

D.P. Anashkin writes: “Let us not judge the doting parents for grasping at any opportunity to aid their son, who himself loved Grigory Efimovich. But again arises the question of this character’s two-faced nature. Did he truly love the Royal Family? If it were so, he would not have discredited them in the eyes of the public by his behavior. Or, if he saw that the situation had gotten out of hand, then he would have quietly withdrawn. Instead, he placed self-assuredness before this. Besides which, sanctity does not signify omniscience. Though sincere [in their affection], the Royal Family misjudged their ‘friend.’

“It must be noted that the ‘special intimacy of the elder’ with the Royal Family advertised by Rasputin’s admirers is greatly exaggerated. To be exact, there was no ‘special bond’ at all. The Tsar, contrary to the commentary of both the pro-Rasputin and the Soviet press, did not place blind trust in Rasputin. In a letter to the Empress, he writes, ‘As far as Rasputin’s counsels, you know how carefully one must regard his counsels.’ As evidence, S. Oldenburg shows in his book, *The Life and Rule of Emperor Nicholas II,* that in 1915–16 the Sovereign heeded not one of Rasputin’s seventeen recommendations.”[[306]](#footnote-306)

This judgement was confirmed by the Tsar’s sister Grand Duchess Olga Alexandrovna, who witnesses that the real influence of Rasputin on the Tsar was negligible: "Knowing Nicky as I did, I must insist that Rasputin had not a particle of influence over him. It was Nicky who eventually put a stop to Rasputin's visits to the palace. It was again Nicky who sent the man back to Siberia and that more than once. And some of Nicky's letters to Alicky are proof enough of what he really thought of Rasputin's advice..."

Of particular significance was the relationship between Rasputin and Archimandrite, later Bishop Theophan (Bystrov).[[307]](#footnote-307) Vladyka was at first impressed by the peasant, but became disillusioned with him after becoming convinced, from his own observations and from the confessions of his spiritual daughters, that the man was untrustworthy and sexually rapacious.

“After a while,” he testified to the Extraordinary Commission, “rumours reached me that Rasputin had resumed his former way of life and was undertaking something against us… I decided to resort to a final measure – to denounce him openly and to communicate everything to the former emperor. It was not, however, the emperor who received me but his wife in the presence of the maid of honour Vyrubova.

“I spoke for about an hour and demonstrated that Rasputin was in a state of spiritual deception… The former empress grew agitated and objected, citing theological works… I destroyed all her arguments, but she… reiterated them: ‘It is all falsehood and slander’… I concluded the conversation by saying that I could no longer have anything to do with Rasputin… I think Rasputin, as a cunning person, explained to the royal family that my speaking against him was because I envied his closeness to the Family… that I wanted to push him out of the way.

“After my conversation with the empress, Rasputin came to see me as if nothing had happened, having apparently decided that the empress’s displeasure had intimidated me… However, I told him in no uncertain terms, ‘Go away, you are a fraud.’ Rasputin fell on his knees before me and asked my forgiveness… But again I told him, ‘Go away, you have violated a promise given before God.’ Rasputin left, and I did not see him again.”

At this point Vladyka received a confession from a former devotee of Rasputin’s. On reading this, he understood that Rasputin was “a wolf in sheep’s clothing” and “a sectarian of the *khlyst* type” who “taught his followers not to reveal his secrets even to their confessors. For if there is allegedly no sin in what these sectarians do, then their confessors need not be made aware of it.”

“Availing myself of that written confession, I wrote the former emperor a second letter… in which I declared that Rasputin not only was in a state of spiritual deception but was also a criminal in the religious and moral sense… In the moral sense because, as it followed from the ‘confession’, Father Gregory had seduced his victims.”

There was no reply to this letter. “I sensed that they did not want to hear me out and understand… It all depressed me so much that I became quite ill.” And indeed, the Tsaritsa’s faith in the “elder” was unshakeable; she felt in her heart – “which has never deceived me” – that Rasputin was a man of God and that her family and Russia lived through his prayers. It must be remembered that by this time the empress, worn down by many trials, had developed what Dr. Botkin, who was later martyred with the Royal Family, called “progressive hysteria”. In his view, her major illness was “psychosomatic”, although she had real physical weaknesses in the form of sciatica and a weak heart. These factors must be taken into account when assessing her behaviour.

In fact, Vladyka’s letter had reached the Tsar, and the scandal surrounding the rape of the children’s nurse, Vishnyakova, whose confessor was Vladyka, could no longer be concealed. Vishnyakova herself testified to the Extraordinary Commission that she had been raped by Rasputin during a visit to Verkhoturye Monastery in Tobolsk province, a journey undertaken at the empress’s suggestion. “Upon our return to Petrograd, I reported everything to the empress, and I also told Bishop Theophan in a private meeting with him. The empress did not give any heed to my words and said that everything Rasputin does is holy. From that time forth I did not see Rasputin, and in 1913 I was dismissed from my duties as nurse. I was also reprimanded for frequenting the Right Reverend Theophan.”

Another person in on the secret was the maid of honour Sophia Tyutcheva, grand-daughter of the famous poet. As she witnessed to the Commission, she was summoned to the Tsar, who said to her:

“You have guessed why I summoned you. What is going on in the nursery?”

She told him.

“So you too do not believe in Rasputin’s holiness?”

She replied that she did not.

“But what will you say if I tell you that I have lived all these years only thanks to his prayers?”

Then he “began saying that he did not believe any of the stories, that the impure always sticks to the pure, and that he did not understand what had suddenly happened to Theophan, who had always been so fond of Rasputin. During this time he pointed to a letter from Theophan on his desk.”

“’You, your majesty, are too pure of heart and do not see what filth surrounds you.’ I said that it filled me with fear that such a person could be near the grand duchesses.

“’Am I then the enemy of my own children?’ the sovereign objected.

“He asked me never to mention Rasputin’s name in conversation. In order for that to take place, I asked the sovereign to arrange things so that Rasputin would never appear in the children’s wing.”

But her wish was not granted, and both Vishnyakova and Tyutcheva would not long remain in the tsar’s service…

It was at about this time that the newspapers began to write against Rasputin. And a member of the circle of the Grand Duchess Elizabeth Fyodorovna, Michael Alexandrovich Novoselov, the future bishop-martyr of the Catacomb Church, published a series of articles condemning Rasputin. "Why do the bishops,” he wrote, “who are well acquainted with the activities of this blatant deceiver and corrupter, keep silent?… Where is their grace, if through laziness or lack of courage they do not keep watch over the purity of the faith of the Church of God and allow the lascivious *khlyst* to do the works of darkness under the mask of light?" The brochure was forbidden and confiscated while it was still at the printer's, and the newspaper *The Voice of Moscow* was heavily fined for publishing excerpts from it.

Also disturbed by the rumours about Rasputin was the Prime Minister Peter Arkadievich Stolypin. But he had to confess, as his daughter Maria relates: “Nothing can be done. Every time the opportunity presents itself I warn his Majesty. But this is what he replied to me recently: ‘I agree with you, Peter Arkadievich, but better ten Rasputins than one hysterical empress.’ Of course, the whole matter is in that. The empress is ill, seriously ill; she believes that Rasputin is the only person in the whole world who can help the heir, and it is beyond human strength to persuade her otherwise. You know how difficult in general it is to talk to her. If she is taken with some idea, then she no longer takes account of whether it is realisable or not… Her intentions are the very best, but she is really ill…”

In the spring of 1911, after listening to a report on Rasputin by Stolypin, the tsar thanked him and said: “I know and believe, Peter Arkadyevich, that you are sincerely devoted to me. Perhaps all that you say is true. But I beseech you never again to talk to me about Rasputin. In any case I can do nothing…”[[308]](#footnote-308)

In November, 1910, Bishop Theophan went to the Crimea to recover from his illness. But he did not give up, and inundated his friend Bishop Hermogen of Saratov, the future hieromartyr, with letters. It was his aim to enlist this courageous fighter against freethinking in his fight against Rasputin. But this was difficult because it had been none other than Vladyka Theophan who had introduced Rasputin to Bishop Hermogen, speaking of him, as Bishop Hermogen himself said, “in the most laudatory terms.” Indeed, for a time Bishop Hermogen and Rasputin had become allies in the struggle against freethinking and modernism.

Unfortunately, a far less reliable person then joined himself to Rasputin’s circle – Sergius Trophanov, in monasticism Iliodor, one of Bishop Theophan’s students at the academy. He later became a co-worker of Dzerzhinsky, a Baptist, married and had seven children. In an interview with the newspaper *Rech’* (January 9, 1913) Fr. Iliodor said: “I used to be a magician and fooled the people. I was a Deist.” He built a large church in Tsaritsyn on the Volga, and began to draw thousands to it with his fiery sermons against the Jews and the intellectuals and the capitalists. He invited Rasputin to join him in Tsaritsyn and become the elder of a convent there. Rasputin agreed.

However, Iliodor’s inflammatory sermons were not pleasing to the authorities, and in January, 1911 he was transferred to a monastery in Tula diocese. But he refused to go, locked himself in his church in Tsaritsyn and declared a hunger-strike. Bishop Hermogen supported him, but the tsar did not, and ordered him to be removed from Tsaritsyn.

When Rasputin’s bad actions began to come to light, Hermogen vacillated for a long time. However, having made up his mind that Vladyka Theophan was right, and having Iliodor on his side now too, he decided to bring the matter up before the Holy Synod, of which he was a member, at its next session. Before that, however, he determined to denounce Rasputin to his face. On December 16, 1911, according to Iliodor’s account, Hermogen, clothed in hierarchical vestments and holding a cross in his hand, “took hold of the head of the ‘elder’ with his left hand, and with his right started beating him on the head with the cross and shouting in a terrifying voice, ‘Devil! I forbid you in God’s name to touch the female sex. Brigand! I forbid you to enter the royal household and to have anything to do with the tsarina! As a mother brings forth the child in the cradle, so the holy Church through its prayers, blessings, and heroic feats has nursed that great and sacred thing of the people, the autocratic rule of the tsars. And now you, scum, are destroying it, you are smashing our holy vessels, the bearers of autocratic power… Fear God, fear His life-giving cross!”

Then they forced Rasputin to swear that he would leave the palace. According to one version of events, Rasputin swore, but immediately told the empress what had happened. According to another, he refused, after which Vladyka Hermogen cursed him. In any case, on the same day, December 16, five years later, he was killed…

Then Bishop Hermogen went to the Holy Synod. First he gave a speech against the *khlysty*. Then he charged Rasputin with *khlyst* tendencies. Unfortunately, only a minority of the bishops supported the courageous bishop. The majority followed the over-procurator in expressing dissatisfaction with his interference “in things that were not of his concern”.

Vladyka Hermogen was then ordered to return to his diocese. As the director of the chancery of the over-procurator witnessed, “he did not obey the order and, as I heard, asked by telegram for an audience with the tsar, indicating that he had an important matter to discuss, but was turned down.” On receiving this rejection, Bishop Hermogen began to weep. Then he said: “They will kill the tsar, they will kill the tsar, they will surely kill him.”

The opponents of Rasputin now felt the fury of the Tsar. Bishop Hermogen and Iliodor were exiled to remote monasteries. (Iliodor took his revenge by leaking forged letters of the Empress to Rasputin.) And Vladyka Theophan was transferred to the see of Astrakhan. The Tsar ordered the secular press to stop printing stories about Rasputin. Before leaving the Crimea, Vladyka called on Rasputin’s friend, the deputy over-procurator Damansky. He told him: “Rasputin is a vessel of the devil, and the time will come when the Lord will chastise him and those who protect him.” Later, in October, 1913, Rasputin tried to take his revenge on Bishop Theophan by bribing the widow of a Yalta priest who knew him to say that Vladyka had said that he had had relations with the empress. The righteous widow rejected his money and even spat in his face…

During the war, the influence of Rasputin became more dangerous. For, with the Tsar at the front, control of home appointments *de facto* came under the control of the Tsarina, who always turned to Rasputin and to those who were approved by him... Voeikov points out that from 1914 Vyrubova and Rasputin “began to take a greater and greater interest in questions of internal politics”, but at the same time argues that the number of appointments actually made by the Tsarina were few.[[309]](#footnote-309) Bakhanov calculates that there were eleven. But these few included Prime Ministers, Interior Ministers and church metropolitans! Moreover, even the Tsarina admitted that one of them, the appointment of A.N. Khvostov as Interior Minister, was disastrous![[310]](#footnote-310) It is hardly surprising, in those circumstances, that the reputation of the Royal Couple suffered...

Who, in the end, was Rasputin? Bishop Theophan’s opinion was that Rasputin had originally been a sincerely religious man with real gifts, but that he had been corrupted by his contacts with aristocratic society. Archbishop Anthony (Khraptovitsky) of Voronezh had a similar opinion. After having tea with him twice, Rasputin “revealed himself as a deceiver and intriguer”.

But the Royal Couple, “surrounded as they were from all sides by flattery and slanders, decided that love for truth and honourableness remained only in the simple people, and therefore turned to ‘the people’s reason’…

“However, they forgot about the most important point in such a choice.

“I myself was raised in the countryside amidst middle-ranking landowners and close to the people, and I share all the positive declarations about the people’s reason and honourableness. But I insist on my conviction that a peasant is worthy of every respect only as long as he remains a peasant. But if he enters the milieu of the masters, he will unfailingly be corrupted...”[[311]](#footnote-311)

Perhaps the most weighty witness concerning Rasputin came from St. John of Kronstadt. According to a chanter in the choir of his St. Andrew cathedral in Kronstadt, “Once, at the end of a service, when Fr. John came out onto the ambon, a tall man with a black beard came up to him, asking for a blessing. Fr. John stepped away from him, stretching the palm of his right hand towards him, and exclaimed threateningly: ‘You will not have my blessing, for your life will be in accordance with your name [“debauched”].’ The perplexity of those who heard and saw this was soon explained: this turned out to be Rasputin.”[[312]](#footnote-312)

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Rasputin was killed on December 16, 1916 at the hands of Great Prince Dmitri Pavlovich Romanov, Prince Felix Yusupov and a right-wing member of the Duma, Purishkevich. Yusupov lured him to his flat on the pretext of introducing him to his wife, the beautiful Irina, the Tsar’s niece. He was given madeira mixed with poison (although this is disputed), but this did not kill him. He was shot twice, but neither did this kill him. Finally he was shot a third time – according to recent joint investigation by British and Russian police, by a British secret agent, Oswald Rayner[[313]](#footnote-313) - before being pushed under the ice of the River Neva.

The Tsar did not condone the murder. But Yusupov was justified by his close friend, Great Princess Elizabeth Fyodorovna, who said that he had only done his patriotic duty – “you killed a demon,” she said. (To Yusupov’s parents she wrote: “May the Lord bless the patriotic exploit of your son”.[[314]](#footnote-314)) Then, as Yusupov himself writes in his *Memoirs*, “she informed me that several days after the death of Rasputin the abbesses of monasteries came to her to tell her about what had happened with them on the night of the 30th. During the all-night vigil priests had been seized by an attack of madness, had blasphemed and shouted out in a voice that was not their own. Nuns had run down the corridors crying like hysterics and tearing their dresses with indecent movements of the body…”[[315]](#footnote-315)

And to the Tsar she wrote on December 29: “Crime remains crime, but this one being of a special kind, can be counted as a duel and it is considered a patriotic act… Maybe nobody has had the courage to tell you now, that in the street of the towns people kissed like at Easter week, sang the hymn in the theatres and all moved by one feeling – at last the black wall between us and our Emperor is removed.”[[316]](#footnote-316)

Montefiore speaks of “the great myth of Alexandra’s and Rasputin’s influence” on the Tsar during the great crisis of July, 1914.[[317]](#footnote-317) However, there is no doubt that during the war, Rasputin became more influential and dangerous. For, with the Tsar at the front, control of home appointments *de facto* came under the control of the Tsarina, who always turned to Rasputin and to those who were approved by him... Voeikov points out that from 1914 Rasputin and the Tsarita’s and Rasputin’s friend Vyrubova “began to take a greater and greater interest in questions of internal politics”, but at the same time argues that the number of appointments actually made by the Tsarina were few.[[318]](#footnote-318) Bakhanov calculates that there were no more than eleven… But these few included Prime Ministers, Interior Ministers and church metropolitans! Moreover, even the Tsarina admitted that one of them, the appointment of A.N. Khvostov as Interior Minister, was disastrous![[319]](#footnote-319) It is hardly surprising, in those circumstances, that the reputation of the Royal Couple suffered...

Rasputin was a symbol of the state of the peasantry in the last days of the empire. Though basically Orthodox and monarchist, it was infected with spiritual diseases that manifested themselves in the apostasy and violence of so many peasants and workers after the revolution. The support of the peasants kept the monarchy alive just as Rasputin kept the tsarevich alive, stopping the flow of blood that represented the ebbing spiritual strength of the dynasty.

“Rasputin,” writes Radzinsky, “is a key to understanding both the soul and the brutality of the Russia that came after him. He was a precursor of the millions of peasants who, with religious consciousness in their souls, would nevertheless tear down churches, and who, with a dream of the reign of Love and Justice, would murder, rape, and flood the country with blood, in the end destroying themselves...”[[320]](#footnote-320)

But while Rasputin lost grace and the majority of Russians descended into madness, it was a different story for the royal family. They had put their trust in a charlatan, but inwardly had remained pure and faithful to God, and so were finally counted worthy of martyrdom... Thus both the Tsar, the Tsaritsa and the tsarevnas were shot in July, 1918. And “the child,” the Tsarevich Alexei, the future of the dynasty, “who was to rule all nations with a rod of iron” and over whom Rasputin appeared to have had such power, “was caught up to God and His throne” (Revelation 12.5)...

## **64. STUPIDITY OR TREASON?**

Russia was not defeated militarily from without, but by revolution from within, a revolution prepared by Russian Masonry. And yet the losses sustained by Russia during the war had a significant bearing on the outcome of the revolution. The pre-revolutionary aristocracy of Russia was almost completely wiped out in the first two years.[[321]](#footnote-321) And in the first year almost all the old military cadres, from privates to colonels, - that is, the best and the most loyal to the Tsar – were killed. From 1916, to fill up the losses in the ranks of the junior and middle commanders, the officer schools were forced to take 9/10ths of their entrance from non-noble estates. These new commanders were of much lower quality than their predecessors, who had been taught to die for the Faith and the Fatherland. Especially heavy losses were suffered in the same period by the military chaplains. The older generation of clergy had enjoyed considerable spiritual authority among the soldiers. But they were replaced by less experienced men enjoying less authority.[[322]](#footnote-322)

The critical factor was not lack of armaments, as in 1915, but a loss of morale among the rank and file. In general, the appeals of the extreme socialists at the Zimmerwald conference that the workers of different countries should not fight each other had not been successful. Patriotic feelings turned out to be stronger than class loyalties. However, the terrible losses suffered in the war, the evidence of massive corruption and incompetence in arms deliveries, the propaganda against the Tsar and the return of Bolshevik agitators – all these factors began to take their toll. S.S. Oldenburg writes that in the autumn of 1916 “the spirit of military regulations, the spirit of the old tsarist army was strong, even the shadow of tradition turned out be sufficient to maintain discipline in the eight-million mass of soldiers”.[[323]](#footnote-323) However, more recent authorities paint a darker picture. According to Stevenson, “Evidence suggests that many soldiers were convinced by 1915 that they could not beat the Germans, and that by the end of 1916 they were full of despondency and recrimination against the authorities who had sent them into war without the wherewithal to win. The evidence that victory was as remote as ever, despite Brusilov’s initial successes and another million casualties, produced a still uglier mood. Soldiers’ letters revealed a deep anxiety about the deteriorating quality and quantity of their provisions (the daily bread ration was reduced from three pounds to two, and then to one, during the winter), as well as anger about rocketing inflation and scarcities that endangered their loved ones’ welfare. Many wanted to end the war whatever the cost, and over twenty mutinies seem to have occurred in October-December 1916 (the first on this scale in any army during the war), some involving whole regiments, and in each case taking the form of a collective refusal of orders to attack or to prepare to attack.”[[324]](#footnote-324)

This was not a situation that one man, even one at the summit of power, could reverse. For Russia was now that nation of which the prophet cried: “Alas, sinful nation, a people laden with iniquity, a brood of evildoers, children who are corrupters! They have forsaken the Lord, they have provoked to anger gthe Holy One of Israel, they have turned away backward. Why should you be stricken again? You will revolt more and more. The whole head is sick, and the whole heart faints. From the sole of the goot even to the head there is no soundness in it. But wounds and bruises and putrefying sores. They have not been closed or bound up, or soothed with ointment. Your country is desolate, your cities are burned with fire, strangers devour your land in your presence” (Isaiah 1.4-7).

The situation in Russia differed in only one way from that described by the prophet: the head, the tsar, was not sick, but a holy man. However, he could do nothing on his own – and, with the tsarists, he *was* alone. In any case, real one-man rule had become almost impossible by the early twentieth-century: not only had democratic sentiments spread throughout society in all the Great Powers, and public opinion as expressed in the press was a force that no ruler could ignore: the sheer complexity of ruling a large, increasingly differentiated and rapidly industrializing society inevitably involved a large measure of devolution of power with a corresponding loss of control from the head. Now Tsar Nicholas, as we have seen, was highly educated and intelligent, and probably as capable of coping with the vast complexity of ruling a twentieth-century empire as any man. Nor, contrary to the accepted opinion, did he lack decisiveness or courage. But it is true to say that he found it difficult to impose his will on his subordinates. He was the most tactful and merciful of men, and the least inclined, as the Tsarina noticed, to lay down the law in a masterful fashion. And yet such masterfulness was sometimes necessary, if not sufficient, and especially at this time. For “to the lot of the emperor,” according to Baroness Sophia Buksgevden, the Tsarina’s lady-in-waiting, “fell a task whose successful execution would have required the appearance on the throne of Napoleon and Peter the Great in one person…”[[325]](#footnote-325)

But the tsar, to his credit, did not have the ruthlessness of those tyrants. Once the head of the police promised him that there would be no revolution in Russia for a hundred years if he would permit 50,000 executions. The Tsar quickly rejected this proposal… And yet he could manifest firmness, and was by no means as weak-willed as has been claimed. Thus once, in 1906, Admiral F.V. Dubasov asked him to have mercy on a terrorist who had tried to kill him. The Tsar replied: “Field tribunals act independently and independently of me: let them act with all the strictness of the law. With men who have become bestial there is not, and cannot be, any other means of struggle. You know me, I am not malicious: I write to you completely convinced of the rightness of my opinion. It is painful and hard, but right to say this, that ‘to our shame and gall’ [Stolypin’s words] only the execution of a few can prevent a sea of blood and has already prevented it.”[[326]](#footnote-326)

However, it was not the execution of a few (or even 50,000) revolutionaries that was the question or the solution ten years later, in the autumn of 1916. Only in the factories of St. Petersburg was the revolution well-entrenched with its defeatist programme. The real problem was the legal opposition, the progressive bloc in the Duma, which professed to want the war continued to a successful end, but argued that success could be attained, in effect, only by destroying the Russian autocracy and replacing it by a constitutional monarchy in which the real power remained in their own hands. What many of them really hoped for was the defeat of Russia followed by the fall of the monarchy, which would enable them to assume power.

To this end they employed all kinds of dishonourable, lying means. They concealed from the general public the improving situation in the army; they insinuated that the Tsar was ruled by Rasputin, when he was not[[327]](#footnote-327); that the Tsarina was pro-German and even a German spy, which she was not[[328]](#footnote-328); that the Tsar’s ministers with German names, such as Prime Minister Stürmer, were Germanophiles, which they were not.

In the Duma on November 1, 1916, the leader of the Cadet party, Paul Milyukov, holding a German newspaper in his hand and reading the words: “the victory of the court party grouped around the young Tsarina”, uttered his famously seditious evaluation of the regime’s performance: “Is it stupidity – or treason?” insinuating that the authorities wanted a separate peace with Germany. To which the auditorium replied: “Treason”. Major-General V.N. Voeikov, who was with the Tsar at the time, wrote: “The most shocking thing in this most disgusting slander, unheard of in the annals of history, was that it was based on German newspapers…

“For Germany that was at war with us it was, of course, necessary, on the eve of the possible victory of Russia and the Allies, to exert every effort and employ all means to undermine the might of Russia.

“Count P.A. Ignatiev, who was working in our counter-espionage abroad, cites the words of a German diplomat that one of his agents overheard: ‘We are not at all interested to know whether the Russian emperor wants to conclude a separate peace. What is important to us is that they should believe this rumour, which weakens the position of Russia and the Allies.’ And we must give them their due: in the given case both our external and our internal enemies showed no hesitation: one example is the fact that our public figures spread the rumour coming from Duma circles that supposedly on September 15, 1915 Grand Duke Ludwig of Hesse, the brother of the Empress, secretly visited Tsarskoye Selo. To those who objected to this fable they replied: if it was not the Grand Duke, in any case it was a member of his suite; the mysterious visit was attributed to the desire of Germany, with the cooperation of the Empress, to conclude a separate peace with Russia.

“At that time nobody could explain to me whether the leader of the Cadet party, Miliukov himself, was led by stupidity or treason when he ascended the tribune of the State Duma, holding in his hands a German newspaper, and what relations *he* had with the Germans…”[[329]](#footnote-329)

Treason was certainly afoot – but among the liberals, masons and socialists, not the Royal Family. Every attempt by the Tsar to appoint a Prime Minister who would be able to work with the Duma – first Protopopov, then Sturmer, then Trepov, then Golitsyn – was met by the deputies with a storm of abuse. Stirred up by the plotters, they were making government impossible. It could therefore be argued that the Tsar should have acted against the conspirators at least as firmly in 1916-17 as he had against the revolutionaries in 1905-06.

This was precisely what the Tsaritsa argued in private letters to her husband: “Show to all, that you are the Master & your will shall be obeyed – the time of great indulgence & gentleness is over – now comes your reign of will & power, & obedience…” (December 4, 1916). And again: “Be Peter the Great, John [Ivan] the Terrible, Emperor Paul – crush them all under you.” (December 14, 1916). She urged him to prorogue the Duma, remove Trepov and send Lvov, Miliukov, Guchkov and Polivanov to Siberia…

But the days were past when the banishment of a few conspirators could have saved the situation. Soon even the generals would rebel against their commander-in-chief, compelling his abdication. At that point there was nothing that the righteous tsar could do except place his beloved country in the hands of the All-Just and All-Merciful God…

“Several days later,” writes I.P. Yakobi, “the former minister of the interior N.A. Maklakov delivered in the State Council a speech that was murderous for the opposition. With figures at his finger-tips, the orator demonstrated that the so renowned ‘social organizations’ who were supposed to have supplied the army instead of the incapable Tsarist Government had in reality done almost nothing for the war. Thus, for example, the military-industrial committee, which was ruled by Guchkov, had hardly been able to provide *one-and-a-half percent* of all the artillery orders, which had been fulfilled by state factories. ‘The opposition does everything for the war,’ said A.N. Maklakov, ‘but for the war against order; they do everything for victory, but the victory over the Government. Here, in the rear, they are trying to deceive Russia, but we shall not betray her. We have served her, we have believed in her and with this feeling we shall fight and die for her.’

“Prophetic words! Twenty months later N.A. Maklakov, faithful to his oath and his duty, fell brilliantly to the bullets of the enemy of the Fatherland – the Bolsheviks, while at the same time the ‘heroes of the revolution’ – the Kerenskys, Miliukovs, Guchkovs and Rodziankos – pusillanimously fled from Russia, saving themselves from the fire they had themselves lit.”[[330]](#footnote-330)

Treason was certainly afoot – but among the liberals, masons and socialists, not the Royal Family. On this basis, it could be argued, the Tsar should have acted against the conspirators at least as firmly in 1916-17 as he had against the revolutionaries in 1905-06. Moreover, this was precisely in what the Tsaritsa argued in private letters to her husband: “Show to all, that you are the Master & your will shall be obeyed – the time of great indulgence & gentleness is over – now comes your reign of will & power, & obedience…” (December 4, 1916). And again: “Be Peter the Great, John [Ivan] the Terrible, Emperor Paul – crush them all under you.” (December 14, 1916). She urged him to prorogue the Duma, remove Trepov and send Lvov, Miliukov, Guchkov and Polivanov to Siberia… But the days were past when the banishment of a few conspirators could have saved the situation. Soon even the generals would rebel against their commander-in-chief, compelling his abdication. At that point there was nothing that the righteous tsar could do except place his beloved country in the hands of the All-Just and All-Merciful God…

## **65. THE PLOT**

We come back to the question why the Tsar did not immediately imprison the plotters against his throne. Archpriest Lev Lebedev supposes that the Tsar, too, was tempted to deal with them “simply and speedily. We remember his words, that ‘with men who have become bestial there is not, and cannot be, any other means of struggle’ (*besides shooting them)* and that ‘only the execution of a few can prevent a sea of blood’. But there appeared before the Tsar at that time in the persons of Lvov, Rodzyanko, Guchkov, etc. not ‘bestialized’ criminal murderers like the Bolsheviks, but respectable people with good intentions! Yes, they were *in error* in thinking that by removing the Tsar from power they rule Russia better [than he]. But this was a *sincere error,* they *thought* that they were truly *patriots.* It would have been wrong to kill *such* people! *Such* people should not even have been sent to Siberia (that is, into prison). It was necessary to *show* them that they *were mistaken*. And how better to show them than by *victory* over the external enemy, a victory which was already in their hands, and would be inevitable in four or five *months*! The tsar *did not know* that his closest generals had already prepared to arrest him and deprive him of power on February 22, 1917. And the generals did not know that they were doing this precisely in order that in four or five months’ time *there should be no victory*! That had been decided in Bnai-Brith, in other international Jewish organizations (Russia must not be ‘among the victor-countries’!). Therefore through the German General Staff (which also *did not know* all the plots, but thought only about its own salvation and the salvation of Germany), and also directly from the banks of Jacob Schiff and others (we shall name them later) huge sums of money had already gone to the *real murderers* of the Tsar and the Fatherland - the Bolsheviks. This was *the second echelon* [of plotters], it hid behind the first [the Russian Masons]. It was on them (and not on the ‘noble patriots’) that the world powers of evil placed their hopes, for they had no need at all of a transfigured Russia, even if on the western (‘their’) model. What they needed was that Russia and the Great Russian people should *not exist* as such! For they, the powers of evil, *knew Great Russia better* (incomparably better!) than *the whole* of Russian ‘society’ (especially the despised intelligentsia). Did Guchkov know about the planned murder of the whole of Great Russia? *He knew!* The Empress accurately called him ‘cattle’. Kerensky also knew, and also several *specially initiated* Masons, who hid this from *the overwhelming majority* of all the ‘brothers’ – the other Russian Masons. The specially initiated had already for a long time had secret links (through Trotsky, M. Gorky and several others) with Lenin and the Bolsheviks, which *the overwhelming majority* of the Bolsheviks, too, *did not know!*

“And what did his Majesty know? He knew that society was eaten up by Judaeo-Masonry, that in it was *error* and cowardice and deception. But he *did not know* that at the base of the error, in its secret places, was *treason.* And he also *did not know* that treason and cowardice and deception were all around him, that is, everywhere throughout the higher *command* of the army. And what is the Tsar without an army, without troops?! Then there is the question: could the Tsar have learned in time about the treachery among the generals? Why not! Let’s take, for example, Yanushkevich, or Gurko, or Korfa (or all of them together), whom Sukhomlinov had pointed to as plotters already in 1909 (!). In prison, *under torture* – such torture as they had with Tsars Ivan and Peter – they would have said everything, *given up all the rest*…! But then he, Nicholas II, would have needed to be truly like Ivan IV or Peter I from the beginning – that is, a *satanist* and a born murderer (psychologically), not trusting *anyone*, suspecting *everyone,* sparing *nobody.* It is significant that her Majesty joined to the names of these Tsars the name of Paul I. That means that she had in mind, not Satanism and bestiality, but only *firmness*... But she *felt* with striking perspicacity that her husband was ‘suffering for the mistakes of his royal *predecessors*’. Which ones?! Just as we said, first of all and mainly for the ‘mistakes’ *precisely of Ivan IV and Peter I*. Not to become like them, these predecessors, to overcome the temptation of *replying to evil with evil means* – that was the task of Nicholas II. For *not everything is allowed*, *not all means* are good for the attainment of what would seem to be the most important ends. *The righteousness of God* is not attained by diabolic methods. Evil is not conquered by evil! There was a time when they, including also his Majesty Nicholas II, suppressed evil by evil! But in accordance with the Providence of God *another time* had come, a time to show where the Russian Tsar could himself become *a victim of evil* – voluntarily! – and endure evil *to the end*. *Did he believe* in Christ and *love* Him truly in such a way as to suffer voluntarily *like Christ*? The same Divine providential *question as was posed for the whole of Great Russia!* This was the final test of faith – *through life and through death.* If one can live only by killing and making oneself *one* with evil and the devil (as those whom one has to kill), then it would be better *not to live!* That is the reply of the Tsar and of Great Russia that he headed! The more so in that it was then a matter of earthly, *historical* life. Here, in *this* life and in *this* history to die in order to live again in the eternal and new ‘history’ of the Kingdom of Heaven! For there is no other way into this Kingdom of Heaven – *the Lord* left no other. He decreed that it should be experienced only *by this* entry… That is what turned out to be His, God’s will!

“We recall that his Majesty Nicholas II took all his most important decisions after ardent prayer, having felt *the goodwill of God.* Therefore now, on considering earnestly why he then, at the end of 1916 and very beginning of 1917, did not take those measures which his wife so warmly wrote to him about, we must inescapably admit one thing: he *did not have* God’s goodwill in relation to them! Her Majesty’s thought is remarkable in itself, that the Tsar, if he had to be ruled by anyone, should be ruled only by one who was himself ruled by God! But there was no such person near the Tsar. Rasputin was *not that* person. His Majesty already understood this, but the Tsaritsa did not yet understand it. In this question he was condescending to her and delicate. But, as we see, he did not carry out the advice of their ‘Friend’, and did not even mention him in his replies to his wife. The Tsar entrusted all his heart and his thoughts to God and was forced to be ruled by Him alone.”[[331]](#footnote-331)

There is much of value in this hypothesis, but it is too kind to the Masonic plotters. Yes, they were “sincere” – but so were the Bolsheviks! It seems unlikely that the Tsar should have considered the Bolsheviks worthy of punishment, but the Masons not.

More likely, in our opinion, is that he thought that acting against the Masons would bring forward the revolution at precisely the moment when he wanted peace in the rear of the army.

It must be remembered the Masons controlled the public organizations, like the Military-Industrial Committee, whose leader was Guchkov, and the *zemstva*, whose leader was Prince George Lvov (who also happened to be the leader of Russian Masonry). These, in spite of their disloyalty, were nevertheless making their contribution to providing *some* ammunition for the army and helping the wounded. The Emperor held the opinion that “in wartime one must not touch the public organizations”.[[332]](#footnote-332) And so it was the war that both created the conditions that made the revolution possible, and prevented the Tsar from taking the steps that were necessary in order to crush it…

Many people think that the Russian revolution was the result of an elemental movement of the masses. This is not true – although the masses later joined it. The February revolution was a carefully hatched plot involving about three hundred Masons; its organizer was Guchkov.

The plot was successful. But it succeeded in eventually bringing to power, not the Masonic plotters, but the Bolsheviks, who destroyed all the plotters and all their Masonic lodges, forcing the Masons themselves to flee back to their mother lodges abroad… Thus in October Kerensky and his Masonic colleagues fled to France, where they set up lodges under the aegis of the Grand Orient. [[333]](#footnote-333)

Almost all the plotters later repented of their actions. Thus “in the summer of 1917,” writes F. Vinberg, “in Petrograd and Moscow there circulated from hand to hand copies of a letter of the Cadet leader Milyukov. In this letter he openly admitted that he had taken part, as had almost all the members of the State Duma, in the February coup, in spite of the fact that he understood the danger of the ‘experiment’ he had undertaken. ‘But,’ this gentleman cynically admitted in the letter, ‘we knew that in the spring we were were about to see the victory of the Russian Army. In such a case the prestige and attraction of the Tsar among the people would again become so strong and tenacious that all our efforts to shake and overthrow the Throne of the Autocrat would be in vain. That is why we had to resort to a very quick revolutionary explosion, so as to avert this danger. However, we hoped that we ourselves would be able to finish the war triumphantly. It turned out that we were mistaken: all power was quickly torn out of our hands by the plebs… Our mistake turned out to be fatal for Russia’…”[[334]](#footnote-334)

So we must conclude that it was *both* stupidity *and* treason that manifested themselves in the actions of the February plotters. They were undoubtedly traitors in violating their oath of allegiance to the Tsar. But they were also stupid because they did not understand what the overthrow of the Tsar would lead to – something that Rasputin understood better than they…

## **66. APOCALYPTIC VISIONS**

On February 21, 1917, just before the February revolution, a 14-year-old Kievan novice, Olga Zosimovna Boiko, fell into a deep trance lasting for forty days during which many mysteries were revealed to her. She saw the following: “In blinding light on an indescribably wonderful throne sat the Saviour, and next to Him on His right hand – our sovereign, surrounded by angels. His Majesty was in full royal regalia: a radiant white robe, a crown, with a sceptre in his hand. And I heard the martyrs talking amongst themselves, rejoicing that the last times had come and that their number would be increased. They said that they would be tormented for the name of Christ and for refusing to accept the seal [of the Antichrist], and that the churches and monasteries would soon be destroyed, and those living in the monasteries would be driven out, and that not only the clergy and monastics would be tortured, but also all those who did not want to receive ‘the seal’ and would stand for the name of Christ, for the Faith and the Church.”[[335]](#footnote-335)

So the coming age was to be an apocalyptic struggle against the Antichrist, an age of martyrdom for Christ’s sake – and the Tsar would be among the martyrs.

More was revealed a few weeks later, on March 2, the very day of the Tsar’s abdication, when the Mother of God appeared to the peasant woman Eudocia Adrianovna and said to her: “Go to the village of Kolomenskoye; there you will find a big, black icon. Take it and make it beautiful, and let people pray in front of it.” Eudocia found the icon at 3 o’clock, the precise hour of the abdication. Miraculously it renewed itself, and showed itself to be the “Reigning” icon of the Mother of God, the same that had led the Russian armies into war with Napoleon. On it she was depicted sitting on a royal throne dressed in a dark red robe and bearing the orb and sceptre of the Orthodox Tsars, as if to show that the sceptre of rule of the Russian land had passed from earthly rulers to the Queen of Heaven…[[336]](#footnote-336)

So the Orthodox Autocracy, as symbolized by the orb and sceptre, had not been destroyed, but was being held “in safe keeping”, as it were, by the Queen of Heaven, until the earth should again be counted worthy of it…[[337]](#footnote-337)

A third vision was given in this year to Metropolitan Macarius of Moscow, who alone in the Church's hierarchy had refused to accept the Provisional Government because of his oath of allegiance to the Tsar: "I saw a field. The Saviour was walking along a path. I went after Him, crying,

"'Lord, I am following you!'

"Finally we approached an immense arch adorned with stars. At the threshold of the arch the Saviour turned to me and said again:

"'Follow me!'

And He went into a wondrous garden, and I remained at the threshold and awoke. Soon I fell asleep again and saw myself standing in the same arch, and with the Saviour stood Tsar Nicholas. The Saviour said to the Tsar:

"'You see in My hands two cups: one which is bitter for your people and the other sweet for you.'

"The Tsar fell to his knees and for a long time begged the Lord to allow him to drink the bitter cup together with his people. The Lord did not agree for a long time, but the Tsar begged importunately. Then the Saviour drew out of the bitter cup a large glowing coal and laid it in the palm of the Tsar's hand. The Tsar began to move the coal from hand to hand and at the same time his body began to grow light, until it had become completely bright, like some radiant spirit. At this I again woke up.

“Falling asleep yet again, I saw an immense field covered with flowers. In the middle of the field stood the Tsar, surrounded by a multitude of people, and with his hands he was distributing manna to them. An invisible voice said at this moment:

"'The Tsar has taken the guilt of the Russian people upon himself, and the Russian people is forgiven.'"

But how could the Russian people could be forgiven through the Tsar? A.Ya. Yakovitsky has expressed the following interpretation. The aim of the Provisional Government was to have elections to the Constituent Assembly, which would finally have rejected the monarchical principle. But this would also have brought the anathema of the *Zemsky Sobor* of 1613 upon the whole of Russia, because the anathema invoked a curse on the Russian land if it ever rejected Tsar Michael Romanov and his descendants. Now according to Yakovitsky, the vision of Metropolitan Macarius demonstrates that through his martyric patience the Tsar obtained from the Lord that the Constituent Assembly should not come to pass – through its dissolution by the Bolsheviks in January, 1918. Moreover, his distributing manna to the people is a symbol of the distribution of the Holy Gifts of the Eucharist. So the Church hierarchy, while it wavered in its loyalty in 1917, did not finally reject monarchism, and so did not come under anathema and was able to continue feeding the people spiritually. In this way the Tsar saved and redeemed his people.

Returning to the Reigning icon, Yakovitsky writes: “Through innumerable sufferings, blood and tears, and after repentance, the Russian people will be forgiven and Royal power, preserved by the Queen of Heaven herself, will undoubtedly be returned to Russia. Otherwise, why should the Most Holy Mother of God have preserved this Power?”[[338]](#footnote-338) “With this it is impossible to disagree. The sin committed can be purified only by blood. But so that the very *possibility of redemption* should arise, some other people had to receive power over the people that had sinned, as Nebuchadnezzar received this power over the Jewish people (as witnessed by the Prophet Jeremiah), or Baty over the Russian people (the first to speak of this after the destruction was the council of bishops of the Kiev metropolia)… Otherwise, the sufferings caused by fraternal blood-letting would only deepen the wrath of God…”[[339]](#footnote-339)

So redemption could be given to the Russian people only if they expiated their sin through the sufferings of martyrdom and repentance, and provided that they did not reject the Orthodox Autocracy *in principle*. The Tsar laid the foundation to this redemption by his petition before the throne of the Almighty. The New Martyrs built on this foundation through their martyric sufferings.

And yet redemption, as revealed in the restoration of the Orthodox Autocracy, has not yet come. And that because the third element – the repentance of the whole people – has not yet taken place.

In the same fateful year of 1917 Elder Nectarius of Optina prophesied: "Now his Majesty is not his own man, he is suffering such humiliation for his mistakes. 1918 will be still worse. His Majesty and all his family will be killed, tortured. One pious girl had a vision: Jesus Christ was sitting on a throne, while around Him were the twelve apostles, and terrible torments and groans resounded from the earth. And the Apostle Peter asked Christ:

"'O Lord, when will these torments cease?'

"And Jesus Christ replied: 'I give them until 1922. If the people do not repent, do not come to their senses, then they will all perish in this way.'

"Then before the throne of God there stood our Tsar wearing the crown of a great-martyr. Yes, this tsar will be a great-martyr. Recently, he has redeemed his life, and if people do not turn to God, then not only Russia, but the whole of Europe will collapse..."[[340]](#footnote-340)

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Having described three true, God-given visions of 1917, it will not be out of place to mention a false, satanic vision that was nevertheless to play an important role in Church life later in the century.

In 1917, on the thirteenth day of the month of May, and for six months thereafter the Virgin Mary supposedly appeared to three shepherd girls in Fatima, Portugal. The girls were entrusted with “three secrets”, the second of which is the most important. This supposedly revealed that, in order to avoid terrible calamities in the world and the persecution of the Catholic Church, the Virgin will ask for the consecration of Russia to her Immaculate Heart. If her request is granted, Russia will be converted, and there will be peace. If not, then she [Russia] will spread her errors throughout the world, causing wars and persecution of the Church. “The good will be martyred, the Holy Father will have much to suffer, various nations will be annihilated. In the end, my Immaculate Heart will triumph. The Holy Father will consecrate Russia to me, and she shall be converted, and a period of peace will be granted to the world.”

Now from the point of view of the Orthodox Saints and Holy Fathers (and even of some of the Catholic “saints”, such as John of the Cross), these visions and revelations are clear examples of demonic deception and not to be trusted. In May, 1917 it was not difficult to see that Russia was descending into chaos, and the devil used the opportunity to try and persuade people that the chaos could be averted only through the submission of Russia to his tool, the Catholic Church. Not surprisingly, the Vatican seized on these “revelations” and in 1930 pronounced them worthy of trust; and every Pope since then has been committed to belief in the Fatima phenomenon.

## **67. THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION**

The Masons began to execute their plans in January, 1917. In that month, there arrived in Petrograd an Allied Commission composed of representatives of England, France and Italy whose purpose was to plan combined Allied strategy for the coming year. After meeting with Guchkov, who was president of the Military-Industrial Committee, Prince George Lvov, president of the State Duma Rodzyanko, General Polivanov (who had been dismissed from his post as Minister of War in March), Sazonov, the English ambassador Buchanan, Miliukov and others, the mission presented the following demands to the Tsar:

1. The introduction into the Staff of the Supreme Commander of allied representatives with the right of a deciding vote.
2. The renewal of the command staff of all the armies on the indications of the heads of the Entente.
3. The introduction of a constitution with a responsible ministry.

The Tsar replied to these demands, which amounted to a demand that he renounce both his autocratic powers and his powers as Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armies, as follows:

1. “The introduction of allied representatives is unnecessary, for I am not suggesting the introduction of my representatives into the allied armies with the right of a deciding vote.”
2. “Also unnecessary. My armies are fighting with greater success than the armies of my allies.”
3. “The act of internal administration belongs to the discretion of the Monarch and does not require the indications of the allies.”

When this truthful and courageous reply was made known to the plotters, they assembled in the English Embassy and decided: “To abandon the lawful path and step out on the path of revolution”. As Miliukov explained: “We knew that in the spring there would be victories for the Russian Army. In that case the prestige and glamour of the Tsar among the people would become so strong that ll our efforts to shak and overthrow the Throne of the Autocrat would be in vain. That is why we had to resort to a very speedy revolutionary explosion, so as to avert this danger.[[341]](#footnote-341)”Thus “the English Embassy,” wrote Princess Paley, “on the orders of Lloyd George, became a nest of propaganda. The liberals, and Prince Lvov, Miliukov, Rodzyanko, Maklakov, etc., used to meet there constantly. It was in the English embassy that the decision was taken to abandon legal paths and step out on the path of revolution.”[[342]](#footnote-342)

On January 27, on the basis of reports from the Petrograd Okhrana, the members of a working group of Guchkov’s Military-Industrial Committee that served as a link with the revolutionary workers’ organizations, were arrested. The documents seized left no doubt about the revolutionary character of the working committee… But the new Prime Minister, Prince Golitsyn, softened the sentences of the plotters. [[343]](#footnote-343) And so “the sessions of the workers in the Committee continued. However, the Okhrana department lost its informers from the workers’ group.”[[344]](#footnote-344)

At the beginning of February the Tsar summoned N.A. Maklakov and entrusted him with composing a manifesto for the proroguing of the Duma – in case it should step out on the path of open revolution.[[345]](#footnote-345) For, as he said to the former governor of Mogilev in early February: “I know that the situation is very alarming, and I have been advised to dissolve the State Duma… But I can’t do this… In the military respect we are stronger than ever before. Soon, in the spring, will come the offensive and I believe that God will give us victory, and then moods will change…”[[346]](#footnote-346)

When the State Duma reassembled on February 14, Kerensky proclaimed his aim openly: “The historical task of the Russian people at the present time is the task of annihilating the medieval regime immediately, at whatever cost… How is it possible to fight by lawful means against those whom the law itself has turned into a weapon of mockery against the people?... There is only one way with the violators of the law – their physical removal.”[[347]](#footnote-347)

And yet loyal patriots still existed. Thus on February 21 Bishop Agapit of Yekaterinoslav together with members of the Yekaterinoslav section of the Union of the Russian People, headed by their president, Obraztsov, wrote to the chancellery of the Over-Procurator: “The gates of hell will not prevail over the Church of Christ, but the destiny of Orthodoxy in our fatherland is indissolubly bound up with the destiny of the Tsarist Autocracy. Remembering on the Sunday of Orthodoxy the merits of the Russian Hierarchs before the Church and the State, we in a filial spirit dare to turn to your Eminence and other first-hierarchs of the Russian Church: by your unanimous blessings and counsels in the spirit of peace and love, strengthen his Most Autocratic Majesty to defend the Sacred rights of the Autocracy, entrusted to him by God through the voice of the people and the blessing of the Church, against which those same rebels who are encroaching against our Holy Orthodox Church are now encroaching.”[[348]](#footnote-348)

The Tsar stayed in Tsarskoye Selo until February 22, when he was summoned urgently to Stavka by General Alexeyev. This surprised the Tsar, who did not see the need for it and wanted to stay close to the capital. It was clearly part of the plot – as Baroness Bukstevden points out, it was precisely in the next eight days, when the Tsar was away at the front, that the revolution took place…[[349]](#footnote-349)

“In the middle of 1916,” writes Fr. Lev Lebedev, “the Masons had designated *February 22, 1917* for the revolution in Russia. But on this day his Majesty was still at Tsarksoye Selo, having arrived there more than a month before from Headquarters, and only at 2 o’clock on the 22nd did he leave again for Mogilev. Therefore everything had to be put back for one day and begin on *February 23*.[[350]](#footnote-350) By that time special trains loaded with provisions had been *deliberately* stopped on the approaches to Petrograd on the excuse of heavy snow drifts, which immediately elicited a severe shortage of bread, an increase in prices and the famous ‘tails’ – long queues for bread. The population began to worry, provocateurs strengthened the anxiety with rumours about the approach of inevitable famine, catastrophe, etc. But it turned out that the military authorities had reserves of food… that would allow Petrograd to hold out until the end of the snow falls.[[351]](#footnote-351) Therefore into the affair at this moment there stepped a second very important factor in the plot – the soldiers of the reserve formations, who were in the capital waiting to be sent off to the front. There were about 200,000 of them, and they since the end of 1916 had been receiving 25 roubles a day (a substantial boost to the revolutionary agitation that had been constantly carried out among them) from a secret ‘revolutionary fund’. Most important of all, they did not want to be sent to the front. They were reservists, family men, who had earlier received a postponement of their call-up, as well as new recruits from the workers, who had been under the influence of propaganda for a long time. His Majesty had long ago been informed of the unreliability of the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison and had ordered General Alexeyev to introduce guards units, including cavalry, into the capital. However, Alexeyev *had not carried out the order*, referring to the fact that, according to the information supplied by the commandant of the Petrograd garrison General Khabalov, all the barracks in the capital were filled to overflowing, and there was nowhere to put the guardsmen!... In sum, against 200,000 unreliable reservists who were ready to rebel the capital of the Empire could hardly number 10,000 soldiers – mainly junkers and cadets from other military schools – who were faithful to his Majesty. The only Cossack regiment from the reserves was by that time also on the side of the revolution. The plotters were also successful in gaining the appointment of General Khabalov to the post of commandant of the capital and district. He was an inexperienced and extremely indecisive man. Had Generals Khan-Hussein of Nakhichevan or Count Keller been in his place, everything might have turned out differently.

“On February 23, at a command, 30,000 (according to other data, 90,000) workers went on strike with the slogans ‘Bread!’ and ‘Down with the War!’ The police had difficulty in dispersing their demonstrations. On February 24 up to 170,000 workers poured out onto the streets of Petrograd. Their slogans were: ‘Down with the Tsarist Government!’, ‘*Long Live the Provisional Government*!’ (although it did not exist yet!) and ‘Down with the War!’. About 40,000 gathered in Nevsky Prospekt. The police and the soldiers pushed them away, but they went into the side streets, smashed shop windows, robbed the shops, stopped trams, and already sang the ‘Marseillaise’ and ‘Rise, Stand up, Working People!’ However, Protopopov reported to her Majesty in Tsarskoye that the disorders were elicited only by a lack of bread. In the opinion of many ministers, everything had begun with a chance ‘women’s rebellion’ in the queues. They did not know, or simply *were frightened to know*, that a *previously organized* revolution had begun. The Cossacks did nothing, protecting the demonstrators. On February 25 already 250,000 people were on strike! In their hands they held a Bolshevik leaflet (‘… All under the red flag of the revolution. Down with the Tsarist monarchy. Long live the Democratic Republic… Long live the Socialist International’.) At a meeting at the Moscow station the police constable Krylov hurled himself at a demonstrator in order to snatch a red flag from him, and was killed… *by a Cossack!* The crowd lifted the murderer on their shoulders. In various places they were beating, disarming and killing policemen. At the Trubochny factory Lieutenant Hesse shot an agitator, and those who had assembled, throwing away their red flags and banners, ran away. The same happened in the evening on Nevsky, where the demonstrators opened fire on the soldiers and police, and in reply the soldiers shot into the crowd (several people were immediately killed), who then ran away. The speeches of the workers, as we see, were the work of the hands of the second echelon of the revolution (the social democrats). But it is also evident that without the soldiers it would not have worked for either the first or the second echelon…

“On the evening of the same February 25, a Saturday, his Majesty sent Khabalov a personal telegram: ‘I order you to stop the disturbances in the capital tomorrow, disturbances that are inadmissible in the serious time of war against Germany and Austria. Nicholas.’ Khabalov panicked. Although everything indicated that there was no need to panic, decisive action even by those insignificant forces that were faithful and reliable, that is, *firing* against the rebels, could have stopped everything in its tracks. The Duma decreed that their session should stop immediately. But the deputies remained and continued to gather in the building of the Tauris palace.

“On February 26, a Sunday, it was peaceful in the morning and Khabalov *hastened* to tell his Majesty about this. What lengths does fear for themselves and for their position or career take people to!... On that day the newspapers did not come out, and at midday demonstrations began again and the Fourth company of the reserve battalion of the Pavlovsky regiment mutinied. It was suppressed, and the mutineers arrested. It was difficult to incite soldiers to rebel, even those like the Petrograd reservists. They replied to the worker-agitators: ‘You’ll go to your homes, but we’ll get shot!’… The plotters understood that the troops could be aroused only by some kind of exceptional act, after which it would no longer be possible for them to go back. Such an act could only be a serious military crime – a murder… The heart of the Tsar sensed the disaster. On the evening of the 26th he noted in his diary: ‘This morning during the service I felt a sharp pain in my chest… I could hardly stand and my forehead was covered with drops of sweat.’ On that day Rodzyanko sent the Tsar a telegram in which, after describing the disorders in the capital, the clashes of military units and the firing, he affirmed: ‘It is necessary immediately to entrust a person enjoying *the confidence of the country* (!) to form *a new government*. There must be no delay. Delay is like death. I beseech God that at this hour responsibility may not fall on the Crown-bearer.’ A liar and a hypocrite, Rodzyanko had more than once very bombastically expressed his ‘devotion’ to his Majesty, while at the same time preparing a plot against him. He immediately sent copies of this telegram to the commanders of the fronts – Brusilov and Ruzsky, asking them to support his demand for a ‘new government’ and a ‘person’ with the confidence of the country before his Majesty. They replied: ‘task accomplished’.[[352]](#footnote-352)

“On the night from the 26th to the 27th in the Reserve battalion of the Light-Guards of the Volhynia regiment (the regiment itself was at the front), the under-officer of the Second Company Kirpichnikov (a student, the son of a professor) convinced the soldiers ‘to rise up against the autocracy’, and gained their promise to follow his orders. The whole night the same agitation was going on in other companies. By the morning, when Captain Lashkevich came into the barracks, they told him that the soldiers had decided not to fire at the people any more. Lashkevich hurled himself at under-officer Markov, who had made this declaration, and was immediately killed. After this the Volhynians under the command of Kirpichnikov went to the reserves of the Preobrazhensky regiment. There they killed the colonel. The rebels understood that now they could escape punishment (and at the same time, being sent to the front) only if they would all act *as a group, together* (there was no going back). The ‘professional’ revolutionaries strengthened them in their feelings. The Volhynians and Preobrazhenskys were joined on the same morning of the 27th by a company of the Lithuanian regiment, the sappers, a part of the Moscow regiment (reservists, of course). The officers saved themselves from being killed, they started firing and ran. The workers united with the soldiers. Music was playing. They stormed the police units and the ‘Kresty’ prison, from which they freed all those under arrest, including recently imprisoned members of the ‘Working Group’ of the Military-Industrial Committee, who had fulfilled the task of being the link between the Masonic ‘headquarters’ and the revolutionary parties, and first of all – the Bolsheviks. They burned the building of the District Court. The appeal sounded: ‘Everyone to the State Duma’. And a huge crowd rolled into the Tauride palace, sacked it, ran amok in the halls, but did not touch the Duma deputies. But the Duma delegates, having received on the same day an order from his Majesty to prorogue the Duma until April, did not disperse, but decided to form a *Provisional Committee of the State Duma* ‘to instil order in the capital and to liaise with public organizations and institutions’.[[353]](#footnote-353) The Committee was joined by the whole membership of the bureau of the ‘Progressive Bloc’ and Kerensky and Chkeidze (the first joining up of the first and second echelons). *Immediately,* in the Tauride palace, at the same time, only in different rooms, revolutionaries of the second echelon, crawling out of the underground and from the prisons, formed the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies (which later added ‘and of Soldiers’ to its name). The Soviet was headed by Alexandrovich, Sukhanov (Gimmer) and Steklov (Nakhamkes), and all the rest (97%) were Jews who had never been *either workers or soldiers*. Immediately the Executive Committee sent invitations round the factories for deputies to the Congress of Soviets, which was appointed to meet at 7 o’ clock in the evening, and organized ‘requisitions’ of supplies from the warehouses and shops for ‘the revolutionary army’, so that the Taurida Palace immediately became *the provisioning point* for the rebels (the Provisional Committee of the Duma had not managed to think about that!).

“The authorities panicked. Khabalov hastily gathered a unit of 1000 men under the command of Colonel A.P. Kutepov, but with these forces he was not able to get through to the centre of the uprising. Then soldiers faithful to his Majesty, not more than 1500-2000 men (!) gathered in the evening on Palace Square in front of the Winter Palace. With them were the Minister of War Belyaev, and Generals Khabalov, Balk and Zankevich. Khabalov telegraphed the Tsar that he could not carry out his instructions. He was joined by Grand Duke Cyril Vladimirovich, who declared that the situation was hopeless. Then, during the night, there arrived Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich, the (younger) brother of the Tsar, who said that the soldiers would have to be taken out of the Palace since he ‘did not want the soldiers to fire at the people from the House of the Romanovs’. And he suggested telegraphing the Tsar to ask him to appoint Prince Lvov as the new President of the Council of Ministers…[[354]](#footnote-354) The completely bewildered generals were moved to the Admiralty, and the soldiers began to disperse. On the afternoon of the 28th their remnants left the Admiralty at the demand of the Minister of the Navy and, laying down their weapons, dispersed. One should point out that many members of the Imperial House behaved very unworthily in those days. They even discussed a plan for a ‘palace coup’ (to overthrow his Majesty and ‘seat’ one of the Great Princes on the throne). And some of the Great Princes directly joined the revolution. There were still some members of the Council of Ministers and the State Council in the Mariinsky Palace. They advised Protopopov (who was especially hated by ‘society’) to say that he was ill, which he did. Prince Golitsyn telegraphed the Tsar with a request that he be retired and that he grant a ‘responsible ministry’. His Majesty replied that he was appointing a new leader of the Petrograd garrison, and gave an order for the movement of troops against Petrograd. He gave Golitsyn all rights in civil administration since he considered ‘changes in the personal composition (of the government) to be inadmissible in the given circumstances’. His Majesty was very far from a ‘non-resistance to evil’ Tolstoyan! On the same day, the 27th, he gave an order to send a whole group of military units that were brave and faithful to the Fatherland from all three fronts to Petrograd, and told everyone that on the 28th he would personally go to the capital. At the same time his Majesty ordered General N.I. Ivanov to move on Petrograd immediately with a group of 700 Georgievsky cavalrymen, which he did the next day. At that time, on February 27, the ministers and courtiers, gathering together for the last time, suddenly received the news that an armed crowd was heading for the Mariinsky Palace. They decided to disperse! They dispersed forever! The crowd came and began to sack and loot the Mariinsky.

“***It was all over with the government of Russia.*** On the evening of the 27th, as has been noted, there took place the first session of the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies, who elected Chkheidze as their president. They also elected a ‘literary commission’ and ordered the publication of the Soviet’s *Izvestia*. At that point, on the night from the 27th to the 28th, the Provisional Committee of the State Duma began to try and persuade Rodzyanko ‘to take power into his hands’, since, in the words of Miliukov, ‘the leaders of the army were in cahoots with him’. 15 minutes of tormented waiting passed. Finally, Rodzyanko agreed. The Provisional Committee proclaimed itself to be the ‘power’ of Russia. But…, as became clear, with the prior agreement of the Soviet’s Executive Committee! From that moment all the members of the Provisional Government, that is, the first ‘echelon’, would be led by the leaders of the Soviet, that is, the second ‘echelon’ of the revolution, although few knew about that.

“On February 28th the uprising spread to the suburbs of Petrograd. In Kronstadt drunken soldiers killed Admiral Viren and tens of officers. In Tsarkoye Selo the troops who were guarding the Family of his Majesty [under the command of Grand Duke Kyril Vladimirovich] declared that they were ‘neutral’.

“At 6 o’clock in the morning of February 28, 1917 Rodzyanko twice telegraphed General Alexeyev in Headquarters. The first telegram informed him that ‘power has passed to the Provisional Committee’, while the second said that this new power, ‘with the support of the troops and with the sympathy of the population’ would soon instil complete order and ‘re-establish the activity of the government institutions’. It was all a lie!”[[355]](#footnote-355)

A little before this, at 3 a.m., Grand Duke Michael “was driven with a military escort to the Winter Palace, only just escaping revolutionarie by accelerating away. At the palace he found General Khabalov and a thousand loyal troops, but ordered them not to defend the palace…”[[356]](#footnote-356)

It was during the night of February 27-28 that the February revolution reached its first climax. When the government led by Golitsyn collapsed, and as long as the Tsar and General Ivanov were still on their way to Petrograd, Rodzyanko could have seized power as being the leader of the Duma, the only other lawful organ of power in the city. But he hesitated; and while the Duma deputies wasted time on speeches, precious time was lost. Meanwhile, in room number 12 of the same building, the Tauride palace, in which the Duma was meeting, a new, completely illegal organ of power, the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ deputies, was being formed. On hearing of this, writes Yakoby, “the group of Rodzyanko and Milyukov entered into negotiations with the leaders of the Soviet, and at exactly midnight these negotiations led to the creation of an executive committee of the State Duma, on which power was temporarily conferred.

“This committee seemed quite moderate in its composition, although representatives of the rightist parties were not admitted into it, and the representatives of the leftists – Kerensky and Chkeidze – were given a very prominent role. In essence, this was the most complete capitulation of the ‘bourgeois’ elements of the revolution before the representatives of the proletariat. Never in their wildest dreams had Rodzyanko and those who thought like him gone further than a constitutional monarchy ruled by the highest financial circles and headed by a Sovereign playing only a decorative role. That noisy and disheveled monster that suddenly jumped from room number 12 like a demon from a box finally confused the irreconcilable opponents of ‘tsarism’…”[[357]](#footnote-357)

For at that point, continues Yakobi, “Rodzyanko suggested to the socialists of the Soviet that they take power completely themselves. A pitiful recognition of helplessness, a complete capitulation of the bourgeois elements before the fist of the Second International, which was preparing the way for Bolshevism! But the Soviet refused. The ‘bourgeoisie had started the revolution, they themselves were obliged to dig the grave in which their hopes would be buried.

“The Soviet used the same methods for exerting pressure on the Duma committee as had been applied by the opposition to terrorize the Tsarist Government – frighten them with the spectre of bloodshed: but Chkeidze and the other agents of Bolshevism played their game more decisively than Rodzyanko. The slightest attempt at resistance was suppressed with the aid of an artificially elicited disturbance of the mob in the street.”[[358]](#footnote-358)

On March 1 the composition of the Provisional Committee was announced. It contained two leaders of the Soviet: Kerensky and Chkeidze, together with Rodzyanko, Shulgin, Miliukov, Konovalov, Dmitriukov, Rzhevsky, Shidlosvksy, Nekrasov, Lvov.[[359]](#footnote-359)

On the same day Grand Duke Paul Alexandrovich composed and signed a manifesto in the name of the Tsar giving a constitution. (This was the same date on which Tsar Alexander II had been killed after signing a similar document!) He sent it to the Tsaritsa for her signature, but she refused, for no signature could take the place of the Tsar’s in such an act. He then sent it to Grand Dukes Michael Alexandrovich and Cyril Vladimirovich, who both signed it. It was then sent to Miliukov, who glanced at it and then stuffed it carelessly into his portfolio, saying: “That’s an interesting document”…[[360]](#footnote-360)

## **68. THE ABDICATION OF THE TSAR**

However, all was not lost yet: the Master of the House had not yet appeared on the scene…

On February 28, the Tsar, having sent Ivanov to crush the revolution in Petrograd, set off by train from Army Headquarters to his family in Tsarskoye Selo. He had been delayed several critical hours by the open disobedience of Quarter-master General Lukomsky, who tried to make him stay at Headquarters.[[361]](#footnote-361) Then, in accordance with Guchkov’s plan, the train was stopped first at Malaya Vishera, then at Dno. This was supposedly because the stations further down the line were in the hands of the rebels. [[362]](#footnote-362)

The Russian word “Dno” means “bottom” or “abyss” – it was precisely at this spot that Imperial Russia reached the bottom of her historical path, and Orthodox Russia stood at the edge of the abyss...

Lebedev continues: “Movement along the railway lines was already controlled by the appointee of the Masons and revolutionary Bublikov (a former assistant of the Minister of Communications). Incidentally, he later admitted: ‘One disciplined division from the front would have been sufficient to put down the rebellion’. But Alexeyev, Brusilov and Ruzsky *did not allow even one* division as far as Petrograd, as we shall now see! It was decided to direct the Tsar’s train to Pskov, so as then to attempt to get through to Tsarskoye Selo via Pskov. The Tsar hoped that the whole situation could be put right by General Ivanov, who at that moment was moving towards Tsarskoye Selo by another route. So everything was arranged so that his Majesty should be in Pskov, where the Headquarters of the Commander of the Northern Front, General Ruzsky, was. The Tsar was very much counting on him. Not knowing that he was one of the main traitors… It has to be said again that this lack of knowledge was not the result of bad work on the part of the police. The Masons had done their conspiring well. Moreover, it did not enter the heads either of the police or of his Majesty that fighting generals, commanders of fronts, the highest ranks in the army, ‘the most noble gentlemen’ from the Duma, the ministries and institutions could be plotters!...

“On March 1 there arrived at the Duma new military units, or their deputations, with declarations of fidelity to ‘the new power’. At 4 o’clock in the afternoon there arrived Grand Duke Cyril Vladimirovich at the head of the Guards Naval Squadron.[[363]](#footnote-363) He told Rodzyanko that he was at his disposal…

“On the same March 1 the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies issued the famous ‘Order No. 1’ to the army, signed by the Mason N.D. Sokolov. Its essence was that soldiers’ committees should be elected by the troops and that only those orders of the Military Commission of the State Duma should be carried out which did not contradict the orders of the Soviet (!), and that all the weapons of the army should be at the disposal and under the control of the company and battalion elected committees and in no circumstances were ‘to be given to the officers, even at their demand’. Saluting and addressing [officers] by their titles were also rescinded. This was the beginning of the collapse of the Russian army. After the departure of his Majesty from Stavka General Alexeyev at 1.15 a.m. on March 1, without the knowledge of the Tsar, sent General Ivanov telegram No. 1833, which for some reason he dated February 28, in which he held Ivanov back from decisive actions by referring to ‘private information’ to the effect that ‘complete calm had arrived’ in Petrograd, that the appeal of the Provisional Government spoke about ‘the inviolability of the monarchical principle in Russia’, and that everyone was awaiting the arrival of His Majesty in order to end the matter through peace, negotiations and the averting of ‘civil war’. Similar telegrams with completely false information were sent at the same time to all the chief commanders (including Ruzsky). The source of this lie was the Masonic ‘headquarters’ of Guchkov. ‘Brother’ Alexeyev could not fail to believe the ‘brothers’ from the capital, moreover he passionately *wanted* *to believe*, since only in this could there be a ‘justification’ of his treacherous actions.”

Meanwhile, “General Ivanov slowly, but surely moved towards the capital. The railwaymen were forced, under threat of court martial, to carry out his demands. At the stations, where he was met by revolutionary troops, he acted simply – by commanding them: ‘On your knees!’ They immediately carried out the command, casting their weapons on the ground…”[[364]](#footnote-364)

However, Ivanov got no further than Vyritsa, from where he was summoned to Mogilev after the abdication of the Tsar.[[365]](#footnote-365)

“Meanwhile, continues Lebedev, “the Tsar arrived in Pskov. On the evening of March 1, 1917 there took place between him and General Ruzsky a very long and difficult conversation. N.V. Ruzsky, who thought the same about the situation in the capital as Alexeyev, on the instructions of Rodzyanko kept saying unashamedly to the members of the royal suite: ‘*It remains only to cast ourselves on the mercy of the conquerors’,* supposing that ‘the conquerors’ were the Masonic ‘Progressive Bloc’ of the State Duma… Unexpectedly for Nicholas II, Ruzsky ‘heatedly’ began to demonstrate to him the necessity of a ‘responsible ministry’.[[366]](#footnote-366) His Majesty calmly objected: ‘*I am responsible before God and Russia for everything that has happened and will happen*; it does not matter whether the ministers will be responsible before the Duma and the State Council. If I see that what the ministers are doing is not for the good of Russia, I will never be able to agree with them, comforting myself with the thought that the matter is out of my hands.’ The Tsar went on to go through the qualities of all the main actors of the Duma and the ‘Bloc’, showing that none of them had the necessary qualities to rule the country. However, all this was not simply an argument on political questions between two uninvolved people. From time to time in the course of this strange conversation his Majesty received witnesses to the fact that this was the position not only of Ruzsky, but also of Alexeyev. The latter sent a panicky telegram from Headquarters about the necessity *immediately* of bestowing ‘a responsible ministry’ and even sent him the text of a *royal manifesto* composed by him to this effect! Besides, it turned out that his Majesty *could not* even communicate with anyone by direct line! The Tsar sent [V.N.] Voeikov (the palace commandant) to telegraph his reply to Alexeyev. Voeikov demanded access to the telegraph apparatus from General Davydov (also a traitor from Ruzsky’s headquarters). Ruzsky heard the conversation and declared that it was impossible to hand over the apparatus. Voeikov said that he was only carrying out ‘the command of his Majesty’. Ruzsky said that ‘he would not take such an insult (?!), since he, Ruzsky, was the commander-in-chief here, and his Majesty’s communications *could not* take place through his headquarters without his, Ruzsky’s, knowledge, and that at the present worrying time he, Ruzsky *would not allow* Voeikov to use the apparatus at all! The Tsar understood that practically speaking *he was already separated from the levers and threads of power*. The members of his suite also understood this. One of them recalled that the behaviour and words of Ruzsky (on casting themselves ‘on the mercy of the conquerors’) ‘undoubtedly indicated that not only the Duma and Petrograd, but also the higher commanders at the front were acting *in complete agreement* and had decided to carry out *a coup.* We were only perplexed when this took place.’[[367]](#footnote-367) It began ‘to take place’ already in 1915, but *the final* decision was taken by Alexeyev and Ruzsky during a telephone conversation they had with each other on the night *from February 28 to March 1.* I. Solonevich later wrote that ‘of all the weak points in the Russian State construction *the heights of the army* represented *the weakest point.* And all the plans of his Majesty Emperor Nicholas Alexandrovich were shattered *precisely at this* point’.

“In view of the exceptional and extraordinary importance of the matter, we must *once again* ask ourselves: why was it precisely this point in the ‘construction’ that turned out to be the weakest? And once again we reply: because it was eaten up from within by the rust of *Masonry*, its propaganda. Then there is one more question: how did this become possible in the Russian Imperial army? And again the reply: only because, since the time of *Peter I,* through the implanting of Masonry into Russia, the ideological *idol* of ‘service to Russia and the Fatherland’ was raised in the consciousness of the nobility, and in particular the serving, *military* nobility, *above* the concept of service to God and the Tsar, as was demanded by the direct, spiritual-mystical *meaning of the Oath* given by the soldiers *personally*, not to some abstraction, but to a given, concrete *Sovereign before God!* The emperors of the 19th century did not pay due attention to this danger, or were not able to destroy this idol-worship. In truth, the last of them, his Majesty Nicholas II, was now paying in full for this, ‘*suffering for the mistakes of his predecessors’.*

“Seeing the extreme danger of the situation, at 0.20 a.m. on the night from March 1 to March 2 the Tsar sent this telegram to General Ivanov, who had already reached Tsarskoye Selo: ‘I ask you to undertake no measures before my arrival and your report to me.’ It is possible that, delighted at this text, Ruzsky, behind the back of his Majesty, *on his own authority* and against the will of the Tsar, immediately *rescinded* the sending of soldiers of the Northern Front to support Ivanov and ordered them to *return* the military echelons which had already been sent to Petrograd. *At the same time* Alexeyev from Headquarters, *in the name of his Majesty, but without his knowledge and agreement,* ordered all the units of the South-Western and Western fronts that had earlier been sent to Petrograd to return and stop the loading of those who had only just begun to load. The faithful officers of the Preobrazhensky regiment recalled with pain how they had had to submit to this command. They did not know that this was not the command of the Tsar, but that *Alexeyev had deceived* them!”

“At 2 a.m., now on 2 March,” writes Montefiore, “Nicholas agreed to appoint Rodaianko prime minister, retaining autocratic power. Then he went to bed. Ruzky informed Rodzianko, who replied at 3.30 a.m., ‘It’s obvious neither his Majesty nor you realize what’s going on here…there is no return to the past. The threatening demands for an abdication in favour of the son with Michael Alexandrovich as regent are becoming quite definite.’ In the course of that evening the bewhiskered gents of the Duma, who wished to preserve the monarchy, and the leather-capped Marxists of the Petrograd Soviet, who wanted a republic, had compromised to form a Provisional Government – and seek Nicholas’s abdication in favour of Alexei. The new premier was Prince Lvov, with Kerensky as justice minister. Now that they knew Nicholas was in Pskov, the Dumas sent two members, Guchkov and Vasily Shulgin, to procure his abdication. They set off immediately.”[[368]](#footnote-368)

However, as Lebedev writes,“Rodzyanko again, without any gnawing of conscience, *lied* to Alexeyev and Ruzsky that the Provisional Government had complete control of the situation, that ‘everybody obeyed him (i.e. Rodzyanko) alone’… He was hiding the fact that ‘everyone’ (that is, the Soviet first of all) *was frightened*, as of fire, of the return of the Tsar to the capital! For they were not sure even of the mutinous reservists, and if even only one warlike unit (even if only a division) were to arrive from the front – that would the end for them all and for the revolution! We can see what the real position of the Provisional Government was from the fact that already on March 1 the Soviet had *expelled* it from its spacious accommodation in the Tauris palace, which it occupied itself, into less spacious rooms, and refused Rodzyanko a train to go to negotiate with the Tsar. So Rodzyanko was compelled to *beg*. The Soviet gave him two soldiers to go to the post, since on the road the ‘ruler of Russia’, whom everyone supposedly obeyed, might be attacked or completely beaten up… One of the main leaders of the Soviet in those days was Sukhanov (Himmer). In his notes he conveyed an accurate general picture of the state of things. It turns out that the ‘progressivists’ of the Duma on that very night of March 1 in a humiliating way *begged* Himmer, Nakhamkes and Alexandrovich to *allow* them to create a ‘government’. Himmer wrote: ‘The next word was mine. I noted either we could restrain the masses or nobody could. The real power, therefore, was with us or with nobody. There was only one way out: agree to *our* conditions and accept them as *the government programme*.’ And the Provisional Committee (the future ‘government’) *agreed*! Even Guchkov (!) refused to take part in such a government. He joined it later, when the Bolsheviks *allowed* them to *play a little* at a certain self-sufficiency and supposed ‘independence’ before the public.

“… But Rodzyanko lied and *deceived the generals*, since it was his direct responsibility before the ‘senior brothers’ by all means not to allow the arrival of military units and the Tsar into Petrograd at that moment!

“At 10.15 a.m. on March 2 Alexeyev on his own initiative sent to all the front-commanders and other major military leaders a telegram in which, conveying what Rodzyanko was saying about the necessity of the abdication of his Majesty for the sake of *the salvation of the Monarchy*, Russia and the army, and for victory over the external foe, he added *personally on his own part*..: ‘*It appears that* *the situation does not allow any other resolution.’* By 2.30 on March 2 the replies of the commanders had been received. Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolayevich replied, referring to the ‘fateful situation’: ‘I, as a faithful subject (?!), consider it necessary, in accordance with the duty of the oath and in accordance with the spirit of the oath, *to beseech* Your Imperial Majesty *on my knees’* (… to abdicate). General Brusilov (the future Bolshevik ‘inspector of cavalry’) also replied that without the abdication ‘Russia will collapse’. General Evert expressed the opinion that ‘it is impossible to count on the army in its present composition for the suppression of disorders’. This was not true! The army as a whole, and some units in particular, was devoted to his Majesty. Masonic and revolutionary propaganda was indeed being carried out in it, but it did not have the necessary success *as long as the Tsar remained at the head of his Army.* General Sakharov, while reviling the Duma for all he was worth (‘a thieving band of men… which has taken advantage of a propitious moment’), nevertheless, ‘sobbing, was forced to say that abdication was the most painless way out’… To these replies Alexeyev appended his own opinion, which was also in favour of the abdication of the Tsar. Only the commander of the Guards Cavalry, General Khan-Hussein of Nakhichevan (a Muslim) remained faithful to the Russian Orthodox Autocrat! ‘I beseech you not to refuse to lay at the feet of His Majesty the boundless devotion of the Guards Cavalry and our readiness to die for our adored Monarch’, was his reply to Alexeyev. But the latter *did not pass on* this reply to the Tsar in Pskov. They also did not tell him that Admiral Rusin in Headquarters had more or less accused Alexeyev and his assistant General Lukomsky of *‘treason’* when they had suggested that the admiral sign the text of a general telegram to his Majesty in the name of all the commanders expressing the opinion that abdication was necessary. Then Rusin voluntarily refused to serve the enemies of Russia and resigned his post. So at that time there were still leaders who were completely faithful to the Tsar, and not only traitors like Alexeyev, Lukomsky, Ruzsky and Danilov, or like Generals Brusilov, Polivanov, Manikovsky, Bonch-Bruyevich, Klembovsky, Gatovsky, Boldyrev and others, who tried to please the Bolsheviks. At 10 a.m. on March 2 his Majesty was speaking to Ruzsky about the abdication: ‘If it is necessary that I should step aside for the good of Russia, I am ready, but I am afraid that the people will not understand this’… At this point they brought the text of Alexeyev’s telegram to the commanders. It was decided to wait for the replies. By 3 p.m. the replies had arrived from Headquarters. Ruzsky, accompanied by Danilov and Savich, came with the text of the telegram to his Majesty’s carriage. The Tsar, as Danilov recalled, ‘seemed calm, but was paler than usual: it was evident that he had passed most of the night without sleep. He was dressed in a dark blue Circassian coat, with a dagger in a silver sheath in his belt.’ Having sat down at the table, his Majesty began to listen to Ruzsky. He informed him of the events of the past hours and handed the Tsar the replies of the commanders. The Tsar read them. Ruzsky, ‘emphasizing each word’, began to expound his own opinion, which consisted in the fact that his Majesty had to act *as the generals advised him.* The Tsar asked the opinion of those present. Danilov and Savich said the same as Ruzsky. ‘A deathly silence ensued,’ wrote Danilov. ‘His Majesty was visibly perturbed. Several times he unconsciously looked at the firmly drawn window of the carriage.’ His Majesty’s widowed mother, Empress Maria Fyodorovna, later, from the words of her son, affirmed that Ruzsky had even dared to say: ‘Well, decide.’

“What was his Majesty thinking about at that moment? According to the words of another contemporary of the events, the Tsar ‘clearly understood that General Ruzsky would not submit to his command if he ordered him to suppress the mutiny raging in the capital. He felt that a secret *betrayal was encompassing him like a sticky spider’s web.’* Immediately the Empress learned that his Majesty was in Pskov, she expressed herself with maximum accuracy: ‘It’s *a trap!*’ Danilov continues: ‘Then, standing up and turning quickly towards us, [the Tsar] crossed himself and said: “I have decided… I have decided to renounce the Throne in favour of my son Alexis!... I thank all of you for your brilliant and faithful service. I hope that it will continue under my son…” It was as if a stone that had been pressing on us fell from our shoulders. It was a profoundly triumphant moment. The behaviour of the abdicated Emperor was worthy of every kind of praise.’

“The moment was fateful. But for the traitor-generals themselves. Each of them would later receive his recompense from the Bolsheviks and God. But it was also a fateful moment for the whole of Russia!”[[369]](#footnote-369)

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Why did the Tsar agree to abdicate? Yana Sedova goes back to the similar crisis of October, 1905. “His Majesty himself explained the reason for his agreement. He wrote that he had to choose between two paths: a dictatorship and a constitution. A dictatorship, in his words, would give a short ‘breathing space’, after which he would ‘again have to act by force within a few months; but this would cost rivers of blood and in the end would lead inexorably to the present situation, that is, the power’s authority would have been demonstrated, but the result would remain the same and reforms could not be achieved in the future’. So as to escape this closed circle, his Majesty preferred to give a constitution with which he was not in sympathy.

“These words about a ‘breathing-space’ after which he would again have to act by force could perhaps have been applied now [in 1917]. In view of the solitude in which his Majesty found himself in 1917, the suppression of the revolution would have been the cure, not of the illness, but of its symptoms, a temporary anaesthesia – and, moreover, for a very short time.”[[370]](#footnote-370)

“By contrast with Peter I, Tsar Nicholas II of course was not inclined to walk over other people’s bodies. But he, too, was able, in case of necessity, to act firmly and send troops to put down the rebellious city. He could have acted in this way to defend the throne, order and the monarchical principle as a whole. But now he saw how much hatred there was against himself, and that the February revolution was as it were directed only personally against him. He did not want to shed the blood of his subjects to defend, not so much his throne, as himself on the throne…”[[371]](#footnote-371)

Archpriest Lev Lebedev agrees that the Tsar agreed to abdicate because he believed that the general dissatisfaction with his *personal* rule could be assuaged by his *personal* departure from the scene. But he never saw in this the renunciation of the Monarchy and its replacement by a republic; he envisaged only the transfer of power from himself to another member of the Dynasty – his son, under the regency of his brother. This, he thought, would placate the army and therefore ensure victory against Germany.

Let us look more closely at this hypothesis… The Tsar wrote in his diary-entry for March 2: “My abdication is necessary. Ruzsky transmitted this conversation [with Rodzyanko] to the Staff HQ, and Alexeyev to all the com­manders-in-chief of the fronts. The replies from all arrived at 2:05. The essence is that that for the sake of the salvation of Russia and keeping the army at the front quiet, I must resolve on this step. I agreed. From the Staff HQ they sent the draft of a manifesto. In the evening there arrived from Petrograd Guchkov and Shulgin. I discussed and transmitted to them the signed and edited manifesto. At one in the morning I left Pskov greatly affected by all that had come to pass. All around me I see treason, cowardice, and deceit.”

Commenting on these words, Fr. Lev writes: “The Tsar was convinced that this treason was personally directed to him, and not to the Monarchy, not to Russia! The generals were *sincerely* convinced of the same: they supposed that in betraying the Tsar they were not betraying the Monarchy and the Fatherland, but were even serving them, acting for their true good!... But betrayal and treason to *God’s* Anointed is treason to everything that is headed by him. The Masonic consciousness of the generals, drunk on their supposed ‘real power’ over the army, could not rise even to the level of this *simple* spiritual truth! And meanwhile the traitors had already been *betrayed*, the deceivers *deceived*! Already on the following day, March 3, General Alexeyev, having received more detailed information on what was happening in Petrograd, exclaimed: ‘I shall never forgive myself that I *believed* in the sincerity of certain people, obeyed them and sent the telegram to the commanders-in-chief on the question of the abdication of his Majesty from the Throne!’… In a similar way General Ruzsky quickly ‘*lost faith* in the new government’ and, as was written about him, ‘suffered great moral torments’ concerning his conversation with the Tsar, and the days March 1 and 2, ‘until the end of his life’ (his end came in October, 1918, when the Bolsheviks finished off Ruzsky in the Northern Caucasus). But we should not be moved by these belated ‘sufferings’ and ‘recovery of sight’ of the generals (and also of some of the Great Princes). They did not have to possess information, nor be particularly clairvoyant or wise; they simply had to be *faithful to their oath* – and nothing more!..

“… At that time, March 1-2, 1917, the question was placed before the Tsar, his consciousness and his conscience in the following way: the revolution in Petrograd is being carried out under *monarchical* banners: society, the people (Russia!) are standing for the preservation of tsarist power, for the planned carrying on of the war to victory, but this is being hindered only by one thing – general dissatisfaction *personally* with Nicholas II, general distrust of his *personal* leadership, so that if he, for the sake of the good and the victory of Russia, were to depart, he would *save* both the Homeland and the Dynasty!

“Convinced, as were his generals, that everything was like that, his Majesty, who never suffered from love of power (he could be powerful, but not power-loving!), after 3 o’clock in the afternoon of March 2, 1917, immediately sent two telegrams – to Rodzyanko in Petrograd and to Alexeyev in Mogilev. In the first he said: ‘*There is no sacrifice that I would not undertake in the name of the real good of our native Mother Russia.* For that reason I am ready to renounce the Throne in favour of My Son, in order that he should remain with Me until his coming of age, under the regency of My brother, Michael Alexandrovich’. The telegram to Headquarters proclaimed: ‘In the name of the good of our ardently beloved Russia, her calm and salvation, I am ready to renounce the Throne in favour of My Son. I ask everyone to serve Him faithfully and unhypocritically.’ His Majesty said, as it were between the lines: ‘Not as you have served Me…’ Ruzsky, Danilov and Savich went away with the texts of the telegrams.

“On learning about this, Voeikov ran into the Tsar’s carriage: ‘Can it be true… that You have signed the abdication?’ The Tsar gave him the telegrams lying on the table with the replies of the commanders-in-chief, and said: ‘What was left for me to do, when they have all betrayed Me? And first of all – Nikolasha (Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolayevich)… Read!’”[[372]](#footnote-372)

As in 1905, so in 1917, probably the single most important factor influencing the Tsar’s decision was the attitude of his uncle and the former Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolayevich Romanov, “Nikolasha” as he was known in the family. It was indeed the case that there was very little he could do in view of the treason of the generals and Nikolasha.[[373]](#footnote-373) He could probably continue to defy the will of the social and political élite, as he had done more than once in the past – but not the generals…[[374]](#footnote-374)

S.S. Oldenburg writes: “One can speculate whether his Majesty could have not abdicated. With the position taken by General Ruzsky and General Alexeyev, the possibility of resistance was excluded: the commands of his Majesty were not delivered, the telegrams of those who were loyal to him were not communicated to him. Moreover, they could have announced the abdication without his will: Prince Mark of Baden announced the abdication of the German emperor (9.11.1918) when the Kaiser had by no means abdicated! His Majesty at least retained the possibility of addressing the people with his own last word… His Majesty did not believe that his opponents could cope with the situation. For that reason, to the last moment he tried to keep the steering wheel in his own hands. When that possibility had disappeared – it was clear that he was in captivity – his Majesty wanted at least to do all he could to make the task of his successors easier… Only he did not want to entrust his son to them: he knew that the youthful monarch could not abdicate, and to remove him they might use other, bloody methods. His Majesty gave his opponents everything he could: they still turned out to be powerless in the face of events. The steering wheel was torn out of the hands of the autocrat-‘chauffeur’ and the car fell into the abyss…”[[375]](#footnote-375)

E.E. Alferev echoes this assessment and adds: “The Empress, who had never trusted Ruzsky, on learning that the Tsar’s train had been help up at Pskov, immediately understood the danger. On March 2 she wrote to his Majesty: ‘But you are alone, you don’t have the army with you, you are caught like a mouse in a trap. What can you do?’”[[376]](#footnote-376)

Perhaps he could have counted on the support of some military units. But the result would undoubtedly have been a civil war, whose outcome was doubtful, but whose effect on the war with Germany could not be doubted: the Germans would have been given a decisive advantage at a critical moment when Russia was about to launch a spring offensive. This last factor was decisive for the Tsar: he would not contemplate undermining the war effort for any reason. For the first duty of an Orthodox Tsar after the defence of the Orthodox faith is the defence of the country against external enemies – and in the case of the war with Germany the two duties coincided.

The Tsar had always steadfastly refused to consider any internal constitutional changes during the war for the very good reason that such changes were bound to undermine the war effort. But his enemies wanted to force him to make such changes precisely while the war was still being waged. For, as George Katkov penetratingly observes, the Russian liberals’ and radicals’ “fear of the military failure and humiliation of Russia was, if we are not mistaken, only the decent cover for another feeling – the profound inner anxiety that the war would end in victory before the political plans of the opposition could be fulfilled, and that the possibilities presented to it by the exceptional circumstances of wartime, would be missed”.[[377]](#footnote-377)

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Guchkov and Shulgin arrived at about 10 p.m. on March 2. “By this time, that is, in the evening, the Tsar had somewhat changed his original decision. The point was the extremely dangerous illness of his Son, the Tsarevich Alexis, who was still destined to rule, albeit under the regency of his uncle, Michael. The Tsar-Father, worrying about his, asked the doctors for the last time: was there the slightest hop of Alexis Nikolayevich being cured of haemophilia? And he received a negative reply: there was no hope. Then the Tsar took the decision to keep his sick son completely with himself and abdicate in favour of his brother *Michael.* However, the text of the abdication manifesto was still marked as March 2, *15.00 hours*, that is, the moment when he decided to renounce his power. So when Guchkov and Shulgin brought the text of the manifesto that they had composed they found that it was not necessary. The Tsar gave them his. And they had to admit with shame how much more powerful, spiritual and majestic in its simplicity was the manifesto written by the Tsar than their talentless composition.[[378]](#footnote-378) They *begged* the Tsar *to appoint* Prince Lvov as President of the Council of Ministers and General L.G. Kornilov as Commander of the Petrograd military district. The Tsar signed the necessary orders. These were the last appointments made by *the Tsar.*

“Seeing themselves as the controllers of the destinies and rulers of Russia, Guchkov and Shulgin both arrived in a concealed manner, bewildered, unshaven, in noticeably dirty collars, and departed with all the papers they had been given in a conspiratorial manner, looking around them and concealing themselves from ‘the people’ whom they thought to rule… Thieves and robbers! Guchkov’s plan had been carried out, while as for Guchkov himself – what a boundlessly pitiful situation did this very clever Mason find himself in, he who had worked for so many years to dig a hole under Tsar Nicholas II!

“Nicholas II’s manifesto declared: ‘During the days of the great struggle against the external foe which, in the space of almost three years, has been striving to enslave our Native Land, it has pleased the Lord God to send down upon Russia a new and difficult trial. The national disturbances that have begun within the country threaten to reflect disastrously upon the further conduct of the stubborn war. The fate of Russia, the honour of our heroic army, the well-being of the people, the entire future of our precious Fatherland demand that the war be carried out to a victorious conclusion, come what may. The cruel foe is exerting what remains of his strength, and nor far distant is the hour when our valiant army with our glorious allies will be able to break the foe completely. In these decisive days in the life of Russia, We have considered it a duty of conscience to make it easy for Our people to bring about a tight-knit union and cohesion of all our national strength, in order that victory might be the more quickly attained, and, in agreement with the State Duma We have concluded that it would be a good thing to abdicate the Throne of the Russian State and to remove Supreme Power from Ourselves. Not desiring to be separated from Our beloved Son, We transfer Our legacy to Our Brother Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich, and bless Him to ascend the Throne of the Russian State. We command Our Brother to conduct State affairs fully and in inviolable unity with the representatives of those men who hold legislative office, upon those principles which they shall establish, swearing an inviolable oath to that effect. In the name of our ardently beloved Native Land We call upon all faithful sons of the Fatherland to fulfil their sacred duty before it, by submitting to the Tsar during the difficult moment of universal trials, and, aiding Him, together with the representatives of he people, to lead the Russian State out upon the path of victory, well-being and glory. May the Lord God help Russia. Pskov. 2 March, 15.00 hours. 1917. Nicholas.’ Countersigned by the Minister of the Court Count Fredericks.[[379]](#footnote-379)

“Then – it was already night on March 2 – the Tsar telegraphed the essence of the matter to his brother Michael and asked forgiveness that he ‘had not been able to warn’ him. But this telegram *did not reach* its addressee.

“Then the train set off. Left on his own, in his personal compartment, the Tsar prayed for a long time by the light only of a lampada that burned in front of an icon. Then he sat down and wrote in his diary: ‘At one in the morning I left Pskov greatly affected by all that had come to pass. All around me I see treason, cowardice, and deceit.’

“This is the condition that *reigned* at that time in ‘society’, and especially in democratic, Duma society, in the highest army circles, in a definite part of the workers and reservists of Petrograd...”[[380]](#footnote-380)

Although he had abdicated, the Tsar considered himself to be still Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. That is why his train now moved towards Mogilev, and why neither Ruzsky nor Alexeyev nor even Guchkov prevented him from returning there.

General Voeikov writes: “Immediately the train had moved from the station, I went into the Tsar’s compartment, which was lit by one lampada burning in front of an icon. After all the experiences of that heavy day, the Tsar, who was always distinguished by huge self-possession, could not control himself. He embraced me and sobbed... My heart broke into pieces at the sight of such undeserved sufferings that had fallen to the lot of the noblest and kindest of tsars. He had only just endured the tragedy of abdicating from the throne for himself and his son because of the treason and baseness of the people who had abdicated from him, although they had received only good from him. He was torn away from his beloved family. All the misfortunes sent down upon him he bore with the humility of an ascetic... The image of the Tsar with his tear-blurred eyes in the half-lit compartment will never be erased from my memory to the end of my life...”[[381]](#footnote-381)

“Afterwards, ‘I slept long and deeply,’ wrote Nicholas. ‘Talked with my people about yesterday. Read a lot about Julius Caesar.’ Then he remembered Mish: ‘to his Majesty Emperor Michael. Recent events have led me to decide irrevocably to take this extreme step. Forgive me if it grieves you and also for no warning – there was no time.’”[[382]](#footnote-382)

Well he might remember Julius Caesar. For like Caesar, the Tsar was stabbed in the back on the Ides of March…

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At Stavka the Tsar appointed Nikolasha supreme commander of the armed forces, and Prince George Lvov – president of the Council of Ministers of the Provisional Government. For the last time, he listened to a report by General Alexeyev on the military situation. At the end of it, in a low voice said that it was difficult for him to part from them, and it was sad for him to be present for the last time at a report, “but it is evident that the will of God is stronger than my will”.[[383]](#footnote-383)

Sister Florence Farmborough, an English Red Cross nurse serving at the Russian Front, writes: “Deprived of Throne and Power, his visit was sorrowful in the extreme. He spent only a few days there and was visited by his mother, the Dowager Empress Marie. There they parted; she, to return to her home in Kiyev; he, to return as a prisoner to his family in Tsarskoe Selo [the Village of the Tsar]. Those who saw him in Mogilev were amazed at the self-control and courage with which he carried out the final ceremonies. He wrote to his fighting men on the various Fronts and addressed the troops in person. He told them that he was leaving them because he felt that he was no longer necessary; thanked them for their never-failing loyalty; praised them for their unwavering patriotism and besought them to obey the Provisional Government, to continue the war and to lead Russia to Victory. Only his mournful, hollow eyes, and extreme pallor told of the effort he was making to preserve the calm demanded of him.

“Even before he left Mogilev, vociferous celebrations were taking place in the town; large red flags blazed in the streets; all photographs of himself and family had disappeared; Imperial emblems were being pulled down from walls, cut off uniforms; and, while the ex-Tsar sat alone in his room, the officers who had visited him, cheered his brave words and bowed low – many in tears – before him as he bid them farewell, were at that moment queuing up in the open air, outside his window, to take the Oath of Allegiance to the Provisional Government.”[[384]](#footnote-384)

On March 5, in the presence of the Tsar and the Vladimir icon of the Mother of God, a liturgy was served at which the tsar was commemorated but no longer as ‘his most autocratic majesty and emperor”. A hum went through the congregation, and many wept.

On March 7 the Provisional Government ordered the arrest of the Tsar, and on March 8 four Duma deputies came to Mogilev and arrested him. This meant that he could not leave Russia (even if he had wanted to, which he and the Tsarina did not), and was the step that led inexorably to his martyrdom in Yekaterinburg the following year…

And for almost a whole week he continued to lead all the Armed Forces of Russia!... But, although there were many senior officers there who were ready to die for him, the Tsar made no move to make use of his powerful position to march against the revolution. For, according to Lebedev, he was sincerely convinced that “his departure from power could help everyone to come together for the decisive and already very imminent victory over the external enemy (the general offensive was due to take place in April). Let us recall his words to the effect that *there was no sacrifice* which he was not prepared to offer for the good of Russia. In those days the Tsar expressed himself still more definitely: ‘*… If Russia needs an atoning sacrifice, let me be that sacrifice’.* The Tsar was convinced (and they convinced him) that… the Provisional Government, society and the revolution were all (!) for *the preservation of the Monarchy* and for carrying through the war to a glorious *victory*…”[[385]](#footnote-385)

Lebedev is not convincing here. The Tsar’s first priority was undoubtedly a successful conclusion to the war. After all, on the night of his abdication, he wrote in his diary: “I decided to take this step for the sake of Russia, *and to keep the armies in the field*.” But it is hard to believe that he *still*, after all the treason he had seen around him, believed that “the Provisional Government, society and the revolution [!] are all for the preservation of the Monarchy”…

It is more likely is that he believed that without the cooperation of the generals and the Duma Russia could not win the war, which was the prime objective, upon which everything else depended.And so he abdicated, not because he had any illusions about the Provisional Government, but because, as a true patriot, he wanted Russia to win the war...

One of the best comments on the Tsar in the February revolution came from Winston Churchill, a minister in the British government at the time: “Surely to no nation has Fate been more malignant than to Russia. Her ship went down in sight of port… Every sacrifice had been made; the toil was achieved… In March the Tsar was on the throne: the Russian Empire and the Russian army held up, the front was secured and victory was undoubted. The long retreats were ended, the munitions famine was broken; arms were pouring in; stronger, larger, better equipped armies guarded the immense front… Moreover, no difficult action was now required: to remain in presence: to lean with heavy weight upon the far stretched Teutonic line: to hold without exceptional activity the weakened hostile forces on her front: in a word to endure – that was all that stood between Russia and the fruits of general victory… According to the superficial fashion of our time, the tsarist order is customarily seen as blind, rotten, a tyranny capable of nothing. But an examination of the thirty months of war with Germany and Austria should correct these light-minded ideas. We can measure the strength of the Russian Empire by the blows which it suffered, by the woes it experienced, by the inexhaustible forces that it developed, and by the restoration of forces of which it showed itself capable… In the government of states, when great events take place, the leader of the nation, whoever he may be, is condemned for failures and glorified for successes. The point is not who did the work or sketched the plan of battle: reproach or praise for the outcome is accorded to him who bears the authority of supreme responsibility. Why refuse this strict examination to Nicholas II? The brunt of supreme decisions centred upon him. At the summit where all problems are reduced to Yea and Nay, where events transcend the faculties of men and where all is inscrutable, he had to give the answers. His was the function of the compass needle. War or no war? Advance or retreat? Right or left? Democratise or hold firm? Quit or persevere? These were the battlefields of Nicholas II. Why should he reap no honour for them?...

“The regime which he personified, over which he presided, to which his personal character gave the final spark, had at this moment won the war for Russia. Now they crush him. A dark hand intervenes, clothed from the beginning in madness. The Tsar departs from the scene. He and all those whom he loved are given over to suffering and death. His efforts are minimized; his actions are condemned; his memory is defiled…”[[386]](#footnote-386)

The autocrat, according to the Orthodox understanding, can rule only in partnership or “symphony” with the Church. Moreover, the leaders of neither Church nor State can rule if the people rejects them; for in Deuteronomy 17.14 the Lord had laid it down as one of the conditions of the creation of a God-pleasing monarchy that the people should *want* a God-pleasing king.[[387]](#footnote-387) In view of this, the Tsar, who very well understood the true meaning of the autocracy, could not continue to rule if the Church and people did not want it. Just as it takes two willing partners to make a marriage, so it takes a head and a body who are willing to work with each other to make a Christian state. The bridegroom in this case was willing and worthy, but the bride was not…

In an important address entitled “Tsar and Patriarch”, P.S. Lopukhin approaches this question by noting that the Tsar’s role was one of *service,* service in the Church and for the Church. And its purpose was to bring people to the Church and keep them there, in conditions maximally conducive to their salvation. But if the people of the Church, in their great majority, cease to understand the Tsar’s role in that way, then he becomes literally of no service to them.

“The understanding of, and love and desire for, the ‘tsar’s service’ began to wane in Russia. Sympathy began to be elicited, by contrast, by the bases of the rationalist West European state, which was separated from the Church, from the religious world-view. The idea of the democratic state liberated from all obligation in relation to God, the Church and the spiritual state of the people began to become attractive. The movement in this direction in the Russian people was long-standing and stubborn, and it had already a long time ago begun to elicit profound alarm, for this movement was not so much ‘political’ as spiritual and psychological: the so-called Russian ‘liberation’ and then ‘revolutionary movement’ was mainly, with rare and uncharacteristic exceptions, an a-religious and anti-religious movement.

“It was precisely this that elicited profound alarm in the hearts of St. Seraphim, Fr. John of Kronstadt, Dostoyevsky and Metropolitan Anthony…

“This movement developed inexorably, and finally there came the day when his Majesty understood that he was alone in his ‘service of the Tsar’…

“The Orthodox Tsar has authority in order that there should be a Christian state, so that there should be a Christian-minded environment. The Tsar bears his tsarist service for this end.

“When the desire for a Christian state and environment is quenched in the people, the Orthodox monarchy loses both the presupposition and the aim of its existence, for nobody can be forced to become a Christian. The Tsar needs Christians, not trembling slaves.

“In the life of a people and of a man there are periods of spiritual darkening, of ‘stony lack of feeling’, but this does not mean that the man has become completely stony: the days of temptation and darkness pass, and he is again resurrected. When a people is overcome by passions, it is the duty of the authorities by severe means to sober it up and wake it up. And this must be done with decisive vividness, and it is healing, just as a thunderstorm is healing.

“But this can only be done when the blindness is not deep and when he who is punished and woken up understands the righteousness of the punishment. Thus one peasant reproached a landowner, asking why he had not begun to struggle against the pogroms with a machine-gun. “Well, and what would have happened them?’ ‘We would have come to our senses! But now we are drunk and we burn and beat each other.’

“But when the spiritual illness has penetrated even into the subconscious, then the application of force will seem to be violence, and not just retribution, then the sick people will not longer be capable of being healed. Then it will be in the state in which was the sinner whom the Apostle Paul ‘delivered to Satan for the tormenting of the flesh, so that his spirit may be saved’ (I Corinthians 5.5).

“At the moment of his abdication his Majesty felt himself to be profoundly alone, and around him was ‘cowardice, baseness and treason’, and to the question how he could have abdicated from his tsarist service, it is necessary to reply: he did this because we abdicated from his tsarist service, from his sacred and sanctified authority…”[[388]](#footnote-388)

As St. John Maximovich put it: “Calculating malice did its work: it separated Russia from her tsar, and at that terrible moment in Pskov he remained abandoned… The terrible abandonment of the Tsar… But it was not he who abandoned Russia: Russia abandoned him, who loved Russia more than his own life. Seeing this, and in hope that his self-humiliation would calm the stormy passions of the people, his Majesty renounced the throne… They rejoiced who wanted the deposition of the Tsar. The rest were silent. There followed the arrest of his Majesty and the further developments were inevitable… His Majesty was killed, Russia was silent…”

These explanations of why the Tsar abdicated agree with each other and are essentially true. But we can go still further and deeper. Michael Nazarov argues that the Tsar, seeing that it was impossible to stem the tide of apostasy at that time, offered himself as a sacrifice for the enlightenment of *future* generations, in accordance with the revelation given to Metropolitan Macarius (see above): “His Majesty Nicholas II very profoundly felt the meaning of his service as tsar. His tragedy consisted in the fact that at the governmental level of the crisis fewer and fewer co-workers were appearing who would combine in themselves administrative abilities, spiritual discernment and devotion. ‘All around me are betrayal and cowardice and deception’, wrote his Majesty in his diary on the day of the abdication… Therefore, in the conditions of almost complete betrayal, his humble refusal to fight for power was dictated not only by a striving to avoid civil war, which would have weakened the country before the external enemy. This rejection of power was in some way similar to Christ’s refusal to fight for His life before His crucifixion – for the sake of the future salvation of men. Perhaps his Majesty Nicholas II, the most Orthodox of all the Romanovs, intuitively felt that there was already no other way for Russia to be saved – except *the path of self-sacrifice for the enlightenment of descendants,* hoping on the help and the will of God…”[[389]](#footnote-389)

From this point of view it was the will of God that the Tsar abdicate, even though it meant disaster for the Russian people, just as it was the will of God that Christ be crucified, even though it meant the destruction of the Jewish people. Hence the words of Eldress Paraskeva (Pasha) of Sarov (+1915), who had foretold the Tsar’s destiny during the Sarov Days: “Your Majesty, descend from the throne yourself”.[[390]](#footnote-390) On the one hand, his abdication was wrong both in the legal sense that it was contrary to the Basic Laws of the Autocracy, which does not allow for the abdication of the tsar, and in the sense that it meant “the removal of him who restrains” the coming of the Antichrist (II Thessalonians 2.7) But on the other hand, it was right and inevitable in a mystical, eschatological sense, in that it preserved the Autocracy pure and unimpaired, ready for the time when the bride would awake from her profound sleep and return with penitence and joy to her bridegroom... [[391]](#footnote-391) As Blessed Duniushka of Ussuruisk, who was martyred in 1918, said: “The Tsar will leave the nation, which shouldn’t be, but this has been foretold to him from Above. This is his destiny. There is no way that he can evade it…”[[392]](#footnote-392)

## **69. THE FALL OF THE DYNASTY**

The Tsar said with complete truthfulness: “I have always protected, not the autocratic power, but Russia.” The trouble was: Russia without an autocratic ruler was bound to become, in the words of St. John of Kronstadt, “a stinking corpse”. And as events were to show only too clearly, there was nobody who could replace him as the ruler of Russia…

The revolution had not been taking place only in Petrograd. “In Moscow on February 28th there were massive demonstrations under red flags. The garrison (also composed of reservists) passed over to the side of the rebellion on March 1. In those days a Soviet of workers’ deputies and a Committee of public organizations was formed in the Moscow Duma, as in Petrograd. Something similar took place also in Kharkov and Nizhni-Novgorod. In Tver a crowd killed Governor N.G. Byunting, who, as the crowd approached, had managed to make his confession [by telephone] to the bishop…”[[393]](#footnote-393)

In such circumstances, the Duma and the Provisional Government, which always followed rather than led public opinion, could not be for the continuation of the Monarchy. Although, on March 2, the Tsar had addressed a telegram to “Emperor Michael Alexandovich”, he was destined to be emperor for no more than a day. For “on March 3, 1917 it became clear that the Provisional Government and society were by no means for the Monarchy. On that day the members of the new government in almost their complete composition appeared before Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich with the text of Nicholas II’s manifesto on his abdication in favour of his brother. Only Guchkov and Milyukov expressed themselves for the preservation of the Monarchy (a constitutional one, it goes without saying), that is, for the Great Prince’s accepting power. The rest, especially Kerensky, Rodzyanko and Lvov, ardently tried to prove the impossibility and danger of such an act at the present time. They said openly that in that case Michael Alexandrovich could be killed, while the Imperial Family and all the officers could ‘have their throats cut’. A second historically important moment had arrived. What would the Great Prince decide, who was then from a juridical point of view already *the All-Russian Emperor*?”[[394]](#footnote-394)

Edvard Radzinsky describes the scene:-

“Michael came in, tall, pale, his face very young.

“They spoke in turn.

“Socialist Revolutionary Alexander Kerensky: ‘By taking the throne you will not save Russia. I know the mood of the masses. At present everyone feels intense displeasure with the monarchy. I have no right to conceal that the dangers that taking power would subject you to personally. I could not vouch for your life.’

“Then silence, a long silence. And Michael’s voice, his barely audible voice: ‘In these circumstances, I cannot.’

“Michael was crying. It was his fate to end the monarchy. Three hundred years – and it all ended with him.”[[395]](#footnote-395)

However, continues Lebedev, “Michael Alexandrovich… did not decide [completely] as Kerensky and the others wanted. He did not abdicate from the Throne directly *in favour of the Provisional Government.* In the manifesto that he immediately wrote he suggested that the question of his power and in general of the form of power in Russia should be decided *by the people itself*, and in that case he would become ruling Monarch if ‘that will be the will of our Great People, to whom it belongs, by universal suffrage, through their representatives in a Constituent Assembly, to establish the form of government and the new basic laws of the Russian State’. For that reason, the manifesto goes on to say, ‘invoking the blessing of God, I beseech all the citizens of the Russian State to submit to the Provisional Government, which has arisen and been endowed with all the fullness of power *at the initiative of the State Duma* (that is, in a self-willed manner, not according to the will of the Tsar – Prot. Lebedev), *until* the Constituent Assembly, convened in the shortest possible time on the basis of a *universal, direct, equal and secret ballot*, should by its decision on *the form of government* express *the will of the people.* Michael.’ The manifesto has been justly criticised in many respects. But still it is not a direct transfer of power to the ‘democrats’!”[[396]](#footnote-396)

Nevertheless, Tsar Michael had effectively given the people the final say in how they were to be ruled, thereby destroying the monarchy. “The talk was not,” writes M.A. Babkin, “about the Great Prince’s abdication from the throne, but about the impossibility of his occupying the royal throne without the clearly expressed acceptance of this by the whole people of Russia.”[[397]](#footnote-397) Tsar Nicholas clearly saw what had happened, writing in his diary: “God knows who gave him the idea of signing such rot”.[[398]](#footnote-398)

This second abdication “was the beginning”, as Baroness Sophia Buksgevden, the Tsarina’s lady-in-waiting during these days, writes, “of universal chaos. All the structures of the empire were destroyed. The natural consequences of this were a military rebellion that was supported by the civil population, which was also discontented with the actions of the cabinet. And all this, to sum up, led to a complete collapse. The supporters of the monarchy, of whom there were not a few in the rear and at the front, found themselves on their own, while the revolutionaries used the universal madness to take power into their own hands.”[[399]](#footnote-399)

Some have compared March, 1917 to the people’s election of the first Romanov tsar in 1613. At that time there was no tsar, it was a time of anarchy; so it was incumbent upon the people to take the initiative in choosing their ruler. But here, as we have seen, Michael was already from a juridical point of view tsar by a lawful transfer of power from the former tsar. So, unlike Tsar Nicholas, who simply transferred power from himself to his lawful successor, Tsar Michael undermined the very basis of the Monarchy by acting as if he were not the lawful tsar already. Like King Saul in the Old Testament he listened to the voice of the people (and out of *fear* of the people) rather than the voice of God – with fateful consequences for himself and the people.

It has been argued that Tsar Nicholas’ abdication had no legal force because there was no provision for abdication in the Basic Laws. As Michael Nazarov points out, the Basic Laws of the Russian Empire, which had been drawn up by Tsar Paul I and which all members of the Royal Family swore to uphold, “do not foresee the abdication of a reigning Emperor (‘from a religious… point of view the abdication of the Monarch, the Anointed of God, is contrary to the act of His Sacred Coronation and Anointing; it would be possible only by means of monastic tonsure’ [N. Korevo]). Still less did his Majesty have the right to abdicate for his son in favour of his brother; while his brother Michael Alexandrovich had the right neither to ascend the Throne during the lifetime of the adolescent Tsarevich Alexis, nor to be crowned, since he was married to a divorced woman, nor to transfer power to the Provisional government, nor refer the resolution of the question of the fate of the monarchy to the future Constituent Assembly.

“Even if the monarch had been installed by the will of such an Assembly, ‘this would have abolished the Orthodox legitimizing principle of the Basic Laws’, so that these acts would have been ‘juridically non-existent’, says M.V. Zyzykin[[400]](#footnote-400)… ‘Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich… performed only an act in which he expressed his personal opinions and abdication, which had an obligatory force for nobody. Thereby he estranged himself from the succession in accordance with the Basic Laws, which juridically in his eyes did not exist, in spite of the fact that he had earlier, in his capacity as Grand Duke on the day of his coming of age, sworn allegiance to the decrees of the Basic Laws on the inheritance of the Throne and the order of the Family Institution’.

“It goes without saying that his Majesty did not expect such a step from his brother, a step which placed the very monarchical order under question…”[[401]](#footnote-401)

We can see the confusion and searching of consciences it caused in a letter of some Orthodox Christians to the Holy Synod dated July 24, 1917: “We Orthodox Christians most ardently beseech you to explain to us in the newspaper *Russkoe Slovo* [*Russian Word*] what... the oath given to us to be faithful to the Tsar, Nicholas Alexandrovich, means. People are saying in our area that if this oath is worth nothing, then the new oath to the new Tsar [the Provisional Government?] will be worth nothing. Which oath must be more pleasing to God. The first or the second? Because the Tsar is not dead, but is alive and in prison…”[[402]](#footnote-402)

Since Grand Duke Michael had presented the choice of the form of State government to the Constituent Assembly, many opponents of the revolution were prepared to accept the Provisional Government on the grounds that it was just that – provisional. Moreover, they could with some reason argue that they were acting in obedience to the last manifestation of lawful, tsarist power in Russia… They were not to know that the Constituent Assembly would hardly be convened before it would be forcibly dissolved by the Bolsheviks in January, 1918. So the results of the Tsar’s abdication for Russia were different from what he had hoped and believed. Instead of an orderly transfer of power from one member of the royal family to another, the whole dynasty and autocratic order collapsed. And instead of preventing civil war for the sake of victory in the world war, the abdication was followed by defeat in the world war and the bloodiest civil war in history, followed by the greatest persecution of the faith in the history of the Church.

Tsar Michael was shot by the Bolsheviks in Perm in June, 1918…

But what about the other Romanovs? Could not any of them have claimed the throne after the abdication of Michael?

Robert Massie writes: “After Nicholas II’s sisters, nephews, and nieces, the tsar’s closest surviving relatives were the Vladimirovichi, then comprising his four first cousins, Grand Dukes Cyril, Boris, and Andrew and their sister, Grand Duchess Helen, all children of Nicholas’s eldest uncle, Grand Duke Vladimir. In normal times, the near-simultaneous deaths of a tsar, his son, and his brother, as happened in 1918, automatically would have promoted the eldest of these cousins, Cyril, who was forty-two in 1918, to the Imperial throne. In 1918, however, there was neither empire nor throne, and, consequently, nothing was automatic. Succession to the Russian throne followed the Salic law, meaning that the crown passed only to males, through males, until there were no more eligible males. When an emperor died and neither a son nor a brother was available, the eldest eligible male from the branch of the family closest to the deceased monarch would succeed. In this case, under the old laws, this was Cyril. After Cyril stood his two brothers, Boris and Andrew, and after them the only surviving male of the Pavlovich line, their first cousin Grand Duke Dimitri, the son of Nicholas II’s youngest uncle, Grand Duke Paul. Nicholas II’ six nephews, the sons of the tsar’s sister Xenia, were closer by blood than Cyril but were ineligible because the succession could not pass through a woman…”[[403]](#footnote-403)

However, there were powerful objections to Cyril’s candidacy. He had married a Lutheran and his first cousin, Victoria Melita, a grand-daughter of Queen Victoria, who, moreover, had been married to and divorced from Tsaritsa Alexandra’s brother, Grand Duke Ernest of Hesse. By marrying a divorced and heterodox woman who was his cousin, he violated Basic Laws 183 and 185 as well as the Church canons. The Tsar exiled him from Russia, and then, in 1907, deprived him and his descendants of the right to inherit the throne in accordance with Basic Law 126.

Although the Tsar later allowed him and wife to return, the couple plotted against him, and on March 1, even before the abdication, Cyril withdrew his Naval Guard from guarding the Tsaritsa and her family at Tsarskoye Selo and went to the Duma to hail the revolution, sporting a red cockade. He recognized the revolution, renounced his rights to the Thone, and hoisted the red flag above his palace and onto his car…[[404]](#footnote-404) In July, noting the anti-monarchist mood in Petrograd, he moved to nearby Finland, and only moved again to Switzerland in 1920, when it was clear that there was no hope of the restoration of the monarchy in the near future.

Cyril eventually emigrated to France, but was at first cautious about putting forward his claim to the throne. “The Dowager Empress Marie would not believe that her son and his family were dead and refused to attend any memorial service on their behalf. A succession proclamation by Cyril would have shocked and deeply offended the old woman. Further, there was another, not very willing pretender: Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich, former commander-in-chief of the Russian Army, was from the Nicholaevichi, a more distant branch of the Romanov tree, but, among Russians, he was far more respected and popular than Cyril. Nicholas Nicholaevich was forceful and Russia’s most famous soldier whereas Cyril was a naval captain, who, having had one ship sunk beneath him, refused to go to sea again. Nevertheless, when émigré Russians spoke to Grand Duke Nicholas about assuming the throne in exile, he refused, explaining tht he did not wish to shatter the hopes of the dowager empress. Besides, Nicholas agreed with Marie that if Nicholas II, his son, and his brother really were dead, the Russian people should be free to choose as their new tsar whatever Romanov – or whatever Russian – they wished.

“In 1922, six years before the death of Marie and while the old soldier Nicholas Nicholaevich still had seven years to live, Cyril decided to wait no longer. He proclaimed himself first Curator of the Throne and then, in 1924, Tsar of All the Russias – although he announced that for everyday use he still should be addressed by the lesser title Grand Duke. He established a court around his small villa in the village of Saint-Briac in Brittany, issued manifestos, and distributed titles…”[[405]](#footnote-405)

His claim to be Tsar was recognized by Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky), first-hierarch of the Russian Church Abroad, but not by Metropolitan Evlogy of Paris.

As Evlogy wrote in his memoirs, he was in Karlovtsy in the autumn of 1922, when “I received a telegram: ‘At the request of Grand Duke Cyril Vladimirovich, we ask you insistently to come immediately to Paris.’ I arrived… I was presented with a group of generals led by General Sakharov, and a group of dignitaries asked me to go and visit Grand Duke Cyril Vladimirovich in Saint-Briac so as to perform a Divine service for him and give him my blessing to assume the imperial throne. I refused…”[[406]](#footnote-406)

Most of the Romanov family living in exile also rejected Cyril’s claim… The other leading Romanovs were either killed or made their peace with the new regime. Thus the behavior of Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolayevich (“Nikolasha”) was, according to Nazarov, “unforgiveable: he didn’t move a finger to avert the plot that he knew was being prepared…, pushed Nicholas II to abdicate, and, having again been appointed by him Commander-in-Chief of the Army, swore to the plotters: ‘The new government already exists and there can be no changes. I will not permit any reaction in any form…’

“In those days the other members of the Dynasty also forgot about their allegiance to the Tsar and welcomed his abdication. Many signed their own rejection of their rights to the Throne…: Grand Dukes Dmitri Konstantinovich, Gabriel Konstantinovich, Igor Konstantinovich, George Mikhailovich and Nicholas Mikhailovich. The latter, following Cyril, also paid a visit of loyalty to the revolutionary Duma on March 1… In the press there appeared declarations by Grand Dukes Boris Vladimirovich, Alexander Mikhailovich, Sergius Mikhailovich and Prince Alexander Oldenburg concerning their ‘boundless support’ for the Provisional government…

“The identical form of these rejections and declarations witness to the fact of a corresponding demand on the part of the new authorities: these were a kind of signature of loyalty to the revolution. (It is possible that this conceals one of the reasons for the monarchical apathy of these members of the Dynasty in emigration. Only ‘Cyril I’ felt not the slightest shame: neither for the plans of his mother ‘to destroy the empress’, not for his own appeal to the soldiers to go over to the side of the revolution…)

“It goes without saying that in rebelling against his Majesty before the revolution, such members of the Dynasty did not intend to overthrow the monarchy: they would thereby have deprived themselves of privileges and income from their Appanages. They hoped to use the plotters in their own interests, for a court coup within the Dynasty, - but were cruelly deceived. The Provisional government immediately showed that even loyal Romanovs – ‘symbols of Tsarism’ – were not needed by the new authorities: Nicholas Nikolayevich was not confirmed in the post of Commander-in-Chief, and Grand Duke Boris Vladimirovich found himself under house arrest in his own palace for ‘being slow to recognize the new order’… We have some reason to suppose that by their ‘signatures of loyalty’ and renunciations of their claims to the Throne the Grand Dukes bought freedom for themselves. Kerensky declared at the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies: ‘You have doubts about the fact that some members of the Royal Family have remained in freedom. But only those are in freedom who have protested with us against the old regime and the caprices of Tsarism.’

“The Februarists from the beginning did not intend to give the Royal Family freedom. They were subjected to humiliating arrest in the palace of Tsarskoye Selo, and were restricted even in their relations with each other. And none of the previously active monarchists spoke out for them. True, many of them had already been arrested, the editors of their newspapers and their organizations had been repressed. But even more monarchist activists kept silent, while some even signed declarations of loyalty to the new government…”[[407]](#footnote-407)

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It is beyond the scope of this book to go into the further history of the dynastic disputes surrounding the succession to the Russian throne. More important, and more relevant to our theme, is the fact that, even among most monarchists, and even among the Romanovs themselves, the argument today is no longer over who should become the *autocrat*, but rather who should become the *constitutional monarch* of Russia*.* This is both ironic and sad, for it implies that even if the Russian monarchy were restored now with the enthronement of one of the Romanovs, it would not be a true restoration, but a surrender to that liberal and emasculated view of monarchy which Tsar Nicholas and his predecessors and the Russian saints fought so hard against. For it is important to realize that the fall of the Romanov dynasty was not engineered in the first place by the Jewish Bolsheviks or American bankers, nor by the German General Staff. As we have seen, it was engineered and carried out by what Lebedev calls “the first echelon” of the revolution – the Mason-Cadets and Octobrists, such as Rodzyanko and Guchkov. Their creed was not revolution – or, at any rate, not the full-blooded revolution that aimed at regicide and the complete overthrow of the existing social order; for they had too much to lose from such an upheaval. Their ideal was the more moderate but thoroughly unRussian one of *English constitutional monarchy*.

Indeed, with the exception of some real republicans such as the Trudovik Kerensky, the conspirators of February would probably have been content with simply stripping the Tsar of his autocratic powers and turning him into a constitutional monarch on the English model – provided he did not interfere with their own supreme power. They forced him to abdicate only when they saw that he would not play their game, but was determined to preserve the Autocracy – if not in his own person, then in the person of his appointed heir. But their shortsightedness, and their lack of understanding of the revolutionary process that they had initiated, meant that their rule was short-lived and served only as a transition from full Autocracy to the victory of the Bolsheviks.

The Russian constitutionalists demanded of Tsar Nicholas that he give them a “responsible” government – that is, a government completely under *their* control. But the rule of Tsar Nicholas was already responsible in the highest degree – to God. For this is the fundamental difference between the Orthodox autocrat and the constitutional monarch, that the autocrat truly governs his people, whereas the constitutional monarch “reigns, but does not rule”, in the phrase of Adolphe Thiers. The first is responsible to God alone, but the latter, even if he claims to rule “by the Grace of God” and receives a Church coronation, in fact is in thrall to the people and fulfils their will rather than God’s. As St. John Maximovich writes, “the Russian sovereigns were never tsars by the will of the people, but always remained Autocrats by the Mercy of God. They were sovereigns in accordance with the dispensation of God, and not according to the ‘multimutinous’ will of man.”[[408]](#footnote-408) And so we have three kinds of king: the Orthodox autocrat, who strives to fulfill the will of God alone, and is responsible to Him alone, being limited only by the Faith and Tradition of the people as represented by the Orthodox Church; the absolute monarch, such as the French Louis XIV or the English Henry VIII, who fulfills only his own will, is responsible to nobody, and is limited by nothing and nobody; and the constitutional monarch, who fulfills the will of the people, and can be ignored or deposed by them as they see fit.

Monarchy by the Grace of God and monarchy by the will of the people are incompatible principles. The very first king appointed by God in the Old Testament, Saul, fell because he tried to combine them; he listened to the people, not God. Thus he spared Agag, the king of the Amalekites, together with the best of his livestock, instead of killing them all, as God had commanded "because I listened to the voice of the people" (I Kings 15.20). In other words, he abdicated his God-given authority and *became, spiritually speaking, a democrat,* listening to the people rather than to God.

The significance of the reign of Tsar Nicholas II lies in the fact that he demonstrated what a true Orthodox autocrat – as opposed to an absolutist despot or a constitutional monarch - really is. This knowledge had begun to fade in the minds of the people, and with its fading the monarchy itself had become weaker. But Tsar Nicholas restored the image to its full glory, and thereby preserved the possibility of the complete restoration of the autocracy in a future generation…

Appearances can be deceptive. There is a famous photograph of the Russian Tsar Nicholas II and the English King George V standing together, looking as if they were twins (they were in fact cousins) and wearing almost identical uniforms. Surely, one would think, these were kings of a similar type, even brothers in royalty? After all, they called each other “Nicky” and “Georgie”, had very similar tastes, had ecumenical links (Nicky was godfather of Georgie’s son, the future Edward VIII, and their common grandmother, Queen Victoria, was invited to be godmother of Grand Duchess Olga[[409]](#footnote-409)), and their empires were similar in their vastness and diversity (Nicholas was ruler of the greatest land empire in history, George – of the greatest sea power in history). Moreover, the two cousins never went to war with each other, but were allies in the First World War. They seem to have been genuinely fond of each other, and shared a mutual antipathy for their bombastic and warmongering “Cousin Willy” – Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany. To crown it all, when Tsar Nicholas abdicated in 1917, Kerensky suggested that he take refuge with Cousin Georgie in England.

But Cousin Georgie betrayed Cousin Nicky; in August, 1917 he withdrew his invitation for fear of a revolution in England.

As Roy Hattersley writes, in view of the failure of rescue attempts from within Russia, “the future of the Tsar and his family grew ever more precarious. It was the [British] Prime Minister who initiated the meeting with George V’s private secretary at which, for a second time, ‘it was generally agreed that the proposal we should receive the Emperor in this country… could not be refused’. When Lloyd George proposed that the King should place a house at the Romanovs’ disposal he was told that only Balmoral was available and that it was ‘not a suitable residence at this time of year’. But it transpired that the King had more substantial objections to the offer of asylum. He ‘begged’ (a remarkably unregal verb) the Foreign Secretary ‘to represent to the Prime Minister that, from all he hears and reads in the press, the residence in this country of the ex-Emperor and Empress would be strongly resented by the public and would undoubtedly compromise the position of the King and Queen’. It was the hereditary monarch, not the radical politician, who left the Russian royal family to the mercy of the Bolsheviks and execution in Ekaterinburg.”[[410]](#footnote-410)

The result was that, as Frances Welch writes, “eleven months later, the Tsar, the Tsarina and their five children were all murdered. But when the Tsar’s sister finally reached London in 1919, King George V brazenly blamed his Prime Minister for refusing a refuge to the Romanovs. Over dinner, he would regularly castigate Lloyd George as ‘that murderer’…”[[411]](#footnote-411)

Nor was this the first or only betrayal: in a deeper sense English constitutionalism betrayed Russian autocracy in February, 1917. For it was a band of constitutionalist Masons supported by the Grand Orient of France and the Great Lodge of England, that plotted the overthrow of the Tsar in the safe haven of the English embassy in St. Petersburg. (Surprising as it may seem in view of the Masons’ overt republicanism, they were patronized by the British monarchy; there is a photograph of King Edward VII, Georgie’s father, in the full regalia of a Grand Master…[[412]](#footnote-412))

And so it was constitutional monarchists who overthrew the Russian autocratic monarchy. The false kingship that was all show and no substance betrayed the true kingship that died in defence of the truth in poverty and humiliation. For Tsar Nicholas died in true imitation of the Christ the King. And with Him he could have said: “You say rightly that I am a king: for this cause I was born, and for this cause I have come into the world, that I should bear witness to the truth!” (John 18.37).

The Tsar’s attachment to the autocratic principle never wavered: as he said to Count Witte in 1904: “I will never, in any circumstances, agree to a representative form of government, for I consider it harmful for the people entrusted to me by God.”[[413]](#footnote-413) And his choice was vindicated by his own conduct: no autocrat conducted himself with more genuine humility and love for his subjects, and a more profound feeling of responsibility before God. He was truly an autocrat, and not a tyrant. He did not sacrifice the people for himself, but himself for the people. The tragedy of Russia was that she was about to exchange the most truly Christian of monarchs for the most horrific of all tyrannies – all in the name of freedom!

The tsar’s commitment to the autocratic principle was reinforced by the tsarina, who, as Hew Strachan writes, “despite being the granddaughter of a British queen, believed, according to [the British ambassador] Buchanan, that ‘autocracy was the only regime that could hold the Empire together’.

“Writing after the war, Buchanan confessed that she might have been right. It was one thing for well-established liberal states to move in the direction of authoritarianism for the duration of the war; it was quite another for an authoritarian government to move towards liberalism which many hoped would last beyond the return to peace. Moreover, the strains the war had imposed on Russian society, and the expectations that those strains had generated, looked increasingly unlikely to be controlled by constitutional reform…”[[414]](#footnote-414)

The constitutionalists then as now criticize the Orthodox autocracy mainly on the grounds that it presented a system of absolute, uncontrolled power, and therefore of tyranny. They quote the saying of the historian Lord Acton: “Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely”. But this is and was a serious misunderstanding. The Russian autocracy was based on the anointing of the Church and on the faith of the people; and when it betrayed either – by disobeying the Church, or by trampling on the people’s faith, - it lost its legitimacy, as we see in the Time of Troubles, when the people rejected the false Dmitri. It was therefore limited, not absolute. But it was limited, not by parliament or any secular power, but by the teachings of the Orthodox Faith and Church, and as such must not be confused with the system of absolutist monarchy that we see in, for example, the French King Louis XIV, or the English King Henry VIII, who felt limited by nothing and nobody on earth.

The Tsar could have refused to abdicate and started a civil war against those who sought to overthrow him. But this would have meant imposing his will in an absolutist manner on the majority of his people, whose faith was now no longer the faith of Tsarist Russia but that of the “enlightened” West. So, like Christ the King in Gethsemane, he told his friends to put up their swords, and surrendered himself into the hands of his enemies; “for this is your hour, and the power of darkness” (Luke 22.53). He showed that the Orthodox Autocracy was not a form of western-style absolutism, whose right lies exclusively in its might, but something completely *sui generis*, whose right lies in its faithfulness to the truth of Christ. He refused to treat his power as if it were *independent of* or *over* the Church and people, but showed that it was a form of *service to* the Church and the people *from within* the Church and the people; and if the people now renounced him and the Church, so be it - there was no longer any place for him in Russia.

For these reasons Nicholas II was completely justified in his firm attachment to the autocratic principle. And his choice was vindicated by his own conduct: no autocrat conducted himself with more genuine humility and love for his subjects, and a more profound feeling of responsibility before God. He was truly an autocrat, and not a tyrant. He did not sacrifice the people for himself, but himself for the people. The tragedy of Russia was that she was about to exchange the most truly Christian of monarchs for the most horrific of all tyrannies – all in the name of freedom!

IBut in what resides true freedom? The Anglophile liberals claimed that only a constitution can guarantee the freedom and equality of its citizens. However, the “freedom” of the liberals had little to do with *spiritual* freedom. In any case, England in 1914 was probably a less free and less equal society than Russia - the monstrously rich English factory-owners and aristocratic landlords had seen to it that the English workers’ lot remained as harsh as it had been when Marx and Engels first wrote about it in the 1840s. But in Russia in 1914 greatly increased prosperity, rapidly spreading education among all classes, liberal labour laws and a vast increase in a free, independent peasantry (especially in Siberia) were transforming the country. As regards freedom, it is a paradoxical but true fact that Russia in the last decades before the revolution was, as the Duma deputy Baron A.D. Meyendorff admitted, “the most democratic monarchy in the world”.[[415]](#footnote-415)

The idea that autocracy is necessarily inimical to freedom and equality was refuted by the monarchist Andozerskaya in Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s novel, *The Red Wheel*: “Under a monarchy it is perfectly possible for both the freedom and the equality of citizens to flourish. First, a firm hereditary system delivers the country from destructive disturbances. Secondly, under a hereditary monarchy there is no periodic upheaval of elections, and political disputes in the country are weakened. Thirdly, republican elections lower the authority of the power, we are not obliged to respect it, but the power is forced to please us before the elections and serve us after them. But the monarch promised nothing in order to be elected. Fourthly, the monarch has the opportunity to weigh up things in an unbiased way. The monarchy is the spirit of national unity, but under a republic divisive competition is inevitable. Fifthly, the good and the strength of the monarch coincide with the good and the strength of the whole country, he is simply forced to defend the interests of the whole country if only in order to survive. Sixthly, for multi-national, variegated countries the monarch is the only bond and the personification of unity…”[[416]](#footnote-416)

If we compare the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II in 1917 with that of his godson, the British King Edward VIII in 1936, we immediately see the superiority, not only of the Tsar over the King personally, but also of Orthodox autocracy over constitutional monarchy generally. Edward VIII lived a debauched life, flirted with the Nazis, and then abdicated, not for the sake of the nation, but because he could not have both the throne and continued debauchery at the same time. He showed no respect for Church or faith, and perished saying: “What a wasted life!” While the abdication of Edward VIII placed the monarchy in grave danger, the abdication of Tsar Nicholas, by contrast, saved the autocracy for the future by abdicating and refusing to run away from death. For in abdicating he resisted the temptation to apply force and start a civil war in a cause that was just from a purely juridical point of view, but which could not be justified from a deeper, eschatological point of view. If the people and the Church did not want him, he would not impose himself on them, because his was truly a government *for* the people. He would not fight a ruinous civil war in order to preserve his power, because his power was not given to him to take up arms *against* the people. Instead he chose to *die,* and in dying he proclaimed the truth of Christ the King. He followed the advice of the Prophet Shemaiah to King Rehoboam and the house of Judah as they prepared to face the house of Israel: “Thus saith the Lord, Ye shall not go up, nor fight against your brethren, the children of Israel. Return every man to his house…” (I Kings 12.24))

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The fall of the Romanov dynasty so soon after Tsar Nicholas’ abdication, and the seizing of power by the Bolsheviks only a few months after that, proves the essential rightness of the Tsar’s struggle to preserve the autocracy and his refusal to succumb to pressures for a constitutional government. As in 1789, so in 1917, constitutional monarchy, being itself the product of a disobedient, anti-monarchical spirit, proved itself to be a feeble reed in the face of the revolution. The Tsar clung onto power for as long as he could, not out of personal ambition, but because he knew that he was literally *irreplaceable.* Or rather, he believed that *the dynasty* was irreplaceable, which is why he passed on is power, not to the Duma, but to his brother Michael. But the dynastic family, being itself corrupted by its disobedience and disloyalty to the Tsar (even Michael had disobeyed the Tsar in marrying Natalia Brassova), was unable to take up the burden that Tsar Nicholas had borne so bravely. They were not fit to bear that burden. And God did not allow them.

And so not only the Tsar and his family, perished, but the whole of Russia…

And not only Russia… It is striking how, with the fall of the autocracy in Russia, the structure of European monarchy, being built, not on the rock of true faith and the Grace of God, but on the porous sand of the “multimutinous will” of the people, began to collapse. For in 1917-18 the dynasties of all the defeated nations: Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria (temporarily) collapsed. And within a decade monarchy had more or less disappeared in several other nations, such as Turkey, Italy and Greece, while the British Empire was shaken by nationalist rebellions in Ireland, Egypt, Iraq and India. Monarchy survived in Serbia until the Second World War – probably thanks to the protection that the Serbs offered to the monarchist Russian Church in Exile.

The first monarchy to go had to be Russia; for the one true monarchy had to be destroyed violently before the pseudo-monarchies could be peacefully put out to grass, reigning figuratively but not truly ruling over their subjects. The abortive revolution of 1905 had imposed a kind of constitution on the Tsar. But then he, by a courageous and subtle but always honourable administration of the new Duma, managed to keep the Masons at bay and the monarchy effectively in control until 1917. And even then he did not give them their “responsible government”, but abdicated in favour of another member of the dynasty. Thus the Russian autocracy went out with a bang, undefeated in war and defiantly resisting the traitors and oath-breakers who opposed it. The latter, however, went out with a whimper, ingloriously losing the war, and after only nine months’ rule fleeing in all directions (Kerensky fled in women’s clothes to Paris).

The two royal abdications of March, 1917 brought to an end the 1600-year period of the Orthodox Christian Empire that began with St. Constantine the Great. “He who restrains” the coming of the Antichrist, the Orthodox Christian Emperor, “was removed from the midst” (II Thessalonians 2.7) – and very soon “the collective Antichrist”, Soviet power, began its savage torture of the Body of Holy Russia. St. John of Kronstadt had said that Russia without the Tsar would no longer even bear the name of Russia, and would be “a stinking corpse” - and so it proved to be.

## **70. THE CHURCH AND THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION**

Why did the Church not intervene in this great crisis, as she had intervened on similar occasions in Russian history? After all, on the eve of the revolution, she had canonized St. Hermogen, Patriarch of Moscow in the Time of Troubles, as if to emphasize that, just as St. Hermogen had refused to recognize the false Demetrius as a legitimate political authority, so the time was coming when it would again be necessary to distinguish between true and false political authorities. So surely the Church would stand up against Bolshevism and in defence of the monarchy as St. Hermogen did then?

However, at this critical moment the Synod showed itself to be at a loss. At its session of February 26, it refused the request of the assistant over-procurator, Prince N.D. Zhevakhov, to threaten the creators of disturbances with ecclesiastical punishments.[[417]](#footnote-417) Then, on February 27, it refused the request of the over-procurator himself, N.P. Rayev, that it publicly support the monarchy.[[418]](#footnote-418) It was ironic that that much-criticised creation of Peter the Great, the office of Over-Procurator of the Holy Synod, proved more faithful to the Anointed of God at this critical moment than the “Holy Governing [*Pravitel’stvennij*] Synod” itself…

“On March 2,” writes Babkin, “the Synodal hierarchs gathered in the residence of the Metropolitan of Moscow. They listened to a report given by Metropolitan Pitirim of St. Petersburg asking that he be retired (this request was agreed to on March 6 – M.B.). The administration of the capital’s diocese was temporarily laid upon Bishop Benjamin of Gdov. But then the members of the Synod recognized that it was necessary immediately to enter into relations with the Executive committee of the State Duma. On the basis of which we can assert that the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church recognized the Provisional Government even before the abdication of Nicholas II from the throne. (The next meeting of the members of the Synod took place on March 3 in the residence of the Metropolitan of Kiev. On that same day the new government was told of the resolutions of the Synod.)

“The first triumphantly official session of the Holy Synod after the coup d’état took place on March 4. Metropolitan Vladimir of Kiev presided and the new Synodal over-procurator, V.N. Lvov[[419]](#footnote-419), who had been appointed by the Provisional government the previous day, was present. Metropolitan Vladimir and the members of the Synod (with the exception of Metropolitan Pitirim, who was absent – M.B.) expressed their sincere joy at the coming of a new era in the life of the Orthodox Church. And then at the initiative of the over-procurator the royal chair… was removed into the archives… One of the Church hierarchs helped him. It was decided to put the chair into a museum.

“The next day, March 5, the Synod ordered that in all the churches of the Petrograd diocese the Many Years to the Royal House ‘should no longer be proclaimed’. In our opinion, these actions of the Synod had a symbolical character and witnessed to the desire of its members ‘to put into a museum’ not only the chair of the Tsar, but also ‘to despatch to the archives’ of history royal power itself.

“The Synod reacted neutrally to the ‘Act on the abdication of Nicholas II from the Throne of the State of Russia for himself and his son in favour of Great Prince Michael Alexandrovich’ of March 2, 1917 and to the ‘Act on the refusal of Great Prince Michael Alexandrovich to accept supreme power’ of March 3. On March 6 it decreed that the words ‘by order of His Imperial Majesty’ should be removed from all synodal documents, and that in all the churches of the empire molebens should be served with a Many Years ‘to the God-preserved Russian Realm and the Right-believing Provisional Government’.”[[420]](#footnote-420)

But was the new government, whose leading members were Masons[[421]](#footnote-421), really “right-believing”? Even leaving aside the fact of their membership of Masonic lodges, which is strictly forbidden by the Church, the answer to this question has to be: no. When the Tsar opened the First State Duma in 1906 with a moleben, the Masonic deputies sniggered and turned away, openly showing their disrespect both for him and for the Church. And now the new government openly declared that it derived its legitimacy, not from God, but from the revolution. But the revolution cannot be lawful, being the incarnation of lawlessness.

On March 7, with the support of Archbishop Sergius (Stragorodsky) of Finland, Lvov transferred the Synod’s official organ, *Tserkovno-Obschestvennij Vestnik (Church and Society Messenger)*, into the hands of the “All-Russian Union of Democratic Orthodox Clergy and Laity”, a left-wing grouping founded in Petrograd on the same day and led by Titlinov, a professor at the Petrograd Academy of which Sergius was the rector.[[422]](#footnote-422) Archbishop (later Patriarch) Tikhon protested against this transfer, and the small number of signatures for the transfer made it illegal. However, in his zeal to hand this important Church organ into the hands of the liberals, Lvov completely ignored the illegality of the act and handed the press over to Titlinov, who promptly began to use it to preach his Gospel of “Socialist Christianity”, declaring that “Christianity is on the side of labour, not on the side of violence and exploitation”.[[423]](#footnote-423)

Also on March 7, the Synod passed a resolution “On the Correction of Service Ranks in view of the Change in State Administration”. In accordance with this, a commission headed by Archbishop Sergius (Stragorodsky) was formed that removed all references to the Tsar in the Divine services. This involved changes to, for example, the troparion for the Church New Year, where the word “Emperor” was replaced by “people”, and a similar change to the troparion for the feast of the Exaltation of the Cross. Again, on March 7-8 the Synod passed a resolution, “On Changes in Divine Services in Connection with the Cessation of the Commemoration of the Former Ruling House”. The phrase “*formerly* ruling” (*tsarstvovavshego*) implied that there was no hope of a restoration of any Romanov to the throne.

Then, on March 9, the Synod addressed all the children of the Church: “The will of God has been accomplished. Russia has entered on the path of a new State life. May God bless our great Homeland with happiness and glory on its new path… For the sake of the many sacrifices offered to win civil freedom, for the sake of the salvation of your own families, for the sake of the happiness of the Homeland, abandon at this great historical moment all quarrels and disagreements. Unite in brotherly love for the good of Russia. Trust the Provisional Government. All together and everyone individually, apply all your efforts to this end that by your labours, exploits, prayer and obedience you may help it in its great work of introducing new principles of State life…”

But was it true that “the will of God has been accomplished”? Was it not rather that God had allowed the will of *Satan* to be accomplished, as a punishment for the sins of the Russian people? And if so, how could the path be called a “great work”? As for the “new principles of State life”, everyone knew that these were revolutionary in essence…

Indeed, it could be argued that, instead of blessing the Masonic Provisional Government in its epistle of March 9, the Synod should have applied to it the curse pronounced in 1613 against those who would not obey the Romanov dynasty: “It is hereby decreed and commanded that God's Chosen One, Tsar Michael Feodorovich Romanov, be the progenitor of the Rulers of Rus' from generation to generation, being answerable in his actions before the Tsar of Heaven alone; and should any dare to go against this decree of the Sobor - whether it be Tsar, or Patriarch, or any other man, - may he be damned in this age and in the age to come, having been sundered from the Holy Trinity...”

Babkin writes that the epistle of March 9 “was characterised by B.V. Titlinov, professor of the Petrograd Theological Academy, as ‘an epistle blessing a new and free Russia’, and by General A.I. Denikin as ‘sanctioning the coup d’état that has taken place’. To the epistle were affixed the signatures of the bishops of the ‘tsarist’ composition of the Synod, even those who had the reputation of being monarchists and ‘black hundredists’, for example, Metropolitan Vladimir of Kiev and Metropolitan Macarius of Moscow. This witnessed to the ‘loyal’ feelings of the Synodal hierarchs…”[[424]](#footnote-424)

Why did the hierarchs sanction the coup so quickly? Probably in the hope of receiving internal freedom for the Church. This is hinted at in a declaration of six archbishops to the Holy Synod and Lvov on March 8: “The Provisional Government in the person of its over-procurator V.N. Lvov, on March 4 in the triumphant opening session of the Holy Synod, told us that it was offering to the Holy Orthodox Russian Church full freedom in Her administration, while preserving for itself only the right to halt any decisions of the Holy Synod that did not agree with the law and were undesirable from a political point of view. The Holy Synod did everything to meet these promises, issued a pacific epistle to the Orthodox people and carried out other acts that were necessary, in the opinion of the Government, to calm people’s minds…”[[425]](#footnote-425)

Lvov broke his promises and proceeded to act like a tyrant, which included expelling Metropolitans Pitirim of Petrograd and Macarius of Moscow from their sees as being supposedly the appointees of Rasputin. It was then that Metropolitan Macarius repented of having signed the March 9 epistle. And later, after the fall of the Provisional Government, he said: “They [the Provisional Government] corrupted the army with their speeches. They opened the prisons. They released onto the peaceful population convicts, thieves and robbers. They abolished the police and administration, placing the life and property of citizens at the disposal of every armed rogue… They destroyed trade and industry, imposing taxes that swallowed up the profits of enterprises… They squandered the resources of the exchequer in a crazy manner. They radically undermined all the sources of life in the country. They established elections to the Constituent Assembly on bases that were incomprehensible to Russia. They defiled the Russian language, distorting it for the amusement of half-illiterates and sluggards. They did not even guard their own honour, violating the promise they had given to the abdicated Tsar to allow him and his family free departure, by which they prepared for him inevitable death…

“Who started the persecution on the Orthodox Church and handed her head over to crucifixion? Who demanded the execution of the Patriarch? Was it those whom the Duma decried as ‘servants of the dark forces’, labelled as enemies of the freedom of the Church?... No, it was not those, but he whom the Duma opposed to them as a true defender of the Church, whom it intended for, and promoted to the rank of, over-procurator of the Most Holy Synod – the member of the Provisional Government, now servant of the Sovnarkom – Vladimir Lvov.”[[426]](#footnote-426)

Lvov was indeed thoroughly unsuited for the post of over-procurator – he ended up as a renovationist and enemy of Orthodoxy. In appointing him the Provisional Government showed its true, hostile attitude towards the Church. It also showed its inconsistency: having overthrown the Autocracy and proclaimed freedom for all people and all religions, it should have abolished the office of over-procurator as being an outdated relic of the State’s dominion over the Church.

But it wanted to make the Church tow the new State’s line, and Lvov was to be its instrument in doing this. Hence his removal of all the older, more traditional hierarchs, his introduction of three protopriests of a Lutheran orientation into the Synod and his proclamation of the convening of an All-Russian Church Council – a measure which he hoped would seal the Church’s descent into Protestant-style renovationism, but which in fact, through God’s Providence, turned out to be the beginning of the Church’s true regeneration and fight back against the revolution…

Meanwhile, the Council of the Petrograd Religio-Philosophical Society went still further, denying the very concept of Sacred Monarchy. Thus on March 11 and 12, it resolved that the Synod’s acceptance of the Tsar’s abdication “does not correspond to the enormous religious importance of the act, by which the Church recognized the Tsar in the rite of the coronation of the anointed of God. It is necessary, for the liberation of the people’s conscience and to avoid the possibility of a restoration, that a corresponding act be issued in the name of the Church hierarchy *abolishing the power of the Sacrament of Royal Anointing, by analogy with the church acts abolishing the power of the Sacraments of Marriage and the Priesthood.”[[427]](#footnote-427)*

Fortunately, the Church hierarchy rejected this demand. For not only can the Sacrament of Anointing not be abolished, since it is of God: even the last Tsar still remained the anointed Tsar after his abdication. As Shakespeare put it in *Richard II*, whose plot is closely reminiscent of the tragedy of the Tsar’s abdication:

*Not all the water in the rough rude sea*

*Can wash the balm off from an anointed king;*

*The breath of worldly men cannot depose*

*The deputy elected by the Lord.*

For since the power of the anointed autocrat comes from God, not the people, it cannot be removed by the people. The converse of this fact is that if the people attempt to remove the autocrat for any other reason than his renunciation of Orthodoxy, then they themselves sin against God and deprive themselves of His Grace. That is why St. John of Kronstadt had said that if Russia were to be deprived of her tsar, she would become a “stinking corpse”. And so it turned out: as a strictly logical and moral consequence, “from the day of his abdication,” as St. John Maximovich wrote, “everything began to collapse. It could not have been otherwise. The one who united everything, who stood guard for the truth, was overthrown…”[[428]](#footnote-428) For, as St. John said in another place: “The Tsar was the embodiment of the Russian people’s… readiness to submit the life of the state to the righteousness of God: therefore do the people submit themselves to the Tsar, because he submits to God. Vladyka Anthony [Khrapovitsky] loved to recall the Tsar’s prostration before God and the Church which he makes during the coronation, while the entire Church, all its members, stand. And then, in response to his submission to Christ, all in the Church make a full prostration to him.”[[429]](#footnote-429)

For “faithfulness to the monarchy is a condition of soul and form of action in which a man unites his will with the will of his Sovereign, his dignity with his dignity, his destiny with his destiny… The fall of the monarchy was the fall of Russia herself. A thousand-year state form fell, but no ‘Russian republic’ was put in its place, as the revolutionary semi-intelligentsia of the leftist parties dreamed, but the pan-Russian disgrace foretold by Dostoyevsky was unfurled, and a failure of spirit. And on this failure of spirit, on this dishonour and disintegration there grew the state Anchar of Bolshevism, prophetically foreseen by Pushkin – a sick and unnatural tree of evil that spread its poison on the wind to the destruction of the whole world. In 1917 the Russian people fell into the condition of *the mob*, while the history of mankind shows that the mob is always muzzled by *despots* and *tyrants…*

“The Russian people unwound, dissolved and ceased to serve the great national work – and woke up under the dominion of internationalists. History has as it were proclaimed a certain law: *Either one-man rule or chaos* is possible in Russia; Russia is not capable of a republican order. Or more exactly: the existence of Russia demands *one-man rule* – either a religiously and nationally strengthened one-man rule of honour, fidelity and service, that is, a *monarchy,* or one-man rule that is atheist, conscienceless and dishonourable, and moreover *anti-national and international*, that is, a *tyranny.*”[[430]](#footnote-430)

However, the democratic wave continued, and the Church was carried along by it. The hierarchy made some protests, but these did not amount to a real “counter-revolution”. Thus on April 14, a stormy meeting took place between Lvov and the Synod during which Lvov’s actions were recognised to be “uncanonical and illegal”. At this session Archbishop Sergius apparently changed course and agreed with the other bishops in condemning the unlawful transfer of *Tserkovno-Obshchestvennij Vestnik*. However, Lvov understood that this was only a tactical protest. So he did not include Sergius among the bishops whom he planned to purge from the Synod; he thought – rightly - that Sergius would continue to be his tool in the revolution that he was introducing in the Church. The next day Lvov marched into the Synod at the head of a detachment of soldiers and read an order for the cessation of the winter session of the Synod and the retirement of all its members *with the single exception of Archbishop Sergius (Stragorodsky) of Finland*.[[431]](#footnote-431)

Thus in little more than a month since the coup, the Church had been effectively placed in the hands of a lay dictator, who had single-handedly dismissed her most senior bishops in the name of the “freedom of the Church”…

Here we see a striking difference in the way in which the Provisional Government treated secular or political society, on the one hand, and the Church, on the other. While Prince G.E. Lvov, the head of the government, refused to impose his authority on anyone, whether rioting peasants or rampaging soldiers, granting “freedom” – that is, more or less complete licence – to any self-called political or social “authority”, Prince V.E. Lvov, the over-procurator, granted quite another kind of “freedom” to the Church – complete subjection to lay control…

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Meanwhile, the turmoil in both Church and State in Russia gave the opportunity to the Georgian Church to reassert its autocephalous status, which it had voluntarily given up over a century before. On March 12, without the agreement of the Holy Synod of the Russian Church, and in spite of the protests of the exarch of Georgia, Archbishop Platon, a group of Georgian bishops proclaimed the autocephaly of their Church and appointed Bishop Leonid (Okropiridze) of Mingrelia as *locum tenens* of the Catholicos with a Temporary Administration composed of clergy and laity.[[432]](#footnote-432) The Russian Synod sent Bishop Theophylact to look after the non-Georgian parishes in Georgia. But he was removed from Georgia, and the new exarch, Metropolitan Cyril (Smirnov), was not allowed into the capital. The result was a break in communion between the two Churches.

In the same month of March the Russian government ceased subsidising the American diocese. The ruling Archbishop Eudocimus (Mescheriakov) went to the All-Russian Council in August, leaving his vicar, Bishop Alexander (Nemolovsky) of Canada, as his deputy. But then Protopriest John Kedrovsky with a group of renovationist priests tried to remove Bishop Alexander and take power into their own hands “without submitting to imperial power or hierarchical decrees”.[[433]](#footnote-433)

On April 29, the new Synod headed by Archbishop Sergius proclaimed the principle of the election of the episcopate, the preparation for a Council and the establishment of a Preconciliar Council. This Address triggered a revolution in the Church*.* The revolution consisted in the fact that all over the country the elective principle with the participation of laymen replaced the system of “episcopal autocracy” which had prevailed thereto. In almost all dioceses Diocesan Congresses elected special “diocesan councils” or committees composed of clergy and laity that restricted the power of the bishops. The application of the elective principle to almost all ecclesiastical posts, from parish offices to episcopal sees, resulted in the removal of several bishops from their sees and the election of new ones in their stead. Thus Archbishops Basil (Bogoyavlensky) of Chernigov, Tikhon (Nikanorov) of Kaluga and Anthony (Khrapovitsky) of Kharkov were removed. Archbishop Joachim (Levitsky) of Nizhni-Novgorod was even arrested and imprisoned for a time before being shot. The retirement of Archbishop Alexis (Dorodnitsyn) of Vladimir was justified by his earlier closeness to Rasputin. The others were accused of being devoted to the Autocracy.[[434]](#footnote-434)

Although the spirit behind this revolutionary wave was undoubtedly anti-ecclesiastical in essence, by the Providence of God it resulted in some changes that were beneficial for the Church. Thus the staunchly monarchist Archbishop Anthony, after being forced to retire, was later reinstated at the demand of the people. Again, Archbishop Tikhon (Bellavin) of Lithuania was elected metropolitan of Moscow (the lawful occupant of that see, Metropolitan Macarius, was later reconciled with him), and Archbishop Benjamin (Kazansky) was made metropolitan of Petrograd. However, there were also harmful changes, such as the election of Sergius Stragorodsky as Archbishop of Vladimir.

In the countryside, meanwhile, “there was a strong anti-clerical movement: village communities took away the church lands, removed priests from the parishes and refused to pay for religious services. Many of the local priests managed to escape this fate by throwing in their lot with the revolution.”[[435]](#footnote-435) However, several priests were savagely killed – the martyrdom of the Church began, not with the Bolshevik coup, but with the liberal democratic revolution.

From June 1 to 10 the All-Russian Congress of clergy and laity took place in Moscow with 800 delegates from all the dioceses. As Shkarovskii writes, it “welcomed the revolution, but expressed the wish that the Church continue to receive the legal and material support of the state, that divinity continue to be an obligatory subject in school, and that the Orthodox Church retain its schools. Consequently, a conflict soon broke out with the government. The Synod protested against the law of 20 June that transferred the [37,000] parish church schools to the Ministry of Education. A similar clash occurred over the intention to exclude divinity from the list of compulsory subjects.”[[436]](#footnote-436)

The transfer of the church schools to the state system was disastrous for the Church because the state’s schools were infected with atheism. It would be one of the first decrees that the coming Council of the Russian Orthodox Church would seek (unsuccessfully) to have repealed…

In general, the June Congress carried forward the renovationist wave; and although the June 14 decree “On Freedom of Conscience” was welcome, the government still retained *de jure* control over the Church. Even when the government allowed the Church to convene its own All-Russian Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church in August, it retained the right of veto over any new form of self-administration that Council might come up with. Moreover, the Preconciliar Council convened to prepare for the forthcoming Council was to be chaired by the Church’s leading liberal, Archbishop Sergius…

With the Tsar gone, and the Church led by liberals and treated with contempt by the State, it is not surprising that the conservative peasant masses were confused. Thus a telegram sent to the Holy Synod on July 24, 1917 concerned the oath of loyalty that the Provisional Government was trying to impose on them: “We Orthodox Christians ardently beseech you to explain to us in the newspaper *Russkoye Slovo* what constitutes before the Lord God the oath given by us to be faithful to the Tsar, Nicholas Alexandrovich. People are saying amongst us that if this oath is worth nothing, then the new oath to the new Tsar is also worth nothing.

“Is that so, and how are we to understand all this? Following the advice of someone we know, we want this question decided, not by ourselves, but by the Governing Synod, so that everyone should understand this in the necessary way, without differences of opinion. The *zhids* [Jews] say that the oath is nonsense and a deception, and that one can do without an oath. The popes [priests] are silent. Each layman expresses his own opinion. But this is no good. Again they have begun to say that God does not exist at all, and that the churches will soon be closed because they are not necessary. But we on our part think: why close them? – it’s better to live by the church. Now that the Tsar has been overthrown things have got bad, and if they close the churches it’ll get worse, but we need things to get better. You, our most holy Fathers, must try to explain to all of us simultaneously: what should we do about the old oath, and with the one they are trying to force us to take now? Which oath must be dearer to God. The first or the second? Because the Tsar is not dead, but is alive in prison. And is it right that all the churches should be closed? Where then can we pray to the Lord God? Surely we should not go in one band to the zhids and pray with them? Because now all power is with them, and they’re bragging about it…”[[437]](#footnote-437)

The hierarchy had no answers to these questions…

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What could it have done? It could and should have rallied round the sacred principle of the Orthodox Autocracy and used its still considerable influence among the people to restore monarchical rule. As Bishop Diomedes writes: “It was necessary in the name of the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church to persuade the Ruling House not to leave the Russian State to be destroyed by rebels, and to call all the rebels to repentance by anathematizing them with the 11th anathema of the Sunday of Orthodoxy.”[[438]](#footnote-438) A clear precedent existed: in the recently canonized Patriarch Hermogen’s call to liberate Russia from foreign Catholic rule and restore a lawful monarchy in 1612. Like Hermogen, the Holy Synod in 1917 could have called the Russian people to arms against those who had in effect *forced* the abdication of both the Tsar and Great Prince Michael, and who were therefore, in effect, rebels against lawful authority and subject to anathema. It could have approached any member of the Romanov dynasty – with the exception of Grand Duke Cyril Vladimirovich, who had already declared his allegiance to the revolution - with an invitation that he ascend the throne.

But the opportunity was lost. The years of anti-monarchist propaganda had done their work: some hierarchs supported the revolution, others rejected it, but the Synod as a whole sided with its supporters. It was simply not prepared to lead the people in such a way as to oppose the rebels and protect the monarchical principle.

Of course, following the example of St. Hermogen in this way would have been very difficult, requiring great courage. And blessing a civil war in the midst of a world war would of course have been extremely bold… But it was not impossible…

There was another alternative, less radical than the one just mentioned, but honourable and more in accordance with the manifestos of the two last Tsars. As Babkin writes, this alternative “was laid out in the actions and sermons of Bishop Andronicus (Nikolsky) of Perm and Kungur. On March 4 he addressed an archpastoral epistle ‘to all Russian Orthodox Christians’ in which, having expounded the essence of the ‘Acts’ of March 2 and 3, he characterized the situation in Russia as an ‘interregnum’. Calling on everyone to obey the Provisional Government in every way, he said: ‘We shall beseech the all-Merciful One [God – M.B.] to establish authority and peace on the earth, that He not leave us long without a Tsar, like children without a mother… May He help us, as three hundred years ago He helped our forefathers, to receive a native Tsar from Him, the All-Good Provider, in a unanimous and inspired manner.’ Analogous theses were contained in the sermon that the Perm archpastor gave in his cathedral church on March 5.

“On March 19 Bishop Andronicus and the Perm clergy in his cathedral church and in all the city churches swore an oath of allegiance and service to the Russian state themselves and brought the people to swear it in accordance with the order established by the Provisional Government. But while swearing allegiance to the Provisional Government as a law-abiding citizen, Vladyka Andronicus actively conducted monarchical agitation, pinning his hopes of a ‘regeneration’ of the only temporarily ‘removed’ from power tsarist administration on the Constituent Assembly.

“The ‘dangerous activity’ of the Perm archpastor (this is precisely how it was evaluaged by the local secular authorities and in the office of the Synod) drew the attention of the Committee of social security and the Soviet of workers’ and soldiers’ deputies of the city of Perm, from whom on March 21 a telegram was sent to the over-procurator of the Holy Synod complaining that ‘Bishop Andronicus in a sermon compared Nicholas II to Christ in His Passion, and called on the flock to have pity on him.’ In reply, on March 23, the over-procurator demanded of the rebellious bishop that he give an explanation and account of his activity, which was directed to the defence of the old order and ‘to re-establishing the clergy against the new order’.

“The correspondence elicited between the Bishop of Perm and the over-procurator by his ‘counter-revolutionary’ activity was completed on April 16 when Bishop Androniucs said in a detailed letter of explanation: ‘Michael Alexandrovich’s act of abdication that legalized the Provisional Government declared that after the Constituent Assembly we can have a tsarist administration, like any other, depending on what the Constituent Assembly says about it... I have submitted to the Constituent Assembly, and I will submit to a republic, if that is what the Constituent Assembly declares. But until then not one citizen is deprived of the freedom to express himself on any form of government for Russia; otherwise even the Constituent Assembly would be superfluous if someone has already irreversibly decided the question on Russia’s form of government. As I have already said many times, I have submitted to the Provisional Government, I submit now and and I call on everyone to submit… I am perplexed on what basis you find it necessary… to accuse me ‘of stirring up the people not only against the Provisional Government, but also against the spiritual authorities in general’.”

Babkin cites many examples of priests and parishes praying simultaneously for the Tsar and the Provisional Government until the end of April. All these instances were based on the theoretical possibility, pointed out by Bishop Andronicus, that the Constituent Assembly could vote for a restoration of the monarchy. And so, he concludes, since, in March, 1917 “the monarchy in Russia, in accordance with the act of Great Prince Michael Alexandrovich, continued to exist as an institution”, the Synod should have acted as if there was an “interregnum” in the country.[[439]](#footnote-439)

The weakness of the Church at this critical moment was the result of a long historical process. Having been deprived of its administrative independence by Peter the Great, the Church hierarchy was not ready to stand alone against the new regime and in defence of the monarchical principle in March, 1917. Instead, in the early days of March, it hoped that, in exchange for recognizing it and calling on the people to recognize it, it would receive full administrative freedom… But it was deceived: when Lvov came to power, he began to act like a tyrant worse than the old tsarist over-procurators. And then a wave of democratization began at the diocesan and parish levels… Thus was the prophecy of St. Ignaty (Brianchaninov) fulfilled: “Judging from the spirit of the times and the intellectual ferment, we must suppose that the building of the Church, which has already been wavering for a long time, will collapse quickly and terribly. There will be nobody to stop this and withstand it. The measures undertaken to support [the Church] are borrowed from the elements of the world hostile to the Church, and will rather hasten her fall than stop it…”[[440]](#footnote-440)

And so we must conclude that in March, 1917 the Church – *de facto*, if not *de jure* - renounced Tsarism, one of the pillars of Russian identity for nearly 1000 years. With the exception of a very few bishops, such as Metropolitan Macarius of Moscow and Archbishop Andronicus of Perm, the hierarchy hastened to support the new democratic order. As Bishop Gregory (Grabbe) writes: “There were few who understood at that moment that, in accepting this coup, the Russian people had committed the sin of oath-breaking, had rejected the Tsar, the Anointed of God, and had gone along the path of the prodigal son of the Gospel parable, subjecting themselves to the same destructive consequences as he experienced on abandoning his father.”[[441]](#footnote-441)

However, the fact that Tsarism was renounced only *de facto* and not *de jure* means that Bishop Diomedes’ thesis that the whole Church lost grace in 1917 is false. The pusillanimity of individual hierarchs, however senior or numerous, does not amount to heresy. Nevertheless, that a very serious sin – the sin of treason, of oath-breaking – had been committed in the name of the Church cannot be denied…The only question remaining was: could the Church cleanse herself of this sin at the Council which, thanks to the Provisional Government, it convened in August, and, thus cleansed and strengthened by the Grace of God, lead the people out of the abyss of the revolution?

St. Anatoly of Optina said: “The destiny of the Tsar is the destiny of Russia. If the Tsar will rejoice, Russia also will rejoice. If the Tsar will weep, Russia also will weep… Just as a man with his head cut off is no longer a man, but a stinking corpse, so Russia without the Tsar will be a stinking corpse…”

It remained only to witness the fulfilment of the prophecy…

The abdication of Tsar Nicholas II marked the end of the Christian era of political history initiated by the coming to power of St. Constantine the Great in 306. The enormous change – and enormous loss – was felt immediately by those who lived through it. As the novelist I.A. Bunin wrote: “Our children and grandchildren will not be able even to imagine that Russia in which we once (that is, yesterday) lived, which we did not value and did not understand – all that might, complexity, wealth and happiness…”

Thus did the Russian people fall under the anathema they laid upon themselves in 1613 if they should ever betray their allegiance to Michael Romanov and the Romanov dynasty… The abdication, and consequently the murder of the Tsar and his family, were not the responsibility of the Masons and the Bolsheviks only, but of all those who, directly or indirectly, connived at it or later approved of it. As St. John Maximovich explained: “The sin against him and against Russia was perpetrated by all who in one way or another acted against him, who did not oppose, or who merely by sympathizing participated in those events which took place forty years ago. That sin lies upon everyone until it is washed away by sincere repentance…”[[442]](#footnote-442)

“He who restrains” the coming of the Antichrist, the Orthodox Autocracy, had been removed with the massive cooperation of the Orthodox people themselves; and now, with all restraint removed, the world entered the era of the collective Antichrist...

# *PART VII. THE COLLECTIVE ANTICHRIST (1917-1925)*

*The dragon gave him his power, his throne, and great authority.*

Revelation 13.2**.**

*The legalized anarchy of Prince Lvov and Kerensky naturally and inevitably gave way to the demagogic depotism of Lenin.*

P. Novgorodtsev (1926).

## **71. DUAL POWER**

“The two forces that brought down the monarchy,” writes S.A. Smith, “ – the mass movement of workers and soldiers and the middle-class parliamentary opposition – became institutionalized in the new political set-up, the Petrograd Soviet keeping a watchful eye over the Provisional Government. The government, headed by Prince G.E. Lvov, a landownerwith a long record of service to the zemstvos, was broadly representative of professional and business interests. It was liberal, even mildly populist, in its politics; the only organized force within it was the Kadet Party, once a liberal party but now evolving rapidly in the direction of conservative nationalism. In its manifesto of 2 March, the government pledged to implement a far-reaching programme of civil and political rights and to convoke a Constituent Assembly. Significantly, it said nothing about the burning issues of war and land. The government, which had no popular mandate, saw its principal task as being to oversee the election of a Constituent Assembly, which would determine the shape of the future polity. It believed that only such an assembly had the authority to resolve such pressing issues as land redistribution.

“The Petrograd Soviet enjoyed the real attributes of power since it controlled the army, transport, and communications, as well as vital means of information. It also had a popular mandate insofar as 1,200 deputies were elected to it within the first week. A few Bolsheviks, anarchists, and others pressed the Sovietto assume full power, but the moderate socialist intellectuals who controlled its executive committee believed that this was not appropriate to a revolution whose character they defined as ‘bourgeois’, i.e. as destined to bring about democracy and capitalist development in Russia rather than socialism. In addition, they feared that any attempt to assert their authority would provoke ‘counter-revolution’. Consequently, they agreed to support but not to join the ‘bourgeois’ Provisional Government, so long as it did not override the interests of the people. The radical lawyer A.F. Kerensky alone of the Petrograd Soviet representatives determined to join the government, portraying himself as the ‘hostage of the democracy’ within it. Thus was born ‘dual power’. In spite of the prevailing mood of national unity, it reflected a deep division in Russian society between the ‘democracy’ and ‘propertied society’.

“Outside Petrograd dual power was much less in evidence. In most localities a broad alliance of social groups formed committees of public organizations to eject police and tsarist officials, maintain order and food supply, and to oversee the democratization of the town councils and zemstvos. The government endeavoured to enforce its authority by appointing commissars, most of whom were chairs of county zemstvos – which by this stage were undergoing democratic election – and the soviets refelected the deep fragmentation of power in provincial towns and cities. In rural areas peasants expelled land captains, township elders, and village policemen and set up township committees under their control. The government attempted to strengthen its authority by setting up land and food committees at township level, but these too fell under peasant control. At the very lowest level the authority of the village gathering was strengthened by the revolution, although it became ‘democratized’ by the participation of younger sons, landless labourers, village intelligentsia (scribes, teachers, vets, and doctors), and some women. The February Revolution thus devolved power to the localities and substantially reduced the capacity of the Provisional Government to make its writ run beneathy the county level.”[[443]](#footnote-443)

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However, the immediate result of the abdication of the Tsar was not the emergence of a new power, but a power vacuum – that is, *anarchy*. I.L. Solonevich writes: “I remember the February days of our great and bloodless [revolution] – how great a mindlessness descended on our country! A 100,000-strong flock of completely free citizens knocked about the prospects of Peter’s capital. They were in complete ecstasy, this flock: the accursed bloody autocracy had come to an end! Over the world there was rising a dawn deprived of ‘annexations and contributions’, capitalism, imperialism, autocracy and even Orthodoxy: now we can begin to live! According to my professional duty as a journalist, overcoming every kind of disgust, I also knocked about among these flocks that sometimes circulated along the Nevsky Prospect, sometimes sat in the Tauris palace, and sometimes went to watering holes in the broken-into wine cellars. They were happy, this flock. If someone had then begun to tell them that in the coming third of a century after the drunken days of 1917 they would pay for this in tens of millions of lives, decades of famine and terror, new wars both civil and world, and the complete devastation of half of Russia, - the drunken people would have taken the voice of the sober man for regular madness. But they themselves considered themselves to be completely rational beings…”[[444]](#footnote-444)

The only possible source for the legitimate, ordered succession of power after the abdication of the Tsar was the Tsar’s own orders, given on the same day, transferring royal power to his brother, Great Prince Michael, and appointing – at the request of the Duma representatives Guchkov and Shulgin -Prince G.E. Lvov as President of the Council of Ministers and General L.G. Kornilov as Commander of the Petrograd military district. But the Duma politicians had no intention of accepting Great Prince Michael as tsar (Milyukov and Guchkov were in favour of a constitutional monarchy, but not a true autocracy), and soon, as we have seen, they compelled him, too, to abdicate (he was shot in Perm in June, 1918). As for Lvov, he was made head of the Provisional Government, but not by virtue of any order of the Tsar, whose authority the Duma politicians rejected.

The Duma politicians had a real problem of legitimacy. Since the legitimizing power of the Tsar’s orders had been rejected, there remained only the authority of a popular election, according to liberal theory. But the Provisional Government had not, of course, been elected. Rather, its purpose was to supervise the election of a Constituent Assembly that alone, according to liberal theory, could bring a legitimate government into power.

So when the formation of the Provisional Government was announced Miliukov on March 2, he resorted to a deliberate paradox. In response to the question “Who elected you?” he replied that they had been “elected” by *the revolution*.[[445]](#footnote-445) The paradox consisted in the fact that revolutions do not “elect” in accordance with established legal procedures. For the revolution is the *violent overthrow* of all existing procedures and legalities…

If it was the revolution that “elected” the leaders of the Provisional Government, what objection could they have against the further “election” of Lenin in the next stage of the revolution? They could have none. That is why they offered no real opposition to the Bolshevik revolution in October, and were so easily swept into “the dustbin of history”, in Trotsky’s phrase. For if the Provisional Government came to power through the revolution – that is, through the violent overthrow of all existing procedures and legalities – it had no *legal* authority to suppress the *continuation* of the revolution (for who can tell when the revolution is complete?) through the violent overthrow of *its own* power. In this fact lies the clue to the extraordinarily weak and passive attitude of the Provisional Government towards all political forces to the left of itself. It could not rule because, according to its own liberal philosophy, it had no right to rule…

No such inhibitions were felt by the radical socialists, for whom might was right and the niceties of liberal political philosophy and procedure were irrelevant. Already the previous night the Duma had *begged* Himmer, Nakhamkes and Alexandrovich of the Petrograd Soviet to *allow* them to create a government; which showed that the Soviet, and not the Provisional Government, was the real ruler.

The Soviet also made its power felt in the composition of the Provisional Government. Thus Rodzyanko was excluded from the list of ministers as being unacceptable to the masses; while Guchkov and Miliukov, the Ministers of War and Foreign Affairs, who had also played major roles in the abdication, did not last beyond the April Crisis after their continued support for the war became apparent. This left the government in the hands of a group of leftist Masons: Kerensky (the link with the Petrograd Soviet), Nekrasov, Konovalov, Tereshchenko and Efremov. Together with the Soviet, they immediately passed a series of laws: political prisoners and revolutionaries were amnestied, trade unions were recognized, an eight-hour day for workers was introduced, the Tsarist police was replaced by a “people’s militia”, and full civil and religious freedoms, and the removal of all restrictions on the Jews, were introduced.

The formal head of the Provisional Government was Prince Lvov. But the real leader was the Justice Minister, Alexander Kerensky, a Trudovik lawyer who had wanted to be an actor. As Graham Darby writes, contemporaries saw Kerensky “as the real prime minister from the outset but despite being in both the government and the soviet – thereby embodying the dual power structure – he was in between the two camps, distanced from party politics, a politician of compromise who would fail to reconcile the irreconcilable… For a brief moment Kerensky was the essential man, the peoples’ tribune, a fine orator and a man of charisma. A good actor, he could catch the mood of an audience. He wore semi-military costume and attempted to strike a Napoleonic pose. He enjoyed immense popularity, even adulation, in the early months and a personality cult grew up around him fuelled by his own self-promotion, a range of propaganda (articles, medals, badges, poems) and a receptive audience. Many saw him as a saviour, the true successor to the tsar. There was, however, an inherent contradiction between Russia’s political culture, with its dependency on powerful leaders, and the democratic ideology of the early stages of the revolution, a contradiction embodied in Kerensky, the undemocratic democrat. The adulation went to his head and he came to overestimate his popularity long after it had evaporated. He moved into the Winter Palace, lived in the tsar’s apartments and used the imperial train. He was seemingly powerful but only by virtue of the offices he held and the fickle nature of mass popularity. To sustain the latter he had to fulfil everyone’s expectations, but as Lenin pointed out, he ‘wanted to harmonise the interests of landowners and peasants, workers and bosses, labour and capital’. It was an impossible task…”[[446]](#footnote-446)

P. Novgorodtsev writes: "Prince Lvov, Kerensky and Lenin were bound together by an unbroken bond. Prince Lvov was as guilty of Kerensky as Kerensky was of Lenin. If we compare these three actors of the revolution, who each in turn led the revolutionary power, in their relationship to the evil principle of civil enmity and inner dissolution, we can represent this relationship as follows. The system of guileless non-resistance to evil, which was applied by Prince Lvov as a system of ruling the state, with Kerensky was transformed into a system of pandering to evil camouflaged by phrases about 'the revolutionary leap' and the good of the state, while with Lenin it was transformed into a system of openly serving evil clothed in the form of merciless class warfare and the destruction of all those displeasing to the authorities. Each of the three mentioned persons had his utopian dreams, and history dealt with all of them in the same way: it turned their dreams into nothing and made of them playthings of the blind elements. The one who most appealed to mass instincts and passions acquired the firmest power over the masses. In conditions of general anarchy the path to power and despotism was most open to the worst demagogy. Hence it turned out that the legalized anarchy of Prince Lvov and Kerensky naturally and inevitably gave way to the demagogic depotism of Lenin."[[447]](#footnote-447)

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The very first act of the Soviet, “Soviet Order Number One”, proclaimed: “The orders of the military commission of the State Duma are to be obeyed only in such instances when they do not contradict the orders and decrees of the Soviet”. In other words, the Provisional Government was to rule only by permission of the *real* ruler, the Soviet, which had come into being on March 1 and supposedly represented the soldiers and workers. So Soviet power was born in March, not October, 1917. Only for a few months this fact was masked by the “dual power” arrangement with the Provisional Government.

The immediate effect of Order Number One was to destroy discipline in the army. Florence Farmborough wrote in her diary for March 4, 1917: “Manifestoes from the new Government have begun to be distributed widely along the Russian Front. Our *Letuchka* [flying squad] is well supplied with them; many are addressed to me by the military staff – a courtesy which I greatly appreciate. The main trend of these proclamations directed especially to the fighting men, is FREEDOM. ‘Russia is a free country now,’ the Manifestoes announce. ‘Russia is free and *you*, Russian soldiers, are free men. If you, before being freed, could fight for your Mother-Country, how much more loyally will you fight now, when, as free men, you will carry on the successful conflict on behalf of your free Country.’ So the great *perevorot* [revolution] had come! Russia is a free country! The Russians are a free people! Tremendous excitement reigns on all sides; much vociferous enthusiasm, tinged with not a little awe. What will happen now? Newspapers are seized and treasured as though made of gold, read, and re-read. ‘The Dawn of Russian Freedom!’ ‘The Daybreak of the New Epoch!’ rhapsodise the romancer-reporters. A *prekaz* [order] has been sent to the Front Line soldiers describing the *otkaz* [dismissal] of the Emperor. We were told that in some sectors the news had been received with noisy gratification; in others, the men have sat silent and confused…”[[448]](#footnote-448)

The soldiers had to decide: which of the two powers – the Provisional Government or the Soviets – were they to obey? On March 7 a “Text of Oath for Orthodox and Catholics” and signed by Lvov was published and distributed to the army: “I swear by the honour of an officer (soldier, citizen) and promise before God and my own conscience to be faithful and steadfastly loyal to the Russian Government, as to my Fatherland. I swear to serve it to my last blood… I pledge obedience to the Provisional Government, at present proclaimed the Russian government, until the establishment of the System of Government sanctioned by the will of the People, through instrumentality of the Constituent Assembly…”[[449]](#footnote-449)

In general, the officers were happy to make this oath. And soldiers of all faiths repeated it word for word and then shouted “Hurrah!” But what of those who did not believe in God, or who thought they were now free of all masters – not only of *Batyushka* Tsar, but also of *Batyushka* God?

In May Kerensky began to visit the troops. On May 13 he came to Podgaytsy, and Sister Florence witnessed his speech: “He spoke for about twenty minutes, but time seemed to stand still. His main theme was freedom; that great, mystical Freedom which had come to Russia. His words were often interrupted by wild applause, and, when he pointed out that the war must, at all costs, continued to a victorious end, they acclaimed him to the echo. ‘You will fight to a victorious end!’ he adjured them. ‘We will!’ the soldiers shouted as one man. ‘You will drive the enemy off Russian soil!’ ‘We will!’ they shouted again with boundless enthusiasm. ‘You, free men of a Free Country; you will fight for Russia, your Mother-Country. You will go into battle with joy in your hearts!’ ‘We are free men,’ they roared. ‘We will follow you into battle. Let us go now! Let us go now!’

“When he left, they carried him on their shoulders to his car. They kissed him, his uniform, his car, the ground on which he walked. Many of them were on their knees praying; others were weeping. Some of them cheering; others singing patriotic songs. To the accompaniment of this hysterical outburst of patriotic fervor, Kerensky drove away…”[[450]](#footnote-450)

The soldiers had been promised that the Offensive (originally planned under Tsar Nicholas) would not long be delayed. But time passed, the order did not come, discipline collapsed, desertions began… Then came the Bolshevik agitators who harangued the troops with a new message: surrender! Farmborough describes one such meeting: “It was a most extraordinary meeting! Never, in our wildest dreams did we imagine that we should listen to such an outpouring of treachery. We sat in a group among the trees, surrounded on all sides by soldiers. Some of our hospital Brothers were there and I caught sight of several of our transport drivers.

“The man who had come to speak to the soldiers had an ordinary face and was dressed in ordinary Russian clothes; dark trousers and a dark shirt, buttoned on the left and worn outside his trousers, with a black belt around the waist. His face was serious and pale, but he smiled and nodded once or twice to one or another of the audience, as though he recognized friends. He spoke for a time about Russia, her vast territory, her wealth and the many overlords who, possessing enormous estates and resources, were revered on account of their riches throughout the western world. Then he described the impoverished peasantry who, unschooled, uncared for and half-starved, were eking out a miserable existence by tilling and cultivating the land belonging to those same overlords. War had burst upon Russia and enemies had invaded her territory, and who were the men who had sacrificed themselves to fight the ruthless invaders and drive them off Russian soil! Not the wealthy overlords, not the despotic land-owners; no! – they were safely installed in their fortress-homes. It was those downtrodden countrymen who had been roped in in their thousands, in their millions, to stem the tide of invasion; when they had been killed, others had been quickly collected and sent to replace them. There had been no end to the slaughter and sacrifice of the Russian peasant. Enemy guns had devoured them daily, hourly; every minute of the day and night, the heavy guns had feasted on them and every minute new recruits were being seized and thrust like fodder into the voracious jaws of the enemy’s cannon. But now a tremendous even had taken place! The Tsar – that arch-potentate, that arch-tyrant – had been dethroned and dismissed. Russia had been pronounced a free country! – the Russian citizens a free people! Freedom had come at last to the downtrodden people of Russia.

“Our doctors were moving restlessly. They were, as always, in officers’ uniform. I wondered if they were thinking it was high time to leave, but they stayed. Undoubtedly, it was the wisest thing to do. I glanced around. Most of the soldiers were young and raw, inexperienced and impressionable; all of them drawn from far-off corners of what, until recently, had been known as the Russian Empire. What easy prey they would be for seditious guile! New ideas could so readily take hold of their gullible minds and a cunning speaker would soon be aware that he could sway them this way and that with his oratory.

“The speaker was harping on the theme of freedom. Freedom, he declared, was a possession so great, so precious, one dared not treat it lightly. But war was an enemy of freedom, because it destroyed peace, and without peace there could be no freedom. It was up to the Russian soldier to do all in his power to procure peace. And the best and quickest way to bring about a guaranteed peace was to *refuse to fight.* War could not be fought if there were no soldiers to fight! War was never a one-sided operation! Then, when peace had at last come to Russia, freedom could be enjoyed. The free men of Free Russia would own their own land. The great tracts of privately-owned territory would be split up and divided fairly among the peasantry. There would be common ownership of all properties and possessions. Once the Russian soldier had established peace in his homeland, he would reap benefits undreamt of. Peace above all else! Down with war!

“The soldiers were all astir; they were whispering, coughing, muttering. But there all in full accord with the orator; he held them in his hand! Their stolid faces were animated and jubilant. ‘*Tovarishchi!* You free men of Free Russia! You will demand peace!’ ‘We will!’ they shouted in reply. ‘You will assert your rights as free Russian citizens!’ ‘We will assert our rights,’ they echoed with one voice. ‘You will never allow yourselves to be pushed into the trenches to sacrifice your lives in vain!’ ‘Never!’ they roared in unison…”[[451]](#footnote-451)

The success of the Bolsheviks’ propaganda against the war deprived the army of the minimum discipline required for any successful offensive. In the event, while General Alexeyev calculated that the losses would be about 6000, they turned out to be 400,000.[[452]](#footnote-452) “The key to Russia’s military defeat,” writes Niall Ferguson, “was the huge number of surrenders in that year [1917]. Overall, more than half of total Russian casualties were accounted for by men who were taken prisoner.”[[453]](#footnote-453) An offensive that had been designed by Kerensky and the liberals to bolster the state by bringing all classes together on a patriotic wave ended by opening the path to the final destruction of the state.

Nobody was more saddened than the imprisoned Tsar Nicholas, who had abdicated precisely in order to avoid civil strife and thereby guarantee the army’s successful offensive. “In the words of the children’s tutor, Pierre Gilliard, this caused the Emperor ‘great grief’. As always, hoever, Nicholas’s optimism struggled against bad news. ‘I get a little hope from the fact that in our country people love to exaggerate. I can’t believe that the army at the front has become as bad as they say. It couldn’t have disintegrated in just two months to such a degree.’”[[454]](#footnote-454)

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“One of the bitterest ironies of 1917 is that the peace programme of the Russian revolution echoed that sponsored by the American president only a few months earlier prior to America’s entry into the war: a peace without victory, without annexation or indemnities and based on self-determination. If Wilson had been able to stay out of the war a few months longer, or the tsar’s regime had fallen a few weeks sooner, the revolutionary regime in Petrograd might have offered the president precisely the wedge that he wanted to drive Britain and France to the negotiating table. Germany’s gamble on the U-boats voided that fateful juncture…”[[455]](#footnote-455)

In order to gain the support of the Soviet, as Douglas Smith writes, the Provisional Government “had to agree to eight conditions, including amnesty for all political prisoners; freedom of speech, press, and assembly; and the abolition of all restrictions based on class, religion, and nationality… The new government also agreed to immediately abolish the police, the Okhrana, and the Corps of Gendarmes. This step, together with the dissolution of the tsarist provincial bureaucracy, was to have fatal consequences, for without new institutions to take their place, the Provisional Government was left with no means to effectively govern the country at the very moment it was descending into ever greater disorder…”[[456]](#footnote-456)

This orgy of liberal freedoms – accompanied by an orgy of violence throughout the country - earned the government the plaudits, not only of deadly enemies of Tsarism such as the Jewish banker Jacob Schiff in New York, but also of the western governments, whose democratic prejudices blinded them to the fact that the revolution was turning Russia from their most faithful ally into their deadliest enemy... But as time passed and the chaos spread throughout the country, it became clear that neither the Provisional Government, nor even the Soviets, nor even a coalition between the two on a pro-war platform, would be able to control the revolutionary masses, who wanted peace at any price with the Germans abroad and the most radical social revolution at home. Of all the parties represented in the Soviets, it was only the Bolsheviks (for the soldiers and workers) and the Left Social Revolutionaries (for the peasants) who understood this, who had their fingers on the nation’s revolutionary pulse…

Anarchy was the order of the day, and the only “justice” was imposed by lynchings. Thus Gorky claimed to have seen 10,000 lynchings in 1917 alone.[[457]](#footnote-457) The Church suffered particularly in this period; many priests were killed… The orgy of liberal freedoms accompanied by violence earned the government the plaudits, not only of deadly enemies of Tsarism such as the Jewish banker Jacob Schiff in New York, but also of the western governments, whose democratic prejudices blinded them to the fact that the revolution was turning Russia from their most faithful ally into their deadliest enemy... But as time passed and the chaos spread throughout the country, it became clear that neither the Provisional Government, nor even the Soviets, nor even a coalition between the two on a pro-war platform, would be able to control the revolutionary masses, who wanted peace at any price with the Germans abroad and the most radical social revolution at home. Of all the parties represented in the Soviets, it was only the Bolsheviks (for the soldiers and workers) and the Left Social Revolutionaries (for the peasants) who understood this, who had their fingers on the nation’s revolutionary pulse…

In an article written in 1923 G. Mglinsky explained why the government proved so weak: “Understanding the absence of firm ground under their feet because of the absence of those layers of the population on which it was possible to rely, the new government fell immediately into dependence on the ‘Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies’ which had been formed even before the abdication of his Majesty the Emperor, and behind which there stood the capital’s working masses who had been propagandized by the same Russian intelligentsia. Although it did not really sympathize with the content of Order Number 1, which destroyed the army, and understood all its danger, the Provisional Government nevertheless allowed the carrying out of this order at the hands of its Minister of War Guchkov.

“Fearing a reaction in the Russian people, which, as it well understood, would hardly be likely to be reconciled with the seizure of power by a bunch of intriguers, the Provisional Government from the very beginning of its activity tried hard to destroy the state-administrative apparatus. With a stroke of the pen all administrative power in Russia was destroyed. The governors were replaced by *zemstvo* activists, the city commanders – by city-dwellers, the police – by militia.

“But, as is well known, it is always easy to destroy, but very difficult to create. And so it was here: having destroyed the old state apparatus, the Provisional Government did not think of, or, more likely, was simply not able to create anything in its place. Russia was immediately handed over to itself and nepotism was introduced as a slogan for the whole of the state administration, and this at precisely the moment when a strong power was required as never before.

“When representatives of the old and new administrations came to the head of the Provisional Government, Prince [G.E.] Lvov, and demanded directions, they unfailingly received the same refusal which Prince Lvov gave to the representatives of the press in his interview of 7 March, that is, five days after the coup. ‘This is a question of the old psychology. The Provisional Government has removed the old governors and is not going to appoint anybody. They will be elected on the spot. Such questions must be resolved not from the centre, but by the population itself… We are all boundlessly happy that we have succeeded in living to this great moment when we can create a new life of the people – not for the people, but together with the people… The future belongs to the people which has manifested its genius in this historical days. What great happiness it is to live in these great days!...’

“These words, which sound now like pure irony, were not invented, they are found in the text of the 67th page of the first volume of *A History of the Second Russian Revolution* written, not by any die-hard or black-hundredist, but by Paul Milyukov ‘himself’, who later on the pages of his history gives the following evaluation of the activity of the head of the government which he himself joined as Minister of Foreign Affairs:

“’This world-view of the leader of our inner politics,’ says Milyukov, ‘led in fact to the systematic cessation of activity of his department and to the self-limitation of the central authority to a single task – the sanctioning of the fruits of what in the language of revolutionary democracy is called the revolutionary creation of rights. The population, left to itself and completely deprived of protection from the representatives of the central power, necessarily had to submit to the rule of party organizations, which acquired, in new local committees, a powerful means of influence and propagandizing certain ideas that flattered the interests and instincts of the masses, and for that reason were more acceptable for them.’ ”[[458]](#footnote-458)

Prince N.D. Zhevakov, who was assistant over-procurator during the February Revolution, comments on these words: “If Milyukov, who took the closest participation in the overthrow of Tsarist Power in Russia, could talk like this, then what was it like in reality! ‘Things were no better in other departments. Everywhere complete chaos reigned, for none of the departmental bosses, nor the government as a whole, had any definite, systematically realizable plan. They broke down everything that was old, they broke it down out of a spectral fear of a return to the old. Without thinking of tomorrow, with a kind of mad haste, they broke down everything that the whole Russian people is now beginning to sorrow over…’” [[459]](#footnote-459)

There was no real opposition to this wanton destruction of old Russia because the forces on the right were in a state of shock and ideological uncertainty that left them incapable of undertaking any effective counter-measures. We search in vain for a leader, in Church or State, who called for the restoration of the Romanov dynasty at this time. Perhaps the deputy over-procurator, Raev, who called on the Synod to support the monarchy, was an exception to this rule, or the only Orthodox general who remained faithful to his oath, Theodore Keller. Or perhaps Archimandrite Vitaly (Maximenko) of Pochaev monastery, the future Archbishop of Eastern America, who, “having found out about the emperor’s abdication… travelled to the Tsar’s military headquarters in Mogilev in order to plead with the sovereign to rescind his abdication. He was not allowed a meeting…”[[460]](#footnote-460)

Orthodox monarchism, it seemed, was dead… The abdication of the Tsar was greeted with joy by people of all classes – even the peasantry. As Oliver Figes writes, “the news from the capital was joyously greeted by huge assemblies in the village fields. ‘Our village,’ recalls one peasant, ‘burst into life with celebrations. Everyone felt enormous relief, as if a heavy rock had suddenly been lifted from our shoulders.’ Another peasant recalled the celebrations in his village on the day it learned of the Tsar’s abdication: ‘People kissed each other from joy and said that life from now on would be good. Everyone dressed in their best costumes, as they do on a big holiday. The festivities went on for three days.’ Many villages held religious processions to thank the Lord for their newly won freedoms, and offered up prayers for the new government. For many peasants, the revolution appeared as a sacred thing, while those who had laid down their lives for the people’s freedom were seen by the peasants as modern-day saints. Thus the villagers of Bol’she-Dvorskaya volost in the Tikhvinsk district of Petrograd province held a ‘service of thanksgiving for the divine gift of the people’s victory and the eternal memory of those holy men who fell in the struggle for freedom’. The villagers of Osvyshi village in Tver province offered, as they put it, ‘fervent prayers to thank the Lord for the divine gift of the people’s victory… and since this great victory was achieved by sacrifice, we held a requiem for all our fallen brothers’. It was often with the express purpose of reciprocating this sacrifice that many villages sent donations, often amounting to several hundred roubles, to the authorities in Petrograd for the benefit of those who had suffered losses in the February Days.”[[461]](#footnote-461)

This confusion of the values of Christianity with those of the anti-Christian revolution was also evident in contemporary literature – in, for example, Blok’s poem *The Twelve*, in which Christ is portrayed at the head of the Red Guards! The prevalence of this confusion among all classes of society showed how deeply the democratic-revolutionary ideology had penetrated the masses in the pre-revolutionary period. For those with eyes to see it showed that there could be no quick return to normality, but only a very long, tortuous and tormented path of repentance through suffering…

## **71. THE COMING OF LENIN**

Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, usually known as Lenin, was a hereditary nobleman of mixed Russian, German and Jewish origin, a revolutionary who lived on party funds and income from his mother’s estate. Choosing to live in the underground[[462]](#footnote-462), he had very little direct knowledge of the way ordinary people lived, and cared even less. “According to Gorky, it was this ignorance of everyday work, and the human suffering which it entailed, which had bred in Lenin a ‘pitiless contempt, worthy of a nobleman, for the lives of the ordinary people… Life in all its complexity is unknown to Lenin. He does not know the ordinary people. He has never lived among them.’”[[463]](#footnote-463)

Lenin hated his own country. “I spit on Russia”, he said once; and his actions showed his contempt for Russians of all classes. Nothing is further from the truth than the idea that Lenin’s revolution was carried out for the sake of Russia or the Russians: it was carried out, not out of love for anybody or anything, but simply out of irrational, demonic, universal hatred…

Still less was it carried out for the sake of truth. As Victor Sebastyen says, “In his ideas and polemics Lenin constantly created images of an alternative reality, appealing not so much to facts, as to emotions. This is the politics of post-truth, in which real facts and truth are substituted by their emotional fictions and utopian surrogates.”[[464]](#footnote-464)

This leads us to the question: Was Lenin a real Marxist?

In order to answer this question, let us recall that after the failure of the “going to the people” movement in thr early 1870s, the radicals split into two: into Socialist Revolutionary terrorist organizations such as *Land and Liberty* and *The People’s Will,* on the one hand, and the Marxist Social Democratic movement, on the other. Both movements wanted revolution; but since the Marxists, led by George Plekhanov, did not believe that the revolution could come to Russia before it had become an industrial country, and that it was the workers, not the peasants, who would spearhead it, real revolutionaries focussed on the Socialist Revolutionary terrorists who were only marginally interested in Marx and, like Bakunin, wanted apocalypse *now*.

Now Lenin saw himself as a true follower of Marx, and he conducted much statistical research endeavouring to prove the truth of Marx’s laws. But there was a problem with being a conventional Plekhanovite or Menshevik Marxist at the end of the 19th century. For “Marx's laws of motion were failing. Capitalism still flourished: no sign of the falling rate of profit that would signal its end. The working class was getting the vote. The welfare state was taking shape. Factory conditions were improving and wages were rising well above the floor of subsistence. All this was contrary to Marx's laws.

“In response, the left was splitting. On one side were reformers and social democrats who saw that capitalism could be given a human face. On the other were those who believed that Marx's system could be developed and restated, always true to its underlying logic—and, crucially, with its revolutionary as opposed to evolutionary character brought to the fore.

“Whose side in this would Marx have been on? Revolution or reform? Would he have continued to insist that the vampire be destroyed? Or would he have turned reformer, asking it nicely to suck a bit less blood? The latter seems unlikely. Marx was a scholar, but he was also a fanatic and a revolutionary. His incapacity for compromise (with comrades, let alone opponents) was pathological. And in the preface to the 1882 Russian edition of the *Manifesto*, his last published writing, Marx hoped that a revolution in Russia might become ‘the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that both complement each other’; if so, Russia, despite its pre-capitalist characteristics, ‘may serve as the starting-point for a communist development.’ Lenin was surely right to believe that he, not those soft-headed bourgeois accommodationists, was true to the master's thought.”[[465]](#footnote-465)

In the last analysis, however, we must agree with I.P. Goldenberg that Lenin was the successor of Bakunin, not Marx, and that his tactics were those of “the universal apostle of destruction”…[[466]](#footnote-466)

For a revolutionary, Lenin lived a relatively simple, even ascetic life, and had only one known affair - with Inessa Armand. But, as Oliver Figes writes, “asceticism was a common trait of the revolutionaries of Lenin’s generation. They were all inspired by the self-denying revolutionary Rakhmetev in Chernyshevsky’s novel *What Is To Be Done?* By suppressing his own sentiments, by denying himself the pleasures of life, Lenin tried to strengthen his resolve and to make himself, like Rakhmetev, insensitive to the sufferings of others. This, he believed, was the ‘hardness’ required by every successful revolutionary: the ability to spill blood for political ends. ‘The terrible thing in Lenin,’ Struve once remarked, ‘was that combination in one person of self-castigation, which is the essence of all real asceticism, with the castigation of other people as expressed in abstract social hatred and cold political cruelty…

“The root of this philistine approach to life was a burning ambition for power. The Mensheviks joked that it was impossible to compete with a man, such as Lenin, who thought about revolution twenty-four hours every day. Lenin was driven by an absolute faith in his own historical destiny. He did not doubt for a moment, as he had once put it, that he was the man who was to wield the ‘conductor’s baton’ in the party. This was the message he brought back to Russia in April 1917. Those who had known him before the war noticed a dramatic change in his personality. ‘How he had aged,’ recalled Roman Gul’, who had met him briefly in 1905. ‘Lenin’s whole appearance had altered. And not only that. There was none of the old geniality, his friendliness or comradely humour, in his relations with other people. The new Lenin that arrived was cynical, secretive and rude, a conspirator “against everyone and everything”, trusting no one, suspecting everyone, and determined to launch his drive for power.’…

“Lenin had never been tolerant of dissent within his party’s ranks. Bukharin complained that he ‘didn’t give a damn for the opinions of others’. Lunacharsky claimed that Lenin deliberately ‘surrounded himself with fools’ who would not dare question him. During Lenin’s struggle for the April Theses this domineering attitude was magnified to almost megalomaniac proportions. Krupskaya called it his ‘rage’ – the frenzied state of her husband when engaged in clashes with his political rivals – and it was an enraged Lenin whom she had to live with for the next five years. During these fits Lenin acted like a man possessed by hatred and anger. His entire body was seized with extreme nervous tension, and he could neither sleep nor eat. His outward manner became vulgar and coarse. It was hard to believe that this was a cultivated man. He mocked his opponents, both inside and outside the party, in crude and violent language. They were ‘blockheads’, ‘bastards’, ‘dirty scum’, ‘prostitutes’, ‘cunts’, ‘shits’, ‘cretins’, ‘Russian fools’, ‘windbags’, ‘stupid hens’ and ‘silly old maids’. When the rage subsided Lenin would collapse in a state of exhaustion, listlessness and depression, until the rage erupted again. This manic alteration of mood was characteristic of Lenin’s psychological make-up. It continued almost unrelentingly between 1917 and 1922, and must have contributed to the brain haemorrhage from which he eventually died.

“Much of Lenin’s success in 1917 was no doubt explained by his towering domination over the party. No other political party had ever been so closely tied to the personality of a single man. Lenin was the first modern party leader to achieve the status of a god: Stalin, Mussolini, Hitler and Mao Zedong were all his successors in this sense. Being a Bolshevik had come to imply an oath of allegiance to Lenin as both the ‘leader’ and the ‘teacher’ of the party. It was this, above all, which distinguished the Bolsheviks from the Mensheviks (who had no close leader of their own)…”[[467]](#footnote-467)

In February, 1917 Lenin was living in Switzerland. He had been on the German payroll as an agent of the Reich for some time. Thus on December 29, 1915 the Jewish revolutionary Alexander Helphand (code-name: Parvus) recorded receiving a million rubles to support the revolution in Russia from the German envoy in Copenhagen. Still larger sums were given by Jewish bankers in the West. The leading American Jewish banker who bankrolled the Bolsheviks was Jacob Schiff, a member of Bnai Brith, a cabbalistic sect founded in 1843 in America.[[468]](#footnote-468) Schiff was related to the German Jewish banker Warburg, who financed the Bolsheviks from Germany. Lilia Shevstova writes: “Germany provided the Bolsheviks with substantial funds for ‘revolutionary purposes’: prior to October 1917, the Germans had paid them 11 million German gold marks; in October 1917, the Bolsheviks received another 15 million marks.”[[469]](#footnote-469)

“It has been estimated,” writes Niall Ferguson, “that 50 million gold marks ($12m) were channelled to Lenin and his associates, much of it laundered through a Russian import business run by a woman named Evgeniya Sumenson. Adjusting on the basis of unskilled wage inflation, that is equivalent to £800m today… To an extent that most accounts still underrate, the Bolshevik Revolution was a German-financed operation…”[[470]](#footnote-470)

However, until 1917 the German and Jewish investment in Lenin did not seem to have paid off. His message that the proletariat should turn the war between nations into a civil war between classes had not been listened to even by other socialist parties. But the February revolution – which took Lenin, living in Switzerland, completely by surprise – changed everything. Arthur Zimmermann – the same man whose famous telegram the month before had caused Germany such damage by pushing America into the war – now made up for his mistake by persuading the Kaiser and the army that Lenin should be smuggled back into Russia.[[471]](#footnote-471) On April 2 Count Brockdorff-Rantzau wrote to the German Foreign Office that they should smuggle Lenin into Russia with a lot of money “in order to create… the greatest possible chaos. We should do all we can… to exacerbate the differences between the moderate and extremist parties, because we have the greatest possible interest in the latter gaining the upper hand”.[[472]](#footnote-472)

The Germans must have known that if Lenin, a sworn enemy of all governments, were to succeed in Russia, they would have created a scourge for their own backs. But they also knew that the Russian offensive of spring, 1917, if combined with simultaneous attacks from the west, was very likely to be successful. So their only hope lay in the disintegration of Russia from within before Germany was defeated from without…

“The German special services guaranteed [Lenin’s] passage through Germany in the sealed carriage. Among the passengers were: Zinoviev, Radek, Rozenblum, Abramovich, Usievich, and also the majors of the German General Staff, the professional spies Anders and Erich, who had been cast in prison for subversive and diversionary work in Russia in favour of Germany and the organization of a coup d’état. The next day there arrived in Berlin an urgent secret report from an agent of the German General Staff: ‘Lenin’s entrance into Russia achieved. He is working completely according to our desires.’…”[[473]](#footnote-473)

“The trickiest part was crossing from Sweden to Russia… A British spy who had been posted to the crossing as a passport control officer, tried gamely to delay them. But the authorities in Petrograd… believed that a democratic country should not ban its own citizens from entry. For that mistake, [tens of] millions died.”[[474]](#footnote-474)

Although History had not revealed to her acolyte what had been obvious to many, that the Russian empire at the beginning of 1917 was on the verge of collapse, Lenin made up for lost time after arriving in Petrograd in April by trying to jump ahead of History. Ignoring Marxist teaching that the proletarian revolution must be preceded by a period of bourgeois rule, he called for non-recognition of the Provisional Government, all power to the Soviets and the immediate cessation of the war. “Addressing – and dressing down – his Bolshevik supporters, Lenin soon formulated his immediate policy. There would be no accommodation with the government. Abroad, hostilities must cease. At home, he came not to bring peace but the sword. The class war must be ruthlessly prosecuted. There could be no compromise with other parties. Land to the peasants. All power to the soviets. For Sukhanov this ‘thunderous speech’ was another revolution. ‘It seemed as if all the elements of universal destruction had arisen from their lairs, knowing neither barriers not doubts, personal difficulties nor personal considerations, to hover over… the head of the bewitched disciples.’”[[475]](#footnote-475)

Even his own party found his position extreme, if not simply mad – but such madness was what the maddened revolutionary masses wanted… For, as Douglas Smith writes, the foot soldiers of the revolution “had no understanding or even interest in Marxist theory, nor were they concerned with what the new Russian society would look like. Rather, they were motivated by one thing: the desire to destroy the old order…”[[476]](#footnote-476)

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The removal of the “annexationist” Guchkov and Milyukov left the government in the hands of a group of leftist Masons: Kerensky (the link with the Petrograd Soviet), Nekrasov, Konovalov, Tereshchenko and Efremov. Together with the Soviet, they immediately passed a series of laws: political prisoners and revolutionaries were amnestied, trade unions were recognized, an eight-hour day for workers was introduced, the replacement of the Tsarist police by a “people’s militia”, full civil and religious freedoms, the abolition of the death penalty and the removal of all restrictions on the Jews. “In a breath-taking reversal,” writes Adam Tooze, “Russia, formerly the autocratic bubear of Europe, was remaking itself as the freest, most democratic country on earth.”[[477]](#footnote-477)

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Meanwhile, the Justice Minister Kerensky was visiting the troops. On May 13 he came to Podgaytsy, and Sister Florence witnessed his speech: “He spoke for about twenty minutes, but time seemed to stand still. His main theme was freedom; that great, mystical Freedom which had come to Russia. His words were often interrupted by wild applause, and, when he pointed out that the war must, at all costs, continued to a victorious end, they acclaimed him to the echo. ‘You will fight to a victorious end!’ he adjured them. ‘We will!’ the soldiers shouted as one man. ‘You will drive the enemy off Russian soil!’ ‘We will!’ they shouted again with boundless enthusiasm. ‘You, free men of a Free Country; you will fight for Russia, your Mother-Country. You will go into battle with joy in your hearts!’ ‘We are free men,’ they roared. ‘We will follow you into battle. Let us go now! Let us go now!’

“When he left, they carried him on their shoulders to his car. They kissed him, his uniform, his car, the ground on which he walked. Many of them were on their knees praying; others were weeping. Some of them cheering; others singing patriotic songs. To the accompaniment of this hysterical outburst of patriotic fervor, Kerensky drove away…”[[480]](#footnote-480)

The soldiers had been promised that the Offensive (originally planned under Tsar Nicholas) would not long be delayed. But time passed, the order did not come, discipline collapsed, desertions began… Then came the Bolshevik agitators who harangued the troops with a new message: surrender! Farmborough describes one such meeting: “It was a most extraordinary meeting! Never, in our wildest dreams did we imagine that we should listen to such an outpouring of treachery. We sat in a group among the trees, surrounded on all sides by soldiers. Some of our hospital Brothers were there and I caught sight of several of our transport drivers.

“The man who had come to speak to the soldiers had an ordinary face and was dressed in ordinary Russian clothes; dark trousers and a dark shirt, buttoned on the left and worn outside his trousers, with a black belt around the waist. His face was serious and pale, but he smiled and nodded once or twice to one or another of the audience, as though he recognized friends. He spoke for a time about Russia, her vast territory, her wealth and the many overlords who, possessing enormous estates and resources, were revered on account of their riches throughout the western world. Then he described the impoverished peasantry who, unschooled, uncared for and half-starved, were eking out a miserable existence by tilling and cultivating the land belonging to those same overlords. War had burst upon Russia and enemies had invaded her territory, and who were the men who had sacrificed themselves to fight the ruthless invaders and drive them off Russian soil! Not the wealthy overlords, not the despotic land-owners; no! – they were safely installed in their fortress-homes. It was those downtrodden countrymen who had been roped in in their thousands, in their millions, to stem the tide of invasion; when they had been killed, others had been quickly collected and sent to replace them. There had been no end to the slaughter and sacrifice of the Russian peasant. Enemy guns had devoured them daily, hourly; every minute of the day and night, the heavy guns had feasted on them and every minute new recruits were being seized and thrust like fodder into the voracious jaws of the enemy’s cannon. But now a tremendous even had taken place! The Tsar – that arch-potentate, that arch-tyrant – had been dethroned and dismissed. Russia had been pronounced a free country! – the Russian citizens a free people! Freedom had come at last to the downtrodden people of Russia.

“Our doctors were moving restlessly. They were, as always, in officers’ uniform. I wondered if they were thinking it was high time to leave, but they stayed. Undoubtedly, it was the wisest thing to do. I glanced around. Most of the soldiers were young and raw, inexperienced and impressionable; all of them drawn from far-off corners of what, until recently, had been known as the Russian Empire. What easy prey they would be for seditious guile! New ideas could so readily take hold of their gullible minds and a cunning speaker would soon be aware that he could sway them this way and that with his oratory.

“The speaker was harping on the theme of freedom. Freedom, he declared, was a possession so great, so precious, one dared not treat it lightly. But war was an enemy of freedom, because it destroyed peace, and without peace there could be no freedom. It was up to the Russian soldier to do all in his power to procure peace. And the best and quickest way to bring about a guaranteed peace was to *refuse to fight.* War could not be fought if there were no soldiers to fight! War was never a one-sided operation! Then, when peace had at last come to Russia, freedom could be enjoyed. The free men of Free Russia would own their own land. The great tracts of privately-owned territory would be split up and divided fairly among the peasantry. There would be common ownership of all properties and possessions. Once the Russian soldier had established peace in his homeland, he would reap benefits undreamt of. Peace above all else! Down with war!

“The soldiers were all astir; they were whispering, coughing, muttering. But there all in full accord with the orator; he held them in his hand! Their stolid faces were animated and jubilant. ‘*Tovarishchi!* You free men of Free Russia! You will demand peace!’ ‘We will!’ they shouted in reply. ‘You will assert your rights as free Russian citizens!’ ‘We will assert our rights,’ they echoed with one voice. ‘You will never allow yourselves to be pushed into the trenches to sacrifice your lives in vain!’ ‘Never!’ they roared in unison…”[[481]](#footnote-481)

The success of the Bolsheviks’ propaganda against the war deprived the army of the minimum discipline required for any successful offensive. In the event, while General Alexeyev calculated that the losses from the July offensive would be about 6000, they turned out to be 400,000.[[482]](#footnote-482)

“The key to Russia’s military defeat,” writes Niall Ferguson, “was the huge number of surrenders in that year. Overall, more than half of total Russian casualties were accounted for by men who were taken prisoner.”[[483]](#footnote-483) An offensive that had been designed by Kerensky and the liberals to bolster the state by bringing all classes together on a patriotic wave ended by opening the path to the final destruction of the state.

The offensive was crushed, and on September 3 the Germans entered Riga…

Nobody was more saddened by the Russian rout than the imprisoned Tsar Nicholas, who had abdicated precisely in order to avoid civil strife and thereby guarantee the army’s successful offensive. “In the words of the children’s tutor, Pierre Gilliard, this caused the Emperor ‘great grief’. As always, however, Nicholas’s optimism struggled against bad news. ‘I get a little hope from the fact that in our country people love to exaggerate. I can’t believe that the army at the front has become as bad as they say. It couldn’t have disintegrated in just two months to such a degree.’”[[484]](#footnote-484)

On July 17 military units around Petrograd marched into the centre of the city, demanding an end to the war. The Bolsheviks had not led this “semi-insurrection”, as Trotsky called it, but now they assumed the leadership of it, setting up a separate government by the Bolshevized sailors of Kronstadt. But the insurrection failed, the mutinous soliders were suppressed (but not disarmed), Kerensky became prime minister and a crackdown on the Bolsheviks began. Lenin fled, disguised as a woman, to Finland, and many party members were arrested. It was left to Stalin and Sverdlov, working underground, to keep the party afloat… The Mensheviks and other socialists to the right of the Bolsheviks also helped at this critical point. Believing that there were “no enemies to the Left”, and fearing a counter-revolution, they protected the Bolsheviks from treason charges. A year later, the Bolsheviks proved their ingratitude by imprisoning the Mensheviks…[[485]](#footnote-485)

“State authority,” writes Daniel T. Orlovsky, “continued to disintegrate. The government now operated under the cloud of military catastrophe, even the threat that the Germans would occupy Petrograd itself. And on the domestic front its problems were legion: land seizures and pogroms, strikes and demonstrations by workers, massive breakdowns in supply and transport, and the strident demands of nationalities. In early July the first coalition finally collapsed from disagreements over Ukrainian autonomy (which, to the liberals’ dismay, the socialists proposed to acknowledge) and Chernov’s agrarian policies (which the liberals saw as sanctioning illegal peasant actions). Once Prince Lvov and the Kadet ministers resigned, only a rump cabinet of socialists remained in charge.

“That government now became the personal instrument of Kerensky, who had succeeded Lvov as Prime Minister…”[[486]](#footnote-486)

## ***72. THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION***

In spite of this setback, support for the Bolsheviks continued to grow, especially after they adopted the SR slogan, “Land to the Peasants!” legalizing the peasants’ seizure of the landowners’ estates. As their wars against the peasantry in 1918-22 and 1928-1934 were to show, the Bolsheviks were never a pro-peasant party, and really wanted to nationalize the land rather than give it to the peasants. This was in accordance with Marxist teaching, which saw the industrial proletariat as the vanguard of the revolution, but looked down on the peasants, with their religiosity, old-fashioned ways and rejection of state interference, as being relics of the old order. However, towards the end of his life, in 1881, Marx had entered into correspondence with the *narodnik* Vera Zasulich, and had recognized the possibility that the revolution in Russia could begin with the agrarian socialists.[[487]](#footnote-487) So Lenin had some precedent in making tactical concessions to the SRs at this point – concessions he was soon to take back once he was in power. It paid off: many Left SRs joined the party, and others voted for the Bolsheviks in the Soviets.

In late August, alarmed by the increasing power of the Bolsheviks, and by the German advance on Petrograd, General Lavr Kornilov, a war hero who had arrested the Royal Family in Tsarskoye Selo in March, ordered his troops to march on Petrograd in order to suppress “democracy run amok” and restore order. As he said on August 11: “It is time to put an end to all this. It is time to hang the German agents and spies, with Lenin at their head, to dispel the Council of Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies and scatter them far and wide, so that they should never be able to come together again!”[[488]](#footnote-488)

Right-wing forces in politics (Rodzianko, Guchkov, Miliukov), in business and in the army (the Officers’ Union and the Union of Cossacks) soon rallied around him, hoping to prevent the Russian revolution from following the pattern of the French revolution and passing from a bourgeois, liberal phase to a Jacobin, terrorist one.

“Much ink has been spilt,” writes Orlovsky, “on the Kornilov affair, mostly along predictable political lines, with the left accusing the general of an attempted coup (Kornilov did order the march on Petrograd to destroy the soviet and instal himself as a Napoleonic strongman) and the right and centre (who accuse Kerensky of goading Kornilov to act and then perfidiously betraying him). Both accounts are true: the general did attempt a coup, believing that he had Kerensky’s support, and Kerensky did lose his nerve and renege, sacrificing the general in a desperate effort to regain popular support. Workers and paramilitary units known as Red Guards were mobilized to repulse ‘counter-revolution’ and, without much bloodshed, arrested Kornilov and disarmed his troops. [On the approaches to Petrograd, Bolshevik agitators and railwaymen managed to infiltrate Kornilov’s troops and persuade them to give up the coup attempt.] Kerensky dissolved the second coalition and declared himself head of a new government, a five-man ‘Directory’.

“The Kornilov affair had enormous repercussions. Kerensky’s machinations soon became public, severely damaging his personal authority. It also lent new credibility to the spectre of counter-revolution – a myth that greatly exaggerated the power of conservative forces, but none the less impelled workers, soldiers, and activists to organize militias, Red Guards, and *ad hoc* committees to defend the revolution. Even when the Kornilov threat had passed, these armed forces refused to disband and became a powerful threat to the government itself….”[[489]](#footnote-489)

Figes writes: “The social polarization of the summer gave the Bolsheviks their first real mass following as a party which based its main appeal on the plebeian rejection of all superordinate authority. The Kornilov crisis was the critical turning point, for it seemed to confirm their message that neither peace nor radical social change could be obtained through the politics of compromise with the bourgeoisie. The larger factories in the major cities, where the workers’ sense of class solidarity was most developed, were the first to go over in large numbers to the Bolsheviks. By the end of May, the party had already gained control of the Central Bureau of the Factory Committees and, although the Menshevik trade unionists remained in the ascendancy until 1918, it also began to get its resolutions passed at important trade union assemblies. Bolshevik activists in the factories tended to be younger, more working class and much more militant than their Menshevik or SR rivals. This made them more attractive to those groups of workers – both among the skilled and the unskilled – who were becoming increasingly prepared to engage in violent strikes, not just for better pay and working conditions but also for the control of the factory environment itself. As their network of party cells at the factory level grew, the Bolsheviks began to build up their membership among the working class, and as a result their finances grew through the new members’ contributions. By the Sixth Party Conference at the end of July there were probably 200,000 Bolshevik members, rising to perhaps 350,000 on the eve of October, and the vast majority of these were blue-collar workers.”[[490]](#footnote-490)

Similar swings to the Bolsheviks took place in the city Duma elections of August and September, and in the Soviets. “As early as August, the Bolsheviks had won control of the Soviets in Ivanovo-Voznesensk (the ‘Russian Manchester’), Kronstadt, Yekaterinburg, Samara and Tsaritsyn. But after the Kornilov crisis many other Soviets followed suit: Riga, Saratov and Moscow itself. Even the Petrograd Soviet fell to the Bolsheviks… [On September 9] Trotsky, appearing for the first time after his release from prison, dealt the decisive rhetorical blow by forcing the Soviet leaders to admit that Kerensky, by this stage widely regarded as a ‘counter-revolutionary’, was still a member of their executive. On 25 September the leadership of the Petrograd Soviet was completely revamped, with the Bolsheviks occupying four of the seven seats on its executive and Trotsky replacing Chkheidze as its Chairman. This was the beginning of the end. In the words of Sukhanov, the Petrograd Soviet was ‘now Trotsky’s guard, ready at a sign from him to storm the coalition’.”[[491]](#footnote-491)

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On October 10 Lenin returned secretly to Petrograd from Finland determined that an armed insurrection should be launched now, even before the convening of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets on October 20; for he did not want to share power with the other parties represented at the Congress. On October 10, by a margin of ten to two (Zinoviev and Kamenev voted against) his views prevailed in the Central Committee, and on October 16 Trotsky set up the Petrograd Revolutionary Military Committee, which was theoretically under the control of the Petrograd Soviet but was in fact designed to be the spearhead of the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power.

Trotsky’s support for the Leninist line was crucial to the success of the revolution. For a long time he had not seen eye-to-eye with Lenin. Originally a Menshevik, in 1904 he accurately summed up Lenin’s dictatorial aims: “The party organization is substituted for the party, the Central Committee is substituted for the party organization, and finally a ‘dictator’ is substituted for the Central Committee”.[[492]](#footnote-492) And as late as March, 1917, Lenin had expressed his wariness of Trotsky: “The main thing is not to let ourselves get caught in stupid attempts at ‘unity’ with social patriots, or still more dangerous… with vacillators like Trotsky & Co.”[[493]](#footnote-493) Nevertheless, by 1917 there were no major differences between the two revolutionaries, so it was logical that Trotsky should join - it was probably his vanity and ambition that had prevented him from surrendering to the party he had criticized for so long. And now his oratorical power to sway the mob, and the key position he occupied in the Petrograd Soviet and its Revolutionary Military Committee, supplied the vital element that propelled the Bolsheviks to power.

Figes continues: “The rising fortunes of the Bolsheviks during the summer and autumn were essentially due to the fact that they were the only major political party which stood uncompromisingly for Soviet power. This point bears emphasizing, for one of the most basic misconceptions of the Russian Revolution is that the Bolsheviks were swept to power on a tide of mass support for the party itself. The October insurrection was a *coup d’étât*, actively supported by a small minority of the population (and indeed opposed by several of the Bolshevik leaders themselves). But it took place amidst a social revolution, which was centred on the popular realization of Soviet power as the negation of the state and the direct self-rule of the people, much as in the ancient peasant ideal of *volia*. The political vacuum brought about by this social revolution enabled the Bolsheviks to seize power in the cities and consolidate their dictatorship during the autumn and winter. The slogan ‘All Power to the Soviets!’ was a useful tool, a banner of popular legitimation covering the nakedness of Lenin’s ambition (which was better expressed as All Power to the Party). Later, as the nature of the Bolshevik dictatorship became apparent, the party faced the growing opposition of precisely those groups in society which in 1917 had rallied behind the Soviet slogan…”[[494]](#footnote-494)

The lack of opposition to the Bolshevik coup was almost farcical. First, the Petrograd garrison mutinied, leaving the government no substantial forces in the capital. Then, on the night of the 24th, Kerensky fled in a stolen car and fled to the West, never to return. A week before his death he said to an acquaintance: “My own children are ashamed of me. They say that I have entered into history as the father of ‘Kerenshchina’. Forgive me and forget me. I destroyed Russia…”

The rest of the ministers huddled in the Winter Palace guarded by some Cossacks, cadets and 200 women from the Shock Battalion of Death – about 3000 people in all. But such was their lack of morale that by the evening only 300 of these were left. Very little fighting actually took place.

The Bolsheviks’ most potent weapon was the blank round fired by the cruiser *Aurora* at 9.40 p.m. “The huge sound of the blast, much louder than a live shot, caused the frightened ministers to drop at once to the floor. The women from the Battalion of Death became hysterical and had to be taken away to a room at the back of the palace, where most of the remaining cadets abandoned their posts.”[[495]](#footnote-495) When the Bolsheviks finally stormed into the Palace, their first act was to break open the wine cellars and get drunk…

The only real drama took place at the Soviet Congress, which finally convened at 10.40 p.m. The delegates at first supported the formation of a Soviet government, which, if the Bolsheviks had really believed their slogan: “All Power to the Soviets!” should have stopped their coup in its tracks. “Martov proposed the formation of a united democratic government based upon all the parties in the Soviet: this, he said, was the only way to avert a civil war. The proposal was met with torrents of applause. Even Lunacharsky was forced to admit that the Bolsheviks had nothing against it – they could not abandon the slogan of Soviet Power – and the proposal was immediately passed by a unanimous vote. But just as it looked as if a socialist coalition was at last about to be formed, a series of Mensheviks and SRs bitterly denounced the violent assault on the Provisional Government. They declared that their parties, or at least the right-wing sections of them, would have nothing to do with this ‘criminal venture’, which was bound to throw the country into civil war, and walked out of the Congress hall in protest, while the Bolshevik delegates stamped their feet, whistled and hurled abuse at them.

“Lenin’s planned provocation – the pre-emptive seizure of power – had worked. By walking out of the Congress, the Mensheviks and SRs undermined all hopes of reaching a compromise with the Bolshevik moderates and of forming a coalition government of all the Soviet parties. The path was now clear for the Bolshevik dictatorship, based on the Soviet, which Lenin had no doubt intended all along. In the charged political atmosphere of the time, it is easy to see why the Mensheviks and SRs acted as they did. But it is equally difficult not to draw the conclusion that, by their actions, they merely played into Lenin’s hands and thus committed political suicide…”[[496]](#footnote-496)

Trotsky shouted after the departing delegates: “You are miserable bankrupts, your role is played out; go where you ought to go – into the dustbin of history.” Then he proposed a resolution condemning the “treacherous” attempts of the Mensheviks and SRs to undermine Soviet power. The mass of the remaining delegates (Bolsheviks and Left SRs) fell into the trap and voted for the motion, thereby legitimizing the Bolshevik coup in the name of the Soviet Congress.

At 2 a.m. the ministers in the Winter Palace were arrested and cast into the Peter and Paul fortress. Kamenev announced the arrest of the ministers to the Congress.

“And then Lunacharsky read out Lenin’s Manifesto ‘To All Workers, Soldiers and Peasants’, in which ‘Soviet Power’ was proclaimed, and its promises on land, bread and peace were announced. The reading of this historic proclamation, which was constantly interrupted by the thunderous cheers of the delegates, played an enormous symbolic role. It provided the illusion that the insurrection was the culmination of a revolution by ‘the masses’. When it had been passed, shortly after 5 a.m. on the 26th, the weary but elated delegates emerged from the Tauride Palace. ‘The night was yet heavy and chill,’ wrote John Reed. ‘There was only a faint unearthly pallor stealing over the silent streets, dimming the watch-fires, the shadow of a terrible dawn rising over Russia…’”[[497]](#footnote-497)

“We have it on the authority of Trotsky himself,” writes Richard Pipes, “that the October ‘revolution’ in Petrograd was accomplished by ‘at most’ 25,000-30,000 persons – this in a country of 150 million and a city with 400,000 workers and a garrison of over 200,000 soldiers.

As Carolly Erickson writes, Lenin “declared all private property abolished, virtually inviting the propertyless of Petrograd to confiscate mansions, shops, warehouses, churches, with everything they contained. Robbery was not robbery, under the new Bolshevik decree, but a patriotic appropriation of goods for the benefit of the people; therefore the expropriation went forward with a vengeance.

“And in order to safeguard the newly constituted Bolshevik state, the killings began. All those opposed to the party in power – member of the rival political parties, some union members, the remnant of monarchists, soldiers and cadets loyal to the Provisional Government – came under suspicition. Many hundreds were murdered in the days following the takeover.[[498]](#footnote-498) And Petrograd, suddenly, was awash in liquor. The vast wine cellars of the Winter Palace were plundered, wine barrels in the vaults and warehouses of merchants were seized, tapped and their contents consume. Wine flowed everywhere. ‘The air was saturated with vinous vapours,’ a contemporary wrote. ‘The whole population came at a run and… gathered into pails the snow saturated with wine, drew with cupts the flowing rivulets, or drank lying flat on the ground and pressing their lips to the snow. Everybody was drunk.’

“As the murders and thefts continued, the ‘wine riots’ went on unchecked, people wandered in a fog of intoxication, brawling, vomiting, lying dead drunk in the snow. Petrograd was the scene of a monumental crime spree and a monumental debauch – the latter a conspicuous symbol of the new government, of the depths to which the revolution had sunk…”[[499]](#footnote-499)

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“On the day after the coup,” writes Adam Tooze, “Lenin proposed that the Constituent Assembly elections be cancelled altogether. There was no need for such an exercise in ‘bourgeois democracy’. But he was overruled by the Bolshevik Executive Committee, which decided that to flout the democratic hopes of the February revolution so openly would do more harm than good.”[[500]](#footnote-500)

In the elections to the Constituent Assembly, the turnout was large (60%), and Russians voted in large numbers for the main socialist party of the SRs (58%). The Bolsheviks polled only 25%, the Ukrainian Mensheviks - 12%, and other national parties - 4%. In all, socialist or revolutionary parties received 80% of the vote, while the liberal Cadets received 5%.[[501]](#footnote-501) There is no question about it: the revolution was not imposed upon the Russian people, in their great majority they called it upon themselves…

According to Solzhenitsyn, “‘More than 80% of the Jewish population of Russia voted’ for Zionist parties. Lenin wrote that 550,000 were for Jewish nationalists. ‘The majority of the Jewish parties formed a single national list, in accordance with which seven deputies were elected – six Zionists and Gruzenberg. ‘The success of the Zionists’ was also aided by the [published not long before the elections] Declaration of the English Foreign Minister Balfour [on the creation of a ‘national centre’ of the Jews in Palestine], ‘which was met by the majority of the Russian Jewish population with enthusiasm’.”[[502]](#footnote-502) Thus in many cities there were festive manifestations, meetings and religious services.

The Constituent Assembly was convened in January, 1918. On the first day, “between 3 and 4 a.m. on the 6th, the Chairman of the Assembly and leader of the SRs, Victor Chernov (1873-1952), was trying to pass a law for the abolition of landed property when he was tapped on the shoulder by a sailor, the commander of the Bolshevik Guard. ‘I have been instructed to inform you that all those present should leave the Assembly Hall,’ the sailor announced, ‘because the guard is tired’.”[[503]](#footnote-503) The Assembly never reconvened.

So the supreme authority in the Russian republic disappeared because *the guard was tired…* Thus was Russian democracy brought to an abrupt and inglorious end… And with it disappeared the last chance that the Russian people would have to reinstate the monarchy in a peaceful and orderly fashion and avoid the great catastrophe that now overtook them…

The new regime was subsequently labelled “totalitarian”. “This term,” writes Pipes, “has fallen out of favour with Western sociologists and political scientists determined to avoid what they consider the language of the Cold War. It deserves note, however, how quickly it found favour in the Soviet Union the instant the censor’s prohibitions against its use had been lifted. This kind of regime, unknown to previous history, imposed the authority of a private but omnipotent ‘party’ on the state, claiming the right to subject to itself all organized life without exception, and enforcing its will by means of unbounded terror…”[[504]](#footnote-504)

However, while new in essence, the new regime could not have survived without preserving some continuity with the old. Thus Lenin decided, writes Orlovsky, “to retain the ministerial bureaucracy and cabinet executive rather than destroy these creatures of the tsarist regime (as recently envisaged in his *State and Revolution*), he simply relabelled ministries ‘commissariats’ and the cabinet ‘Council of People’s Commissars’. With this legerdemain he rebaptized these bodies as qualitatively different, purportedly because they were now part of a workers’ and peasants’ state and presumably staffed by proletarians.

“This was a masterful illusion: few proletarians were prepared for such service. It created, however, a golden opportunity for the white-collar employees of the tsarist and provisional governments… They found the transition easy…

“… The key revolutionary institutions of 1917 – soviets, factory committees, trade union, cooperatives, professional associations, and the like – were gradually subsumed into the new bureaucracy or extinguished outright…”[[505]](#footnote-505)

## **73. THE SPIRIT OF LENINISM**

In 1796, in his *Manifesto of Equals*, Gracchus Babeuf had proclaimed: “The French Revolution is only the forerunner of another, even greater revolution that will finally put an end to the era of revolutions. The people have swept away the Kings and priests who have been in league with them… We intend the COMMON GOOD or the COMMUNITY OF GOODS.”[[506]](#footnote-506) Babeuf was right at any rate in his first statement – the French Revolution was only the forerunner of the still greater Russian, or Leninist revolution. But he was utterly naïve in thinking that the French revolution or any of its successors or imitators had anything essentially to do with communism in the sense of the community of goods. The spirit of Leninism – and it was indeed a spirit, not just an ideology – was far deeper and darker than that.

As Elder Aristocles of Moscow (+1918) had prophesied in 1911, the power that would conquer Russia in 1917 would not be a philosophy or ideology, still less an expression of the Russian soul, but *a spirit from hell…*

It was precisely the madness of Lenin that made him the man of the moment, the politician best suited for those mad times. The word “madness” here is not used in a wholly metaphorical sense. Of course, in 1917 he was not mad in the sense that he had lost contact with ordinary, everyday reality – his clever tactical manoeuvring and his final success in October proves that he was more realistic about Russian politics than many. But the photographs of him in his last illness reveal a man who was truly mad – post-mortems showed that his brain had been terribly damaged by syphilis. Moreover, in a spiritual sense he was mad with the madness of the devil himself: he was demonized, with an irrational rage against God and man, an urge to destroy and kill and maim that can have no rational basis.

As the SR leader Victor Chernov wrote in 1924: “Nothing to him was worse than sentimentality, a name he was ready to apply to all moral and ethical considerations in politics. Such things were to him trifles, hypocrisy, ‘parson’s talk’. Politics to him meant strategy, pure and simple. Victory was the only commandment to observe; the will to rule and to carry through a political program without compromise that was the only virtue; hesitation, that was the only crime.

“It has been said that war is a continuation of politics, though employing different means. Lenin would undoubtedly have reversed this dictum and said that politics is the continuation of war under another guise. The essential effect of war on a citizen’s conscience is nothing but a legalization and glorification of things that in times of peace constitute crime. In war the turning of a flourishing country into a desert is a mere tactical move; robbery is a ‘requisition’, deceit a stratagem, readiness to shed blood of one’s brother military zeal; heartlessness towards one’s victims is laudable self-command; pitilessness and inhumanity are one’s duty. In war all means are good, and the best ones are precisely the things most condemned in normal human intercourse. And as politics is disguised war, the rules of war constitute its principles…”[[507]](#footnote-507)

Although we have emphasized Lenin’s ferocious single-mindedness, we must not forget that he was also prepared to be highly flexible tactically in pursuit of his goal. This is most clearly evident in his pushing through the treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March, 1918, which involved giving up to the Germans a third of Russia’s territory in the West with a large part of her industrial and agricultural wealth for the sake of the survival of the revolution in Central Russia. As he himself said: “It is necessary to unite the strictest devotion to the ideas of communism with the ability to adopt all necessary practical compromises, twistings, deals, zig-zags, retreats, etc.” for the sake of hastening the bankruptcy of his class opponents.[[508]](#footnote-508)

Archpriest Lev Lebedev writes that Lenin “understood *the main thing* in Marx and Marxism and created not simply a political revolutionary party on the basis of the economic and social ‘scientific’ theory of Marxism: he founded a *religion,* and one, moreover, in which ‘god’ turned out to be himself! In this lies the essence of all the disagreements between Lenin and the legal Marxists like Struve and Plekhanov, and the Mensheviks – that is, all those who through naivety and evident misunderstanding took Marxism to be precisely a ‘scientific’ theory able to serve the ‘radiant future’ of humanity, beginning with Russia… For Lenin, as for Marx, the only thing that was necessary and important was his *personal power* with the obligatory *deification* of his own person, regardless not only of objections or criticisms, but even simply of insufficient *servility*. Lenin (like Marx) considered himself to be nothing less than the ‘Messiah’ – the ‘teacher’ and ‘leader’ not only of Russian, but also of world significance. This was *the psychology of the Antichrist*, which was reflected both in Lenin’s teaching on ‘the new type of party’, and in the ‘world revolution’, and in the construction of socialism in Russia, and in his ‘philosophy’, and in his methods of ‘leadership’, when he and his ‘comrades’ came to power. In the sphere of politics Lenin was always, from the very beginning, an inveterate *criminal*. For him there existed no juridical, ethical or moral limitations of any kind. All means, any means, depending on the circumstances, were permissible for the attainment of his goal. Lies, deceit, slander, treachery, bribery, blackmail, murder – this was the almost daily choice of means that he and his party used, while at the same time preserving for rank-and-file party members and the masses the *mask* of ‘crystal honesty’, decency and humanity – which, of course, required exceptional art and skilfulness in lying. Lenin always took a special pleasure in news of *murders*, both individual and, still more mass murders – carried out *with impunity.* At such moments he was sincerely happy. This bloodthirstiness is the key to that *special power* that ‘the leader of the world proletariat’ received from the devil and the angels of the abyss. In the sphere of philosophy Lenin was amazingly *talentless.* How to lie a little more successfully – that was essentially his only concern in the sphere of ideas. But when he really had to *think*, he admitted blunders that were unforgivable in a ‘genius’…

“But the question is: *how* could a teaching that conquered millions of minds in Russia and throughout the world be created on the basis of such an intellectually impoverished, primitive basis?! An adequate answer can never be given if one does not take into account the main thing about Marxism-Leninism – that it is not simply a teaching, but a *religion, a cult of the personality* of its founders and each of the successive ‘leaders’, that was nourished, not by human, but by *demonic* forces from ‘the satanic depths’. Therefore its action on the minds took place simultaneously with a demonic *delusion* that blinded and darkened the reasoning powers. In order to receive such support from hell, it was necessary to deserve it in a special way, by immersing oneself (being ‘initiated’) into Satanism. And Lenin, beginning in 1905, together with his more ‘conscious comrades’ immersed himself in it (in particular, through the shedding of *innocent blood*), although there is not information to the effect that he personally killed anybody. The ‘leader’ had to remain ‘unsullied’… By contrast with certain other satanic religions, the religion of Bolshevism had the express character of *the worship of the man-god* (and of his works as sacred scripture). This was profoundly non-coincidental, since what was being formed here was nothing other than the religion of *the coming Antichrist*. Lenin was one of the most striking prefigurations of the Antichrist, one of his forerunners, right up to a resemblance to the beast whose name is 666 in certain concrete details of his life (his receiving of a deadly wound and healing from it). Lenin was not able to create for himself a general cult during his lifetime, since he was forced to share the worship of the party and the masses with such co-workers as, for example, Trotsky. But the ‘faithful Leninist’ Stalin was able truly to take ‘Lenin’s work’ *to its conclusion*, that is, to the point of absurdity… He fully attained his own cult during the life and posthumous cult of personality of his ‘teacher’. Lenin, who called religion ‘necrophilia’, was the founder of the religion of his own *corpse, the main ‘holy thing’* of Bolshevism to this day! All this conditioned, to an exceptional degree, the extraordinary *power* of Lenin and his party-sect…”[[509]](#footnote-509)

The Bolshevik party was indeed more like a religious sect than a normal political party. While members of other parties, even socialist ones, had a private life separate from their political life, this was not so for the Bolsheviks and the parties modelled on them. Thus Igor Shafarevich writes: “The German publicist V. Schlamm tells the story of how in 1919, at the age of 15, he was a fellow-traveller of the communists, but did not penetrate into the narrow circle of their functionaries. The reason was explained to him twenty years later by one of them, who by that time had broken with communism. It turns out that Schlamm, when invited to join the party, had said: ‘I am ready to give to the party everything except two evenings a week, when I listen to Mozart.’ That reply turned out to be fatal: a man having interests that he did not want to submit to the party was not suitable for it.

“Another aspect of these relations was expressed by Trotsky. Having been defeated by his opponents, in a speech that turned out to be his last at a party congress, he said: ‘I know that it is impossible to be right against the party. One can be right only with the party, for History has not created any other ways to realize rightness.’

“Finally, here is how Piatakov, already in disgrace and expelled from the party, explained his relationship to the party to his party comrade N.V. Valentinov. Remembering Lenin’s thesis: ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat is a power realized by the party and relying on violence and not bound by any laws’ (from the article, ‘The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky’), Piatakov added that the central idea here was not ‘violence’ but precisely ‘not being bound by any laws’. He said: ‘Everything that bears the seal of human will must not, cannot be considered inviolable, as being bound by certain insuperable laws. Law is a restriction, a ban, a decree that one phenomenon is impermissible, another act is possible, and yet another impossible. When the mind holds to violence as a matter of principle, is psychologically free, and is not bound by any laws, limitations or obstacles, then the sphere of possible action is enlarged to a gigantic degree, while the sphere of the impossible is squeezed to an extreme degree, to the point of nothingness… Bolshevism is the party that bears the idea of turning into life that which is considered to be impossible, unrealizable and impermissible… For the honour and glory of being in her ranks we must truly sacrifice both pride and self-love and everything else. On returning to the party, we cast out of our heads all convictions that are condemned by it, even if we defended them when we were in opposition… I agree that those who are not Bolsheviks and in general the category of ordinary people cannot in a moment make changes, reversals or amputations of their convictions… We are the party consisting of people who make the impossible possible; penetrated by the idea of violence, we direct it against ourselves, while if the party demands it, if it is necessary and important for the party, we can by an act of will in 24 hours cast out of our heads ideas that we have lived with for years… In suppressing our convictions and casting them out, it is necessary to reconstruct ourselves in the shortest time in such a way as to be inwardly, with all our minds, with all our essence, in agreement with this or that decision decreed by the party. Is it easy violently to cast out of one’s head that which yesterday I considered to be right, but which today, in order to be in complete agreement with the party, I consider to be false? It goes without saying – no. Nevertheless, by violence on ourselves the necessary result is attained. The rejection of life, a shot in the temple from a revolver – these are sheer trivialities by comparison with that other manifestation of will that I am talking about. This violence on oneself is felt sharply, acutely, but in the resort to this violence with the aim of breaking oneself and being in complete agreement with the party is expressed the essence of the real, convinced Bolshevik-Communist… I have heard the following form of reasoning… It (the party) can be cruelly mistaken, for example, in considering black that which is in reality clearly and unquestionably white… To all those who put this example to me, I say: yes, I will consider black that which I considered and which might appear to me to be white, since for me there is no life outside the party and outside agreement with it.’”[[510]](#footnote-510)

For the Bolsheviks, anyone who was not with them was against them. We see this, for example, in the attitude to Freemasonry adopted by the Fourth Congress of the Comintern in December, 1922. Now the French Communist Party, which was applying to join the Comintern, was filled with Masons from the Grand Orient and other Masonic lodges. In spite of the impeccable revolutionary credentials of the Grand Orient, this was unacceptable to Trotsky because of its bourgeois origins. “With the crudity natural to him,” writes O.F. Soloviev, Trotsky demanded a thorough purge or “shaking” of the higher ranks of the party. For, as he said, “there is no doubt that they hide their communism there, just as they hide their Freemasonry in our midst”.[[511]](#footnote-511)

The philosopher Ivan Alexandrovich Ilyin wrote of the Bolsheviks: “It was necessary to help, serve, be useful, carry out all demands, even the most disgusting, dishonourable, humiliating and treacherous. One had either to go to one’s death as a hero-confessor, or become a evil-doer ready for anything: denounce one’s father and mother, destroy whole nests of innocent people, betray friends, openly demand the death penalty for honourable and courageous patriots (as did, for example, the artist Kachalov on the radio), carry out provocative acts, simulate views that one did not have and which one despised, propagandize atheism, teach the most idiotic theories from the lecture-stand, believe in intentional, shameless lies, and flatter unceasingly, shamelessly flatter small ‘dictators’ and big tyrants…

“In a word, the choice was and has remained to the present day simple and unambiguous: heroism and a martyric death, or enslavement and complicity.”[[512]](#footnote-512)

Having completely surrendered their minds and wills to the party, much as the Jesuits surrendered their minds and wills to the Pope (Chernov compared Lenin to Torquemada), the Bolsheviks were able to proceed to violence and bloodshed on a scale that far exceeded the Inquisition or any previous tyranny in the history of the world, casting aside the restraint of any and every morality. Thus Lenin called for “mass terror against the kulaks, priests and White Guards”. And Trotsky said: “We must put an end, once and for all, to the papist-Quaker babble about the sanctity of human life”.[[513]](#footnote-513) Again, Gregory Zinoviev said: “To overcome our enemies we must have our own socialist militarism. We must carry along with us 90 million out of the 100 million of Soviet Russia’s population. As for the rest, we have nothing to say to them. They must be annihilated…”[[514]](#footnote-514) Again, the first issue of the Kiev Cheka, *Krasnij Mech* (The Red Sword) for 1918 proclaimed: “We reject the old systems of morality and ‘humanity’ invented by the bourgeoisie to oppress and exploit the ‘lower classes’. Our morality has no precedent, and our humanity is absolute because it rests on a new ideal. Our aim is to destroy all forms of oppression and violence. To us, everything is permitted, for we are the first to raise the sword not to oppress races and reduce them to slavery, but to liberate humanity from its shackles… Blood? Let blood flow like water! Let blood stain forever the black pirate’s flag flown by the bourgeoisie, and let our flag be blood-red forever! For only through the death of the old world can we liberate ourselves from the return of those jackals!”[[515]](#footnote-515)

In view of the fact that communism is by a wide margin the most bloodthirsty movement in human history, having already killed hundreds of millions of people worldwide (and we are still counting in North Korea especially), it is necessary to say a few words about this aspect of its activity, which cannot be understood by reference to its ideology – which in any case was closer to Bakunin’s anarchism than Marx’s materialism.[[516]](#footnote-516)

According to Lebedev, the essence of the movement was “*devil-worshipping*. For the blood it sheds is always ritualistic, it is a sacrifice to demons. As St. John Chrysostom wrote: ‘It is a habit among the demons that when men give Divine *worship* to them with the stench and smoke of blood, they, like bloodthirsty and insatiable dogs, *remain in those places* for eating and enjoyment.’ It is from such bloody sacrifices that the Satanists receive those demonic *energies* which are so necessary to them in their struggle for power or for the sake of its preservation. It is precisely here that we decipher the enigma: the strange bloodthirstiness of all, without exception all, revolutions, and of the whole of the regime of the Bolsheviks from 1917 to 1953.”[[517]](#footnote-517)

That communism, a supposedly “scientific” and atheist doctrine, should be compared to devil-worshipping may at first seem strange. And yet closer study of communist history confirms this verdict. The communists’ extraordinary hatred of God and Christians, and indeed of mankind in general, can only be explained by demon-possession – more precisely, by an unconscious compulsion to bring blood-sacrifices to the devil, who was, in Christ’s words, “a murderer from the beginning” (John 8.44)…

The trigger of this demonic bacchanalia, in the firm conviction of the truly Orthodox Church, was the rejection by most of Orthodox Russia, and of the Orthodox world in general, of the person and idea of the Orthodox Autocracy, “he who restrains” the coming of the Antichrist.

Thus “in October 1917,” writes Lebedev, “a satanic sect came to power in Russia that formed a secret conspiracy within the communist party (of the Bolsheviks). The threads leading to the centre of this sect’s administration went far beyond the ocean… At the base of this organization there lay the Masonic principle of many-levelled initiation. Thus ordinary communists knew absolutely nothing about the real aims of their leaders, while those, in their turn, did not know the aims of the ‘high-ups’… Thus the RCP(B)-CPSU was a party-werewolf from the beginning: it was one thing in its words, its slogans, its declarations and its official teaching of Marxism-Leninism, but in fact it was completely the opposite. This party created a state-werewolf in its image and likeness: according to the constitution, the law and its official decrees it was one thing, but in essence, in spirit and in works it was something completely different!

“There has never been any such thing in the history of humanity! There have been cruel, unjust or lying rulers, whose works did not accord with their words. But never have there been rulers, or governments, which set as their aim the annihilation of a people and a people’s economy that came into their possession! But this is precisely what they began to do in Russia.

“There are now various estimates of the victims of the Bolshevik regime (higher and lower). It goes without saying that it is impossible to establish exact figures. We have tried to take a middle course. And according to such middling estimates, from 1917 to 1945 in one way or another (through shooting, camps and prisons, the two famines of the beginning of the 1920s and 1930s, the deliberately ‘Pyrrhic’ victories in the Second World War) up to 80 million Great Russians only were annihilated (not counting Ukrainians, Belorussians and other nationalities of the former Russian empire). In all, up to 100 million. From 1917 to 1926 20 million were simply shot. We must think that from 1927 to 1937 not less than 10 million. Under ‘collectivization’ 4 million were immediately shot. So that out of the 80 million who perished by 1945 about 30-40 million were simply executed. These figures could not have been made up of political enemies, representatives of the ‘former ones’ (landowners and capitalists), nor of ‘their own’, that is, those communists who for some reason or other became unsuitable. All these together constituted only a small percentage of those who perished. The main mass – tens of millions – were the ‘simple’ Russian People, that is, all the firmly believing Orthodox people who, even if they did not oppose the new power, could not be re-educated and re-persuaded… These were simple peasants and town-dwellers, who in spite of everything kept the Orthodox faith. And these were the overwhelming majority of the Russian People. Among them, of course, there perished the overwhelming majority of the clergy and monastics (by 1941 100,000 clergy and 205 bishops had been annihilated).

“At the same time, from 1917 to 1945, from the offspring of the off-scourings of the people, but also from unfortunate fellow-travellers for whom self-preservation was higher than all truths and principles, a new people grew up – the ‘Soviet’ people, or ‘Sovki’, as we now call ourselves. From 1918 children in schools no longer learned the Law of God, but learned atheist filthy thinking (and it is like that to the present day). After 1945 it was mainly this new, ‘Soviet’ people that remained alive. Individual representatives of the former Russian, that is, Orthodox People who survived by chance constituted such a tiny number that one could ignore them, since they could no longer become the basis of the regeneration of the true, real Rus’…”[[518]](#footnote-518)

Some will quarrel with some details of this analysis. Thus Lebedev’s figures for those killed count among the higher estimates.[[519]](#footnote-519) Again, already in the 1920s and 1930s a larger proportion of the population was probably genuinely Soviet and anti-Orthodox than Lebedev admits, while more genuinely Russian and Orthodox people survived into the post-war period. Nevertheless, his words have been quoted here because their *main* message about the Russian revolution is *true*. Too often commentators in both East and West have tried to push the Russian revolution into the frame of “ordinary” history, grossly underestimating the unprecedented scale of the tragedy – and its anti-Russian nature.

The fact is that the Russian revolution brought to an end the Christian period of history, characterized by mainly monarchical governments ruling – or, at any rate, claiming to rule – by Christian principles, and ushered in the Age of the Antichrist…

## **74. THE RUSSIAN-JEWISH ANTICHRIST**

The terms “Antichrist” and “The Age of the Antichrist” need to be defined. St. John of Damascus writes: “Everyone who confesses not that the Son of God came in the flesh and is perfect God, and became perfect man after being God, is Antichrist (I John 2.18, 22; 4.3). But in a peculiar and special sense he who comes at the consummation of the age is called Antichrist. First, then, it is requisite that the Gospel should be preached among all nations, as the Lord said (Matthew 24.14), and then he will come to refute the impious Jews.”[[520]](#footnote-520)

Archimandrite Justin (Popovich) writes: “The Antichrist will be, as it were, an incarnation of the devil, for Christ is the incarnation of God. The Antichrist will be the personification of evil, hatred, lying, pride and unrighteousness, for Christ is the personification of goodness, love, truth, humility and righteousness. Such will be the chief Antichrist, who will appear before the Second Coming of the Lord Christ, and will stand in the place of God and proclaim himself to be God (whom He will destroy at His glorious Second Coming with the breath of His mouth (II Thessalonians 2.4)). But before him there will be forerunners, innumerable antichrists. For an antichrist is every one who wishes to take the place of Christ; an antichrist is every one who wishes, in place of the truth of Christ, to place his own truth, in place of the righteousness of Christ – his own righteousness, in place of the love of Christ – his own love, in place of the Goodness of Christ – his own goodness, in place of the Gospel of Christ – his own gospel…

“In what does his main lie consist? In the rejection of the God-Man Christ, in the affirmation that Jesus is not God, not the Messiah=Christ, not the Saviour. Therefore this is the work of the Antichrist. The main deceiver in the world is the devil, and with him – the Antichrist. It goes without saying that a deceiver is every one who in anyway rejects that Jesus is God, the Messiah, the Saviour. This is the main lie in the world, and all the rest either proceeds from it, or is on the way to it.”[[521]](#footnote-521)

So anyone who rejects the Divinity of Christ is an antichrist, while the Antichrist, or the chief Antichrist, will appear as an evil world-ruler towards the end of the world. In the first sense, of course, there have been multitudes of antichrists long before 1917. As the Holy Apostle John said already in the first century: “Children, it is the last times, and as you have heard that the Antichrist will come, so even now there are many antichrists” (I John 2.18). As for the Antichrist, he has not appeared yet. So in what sense could the Antichrist be said to have appeared in the period surveyed in this book?

In order to answer this question we need to turn to a prophecy of the Holy Apostle Paul concerning the Antichrist: “You know what is restraining his appearance in his time. The mystery of iniquity is already at work: only he who restrains will continue to restrain until he is removed from the midst. And then the lawless one will be revealed”(II Thessalonians 2.6-8). Now the unanimous teaching of the Early Church, as of more recent commentators such as St. Theophan the Recluse, is that “he who restrains” is *the Roman emperor,* or, more generally, *all legitimate State power on the Roman model.* In the pre-revolutionary period this legitimate State power was incarnated especially in the Russian Tsar, the last Orthodox Christian Emperor, whose empire was known as “the Third Rome”. Thus his “removal from the midst” would be followed, according to the prophecy, by the appearance of the Antichrist.

Now in 1905 the Tsar’s October Manifesto, which significantly limited his autocratic power and therefore his ability to restrain “the mystery of iniquity”, or the revolution, was followed *immediately* by the appearance of the St. Petersburg Soviet led by Lev Trotsky. In March, 1917, when the Tsar abdicated, the Soviets again appeared *immediately*, and in October they won supreme power in the country. The Church had existed without a Christian Emperor in the first centuries of her existence, and she would continue to do so after 1917. Nevertheless, “from the day of his abdication,” as St. John Maximovich writes, “everything began to collapse. It could not have been otherwise. The one who united everything, who stood guard for the truth, was overthrown.”[[522]](#footnote-522) So if we expect the Antichrist to appear after the removal of “him who restrains”, the Orthodox emperor, then the significance of the appearance of Soviet power under the leadership of Lenin immediately after the removal of the tsar is obvious. Of course, it is also obvious that neither Lenin nor Stalin was *the* Antichrist for the simple reason that the Antichrist, according to all the prophecies, will be a Jewish king who claims to be the Messiah and God, whereas Lenin was not only or not mainly Jewish (although most of his leading followers were Jewish), but also an atheist and an enemy of all religions, including the Jewish one. Moreover, the Soviet Antichrist was not the only Beast in this period. Whether in imitation of him, or in reaction to him, but using essentially the same methods, a number of Antichrist tyrants appeared around the world.

This phenomenon, which encompassed Italian and Nazi Fascism as well as Leninist Communism, has been called “totalitarianism”. The term was first invented in 1923, as Richard Pipes explains, “by an opponent of Mussolini, Giovanni Amendola (later murdered by the Fascists), who, having observed Mussolini’s systematic subversion of state institutions, concluded that his regime suffered fundamentally from conventional dictatorships. In 1925, Mussolini [originally a socialist and an admirer of Lenin] adopted the term and assigned it a positive meaning. He defined Fascism as ‘totalitarian’ in the sense that it politicized everything ‘human’ as well as ‘spiritual’: ‘Everything within the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state’.”[[523]](#footnote-523)

The term has received criticism, but seems to us to be a more or less accurate characterization. For what all these Antichrists had in common was a desire to possess *the totality* of man. For those living under one of the totalitarian dictators of the twentieth century there was no private space they could retreat to in order to get away from the pressure of public politics. *Everything* – politics, religion, science, art, even personal relationships – came under the scrutiny of the totalitarianism in question, and was subject to its unprecedentedly harsh power…

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The February revolution of 1917 brought only harm and destruction to the Russian population. However, it was different for the Jews: “Jewish society in Russia received in full from the February revolution everything that it had fought for, and the October coup was really not needed by it, except that cutthroat part of the Jewish secular youth that with its Russian brother-internationalists had stacked up a charge of hatred for the Russian state structure and was rearing to ‘deepen’ the revolution.” It was they who through their control of the Executive Committee of the Soviet – over half of its members were Jewish socialists – assumed the real power after February, and propelled it on – contrary to the interests, not only of the Russian, but also of the majority Jewish population, - to the October revolution.[[524]](#footnote-524)

Nevertheless, at the time of the October revolution only a minority of the Jews were Bolsheviks (in the early 1900s they constituted 19% of the party). “At the elections to the Constituent Assembly ‘more than 80% of the Jewish population of Russia voted’ for Zionist parties. Lenin wrote that 550,000 were for Jewish nationalists. ‘The majority of the Jewish parties formed a single national list, in accordance with which seven deputies were elected – six Zionists’ and Gruzenberg. ‘The success of the Zionists’ was also aided by the [published not long before the elections] Declaration of the English Foreign Minister Balfour [on the creation of a ‘national centre’ of the Jews in Palestine], ‘which was met by the majority of the Russian Jewish population with enthusiasm’.”[[525]](#footnote-525) In Moscow, Petrograd, Odessa, Kiev and many other cities there were festive manifestations, meetings and religious services.

The unprecedented catastrophe of the Russian revolution required an explanation… For very many this lay in the coming to power of the Jews, and their hatred for the Russian people. However, Archbishop Andrew of Ufa, the future hieromartyr, wrote: “In defence of the Russian people, they try to say that the people have been confused by the Jews, or deceived by their own leaders... A bad excuse! It's a fine people and a fine Christian religious disposition that can be confused by any rogue that comes along!...”

Nevertheless, that the revolution brought power to the Jews, who had been plotting against the Russian state for decades, if not centuries, is undeniable. The removal of “him who restrains” had enthroned, if not *a Jew, the* (personal) *Antichrist*, at any rate, *the Jews* and *a* (collective) *Antichrist.* Thus according to Donald Rayfield, in 1922, the Jews “reached their maximum representation in the party (not that they formed a coherent group) when, at 15 per cent, they were second only to ethnic Russians with 65 per cent.”[[526]](#footnote-526)

But it was in the *higher reaches* of the Party and Government that Jewish dominance was so striking. Douglas Reed writes: “The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, which wielded the supreme power, contained 3 Russians (including Lenin) and 9 Jews. The next body in importance, the Central Committee of the Executive Commission (or secret police) comprised 42 Jews and 19 Russians, Letts, Georgians and others. The Council of People’s Commissars consisted of 17 Jews and five others. The Moscow Che-ka (secret police) was formed of 23 Jews and 13 others. Among the names of 556 high officials of the Bolshevik state officially published in 1918-1919 were 458 Jews and 108 others. Among the central committees of small, supposedly ‘Socialist’ or other non-Communist parties… were 55 Jews and 6 others.”[[527]](#footnote-527)

Richard Pipes admits: “Jews undeniably played in the Bolshevik Party and the early Soviet apparatus a role disproportionate to their share of the population. The number of Jews active in Communism in Russia and abroad was striking: in Hungary, for example, they furnished 95 percent of the leading figures in Bela Kun’s dictatorship. They also were disproportionately represented among Communists in Germany and Austria during the revolutionary upheavals there in 1918-23, and in the apparatus of the Communist International.”[[528]](#footnote-528)

The London *Times* correspondent in Russia, Robert Wilton, reported: ”Taken according to numbers of population, the Jews represented *one* in ten; among the commissars that rule Bolshevik Russia they are *nine* in ten; if anything the proportion of Jews is still greater.”[[529]](#footnote-529)

On June 9, 1919 Captain Montgomery Shuyler of the American Expeditionary Forces telegrammed from Vladivostok on the makeup of the presiding Soviet government: “… (T)here were 384 ‘commissars’ including 2 negroes, 13 Russians, 15 Chinamen, 22 Armenians, and more than 300 Jews. Of the latter number, 264 had come to Russia from the United States since the downfall of the Imperial Government.”[[530]](#footnote-530)

The Jews were especially dominant in the most feared and blood-thirsty part of the Bolshevik State apparatus, the Cheka, which, writes Brendon, “consisted of 250,000 officers (including 100,000 border guards), a remarkable adjunct to a State which was supposed to be withering away. In the first 6 years of Bolshevik rule it had executed at least 200,000. Moreover, the Cheka was empowered to act as ‘policeman, gaoler, investigator, prosecutor, judge and executioner’. It also employed barbaric forms of torture.”[[531]](#footnote-531)

So complete was the Jewish domination of Russia as a result of the revolution that it is a misnomer to speak about the “Russian” revolution; it should more accurately be called the Russian-Jewish revolution.That the Russian revolution was actually a *Jewish* revolution, but at the same time part of an *international* revolution of Jewry against the Christian and Muslim worlds, is indicated by an article by Jacob de Haas entitled “The Jewish Revolution” and published in the London Zionist journal *Maccabee* in November, 1905: “The Revolution in Russia is a Jewish revolution, for it is a turning point in Jewish history. This situation flows from the fact that Russia is the fatherland of approximately half of the general number of Jews inhabiting the world… The overthrow of the despotic government must exert a huge influence on the destinies of millions of Jews (both in Russia and abroad). Besides, the revolution in Russia is a Jewish revolution also because the Jews are the most active revolutionaries in the tsarist Empire.”

But what was it in their upbringing and history that led them to adopt the atheist revolutionary teachings of Russia’s “superfluous young men” more ardently than the Russians themselves? Hatred of Christ was, of course, deeply imbedded in the Talmud. But the angry young men that began killing thousands of the Tsar’s servants even before the revolution of 1905, had rejected the Talmud as well as the Gospel, and even all religion in general.

Donald Rayfield writes: “The motivation of those Jews who worked for the Cheka was not Zionist or ethnic. The war between the Cheka and the Russian bourgeoisie was not even purely a war of classes or political factions. It can be seen as being between Jewish internationalism and the remnants of a Russian national culture…

“…What was Jewish except lineage about Bolsheviks like Zinoviev, Trotsky, Kamenev or Sverdlov? Some were second- or even third-generation renegades; few even spoke Yiddish, let alone knew Hebrew. They were by upbringing Russians accustomed to a European way of life and values, Jewish only in the superficial sense that, say, Karl Marx was. Jews in anti-Semitic Tsarist Russia had few ways out of the ghetto except emigration, education or revolution, and the latter two courses meant denying their Judaism by joining often anti-Jewish institutions and groups.”[[532]](#footnote-532)

This can be seen in the deathbed confession of the Tsar’s murderer, Yurovsky: “Our family suffered less from the constant hunger than from my father’s religious fanaticism… On holidays and regular days the children were forced to pray, and it is not surprising that my first active protest was against religious and nationalistic traditions. I came to hate God and prayer as I hated poverty and the bosses.”[[533]](#footnote-533)

At the same time, the Bolshevik Jews did appear to sympathize with Talmudism more than with any other religion. Thus in 1905, as we have seen, the Jewish revolutionaries in Kiev boasted that they would turn St. Sophia cathedral into a synagogue. Again, in 1918 they erected a monument to Judas Iscariot in Sviazhsk, and in 1919 - in Tambov![[534]](#footnote-534) And when the Whites reconquered Perm in 1918 they found many Jewish religious inscriptions both in the former Bolshevik headquarters – and on the walls of the basement of the Ipatiev House in Yekaterinburg where the Tsar and his family were shot.

The Danish writer Halling Keller was present at the unveiling of the monument to Judas in Sviazhsk. He wrote: “The local Soviet discussed to whom to raise a statue for a long time. It was thought that Lucifer did not completely share the idea of communism. Cain was too much of a legendary personality, so they decided on Judas Iscariot since he was a completely historical personality. They represented him at full height with his fist raised to heaven…” [[535]](#footnote-535)

While rejecting the Talmud and all religion, the revolutionaries did not reject the unconscious emotional energy of Talmudic Judaism, which was concentrated in a fiercely proud nationalism that was more passionately felt by virtue of the Jews having once truly been the chosen people of God. Having fallen away from that chosen status, and been scattered all over the world by the wrath of God, they resented their replacement by the Christian peoples with an especially intense resentment. *Roma delenda est* – Christian Rome had to be destroyed, and Russia as “The Third Rome”, the Rome that now reigned, had to be destroyed first of all. The atheist revolutionaries of the younger generation took over this resentment and hatred even while rejecting its religio-nationalist-historical basis…

L.A. Tikhomirov wrote: “It is now already for nineteen centuries that we have been hearing from Jewish thinkers that the religious essence of Israel consists not in a concept about God, but in the fulfilment of the Law. Above were cited such witnesses from Judas Galevy. The very authoritative Ilya del Medigo (15th century) in his notable *Test of Faith* says that ‘Judaism is founded not on religious dogma, but on religious acts’.

“But religious acts are, in essence, those that are prescribed by the Law. That means: if you want to be moral, carry out the Law. M. Mendelsohn formulates the idea of Jewry in the same way: ‘Judaism is not a revealed religion, but a revealed Law. It does not say ‘you must believe’, but ‘you must act’. In this constitution given by God the State and religion are one. The relationships of man to God and society are merged. It is not lack of faith or heresy that attracts punishment, but the violation of the civil order. Judaism gives no obligatory dogmas and recognizes the freedom of inner conviction.’

“Christianity says: you must believe in such-and-such a truth and on the basis of that you must do such-and-such. New Judaism says: you can believe as you like, but you have to do such-and-such. But this is a point of view that annihilates man as a moral personality…”[[536]](#footnote-536)

Thus Talmudism creates a personality that subjects faith and truth to the imperative of *action*. That is, it is the action that is first proclaimed as necessary – the reasons for doing it can be thought up later. And this corresponded exactly both to the philosophy of Marx, for whom “the truth, i.e. the reality and power, of thought must be demonstrated *in action*”[[537]](#footnote-537), and to the psychological type of the revolutionary, who first proclaimed that Russia had to be destroyed, and then looked for an ideology that would justify its destruction. Talmudic Law was useful, indeed necessary, not because it proclaimed God’s truth, but in order to secure the solidarity of the Jewish people and their subjection to their rabbinic leaders. In the same way, Marxist theory was necessary, not because it was true, but only in order to unite adherents, expel dissidents and in general justify the violent overthrow of the old system.

This point has been well developed by Richard Pipes: “Important as ideology was,… its role in the shaping of Communist Russia must not be exaggerated. If any individual or a group profess certain beliefs and refer to them to guide their conduct, they may be said to act under the influence of ideas. When, however, ideas are used not so much to direct one’s personal conduct as to justify one’s domination over others, whether by persuasion of force, the issue becomes confused, because it is not possible to determine whether such persuasion or force serves ideas or, on the contrary, ideas serve to secure or legitimize such domination. In the case of the Bolsheviks, there are strong grounds for maintaining the latter to be the case, because they distorted Marxism in every conceivable way, first to gain political power and then to hold on to it. If Marxism means anything it means two propositions: that as capitalist society matures it is doomed to collapse from inner contradictions, and that this collapse (‘revolution’) is effected by industrial labor (‘the proletariat’). A regime motivated by Marxist theory would at a minimum adhere to these two principles. What do we see in Soviet Russia? A ‘socialist revolution’ carried out in an economically underdeveloped country in which capitalism was still in its infancy, and power taken by a party committed to the view that the working class left to its own devices is unrevolutionary. Subsequently, at every stage of its history, the Communist regime in Russia did whatever it had to do to beat off challengers, without regard to Marxist doctrine, even as it cloaked its actions with Marxist slogans. Lenin succeeded precisely because he was free of the Marxist scruples that inhibited the Mensheviks. In view of these facts, ideology has to be treated as a subsidiary factor: an inspiration and a mode of thinking of the new ruling class, perhaps, but not a set of principles that either determined its actions or explains them to posterity. As a rule, the less one knows about the actual course of the Russian Revolution the more inclined one is to attribute a dominant influence to Marxism…” [[538]](#footnote-538)

So the Russian revolution was Jewish not so much because of the ethnic composition of its leaders as because the Satanic hatred of Christ and all Christians that is characteristic of Judaic Talmudism throughout its history was transferred – as Moses Hess, the teacher of Marx, had planned in his famous book, *The Revival of Israel: Rome and Jerusalem: The Last National Question* (1862) – from the nationalist Talmudic fathers to their internationalist atheist sons.

## **75. THE RESTORATION OF THE PATRIARCHATE**

On August 15, 1917 the Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church convened; 564 delegates, including 299 laymen, assembled in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow. On the one hand, the delegates included such open Freemasons as Lvov. On the other, it excluded such pious hierarchs as Metropolitan Macarius of Moscow because of his monarchist views.

However, in spite of this and other flaws, this was the first Council in the history of the Russian Church since 1682, and was to be a critical point of repose, refreshment and regrouping for the Church before the terrible trials that awaited her. It coincided with the fall of the Provisional Government and the Bolshevik coup, the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the beginning of the Civil War. On all these events it made declarations that expressed the opinion of Orthodox Russia. In a real sense, it was the voice of Russia – or, at any rate, of that part of the population that had not yet been engulfed by the revolutionary frenzy. As for the Bolsheviks, whose decrees with regard to the Church were either ignored or outrightly defied by the Council, they made no serious attempt to impede its work before closing it down on September 20, 1918…

At the beginning, however, there was little sign that more than a minority of the delegates understood the full apocalyptic significance of the events they were living through. On August 24, and again on October 20, the Council issued statements condemning the violence, theft and sacrilege against churches, monasteries and priests that had been increasing ever since February. Thus Metropolitan Tikhon, the future Patriarch, said: “Look! Her unfortunate, maddened children are tormenting our dear mother, your native Rus’, they are trying to tear her to pieces, they wish to take away her hallowed treasure – the Orthodox Faith. They defame your Father-Tsar, they destroy His portraits, they disparage his Imperial decrees, and mock him. Can your heart be calm before this, O Russian man? Again ask of your conscience. It will remind you of your truly loyal oath. It will say to you – be a loving son of your native land” [[539]](#footnote-539)

But in general revolutionary sentiment was dominant. Thus according to Princess Urusova, the Council even decreed that there should be no discussion of “politics” – that is, no condemnation of the revolution. Instead property questions were discussed. But then a professor from Belorussia said: “We should not be discussing these questions now! Russia is perishing, the throne is mocked. Without an Anointed of God, an Orthodox Tsar, she will soon fall under the power of darkness.” But he could not continue his speech since he had touched on “politics”…[[540]](#footnote-540)

Few were those who alluded to the primary cause of the general moral degradation: the nation’s – and the Synod’s – betrayal of the Tsar and Tsarism. “I have long asked myself,” writes N. Kusakov, “why did the council not demand of the Provisional Government the immediate release of the Royal Family from under guard? Why did Metropolitan Pitirim of Petrograd and Metropolitan Macarius of Moscow remain in prison under the Provisional Government during the days of the Council? The cold breath of February blew in the corridors of the Council…”[[541]](#footnote-541)

On October 21, during Vespers in the Dormition cathedral of the Kremlin, two people dressed in soldiers’ uniforms went up to the shrine and relics of St. Hermogen, Patriarch of Moscow, threw off the covers and began to remove the vestments. When taken to the commissariat, they told the police that “now there is freedom and everyone can do anything he wants”. Three days later a penitential *moleben* was carried out in front of the shrine. The next day, the October revolution took place. St. Hermogen, who been canonized by the Church only a few years before, was notable for his refusal to recognize the government of the False Demetrius, and for his call to the nation to rise up in arms against it. For those with eyes to see, the incident at his shrine just before the Bolshevik coup was a sign that the time had come to act in his spirit, against another false or anti-government.

The Council seemed to understand this, for after the Bolsheviks came to power on October 25, a new spirit of defiance began to prevail in it, especially after the Bolsheviks dispersed the Constituent Assembly in January. Metropolitan Eulogius of Paris described the change thus: “Russian life in those days was like a sea tossed by the storm of revolution. Church life had fallen into a state of disorganization. The external appearance of the Council, because of the diversity of its composition, its irreconcilability and the mutual hostility of its different tendencies and states of mind, was at first matter for anxiety and sadness and even seemed to constitute a cause for apprehension… Some members of the Council had already been carried away by the wave of revolution. The intelligentsia, peasants, workers and professors all tended irresistibly to the left. Among the clergy there were also different elements. Some of them proved to be ‘leftist’ participants of the previous revolutionary Moscow Diocesan Congress, who stood for a thorough and many-sided reform of church life. Disunion, disorder, dissatisfaction, even mutual distrust… – such was the state of the Council at first. But – O miracle of God! – everything began gradually to change… The disorderly assembly, moved by the revolution and in contact with its sombre elements, began to change into something like a harmonious whole, showing external order and internal solidarity. People became peaceable and serious in their tasks and began to feel differently and to look on things in a different way. This process of prayerful regeneration was evident to every observant eye and perceptible to every participant in the Council. A spirit of peace, renewal and unanimity inspired us all…”[[542]](#footnote-542)

The first important decision of the Council was the restoration of the Patriarchate in November, 1917 through the election of Metropolitan Tikhon of Moscow as Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia. This was a profoundly conservative act, a recreation of one of the major institutions of Muscovite Russia that Peter the Great had destroyed, at a time when open war had just been proclaimed on the whole of the Russian past. Through it the wish of one of the peasant delegates was fulfilled: “We have a tsar no more; no father whom we love. It is impossible to love a synod; and therefore we, the peasants, want a Patriarch.” Archbishop Hilarion (Troitsky) triumphantly declared: “The eagle of Petrine autocracy, shaped in imitation of the West, tore asunder the Patriarchate, that sacred heart of Russian Orthodoxy. The sacrilegious hand of the impious Peter pulled down the senior hierarch of the Russian Church from his traditional seat in the Dormition Cathedral. The Council, by the authority given it by God, has once more placed the patriarch of Moscow in the chair, which belongs to him by inalienable right.”[[543]](#footnote-543)

Some wondered: what could a patriarch do that the senior member of the Holy Synod could not do? Was he not simply a first among equals? This was true: the patriarchate in Orthodoxy is not a kind of eastern papism, or fourth level of the priesthood. However, this objection failed to take into account the need of the Orthodox people at that time to have a clear leader; and if it could not be the Tsar, it would have to be a patriarch. As Archimandrite Luke writes: “The idea that a Patriarch would replace the Tsar (especially after his execution) was not absent from the delegates’ understanding. ‘The proponents for the scheme to re-establish the Patriarchate emphasized the fact that “the state desired to be non-confessional, openly severing its alliance with the church”, and consequently the Church “must become militant and have its own spiritual leader”’. ‘Somehow the thought of Patriarch became associated with that of Tsar, while those opposed to the reestablishment of the Patriarchate brought forward democratic and republican principles.’”[[544]](#footnote-544)

Metropolitan Tikhon was enthroned on November 21 in the Kremlin Dormition cathedral to the sound of rifle fire from the battle for Moscow outside. With his enthronement, as Sergius Firsov writes, “an historical event took place – the Orthodox Church received its canonical head, whose voice had not been heard for a whole 217 years. Not only formally, but effectively this was the closing of the last page in the history of the Synodal period.”[[545]](#footnote-545)

According to the new constitution of the Russian Church agreed at the Council, the Church’s supreme organ was the Sacred All-Russian Council, composed of bishops, clergy and laity, which was to be periodically convoked by the Patriarch but to which the Patriarch himself was responsible. Between Councils, the Patriarch administered the Church with the aid of two permanent bodies: the Synod of Bishops, and the Higher Church Council, on which parish clergy and laity could sit. Questions relating to theology, religious discipline and ecclesiastical administration were to be the prerogative of the Synod of Bishops, while secular-juridical, charity and other church-related social questions were to be the prerogative of the Higher Church Council. On December 7 the Holy Synod was elected, and on December 8 – the Higher Church Council.

On January 25, the Council heard that Metropolitan Vladimir of Kiev had been murdered by the Bolsheviks. These events concentrated minds on the danger the Patriarch was in; and on the same day the Council immediately passed a resolution entrusting him with the drawing up of the names of three men who could serve as *locum tenentes* of the Patriarch in the event of his death and before the election of a new Patriarch. These names were to be kept secret - on February 3/16 Prince Trubestkoy said that there had been “a closed session of the Council” to discuss this question, and that “it was decreed that the whole fullness of the rights of the Patriarch should pass to the locum tenens”, and that “it is not fitting to speak about all the motivation behind the decision taken in an open session”.[[546]](#footnote-546)

The Patriarch’s will was revised by him towards the end of 1924, and was published only after his death in 1925. It was read out in the presence of sixty hierarchs and declared: “In the event of our death our patriarchal rights and obligations, until the canonical election of a new Patriarch, we grant temporarily to his Eminence Metropolitan Cyril (Smirnov). In the event of the impossibility, by reason of whatever circumstances, of his entering upon the exercise of the indicated rights and obligations, they will pass to his Eminence Metropolitan Agathangel (Preobrazhensky). If this metropolitan, too, does not succeed in accomplishing this, then our patriarchal rights and obligations will pass to his Eminence Peter (Polyansky), Metropolitan of Krutitsa.”

Since both Metropolitans Cyril and Agathangelus were in exile at the time of the Patriarch’s death, Metropolitan Peter became the patriarchal *locum tenens*… Tikhon’s choice turned out to be inspired, although Metropolitan Peter was not well known at the time of the Council. As Regelson comments: “That the first-hierarchical authority in the Russian Church after the death of Patriarch Tikhon was able to be preserved was thanks only to the fact that one of the patriarchal *locum tenentes* Patriarch Tikhon chose in 1918 was Metropolitan Peter, who at the moment of the choice was only a servant of the Synod! Many hierarchs were amazed and disturbed by his subsequent swift ‘career’, which changed him in the course of six years into the metropolitan of Krutitsa and Kolomna… But it was precisely thanks to the extraordinary nature of his destiny that he turned out to be the only one chosen by the Patriarch (in actual fact, *chosen by the Council, as entrusted to the Patriarch*) who was left in freedom at the moment of the death of Patriarch Tikhon. It is difficult even to conjecture how complicated and, besides, tragic would have been the destiny of the Russian Church if the wise thought of the Council and the Patriarch had not been realized in life.”[[547]](#footnote-547)

## **76. THE ANATHEMATIZATION OF SOVIET POWER**

The second major decision of the Moscow Council of 1917-18 was the refusal to recognize the legitimacy of Soviet power. Already on the day after the coup, October 26, when Lenin nationalized all land, making the Church’s and parish priests’ property illegal, the Council addressed a letter to the faithful on November 11, calling the revolution “descended from the Antichrist and possessed by atheism”: “Open combat is fought against the Christian Faith, in opposition to all that is sacred, arrogantly abasing all that bears the name of God (II Thessalonians 2.4)… But no earthly kingdom founded on ungodliness can ever survive: it will perish from internal strife and party dissension. Thus, because of its frenzy of atheism, the State of Russia will fall… For those who use the sole foundation of their power in the coercion of the whole people by one class, no motherland or holy place exists. They have become traitors to the motherland and instigated an appalling betrayal of Russia and her true allies. But, to our grief, as yet no government has arisen which is sufficiently one with the people to deserve the blessing of the Orthodox Church. And such will not appear on Russian soil until we turn with agonizing prayer and tears of repentance to Him, without Whom we labour in vain to lay foundations…”[[548]](#footnote-548)

This recognition of the real nature of the revolution came none too early. On November 15, a Tver peasant, Michael Yefimovich Nikonov, wrote to the Council: “We think that the Most Holy Synod made an irreparable mistake when the bishops went to meet the revolution. We do not know the reasons for this. Was it for fear of the Jews? In accordance with the prompting of their heart, or for some laudable reasons? Whatever the reason, their act produced a great temptation in the believers, and not only in the Orthodox, but even among the Old Ritualists. Forgive me for touching on this question – it is not our business to judge that: this is a matter for the Council, I am only placing on view the judgement of the people. People are saying that by this act of the Synod many right-thinking people were led into error, and also many among the clergy. We could hardly believe our ears at what we heard at parish and deanery meetings. Spiritual fathers, tempted by the deception of freedom and equality, demanded that hierarchs they dislike be removed together with their sees, and that they should elect those whom they wanted. Readers demanded the same equality, so as not to be subject to their superiors. That is the absurdity we arrived at when we emphasized the satanic idea of the revolution. The Orthodox Russian people is convinced that the Most Holy Council in the interests of our holy mother, the Church, the Fatherland and Batyushka Tsar, should give over to anathema and curse all self-called persons and all traitors who trampled on their oath together with the satanic idea of the revolution. And the Most Holy Council will show to its flock who will take over the helm of administration in the great State. We suppose it must be he who is in prison [the Tsar], but if he does not want to rule over us traitors,… then let it indicate who is to accept the government of the State; that is only common sense. The act of Sacred Coronation and Anointing with holy oil of our tsars in the Dormition Cathedral [of the Moscow Kremlin] was no simple comedy. It was they who received from God the authority to rule the people, giving account to Him alone, and by no means a constitution or some kind of parliament of not quite decent people capable only of revolutionary arts and possessed by the love of power… Everything that I have written here is not my personal composition alone, but the voice of the Russian Orthodox people, the 100-million-strong village Russia in which I live.”[[549]](#footnote-549)

Many people were indeed disturbed by such questions as: had the Church betrayed the Tsar in March 1917? Were Christians guilty of breaking their oath to the Tsar by accepting the Provisional Government? Should the Church formally absolve the people of their oath to the Tsar? What about the oath of allegiance that the Russian people had made to the Romanov dynasty in 1613? Had the people fallen under the anathema-curse of the 1613 Council against all those who broke that allegiance?

The leadership of the Council passed consideration of these questions, together with Nikonov’s letter, to a subsection entitled “On Church Discipline”. This subsection had several meetings in the course of the next nine months, but came to no definite decisions…[[550]](#footnote-550)

The Council’s decree of December 2, “On the Legal Status of the Russian Orthodox Church”, ruled, on the one hand, that the State could issue no law relating to the Church without prior consultation with and approval by her, and on the other hand, that any decree and by-laws issued by the Orthodox Church that did not directly contradict state laws were to be systematically recognized by the State as legally binding. Church holidays were to remain state holidays, blasphemy and attempts to lure members of the Church away from her were to remain illegal, and schools of all levels organized and run by the Church were to be recognised by the State on a par with the secular schools. It is clear from this decree that the Church was determined to go Her own way in complete defiance of the so-called “authorities”.

On December 11 Lenin decreed that all Church schools be transferred to the Council of People’s Commissars. As a result, the Church was deprived of all its academies, seminaries, schools and all the property linked with them. Then, on December 18, ecclesiastical marriage was deprived of its legal status and civil marriage introduced in its place. The Church responded by declaring that civil marriages were sinful for Orthodox Christians…

As if to test the decree “On the Legal Status of the Russian Orthodox Church”, on January 13, Alexandra Kollontai, the People’s Commissar of Social Welfare (and Lenin’s mistress), sent a detachment of sailors to occupy the Alexander Nevsky monastery and turn it into a sanctuary for war invalids. They were met by an angry crowd of worshippers and in the struggle which followed one priest, Fr. Peter Skipetrov, was shot dead.[[551]](#footnote-551)

According to Orlando Figes, Lenin was not yet ready for a confrontation with the Church, but Kollontai’s actions forced his hand.[[552]](#footnote-552) On January 20 a law on freedom of conscience, later named the “Decree on the Separation of the Church from the State and of the School from the Church”, was passed (it was published three days later in *Izvestia*). This was the Bolsheviks’ fiercest attack yet on the Church. It forbade religious bodies from owning property (all property of religious organizations was declared to be the heritage of the people), from levying dues, from organizing into hierarchical organizations, and from teaching religion to persons under 18 years of age. Ecclesiastical and religious societies did not have the rights of a juridical person. The registering of marriages was to be done exclusively by the civil authorities. Thus, far from being a blow struck *for* freedom of conscience, it was, as the Council put it, a decree on freedom *from* conscience, and an excuse for large-scale pillaging of churches and murders, often in the most bestial manner.[[553]](#footnote-553)

Fr. Alexander Mazyrin points out that this decree in effect deprived the Church of its rights as a legal person. “This meant that *de jure* the Church ceased to exist as a single organization. Only local religious communities could exist in legal terms, the authorities signing with them agreements on the use of Church property. The Eighth Department of the People’s Commissariat of Justice, which was due to put into practice Lenin’s decree, was officially dubbed the ‘Liquidation’ Department. It was the elimination of the Church, not its legalization as a social institution, that was the aim pursued by the ‘people’s commissars’ government.”[[554]](#footnote-554)

As a result of the decree more than one thousand monasteries were “nationalized”...

On January 19 / February 1, Patriarch Tikhon, anticipating the decree, and even before the Council had reconvened[[555]](#footnote-555), issued his famous anathema against the Bolsheviks: “By the power given to Us by God, we forbid you to approach the Mysteries of Christ, we **anathematize** you, if only you bear Christian names and although by birth you belong to the Orthodox Church. We also adjure all of you, faithful children of the Orthodox Church of Christ, not to enter into any communion with such outcasts (*izgoiami*) of the human race: ‘Remove the evil one from among you’ (I Corinthians 5.13).” The decree ended with an appeal to defend the Church, if necessary, to the death. For “the gates of hell shall not prevail against Her” (Matthew 16.18). This anathema against the collective Antichrist was appropriately recorded as Act 66.6…[[556]](#footnote-556)

The significance of this anathema lies not so much in the casting out of the Bolsheviks themselves, as in the command to the faithful to have no communion with them. In other words, the government were to be regarded, not only as apostates from Christ (that was obvious), but also as having no moral authority, *no claim to obedience whatsoever* – an attitude taken by the Church to no other government in the whole of Her history.[[557]](#footnote-557) Coming so soon after the Bolsheviks’ dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, it indicated that now that constitutionalism had proved its uselessness in the face of demonic barbarism, it was time for the Church to enter the struggle in earnest…[[558]](#footnote-558)

It has been argued that the Patriarch’s decree did not anathematize Soviet power as such, but only those who were committing acts of violence and sacrilege against the Church. However, this argument fails to take into account several facts. First, the patriarch himself, in his declarations of June 16 and July 1, 1923, repented precisely of his “anathematization of Soviet power”.[[559]](#footnote-559) Secondly, even if the decree did not formally anathematize Soviet power as such, since Soviet power sanctioned and initiated the acts of violence, the faithful were in effect being exhorted to having nothing to do with it. And thirdly, in his Epistle to the Council of People’s Commissars on the first anniversary of the revolution, November 7, 1918, the Patriarch obliquely but clearly confirmed his non-recognition of Soviet power, saying: “It is not our business to make judgments about earthly authorities. Every power allowed by God would attract to itself Our blessing *if it were truly ‘the servant of God’, for the good of those subject to it, and were ‘terrible not for good works, but for evil’* (Romans 13.3,4). *But now to you, who have used authority for the persecution of the innocent,* We extend this Our word of exhortation… “[[560]](#footnote-560)

It was important that the true significance of the anathema for the Church’s relationship with the State be pointed out. This was done immediately after the proclamation of the anathema, when Count D.A. Olsufyev pointed out that at the *moleben* they had just sung ‘many years’ to the powers that be – that is, to the Bolsheviks whom they had just anathematized! “I understand that the Apostle called for obedience to all authorities – but hardly that ‘many years’ should be sung to them. I know that his ‘most pious and most autocratic’ [majesty] was replaced by ‘the right-believing Provisional Government’ of Kerensky and company… And I think that the time for unworthy compromises has passed.”[[561]](#footnote-561)

On January 22 / February 4 the Patriarch’s anathema was discussed in a session of the Council presided over by Metropolitan Arsenius of Novgorod, and the following resolution was accepted: “The Sacred Council of the Orthodox Russian Church welcomes with love the epistle of his Holiness Patriarch Tikhon, which punishes the evil-doers and rebukes the enemies of the Church of Christ. From the height of the patriarchal throne there has thundered the word of excommunication [*preshchenia*] and a spiritual sword has been raised against those who continually mock the faith and conscience of the people. The Sacred Council witnesses that it remains in the fullest union with the father and intercessor of the Russian Church, pays heed to his appeal and is ready in a sacrificial spirit to confess the Faith of Christ against her blasphemers. The Sacred Council calls on the whole of the Russian Church headed by her archpastors and pastors to unite now around the Patriarch, so as not to allow the mocking of our holy faith.” (Act 67.35-37).[[562]](#footnote-562)

Another source quotes the following response of the Council to the patriarch’s anathema: “The Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia in his epistle to the beloved in the Lord archpastors, pastors and all faithful children of the Orthodox Church of Christ has drawn the spiritual sword against the outcasts of the human race – the Bolsheviks, and anathematized them. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church adjures all her faithful children not to enter into any communion with these outcasts. For their satanic deeds they are cursed in this life and in the life to come. Orthodox! His Holiness the Patriarch has been given the right to bind and to loose according to the word of the Saviour… Do not destroy your souls, cease communion with the servants of Satan – the Bolsheviks. Parents, if your children are Bolsheviks, demand authoritatively that they renounce their errors, that they bring forth repentance for their eternal sin, and if they do not obey you, renounce them. Wives, if your husbands are Bolsheviks and stubbornly continue to serve Satan, leave your husbands, save yourselves and your children from the soul-destroying infection. An Orthodox Christian cannot have communion with the servants of the devil… Repent, and with burning prayer call for help from the Lord of Hosts and thrust away from yourselves ‘the hand of strangers’ – the age-old enemies of the Christian faith, who have declared themselves in self-appointed fashion ‘the people’s power’… If you do not obey the Church, you will not be her sons, but participants in the cruel and satanic deeds wrought by the open and secret enemies of Christian truth… Dare! Do not delay! Do not destroy your soul and hand it over to the devil and his stooges.”[[563]](#footnote-563)

One member of the Council said: “If the father, mother, brothers and sisters did not receive the returning evil-doer, but expelled him, saying: ‘You are a scoundrel, your hands are covered in blood, you are not our son, nor our brother,’ the disorders would cease.”[[564]](#footnote-564)

During the same session A.A. Vasiliev said: “We thank the Lord for giving us what we have been waiting for – that is, finally to hear the true Church voice of our Most Holy Father and Patriarch. For the first time in this year of disorder, a truly ecclesiastical word, a word spoken with regard to the events about which nothing has been said up to now. And a pastoral judgement delivered on all those who are guilty of these events… Our Christian conscience must suggest to each of us what concessions he can and cannot make, and when he must lay down his life for the truth. People are puzzled about precisely who is subject to this ban that his Holiness the Patriarch speaks about in his epistle. After all, it is not just since yesterday, and not since the coming of the Bolsheviks, that we have been experiencing a real satanic attack on the Church of Christ, these fratricides, fights and mutual hatred. At the very beginning of the revolution the authorities carried out an act of apostasy from God (voices: “Right!”). Prayer was banned in the armies, banners with the cross of Christ were replaced by red rags. It is not only the present powers that be that are guilty of this, but also those who have already departed from the scene. We shall continue to hope that the present rulers also, who are now shedding blood, will depart from the scene.”[[565]](#footnote-565)

Then Fr. Vladimir Vostokov spoke: “In this hall too much has been said about the terrible things that have been suffered, and if we were to list and describe them all, it this huge hall would be filled with books. So I am not going to speak about the horrors. I want to point to the root from which these horrors have been created. I understand this present assembly of ours as a spiritual council of doctors consulting over our dangerously ill mother, our homeland. When doctors come up to treat a sick person, they do not stop at the latest manifestations of the illness, but they look deeper, they investigate the root cause of the illness. So in the given case it is necessary to reveal the root of the illness that the homeland is suffering. From this platform, before the enlightener of Russia, the holy Prince Vladimir, I witness to my priestly conscience that the Russian people is being deceived, and that up to this time no-one has told them the whole truth. The moment has come when the Council, as the only gathering that is lawful and truly elected by the people must tell the people the holy truth, fearing nobody except God Himself…

“The derailing of the train of history took place at the end of February, 1917; it was aided first of all by the Jewish-Masonic global organization, which cast into the masses the slogans of socialism, the slogans of a mythical freedom… So much has been said here about the terrors brought upon the country by Bolshevism. But what is Bolshevism? – the natural and logical development of Socialism. And Socialism is – that antichristian movement which in the final analysis produces Bolshevism as its highest development and which engenders those phenomena completely contrary to the principles of Christian asceticism that we are living through now.

“Unfortunately, many of our professors and writers have arrayed Socialism in beautiful clothes, calling it similar to Christianity, and thereby they together with the agitators of revolution have led the uneducated people into error. Fathers and brothers! What fruits did we expect of Socialism, when we not only did not fight against it, but also defended it at times, or almost always were shyly silent before its contagion? We must serve the Church by faith, and save the country from destructive tendencies, and for that it is necessary to speak the truth to the people without delay, telling them what Socialism consists of and what it leads to.

“The Council must say that in February-March a violent coup took place which for the Orthodox Christian is oath-breaking that requires purification through repentance. We all, beginning with Your Holiness and ending with myself, the last member of the Council, must bow the knee before God, and beseech Him to forgive us for allowing the growth in the country of evil teachings and violence. Only after sincere repentance by the whole people will the country be pacified and regenerated. And God will bestow upon us His mercy and grace. But if we continue only to anathematize without repenting, without declaring the truth to the people, then they will with just cause say to us: You, too, are guilty that the country has been reduced to this crime, for which the anathema now sounds out; you by your pusillanimity have allowed the development of evil and have been slow to call the facts and phenomena of state life by their real names!

“Pastors of the Church, search out the soul of the people! If we do not tell the people the whole truth, if we do not call on them now to offer nationwide repentance for definite sins, we will leave this conciliar chamber as turncoats and traitors of the Church and the Homeland. I am so unshakeably convinced of what I say now that I would not hesitate to repeat it even if I were on the verge of death. It is necessary to regenerate in the minds of people the idea of a pure central authority – the idea that has been darkened by the pan-Russian deception. We overthrew the Tsar and subjected ourselves to the Jews! [Voices of members of the Council: ‘True, true…’] The only salvation for the Russian people is a wise Russian Orthodox Tsar. Only through the election of a wise, Orthodox, Russian Tsar can Russia be placed on the good, historical path and re-establish good order. As long as we will not have a wise Orthodox tsar, there will be no order among us, and the people’s blood will continue to be shed, and the centrifugal forces will divide the one people into hostile pieces, until the train of history is completely destroyed or until foreign peoples enslave us as a crowd incapable of independent State life…

“We all must unite into one Christian family under the banner of the Holy and Life-Creating Cross and under the leadership of his Holiness the Patriarch, to say that Socialism, which calls people as if to brotherhood, is an openly antichristian and evil phenomenon, that the Russian people has become the plaything of the Jewish-Masonic organizations behind which the Antichrist is already visible in the form of an internationalist tsar, that by playing on false freedom, the people is forging for itself slavery to the Judaeo-Masons. If we say this openly and honestly, then I do not know what will happen to us, but I know that Russia will be alive!”[[566]](#footnote-566)

On March 12, 1918 the Council reaffirmed the patriarch’s anathema, proclaiming: “To those who utter blasphemies and lies against our holy faith and Church, who rise up against the holy churches and monasteries, encroaching on the inheritance of the Church, while abusing and killing the priests of the Lord and zealots of the patristic faith: ***Anathema*”** (Act 94)**.**

However, in 1918, the rite of the Triumph of Orthodoxy with the anathemas against the atheists, was omitted on the First Sunday in Great Lent. As Valery Shambarov writes: “The Bolsheviks were in power, and such a rite would have constituted an open challenge to on the part of the hierarchs of the Church. Nevertheless, one cannot find any decision on removing the traditional rite of the celebration of the Sunday of the Triumph of Orthodoxy in the materials of the Local Council of 1917-1918.”[[567]](#footnote-567)

The Bolshevik decree on the separation of Church and State elicited strong reactions from individual members of the Council. Thus one exclaimed: “We overthrew the tsar and subjected ourselves to the Jews!” And another said: “The sole means of salvation for the Russian nation is a wise Orthodox Russian tsar!” In reply to this remark, Protopriest Elijah Gromoglasov said: “Our only hope is not that we may have an earthly tsar or president… but that there should be a heavenly Tsar, Christ”.[[568]](#footnote-568)

The section of the Council appointed to report on the decree made the following recommendations: “The individuals wielding the governmental authority audaciously attempt to destroy the very existence of the Orthodox Church. In order to realize this satanic design, the Soviet of People’s Commissars published the decree concerning the separation of the Church from the State, which legalized an open persecution not only of the Orthodox Church, but of all other religious communions, Christian or non-Christian. Not despising deceit, the enemies of Christ fraudulently put on the appearance of granting by it religious liberty.

“Welcoming all real extension of liberty of conscience, the Council at the same time points out that by the provisions of the said decree, the freedom of the Orthodox Church, as well as of all other religious organizations and communions in general, is rendered void. Under the pretence of ‘the separation of the Church from the State’, the Soviet of People’s Commissars attempts to render impossible the very existence of the churches, the ecclesiastical institutions, and the clergy.

“Under the guise of taking over the ecclesiastical property, the said decree aims to destroy the very possibility of Divine worship and ministration. It declares that ‘no ecclesiastical or religious association has the right to possess property’, and ‘all property of the existing ecclesiastical and religious associations in Russia is declared to be national wealth.’ Thereby the Orthodox churches and monasteries, those resting-places of the relics of the saints revered by all Orthodox people, become the common property of all citizens irrespective of their credal differences – of Christians, Jews, Muslims and pagans, and the holy objects designated for the Divine service, i.e. the holy Cross, the holy Gospel, the sacred vessels, the holy miracle-working icons are at the disposal of the governmental authorities, which may either permit or not (as they wish) their use by the parishes.

“Let the Russian people understand that they (the authorities) wish to deprive them of God’s churches with their sacred objects! As soon as all property of the Church is taken away, it is not possible to offer any aid to it, for in accordance with the intention of the decree everything donated shall be taken away. The support of monasteries, churches and the clergy alike becomes impossible.

“But that is not all: in consequence of the confiscation of the printing establishments, it is impossible for the Church independently to publish the holy Gospel as well as other sacred and liturgical books in their wonted purity and authenticity.

“In the same manner, the decree affects the pastors of the Church. Declaring that ‘no one may refuse to perform his civil duties on account of his religious views’, it thereby constrains them to fulfil military obligations forbidden them by the 83rd canon of the holy Apostles. At the same time, ministers of the altar are removed from educating the people. The very teaching of the law of God, not only in governmental, but even in private schools, is not permitted; likewise all theological institutions are doomed to be closed. The Church is thus excluded from the possibility of educating her own pastors.

“Declaring that ‘the governmental functions or those of other public-juridical institutions shall not be accompanied by any religious rites or ceremonies,’ the decree thereby sacrilegiously sunders all connections of the government with the sanctities of the faith.

“On the basis of all these considerations, the holy Council decrees:

“1. The decree published by the Soviet of People’s Commissars regarding the separation of the Church from the State represents in itself, under the guise of a law declaring liberty of conscience, an inimical attempt upon the life of the Orthodox Church, and is an act of open persecution.

“2. All participation, either in the publication of the law so injurious to the Church, or in attempts to put it into practice, is not reconcilable with membership of the Orthodox Church, and subjects all transgressors belonging to the Orthodox communion to the heaviest penalties, to the extent of excommunicating them from the Church (in accordance with the 73rd canon of the holy Apostles, and the 13th canon of the Seventh Ecumenical Council).”[[569]](#footnote-569)

These recommendations were then adopted by the Council as its official reply to the decree (February 7). In the same spirit, on April 15 the Council decreed: “Clergymen serving in anti-ecclesiastical institutions, as well as those who put into effect the decrees on freedom of conscience which are inimical to the Church and similar acts, are subject to being banned from serving and, in the case of impenitence, are deprived of their rank.”[[570]](#footnote-570)

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Although, as we have said, it was unprecedented for a Local Church to anathematize a government, there have been occasions in the history of the Church when individual hierarchs have not only refused to obey or pray for a political leader, but have actually prayed *against* him. Thus in the fourth century St. Basil the Great prayed for the defeat of Julian the Apostate, and it was through his prayers that the apostate was killed, as was revealed by God to the holy hermit Julian of Mesopotamia. Neither St. Basil nor his friend, St. Gregory the Theologian, recognised the rule of Julian the Apostate to be legitimate.[[571]](#footnote-571) Moreover, they considered that Gregory’s brother, St. Caesarius, should not remain at the court of Julian, although he thought that, being a doctor, he could help his relatives and friends through his position there.[[572]](#footnote-572) These and other examples show that, while the *principle* of authority *as such* is from God (Romans 13.1), individual authorities or rulers are sometimes not from God, but are only *allowed* *to exist* by Him, in which case the Church must offer resistance to them out of loyalty to God Himself.[[573]](#footnote-573)

As Bishop Gregory (Grabbe), the foremost canonist of the Russian Church Abroad, wrote: “With regard to the question of the commemoration of authorities, we must bear in mind that now we are having dealings not simply with a pagan government like Nero’s, but with the apostasy of the last times. Not with a so far unenlightened authority, but with apostasy. The Holy Fathers did not relate to Julian the Apostate in the same way as they did to the other pagan Emperors. And we cannot relate to the antichristian authorities in the same way as to any other, for its nature is purely satanic.”[[574]](#footnote-574)

There were some who took the anathema very seriously and fulfilled it to the letter. Thus in 1918, the clairvoyant Elder Nicholas (Parthenov), later Hieromartyr Bishop of Aktar, “following the anathema contained in the Epistle of his Holiness Patriarch Tikhon, and not wishing to enter into relations with ‘the outcasts of the human race’, went into reclusion…”[[575]](#footnote-575) In general, however, the Church and the People paid no attention to it – which must be counted as perhaps the major reason why the revolution gained strength and survived for generations to come…

The Council had exhorted the faithful to protect church property, and soon there were reports of people mobbing the officials and soldiers detailed to carry out the decree. Several hundred thousand people marched through Petrograd in protest. As Michael Shkarovskii writes: “Numerous religious processions, some of which were fired upon, took place in the towns; services in defence of the patriarchate were held in public places and petitions were sent to the government. There followed a mass religious upsurge in Russia. From 1918, thousands of new converts, including some prominent intellectuals, joined the now persecuted Orthodox Church. And an ‘All-Russian Union of United Orthodox Parishes’ was also formed.

“The *Sovnarkom* had expected its decree to be implemented quickly and relatively painlessly, but this was prevented first and foremost by the opposition of millions of peasants, who supported the expropriation of church and monastic property but were against making births, marriages and deaths a purely civil affair, depriving parishes of their property rights, and dropping divinity from the school curriculum. Peasants thus resisted Bolshevik efforts to break the ‘unshakable traditions’ of ‘a life of faith’ in the Russian countryside. The implementation of the law was also hindered by the lack of suitable officials to carry it out, and by the inconsistence of the local authorities’ understanding of the law.”[[576]](#footnote-576)

A Barmenkov wrote: “Some school workers began to interpret [the principle of Church-School separation] as a transition to secular education, in which both religious and anti-religious propaganda in school would be excluded. They supposed that the school had to remain neutral in relation to religion and the Church. A.V. Lunacharsky and N.K. Krupskaia spoke against this incorrect interpretation…, emphasising that in the Soviet state the concept of the people’s enlightenment had unfailingly to include ‘a striving to cast out of the people’s head religious trash and replace it with the light of science.’”[[577]](#footnote-577)

In the midst of this chaos, as James Cunningham writes, “the Patriarch was again and again urged to violate his November decision to avoid inciting armed resistance to the Bolsheviks. He was reminded that Patriarch Hermogen had not hesitated, and that traitors and foreigners had been defeated as a result. The Bolshevik Executive Committee watched nervously to see if Tikhon would be another Hermogen. Church leaders cautiously avoided advocating restoring the monarchy…”[[578]](#footnote-578)

“On March 14/27,” writes Peter Sokolov, “still hoping that the existence of the Church could be preserved under the communist regime and with the aim of establishing direct relations with the higher state authorities, a Church deputation set out in the name of the Council to the Council of People’s Commissars in Moscow. They wanted to meet Lenin personally, and personally present him with their ideas about the conditions acceptable to the Church for her existence in the state of the new type.” This initiative hardly accorded with the anathema against the Bolsheviks, which forbade the faithful from having any relations with them. It was therefore unsuccessful. “The deputation was not received by Lenin. The commissars (of insurance and justice) that conversed with it did not satisfy its requests. A second address to the authorities in the name of the Council that followed soon after the first unsuccessful audience was also unsuccessful…”[[579]](#footnote-579)

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The Council made two other decisions relating to Soviet power and its institutions. On April 15 it decreed: “Clergymen serving in anti-ecclesiastical institutions… are subject to being banned from serving and, in the case of impenitence, are deprived of their rank”. On the assumption that “anti-ecclesiastical institutions” included all Soviet institutions, this would seem to have been a clearly anti-Soviet measure.

However, on August 15, 1918, the Council took a step in the opposite direction, declaring invalid all defrockings based on political considerations, applying this particularly to Metropolitan Arsenius (Matsevich) of Rostov and Priest Gregory Petrov. Metropolitan Arsenius had indeed been unjustly defrocked in the reign of Catherine II for his righteous opposition to her anti-Church measures. However, Petrov had been one of the leaders of the Cadet party in the Duma in 1905 and was an enemy of the monarchical order. How could his defrocking be said to have been unjust in view of the fact that the Church had officially prayed for the Orthodox Autocracy, and Petrov had worked directly against the fulfilment of the Church’s prayers?

The problem was: too many people, including several hierarchs, had welcomed the fall of the Tsarist regime. If the Church was not to divide along political lines, a general amnesty was considered necessary. But if true recovery can only begin with repentance, and repentance must begin with the leaders of the Church, this decree amounted to covering the wound without allowing it to heal. And so, as Bishop Dionysius (Alferov) of Novgorod writes, the Council, in spite of its positive achievements, could be criticized for its “weakening of Church discipline, its legitimization of complete freedom of political orientation and activity, and, besides, its rehabilitation of the Church revolutionaries like Gregory Petrov. By all this it doomed the Russian Church to collapse, presenting to her enemies the best conditions for her cutting up and annihilation piece by piece…”

Perhaps the most serious failing of the Council was its failure to evaluate the betrayal of the Tsar and Tsarism in February, 1917 and to bring forth fitting repentance for it…

## **77. BREST-LITOVSK**

At the beginning of 1918 the Tsar was alone, imprisoned and abandoned by all except his closest family and a few servants who shared his imprisonment. He bitterly repented of his decision to abdicate. For the Bolsheviks had not only come to power, but against all expectations had survived – albeit with the greatest of difficulty.

As for the liberals, if they rejoiced at the abdication of the Tsar, they must now have been appalled at the Bolsheviks’ dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. For all those with eyes to see, it must have been evident that the Bolsheviks were not only no democrats and no better than the German militarists, but probably much worse… Indeed, it could be argued that the Red Terror really began only after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. For it was in January, 1918 that Lenin said: “Until we use terror against speculators – shooting them on the spot – nothing will happen.” To which the Left SR I.N. Sternberg asked: why, in that case, should he waste his time serving as Commissar of Justice?[[580]](#footnote-580)

It was also at this point, however, that the Bolsheviks were at their weakest - not only militarily (the Latvian riflemen were the only real fighting force they had) but also politically, as fury first over their dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and then over the shameful surrender at Brest-Litovsk alienated their closest allies, the Left SRs. The question was: if the formidable military and economic power that was Germany could be defeated, why not the Bolsheviks? Surely, it would require only a small push from the West, and the whole unstable edifice would come tumbling down? But it did not; and in the West’s failure to overthrow Bolshevism at its weakest point we can see the weakest point of Western Democracy in general.

We see this first in the American President Wilson’s famous 14 Points of January, 1918. In Point 6, as Adam Tooze writes, “Wilson addressed the situation in Russia. Given the events since November 1917, one might have expected him to be at pains to draw a sharp distinction between the Russian people and the Bolshevik regime that had violently usurped the right to represent them. Secretary of State Lansing in private memoranda to Wilson was demanding that America should denounce Lenin’s regime ‘as a despotic oligarchy as menacing to liberty as any absolute monarchy on earth’. But no such distinction was made in the 14 Points. On the contrary, Wilson extended to the Bolsheviks praise of a kind he had never offered to the Provisional Government. Whereas in May 1917 Wilson had lined up with the Entente in lecturing Alexander Kerensky and Irakli Tsereteli on the need to continue the war, he now characterized the Bolshevik delegation, who were about to agree a separate peace, as ‘sincere and in earnest’. The spokesmen of the Russian people, the Bolsheviks, were speaking, Wilson opined, in the ‘true spirit of modern democracy’, stating Russia’s ‘conception of what is right, of what is humane and honourable for them to accept… with frankness, a largeness of view, a generosity of spirit, and a universal human sympathy, which must challenge the admiration of every friend of mankind… whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace. Echoing the Bolshevik negotiating position at Brest, Wilson called for the peace to begin with the withdrawal of all foreign forces, so as to allow Russia the ‘unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy’. What is striking about this formulation was precisely Wilson’s unproblematic use of the term ‘Russia’ and ‘national policy’ with regard to an empire that was in the process of violent decomposition. At the moment when the 14 Points began to circulate around the world, nationalist movements in Ukraine, the Baltic and Finland were dissociating themselves from the Soviet regime to which Wilson was giving such fulsome praise…”[[581]](#footnote-581)

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March, 1918 between Imperial Germany and the Bolsheviks was forced upon the Bolsheviks as a result of the continued penetration of German armies deep into Russia. It deprived Russia of a quarter of her territory, a third of her population, most of her oil and half of her industry. Russia was forced to recognize the independence of vast swathes of territory in East Central Europe including the Baltic region, Poland and Ukraine, which immediately became in effect satellites of Germany.

The Tsar had promised that he would never sign a unilateral truce with Germany – and kept his promise. But Lenin – who was, it must be remembered, a German agent[[582]](#footnote-582) – signed the unilateral truce with Germany on the worst possible terms. His aim was that Soviet Russia should have a breathing space from her international war in order to fight her internal enemies, while Germany and the Western Powers fought each other. He thereby turned an international war into a civil war. That war had already begun in the Krasnodar region, where the White armies, having survived a difficult first winter, were gathering their strength.

President Wilson’s partiality to Lenin foreshadowed Roosevelt’s naivety in relation to Stalin, and revealed a besetting blindness of American policy - its inability, almost until it was too late, to see the real nature of the Soviet regime. For by praising the Soviet “democracy” and giving it virtually *carte blanche* in reconquering the lands evacuated by the German Armies, Wilson consolidated Bolshevik power at the moment of its greatest weakness. As the German Armies retreated from the lands they had conquered in the former Tsarist empire, it was essential that the Allies recognize and strengthen the Baltic, Polish and Ukrainian states that now emerged in their wake, so as to weaken the struggling Soviet regime. Allied intervention in the Civil War was necessitated by the “oversight” of the Versailles peacemakers in not applying the principle of self-determination both to these regions and to Russia herself.

It was one of Wilson’s most radical advisors, William Bullitt, who dissuaded him from a decisive intervention against the Bolsheviks. “’In Russia today,’ Bullitt insisted, ‘there are the rudiments of a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.’ The real threat to democracy lay not in Lenin’s *Sovnarkom* (Council of People’s Commissars), but in the forces of reactionary imperialism that were alive within the Entente as much as in the Central Powers. ‘Are we going to make the world safe for this Russian democracy,’ Bullitt demanded, ‘by allowing the allies to place [the Japanese] Terauchi in Irkutsk, while Ludendorff establishes himself in Petrograd?’ On 4 March 1918, Bullitt’s arguments prevailed. The President swung firmly against any Allied intervention; on the advice of Bullitt and Colonel House he renewed the attempt to enlist the Russian revolution in a democratic alliance against reactionary Germany. Wilson appealed directly to the Congress of Soviets, which was meeting on 12 March to hear Lenin’s arguments for ratification of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. Under even more incongruous circumstances than in January, Wilson restated the message of the 14 Points. Ignoring the fact that the Congress of Soviets was standing in for the repressed Constituent Assembly, Wilson expressed ‘every sympathy’ for Russia’s effort to ‘weld herself into a democracy’. He demanded that she be left free of ‘any sinister or selfish influence, which might interfere with such development’.”[[583]](#footnote-583)

The Japanese took the hint, and in April countermanded the order to land troops in Vladivostok. The Congress of Soviets, however, rejected Wilson’s overtures. For Lenin had decided that the only chance of survival for the Bolshevik regime lay in an alliance with – or rather, in humiliating subjection to – the German militarists.

However, even after Brest-Litovsk, the military situation continued to deteriorate from the Bolsheviks’ point of view. For (as usual) they did not fulfil their part of the bargain, and so the Germans continued to advance…

The Bolshevik regime was indeed in great danger, and if God had been willing and the German armies had not begun to falter at precisely that moment on the western front, a German-sponsored restoration of Tsarism in Russia (let us remember that both the Tsars, Nicholas II and Michael Alexandrovich, were still alive) was a distinct possibility less than a year after the October revolution.

“If these threats were not menacing enough, by May Lenin’s regime faced an even more direct threat from the north. Along with the other Baltic states, Finland had declared independence from Russia in December, 1917. In line with Lenin’s nationalities policy, Petrograd had given its blessing. But at the same time it directed local Bolsheviks with strong trade union support to seize control of Helsinki. By the last week of January, Finland was plunged into civil war. In early March 1918 as German troops marched into Ukraine, the Kaiser and Ludendorff settled on a plan for a joint German-Finnish force that would first wipe out the Finnish Bolsheviks before continuing the march south towards Petrograd. Icy weather delayed the arrival of General von der Goltz’s German expeditionary force until early April. But when they joined up with the Finnish White Guards of General Mannerheim they made up for lost time. By 14 April, after heavy fighting, they had cleared Helsinki of Red Guards. As a token of German appreciation, von der Goltz distributed food aid to the cheering burghers of the city. The civil war ended on 15 May, but the killing did not. Following a reprisal shooting of White prisoners of war by Red Guards, the Finnish-German combat group unleashed a ‘White terror’ that by early May had claimed the lives of more than 8,000 leftists. At least 11,000 more would die of famine and disease in prison camps. In the spring of 1918 Finland became the stage for the first of a series of savage counter-revolutionary campaigns that were to open a new chapter in twentieth-century political violence.

“In the first week of May 1918, with the terror in full swing, Mannerheim and his German auxiliaries pushed menacingly towards the Russian fortress of Ino guarding the northern gateway to Petrograd. To the Soviets it seemed as though the Kaiser and his entourage had thought better of the compromise they had settled for at Brest. Why after all should Germany allow itself to be constrained by a mere treaty, one furthermore that the Soviets themselves had dismissed as nothing more than a scrap of paper? If Lenin’s strategy of balancing between the imperialist powers was to work, he would have to go beyond merely ratifying Brest. After signing the treaty he had tacked away from the Germans, encouraging Trotsky to cultivate close contacts with emissaries of the Entente and the United States in Petrograd and Moscow. Now in early May he embarked on a second desperate gamble. If the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was no longer enough to satisfy German imperialism, Lenin would put more flesh on the bare bones of the peace.”[[584]](#footnote-584)

Lenin proposed large-scale economic concessions in order to buy off the Germans. And the militarists and big businessmen were interested… But the liberals in the Reichstag were not. “On 18 May after an urgent intercession by Chancellor Hertling, Ludendorff agreed to halt the Finno-German march on Petrograd. As in Japan, civilian political control asserted itself as a basic safety catch against the more radical fantasies of the German imperialists…”[[585]](#footnote-585)

The Bolsheviks had been very fortunate. At one time before the revolution the Party had been so thoroughly penetrated by Tsarist agents as to make its success extraordinarily improbable; there is even evidence that Stalin was an Okhrana agent. [[586]](#footnote-586) But Kornilov’s attempted coup, and Kerensky’s reaction to it, had played into their hands at a critical time. Then, after the October revolution, the Bolsheviks were able to hang on to power for three main reasons. First, they decided very quickly not to nationalize the land that the peasants had seized from the landowners, thus neutralizing the appeal of their main political opponents, the Social Revolutionaries. Secondly, on December 20, 1917 the Cheka, with Feliz Dzerzhinsky at its head, was founded in order to defend “the fruits of October” by all means possible, including the most extreme cruelties. And thirdly, as we have seen, the victories of the western armies against Germany diverted the threat to Petrograd at the last moment.

Lenin, like another Houdini, had escaped the net…

## **78. WHITE TSAR AND RED TERROR**

After signing his shameful truce with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk in March, 1918, Lenin still had major problems. The country was on the verge of economic collapse, and the Germans, angry at Bolshevik violations of the truce, still threatened Petrograd. The anti-Bolshevik White Russians were forming armies under General Denikin in the south, General Yudenich in the North-West and Admiral Kolchak in Siberia. The Western Allies, fearing that Russia was turning into a colony of Germany, finally decided on intervention on the side of the Whites. The SRs and Mensheviks had been forced out of the government, and were now part of the opposition…

In May, 1918, writes Professor S.A. Smith “the Czech legion, a body of 38,000 men recruited by the Tsarist government from Austro-Hungarian prisoners-of-war, revolted against the Bolsheviks. From this time on, one may speak of full-scale civil war, since armies now fought along clearly defined fronts. Within a few months, the Legion seized control of a vast area east of the Volga and helped the SRs to set up governments committed to overthrowing the Bolsheviks, restoring the Constituent Assembly, and resuming war with Germany. The revolt threw the Bolsheviks into panic. Secret orders were given by Lenin to execute the imperial family in Ekaterinburg lest they be liberated by the insurgents. In fact the SRs proved unable to translate the electoral support they had received in the Constituent Assembly into solid political support and, crucially, into forging a reliable army. Where they remained respectful of democracy and law they were ineffective; where they sought to be firm, they slid into habits not very different from those of the Reds and Whites. Having gone to considerable lengths to secure the cooperation of conservative military men, they ended up in hock to them, compromising what were for the peasants the most important gains of the revolution: land and the devolution of power to the localities. The fate of SR attempts to create a ‘third way’ between the dictatorships of right and left was sealed on 18 November 1918 when Cossack officers arrested the SR members of the Omsk Directory and proclaimed Admiral Kolchak ‘Supreme Ruler’.

“Henceforward the civil war resolved into a conflict between Reds and Whites. The Whites stood for ‘Russia, One and Indivisible’, the restoration of state-mindedness, law and order, and the values of Orthodox Christianity. They strove to redeem the profaned honour of Russia’s armed forces and presented themselves as being ‘above class’ and ‘above party’. In fact, they were not a class movement in any strict sense, since they were slow to develop programmes that could have assisted landowners and industrialists to regain their property and power. So far as the political regime for which they were struggling was concerned, there was little unanimity concerning the shape it should take…”[[587]](#footnote-587)

The critical question for the Whites was: were they going to fight under the banner of Orthodoxy and Tsarism or not? “Some such as General Wrangel of the Volunteer Army were committed monarchists but most favoured some type of military dictatorship, possibly paving the way for a new Constituent Assembly. In an effort to keep political differences at bay, the Whites advanced the principle of ‘non-determination’, i.e. the postponement of all policy-making until the war was over. What kept them united in the meantime was little more than detestation of the Bolsheviks and outrage at the ‘German-Jewish’ conspiracy inflicted on the Russian people.”[[588]](#footnote-588)

Tsarism meant for the Whites, not Tsar Nicholas necessarily, who had abdicated, but the monarchical principle. However, the physical preservation of Tsar Nicholas was important. As long as the Tsar was alive, the possibility of a just and successful war against Bolshevism under the banner of Orthodoxy and Tsarism still existed. That is why the attempts to rescue the Tsar from captivity were not romantic side-shows, but critically important. And that is why the Bolsheviks proceeded to kill the Tsar. As Trotsky wrote: “In essence this decision was inevitable. The execution of the tsar and his family was necessary, not simply to scare, horrify and deprive the enemy of hope, but also to shake up our own ranks, show them that there was no going back. If the White Guardists had thought of unfurling the slogan of the kulaks’ Tsar, we would not have lasted for two weeks…”[[589]](#footnote-589)

And so, on the night of July 17, 1918 Blessed Maria Ivanovna, the fool-for-Christ of Diveyevo, began to shout and scream: “The Tsar’s been killed with bayonets! Cursed Jews!” That night the tsar and his family and servants were shot in Yekaterinburg.[[590]](#footnote-590) As Edward Radzinsky writes, there is a certain “mysticism of history” in the last dwelling-place of the Royal Family: “the monastery whence the first Romanov was called upon to rule, was the Ipatiev; the house where the last ruling Romanov, Nicholas II, parted with his life was the Ipatiev, named after the building’s owner, the engineer N.N. Ipatiev.”[[591]](#footnote-591)

On hearing of the Tsar’s murder, Patriarch Tikhon immediately condemned it; he now celebrated a *pannikhida* for him, blessing the archpastors and pastors to do the same. Then, on July 21, he announced in the Kazan cathedral: “We, in obedience to the teaching of the Word of God, must condemn this deed, otherwise the blood of the shot man will fall also on us, and not only on those who committed the crime…”[[592]](#footnote-592)

Having given a wonderful example of truly Christian love in their lives, the Royal Family were granted to die at the same time and so continue their union in love uninterrupted into eternity. Nor was their love only for each other: before their imprisonment, and especially during the war, they all lived pious and frugal lives distinguished by many acts of mercy. And during their imprisonment they showed exemplary patience and love for their enemies. Thus Martyr-Great-Princess Olga Nikolayevna wrote from Tobolsk: "Father asks the following message to be given to all those who have remained faithful to him, and to those on whom they may have an influence, that they should not take revenge for him, since he has forgiven everyone and prays for everyone, that they should not take revenge for themselves, and should remember that the evil which is now in the world will be still stronger, but that it is not love that will conquer evil, but only love..."

And in the belongings of the same holy martyr were found these verses by S. Bekhteyev:

*Now as we stand before the gates of death,*

*Breathe in the lips of us Thy servants*

*That more than human, supernatural strength*

*To meekly pray for those that hurt us.*

The next day, at Alapayevsk, Grand Duchess Elizabeth was killed together with her faithful companion, the Nun Barbara, and several Great Princes. Tsar Michael had already been shot in June with his English secretary…

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After the murder of the White Tsar there began the Red Terror. The spark was the attempted assassination of Lenin by the Social Revolutionary Fanny (Dora) Kaplan on August 30, who said: “I shot Lenin because I believe him to be a traitor [to socialism]. However, Dzerzhinsky, head of the Cheka, declared that the real organizers of the plot had been the Bolsheviks’ enemies in the just-beginning Civil War, the English and the French. This was the signal for mass revenge: “In Petrograd the leading newspaper shrieked: ‘For the blood of Lenin…. let there be floods of blood of the bourgeoisie – more blood, as much as possible.’”[[593]](#footnote-593)

With a nice feeling for historical symbolism, the Bolsheviks proclaimed the Terror officially on September 5[[594]](#footnote-594), the same day on which the Great Terror of the French revolution had begun. Of course, the Bolsheviks had been terrorizing the population of Russia from the beginning. And only three weeks before Lenin was shot he had written to the Bolsheviks in Penza urging them “to organize public executions to make the people ‘tremble’ ‘for hundreds of kilometres around’. While still recovering from his wounds, he instructed, ‘It is necessary secretly – and *urgently –*to prepare the terror… ’”[[595]](#footnote-595)

Now the terror assumed was on a vastly greater scale than anything seen before. As the intelligence experts Christopher Andrew and Vasily Mitrokhin write, “it is clear that the Cheka enormously outstripped the [pre-revolutionary] Okhrana in both the scale and the ferocity of its onslaught on political opposition. In 1901 4,113 Russians were in internal exile for political crimes, of whom only 180 were on hard labour. Executions for political crimes were limited to those involved in actual or attempted assassinations. During the civil war, by contrast, Cheka executions probably numbered as many as 250,000…

“Even at a time when the Soviet regime was fighting for its survival during the civil war, many of its own supporters were sickened by the scale of the Cheka’s brutality. A number of Cheka interrogators, some only in their teens, employed tortures of scarcely believable barbarity. In Kharkov the skin was peeled off victims’ hands to produce ‘gloves’ of human skin; in Voronezh naked prisoners were rolled around in barrels studded with nails; in Poltava priests were impaled; in Odessa captured White officers were tied to planks and fed slowly into furnaces; in Kiev cages of rats were fixed to prisoners’ bodies and heated until the rats gnawed their way into the victims’ intestines.”[[596]](#footnote-596)

The Cheka in 1918 outnumbered the old tsarist Police departments by a factor of 20; later they were 200 times larger, later still – 1000 times. KGB numbers reached one million. Their informants numbered three to five million.[[597]](#footnote-597) There is really no comparison…

On December 25, 1918 a Red Army soldier wrote to Lenin: “My words to you, you bloodthirsty beast. You intruded into the ranks of the revolution and did not allow the Constituent Assmbly to meet. You said: ‘Down with shooting. Down with soldiering. Let wage workers be secure.’ In a word you promised heaps of gold and a heavenly existence. The people felt the revolution, began to breathe easily. We were allowed to meet, to say what we liked, fearing nothing. And then you, Bloodsucker, appeared and took away freedom from the people. Instead of turning prisons into schools, they’re full of innocent victims. Instead of forbidding shootings, you’ve organized a terror and thousands of the people are shot mercilessly every day; you’ve brought industry to a halt so that workers are starving, the people are without shoes or clothes…”[[598]](#footnote-598)

As a result of this extreme Bolshevik oppression the Civil Wat between the Reds and the Whites began to widen and deepen, which in turn affected the process of the disintegration of the former Tsarist empire…

## **79. THE BREAK-UP OF THE EMPIRE**

“The 1897 census,” writes S.A. Smith, “revealed that Russians constituted only 44% of the total population of the empire. The more accurate 1926 census recognized the existence of 194 different ethnic groups, varying enormously in size, language, religion, culture, and level of socio-economic development. Nationalist movements had posed a challenge to the autocracy in 1905 and during the war many became radicalized as the peripheral regions of the empire experienced foreign occupation and evacuation as Polish and Latvian regiments were formed within the tsarist army, and as Allied propaganda circulated about national self-determination as an Allied war aim. Nationalism, however, was extremely unevenly developed across the empire. Aong the 18 million Muslims, for example, it was a weak force. Only the Tatars of the middle Volga, Urals and Crimea, a scattered population interspersed with Russians, showed much political consciousness and they tended to support a pan-Islamic solution – rather than a nationalist solution based on each ethnic group having its own national territory. Among the biggest concentration of Muslims in Turkestan – a vast region, which ranged from the northern steppe (modern Kazakhstan) east to the khanates of Khiva and Kokand and the emirate of Bukhara, each based on oases and their agriculture – there was barely any ethnic awareness, identities being defined in terms of clans, villages, and oases or, at the macro-level, in terms of the commonwealth of Islam. By contrast, in the Baltic region, the dominance of Germans, together with periodic campaigns of Russification by the tsarist state, had stimulated rather strong nationalist movements, in spite of the fact that neither Latvia nor Estonia had any history of independent statehood.

“The Provisional Government seriously undermined the destabilizing power of nationalism in 1917, fondly imagining that the abrogation of discriminatory legislation would ‘solve’ the national question. After February, the most common nationalist demands were not for outright secession but for rights of cultural self-expression and for a measure of political autonomy within the framework of a federal Russian state. Typical was the slogan of the liberal and socialist politicians of the Ukrainian Rada or National Council: ‘Long Live Autonomous Ukraine in a Federated Russia.’ Only in the untypical cases of Poland and Finland – where existing states had retained some autonomy after incorporation into the empire – did nationalists demand complete separation…

“By October 1917 it looked as though the Russian empire might break up, in the way the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires did, so it was important that the Bolsheviks should have a clear policy on the question of self-determination for the non-Russian peoples…”[[599]](#footnote-599)

Therefore on November 2, 1917, Lenin and Stalin, the Commissar for Nationalities, proclaimed their Declaration of the Rights of the People of Russia, which granted the right to self-determination to the peoples of the former Russian empire. This chimed in with the ideology of the American President Woodrow Wilson, and the same principle was proclaimed both at the first session of the talks leading to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March, 1918 and at the Versailles Conference in 1919.

However, the Bolsheviks were not united on the issue, and in practice their use of the principle of national self-determination was entirely opportunistic (as was the Germans’). They appealed to it when they wanted to place obstacles in the path of the invading German armies. But they renounced it when they returned to take the place of the Germans as despotic conquerors.

In general, Bolshevik national policy smacked more of old-fashioned colonialism on the basis of the principle of “divide and rule” than of real respect for national self-determination. It was certainly fruitful in the creation of new, supposedly independent states on the Soviet model. Thus in 1918, writes Oleg Panfilov, there were created: “the Don Soviet Republic (23 March to 4 May), the Kuban Soviet Republic (13 April – 30 May), the Turkestan Soviet Federal Republic (30 May 1918 to 27 October 1924), the Kuban-Black Sea Soviet Republic (30 May – 6 July), the Socialist Soviet Republic of Latvia (1918-1920), the North Caucasus Soviet Republic (7 July – December), the Tarnobzheg Republic in Galicia (1918-1919), the Estonian Workers Commune in Narva (29 November 1918 – 18 January 1919), the Lithuanian Soviet Republic formed on 16 December 1918, which on 27 February 1919, by a decree of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was united into the puppet Lithuanian-Belorussian Socialist Republic (Litbel).”

“From 1922 to 1940,” writes Jeffrey Mankey, “Moscow formed the largest of these units into the 15 Soviet socialist republics; these republics became independent states when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991.

“Although designed as homelands for their nationalities, the 15 Soviet socialist republics each contained their own minority groups, including Azeris in Armenia, Armenians in Azerbaijan, Abkhazians and Ossetians in Georgia, Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, and Karakalpaks in Uzbekistan, along with Russians scattered throughout the non-Russian republics. Such diversity was part of Stalin’s plan. Stalin drew borders through ethnic groups’ historical territories (despite the creation of Uzbekistan, for the example, the four other Central Asian Soviet republics were left with sizable Uzbek minorities) and included smaller autonomous enclaves within several Soviet republics (such as Abkhazia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan). From Azerbaijan to Uzbekistan, the presence of concentrated minorities within ethnically defined Soviet republics stoked enough tension to limit nationalist mobilization against Moscow…”[[600]](#footnote-600)

Thus each newly formed nation-state contained within itself still smaller nationalities; and these felt less secure in the new state than they had under the large, multinational empires that had now passed away. In the East, the Pandora’s box effect created by this process greatly facilitated Stalin’s ultimate triumph. First he encouraged nationalist separatism, and then, when each newly formed nation was still small and vulnerable, pounced like an eagle to snatch all of them into his new empire…

Let us look in more detail at how this happened in the account of S.A. Smith, going from West to East:-

“On 31 December 1917 the Bolsheviks recognized the independence of Finland, something the Provisional Government had been reluctant to do. In the Baltic as a whole, however, they fought movements for national independence since support for soviet power was strong. In Latvia German occupation undermined the soviets and paved the way for a nationalist government. In Estonia, where soviets ran many towns, Bolshevik indifference to nationalist sensitivities, combined with failure to expropriate the German barons, strengthened support for the Maapäev which repelled the Red Army in early 1919, with assistance from Whites, the British, and Finnish volunteers. By 1920 the Bolsheviks were reconciled to the loss of Estonia and Latvia. In Belorussia and Lithuania nationalism was weak and the defeat of Germany left a power vacuum which Poles and Reds sought to fill. After the Germans withdrew, the feeble government in Belorussia collapsed, allowing the Reds to take over. In March 1919 they merged Belorussia with Lithuania to form the Litbel soviet republic. The following month, however, Poland occupied Vilnius, the putative capital of independent Lithuania, reinstated landowners, and made Polish the official language. Nationalism was weak in Lithuania, the population being largely peasants, and the small urban population Jewish or Polish, yet nationalists rather adeptly exploited the Soviet-Polish war to gain independence albeit within much reducedborders. By the Treaty of Riga, the Bolsheviks recognised the independence of the Baltic States and of Poland whose eastern border extended well into Belorussian and Ukrainian-majority territory. Signed in March 1921, the treaty reflected the inability of either Russia or Poland to establish their hegemony in the Baltic in the way that Germany once had.

In the south, meanwhile, after the Ukrainian Rada refused the German demand that it cultivate all its land so as to feed starving Germans and Austrians, the Germans overthrew it and installed in its place a former tsarist cavalry officer, Skoropadsky. Thus “only six weeks after the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, under the pressure of economic necessity the German military had unilaterally abandoned any residual claim to be acting as the protector of the legitimate cause of self-determination. Skoropadskyi spoke virtually no Ukrainian and filled his cabinet with conservative Russian nationalists. The real power-holders in Germany seemed to have lost interest in the project of creating a viable Ukrainian nation state. Instead, they appeared to be readying Kiev as the launching pad for a conservative conquest of all of Russia…”[[601]](#footnote-601)

No Russian government could contemplate with equanimity the loss of Ukraine, Russia’s breadbasket. And so “no fewer than nine governments came and went in the space of three years, testifying to the inability of nationalists, Whites, or Reds to enforce control. Caught between the Reds and Whites, the intermittent nationalist governments turned for protection first to Germany, then to the Entente, and finally to Poland. Torn by political division, they found themselves increasingly at odds with a peasantry that looked for protection to the guerrilla bands of Makhno and the other *otomany*, or chiefs. The civil war devastated Ukraine but had a paradoxical effect on social identities. Ukrainian peasants turned inward as centralized power broke down, yet their identification with the Ukrainian nation was strengthened as a result of independent statehood. Twice the Bolsheviks gained control of Ukraine and each time their promise of self-determination proved hollow. Only in 1920 after Moscow cleared Russian chauvinists out of leadership of the Ukrainian Communist Party did the new Soviet administration seriously address aspirations for self-determination. And in a pattern replicated elsewhere, radicatl nationalists, recognizing that they must settle for less than they would ideally like, accepted the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a framework in which they could work.

“Aspirations for Transcaucasian unity proved transient once the Russian army withdrew from the region in winter 1917. As Russian power receded, so Turkish influence increased, exacerbating ethnic tension, especially between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Baku. In May this led to the collapse of the Transcaucasian Sejm and the emergence of three separate states, all of which were beset by fearsome economic difficulties, predation by the big powers, and mutual conflict over territorial boundaries. In Azerbaijan Musavat nationalist enjoyed backing from the peasantry and support for soviet power remained strong in Baku. Falling oil revenues led to high unemployment and rocketing inflation. Independent Armenia, confined to a small landlocked territory around Erevan contested by its neighbours, was in an even more wretched state, inundated by refugees and wracked by starvation and disease. The DAshnaktsutiun formed a government of national emergency that quickly dropped any pretension to socialism. In Georgia, by far the most viable of the three states, the Mensheviks won 80% of the popular vote in 1919. Despite the economic chaos, they carried out land reforms and allowed trade unions and cooperatives to operate freely. The one blot on their record was the brutal treatment of ethnic minorities within Georgia.

“Because of its petroleum and mineral resources, the Bolsheviks were determined to regain control of Transcaucasia. In April 1920 the Red Army invaded Azerbaijan and in September Armenia turned to it for help after it became embroiled in war with Turkey. By this stage, many nationalists in both countries saw in their own soviet republics the only viable form of statehood. In Georgia, however, this was not true. In May 1920 Moscow recognized Georgia against the wishes of Georgian communists such as s. Orjonikidze, one of Stalin’s most loyal supporters. Yet in January 1921, in contravention of Moscow’s orders not to ‘self-determine Georgia’, the Red Army marched into the country.

“On 24 November the Bolsheviks invited Muslims to order their national life ‘freely and without hindrance’, yet soviet power was everywhere established by ethnic Russians with a classically colonialist attitude towards the Muslim people. The claim of Tatar merchants, mullahs, and intellectuals to represent the community of Islam was widely resented by Muslims, not least by the Bashkirs of the southern Urals who, though closely related, were patronized by them for having given up nomadism relatively late. Radical Tatars, such as M.S. Sultangaliev, in the absence of a sizeable proletariat, seized on the creation of a Muslim Red Army as a vehicle to establish a Tatar-Bashkir state stretching from the mid-Volga to the Urals. Initially, Bashkirs sought to realize their aspirations by turning to the Whites, but it was not long before reform-minded Muslims and political radicals turned to the communists. Fearful of becoming junior partners in a Tatar-Bashkir state, they insisted on and got their own autonomous soviet socialist republic (ASSR) in March, 1919. As early as June 1920, however, some began to defect to the guerrilla movement, known as the *basmachi*, in disgust at interference in their affairs by Russian communists on the ground. In Crimea, too, the left wing of the Milli Firka joined the communists; and once the Cheka had extirpated all opposition, a Crimean ASSR was proclaimed in October 1921. Meanwhile in the middle Volga a Tatar ASSR was finally established in May 1920, but it left 75% of the scattered Tatars outside its borders. Sultangaliev and his allies, who formed the core of the Tatarstan Communist Party, for a brief period brilliantly used the opportunity of having their own state to promote national identity among the Tatars.

“In Turkestan there was still little agreement as to whether nationhood should be realized on an all-Turkestan scale or whether its constituent people should form separate states. In the steppes, the Alash Orda proclaimed Kazakh autonomy in December 1917 and turned to the Whites in the face of the Red Army advance. By spring 1919, however, Kolchak’s hostility to Kazakh autonomy swung it towards a compromise with the Bolsheviks. In August 1920 the Kazakhs received a polity of their own in the shape of an ASSR, clan and village structures being reconfigured into soviets. In Tashkent the Turkestan Council of People’s Commissars refused to recognize the Kokand autonomous government, dominated as it was by reform-minded Muslims and conservative clerics. In February 1918 it carried out an appalling massacre, putting Kokand to torch and slaughtering almost 60% of its inhabitants. Moscow stepped in to curb these excesses and ensured that ten Muslims were given positions in a new Turkestan Republic. This new government, however, managed to alienate the native population by seizing clerically held lands, closing religious schools, and abolishing *shariat* courts, so that by 1919 over 20,000 had joined the guerrillas. Following the capture of Bukhara in September 1920, the guerrilla movement spread to the whole of Central Asia, acquiring a pronounced Islamist character. It was not finally put down until 1925. The people’s republics of Khorezm and Bukhara – their pre-industrial economies precluded their being called ‘socialist’ – along with the Turkestan ASSR lasted until 1924, when separate Uzbek, Turkmen, Tadzhik, and Kazakh republics were formed.

“Overall, the civil war strengthened national identities yet deepened divisions within nationalist movements. Most nationalists proved unable politically or militarily to remain neutral in the contest between Reds and Whites and many ended up in hock to Germany, Turkey, Allied interventionists, or Poland. Most lacked solid popular support (there were exceptions, such as Georgia) and most fell prey to damaging conflicts over social and economic policies, especially concerning the land. By the end of the civil war, the Bolsheviks offered less than many wanted – although it is worth remembering that in 1917 few had aspired to complete national independence – yet far more than was on offer from Whites, the Allies, the Germans, or Turks. At the same time, they exploited the weakness of nationalism to reintegrate the bulk of the non-Russian territories into the Soviet Union. By 1922 the territory of the Soviet state was only 4% smaller than that of the tsarist empire…”[[602]](#footnote-602)

Beyond the bounds of the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks cast off the sheep’s clothing of concern for national aspirations to reveal the pure rapacity of the wolf. Thus in 1919, writes Panfilov, “from 21 March to 6 August, “133 days in all, there existed the Hungarian Soviet Republic, while for two weeks, from 13 April to 1 May, a Bavarian Soviet Republic was proclaimed in Munich. From 15 to 27 April there existed in Limerick in the south-west of Ireland the self-proclaimed Soviet Republic of Limerick. From 28 April to 26 June there was the Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic, and from 11 May to September – the Bessarabian Soviet Socialist Republic. In the Lencoran uyezd of Baku province in the south of Azerbaidjan for about two months (15 May – 23 July) the Bolsheviks proclaimed the Mugan Soviet Republic. For three weeks, from 16 June to 17 July, there existed the Slovakian Soviet Republic in the south and east of Slovakia with its capital in Presov. This was helped by the Red Guard of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, which occupied the southern part of Slovakia, which was proclaimed within the confines of the Hungarian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. Finally, on the territory of occupied Germany the creation of an Alsace Soviet Republic was proclaimed; on 22 November it ceased its existence after the return of the Lower and Upper Rhine to France.”

Perhaps the clearest example of how the Bolsheviks used pseudo-nationalist concerns to conquer territory for Communist internationalism was Mongolia. Jean-François Revel wrote in 1985: “While Georgia was the first country forcibly annexed by the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia had the honor, also in 1921, of becoming the first Soviet *satellite*, again thanks to a method so well designed from the start that it has been used unchanged many times since, most recently in Nicaragua. In 1921, according to the 1931 Soviet Encyclopedia, there were 164 Communists in Outer Mongolia and 99 members of the Young Communist League. Not very many, in truth. Enough, however, to allow the Communist Party to propose to other parties, representing the peasantry, the formation of a national-front government (here we go!) to oppose ‘Chinese domination’. As soon as the front was formed and became a provisional government, the Communists grasped the levers of power, as they would later in Hungary and, more recently, in Nicaragua. Their allies, unmasked as counterrevolutionaries and bedecked with the exquisitely Mongolian epithet of ‘feudal-theocratic elements’ – an ingenious phrase, and one to bear in mind – were eliminated. All that remained after that was for an improvised ‘national liberation’ army to appeal for ‘fraternal assistance’ from the Red Army, which never needs coaxing to do its fraternal duty. On June 13, 1924, a Mongolian People’s Republic was proclaimed and rapidly attached to the Soviet Union by a web of ‘friendship’ treaties, mutual assistance treaties, cultural, economic and military treaties…”[[603]](#footnote-603)

## **80. THE CHURCH IN THE NEW NATION-STATES**

“Bolshevik nationalism” in politics inevitably affected the unity of the Orthodox Church in the region, as newly independent nations tended to demand their own independent Orthodox Churches. So several schisms from the Russian Orthodox Church took place. Let us examine three of these schisms.

**1. Ukraine.** After leading the rite of the enthronement of Patriarch Tikhon in Decembef, 1917, Metropolitan Vladimir of Kiev returned to his flock, his heart heavy with forebodings about the future. Already in March, on his first return to Kiev after the February revolution, he had had to hold back the waves of incipient revolution there. For an "Executive Committee of clergy and laymen" was organized in Kiev at this time, and a "Commissar for ecclesiastical affairs" was appointed. In a dialogue with representatives of the executive committee, Metropolitan Vladimir stated candidly that "the Executive Committee of clergy and laymen is an illegitimate institution which is trying gradually to expand its power and to usurp prerogatives which do not belong to it." However, in spite of this his opinion of the new organ of the Kievan Church which had been formed as a result of the revolution, Metropolitan Vladimir did not refuse in principle to work with its members to lead the Church in a new direction. He gave his blessing for "the Executive Committee of clergy and laymen" to convene, in Kiev on April 12, 1917, a "Congress of the clergy and laymen of the Kievan diocese", which was for reasons that remain unclear transformed into "the Ukrainian congress of the clergy and laymen of the Kievan diocese".

Metropolitan Vladimir had a negative opinion of this congress. During it bishops were publicly insulted in a manner unheard of in the Orthodox Christian world; clerics in attendance branded them as "parasites". Metropolitan Vladimir likewise had a negative opinion of the resolutions which this congress passed, among which was the declaration that "the autonomous Ukraine must have a Ukrainian church which is independent of the Synod." He also opposed the formation by this congress of a so-called advisory committee to the Metropolitan of Kiev.

This is how the members of this committee characterized the metropolitan's attitude towards them in their account of a meeting which took place on July 1, 1917: "At this meeting, in the presence of three vicar bishops, the metropolitan expressed what can only be called a hostile attitude toward the Church Committee in such clear and candid terms that all of its members wished to leave the metropolitan's inhospitable chambers. One of the committee members (Archpriest E.A. Kapralov) suggested that they do so and that it be recorded in the minutes that the metropolitan's attitude precluded any possibility of cooperative and fruitful labour."

The metropolitan's feelings were best expressed in an "archpastoral address" which he published in early August, 1917, on the eve of the convocation of an extraordinary congress of the Kievan diocese:-

"The great misfortune of our times is that people consider it to be a virtue to have a liberal attitude toward matters of faith and morality. Many consider it their duty to implant such a liberal attitude toward faith and morality in the souls of the Russian people... To justify themselves, they present arguments that seem to merit our attention. They say: every man can judge religious matters from his own point of view and freely express his convictions, whatever they may be, according to his conscience, and he must respect the religious convictions of others. No one will object to freedom of religion and of the conscience. One must not, however, forget that Christian faith is not a human invention, but rather the word of God, and it cannot be changed to suit people's concepts. If people's convictions stand in opposition to the Divine truth, is it reasonable to recognize these convictions, to consider them correct and to guide one's life by them? We must, of course, be tolerant of those who do not agree with us, and bear with even those who have clearly gone astray, but we must turn away from their errors, and prove that they are unfounded. The pastors of the Christian Church and all sincere followers of Christ's teachings should consider this their duty...

"Our local and rapidly growing sorrows add to the misfortune experienced by the whole of the Russian land. I am speaking about a tendency which has surfaced in southern Russia and which threatens to destroy the peace and unity of the Church. It is terrible for us even to hear people talk about separating the churches of southern Russia from the one Orthodox Church of Russia. After their long cooperation, can there be any grounds for such aims? What is their origin? Did not the preachers who spread Orthodoxy throughout Russia come from Kiev? Among the God-pleasing brethren of the Kiev-Caves Lavra do we not see men who came from all corners of Holy Russia? Is it not true that the Orthodox of southern Russia have laboured in all parts of Russia, serving the Church and as scholars in various fields? And conversely, is it not true that the Orthodox of northern Russia have laboured for salvation in various professions in southern Russia? Did they not erect the one great Russian Orthodox Church together? Could the Orthodox of southern Russia possibly reproach the Orthodox of northern Russia for falling away from the faith in some way or for distorting the teachings of faith and morality? Certainly not. Based on my personal experience I can testify that in all the dioceses where God has allowed me to serve, the Orthodox teachings of faith and morality are kept pure and unchanged, and there is everywhere unity in the Church's teachings and liturgical practices. Why should there be any separation? Where will it lead? Indeed, only the enemies both without and within will have cause to rejoice. Our love for our native soil should not suppress and stifle our love for the whole of Russia and for the one Russian Orthodox Church."

The metropolitan concluded by appealing to the clergy and laymen to "take every possible measure to promote unity among themselves and with the whole of the Russian Orthodox Church," and to "devote serious thought and proper preparation to the upcoming congress, thoroughly to discuss the issues presented there, and pass resolutions which are correct, legal, beneficial and which merit implementation."

However, the congress, which took place on August 8 and 9, 1917, took an entirely different direction. On August 9, the metropolitan was so offended by the proceedings of the congress that he fell seriously ill and had to leave the meeting immediately. In a defiant public statement, the delegates interpreted the metropolitan's departure as escapism and an expression of his lack of respect for the meeting.

In October, the Provisional Government fell. The Ukrainian government wished to use the change to turn their autonomous status into one of full independence. And the same tendencies were strongly present in the Church. A special committee in charge of convening a Council of the Orthodox clergy and lay people of the Ukraine was organized in Kiev in mid-November of 1917 according to a resolution passed at the third Cossack military assembly. Archbishop Alexis Dorodnitsyn (formerly of Vladimir), who was in retirement in the Kiev Caves Lavra, stood at the head of this committee. This committee was joined by representatives from among the clergy of Kiev (Fathers Lipkovsky, Tarnavsky, Filipenko and others), who played active roles in the above-mentioned organizations, such as the Executive Committee, Church Advisory Council to the Metropolitan of Kiev, etc.

At a meeting on November 23, this committee "discussed the present position of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine now that the Ukrainian government is being separated from the government of Russia, and took into account the pronouncement of the Russian Patriarch, who might extend his authority to include the Ukrainian Church as well". They passed a whole series of resolutions, which amounted to sweeping changes in the status and administration of the Church in the Ukraine. The organizational committee was renamed "the provisional Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council", and an executive committee established to convene a provisional Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council was proclaimed "the provisional government of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church". It was also decided that this new ecclesiastical government should appoint commissars to all the dioceses of the Ukraine: the priest Pashchevsky was appointed commissar of the Kievan diocese. And the chairman of the Council, Archbishop Alexis, was forbidden to go to Moscow, where he had been summoned to become the abbot of a monastery by Patriarch Tikhon.

On November 24, a general meeting of the Orthodox parish councils of Kiev was convened at which these moves towards Ukrainian ecclesiastical autocephaly were condemned and the fear was expressed that an autocephalous Church might join the uniates and come under the Pope.

A few days later the metropolitan arrived in Kiev. On December 4 a meeting convened by the Union of Orthodox Parish Councils was held under the presidency of the metropolitan and attended by Metropolitan Platon of Georgia. In the days that followed several attempts were made by the autocephalists to remove Metropolitan Vladimir and his vicar bishops from Kiev. At the end of the month another delegation came to the metropolitan and demanded that he leave Kiev. He replied with emotion: "I am not afraid of anyone or anything. I am at all times prepared to give my life for Christ's Church and for the Orthodox faith, to prevent its enemies from mocking it. I will suffer to the very end in order to preserve Orthodoxy in the very place where it first took root in Russia." And then, going up to one member of the delegation and pointing at his heart, he said: "Do you know that the first revolutionary was the devil, and you are making a revolution in the Church of Christ?" Then he wept bitterly.

The metropolitan considered the convening of an All-Ukrainian Council untimely in view of the Bolshevik seizure of power. Nevertheless, he was forced to prepare for the opening of a new Council, and opened its first session on January 7, 1918 with a moleben on Sophia square and a welcoming speech to the delegates. He was unanimously elected to the chairmanship of the Council, and attended every meeting until the civil war broke out in Kiev.

Artillery shells began to fall on the Lavra on January 15 as the Bolsheviks, trampling on the principle of self-determination, tried to seize the Ukraine. However, the metropolitan continued with his religious duties, displaying great calm. On January 23, he celebrated his last Divine Liturgy with the brotherhood of the Lavra.

That evening, after occupying Kiev, the Bolsheviks took control of the Lavra, and violence began. Armed people burst into the churches with hats on their heads and cigarettes between their teeth. With shouting and swearing they conducted searches even during Divine services, and mocked the holy things. They stripped old monks and took off their shoes outside. Then they mocked them and cut them with whips. Officers who were found in the Lavra were killed. In spite of all the commotion, the metropolitan served an akathist to the Dormition of the Mother of God in the great church of the Lavra, which proved to be his last service on earth. Then he and Bishop Theodore of Priluki moved to the altar of the lower church, which was dedicated to St. Michael, first metropolitan of Kiev. He was then shot by the Bolsheviks, the first bishop-martyr of the revolution…

On hearing this news, the Moscow Council of the Russian Orthodox Church then in session appointed the day of Metropolitan Vladimir’s martyrdom, January 25 / February 7, as the day of the commemoration of all the New Martyrs of Russia.

In March, 1918, the Germans conquered Kiev. In November, they were replaced by Petlyura, who arrested Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky) of Kiev, Archbishop Eulogius of Volhynia, Bishop Nicodemus of Chigirinsk, Archimandrite Vitaly (Maximenko) and others, and handed them over to the Poles. In August, 1919, Kiev was liberated by the Whites, and with the help of pressure from the Western powers, the prisoners were released. As the Red Army regained the upper hand, Metropolitan Anthony set off for the Kuban, where he became honorary president of the Higher Church Authority of the South of Russia, which in turn became the core of the Russian Church in Exile.

In 1920 an “Independent Union of Ukrainian Orthodox Parishes” was formed, which convoked the first council of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church in October, 1921. Metropolitan Michael (Ermakov) appeared at the Sophia cathedral and called on those present not to introduce a scandal into Church life, and pointed out that Patriarch Tikhon had “blessed Divine services in the Ukrainian language when that was desired by a majority of parishioners, including women, whom the Patriarch blessed to take part in Church work with full rights”. The metropolitan hoped that the delegates “will not transgress the Church canons or the will of his Holiness the Patriarch”. He did not give his blessing to the assembly, pointing out its anticanonicity, and suggested that the participants disperse to their homes.

When the metropolitan had departed, on October 23 the participants proceeded to a so-called “conciliar consecration”. This strange procedure was necessitated by the fact that, since no bishops had joined them, they were forced to create bishops for themselves in a manner that no other Orthodox Church recognized as canonical, earning for themselves the title of the “Lypkovsky s*amosvyaty*” after the first “bishop” to be thus consecrated, Basil Lypkovsky. As Lypkovsky himself wrote: “30 priests and all the laymen – as many as could fit into the walls of the Sophia cathedral - took part in the consecration. At the moment of consecration a wave of enthusiasm ran through the crowd. The members of the council and all those present put their hands on each other’s shoulders until a chain of hands went up to the priests who surrounded me.” Then they took Lipkovsky to the relics of Great Martyr Mercurius and placed on his head the dead head of the saint. That is how Lypkovsky became a “bishop”. On October 24 and 30 several other bishops were consecrated. The Council also introduced a married episcopate and second marriages for priests.[[604]](#footnote-604)

Later in the 1920s a second autocephalist movement was initiated by Bishop Theophilus (Buldovsky) of Lubensk, who received consecration in the Patriarchal Church at a time when the Lypkovsky schism was declining, but who later separated from the Church on the same basis of Ukrainian nationalism and united the remnants of the Lypkovsky schism to his own.

One of the most popular patriarchal priests in the Ukraine at this time was Fr. Basil (Zelentsov), a disciple of Archbishop Theophanes of Poltava. It was largely through his influence that Buldovsky’s schism was rejected by the people. In 1922 Fr. Basil was put on trial. In his speech at the end of the trial he said that he was loyal to Soviet power insofar as “it, like everything else, is sent to us from above… But where the matter touches the Faith of Christ, the churches of God and human souls, there I have fought, do now fight, and will continue to fight to my last breath with the representatives of this power. It would be shamefully sinful for me, as a warrior of Christ, who bear this cross on my breast, to defend myself personally at a time when the enemies have taken up arms and declared war against Christ Himself.” After his consecration to the episcopate in 1925, Bishop Basil continued to wage a spiritual war against the Bolsheviks, publicly calling them “apostates from God, violators, blasphemers of the Faith of Christ, murderers, a satanic power, blood-suckers, destroyers of freedom and justice, fiends from hell”. He constantly called on the people “to make no allowances or compromises for them, to fight and fight with the enemies of Christ, and not to fear tortures and death, for sufferings from Him are the highest happiness and joy”. In 1930 he suffered martyrdom in Moscow for his rejection of sergianist neo-renovationism.

Although the Ukrainian autocephalists were a clearly schismatic movement, they did not share the modernist ideology of the Muscovite renovationists, and entered into union with them only in the autumn of 1924, evidently with the aim of securing the recognition of their own autocephaly from Constantinople, with whom the renovationists were in communion. That is why it was not until January 5, 1924 that the patriarch extended his anti-renovationist anathema of 1923 to the autocephalists. Even then, the autocephalists showed little animosity towards the patriarch, and in the Second All-Ukrainian Council of 1925 the Synod issued an epistle calling for the review of Patriarch Tikhon’s defrocking by the renovationists.[[605]](#footnote-605) Although the Ukrainian autocephalists were now largely controlled by Soviet agents, in January, 1930 the authorities convened a council which dissolved the whole of their Church organisation…[[606]](#footnote-606)

**2. Bessarabia.** One of the consequences of the Russian revolution was that Russian Moldavia (Bessarabia), 60% of whose population was Romanian, was united to the Romanian state.

Before the revolution, writes Jelavich, “Romanians as such did not face prejudice[[607]](#footnote-607), and there were Romanian as well as Russian large landowners. The widespread discontent was economic and social more than national. The position of the peasants was regulated by the Russian emancipation laws of the 1860s and subsequent reform measures, but, as in other parts of Russia, these had not solved the basic agrarian problems. Since conditions were roughly the same in the Regat, independent Romania did not hold a great attraction for the peasant majority. The main demand of all peasants was a breakup of the large estates and a distribution of their lands…

“Because of these conditions, the Russian revolutions in March and November 1917 were bound to have a great effect. They influenced not only the disaffected peasants, but also the many soldiers in the province who had deserted the rapidly disintegrating Russian army… As early as July 1917 the peasants began to seize the land; by the end of the year they had appropriated about two-thirds.

“In October 1917 a provisional government for Bessarabia was organized, with its center at Kishinev… This government remained in control of the province from November 1917 to November 1918. In December 1917 it declared itself the Democratic Moldavian Republic and expressed the desire to join a Soviet federative republic…”[[608]](#footnote-608)

However, in view of the discussions that had begun between the Soviet and German governments, this decision disturbed the Allied Powers, and with the approval of France the Romanian army invaded the province. On March 27, the Moldavian parliament, surrounded by Romanian soldiers, voted for the union of Bessarabia with Romania, and the Kishinev diocese was handed over to the Romanian Church. It was suggested to Archbishop Anastasy (Gribanovsky) of Kishinev that he join the Romanian Church; but he refused. In May he left the province, and the Kishinev archiepiscopate fell under the jurisdiction of the Romanian Church.[[609]](#footnote-609) On June 14, the Holy Synod of the Romanian Church appointed Bishop Nicodemus (Muntianu) of Khush as deputy *locum tenens* of the see (he later became Patriarch of Romania). He began to “Romanize” the Bessarabian Church, introduced the Romanian language into the Kishinev seminary and in some monasteries replaced Russian and Ukrainian superiors with Romanian ones.

In October, 1918 Patriarch Tikhon wrote to Metropolitan Pimen of Moldavia and Suceava, the president of the Romanian Synod, protesting strongly at the anticanonical seizure of the Kishinev diocese by the Romanian Church, “which by her unilateral decision taken without the agreement of the Russian Church did not have the right to determine the destiny of the Kishinev diocese by submitting it to her power after Orthodox Bessarabia had constituted an indivisible part of the Russian ecclesiastical body for the last one hundred years. This way of acting on the part of the Romanian Holy Synod contradicts at the same time the spirit of Christian love, the age-old canonical decrees and the sacred customs of the Orthodox Church. Pointing to the supposed fact that political union always brings with it a union of the Churches cannot in the given case serve as a justification for the Romanian ecclesiastical authority, first, because it is not itself justified by history, and secondly, because such a point of view rests on a confusion of the nature of ecclesiastical and political life, which are different by their very essence… Moreover, the act of joining Bessarabia to the Romanian kingdom, as we said before, is far from generally recognised from the international point of view and can be subject to review at the final tally of the results of the world war… If the Romanian Church, in spite of the objections we have raised, tries by force to strengthen the position in its favour, we will be forced to break all fraternal and canonical communion with the Romanian Synod and bring the present matter before the judgement of the other Orthodox Churches.”[[610]](#footnote-610)

The Romanians paid no attention to this admonition, and in 1919 placed in the see of Kishinev Archimandrite Gurias (Grossu), a Russian priest of Moldavian extraction, and a graduate of the Kiev Academy…[[611]](#footnote-611)

And so, as K.V. Glazkov writes, “while with one hand the Romanian authorities mercilessly destroyed the communist opposition (for example, mass punitive operation were undertaken against Bolsheviks in the army, and Romanian units took part in the suppression of the red revolution in 1918 in Hungary), with the other hand they suppressed every kind of dissidence. A number of deputies of the Popular Assembly who were opponents of the union of Bessarabia and Romania were shot, after which the National Assembly itself was dissolved, while on the same day the pro-Romanian deputies triumphantly overthrew the monuments to Tsars Alexander I and Alexander II in the capital. In January, 1920, the White armies of General Bredov…, in whose carts were fugitives, women and children, were shot from Romanian machine-guns as they approached the Dniester. In this way the new authorities in Bessarabia spoiled for good their relations with the Russians.[[612]](#footnote-612)

“We should note that from the very beginning the Russian hierarchy and clergy, as if foreseeing the possibility of church-political disturbances, adopted quite a cold attitude to the inclusion of Bessarabia into Romania. This act was even condemned by Archbishop Anastasy (Gribanovsky) of Kishinev and Khotyn (latter first-hierarch of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad). Hoping for the speedy victory of the White movement, the representatives of the Bessarabian Church together with the *zemstva* took part in the creation of a Committee for the liberation of Bessarabia. Therefore the Romanian Synod began the canonical submission of the Bessarabian diocese by demanding that Vladykas Anastasy, Gabriel and Dionysius separate from the Russian Orthodox Church in spite of the protests of Patriarch Tikhon. When the hierarchs refused to do this, the Romanian military units arrested them and exiled them from the country. But the believers were told that the hierarchs had left their diocese voluntarily. In the place of Metropolitan Anastasy there arrived from Bucharest the Romanian Archbishop Nicodemus; he was met by the clergy and laity by no means in a friendly manner. The ecclesiastical authorites [of the Russian Church] Abroad did not recognise the lawfulness of the union of the Kishinev diocese to the Romanian Church. It was violence, deceit and transgression of the Church canons, and not at all the commandments of God, that were laid at the foundation of their actions on the territory of Bessarabia by the Romanian civil and ecclesiastical authorities. How could the coming events unfold except in conditions of further imposition of terror?

“In the Kishinev spiritual seminary and spiritual schools the Romanian authorities removed the teaching of Russian and Church Slavonic languages, clearly intending to create a situation in which in Bessarabia as a whole there would remain no priests able to serve in Church Slavonic. Also, Church Slavonic service books were removed from the churches, and the priests were banned from delivering sermons in Russian. Direct physical persecution began against the zealots for the language of Saints Cyril and Methodius. In the village of Rechul the nuns of the local monastery were beaten with birch-rods by Romanian gendarmes for taking part in services in Church Slavonic, while an old priest of the village of Goreshte who was suspected of sympathising with the opposition was tortured with wet lashes until he lost consciousness, after which he went mad. It may be that the whole guilt of the priest consisted in the fact that he, like many true patriots, did not want to commemorate the Romanian king, his family and the Synod at the liturgy.

“The majority of the zealots for Church Slavonic as the liturgical language were Russians, but many Moldavian priests and laypeople fought steadfastly against forcible Romanianization. ‘The Moldavians,’ reported the Romanian counter-intelligence of Beltsky *uyezd*, ‘are hostile to the Romanian administration, they avoid the Romanian clergy…, they threaten the priests when they commemorate the name of the king in church.’…

“In July, 1922 there was formed in Kishinev a multi-national ‘Union of Orthodox Christians’. Soon Bessarabian patriots came to lead the Union. They were closely linked with the Russian community in Kishinev. According to certain information, Russian monarchists led by General E. Leontovich took part in the organisation of the Union. In 1924 the re-registration of another organisation took place – the Orthodox Brotherhood of Alexander Nevsky, which was led by activists of Moldavian, Gagauz and Russian nationalities – Protopriest Michael Chakir, Priest Nicholas Lashku and K.K. Malanetsky, etc. All these were branded by the secret police as ‘ardent pan-Russists’, while the brotherhood was called the centre for the preservation and propaganda of Russian monarchist ideas…”[[613]](#footnote-613)

**3. Georgia.** Dov Kontorer writes: “In November, 1917 in Tbilisi a Transcaucasian commissariat was established representing a combined government of Georgian socialists, Armenian Dashnaks and Azerbaidzhani Musavatists. The power of this organ extended – theoretically, at least – over the whole territory of Transcaucasia, except for the region of Baku, where the Bolsheviks were in power. The Transcaucasian commissariat refused to recognize the results of the Brest peace, according to which Soviet Russia conceded to Turkey not only the territories conquered in the First World War, but also the districts of Kars, Ardagan and Batum. This led to the destruction of peaceful negotiations at a conference in Trabzon in March-April, 1918. Meanwhile the continuing collapse of the State in Transcaucasia was combined with an excessively bold external politics. In the spring of 1918 the Turks were in quite a difficult situation. Nevertheless, at the cost of some short military actions, they succeeded in seizing Batumi, Ozurgeti, Akhaltsikhe and a series of other territories.

“It was against this background that an ‘independent federal democratic republic’ was proclaimed in Transcaucasia. It lasted for about a month. On May 26, 1918 the Georgian Mensheviks headed by N.S. Chkheidze, I.G. Tsereteli and N.N. Jordania, declared Georgia to be an independent republic… But the reality of Georgian ‘independence’ was such that the new government immediately had to summon German forces onto its territory ‘for defence against the Turks’, and at the same time to sign a peace agreement with Turkey according to which Georgia lost even more than it had according to the conditions of the Brest peace which it had rejected.”[[614]](#footnote-614)

The British occupied Georgia from November, 1918 to July, 1920, after which the country was independent under the Menshevik Jordania until the Bolshevik invasion in February, 1921… The Bolsheviks had gained only a negligible share of the vote in May, 1918. But, as Jean-François Revel writes, “as in the Afghanistan fifty-eight years later, the Kremlin’s puppets in Georgia appealed for the Red Army’s help. The republic was invaded, occupied, annexed. And, as in Afghanistan, the occupying power was held in check by fierce local resistance. In 1924, insurrectionists even succeeded in liberating half of Georgia; the rising was drowned in blood by the aptly named Red Army, but only with the aid of heavy armored and air reinforcements. As it did after the Afghanistan invasion, an ‘indignant’ West was content to ‘follow the events in this part of the world attentively so as to seize the opportunities that might arise to assist this country’s return to a normal situation by peaceful means in accordance with the rules of international law’ [Resolution adopted by the League of Nations on September 24, 1924].”[[615]](#footnote-615)

Georgian ecclesiastical independence had been proclaimed even earlier than Georgian political independence. On March 12, 1917, an Assembly of the bishops, clergy and laity of Georgia proclaimed the re-establishment of the autocephaly of the Georgian Church, which led to a break in communion with the Russian Church. In the summer, however, “the Georgian Church sent a special deputation to the Most Holy Russian Synod to inform the Most Holy Synod about the re-establishment of the autocephaly of the Georgian Church and greet it. The Russian Synod through the mouth of Archbishop Sergius of Finland confirmed ‘that Russian Church consciousness has never been foreign to the thought of the necessity of returning to the Georgian Church her former constitution… If this thought has not been realised up to now, for this there were special reasons’ not depending on Church actors, but ‘now, in the days of the general liberating spring, Russian Church consciousness is ready to welcome the fulfilment … of the long-time dream’ of the Orthodox Georgians, and the Russian hierarchs hope ‘that God will order all for the good, and that certain roughnesses in this matter will be smoothed over’ and that at the forthcoming Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church a fraternal meeting of representatives of the two Churches is bound to take place in order to find a path to mutual understanding’.”[[616]](#footnote-616)

In September, a General Council of the Georgian Church confirmed the Acts of the March Council. On October 1 Bishop Kirion Sadzaguelachvili was enthroned as Catholicos-Patriarch in Tbilisi by three vicar bishops over the protests of three Georgian hierarchs: Demetrius (Abashidze) of Simferopol, Antony of Gori and Nazarius (Lezhavy). On December 29 / January 11, 1918, Patriarch Tikhon also protested against the re-establishment of Georgian autocephaly, pointedly addressing Kirion as only a bishop.[[617]](#footnote-617)

However, the Russian and Georgian governments confirmed this election.[[618]](#footnote-618) Kirion immediately seized the exarchal house and ordered the portraits of the Tsar and the previous exarchs removed. After his first and last liturgy as Catholicos, he fell ill. According tone version, he had been poisoned; according to another, he had poisoned himself. In order to recuperate he went to the monastery of St. Anthony, near Martkopi. There, in June, 1918, he committed suicide. [[619]](#footnote-619)

“In December, 1918,” continues Kontorer, “with the defeat of Germany in the First World War, the German soldiers in Transcaucasia were replaced by a British expeditionary force. They saw their task in guaranteeing the uninterrupted work of the oil industry and the Batumi-Baku railway, while keeping internal peace in the region interested them very little. As a lawful result of this, there began a series of embittered ethnic wars that accompanied a ‘parade of sovereignties’ in Transcaucasia.

“The best known was the Armenian-Azerbaidzhani war, which was accompanied on both sides by the massive slaughter of the peaceful population (in contemporary terminology: ‘ethnic cleansing’). In the autumn of 1920 there entered into the conflict, with the agreement of Georgia, the young Kemalist state of Turkey. Having attained a rapid and complete victory on the field of battle, it imposed significant territorial concessions on Armenia in negotiations in Alexandropol. These were partially reviewed later when the RSFSR and Turkey concluded an agreement in Moscow in 1921.

“But it was not only the major Transcaucasian nations who warred against each other at this time. The assertion of national identity in conditions of the collapse of the previous imperial statehood was accompanied almost everywhere by blood civil conflict. Thus in Georgia the Menshevik government of Noe Jordania conducted in relation to a whole series of national minorities a politics that would be described today as an attempt at genocide. In particular, at that time Georgia exterminated about 18,000 Osetians, which helped greatly to make the population of Northern Osetia to cling desperately to the possibility of remaining within Soviet Russia, while that part of the Osetian population which lived compactly to the south of the Great Caucasian Ridge was extremely grateful to Moscow for the creation within Georgia of the South Osetian autonomous republic.”[[620]](#footnote-620)

For in February, 1921 the Bolsheviks, at the initiative of the Georgians Stalin and Ordzhonikidze, had invaded Georgia, and after a short war of three weeks took control of the country. Soon the Church was deprived of juridical status, and churches and monasteries began to be closed…

“On February 7, 1922,” writes Fr. Elijah Melia, “Catholicos Ambrose sent to the Inter-Allied Conference at Genoa (the highest degree of international jurisdiction at that time) a letter of protest in which, recalling the moral obligations towards the nation of his charge, he protested in the name of the people of Georgia, deprived of their rights, against the foreign occupation and demanded the intervention of civilized humanity to oppose the iniquity committed against Georgia. He was arrested in February 1923 with Archbishop Nasaire and all the members of his Council. Their trial, which took place under conditions of semi-liberty, greatly stirred up the country.

“There were three accusations: 1) the 1922 letter to the Genoa Conference, 2) the concealment of the historic treasures of the Church in order to preserve them from passing into the hands of the State and 3) the prohibition imposed [by the] Governmental Commission for Religion against the redemption of precious objects in favour of the starving. Archbishop Nasaire was assassinated during the trial [on September 1, 1924], most probably in order to impress the others accused. All the members of his Council showed their solidarity with the Catholicos Ambrose, who conducted himself heroically, assuming the entire responsibility for his acts, which he declared to have been in conformity with his obligations and with the tradition of the Church of Georgia in similar cases. He was condemned to eight years imprisonment. Two members of his Council were given five and two years respectively. The Catholicos was liberated before the term of his imprisonment was over. He died on March 29, 1927.

“In August 1924, a general insurrection broke out, organized by all the active forces of the nation – the higher ranks of the army, the political parties, the university, the ecclesiastics, the population as a whole. But the uprising was doomed to fail, for the plot had been betrayed. The repression created thousands of victims. Groups of partisans still operated for some time…”[[621]](#footnote-621)

## **81. THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR**

The defeat of the Whites in the Russian Civil War has been attributed to many factors – the Reds’ occupation of the centre, the Whites’ difficulties of communication, the fitful intervention of the western powers, the betrayal of the Whites by the Poles… One thing is clear: the Reds did *not* represent a formidable opponent at first. Having destroyed the old Imperial army by their propaganda, it was extremely difficult for them to build up an effective new army. By the spring of 1920 80% of the officer corps was staffed by former tsarist officers, whose services were retained only by blackmail - the threat that their families would be massacred if they did not comply. Even so, there were very many desertions to the Whites – 1.76 million in 1919 alone, the Whites’ most successful year.[[622]](#footnote-622)

S.A. Smith writes: “Some see the military advantages of the Reds as overwhelming, but that is to make too much of hindsight. A military victory for the Whites was by no means an impossibility: if Kolchak and Denikin had advanced on Moscow simultaneously in 1919, rather than five months apart, or if Kolchak had struck a deal with the Finnish general Mannerheim (both of which were on the cards), the Red Army might well have gone under.

“If military and strategic factors are paramount in explaining the White defeat, socio-political factors cannot be ignored. By 1919 all the White administrations recognized that they could not simpy shelve the thorny issues of land reform, national autonomy, labour policy, and local government. The policies they concocted, however, offered too little, too late and exposed deep division in White ranks. First, with regard to land, all White administrations accepted that the could be no return to the status quo ante, yet there were enough cases of officers returning former landowners to their estates to fix in peasant minds the notion that a White victory would bring about the return of the landlords. Whenever the White had to deal with non-Russian nationalities, peasants swung behind the Reds. Second, the Whites had to deal with non-Russian nationalities: yet their hatred of what Denikin called the ‘sweet poisonous dreams of independence’ prevented them from making serious concessions. They would not recognize the independence of Finland and the Baltic States; they would not negotiate with J. Pilsudski, President of Poland from November 1918; they would not recognize a ‘separatist’ Ukrainian state. By contrast, the Bolsheviks, however much they alienated nationalists at times, were willing to grant a measure of self-government. Finally, despite trumpeting their devotion to the Russian people, the Whites failed to forge a concept of the nation with which peasants and workers could identify. With the Church on their side, they might have tried to play on the Orthodox faith of the majority, yet they proved too hidebound by a militaristic and narrowly elitish ethos to adapt to the world of mass politics. Ironically, it was the internationalist Bolsheviks who tapped into patriotic sentiment, exploiting the Whites’ dependence on the Allies to portray them as playthings of foreign capital.”[[623]](#footnote-623)

In the last analysis, however, the Whites failed, not because of any military or socio-political factors, but because, as Elder Aristocles of Moscow (+1918) said, “The spirit [among them] is not right.”[[624]](#footnote-624) For many of them were aiming first of all, not at the restoration of Orthodoxy and the Orthodox tsardom, but at the reconvening of the Constituent Assembly or the restoration of their former way of life. Of course, as noted above, if the White armies approaching Yekaterinburg from the East in July, 1918 had managed to rescue the Tsar alive, the task of the Whites would have been easier – which is precisely why the Reds killed them. But even a living Tsar would probably have availed little in view of the fact that in their majority neither the White soldiers nor the populations whose interests they sought to represent were monarchists. Thus in 1919, when the Romanov Great Princes who were in the Crimea approached General Denikin with a request to enter the ranks of the White Army, they were refused. “The reasons,” writes Prince Felix Yusupov, “were political: the presence of relatives of the imperial family in the ranks of the White Army was not desirable. The refusal greatly upset us…”[[625]](#footnote-625)

Certainly, the White armies could not be described as consciously monarchist, with the possible exception of Wrangel’s towards the end. [[626]](#footnote-626) Thus the leading White General A.I. Denikin said during the war: “You think that I’m going to Moscow to restore the throne of the Romanovs? Never!” And after the war he wrote: “It is not given us to know what state structure Russia would have accepted in the event of the victory of the White armies in 1919-20. I am sure, however, that after an inevitable, but short-lived struggle of various political tendencies, a normal structure would have been established in Russia based on the principles of law, freedom and private property. And in any case – no less democratic than that which the reposed Marshal [Pisludsky] introduced in Poland…”[[627]](#footnote-627)

Not having firmly Orthodox and monarchical convictions, but rather, as V. Shambarov writes, “a complete absence of a political programme”[[628]](#footnote-628), the Whites were bound to be disunited amongst themselves and weak in opposing Red propaganda in their rear. This was especially evident on the northern front, where Red propaganda was effective amongst both the White Russians and the British.[[629]](#footnote-629) But it was hardly less true on the other fronts.

As Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky) commented: “Unfortunately, the most noble and pious leader of this [the White] army listened to those unfitting counsellors who were foreign to Russia and sat in his Special council and destroyed the undertaking. The Russian people, the real people, the believing and struggling people, did not need the bare formula: ‘a united and undivided Russia’. They needed neither ‘Christian Russia’, nor ‘Faithless Russia’, nor ‘Tsarist Russia’, nor ‘the Landowners’ Russia’ (by which they will always understand a republic). They needed the combination of the three dear words – ‘for the Faith, the Tsar and the Fatherland’. Most of all, they needed the first word, since faith rules the whole of the state’s life; the second word was necessary since the tsar guards and protects the first; and the third was needed since the people is the bearer of the first words.”

St. John Maximovich summed up the situation: “If the higher military leaders, instead of beseeching his Majesty ‘on their knees’ to abdicate, had carried out what they were bound to do in accordance with their oath, the artificially incited rebellion would have been suppressed and Russia would have been saved… A terrible sin before God and a state crime was carried out. God only knows the extent to which any of them expiated their sin. But there was hardly any open repentance. After the fall of the Provisional Government, and the loss of the power it had seized, there was a call to struggle for Russia. But although it elicited noble feelings among many and a corresponding movement, there was no expression of repentance on the part of the main criminals, who continued to think of themselves as heroes and saviours of Russia. Meanwhile, Trotsky in his *Memoirs* admitted that they (the Soviets) feared above all the proclamation of a Tsar, since then the fall of Soviet power would have been inevitable. However, this did not happen, the ‘leaders’ were also afraid. They inspired many to struggle, but their call was belated and their courage did not save Russia. Some of them laid down their lives and shed their blood in this struggle, but far more innocent blood was shed. It continues to be poured out throughout Russia, crying out to heaven.”

St. John was once asked: “Is it necessary to pray for the white generals?” He said: “Of course, it is necessary to pray for them. But it is also necessary to remember that they were all traitors to their oath…"[[630]](#footnote-630)

The importance of a true motivation in the White Cause is well illustrated by one of the very few truly monarchist White leaders, who was counted worthy to receive a martyr’s crown – General Theodore Keller. He was born in 1857 in Kursk into a military family, and had a very distinguished career in the First World War. On hearing of the February revolution, and the text of the new oath, he declared he would not impose it on the soldiers under his command since “he does not understand the essence and juridical basis of the supreme power of the Provisional Government”. Baron Mannerheim, the future ruler of independent Finland, tried to persuade him “to sacrifice his personal political convictions for the good of the army”, but was met with a firm refusal: “I am a Christian. I think that it is sinful to betray one’s oath.” The court commandant V.N. Voeikov, who knew Theodore Arturovich personally, wrote in his notes that he was “truly Russian, a man of crystal purity, penetrated to the marrow of his bones with a sense of duty and love for the Homeland”. He told his troops: “Today I received a despatch about the abdication of his Majesty and some kind of Provisional Government. This is the telegram that I have sent to the Tsar: ‘The Third Mounted Corps does not believe that You, Your Majesty, have voluntarily renounced the Throne. Give the order, Tsar, and we shall come and defend You.’” The troops thundered in reply: “Hurrah! Hurrah! We shall not allow the Emperor to be offended!” It was only when the commander of the Romanian front threatened to declare him a rebel that General Keller was forced to submit to the order, and to the sound of the hymn, “God save the Tsar!” gave up his corps. The general was escorted in profound sorrow and with tears by warriors who sincerely loved him. After the Bolshevik revolution he thought about taking part in the Volunteer Army of Generals Alexeyev and Denikin, but refused because, as a convinced monarchist, he thought that the struggle with the Bolsheviks could be undertaken only “in the name of the Autocratic Tsar of All Rus’ and following the path of repentance by the whole people and the re-establishment of the old Tsarist Army”. He wrote: “The union of Russia is a great work, but this banner is too indefinite. Declare that you are following the lawful Sovereign, and the whole people that pines for firm authority and all that remains in Russia that is best will follow you without wavering.”

In 1918 there gathered in Kiev those rightist politicians who wanted to create a monarchist Army of the South to struggle against Bolshevism with the aid of the Germans. They suggested to Theodore Arturovich that he head this army. But he refused, saying: “Here a part of the intelligentsia has adopted an Allied orientation, others, the majority, are supporters of a German orientation, but both have forgotten their Russian orientation.”

Then the Pskov monarchists arrived in Kiev in the name of the Army of the North, which was preparing to introduce an oath “to the lawful Tsar and the Russian State”. In this army they were reintroducing the old rules and uniforms with the addition of a white cross sown on the left sleeve. They suggested that Theodore Arturovich head this army. He agreed, and said that he intended “to raise the Imperial standard above the Kremlin in two months’ time.” In Kiev a monarchist Council of Defence was formed under a new commander. Theodore Arturovich addressed his military comrades with an “Appeal to the Old Soldiery”: “The time has come when I again call you to follow me. Remember and read the prayer before battle – that prayer which you read before our glorious victories. Sign yourselves with the sign of the Cross, and with God’s help we go forward for the Faith, for the Tsar and for our undivided Homeland Russia.” When Theodore Arturovich was about to head the Army of the North, Patriarch Tikhon sent him a prosphora and a little icon of the Reigning Mother of God through Bishop Nestor of Kamchatka.

In the autumn of 1918 the soldiers of Petlyura (socialists of a primitive kind, headed by Ataman Petlyura) burst into Kiev. They began to capture officers on the street and subject them to torture. The German soldiers, honouring the reputation of Theodore Arturovich, suggested that he go into hiding. But they set a condition: that he must agree to give up his weapons and take off his military uniform. He refused. Theodore Arturovich and two of his adjutants were imprisoned in the Mikhailovsky monastery in Kiev. The followers of Petlyura then appeared at the monastery. The monks suggested that Theodore Arturovich escape by a secret exit, but he refused. On the night of November 25/ December 8, 1918 the three men were shot.

Another weakness of the Whites was their failure to curb anti-semitic excesses in their ranks, especially among the Cossacks. However, as Richard Pipes writes, “while the Cossack detachments of the Southern Army committed numerous atrocities (none can be attributed to the Volunteer army), a careful reckoning of the pogroms by Jewish organizations indicates that the worst crimes were the work of independent gangs of Ukrainians.”[[631]](#footnote-631)

Hatred of Jews was common to all classes of society, of all ideological persuasions – except the true Christians. A 1920 estimate put the numbers of Jews killed by Whites and Reds together at 150,000.[[632]](#footnote-632) Now historians have paid more attention to atrocities committed by the Whites than to those committed by the Reds. Nevertheless, the fact remains that shameful acts of plunder, torture and rape were committed by the Whites. And while, as Pipes goes on to say, “it is incorrect to lay wholesale blame for the massacres of the Jews on the White Army, it is true that Denikin [commander of the Volunteer Army] remained passive in the face of these atrocities, which not only stained the reputation of his army but also demoralized it…

“Personally, Denikin was not a typical anti-Semite of the time: at any rate, in his five-volume chronicle of the Civil War he does not blame the Jews either for Communism or for his defeat. On the contrary, he expresses shame at their treatment in his army as well as the pogroms and shows awareness of the debilitating effect these had on the army’s morale. But he was a weak, politically inexperienced man who had little control over the behaviour of his troops. He yielded to the pressures of anti-Semites in his officer corps from fear of appearing pro-Jewish and from a sense of the futility of fighting against prevailing passions. In June 1919 he told a Jewish delegation that urged him to issue a declaration condemning the pogroms, that ‘words here were powerless, that any unnecessary clamor in regard to this question will only make the situation of Jews harder, irritating the masses and bringing out the customary accusations of “selling out to the Yids”.’ Whatever the justice of such excuses for passivity in the face of civilian massacres, they must have impressed the army as well as the population at large that the White Army command viewed Jews with suspicion and if it did not actively encourage pogroms, neither was it exercised about them…

“The only prominent public figure to condemn the pogroms openly and unequivocally was the head of the Orthodox Church, Patriarch Tikhon. In an Epistle issued on July 21, 1919, he called violence against Jews ‘dishonor for the perpetrators, dishonour for the Holy Church’...”[[633]](#footnote-633)

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Paradoxically, the population was probably more anti-Bolshevik in the Red-occupied areas than elsewhere – because they had had direct experience of Bolshevik cruelty.

As General A.A. von Lampe writes, “the border regions, which naturally attracted to themselves the attention of those Russians who did not want to submit to the dictatorship established in the centre, *did not know Bolshevism,* that is, they probably did not know the results of its practical application on the skin of the natives. They had not experienced the delights of the Soviet paradise and were not able to exert themselves fully to avoid the trials and torments that were coming upon them.

“The population of these provinces, of course, knew the war that was exhausting the whole of Russia. The population also knew the revolution, which gave them the so-called ‘freedoms’!… The population, with the complicity of the soldiers, who had known on the front only the declaration of *rights*, but not the *obligations* of the soldier, knew only about their rights and did not at all represent to themselves that all these rights were bound up with certain obligations.

“On the territory of this population a real war was being waged, a civil war with its gunfights that did not always hit only those who were fighting in the direct line of fire; with its repressions, not only in relation to people and their property, but also to the settlements themselves, which sometimes, in the course of a battle, were mercilessly and inexorably razed to the ground… The population had to sacrifice their rights and their comforts. The White army was not that equipped and organized army that we are accustomed to imagine when we pronounce that word; immediately on coming into contact with the population it was forced to take from it fodder, horses, reserves of food and, finally, the people themselves!

“War on a given territory always brings with it many deprivations and sufferings. War, and in particular civil war, *feeds itself and supplements itself!* And, of course, the population could not welcome this; it, as I have already said, thought not about its responsibilities, but only about its rights, and it expected from the Whites only the immediate restoration of order and normal conditions of life, not thinking on its side to offer it any help at all.

“The whole sum of *unpleasantnesses* brought by the drawn-out war was very sharply experienced by the population; and at the same time it was being forcibly corrupted by the Red and socialist propaganda promising them deliverance from all these woes, promises of complete prosperity and complete dominion, promises which, as we know, have seduced not only Russia, but are disturbing no small part of the population of the whole world to this day…

“All this came down to the fact that the inconveniences caused by the Whites *ranged the population against them*…

“The Reds threatened and threatened very unambiguously to take *everything* and in fact took *a part* – the population was deceived and… relieved. The Whites promised legality, and took only a little – and the population was embittered…

“The Reds promised *everything*, the Whites only that which was fitting *according to the law…*

“The Reds had terror and machine-guns as arguments and measures of persuasion; the Whites threatened – *with the law…*

“The Reds decisively rejected everything and raised arbitrariness into a law; the Whites, in rejecting the Reds, of course could not also reject the methods of arbitrariness and violence employed by the Reds…

“The population demanded nothing from the Reds since the only thing they could wish for once they had fallen into their hands was peace, and they did not, of course, demand that! But from the Whites the population demanded… a miracle, they demanded that the Whites, with one wave of their white hands, should remove all the blood from Russia…”[[634]](#footnote-634)

Among the Tsarist generals who were forced to serve in the Red Army but later repented was the famous war hero Alexei Brusilov, who wrote: “I firmly believe and know for certain that the Satanist pygmies (the red orators) will not succeed in squeezing the faith of Christ out of us… My eyes were bound, for a long time I considered the Russian revolution to be from the people, an expression of the dissatisfaction of the masses with the old order… Now my eyes are open. This… is a question posed directly concerning the whole of the Christian culture of the whole world! The persecution against the Church, against the best of the clergy, the corruption of children and youth, their artificial vaccination with vices, the teaching of children to spy (asking the little ones at school: do your parents go to church? Do you have icons at home? Do they remember the old times?), the destruction of families - all this is not necessary to the Russian workers and peasants. (Also unnecessary is the destruction of aold cemeteries and monuments that have stood on the graves there for more than a hundred years). This is necessary for antichristian children, such as are the Bolshevik communists, who are led by still higher levels of the black power of the enemies of Christ… I have one prayer to God: deliver us from antichristian children, one hope: that Christ cannot be conquered by Satan, and this will not happen!.. But we have been strongly punished for our sins and we will have to suffer still more!”[[635]](#footnote-635)

As Brusilov correctly intuited, the suffering was only just beginning, and the Lord did not count Russia worthy of deliverance from the Bolshevik scourge as a result of the civil war. For a brief moment, in the autumn of 1919, it looked as if the Whites might break through on three fronts – Kolchak’s in the east, Yudenich’s in the north-west near Petrograd, and Denikin’s in the south on the road to Moscow. However, at this point the Poles decided to abandon their support for the Whites. This, in Denikin’s opinion, was the decisive event that destroyed the Whites’ war effort.

“In exchange for Polish neutrality,” writes Adam Tooze, “the Bolsheviks ceded much of Belorussia and Lithuania. This arrangement allowed the Bolsheviks to redeploy over 40,000 troops against Yudenich, who was approaching Petrograd along the Baltic. Combined with Trotsky’s radical mobilization, which dragooned 2.3 million men into the Red Army, this was enough to tilt the balance. By mid-November the tide of the battle had turned. The Reds triumphed. Denikin and Kolchak were driven in flight. On 17 November 1919 Lloyd George announced to the House of Commons that London, after having spent almost half a billion dollars, was abandoning the attempt to break the Bolshevik regime by military force. The cost was too great and Britain really had no interest in restoring a legitimate and powerful Russian nation state. Echoing the German Foreign Secretary Richard von Kühlmann in the summer of 1918, Lloyd George reminded the House that a ‘great, gigantic, colossal, growing Russia rolling onwards like a glacier towards Persia and the borders of Afghanistan and India’ was the ‘greatest menace the British Empire could be confronted with’. With the threat of revolution on the wane in Western Europe, the better policy was to quarantine the Soviet regime behind ‘a barbed wire fence’.

“Lloyd George’s withdrawal had a devastating impact on the morale of the White forces, but it did not mean the end of the threats to the Soviet regime. Over the winter of 1919-20 the Polish Ministry of War began preparing for the definitive settlement of the Russian question. The largest nationalist party in Poland, the National Democrats, were opposed to an offensive, preferring to defend a more compact, ethnically homogeneous territory. But Marshal Joseph Pilsudski, the dominant figure in the fragile Polish state, did not share their limited vision. Pilsudski dreamed of resurrecting the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which until the ravages of the Thirty Years War had blocked Muscovite expansion to the west. In alliance with an autonomous Ukraine a new Polish super-state would anchor a cordon stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Pilsudski assumed this would appeal to London. But Lloyd George’s government declined to give its backing to Polish aggression. The Poles had to make do with the anaemic support from the French and an alliance with the Ukrainian nationalists, who, following the German retreat from the Brest Litovsk Treaty lines, had taken shelter in Galicia. In exchange for the promise of eastern Galicia for Poland, Pilsudski threw his weight behind Simon Petlura’s bid to establish an independent Ukraine as a permanent part of the new order. It was a high-risk strategy, but Warsaw was convinced that the Red Army was preparing for a push west. Pilsudski would beat them to the punch.

“On 25 April the Polish-Ukrainian army attacked. On 7 May they took Kiev, enabling the surviving White Russian forces under General Pyotr Wrangel to stabilize a new base in the Crimea. Once more the Bolshevik regime seemed to confront an existential threat from the south. But the past three years had taken their toll on Ukraine. The arrival of Petlura and Pilsudski heralded the fifteenth change of regime in Kiev since January 1917. Hundreds of thousands of people had died at the hands of Germans, Austrians, White and Red Russian occupiers, amongst them 90,000 Jews who had been slaughtered in the worst series of pogroms since the Cossack uprising of the seventeenth century. The survivors were in no mood to raise a popular insurrection. In Russia, by contrast, the idea of Polish Lancers cantering through Kiev unleashed a storm of patriotic fury. With war hero Aleksei Brusilov in the lead, former Tsarist officers flooded into Trotsky’s Red Army.

“The result was one of the climactic moments in modern European history. On 5 June 1920 the massed horde of General Semen Budennyi’s Red Cavalry, 18,000-strong, smashed through the Polish lines, forcing a precipitate evacuation of Kiev. Only a month later, on 2 July, the brilliant Bolshevik commander and military theoretician Mikhail Tukhachevsky issued the order for the general advance. ‘Over the corpse of White Poland lies the path to world conflagration… On to Vilno, Minsk, Warsaw! Forward!’ Egged on by their front commanders, Lenin and the Bolshevik leadership now believed that they ‘stood at the turning point of the entire policy of the Soviet government’. It was time to ‘test with bayonets whether the socialist revolution of the proletariat had not ripened in Poland…’”[[636]](#footnote-636)

It had not: in the last twist of this extraordinary war, the Poles surprisingly but decisively defeated the Soviet army on August 31 at the “miracle on the Vistula”. Just as Russia had absorbed and stopped the Mongol advance on Western Europe in the thirteenth century, so the Poles now stopped the newly barbarized Soviet hordes from taking over Central and Western Europe. Another important consequence of the battle is that Stalin, who was Political Commissar of the Red Army in Poland, and partially responsible for the defeat, continued to nurse a grudge against the Poles for the rest of his life…

And there were other consequences. The Bolsheviks’ defeat suggested to them, as Adam Zamoyski writes, “that the whole world was ranged against them, and that the masses in other countries could not be relied on to support them. This gave rise to a siege mentality, isolationism and the doctrine of ‘communism in one country’, expressed to the outside world in a sulky, defensive aggressiveness. Hurt pride is in evidence in the attitude of most of Russia’s leaders to the rest of the world, beginning with Lenin.

“The isolation in which Russia spent the 1920s and 1930s undoubtedly assisted Stalin in his seizure of power and his reign of terror, and it ultimately pushed her into the arms of the other regime born of humiliation and fired by a determination to overthrow the Versailles settlement – Nazi Germany. And when his troops marched into Poland in support of the Germans in 1939, Stalin showed that he had learned the lessons of 1919-20 [he served as political commissar in the Russo-Polish war]. There would be no attempt to win the Poles over to communism; his previous experience had taught him that they were not amenable. So he set about extirpating not only nobles, priests and landowners, but also doctors, nurses and veterinary surgeons, and in general anyone who might show the slightest sign of independent thought or even curiosity – the scores of charges which entailed immediate arrest and deportation included possessing a stamp collection. Over 1,500,000 people were caught up in this fine net. Army officers, for whom Stalin felt a particular hatred, were murdered in the forest of Katyn and elsewhere, other ranks and civilians were dispatched to the Gulag, where a majority died. After 1945 he would do his best to extend the same principles to the rest of Poland.

“How differently things might have turned out in Russia had some kind of peace been negotiated back at the beginning of 1919, and the whole war avoided, it would be idle to speculate. It would be equally pointless, if fascinating, to try to extrapolate the consequences of a Russian victory at Warsaw in 1920: Poland and the Baltic states would have been turned into Soviet republics, followed almost certainly by Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania, and very probably Germany, and the rest of Europe would have been profoundly affected; whether this would have led to world revolution or an international crusade leading to the destruction of Soviet Russia is anybody’s guess….”[[637]](#footnote-637)

Abandoning world revolution went right against one of the central tenets of Leninism. On arriving in Petrograd in April, 1917, Lenin had declared: “I am happy to greet in your persons the victorious Russian revolution, and greet you as the vanguard of the world-wide proletarian army”. The two went together in Lenin’s mind: he thought that revolution in Russia would fail if it were not transformed into world-wide revolution. Nor was it an impossible prospect in the early years after the Great War, when disillusion with western civilization was at its height. For here, as Piers Brendon writes, “was the promise of an end to the capitalist system, which institutionalised greed and exploitation, whose by-products were unjust empires and cruel wars. Instead each would give according to his ability and receive according to his need. The Communist creed tapped the idealism of the generation which mourned the lost generation. Old Socialists like George Lansbury said that the Bolsheviks were ‘doing what Christians call the Lord’s work’ and that Lenin’s devotion to the cause of humanity made his whole life like ‘that of one of the saints of old’ [!]. Communism also appealed to those who craved power. Soon Communist parties were springing up everywhere, encouraged by money and propaganda from Russia (in Britain, for example, the Soviet trade delegation sold tsarist diamonds to subsidise the *Daily Herald*). In 1919 Red revolution broke out in Germany and Hungary. In 1920 some 35 countries sent delegates to the second Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) at Petrograd. It predictably resolved that ‘The International Proletariat will not sheathe its sword until Soviet Russia becomes a link in the federation of Soviet republics of the whole world.’”[[638]](#footnote-638)

But the Soviet defeat on the Vistula put an end to those hopes – for the present. And with that defeat the mood of the masses changed, aided not a little by the foolish tactics of the Comintern in refusing to allow alliances with any more moderate socialist party. “The world rejected the revolutionary gospel of the Bolsheviks just as it had rejected that of the Jacobins and for much the same reasons… The German and Hungarian uprisings were suppressed. In America, where Secretary of State Lansing warned that Bolshevik forces ‘are menacing the present social order in nearly every European country and… may have to be reckoned with even in this country’, there was a Red Scare. In England the Labour party repudiated Communism, which was not surprising in view of Lenin’s offer to support their leaders as a rope supports a hanged man. In Japan the authorities passed a law against ‘thought crime’ and the ‘thought police’ (by no means a figment of George Orwell’s imagination) devised new methods of reminding offenders of their loyalty to the Emperor. In France the Right branded Communism as a German aberration and the Left split over whether to embrace it. In Italy fear of Communism helped to bring Mussolini’s Fascists to power…”[[639]](#footnote-639)

But if the Polish war represented the new regime’s first serious defeat, and Europe as a whole rejected communism, in general Lenin could be well-pleased with himself. He was now in control of almost all of the territory of the former Russian empire. The Whites had effectively lost the Civil War by the winter of 1919-20, and in November, 1920, the last of their forces under General Wrangel were evacuated from the Crimea to Constantinople. The year 1921 was spent in suppressing internal rebellions. And in 1922 Lenin felt strong enough to abolish the hated name of Russia, as St. John of Kronstadt had prophesied; the country was now called the Soviet Union.

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The Russian Civil War was one of the bloodiest conflicts in history. According to Niall Ferguson, “almost as many people died during the Civil War period as people of all nations during the First World War; one estimate for total demographic losses in the Civil War period is as high as 8 million; around 40 per cent of these deaths can be attributed to the Bolshevik policies.”[[640]](#footnote-640) Simon Sebag Montefiore calculates between 10 and 20 million died.[[641]](#footnote-641) However, even this may be a considerable underestimate: Pipes estimates the human casualties of the revolution – whose essence, as Lenin admitted, was civil strife - as 23 million by 1922. By August, 1920, 29 percent of the age group 16-49 had been eliminated.[[642]](#footnote-642)

Kirill Alexandrov writes: “I. The general losses through those who died during the years of the Civil War (1917–1920), in the first place as a result of a worsening of the general conditions of under the influence of the Leninist experiments, constituted not less than **7.5 million** people. Included in this figure are the victims of the terror, the armed struggle and banditism. Some specialists have given higher figures, proceeding from the difference in the numbers of the population between 1917 and 1920-22…

“II. The famine of 1921-22 was not only the result of the climatic drought in the Volga region, but also a direct consequence of the destruction of the village economy by the politics of ‘war communism’. The ban on ‘bourgeois’ trade in accordance with Marxist theory, the robbery of the countryside through Leninist food battalions, the annihilation of free entrepreneurship led to a reduction in the area seeded and the destruction of the food reserves of Russia. There were famines also in Tsarist Russia, but the indices of death by famine in the Leninist state look anomalous. Under Alexander III, in 1891-92, about 375,000 people died from famine and the cholera that accompanied it. In 1921-22, according to the estimates of the specialist demographers of the Russian Academy of Sciences more than **4.5 million** died.

“Moreover, even during the introduction of the New Economic Policy, which assisted the reanimation of the tortured country, Lenin had no intention of condemning the practice of ‘war communism’. Speaking at the 9th Congress of the Soviets in December, 1921, the leader of the communists declared that the experience acquired by the party in 1918-20 ‘was majestic, lofty and great, and had a universal significance’…”[[643]](#footnote-643)

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Why was the Russian people not counted worthy of the mercy of Christ and the return of the Anointed of God? As the holy disciple of Elder Nektary of Optina, Archbishop Andrew (Rymarenko) of Rockland, explained in 1975, the fundamental reason was the people’s *loss of God*: “In your recent address you said that you were born a slave. That means that you were born after the revolution. But I saw everything that happened before the revolution and what prepared it. *It was ungodliness in all forms*, and chiefly the violation of family life and the corruption of youth…”[[644]](#footnote-644)

The roots of the revolution lay in “the mystery of iniquity”, the mystery of *rebellion* against the God-established authorities from *within* the People of God. In the early nineteenth century Joseph de Maistre wrote: “There have always been some forms of religion in the world and wicked men who opposed them. Impiety was always a crime, too… *But only in the bosom of the true religion can there be real impiety…* Impiety has never produced in times past the evils which it has brought forth in our day, for its guilt is always directly proportional to the enlightenment which surrounds it…

“Although impious men have always existed, never before the eighteenth century has there been, in the heart of Christendom, *an insurrection against God.*”[[645]](#footnote-645)

De Maistre was speaking, of course, about the French revolution, and his “true religion” was in fact the heresy of Papism. Nevertheless, in essence his words are profoundly true, and apply with still greater accuracy and force to the Russian revolution and the true religion of Orthodox Christianity. It is therefore to the insurrection against God within the heart of Orthodox Christianity that we must look for the deepest cause of the revolution. To this day the Russians tend to point the finger at others than themselves: Jews, Anglo-Saxons, Masons, George Soros… But while non-Russians clearly have to answer before God for their sins, the real cause of the Russian woes lies in the Russians themselves, and this must be recognized before salvation is possible. For *If My people had heard Me, if Israel had walked in My ways,* *Quickly would I have humbled their enemies, and upon their oppressors would I have laid My hand.* (Psalm 80. 13-14)

## **82. THE MARKS OF THE BEAST**

As we have seen, Leninism, far from being a scientifically based doctrine, was much closer in essence to pagan demon-worship with its incessant demand for more and more blood.[[646]](#footnote-646) The murder of the Tsar and his family was particularly marked by its ritual character. And so, as the number of victims mounted, the Church, slow hitherto in exposing the full horror of the persecution, began to protest more loudly.

Thus on August 8, 1918, in an address “to all the faithful children of the Russian Orthodox Church”, the Patriarch said: “Sin has fanned everywhere the flame of the passions, enmity and wrath; brother has risen up against brother; the prisons are filled with captives; the earth is soaked in innocent blood, shed by a brother’s hand; it is defiled by violence, pillaging, fornication and every uncleanness. From this same poisonous source of sin has issued the great deception of material earthly goods, by which our people is enticed, forgetting the one thing necessary. We have not rejected this temptation, as the Saviour Christ rejected it in the wilderness. We have wanted to create a paradise on earth, but without God and His holy commandments. God is not mocked. And so we hunger and thirst and are naked upon the earth, blessed with an abundance of nature’s gifts, and the seal of the curse has fallen on the very work of the people and on all the undertakings of our hands. Sin, heavy and unrepented of, has summoned Satan from the abyss, and he is now bellowing his slander against the Lord and against His Christ, and is raising an open persecution against the Church.”[[647]](#footnote-647)

In characterizing Socialism in similar terms to those used by Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor, as the temptation to create bread out of stones which Christ rejected, the Patriarch certainly gave a valid critique of Socialism as it was and still is popularly understood – that is, as a striving for social justice on earth, or, as Fr. Sergius Bulgakov put it in 1917, “the thought that first of all and at any price hunger must be conquered and the chains of poverty broken… Socialism does not signify a radical reform of life, it is charity, one of its forms as indicated by contemporary life – and nothing more. The triumph of socialism would not introduce anything essentially new into life.”[[648]](#footnote-648) From this point of view, Socialism was essentially a well-intentioned movement that had gone wrong because it fails to take into account God, the commandments of God and the fallenness of human nature. The guilt of the Socialists consisted in the fact that, rather than seeking paradise in heaven and with God through the fulfilment of His commandments, they “have wanted to create a paradise on earth, but without God and His holy commandments”. The result was hell in this life and (to quote from the anathema of 1918) “the fire of Gehenna in the life to come”…

However, as Igor Shafarevich has demonstrated, Socialism in its more radical form – that is, Revolutionary Socialism (Bolshevism, Leninism) as opposed to Welfare Socialism - is very little concerned with justice and not at all with charity. Its real motivation is simply satanic *hatred,* hatred of the whole of the old world and all those in it, and the desire to destroy it to its very foundations. Its supposed striving for social justice is only a cover, a fig-leaf, a propaganda tool for the attainment of this purely destructive aim.

This aim can be analyzed into four objects: the destruction of: (i) hierarchy, (ii) private property, (iii) the family, and (iv) religion.[[649]](#footnote-649)

**1. Hierarchy.** Hierarchy had already largely been destroyed by the time the Bolsheviks came to power in October, 1917: from that time the only legal hierarchy was the Communist Party; all others, whether political, military, ecclesiastical, social or familial, were in common subjection to the Party.

Lenin aimed to destroy, not only the Russian government and hierarchies, but also those of all foreign countries. For “our cause,” he said, “is an international cause, and so long as a revolution does not take place in all countries… our victory is only half a victory, or perhaps less.”

And so in March, 1919 the Third Communist International (Comintern) was founded in Moscow. Its goal was “the fighting, by every means, even by force of arms, for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie and the creation of an international Soviet republic”.

“The Third Communist International (Comintern),” write Christopher Andrew and Vasily Mitrokhin, “founded in Moscow in March 1919, set itself ‘the goal of fighting, even by force of arms, for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie and the creation of an international Soviet republic’. For the next year or more, Comintern’s Chairman, Grigori Yevseyevich Zinoviev, lived in a revolutionary dream-world in which Bolshevism was about to conquer Europe and sweep across the planet. On the second anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, he declared his hope that, within a year, ‘the Communist International will triumph in the entire world’. At the Congress of the Peoples of the East, convened at Baku in 1920 to promote colonial revolution, delegates excitedly waved swords, daggers and revolvers in the air when Zinoviev called on them to wage a *jihad* against imperialism and capitalism. Except in Mongolia, however, where the Bolsheviks installed a puppet regime, all attempts to spread their revolution beyond Soviet borders foundered either because of lack of popular support or because of successful resistance by counter-revolutionary governments…”[[650]](#footnote-650)

**2. Private Property.** Lenin proclaimed: “Loot the loot” (grab’ nagrablennoe), and by the end of the Civil War most property had passed into the hands of the new aristocracy, the Communist Party. Lenin’s plans were aided by the characteristic refusal of the peasants to admit the right of any but peasants to the land. Richard Pipes writes: “The peasant was revolutionary in one respect only: he did not acknowledge private ownership of land. Although on the eve of the Revolution he owned nine-tenths of the country’s arable, he craved for the remaining 10 percent held by landlords, merchants, and noncommunal peasants. No economic or legal arguments could change his mind: he felt he had a God-given right to that land and that someday it would be his. And by his he meant the commune’s, which would allocate it justly to its members. The prevalence of communal landholding in European Russia was, along with the legacy of serfdom, a fundamental fact of Russian social history. It meant that along with a poorly developed sense for law, the peasant also had little respect for private property. Both tendencies were exploited and exacerbated by radical intellectuals for their own ends to incite the peasants against the status quo.

“Russia’s industrial workers were potentially destabilizing not because they assimilated revolutionary ideologies – very few of them did and even they were excluded from leadership positions in the revolutionary parties. Rather, since most of them were one or at most two generations removed from the village and only superficially urbanized, they carried with them to the factory rural attitudes only slightly adjusted to industrial conditions. They were not socialists but syndicalists, believing that as their village relatives were entitled to all the land, so they had a right to the factories…”[[651]](#footnote-651)

**3. The Family.** One holy witness of the revolution, Archbishop Andrew (Rymarenko) of Rockland, attributed a particular importance to “the violation of family life and the corruption of youth…” in explaining the revolution. After the revolution, the violations increased and multiplied. Thus early in 1918, writes Florence Farmborough, a new law on the status of women decreed “that all young women are to be considered the property of the State, and, if unmarried at the age of eighteen, must register at a special Bureau of Surveillance with a view to acquiring a husband! They are then told to choose a man as a legal husband and their union will receive State approbation. All children born to them will automatically become the property of the State. In the majority of cases, the children will be taken from their mothers in infancy and reared in special institutions; each child will be given a name and number which will ensure its position in the Free State and its right to priveleges accorded by the Proletarian Government. Young men, too, are allowed to choose a wife from the girls registered at the Bureau. So Free Russia is to legalise free love ‘in the interests of the State’.”[[652]](#footnote-652)

This was only part of a wider strategy to destroy all traditional morality. Oliver Figes writes: “The Bolsheviks envisaged the building of their Communist utopia as a constant battle against custom and habit. With the end of the Civil War they prepared for a new and longer struggle on the ‘internal front’, a revolutionary war for the liberation of the communistic personality through the eradication of individualistic (‘bourgeois’) behaviour and deviant habits (prostitution, alcoholism, hooliganism and religion) inherited from the old society. There was little dispute among the Bolsheviks that this battle to transform human nature would take decades. There was only disagreement about when the battle should begin. Marx had taught that the alteration of consciousness was dependent on changes to the material base, and Lenin, when he introduced the NEP, affirmed that until the material conditions of a Communist society had been created – a process that would take an entire historical epoch – there was no point trying to engineer a Communist system of morality in private life. But most Bolsheviks did not accept that the NEP required a retreat from the private sphere. On the contrary, as they were increasingly inclined to think, active engagement was essential at every moment and in every battlefield of everyday life – in the family, the home and the inner world of the individual, where the persistence of old mentalities was a major threat to the Party’s basic ideological goals. And as they watched the individualistic instincts of the ‘petty-bourgeois’ masses become stronger in the culture of the NEP, they redoubled their efforts. As Anatoly Lunacharsky wrote in 1927: ‘The so-called sphere of private life cannot slip away from us, because it is precisely here that the final goal of the Revolution is to be reached.’

“The family was the first arena in which the Bolsheviks engaged the struggle. In the 1920s, they took it as an article of faith that the ‘bourgeois family’ was socially harmful: it was inward-looking and conservative, a stronghold of religion, superstition, ignorance and prejudice; it fostered egotism and material acquisitiveness, and oppressed women and children. The Bolsheviks expected that the family would disappear as Soviet Russia developed into a fully socialist system, in which the state took responsibility for all the basic household functions, providing nurseries, laundries and canteens in public centres and apartment blocks. Liberated from labour in the home, women would be free to enter the workforce on an equal footing with men. The patriarchal marriage, with its attendant sexual morals, would die out – to be replaced, the radicals believed, by ‘free unions of love’.

“As the Bolsheviks saw it, the family was the biggest obstacle to the socialization of children. ‘By loving a child, the family turns him into an egotistical being, encouraging him to see himself as the centre of the universe,’ wrote the Soviet educational thinker Zlata Lilina. Bolshevik theorists agreed on the need to replace this ‘egotistic love’ with the ‘rational love’ of a broader ‘social family’. *The ABC of Communism* (1919) envisaged a future society in which parents would no longer use the word ‘my’ to refer to their children, but would care for all the children in their community. Among the Bolsheviks there were different views about how long this change would take. Radicals argued that the Party should take direct action to undermine the family immediately, but most accepted the arguments of Bukharin and NEP theorists that in a peasant country such as Soviet Russia the family would remain for some time the primary unity of production and consumption and that it would weaken gradually as the country made the transition to an urban socialist society.

“Meanwhile the Bolsheviks adopted various strategies – such as the transformation of domestic space – intended to accelerate the disintegration of the family. To tackle the housing shortages in the overcrowded cities the Bolsheviks compelled wealthy families to share their apartments with the urban poor – a policy known as ‘condensation’ (*uplotnenie*). During the 1920s the most common type of communal apartment (*kommunalka*) was one in which the original owners occupied the main rooms on the ‘parade side’ while the back rooms were filled by other families. At that time it was still possible for the former owners to select their co-inhabitants, provided they fulfilled the ‘sanitary norm’ (a per capita allowance of living space which fell from 13.5 square metres in 1926 to just 9 square metres in 1931). Many families brought in servants or acquaintances to prevent strangers being moved in to fill up the surplus living space. The policy had a strong ideological appeal, not just as a war on privilege, which is how it was presented in the propaganda of the new regime (‘War against the Palaces!’), but also as part of a crusade to engineer a more collective way of life. By forcing people to share communal apartments, the Bolsheviks believed that they could make them communistic in their basic thinking and behaviour. Private space and property would disappear, the individual (‘bourgeois’) family would be replaced by communistic fraternity and organization, and the life of the individual would become immersed in the community. From the middle of the 1920s, new types of housing were designed with this transformation in mind. The most radical Soviet architects, like the Constructivists in the Union of Contemporary Architects, proposed the complete obliteration of the private sphere by building ‘commune houses’ (*doma kommuny*) where all the property, including even clothes and underwear, would be shared by the inhabitants, where domestic tasks like cooking and childcare would be assigned to teams on a rotating basis, and where everybody would sleep in one big dormitory, divided by gender, with private rooms for sexual liaisons. Few houses of this sort were ever built, although they loomed large in the utopian imagination and futuristic novels such as Yevgeny Zamiatin’s *We* (1920). Most of the projects which did materialize, like the Narkomfin (Ministry of Finance) house in Moscow (1930) designed by the Constructivist Moisei Ginzburg, tended to stop short of the full communal form and included both private living spaces and communalized blocks for laundries, baths, dining rooms and kitchens, nurseries and schools. Yet the goal remained to marshal architecture in a way that would induce the individual to move away from private (‘bourgeois’) forms of domesticity to a more collective way of life.

“The Bolsheviks also intervened more directly in domestic life. The new *Code on Marriage and the Family* (1918) established a legislative framework that clearly aimed to facilitate the breakdown of the traditional family. It removed the influence of the Church from marriage and divorce, making both a process of simple registration with the state. It granted the same legal rights to de facto marriages (couples living together) as it gave to legal marriages. The Code turned divorce from a luxury for the rich to something that was easy and affordable for all. The result was a huge increase in casual marriages and the highest rate of divorce in the world – three times higher than in France or Germany and twenty-six times higher than in England by 1926 – as the collapse of the Christian-patriarchal order and the chaos of the revolutionary years loosened sexual morals along with family and communal ties.”[[653]](#footnote-653)

On November 18, 1920 Lenin decreed the legalization of abortions (the first such decree in the world); they were made available free of charge at the mother’s request. For “in Soviet Russia,” writes Pipes, “as in the rest of Europe, World War I led to a loosening of sexual mores, which here was justified on moral grounds. The apostle of free love in Soviet Russia was Alexandra Kollontai, the most prominent woman Bolshevik. Whether she practiced what she preached or preached what she practiced, is not for the historian to determine; but the evidence suggests that she had an uncontrollable sex drive coupled with an inability to form enduring relationships. Born the daughter of a wealthy general, terribly spoiled in childhood, she reacted to the love lavished on her with rebellion. In 1906 she joined the Mensheviks, then, in 1915, switched to Lenin, whose anti-war stand she admired. Subsequently, she performed for him valuable services as agent and courier.

“In her writings, Kollontai argued that the modern family had lost its traditional economic function, which meant that women should be set free to choose their partners. In 1919 she published *The New Morality and the Working Class*, a work based on the writings of the German feminist Grete Meisel-Hess. In it she maintained that women had to be emancipated not only economically but also psychologically. The ideal of ‘*grand amour’* was very difficult to realize, especially for men, because it clashed with their worldly ambitions. To be capable of it, individuals had to undergo an apprenticeship in the form of ‘love games’ or ‘erotic friendships’, which taught them to engage in sexual relations free of both emotional attachment and personal domination. Casual sex alone conditioned women to safeguard their individuality in a society dominated by men. Every form of sexual relationship was acceptable: Kollontai advocated what she called ‘successive polygamy’. In the capacity of Commissar of Guardianship (Prizrenia) she promoted communal kitchens as a way of ‘separating the kitchen from marriage’. She, too, wanted the care of children to be assumed by the community. She predicted that in time the family would disappear, and women should learn to treat all children as their own. She popularized her theories in a novel, *Free Love: The Love of Worker Bees (Svobodnaia liubov’: liubov’ pchel trudovykh*) (1924), one part of which was called, ‘The Love of Three Generations’. Its heroine preached divorcing sex from morality as well as from politics. Generous with her body, she said she loved everybody, from Lenin down, and gave herself to any man who happened to attract her.

“Although often regarded as the authoritarian theoretician of Communist sex morals, Kollontai was very much the exception who scandalized her colleagues. Lenin regarded ‘free love’ as a ‘bourgeois’ idea – by which he meant not so much extramarital affairs (with which he himself had had experience) as casual sex…

“Studies of the sexual mores of Soviet youth conducted in the 1920s revealed considerable discrepancy between what young people said they believed and what they actually practiced: unusually, in this instance behaviour was less promiscuous than theory. Russia’s young people stated they considered love and marriage ‘bourgeois’ relics and thought Communists should enjoy a sexual life unhampered by any inhibitions: the less affection and commitment entered into male-female relations, the more ‘communist’ they were. According to opinion surveys, students looked on marriage as confining and, for women, degrading: the largest number of respondents – 50.8 percent of the women and 67.3 of the women – expressed a preference for long-term relationships based on mutual affection but without the formality of marriage.

“Deeper probing of their attitudes, however, revealed that behind the façade of defiance of tradition, old attitudes survived intact. Relations based on love were the ideal of 82.6 percent of the men and 90.5 percent of the women: ‘This is what they secretly long for and dream about,’ according to the author of the survey. Few approved of the kind of casual sex advocated by Kollontai and widely associated with early Communism: a mere 13.3 percent of the men and 10.6 of the women. Strong emotional and moral factors continued to inhibit casual sex: one Soviet survey revealed that over half of the female student respondents were virgins…”[[654]](#footnote-654)

In this continuing conservatism of Soviet youth we see the continuing influence of the Orthodox Church, into which most Russians had been baptized. The Church resisted all the Soviet innovations, including civil marriage, abortion and divorce on demand. And soon the State, too, reversed its teaching, outlawing abortion in 1936 and condemning free love. But this was not the result of some kind of revival of religion and morality. It was necessitated by the simple fact, emphasized by Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow in the nineteenth century, that the State is founded on the family, and the destruction of the family finally leads to the destruction of the State…

**4. Religion.** Of the four marks of the beast, the most fundamental is the destruction of religion, especially Orthodox Christianity. The incompatibility between Socialism and Christianity was never doubted by the apostles of Socialism. Religion was to Marx “opium for the people”, and to Lenin – “spiritual vodka”. Lenin wrote that “every religious idea, every idea of a god, even flirting with the idea of God is unutterable vileness of the most dangerous kind”.[[655]](#footnote-655) And in 1918 he said to Krasin: “Electricity will take the place of God. Let the peasant pray to electricity; he’s going to feel the power of the central authorities more than that of heaven.”[[656]](#footnote-656)

As regards the Bolshevik attitude to law, this was described by Latsis: “In the investigation don’t search for materials and proofs that the accused acted in word or deed against Soviet power. The first question which you must put to him is: what is his origin, education, upbringing or profession. These are the questions that must decide the fate of the accused… If it is possible to accuse the Cheka of anything it is not in excessive zeal in executions, but in not applying the supreme penalty enough… We were always too soft and magnanimous towards the defeated foe!”[[657]](#footnote-657)

The Bolsheviks always showed special ferocity towards the Church. Thus on May 1, 1919 Lenin sent a secret instruction to the head of the Cheka, Dzerzhinsky: “arrest… popes [priests] as counter-revolutionaries and saboteurs, shoot them mercilessly everywhere. And as many as possible.”[[658]](#footnote-658)

This is precisely what happened as bishops, priests and laymen were killed, monasteries destroyed and holy things vandalized in the greatest persecution of the Church since the time of Diocletian.

As for morality in general, in his address to the Third All-Russian congress of the Union of Russian Youth in October, 1920, Lenin wrote: "In what sense do we reject morality and ethics? In the sense in which it is preached by the bourgeoisie, which has derived this morality from the commandments of God. Of course, as regards God, we say that we do not believe in Him, and we very well know that it was in the name of God that the clergy used to speak, that the landowners spoke, that the bourgeoisie spoke, so as to promote their exploitative interests. Or… they derived morality from idealistic or semi-idealistic phrases, which always came down to something very similar to the commandments of God. All such morality which is taken from extra-human, extra-class conceptions, we reject. We say that it is a deception, that it is a swindle, that it is oppression of the minds of the workers and peasants in the interests of the landowners and capitalists. We say that our morality is entirely subject to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat. Our morality derives from the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat."[[659]](#footnote-659)

Of course, there is an inner contradiction here. If God exists, and all the older systems of morality are nonsense, why entertain any notions of good and evil? And why prefer the interests of the proletariat to anyone else’s? In fact, if God does not exist, then, as Dostoyevsky said, everything is permitted. And this is what we actually find in Bolshevism – everything was permitted, including the murder of the proletariat provided it benefited the interests of the Communist Party. In any case, as Alexander Solzhenitsyn wrote: “The line dividing good and evil passes not between states, not between classes, and not between parties – it passes through each human heart – and through all human hearts…”[[660]](#footnote-660) And again he wrote: “Within the philosophical system of Marx and Lenin, and at the heart of their psychology, hatred of God is the principal driving force, more fundamental than all their political and economic pretensions. Militant atheism is not merely incidental or marginal to Communist policy. It is not a side-effect, but the central pivot…”[[661]](#footnote-661)

That militant atheism, and the rejection of all religion-based morality, was the central pivot of Marxism-Leninism was to become abundantly evident in the next seventy years. Using his position as the head of the Church and the last man in Russia who was allowed to speak his mind almost freely, on October 26, 1918 Patriarch Tikhon wrote to the Sovnarkom: “’All those who take up the sword will perish by the sword’ (Matthew 26.52). This prophecy of the Saviour we apply to you, the present determiners of the destinies of our fatherland, who call yourselves ‘people’s commissars’. For a whole year you have held State power in your hands and you are already preparing to celebrate the anniversary of the October revolution, but the blood poured out in torrents of our brothers pitilessly slaughtered in accordance with your appeals, cries out to heaven and forces us to speak to you this bitter word of righteousness.

“In truth you gave it a stone instead of bread and a serpent instead of a fish (Matthew 7.9, 10). You promised to give the people, worn out by bloody war, peace ‘without annexations and requisitions’. In seizing power and calling on the people to trust you, what promises did you give it and how did you carry out these promises? What conquests could you renounce when you had brought Russia to a shameful peace [the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk] whose humiliating conditions you yourselves did not even decide to publish fully? Instead of annexations and requisitions our great homeland has been conquered, reduced and divided, and in payment of the tribute imposed on it you will secretly export to Germany the gold that was accumulated by others than you… You have divided the whole people into warring camps, and plunged them into a fratricide of unprecedented ferocity. You have openly exchanged the love of Christ for hatred, and instead of peace you have artificially inflamed class enmity. And there is no end in sight to the war you have started, since you are trying to use the workers and peasants to bring victory to the spectre of world revolution… It is not enough that you have drenched the hands of the Russian people in the blood of brothers, covering yourselves with contributions, requisitions and nationalisations under various names: you have incited the people to the most blatant and shameless looting. At your instigation there has been the looting or confiscation of lands, estates, factories, houses and cattle; money, objects, furniture and clothing are looted. At first you robbed the more wealthy and industrious peasants under the name of ‘bourgeois’, thereby multiplying the numbers of the poor, although you could not fail to realise that by devastating a great number of individual citizens the people’s wealth is being destroyed and the country itself ravaged.

“Having seduced the dark and ignorant people with the opportunity of easy and unpunished profit, you darkened their consciences and drowned out in them the consciousness of sin. But with whatever names you cover your evil deeds – murder, violence and looting will always remain heavy sins and crimes that cry out to heaven for revenge.

“You promised freedom. Rightly understood, as freedom from evil, that does not restrict others, and does not pass over into licence and self-will, freedom is a great good. But you have not given that kind of freedom: the freedom given by you consists in indulging in every way the base passions of the mob, and in not punishing murder and robbery. Every manifestation both of true civil and the higher spiritual freedom of mankind is mercilessly suppressed by you. Is it freedom when nobody can get food for himself, or rent a flat, or move from city to city without special permission? Is it freedom when families, and sometimes the populations of whole houses are resettled and their property thrown out into the street, and when citizens are artificially divided into categories, some of which are given over to hunger and pillaging? Is it freedom when nobody can openly express his opinion for fear of being accused of counter-revolution?

“Where is freedom of the word and the press, where is the freedom of Church preaching? Many bold Church preachers have already paid with the blood of their martyrdom; the voice of social and state discussion and reproach is suppressed; the press, except for the narrowly Bolshevik press, has been completely smothered. The violation of freedom in matters of the faith is especially painful and cruel. There does not pass a day in which the most monstrous slanders against the Church of Christ and her servers, and malicious blasphemies and sacrilege, are not published in the organs of your press. You mock the servers of the altar, you force a bishop to dig ditches (Bishop Hermogen of Tobolsk), and you send priests to do dirty work. You have placed your hands on the heritage of the Church, which has been gathered by generations of believing people, and you have not hesitated to violate their last will. You have closed a series of monasteries and house churches without any reason or cause. You have cut off access to the Moscow Kremlin, that sacred heritage of the whole believing people… It is not our task to judge earthly powers; every power allowed by God would attract to itself Our blessing if it were in truth a servant of God subject to the good, and was ‘terrible not for good deeds, but for evil’ (Romans 13.3,4). Now we extend to you, who are using your power for the persecution of your neighbours and the destruction of the innocent, Our word of exhortation: celebrate the anniversary of your coming to power by liberating the imprisoned, by stopping the blood-letting, violence, destruction and restriction of the faith. Turn not to destruction, but to the establishment of order and legality. Give the people the rest from civil war that they desire and deserve. Otherwise ‘from you will be required all the righteous blood that you have shed’ (Luke 11.51), ‘and you who have taken up the sword will perish by the sword’.”[[662]](#footnote-662)

Pipes writes: “The effect that persecution had on religious sentiments and practices during the first decade of Communist rule is difficult to assess. There is a great deal of circumstantial evidence, however, that people continued to observe religious rituals and customs, treating the Communists as they would heathen conquerors. Although the observance of religious holidays had been outlawed, the prohibition could not be enforced. As early as 1918 workers received permission to celebrate Easter provided they did not absent themselves from work for more than five days. Later on, the authorities acquiesced in the suspension of work on Christmas under both the old and new calendars. There are reports of religious processions (*krestnye khody*) in the capital as well as in provincial towns. In the rural districts, the peasants insisted on regarding as legitimate only marriages performed by a priest.

“Religious fervor, which, along with monarchic sentiments, had perceptibly ebbed in 1917, revived in the spring of 1918, when many Christians courted martyrdom by demonstrating, holding protest meetings, and fasting. The fervor increased with each year: in 1920, ‘The Churches filled with worshippers; among them there was not that predominance of women that could be noted before the revolution. Confession acquired particular importance… Church holidays attracted immense crowds. Church life in 1920 was fully restored and perhaps even exceeded the old, pre-Revolutionary one. Without a doubt, the inner growth of church self-consciousness among Russian believers attained a height unknown during the preceding two centuries.’

“Tikhon confirmed this judgement in an interview with an American journalist the same year, saying that ‘the influence of the church on the lives of the people was stronger than ever in all its history’. Confirming these impressions, one well-informed observer concluded in 1926 that the church had emerged victorious from its conflict with the Communists: ‘The only thing the Bolsheviks had achieved was to loosen the hierarchy and split the church’.

“But ahead of it lay trials such as no church had ever endured…”[[663]](#footnote-663)

## **83. THE CHURCH IN THE CIVIL WAR**

The Church was placed in a very difficult dilemma by the Civil War. On the one hand, if ever there was a just war, it was the war against the Bolsheviks. But on the other hand, for the patriarch to bless the White armies would have been equivalent to a call to the population in the Red-occupied areas to rise up against their oppressors – a very difficult call, which would probably have ended in disaster.

It is probably for this reason that in mid-1918, in spite of the pleas of his close advisor, Prince G.I. Trubetskoy, the Patriarch refused to bless a White general in the south, saying that he was not engaging in politics.

But, as we have seen, he did bless the one Orthodox general who had not betrayed his oath to the Tsar, General Theodore Keller. Moreover, he secretly blessed the White armies in Siberia under Admiral A.V. Kolchak, a monarchist and the Whites’ formal head, who was close to the Church. Thus already in November, 1918, in view of the lack of communication with the Patriarch, an autonomous Temporary Higher Church Authority (THCA) was formed in Siberia under the leadership of Archbishop Sylvester of Omsk.

At the request of Admiral Kolchak, the THCA moved to Omsk, and sent 2000 out of the 3500 clergy living on the territories occupied by Kolchak’s armies to serve in the armies as military chaplains. In April, 1919 a Council of the THCA took place in Omsk which anathematised the leaders of the Bolshevik party and ordered the commemoration of Kolchak during Divine services as the Supreme Ruler of Russia. In an address to the clergy the Council declared: “The pastors of the Church have the moral right to struggle against Bolshevism, and nobody must look on this struggle as unfitting to the Church, as the Church’s interference into political and social affairs of the State.”[[664]](#footnote-664)

Kolchak believed that the Orthodox Church combined with an authoritarian system of power based on religious principles would help him stabilize the situation in Siberia. “The spiritual power of the soldiers has weakened,” he said. “Political slogans and the ideas of the Constituent Assembly and of an undivided Russia no longer have any effect. Much more comprehensible is the struggle for the faith, and this only religion can do.”[[665]](#footnote-665)

Perhaps for this reason, in January, 1919 the Patriarch appeared to reverse his apolitical stance, at any rate in relation to the Siberian armies. For to Admiral Kolchak he sent a disguised priest with a tiny photograph of an icon of St. Nicholas and the following message: “As is well known to all Russians and, of course, to your Excellency, before this Icon, revered by the whole of Russia, every day on December 6, the day of the Winter Nicholas feast, there was a prayer service, which ended with the whole people chanting: ‘Save, O Lord, Thy people…’ with all the worshippers on their knees. And then on December 6, 1917, after the October revolution, the people of Moscow, faithful to the faith and tradition, at the end of the prayer service, chanted on their knees: ‘Save, O Lord…’ Soldiers and police came up and drove away the worshippers, and fired at the Icon from rifles and weapons. The holy hierarch on this icon on the wall of the Kremlin was depicted with a cross in his left hand and a sword in his right. The bullets of the fanatics flew around the holy hierarch without touching the God-pleaser anywhere. However, fragments of shells from the explosions tore off the plaster on the left side of the Wonderworker, which destroyed almost the whole of the left side of the holy hierarch on the Icon with the hand in which was the cross. On the same day, on the orders of the powers of the antichrist this Holy Icon was draped with a big red flag with a satanic emblem. It was firmly attached to the lower and side edges. On the wall of the Kremlin the inscription was made: ‘Death to the Faith – the Opium of the People’. On December 6 in the next year, many people gathered for the prayer service, which was coming to its end undisturbed by anyone! But when the people fell on their knees and began to chant: ‘Save, O Lord…’ the flag fell from the Icon of the Wonderworker. The atmosphere of prayerful ecstasy cannot be described! One had to see it, and he who saw it remembers it and feels it to this day. There was chanting, sobbing, cries and hands raised on high, rifle fire, many were wounded, many were killed… and… the place was cleared. The next day, early in the morning, with My Blessing, it was declared in front of the whole people what the Lord had shown through His God-pleaser to the Russian people in Moscow on December 6, 1918.

“I am sending you a photographic copy of the Wonderworking Icon as my blessing to you, Your Excellency, in your struggle with the temporary atheist power over the suffering people of Russia… I ask you, honoured Alexander Vasilyevich, look how the Bolsheviks succeeded in striking out the left hand of the God-pleaser with the cross, which demonstrates as it were the temporary trampling of the Orthodox faith… But the punishing sword of the God-pleaser has remained as a help and blessing to your Excellency in your Christian struggle for the salvation of the Orthodox Church in Russia.”[[666]](#footnote-666)

However, this anti-Soviet stance was not maintained. On October 8, 1919, much to the sorrow of the Whites, the Patriarch issued a decree entitled “On the non-interference of the clergy in the civil war”, in which he called on the clergy to “refrain from participation in political parties and demonstrations”, and to submit to the “orders” of the Soviet authorities. “People point out that with a change in authority the Church servers sometimes welcome this change with the ringing of bells and the organization of triumphant services and various ecclesiastical festivities. But if this happens in some places, it takes place either at the demand of the new authorities themselves, or in accordance with the desire of the masses of the people, but not at all at the initiative of the Church servers, who in accordance with their rank must stand higher and beyond all political interests. They must remember the canonical rules of the Holy Church, by which She forbids Her servers from interfering in the political life of the country, and from belonging to any parties, and still more from making service rites and sacred actions into an instrument of political demonstrations.”[[667]](#footnote-667)

This statement marks the beginning of a significant shift in the Church’s attitude from one of open enmity towards the Bolsheviks to qualified neutrality and civil obedience.

*Izvestia* commented on it as follows: “The Patriarch and the circles around him have evidently become convinced of the solidity of Soviet power and become more cautious. [Soviet power], of course, is not expecting that the Patriarch should invite the clergy subject to him to express sympathy for Soviet power. The most that these circles are capable of is neutrality. Such tactics are recommended by the Patriarch’s appeal… In any case, the epistle of the Patriarch is characteristic in this respect, that it involuntarily confirms the strength of Soviet power, and that the Orthodox clergy are now too frightened to quarrel with it openly.”[[668]](#footnote-668)

This shift in attitude took place when Denikin’s Volunteer Army looked on the point of breaking through to Moscow. So we cannot excuse it on the grounds that the Patriarch thought that the Reds were going to win the war. More probably, the Patriarch realised that the Whites, though better than the Reds, were motivated, as we have seen, not so much by the positive ideal of Orthodoxy as by the negative ideal of anti-Bolshevism – and only that which is truly positive and spiritual can merit the blessing of God and His Church.

It may well have been right for the Patriarch not to follow the example of St. Hermogen and call the people to rise up against Bolshevism. Nevertheless, the failure of the Church to issue an unequivocal condemnation of Bolshevism was a weakness that her enemies, both political and ecclesiastical, were quick to exploit. The Patriarch’s anti-Soviet statements were construed as dabbling in politics; while his refusal to bless the White armies was construed as the equivalent of a blessing on the Soviet State…

However, even if the Church did not expose the evil of Bolshevism with complete clarity, the Bolsheviks were providing their own proofs of their antichristianity by their behaviour. Thus Shkarovskii writes: “The spread of civil war was accompanied by a hardening of Bolshevik anti-religious policies. The RKP(b) anticipated that religious faith and the Church would soon die away completely, and that with a ‘purposeful education system’ and ‘revolutionary action’, including the use of force, they could be overcome fairly quickly. At a later stage Soviet atheist literature referred to this period as ‘*Sturm und Drang’*. In the programme adopted at the Eighth RKP(b) Congress in March 1919, the party proposed a total assault on religion, and talked of the coming ‘complete disappearance of religious prejudice’.

“In order to attain this goal the authorities brought in ever-increasing restrictions. On 3 April 1919 the Commissariat of Justice decreed that voluntary monetary collections among the faithful were permissible ‘only for the needs of a particular church building’. At the beginning of 1919 a complete ban was introduced on religious instruction for anybody under the age of 18. Existing monasteries were only permitted to function if they turned themselves into labour communes or workshops. The closure of cloisters began at the end of 1918. By 1921, 722 monasteries had been nationalized, over half of those existing in Russia. From the summer of 1918 the authorities waged a campaign to destroy ‘holy relics’. This offended the faithful and was a crude intervention in the affairs of the Church, an attempt to regulate its way of life and worship. In the spring of 1919 these actions became widespread, and became a means of conducting anti-religious propaganda by deeds. On 14 March the Commissariat of Justice decreed that they should be welcomed. The authorities also looked upon the Church as a ready source of additional state funds. In 1919 they began a speculative trade in valuable artefacts, including items which they had seized from churches….

“… Despite all the obstacles placed in its way, the Orthodox Church was able to conserve its structure during the civil war. Thousands of small churches which were supposed to have been closed down, even in the capitals, continued to function, as did religious schools. Charitable works continued, and religious processions took place, until the autumn of 1921 in Petrograd.

“A very small number of priests served in the Red Army. The right-wing section of the clergy was active in its support of the White cause… Military chaplains served with the White armies – Kolchak had around 2,000, Denikin had more than 1,000, and Wrangel had over 500. All this provided further ammunition for the Bolsheviks’ anti-clerical campaign. During 1920 state bodies continued the tactic of excluding religion from all aspects of life. A circular issued by the People’s Commissariat of Justice on 18 May resulted in almost all the diocesan councils being liquidated in Russia. A further 58 holy relics were uncovered by the summer.[[669]](#footnote-669) On 29 July the Sovnarkom approved a proposal from the justice commissariat ‘On the Countrywide Liquidation of Relics’. However, the authority of the Church prevented this proposal from being carried out in full. Eight months late, on 1 April 1921, a secret circular issued by the commissariat admitted defeat on this score. By the autumn of 1920 the nationalization of church property had been completed. A report produced by the Eighth Department of the Commissariat of Justice stated that 7,150 million roubles, 828,000 *desiatiny* of church lands, and 1,112 buildings for rent had been expropriated by the state.”[[670]](#footnote-670)

Still more staggering than the material losses were the losses in lives. Thus in 1918-19, according to Ermhardt, 28 bishops and 1,414 priests were killed[[671]](#footnote-671); according to Edward E. Roslof, estimates of numbers of clergy killed between 1918 and 1921 range from 1434 to 9000[[672]](#footnote-672); while by the end of 1922, according to Shumilin, 2233 clergy of all ranks and two million laymen had been executed.[[673]](#footnote-673) These figures prove the truth of Vladimir Rusak’s assertion: “The Bolsheviks’ relationship to the Church was realized independently of legislation. Violence, bayonets and bullets – these were the instruments of the Bolsheviks’ ‘ideological’ struggle against the Church.”[[674]](#footnote-674)

However, as Shkarovskii writes, “the first wave of attacks on religion had not brought the results which had been expected by such Bolshevik theorists as N.I. Bukharin. The majority of the population of Russia remained religious, for all the barbaric methods which had been tried to tear people away from the Church. The patriarchate also emerged from the civil war undefeated.”[[675]](#footnote-675) Moreover, with the suppression of all military and political opposition to the Bolsheviks, the Church remained the only significant anti-communist force in the country.[[676]](#footnote-676) So the Bolsheviks were compelled to resort to a kind of warfare that had a far more sophisticated ideological content...

Nevertheless, ideology always remained subservient to brute force, as is illustrated by the figures brought forward by Kirill Alexandrov: “By 1917 there were 146,000 Orthodox clergy and monastics in Russia, together with almost 56,000 parishes and more than 67,000 churches and chapels. Between 1917 and 1939, out of the 146,000 clergy, more than 120,000 had been killed, the absolute majority of them in the 1930s under Stalin. By autumn, 1939 there remained only between 150 and 300 active Orthodox parishes in the Soviet Union, and not more than 350 churches. By 1941 the general number of priests and deacons living in freedom was only 6376 people; they lived mainly in the western provinces that had been united to the USSR in 1939-40. In the RSFSR church life practically died during the first 23 years of Soviet power, and the Bolsheviks succeeded… in almost completely destroying the strongest Local Orthodox Church in the world.”[[677]](#footnote-677)

## **84. THE PEASANTS AND WORKERS REBEL**

The peasants had never served the Bolsheviks with enthusiasm, and now, after the defeat of the Whites, they rose up against them. “Until March 1921,” writes Richard Pipes, “the Communists tried and in some measure succeeded in placing the national economy under state control. Later this policy came to be known as ‘War Communism’ – Lenin himself first used this term in April 1921 as he was abandoning it. It was a misnomer coined to justify the disastrous consequences of economic experimentation by the alleged exigencies of the Civil War and foreign intervention. Scrutiny of contemporary records, however, leaves no doubt that these policies were, in fact, not so much emergency responses to war conditions as an attempt as rapidly as possible to construct a Communist society. War Communism involved the nationalization of the means of production and most other economic assets, the abolition of private trade, the elimination of money, the subjection of the national economy to a comprehensive plan, and the introduction of forced labor.

“These experiments left Russia’s economy in shambles. In 1920-21, compared to 1913, large-scale industrial production fell by 82 percent, worker productivity by 74 percent, and the production of cereals by 40 percent. The cities empties as their inhabitants fled to the countryside in search of food: Petrograd lost 70 percent of its population, Moscow over 50 percent; the other urban and industrial centers also suffered depletions. The non-agricultural labor force dropped to less than a half of what it had been when the Bolsheviks took power: from 3.6 to 1.5 million. Workers’ real wages declined to one-third of the level of 1913-14. A hydralike black market, ineradicable because indispensable, supplied the population with the bulk of consumer goods. Communist policies had succeeded in ruining the world’s fifth-largest economy and depleting the wealth accumulated over centuries of ‘feudalism’ and ‘capitalism’. A contemporary Communist economist called the economic collapse a calamity ‘unparalleled in the history of mankind’.

“The Civil War ended, for all practical purposes, in the winter of 1919-20, and if war needs had been the driving force behind these policies, now would have been the time to give them up. Instead, the year that followed the crushing of the White armies saw the wildest economic experiments, such as the ‘militarization’ of labor and the elimination of money. The government persevered with forcible confiscations of peasant food ‘surplus’. The peasants responded by hoarding, reducing the sown acreage, and selling produce on the black market in defiance of government prohibitions. Since the weather in 1920 happened to be unfavourable, the meagre supply of bread dwindled still further. It was now that the Russian countryside, until then relatively well off compared to the cities in terms of food supplies, began to experience the first symptoms of famine.

“The repercussions of such mismanagement were not only economic but also social: they eroded still further the thin base of Bolshevik support, turning followers into enemies and enemies into rebels. The ‘masses’, whom Bolshevik propaganda had been telling that the hardships they had endured in 1918-19 were the fault of the ‘White Guards’ and their foreign backers, expected the end of hostilities to bring back normal conditions. The Civil War had to some extent shielded the Communists from the unpopularity of their policies by making it possible to justify them as militarily necessary. This explanation could no longer be invoked once the Civil War was over…

“It now began to dawn even on those willing to give the Bolsheviks the benefit of the doubt, that they had been had, that the true objective of the new regime was not improving their lot but holding on to power, and that to this end it was prepared to sacrifice their well-being and even their very lives. This realization produced a national rebellion unprecedented in its dimensions and ferocity. The end of one Civil War led immediately to the outbreak of another: having defeated the White armies, the Red Army now had to battle partisan bands, popularly known as ‘Greens’ but labelled by the authorities ‘bandits’, made up of peasants, deserters, and demobilized soldiers.

“In 1920 and 1921, the Russian countryside from the Black Sea to the Pacific was the scene of uprisings that in numbers involved and territory affected greatly eclipsed the famous peasant rebellions of Stenka Razin and Pugachev under tsarism. Its true dimensions cannot even now be established, because the relevant materials have not yet been properly studied.[[678]](#footnote-678) The Communist authorities have assiduously minimized its scope: thus, according to the Cheka, in February, 1921, there occurred 118 peasant risings. In fact, there were hundreds of such uprisings, involving hundreds of thousands of partisans. Lenin was in receipt of regular reports from this front of the Civil War, which included detailed maps covering the entire country, indicating that vast territories were in rebellion. Occasionally, Communist historians give us a glimpse of the dimensions of this other Civil War, conceding that some ‘bands’ of ‘kulaks’ numbered 50,000 and more rebels. An idea of the extent and savagery of the fighting can be obtained from official figures of the losses suffered by the Red Army units engaged against the rebels. According to recent information, the number of Red Army casualties in the campaign of 1921-22, which were waged almost exclusively against peasants and other domestic rebels, came to 237,908. The losses among the rebels were almost certainly as high and probably much higher.”[[679]](#footnote-679)

The Peasant Civil War finally failed because the rebels were scattered and disunited, and the Reds were able to destroy each rising separately. Moreover, with the exception of the rebellion led in the Tambov region by Antonov, they “aimed not to march on Moscow so much as to cut themselves off from its influence”.[[680]](#footnote-680) So those who wanted power most clung onto it…

But terrible as the peasant rebellions were, they were not such a direct threat to the regime as the strikes of the workers in Petrograd and the mutiny of the sailors in Kronstadt. For these constituted the primary support of the Bolsheviks, whose interests they were supposed to defend above all others. And so on March 7, Trotsky ordered Tukhachevsky, who had commanded the defeated Red Army in Poland, to attack the sailors across the ice.

The next day the Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Kronstadt published a statement that condemned the revolution in no uncertain terms: “In carrying out the October Revolution, the working class hoped to achieve its liberation. The outcome has been even greater enslavement of human beings. Power has passed from a monarchy based on the police and gendarmerie into the hands of usurpers – Communists – who have given the toilers not freedom but the daily dread of ending up in the torture chambers of the Cheka, the horrors of which exceed many times the rule of tsarism’s gendarmerie. The bayonets, the bullets, the coarse shouts of the *oprichniki* from the Cheka – this is the fruit of the long struggles and sufferings of Soviet Russia’s toilers. The glorious emblem of the toilers’ state – the hammer and sickle – Communist authority has in truth replaced with the bayonet and the iron bar, created to protect the tranquil and careless life of the new bureaucracy, the Communist commissars and functionaries. But basest and most criminal of all is the moral slavery introduced by the Communists: they have also laid their hands on the inner world of the working people, compelling them to think only as they do. By means of state-run trade unions, the workers have been chained to their machines, so that labor is not a source of joy but a new serfdom. To the protests of peasants, expressed in spontaneous uprisings, and those of the workers, whom the very conditions of life compel to strike, they have responded with mass executions and an appetite for blood that by far exceeds that of tsarist generals. Toiling Russia, the first to raise the red banner of the liberation of labor, is thoroughly drenched with the blood of the victims of Communist rule. In this sea of blood, the Communists drown all the great and bright pledges and slogans of the toilers’ revolution. It has become ever more clear, and by now is self-evident, that the Russian Communist Party is not the protector of the working people that it claims to be, that the interests of the working people are foreign to it, and that, having gained power, its only fear is of losing it, and hence that all means [to that end] are permissible: slander, violence, deception, murder, revenge on the families of those who have revolted… The current revolt finally offers the toilers a chance to have their freely elected, functioning soviets, free of violent party pressures, to refashion the state-run trade unions into free associations of workers, peasants, and the working intelligentsia. At last, the police baton of Communist autocracy is smashed…”[[681]](#footnote-681)

Sadly, it was the Kronstadt sailors, not the “Communist autocracy”, that were smashed; but their smashing, coinciding with the crushing of a peasant rebellion in Western Siberia that interrupted vital food shipments for two weeks, marked a critical turning-point.

“On March 15, as the Red Army stood poised to launch the final assault on the naval base, Lenin announced what was to become the linchpin of the New Economic Policy, the abandonment of arbitrary food confiscation known as *prodrazverstka* in favor of a tax in kind. *Prodrazverstka* had been the most universally despised feature of ‘War Communism’ – despised by peasants, whom it robbed of their produce, but also by the urban population, whom in deprived of food.

“Requisitioning had been enforced in an appallingly arbitrary manner. The Commissariat of Supply determined the quantity of foodstuffs it required – a quantity determined by what was needed to feed the consumers in the cities and the armed forces, without regard to what the producers could provide. This figure it broke down, on the basis of inadequate and often outdated information, into quotas for each province, district, and village. The system was as inefficient as it was brutal: in 1920, for example, Moscow set the *prodrazverska* at 583 million puds (9.5 million tons) but managed to collect only half that amount.

“Collectors acted on the premise that peasants lied when they claimed that the grain they were forced to surrender was not surplus but essential to provide food for their families and seed, and that they could compensate for the loss by digging up their hoard. This the peasants may have been able to do in 1918 and 1919. But by 1920 they had little if anything left to hoard: as a result,… in the case of Tambov province, *prodrazverstka,* even if incompletely realized, left them with next to nothing. Nor was this all. Zealous collectors impounded not only ‘surplus’ and food needed for sustenance, but grain set aside for the next season’s sowing: one high Communist official admitted that in many areas the authorities appropriated one hundred percent of the harvest. Refusal to pay resulted in the confiscation of livestock and beatings. In addition, collecting agents and local officials, empowered to label resistance to their demands as ‘kulak’-inspired, or ‘counterrevolutionary’, felt at liberty to appropriate food, cattle, even clothing for their personal use. The peasants resisted fiercely: in the Ukraine alone, they were reported to have killed 1,700 requisition officials.

“A more self-defeating policy would be hard to conceive. The system operated on the absurd principle that the more the peasant produced the more would be taken from him; from which it followed with inexorable logic that he would produce little if anything beyond his own needs. The richer a region, the more it was subjected to government plunder, and the more prone it was to curtail production: between 1916-17 and 1920-21, the decline in the sown acreage in the center of the country, an area of grain deficits, was 18 percent, whereas in the main region of grain surpluses it was 33 percent. And since yields per acre declined from shortage of fertilizer and draft animals as well, grain production, which in 1913 had been 80.1 million tons, dropped in 1920 to 46.1 million tons. If in 1918 and 1919 it has still been possible to extract a ‘surplus’, by 1920 the peasant had learned his lesson and made sure there was nothing to surrender. It apparently never occurred to him that the regime would take what it wanted even if it meant that he went breadless and seedless.

“*Prodrazverstka* had to be abandoned for both economic and political reasons. There was nothing left to take from the peasant, who faced starvation; and it fuelled nationwide rebellions. The Politburo finally decided to drop *prodrazverstka* on March 15. The new policy was made public on March 23. Henceforth, the peasants were required to turn over to government agencies a fixed amount of grain; arbitrary confiscations of ‘surplus’ were terminated…

“While the economic benefits of the new agrarian policy were not immediately apparent, the political rewards were reaped at once. The abandonment of food requisitioning took the wind out of the sails of rebellion. The following year, Lenin could boast that peasant uprisings, which previously had ‘determined the general picture of Russia’, had virtually ceased…”[[682]](#footnote-682)

At the same time, Moscow introduced “The New Economic Policy” (NEP), a humiliating retreat from Communist ideals allowing the return of some small-scale private trade. It worked.

“The benefits appeared first and foremost in agriculture. In 1922, thanks to donations and purchases of seed grain abroad as well as favourable weather, Russia enjoyed a bumper crop. Encouraged by the new tax policy to increase the cultivated acreage, peasants expanded production: the acreage sown in 1925 equalled that of 1913. Yields, however, remained lower than before the Revolution, and the harvest proportionately smaller: as late as 1928, on the eve of collectivization, it was 10 percent below the 1913 figure…”[[683]](#footnote-683)

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The year that climaxed in the crushing of the peasants’ and Kronstadt sailors’ rebellions had revealed that the popularity of the Communist Party was at an all-time low. So Lenin acted to crush dissent within the party; in the same fateful month of March, 1921, the Tenth Party Congress tightened the screws on political dissent at just the moment when a degree of economic liberalization was being introduced through NEP. Thereby it destroyed the last bastion of free speech in the country – within the Party itself.

It did so by crushing a movement called “the Workers’ Opposition” that was led by Alexander Shliapnikov and his mistress, Alexandra Kollontai. For “the emergence of the Workers’ Opposition,” writes Pipes, “brought into the open a smoldering antagonism that went back to the late nineteenth century, between a minority of politically active workers and the intellectuals who claimed to represent them and speak in their behalf. Radical workers, usually more inclined to syndicalism that Marxism, cooperated with the socialist intelligentsia and allowed themselves to be guided by them because they knew they were short of political experience. But they never ceased to be aware of a gulf between themselves and their partners: and once a ‘workers’ state’ had come into being, they saw no reason for submitting to the authority of the ‘white hands’.

“The concerns expressed by the Workers’ Opposition stood at the center of the deliberations of the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921. Shortly before it convened, Kollontai released for internal party use a brochure in which she assailed the regime’s bureaucratization. (Party rules prohibited venting party disputes in public.) The Workers’ Opposition, she argued, made up exclusively of labouring men and women, felt that the Party’s leadership had lost touch with labor: the higher up the ladder of authority one ascended, the less support there was for the Workers’ Opposition. This happened because the Soviet apparatus had been taken over by class enemies who despised Communism: the petty bourgeoisie had seized control of the bureaucracy, while the ‘grand bourgeoisie’, in the guise of ‘specialists’, had taken over industrial management and the military command.

“The Workers’ Opposition submitted to the Tenth Congress two resolutions, one dealing with party organization, the other with the role of trade unions. It was the last time that independent resolutions – that is, resolutions not originating with the Central Committee – would be discussed at a party congress. The first document spoke of a crisis in the party caused by the perpetuation of habits of military command acquired during the Civil War, and the alienation of the leadership from the labouring masses. Party affairs were conducted without either *glasnost’* or democracy, in a bureaucratic style, by elements mistrustful of workers, causing them to lose confidence in the party and to leave it in droves. To remedy this situation, the party should carry out a thorough purge to rid itself of opportunistic elements and increase worker involvement. Every Communist should be required to spend at least three months a year doing physical labor. All functionaries should be elected by and accountable to their members: appointments from the Center should be made only in exceptional cases. The personnel of the central organs should be regularly turned over: the majority of the posts should be reserved for workers. The focus of party work should shift from the Center to the cells.

“The resolution on trade unions was no less radical. It protested the degradation of unions, to the point where their status was reduced to ‘virtual zero’. The rehabilitation of the country’s economy required the maximum involvement of the masses: ‘The systems and methods of construction based on a cumbersome bureaucratic machine stifle all creative initiative and independence’ of the producers. The party must demonstrate trust in the workers and their organizations. The national economy ought to be reorganized from the bottom up by the producers themselves. In time, transferred to a new body, an All-Russian Congress of Producers, not appointed by the Communist Party, but elected by the trade unions and ‘productive’ associations. (In the discussion of this resolution, Shliapnikov denied that the terms ‘producers’ included peasants.) Under this arrangement, the Party would confine itself to politics, leaving the direction of the economy to labor.

“These proposals by veteran Communists from labor ranks revealed a remarkable ignorance of Bolshevik theory and practice. Lenin, in his opening address, minced no words in denouncing them as representing a ‘clear syndicalist deviation’. Such a deviation, he went on, would not be dangerous were it not for the economic crisis and the prevalence in the country of armed banditry (by which he meant peasant rebellions). The perils of ‘petty bourgeois spontaneity’ exceeded even those posed by the Whites: they required greater party unity than ever. As for Kollontai, he dismissed her personal relations with the leader of the Workers’ Opposition (‘Thank God, we know well that Comrade Kollontai and Comrade Shliapnikov are “bound by class ties [and] class consciousness”’).

“Worker defections confronted Lenin and his associates with a problem: how to govern in the name of the ‘proletariat’ when the ‘proletariat’ turned its back on them. One solution was to denigrate Russia’s working class. It was now often heard that the ‘true’ workers had given their lives in the Civil War and that their place had been taken by social dregs. Bukharin claimed that Soviet Russia’s working class had been ‘peasantified’ and that, ‘objectively speaking’, the Workers’ Opposition was a Peasant Opposition, while a Chekist told the Menshevik Dan that the Petrograd workers were ‘scum’ (svoloch) left over after all the true proletarians had gone to the front. Lenin, at the Eleventh Party Congress, denied that Soviet Russia even had a ‘proletariat’ in Marx’s sense, since the ranks of industrial labor had been filled with malingerers and ‘all kinds of casual elements’. Rebutting such charges, Shliapnikov noted that 16 of the 41 delegates of the Tenth Congress supportive of the Workers’ Opposition had joined the Bolshevik party before 1905 and all had done so before 1914…

“… Trotsky criticized Shliapnikov for making a ‘fetish of democracy’: ‘The principle of elections within the labor movement is, as it were, placed above the Party, as if the Party did not have the right to assert its dictatorship even in the event that this dictatorship temporarily clashed with the transient mood within the worker democracy.’ It was not possible to entrust the management of the economy to workers, if only because there were hardly any Communists among them: in this connection, Trotsky cited Zinoviev to the effect that in Petrograd, the country’s largest industrial center, 99 percent of the workers either had no party preference, or, to the extent that they did, sympathized with the Mensheviks or even the Black Hundreds. In other words, one could have either Communism (‘the dictatorship of the proletariat’) or worker rule, but not both: democracy spelled the doom of Communism…

“The Workers’ Opposition suffered a decisive defeat and was ordered to dissolve. It was doomed from the outset not only because it challenged powerful vested interests of the central apparatus, but because it accepted the undemocratic premises of Communism, including the idea of a one-party state. It championed democratic procedures in a party that was by its ideology and, increasingly, by its structure committed to ignoring the popular will…

“To make impossible further dissent in the party, Lenin had the Tenth Congress adopt a new and fateful rule that outlawed the formation of ‘factions’: these were defined as organized groupings with their own platforms. The key, concluding article of the resolution ‘On the unity of the party’, kept secret at the time, provided severe penalties for violators: ‘In order to maintain strict discipline within the party and in all soviet activities, [in order] to attain the greatest unity by eliminating all factionalism, the Congress authorizes the Central Committee in instances of violations of discipline, or the revival or tolerance of factionalism, to apply all measures of party accounting up to exclusion from the party.’

“Although Lenin and the majority that voted for his resolution seem to have been unaware of its potential implications, it was destined to have the gravest consequences: Leonard Schapiro regards it as the decisive event in the history of the Communist Party. Simply put, in Trotsky’s words, the ruling transferred ‘the political regime prevailing in the state to the inner life of the ruling party’. Henceforth, the party, too, was to be run as a dictatorship…”[[684]](#footnote-684)

Of course, Lenin’s dictatorial tendencies had been evident at least since the Party’s founding Congress in 1903. But until recently there had still been leading Communists who believed in free speech, such as Rosa Luxemburg, who said: “Freedom is first of all the freedom to think differently… Freedom that is only for the supporters of the government, only for members of one party, however many they may be, is not freedom. Freedom is always freedom for dissenters. It is not out of the fanaticism of ‘justice’, but because on this in essence depends the whole vivifying, healing and cleansing action of political freedom; it ceases if freedom becomes a privilege.”

However, in order to see how, as a result of the Tenth Congress, the party was turned into a full-blown personal dictatorship, we need to study the transition from Lenin’s rule to that of Stalin…

## **85. THE RISE OF STALIN**

“By the end of 1922,” writes Niall Ferguson, “a new Russian Socialist Federal Republic extended from the Baltic to the Bering Straits. It, along with the far smaller Byelorussian, Transcaucasian and Far Eastern republics, made up the new Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Apart from a westward strip running from Helsinki down to Kishinev, remarkably little of the old Tsarist edifice had been lost – an astonishing outcome given the weakness of the Bolshevik position in the initial phase of the Revolution, and testament to the effectiveness of their ruthless tactics in the civil war. In effect, then, one Russian empire had simply been replaced by another. The 1926 census revealed that slightly less that 53 per cent of the citizens of the Soviet Union regarded themselves as of Russian nationality, though nearly 58 per cent gave Russian as the language they knew best or most often used.

“Some cynics added that the political system had not changed much either; for what was Lenin if not a Red Tsar, wielding absolute power through the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party (which, crucially, maintained direct control over the parties in the other republics)? Yet that was to miss the vast change of ethos that separated the new empire from the old. Though there had been ‘terrible’ Tsars in Russia’s past, the empire established by Lenin and his confederates was the first to be based on terror itself since the short-lived tyranny of the Jacobins in revolutionary France. At the same time, for all the Bolsheviks’ obsession with Western revolutionary models, theirs was a revolution that looked east more than it looked west. Asked to characterize the Russian empire as it re-emerged under Lenin, most Western commentators would not have hesitated to use the word ‘Asiatic’. That was also Trotsky’s view: ‘Our Red Army,’ he argued, ‘constitutes an incomparably more powerful force in the Asiatic terrain of world politics that in European terrain.’ Significantly, ‘Asiatic’ was precisely the word Lenin had used to describe Stalin…”[[685]](#footnote-685)

After the Civil War, which left Russia in ruins and far more backward than it had been under Tsarism, the Bolsheviks decided to retreat somewhat from War Communism to a kind of State Capitalism which was called “the New Economic Policy” (NEP). According to Eric Hobsbawm, “NEP was brilliantly successful in restoring the Soviet economy from the ruin of 1920. By 1926 Soviet industrial production had more or less recovered its pre-war level, though this did not mean much. The USSR remained as overwhelmingly rural as in 1913 (82 per cent of the population in both cases), and indeed only 7.5 per cent were employed outside agriculture. What which mass of peasants wanted to sell to the cities; what it wanted to buy from them; how much of its income it wanted to save; and how many of the many millions who chose to feed themselves in the village rather than face city poverty wanted to leave the farms: this determined Russia’s economic future, for, apart from the state’s tax income, the country had no other available source of investment and labour. Leaving aside all political considerations, a continuation of NEP, modified or not, would at best produce a modest rate of industrialisation. Moreover, until there was a great deal more industrial development, there was little that the peasants could buy in the city to tempt them to see their surplus rather than to eat and drink it in the villages. This (known as the ‘scissors crisis’) was to be the noose that eventually strangled NEP. Sixty years later a similar but proletarian ‘scissors’ undermined Gorbachev’s perestroika. Why, Soviet workers were to argue, should they raise their productivity to earn higher wages unless the economy produced the consumer goods to buy with these higher wages? But how were these goods to be produced unless Soviet workers raised their productivity?

“It was therefore never very likely that NEP – i.e. balanced economic growth based on a peasant market economy steered by the state which controlled its commanding heights – would prove a lasting strategy. For a regime committed to socialism the political arguments against it were in any case overwhelming. Would it not put the small forces committed to this new society at the mercy of petty commodity production and petty enterprise which would regenerate the capitalism just overthrown? And yet, what made the Bolshevik Party hesitate was the prospective cost of the alternative. It meant industrialisation by force: a second revolution, but this time not rising from below but imposed by state power from above.”[[686]](#footnote-686)

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The man to lead this second revolution turned out to be Stalin, a Georgian bank robber and former seminarian who became the greatest mass murderer in history.

The rise to power of Stalin over the whole of Russia and over all his fellow-Bolsheviks is one of the mysteries of Soviet history. In particular, historians have been surprised why it should have been Stalin, and not the more striking Trotsky, who conquered in their famous struggle for power in the 1920s. The question could be put as follows: how did Stalin, the most undistinguished of the leading Bolsheviks from an intellectual point of view, the uncharismatic bureaucratic plodder (an early nickname was “Comrade Filing-Cabinet”[[687]](#footnote-687)) with little hold (in a personal sense) over his fellow Bolsheviks, the non-Russian, non-Slav, non-European ex-seminarian and bank robber, acquire, within ten years of the revolution, such ascendancy within the party and the nation that he could expel from both the party and the nation – Trotsky, the hero of 1905 and October and the Civil War, the brilliant writer and demagogue and courageous man of action, the dynamic, cultivated and popular European internationalist?

As a provisional hypothesis to explain this fact we may apply to the Soviet situation the words of the ancient Greek historian Thucydides in his *History of the Peloponnesian War*: “Inferior minds were as a rule more successful; aware of their own defects and of the intelligence of their opponents, to whom they felt themselves inferior in debate, and by whose versatility of intrigue they were afraid of being surprised, they struck boldly and at once. Their enemies despised them, were confident of detecting their plots, and thought it needless to effect by violence what they could achieve by their brains, and so were taken off their guard and destroyed.”

In agreement with this hypothesis, there is plenty of evidence that Trotsky grossly underestimated Stalin, “the outstanding mediocrity of our Party”, as he said to Sklyansky. Boris Bazhanov, Stalin’s secretary during the mid-twenties, confirms Isaac Deutscher’s opinion that “Trotsky felt it beneath his dignity to cross swords with a man as intellectually undistinguished and personally contemptible as Stalin”[[688]](#footnote-688). Trotsky also felt it beneath his dignity to indulge in the kind of political skulduggery that Stalin excelled in, especially the tactic of “divide and conquer”. Stalin’s very obscurity, the stealthy but steady way in which he acquired power, lulled his opponents into inactivity. Trotsky was like a hare, opening up a large lead very quickly but then sitting back and preening his whiskers, while Stalin the tortoise crept past him to the finishing-line. And indeed, we know that he was vain and arrogant, “treasuring his historic role”, in Lunacharsky’s words, in the looking-glass of his imagination. Stalin, too, was vain, but he hid this fault more carefully… In any case, Stalin was far more talented than Trotsky supposed. He was a skilled and tenacious guerrilla fighter, bank-robber and organizer in the pre-revolutionary period; and during his numerous exiles and escapes from exile he acquired endurance, prudence and ingenuity. The Western leaders and diplomats who met him in the Second World War admired his toughness, realism and cleverness – sometimes even his supposed moral qualities![[689]](#footnote-689) And he outmanoeuvred them time and again…

He was a good judge of character, and could be attractive, strange as it may seem, to women, without ever being controlled by them. He knew several languages, had a fine voice, was thought to be a considerable poet, liked to instruct people in Shakespeare and art and music, and read voraciously in many subjects.[[690]](#footnote-690)

He could not match Trotsky in oratory, and yet this, too, he turned to his advantage, since it marked him out as a genuine proletarian, which Trotsky certainly was not: in the eyes of rough Bolsheviks from the provinces, writes Sebag Montefiore, “his flat quiet public speaking was an asset, a great improvement on Trotsky’s oratorical wizardry. His very faults, the chip on the shoulder, the brutality and fits of irrational temper, were the Party’s faults. ‘He was not trusted but he was the man the Party trusted,’ admitted Bukharin. ‘He’s like the symbol of the Party, the lower strata trust him.’ But above all, reflected the future secret police chief, Beria, he was ‘supremely intelligent’, a political ‘genius’. However rude or charming he might be, ‘he dominated his entourage with his intelligence’.”[[691]](#footnote-691)

In fact, Trotsky was more impressed by Stalin than he liked to admit, and foresaw his triumph earlier than most. As Norman Davies writes, “Trotsky saw it coming: in 1924 he was correctly predicting that ‘the gravedigger of the Party of the Revolution’ would take over: ‘The dialectics of history have already hooked him and will raise him up. He is needed by all of them, by the tired radicals, by the bureaucrats, by the nepmen, by the kulaks [!], by the upstarts, by all the sneaks that are crawling out of the upturned soil of the revolution… He speaks their language, and knows how to lead them. Stalin will become the dictator of the USSR.’”[[692]](#footnote-692)

Montefiore writes: “Stalin impressed Trotsky, whose description reveals why he lost their struggle for power. ‘Stalin was very valuable behind the scenes,’ he wrote. ‘He did have the knack of convincing the average run of leaders, especially the provincials.’ He ‘wasn’t regarded as the official leader of the Party,’ says Sagirashvili, another Georgian Menshevik in Petrograd throughout 1917, but ‘everyone listened to what he had to say, including Lenin – he was a representative of the rank and file, one who expressed its real views and moods’, which were unknown to émigrés like Trotsky. Soso [Stalin] was the ‘unquestioned leader’ of the Caucasians. Lenin, says Sagirashvili, ‘felt that behind him stood countless leaders from the provinces’. While Trotsky was prancing on the stage at the Circus, Stalin was finding new allies such as the young man he had unceremoniously kicked off the Bureau, Molotov.”[[693]](#footnote-693)

There was another aspect to Trotsky’s vanity that placed him at a disadvantage in relation to Stalin. As Edmund Wilson has shown, he was a deeply committed believer in History, and in the ultimate triumph of international Socialism under History’s aegis.[[694]](#footnote-694) But it was self-evident to him that such a great movement must have great leaders – educated, internationally minded men who had absorbed all the riches of bourgeois culture, decisive men of action who would jump to the forefront of the masses and be immediately accepted them. Lenin fitted this role, which is why Trotsky, from 1917 onward, accepted his leadership unquestioningly. But Stalin, the uncouth Asiatic, did *not* fit this role. Trotsky could not see how History could anoint *him*, of all people, to be the leader of the revolutionary movement. Perhaps this betrayed a certain lack of culture and historical knowledge on Trotsky’s part. After all, the ultimate victor in the great French revolution was the provincial, boorish Napoleon. Stalin, too, was a provincial – and he had studied Napoleon…

Trotsky’s fanatical faith in History was indeed a major bonus at those moments when History seemed to be at her most active – in 1905 and 1917-21.[[695]](#footnote-695) At such times fiery ardour, disregard of obstacles and the infirmities of men, firm faith in the goal and hope in its attainment, are at a premium. And these were the times when the plodding, cautious Stalin did not shine – although he did not lose ground, either.

But in the ebb of revolutionary fervour, when History seemed to have hidden her face from her devotees, different qualities were required – patience above all. This was a quality possessed by Stalin, and these were the years – 1906-16 and 1921-27 – when he advanced most rapidly up the ladder of power. Moreover, he continued to show faith in his goddess even in the most difficult times, as during his Siberian exile during the First World War. “Even this fanatical Marxist,” writes Montefiore, “convinced that the progress of history would bring about revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat, must have sometimes doubted if he would ever return. Even Lenin doubted the Revolution, asking Krupskaya, ‘Will we ever live to see it?’ Yet Stalin never seems to have lost faith. ‘The Russian Revolution is as inevitable as the rising of the sun,’ he had written back in 1905 and he had not changed his view. ‘Can you prevent the sun from rising?’”[[696]](#footnote-696)

In 1919 the Central Committee created the “Orgburo” (Organizational Bureau) “to manage the apparatus under Stalin’s command. Hence, even before becoming General Secretary in 1922, Stalin controlled major appointments, including those of provincial party secretaries; he thereby shaped the composition of party conferences and congresses, a crucial asset in the power struggle of the 1920s. Stalin was also the head of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate (*Rabkrin*), another organ of paramount influence.”[[697]](#footnote-697)

From 1922, when Lenin and Kamenev engineered Stalin’s appointment to the powerful post of General Secretary, Trotsky frittered away the enormous advantage given him by his reputation as a war-leader by refusing to build up a political power-base, or appeal to the mass of the party against the growing centralization of power in the Politburo, or in any way to pander to the vanities and jealous susceptibilities of his colleagues. Thus he elicited their contempt by pointedly reading French novels while the Politburo was in session. Through his arrogance and lack of political circumspection, Trotsky made enemies easily – and one of the first was Stalin. Thus when, at the London Congress of 1907, Trotsky attacked the bank robberies that Stalin had organized on Lenin’s behalf, Stalin was hurt, later talking about Trotsky’s “beautiful uselessness”. Trotsky again embittered Stalin by attacking his conduct at Tsaritsyn (later Stalingrad) during the Civil War.

Unfortunately for Trotsky, Stalin’s nature was not such as could shrug off personal insults. He was a bully; but, as Robert Service puts it, “he was an extremely sensitive bully”.[[698]](#footnote-698) And that gave him the defining trait of his nature: *vengefulness.*

Thus “at a boozy dinner, Kamenev asked everyone round the table to declare their greatest pleasure in life. Some cited women, others earnestly replied that it was the progress of dialectical materialism towards the workers’ paradise. Then Stalin answered: ‘My greatest pleasure is to choose one’s victim, prepare one’s plans minutely, slake an implacable vengeance, and then go to bed. There’s nothing sweeter in the world.’…”[[699]](#footnote-699)

This vengefulness is the critical element in Stalin’s character, the element that truly distinguishes him from his colleagues. Not that vengefulness was not characteristic of the whole revolutionary movement. But Stalin possessed it to a quite exceptional degree.

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It appeared early in his life. Thus Vershak writes: “Stalin’s comrades in the seminary circle say that soon after his expulsion [from Tiflis seminary], they were in turn expelled as the result of a denunciation by Stalin to the rector. He did not deny the accusation, but justified the deed by saying that the expelled students, having lost their right to become priests, would become good revolutionaries…”

Again, in 1930 the Georgian Menshevik newspaper, *Brdzolis Khhma*, made an accusation that was first levelled against him by Martov in 1918: “From the earliest days of his activity among the workers, Djugashvili [Stalin] attracted attention by his intrigues against the outstanding Social Democratic leader, Sylvester Jibladze. He was warned but took no notice, continuing to spread slanders with the intention of discrediting the recognized representative of the local organization. Brought before a party tribunal, he was found guilty of unjust slander, and was unanimously excluded from the Tiflis organization.”

Again, Iremashvili relates what Stalin said to him on the death of his first wife, Ekaterina: “This creature softened my stony heart. She is dead, and with her have died my last warm feelings for all human beings.” Iremashvili comments: “From the day he buried his wife, he indeed lost the last vestige of human feelings. His heart filled with the unutterably malicious hatred which his cruel father had already begun to engender in him while he was still a child. Ruthless with himself, he became ruthless with all people.” It would be unwise to discount the importance attached here to the death of Stalin’s first wife. Russian history provides us with a striking parallel: it was after the death of Tsar Ivan IV’s first wife, Anastasia Romanova, that he became “the Terrible”, cruel and rapacious to a paranoiac degree. Ivan’s decimation of the Russian boyars through his oprichnina in the 16th century bears a striking resemblance to Stalin’s of the Communist Party through the NKVD in the 1930s; and Stalin showed great interest in the Terrible Ivan.[[700]](#footnote-700)

While no purely psychological hypothesis can fully explain the extremes of evil that the Russian revolution threw up, it is legitimate to seek a *partial* explanation of the actions of a man like Stalin in his early childhood. Alan Bullock is sympathetic to the thesis, put forward by Erich Fromm, that Stalin, like Hitler, was a narcissist and a paranoid psychopath: “’Narcissism’ is a concept originally formulated by Freud in relation to early infancy, but one which is now accepted more broadly to describe a personality disorder in which the natural development of relationships to the external world has failed to take place. In such a state only the person himself, *his* needs, feelings and thoughts, everything and everybody pertaining to *him* are experienced as fully real, while everybody and everything else lacks reality or interest.

“Fromm argues that some degree of narcissism can be considered an occupational illness among political leaders in proportion to their conviction of a providential mission and their claim to infallibility of judgement and a monopoly of power. When such claims are raised to the level demanded by a Hitler or a Stalin at the height of their power, any challenge will be perceived as a threat to their private image of themselves as much as to their public image, and they will react by going to any lengths to suppress it.

“So far psychiatrists have paid much less attention to Stalin than to Hitler. Lack of evidence is part of the reason. There has been no parallel in the case of the Soviet Union to the capture of documents and interrogation of witnesses that followed the defeat of Germany. But more important is the striking contrast in temperament and style between the two men: the flamboyant Hitler, displaying a lack of restraint and extravagance of speech which for long made it difficult for many to take him seriously, in contrast to the reserved Stalin, who owed his rise to power to his success, not in exploiting, but in concealing his personality, and was underestimated for the opposite reason – because many failed to recognize his ambition and ruthlessness. Nor surprisingly, it is the first rather than the second who has caught the psychiatrists’ attention. All the more interesting then is the suggestion that underlying the contrast there was a common narcissistic obsession with themselves.

“There is one other insight, which Stalin’s American biographer, Robert Tucker, has adopted from Karen Horney’s work on neurosis. He suggests that his father’s brutal treatment of Stalin, particularly the beatings which he inflicted on the boy, and on the boy’s mother in his presence, produced the basic anxiety, the sense of being isolated in a hostile world, which can lead a child to develop a neurotic personality. Searching for firm ground on which to build an inner security, someone who in his childhood had experienced such anxiety might naturally search for inner security by forming an idealistic image of himself and then adopting this as his true identity. ‘From then on his energies are invested in the increasing effort to prove the ideal self in action and gain others’ affirmation of it.’ In Stalin’s case, this fits his identification with the Caucasian outlaw-hero, whose name he assumed, and later with Lenin, the revolutionary hero, on whom he fashioned his own ‘revolutionary persona’, with the name of Stalin, ‘man of steel’, which echoed Lenin’s own pseudonym…

“The earliest recorded diagnosis of Stalin as paranoid appears to have been made in December 1927, when an international scientific conference met in Moscow. A leading Russian neuropathologist, Professor Vladimir Bekhterev from Leningrad, made a great impression on the foreign delegates and attracted the attention of Stalin, who asked Bekhterev to pay him a visit. After the interview (22 December 1927) Bekhterev told his assistant Mnukhin that Stalin was a typical case of severe paranoia [more precisely: “a paranoiac with a withered arm”] and that a dangerous man was now at the head of the Soviet Union. The fact that Bekhterev was suddenly taken ill and died while still in his hotel has inevitably led to the suspicion that Stalin had him poisoned. Whether this is true or not, when the report of Bekhterev’s diagnosis was repeated in *Liternaturnaya Gazeta* in September 1988, it was accepted as correct by a leading Soviet psychiatrist, Professor E.A. Lichko.”[[701]](#footnote-701)

And yet Donald Rayfield may be right that “psychopaths of Stalin’s order arise so rarely in history that forensic psychiatry has few insights to offer”.[[702]](#footnote-702) In such cases, psychiatry needs to be supplemented with demonology…

Stalin’s paranoid cruelty first manifested itself on a large scale in his suppression of his native Georgia’s independence in 1921. The fact that this was his native land did not inhibit him from calling for “the smashing of the hydra of nationalism” there, and burning out “the nationalist survivals with hot iron”. And in 1924 Stalin said of Jordania’s uprising: “All Georgia must be ploughed under.” Now the cruelty and desire to dominate that had been evident in him even as a child began to manifest itself more and more. Not for nothing did he say that the death of one man was a tragedy, but the death of a million – a mere statistic.

On January 21, 1924 Lenin suffered a stroke and died. “Against the wishes of Lenin and his family, Stalin orchestrated the effective deification of the leader and his embalming like an Orthodox saint in a Mausoleum on Red Square. Stalin commandeered the sacred orthodoxy of his late hero to build up his own power…”[[703]](#footnote-703)

After the death of Lenin the rivalry between Stalin and Trotsky became more intense, and for this period we have the invaluable testimony of Bazhanov. He says that Stalin’s sole concern during this period “was to outwit his colleagues and lay his hands on the reins of unrestricted power”. He accused Stalin of murdering Frunze and Sklyansky. And he says: “It was clear to me already in those early years that Stalin was a vindictive Asiatic, with fear, suspicion and revenge deeply embedded in his soul. I could tell from everything he said and left unsaid, his tastes, preferences and demeanour, that he would recoil from nothing, drive every issue to its absurd extreme and send men to their deaths without hesitation if they stood in his way.”

Bazhanov considers Trotsky to have been potentially as ruthless as Stalin. But there was an important difference between the two kinds of ruthlessness. Trotsky’s was not a personally directed emotion but a kind of impersonal passion stemming directly from his faith in the revolution being in essence an extension of it. As Deutscher said (perhaps over-generously): “His judgement remained unclouded by any personal emotion against Stalin, and severely objective.” Stalin, on the other hand, had the great advantage of really hating his opponent. Deutscher suggests that Stalin must have had “better qualities and emotions, such as intellectual ambition and a degree of sympathy with the oppressed, without which no young man would ever join a persecuted revolutionary party”[[704]](#footnote-704). But he produces no evidence in support of this dubious statement. And even he had to admit that Stalin’s betrayal of the Warsaw rising in 1944 could have been motivated, not by political expediency, but by nothing else than “that unscrupulous rancour and insensible spite of which he had given so much proof in the great purges”.[[705]](#footnote-705)

But hatred and ambition, without intelligence, accomplish little. And here we must revise the simplistic notion that Trotsky was intelligent and Stalin stupid. Lenin, for one, did not share this opinion, considering Stalin to be second only to Trotsky in ability among the members of the Politburo. Trotsky was a brilliant intellectual, one of the most acute judges of the national and international scene. Not for nothing did Deutscher call him a “prophet”. But he had his weaknesses apart from the vanity that we have already mentioned. Bazhanov says that he was naïve with the naïveté that comes from fanaticism. Lunacharsky said that he was a bad organizer. These two faults were linked to a third: his blindly optimistic faith in the infallibility of the party. As he wrote to Zinoviev: “The party in the last analysis is always right, because the party is the single historic instrument given to the proletariat for the solution of its fundamental problems… I know that one must not be right *against* the party.” It was because of this faith in the party – and in Lenin – that Trotsky accepted the ban on factionalism at the Tenth Party Congress in 1921. And yet he understood better than anybody what this “egocentralist” restriction of free speech would lead to. As he had declared years earlier: “The organization of the party takes the place of the party itself; the Central Committee takes the place of the organization; and finally the dictator takes the place of the Central Committee.”

Why, then, did he not protest when he saw Stalin attaining supreme power by precisely these means, using his position as General Secretary to fill the party with men loyal to himself alone? Partly because, as we have seen, he underestimated Stalin. And partly because, after Lenin’s death in 1924, he did not want to appear to be stepping too eagerly into Lenin’s shoes. But mainly because he simply trusted in the party to get it right in the long run.

This attitude of Trotsky’s persisted for a long time, even after he had been expelled from the country and the horrors of the First Five-Year-Plan had revealed the extent of Stalin’s “bureaucratic collectivist” heresy. As late as October, 1932, Trotsky refused to support a “Remove Stalin!” slogan because it might encourage counter-revolution. Instead, he proposed the formation of a Fourth International opposed to the Stalin-controlled Comintern – but only after Hitler had come to power in Germany. Even then he said that this new International should have jurisdiction only up to, but not beyond, the frontiers of the USSR. it was only in October, 1933 that he declared that the Opposition should constitute a new party against the Bolsheviks. And it was not until the later 1930s that Trotsky began, in a letter to Angelica Balabanov, to rebel both against the Party and History herself: “History has to be taken as she is; but when she allows herself such extraordinary and filthy outrages [Stalin’s show-trials], one must fight back at her with one’s fists…”

Stalin had no such ideological scruples, no agonies of a revolutionary conscience. He had the great good fortune – or good judgement – to become a follower of Lenin as early as 1903 and to stick to him, in spite of some disagreements, right up to the revolution. Not that he loved Lenin – he was delighted at the news of Lenin’s death, according to Bazhanov, whereas Trotsky fainted for two hours, according to Krupskaya. Nor was he a consistent Leninist thereafter, for all his propaganda to the contrary – Stalin’s career covers the most extraordinary range between extreme communism to near-convergence with capitalism, from the most strident Russian nationalism to the purest internationalism. What mattered to him was not ideological purity, but power; and while he did not underestimate the importance of ideology in the attainment and maintenance of power – in this respect Lenin trained him well, - he never mistook the means for the end.

Thus he paid attention to organization – he was an excellent administrator – and to the shifting patterns of alliances within the party. He did not wear his heart on his sleeve, and was capable of the most studied hypocrisy in the manner of Shakespeare’s Richard III. In October, 1917 Trotsky had impetuously condemned Zinoviev and Kamenev “to the dustbin of history” for their refusal to back Lenin’s call for an immediate putsch; but Stalin held his fire. Thus he was able to use Zinoviev and Kamenev against Trotsky, and then, when his own power base had been established, destroy all three of them. This combination of hatred with prudence, cunning with caution, made him a formidable politician.

Other objective aspects of the political situation in the mid-twenties favoured Stalin against Trotsky. As Deutscher points out, Trotsky’ doctrine of permanent revolution, while critical to the success of the October revolution, offended the self-confident complacency of the party. On the other hand, Stalin’s discovery (with Bukharin) of the slogan “Socialism in One Country” answered to the country’s pride in itself, its weariness with the failure of European revolution and its longing for stability. The fact that Stalin later stole so many pages out of Trotsky’s book – his emphasis on rapid industrialization, on militarization of the unions and on discipline within the party – does not contradict this thesis. In the early twenties, when Trotsky proposed these policies, the time was not yet ripe for their implementation; whereas in the late twenties and early thirties, when the New Economic Policy had run into the sands and political power was concentrated exclusively in Stalin’s hands, they could be embarked upon with some prospect of success – according to Stalin’s criteria, that is.

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Have we then succeeded in explaining why Stalin triumphed over Trotsky? Can we say that Stalin’s greater hatred, cunning, prudence and organizational ability, on the one hand, and Trotsky’s vanity and naiveté, on the other, were bound to lead to Stalin’s triumph in the conditions of war weariness, ideological cooling-off and party sclerosis that prevailed in the Soviet Union of the mid-1920s? In the present writer’s opinion we cannot say this, because the factors mentioned above do not help us to understand the extraordinary drama that took place over Lenin’s will in the critical years 1922-24, when Stalin was very nearly catapulted from power, and in which it is difficult not to see another, metaphysical factor entering into the situation…

In April, 1922 Stalin became General Secretary, the critical platform for his rise to supreme power. In May, 1922 Lenin suffered his first stroke, thereby removing the main obstacle to Stalin’s exploiting the secretariat in his personal bid for power. Then, during the autumn of that year, while he was slowly recovering from his stroke, Lenin fell out for the first time with the man whom, in 1913, he had called “the wonderful Georgian”. The quarrel seems to have been over Georgia, which the Second Army, on instructions from Stalin, had invaded the previous year. Dzerzhinsky reported that Stalin’s underling, Ordzhonikidze, had committed brutalities there, and complaints also reached Lenin against Stalin. Lenin wanted Stalin to pay more attention to Georgian national sensitivities. But Stalin, who had been the Party’s expert on Nationalities for years, believed his countrymen should be kept on a close rein.

But then, in December, 1922, came Lenin’s second stroke. Recovering somewhat, Lenin began to draw up a will, in which, while commenting on each member of the Politburo, he wrote: “Comrade Stalin, having become General Secretary, has concentrated enormous power in his hands; and I am not sure that he always knows how to use that power with sufficient caution.” He also hinted at the possibility of a split between Trotsky and Stalin, which the party should act to avoid. Five days later, on December 30, he wrote: “I think that the hastiness and administrative clumsiness of Stalin played a fatal role here [in Georgia], and also his spite against the notorious ‘social chauvinism’. Spite in general plays the worst possible role in politics…”

Fairly mild criticism, perhaps. But a quarrel between Stalin and Krupskaya led to a significant hardening in Lenin’s attitude in the few months remaining to him.[[706]](#footnote-706) Thus on January 4, 1923, in a postscript to his will, he wrote (if it was he, and not Krupskaya, that wrote it): “Stalin is too rude, and this fault… becomes unbearable in the office of General Secretary. Therefore I propose to the comrades to find a way to remove Stalin from that position and appoint to it another man more patient, more loyal, more polite and more attentive to comrades, less capricious, etc.”

Then, on March 4, there appeared in *Pravda* a blistering attack by Lenin on Stalin’s work as Commissar of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate. Deutscher wrote: “This was Lenin’s first, publicly delivered blow. Behind the scenes he prepared for a final attack at the twelfth party congress, convened for April; and he agreed with Trotsky on joint action. On 5 March, the day after *Pravda* had at last published his criticisms of Stalin’s Commissariat, he had a sharp exchange with Stalin. He then dictated a brief letter to Stalin, telling him that he ‘broke off’ all personal relations with him. The next day, 6 March, he wired a message to the leaders of the Georgian opposition, promising to take up their case at the congress: ‘I am with you in this matter with all my heart. I am outraged by the arrogance of Ordzhonikidze and the connivance of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky.’ He again communicated with Trotsky about their joint tactics in the Georgian business; and he briefed Kamenev who was to depart for Tiflis with a special commission of inquiry. Just in the middle of all these moves, on 9 March, he suffered the third attack of his illness, from which he was not to recover…”[[707]](#footnote-707)

There can be little doubt that if Lenin had survived, Stalin would have been sacked. There can be little doubt, either, that if he had died that March, and not ten months later, Stalin would still have been sacked. For then his will would have been opened at the twelfth congress in April, 1923.

But Krupskaya scrupulously observed the instructions on Lenin’s will: “Open only after my death”, so the contents of the will were not made known until shortly before the fourteenth congress in May, 1924. By that time, however, Stalin had worked hard to create a bloc with Zinoviev and Kamenev against Trotsky. So when the matter came up before the Central Committee, Zinoviev and Kamenev spoke in favour of Stalin and against the publication of the will. Trotsky was silent, the vote was taken – and Stalin was saved. Three years later, Stalin was stronger than all three. In November, 1927 Trotsky and Zinoviev were expelled from the party, and in December the Fifteenth Party Congress confirmed the decision…

The Russian people, and the world, paid very, very dearly for Stalin’s triumph. Kirill Alexandrov writes: “In the USSR in the course of 30 years (1923-1953), [that is, until the death of Stalin], for political reasons alone the Bolsheviks shot more than 750,000 people (on average more than 25,000 executions per year for political accusations). The greatest quantity of executions of ‘enemies of the people’ (more than 680,000, mainly peasants and collective farm workers) took place during ‘Yezhovshina’ (1937-1938). This data was put forward by the Minister of the Internal Affairs of the USSR in 1953…”[[708]](#footnote-708)

However, we take the numbers of deaths from all kinds of unnatural causes, then the death-toll for 1917-1953 was about *fifty million*…[[709]](#footnote-709)

The most bloodthirsty period was probably the early 1930s when Stalin waged all-out war against the Orthodox peasantry, killing and starving to death tens of millions. Once the following conversation took place between Stalin and Churchill on the collectivization of the early 1930s.

“Tell me,” asked Churchill. “Is the tension of the present war as severe for you personally as was the burden of the politics of collectivization?”

“Oh no,” replied “the father of the peoples”. “The politics of collectivization was a terrible struggle.”

“I thought so. After all, you had to deal then not with a handful of aristocrats and landowners, but with millions of small peasants.”

“Tens of millions,” cried Stalin, raising his hands. “It was terrible. And it lasted for four years. But it was absolutely necessary for Russia to avoid famine and guarantee tractors for the countryside…”[[710]](#footnote-710)

Bazhanov writes: “Trotsky’s position in 1923-4 was strong. If he had used the cards history had dealt him, Stalin could have been stopped. Of course Stalin *was* an accomplished schemer, but with the support Lenin had given him Trotsky could have lined up the party behind him if his temperament had not stood in the way. But he failed to understand the nature of the Party machine, Stalin’s use of it, and the full significance Stalin’s position as General Secretary had acquired by the time of the 13th Congress.”

And yet there was more to it than that. The vital factor, which depended neither on psychology nor on politics, was the timing of Lenin’s strokes, and above all the fact that the last stroke incapacitated him without immediately killing him. Was this a product of blind Chance? Or History’s choice of Stalin? Or God’s judgement on apostate Russia?

For a believer in the true God there is only one possible answer to this question. God acted now as He had acted in seventh-century Byzantium when He allowed the cruel tyrant Phocas to murder the good Emperor Maurice and ascend the throne. “One contemporary,” writes Alexander Dvorkin, “cites the story of a certain man who cried out to God: ‘Why did You send Your people such a blood-thirsty wolf?’ And the Lord replied to him: ‘I tried to find someone worse than Phocas, so as to punish the people for its self-will, but was unable. But from now on don’t you question the judgements of God…’”[[711]](#footnote-711)

## **86. THE LAST OF THE MONARCHISTS**

Historians like to look for continuities between pre- and post-revolutionary Russia. Thus some of them see a continuation of the idea of Moscow the Third Rome in the Comintern, the international confederation of communist parties – although this “continuation” should more accurately be called a grotesque parody of its pre-revolutionary counterpart. True, the uniting power of the new “Rome” was still a Russian-speaking empire covering roughly the same territory as the former empire. But though Russian-speaking, this new empire so despised everything that the old empire stood for that it chose to change its name to “the Soviet Union” in 1922, and subjected the Russian people to the greatest persecution any people has known in the history of the world. True, the new empire and its Comintern allies or satellites were united, like the old, by a kind of religious faith, Marxism-Leninism. But Marxism-Leninism is about as different from Orthodox Christianity as any two religions can be, while the moralities of the two religions are also polar opposites…

Nevertheless, the idea did not die. As Simon Sebag Montefiore writes, Stalin “privately believed that Russia needed a ‘tsar’: in April 1926, he mused that, although the Party ruled, ‘the people understand little of this. For centuries the people in Russia were under a tsar. The Russian people are tsarist… accustomed to one person being at the head. And now there should be one.’ He studied Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great particularly. ‘The people need a tsar,’ he said in the 1930s, ‘whom they can worship and for whom they can live and work.’ He carefully crafted his own image to create a new template of tsar, fatherly and mysterious, industrial and urban, the leader of an international mission yet the monarch of the Russians. As the Germans advanced in 1941, he studied 1812 and, in 1942-3, restored ranks, gold braid and epaulettes – and promoted tsarist heroes Kutuzov and Suvorov. Stalin’s Terror allowed him to perform total reversals of policy, such as his pact with Hitler, to survive colossal self-inflicted disasters and force astonishing sacrifices from the Russians. His personal authority, homicidal brutality, Marxist-nationalistic propaganda, breakneck industrialization and command economy meant that he could deploy resources that would have been unimaginable to Nicholas. Stalin was a murderous tyrant, the Soviet experience a dystopian tragedy for the Russians, yet he out-performed the tsars, defeating Germany, leaving Russia as ruler of eastern Europe and a nuclear superpower. He always measured himself against the Romanovs. In 1945, when the US ambassador Averell Harriman congratulated him on taking Berlin, Stalin riposted: ‘Yes, but Alexander I made it to Paris.’”[[712]](#footnote-712)

However, true monarchism did not survive the end of the Civil War in Russia. It was preserved – but only in the catacombs. And outside Russia, in the Russian Church in Exile.

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The Russian Church in Exile grew out of the chaos of the Civil War. By 1920, the White armies, only fitfully supported by the western powers, were in full retreat on all fronts. “The final evacuation of the Crimea,” writes Douglas Smith, “took place in mid-November 1920 under General Wrangel. As they prepared to leave, Wrangel invited to join them all those who would be in danger were they fall into the enemy’s hands. In the span of a few days, 146,000 people – twice the expected number – were placed on boats and sent out over the waters of the Black Sea to Constantinople. Wrangel embarked from Sevastopol on the cruiser *General Kornilov* on the fourteenth. ‘We cannot foretell our future fate,’ he told his fellow exiles. ‘May God grant us strength and wisdom to endure this period of Russian misery, and to survive it.’

“The Russians who fled the approaching Red Army were not exaggerating the danger. Although Mikhail Frunze, the Red commander, had issued generous surrender terms, approximately fifty thousand people – most members of the former privileged classes – were shot or hanged during the final weeks of 1920. As the Red Army moved into the Crimea, the Cheka began registering the cities’ inhabitants and dividing them into three categories: those to be shot; those to be sent to concentration camps; those to be spared. All former White officers were ordered to appear for registration and promised safety. The several thousand who complied were arrested and then taken out over the course of several nights and murdered. No one was safe...

“The killing of former White officers across Russia continued until 1922, despite an amnesty of June 1920 extended to all White officers and soldiers. In Yekaterinodar, about three thousand officers were shot; in Odessa as many as two thousand; in Yekaterinburg, twenty-eight hundred. The worst, however, was in the Crimea, where as many as fifty thousand officers and officials were executed. Justification, after a fashion, for the executions was made with a November 1921 modification to the June 1920 amnesty, according to which all those who had voluntarily fought with the White armies for ‘the goal of defending their class interests and the bourgeois order’ were no longer covered by the amnesty and were henceforth to be deemed ‘outcasts’.

“Around the time the White Army under Wrangel was abandoning the fight, the White forces collapsed in Siberia. Ataman Semenov was run out of his capital in Chita on October 22, 1920, and what remained of his forces fled to Manchuria. In one of the most bizarre chapters of the civil war, Baron Ungern-Sternberg, a Baltic nobleman and former lieutenant of Semenov’s, set up a murderous, occultic base in Outer Mongolia for attacking Soviet Russia. He was overthrown in 1921, captured, and executed. The last White outpost was in Vladivostok, ruled by one of Kolchak’s generals [General Diterichs] until his defeat by the Red Army in late October 1922. With that, the White forces had been crushed, and the civil war was truly over.”[[713]](#footnote-713)

A.F. Traskovsky writes: “The part of the Russian Orthodox Church which was abroad already had quite a long history before the formation of ROCOR. In Western Europe Russian Orthodox churches had been built beginning from the eighteenth century at Russian embassies and holy places that were often visited by Russians on trips abroad. In the East, thanks to the missionary activities of the Russian Orthodox Church missions were founded in China and Japan that later became dioceses, as well as a mission in Jerusalem. The spread of Orthodoxy in Alaska and North America also led to the creation of a diocese. In the “Statute concerning the convening of an Emigration Assembly of the Russian Churches”, mention was made that in 1921 there were 15 emigration regions which had Russian bishops and 14 districts where there were Russian Orthodox parishes but no bishops. The regions included: North America, Japan, China, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, France, Italy, Serbia, Bulgaria, Turkey and the Far East. The districts included: Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, England, Switzerland, Czechia, Hungary, Austria, Romania, Palestine, Greece and the city of Bizert in Tunisia. All the emigration missions, parishes and dioceses were in canonical submission to the higher ecclesiastical authorities in Russia – the Holy Ruling Synod until the restoration of the patriarchate in 1917, and his Holiness the Patriarch after 1917. But then after the revolution there began the Civil War and anarchy. The Bolsheviks began to persecute the Church. The majority of emigration missions and dioceses found themselves either deprived of the possibility of normal relations with the higher ecclesiastical authorities of Russia, or such relations were exceptionally difficult. Moreover, in Russia itself many dioceses were cut off by the front from his Holiness Patriarch Tikhon (Bellavin)’s leadership. After the defeat of the White army, a huge flood of émigrés flooded abroad, amongst whom were not a few representatives of the clergy, including bishops and metropolitans. On the shoulders of the clerics who were abroad and the clergy who had emigrated lay the burden of care for the spiritual nourishment of the huge Russian diaspora. That was the situation in which the part of the Russian Church that was abroad found itself on the eve of the formation of the Church Abroad.

“What was the prehistory of the Russian Church Abroad? Her beginnings went back to 1919, in Russia. In Stavropol in May, 1919 there took place the South Russian Church Council headed by the oldest hierarch in the South of Russia, Archbishop Agathodorus of Stavropol. There took part in the Council all the bishops who were on the territory of the Voluntary army, the members of the All-Russian Ecclesiastical Council and four people from each diocesan council. At the Council there was formed the Higher Church Administration of the South of Russia (HCA of the South of Russia), which consisted of: President – Archbishop Metrophanes of Novocherkassk, Assistant to the President – Archbishop Demetrius of Tauris, Protopresbyter G. Shavelsky, Protopriest A.P. Rozhdestvensky, Count V.V. Musin-Pushkin and Professor of theology P.V. Verkhovsky. In November, 1919 the Higher Church Administration was headed by Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky) of Kiev and Galich, who had arrived from Kiev. [[714]](#footnote-714)

“The aim of the creation of the HCA was the organization of the leadership of church life on the territory of the Volunteer army in view of the difficulties Patriarch Tikhon was experiencing in administering the dioceses on the other side of the front line. A little earlier, in November, 1918, an analogous Temporary Higher Church Administration had been created in Siberia headed by Archbishop Sylvester of Omsk. Later, a part of the clergy that submitted to this HCA emigrated after the defeat of Kolchak’s army and entered the composition of the Chinese dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church. The HCA of the South of Russia, like the Siberian HCA, was, in spite of its self-government, nevertheless in canonical submission to his Holiness Patriarch Tikhon, and in this way Church unity was maintained.

“After the defeat of the armies of Denikin, in the spring of 1920 the head of the HCA of the South of Russia, Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky), was evacuated from Novorossiysk to Constantinople[[715]](#footnote-715), and was then for a time in a monastery on Mount Athos. However, in September, 1920, at the invitation of General Wrangel, he returned to Russia, to the Crimea, where he continued his work. The final evacuation of the HCA of the South of Russia took place in November, 1920, together with the remains of Wrangel’s army. On the steamer ‘Alexander Mikhailovich’ there set out from the Crimea to Constantinople the leaders of the HCA and a large number of simple priests.

“On arriving in Constantinople, as Archbishop Nicon (Rklitsky) indicates in his *Biography of Metropolitan Anthony*, Metropolitan Anthony ‘first considered that from now on all the activities of the Russian Higher Church Administration should be brought to an end and all the care for the spiritual welfare of the Russian Orthodox people should be taken upon herself by the Church of Constantinople and the Local Orthodox Churches in whose bounds the Russian Orthodox people found themselves.’ However, as soon became clear, the realization of this variant became extremely problematic in view of the fact that huge masses of Russian refugees did not know the language and customs of those countries to which they had come, and the nourishment of such a large flock by priests speaking other languages (for example Greeks) presented very many problems. Moreover, the numerous émigré Russian clergy, who were fully able to deal with these problems, would not be involved. Therefore it was decided to continue the activities of the Higher Church Administration.

“In order to work out a plan of further action, the first session of the HCA outside the borders of Russia took place on November 19, 1920…[[716]](#footnote-716) Metropolitan Dorotheus [locum tenens of the Ecumenical patriarchal throne] gave his agreement [to the HCA’s decisions] and the HCA of the South of Russia was transformed into the Higher Church Administration Abroad.

“Literally the day after the above-mentioned session, on November 20, 1920, an event took place in Moscow that had an exceptional significance for the Russian Church Abroad – his Holiness Patriarch Tikhon passed decree № 362 concerning the self-governance of church dioceses in the case of a break of communications between this or that diocese and his Holiness the Patriarch for external reasons over which they had no control (what they had in mind was war or repression by the authorities). This is the decree’s main content:

“’1. With the blessing of his Holiness the Patriarch, the Holy Synod and the Higher Church Council, in a joint session, judged it necessary… to give the diocesan Hierarch… instructions in case of a disconnection with the higher church administration or the cessation of the activity of the latter…

“’2. If dioceses, as a result of the movement of the front, changes of state boundaries, etc., find themselves unable to communicate with the higher church administration or the higher church administration itself together with his Holiness the Patriarch for some reason ceases its activity, the diocesan hierarch will immediately enter into relations with the hierarchs of neighbouring dioceses in order to organize a higher instance of church authority for several dioceses in the same conditions (in the form of a temporary higher church government or metropolitan region, or something similar).

“’3. The care for the organization of the higher church authority for the whole group who are in the situation indicated in point 2 is the obligatory duty of the eldest ranked hierarch in the indicated group…’

“This wise decree of his Holiness Patriarch Tikhon, which was passed in conditions of anti-church terror, was given to the foreign bishops a year after its passing with the help of Bishop Meletius of Nerchensk. It served as the canonical basis for the formation of the Russian Church Abroad, since the émigré clergy were in the situation indicated in points 2 and 3.

“Meanwhile the HCA in Constantinople continued to work out a plan for further action. At the sessions of April 19-21, 1921, it was decided to convene a ‘Congress of the representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad to unite, regulate and revive church activity abroad’, which was later renamed the ‘Russian Church Council Abroad’, also known in the literature as the Karlovtsy Council. Soon, at the invitation of Patriarch Demetrius of Serbia, the HCA led by Metropolitan Anthony moved to Sremskie Karlovtsy in Serbia – a fraternal country which in the course of many years proved to be a safe haven for the leadership of the Church Abroad.”[[717]](#footnote-717)

ROCOR found greater sympathy among the Serbs than among the Greeks. “Alexander I never identified Russia with her new communist government. Being a deeply believing Orthodox man, King Alexander could not contemplate the destiny of Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church without pain… During the Civil war, by command of the Monarch of Yugoslavia, a Serbian corps of volunteers was formed in the South of Russia to fight against the Bolsheviks. When the civil war was lost and the remains of the Volunteer Army, thanks to the efforts of General Wrangel, were saved and left their homeland, Alexander I magnanimously stretched out his hand of help and received those who were without a homeland, the Russian refugees who were needed by nobody, and gave them the opportunity to set themselves up, work and live in this country. The young Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes needed cultural and intellectual forces. It well understood this, but it did not give refuge to Russian people out of avaricious motives – it strove to repay good with good, to repay the joyful hospitality it received from Russia when it was a political émigré, and for help in the war.”[[718]](#footnote-718)

Meanwhile, at the end of 1920, 200,000 Russian refugees with the retreating remnants of the White armies in Siberia crossed from Siberia into China. Among them were six bishops and many priests. This large colony of Russians recognized the authority of the HCA in Serbia.[[719]](#footnote-719)

Among these refugees was a distinguished group of philosophers and theologians, who on September 29, 1922 were sent on the steamer “Oberbürgermeister Haken” from Petrograd to Stettin, including N.A. Berdyaev, S.L. Frank, I.A. Ilyin, S.E. Trubetskoy, B.P. Vysheslavtsev and L.P. Karsavin…

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The canonical status of ROCOR was unique in the history of the Orthodox Church. She always called herself a part of the Local Russian Church - that part which was situated outside Russia and had jurisdiction exclusively outside Russia (point 1 of the Polozhenie or Statute of ROCOR). And yet she had dioceses and parishes on all six continents of Europe, North and South America, Asia, Africa and Australia, and was in canonical submission to none of the Local Orthodox Churches already existing in those places. Moreover, at the beginning of the 1990s, when she returned to Russia, she claimed jurisdiction in Russia as well!

And so ROCOR was, in effect, a world-wide jurisdiction claiming to have jurisdiction in every part of the globe, but which claimed to be only a part of one Local Church, the Russian!

This clearly anomalous situation was justified on a temporary basis, - until the fall of communism in Russia, according to the *Polozhenie*, and, at least for a time, such established Local Churches as Serbia and Jerusalem recognized her. The situation was seen as justified on the grounds, first, of the extraordinarily difficult situation of the three million or so Russian Orthodox scattered around the world, whose spiritual and physical needs had to be met by Russian-speaking pastors. And secondly, on the grounds of the critical situation in the Orthodox Church as a whole, when even the leaders of Orthodoxy were falling into heresy.

On October 13, 1921, in response to a request from ROCOR, the Russian Holy Synod and Higher Church Council under the presidency of Patriarch Tikhon issued resolution № 193, which declared: “(1) In view of the inappropriateness of submitting to the Higher Church Administration of the Russian Church Abroad all the Orthodox churches and communities of the Moscow Patriarchate beyond the borders of Soviet Russia, to leave this Administration with its former privileges, without spreading the sphere of its activities onto the Orthodox Churches in Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which preserve their presently existing form of Church administration, (2) also to turn down the petition for the creation of a post of deputy of his Holiness the Patriarch abroad, as being unnecessary, and (3) to accept the news of the proposed convening of a Council of the Russian Orthodox churches abroad on October 1 old style.”[[720]](#footnote-720)

The First All-Emigration Council opened in Sremskie Karlovtsy on November 21, 1921. Eleven Russian and two Serbian bishops took part; twenty-four Russian bishops who could not attend the Council sent telegrams recognizing its authority. Clergy, monastics and laity also took part in the Council – 163 people in all.[[721]](#footnote-721) Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky) was the president of the Council, and Patriarch Demetrius of Serbia its honorary president. However, when the Bulgarian Metropolitan Stefan of Sophia arrived, bringing a greeting from the Bulgarian Holy Synod, this upset the Patriarch of Serbia, whose relations with the Bulgarians were not good. So he did not come, while Metropolitan Stefan immediately returned to Bulgaria.

Bishop Seraphim (Sobolev), who was in charge of the Russian communities in Bulgaria, reported to the Council about the great difficulty of their position in Bulgaria because of the Bulgarian schism and the impossibility of concelebrating with the Bulgarian clergy. The hierarchs discussed this matter from all sides and declared that they would like to restore communion with the Bulgarian Church, but could not exceed their canonical prerogatives without the participation of the other Local Churches, and in particular of the Church of Constantinople. In spite of that, continuing the practice of the Russian Church and basing themselves on the canons (71, 81, 88 and 122 of Carthage), the delegates allowed the Russian priests and deacons to serve all kinds of Divine services and sacraments with the bishops and clergy of the Bulgarian Church, and they also allowed the Russian bishops to serve with the Bulgarian clergy. Between bishops only joint serving of *molebens*, pannikhidas, etc. was allowed, but “in no way the celebration of the Divine Liturgy and other holy sacraments of the Orthodox Church”.[[722]](#footnote-722)

The Council issued two Epistles, one addressed to the Russian emigration, and the other to the Genoa conference. The first epistle declared: “May [God] return to the All-Russian throne his Anointed One, strong in the love of the people, a lawful tsar from the House of the Romanovs”. 51 delegates voted for this motion, but 32 abstained, including Archbishop Evlogy of Paris, Bishop Benjamin of Sebastopol and most of the clergy. Evlogy abstained because he thought this was a political question beyond the competence of a Church Council.[[723]](#footnote-723) Ironically, he later joined the Moscow Patriarchate, which allowed the Bolsheviks to take control of church life…[[724]](#footnote-724) Archbishop Anastasy of Kishinev also voted against, but for different reasons: he was not anti-monarchist, but did not want the Romanovs to be designated as the only possible monarchs. The hierarchs were split in two, two-thirds of the clergy abstained, and the Epistle was issued only thanks to the votes of the laity.

The second epistle called on the statesmen assembled at Genoa to initiate a kind of crusade to drive the Bolsheviks out of Russia.

“At the Karlovtsy Council,” writes Bishop Dionysius (Alferov), “remembrance was finally made of St. Sergius’ blessing of the Christian Sovereign Demetrius Donskoj for his battle with the enemies of the Church and the fatherland, and of the struggle for the Orthodox Kingdom of the holy Hierarch Hermogenes of Moscow. The question was raised of the ‘sin of February’, but because some of the prominent activists of the Council had participated in this, the question was left without detailed review. The decisions of this Council did not receive further official development in Church life because of the schisms that began both in the Church Abroad and in the monarchist movement. But the question of the re-establishment of the Orthodox Kingdom in Russia had been raised, and thinkers abroad worked out this thought in detail in the works, first of Prince N.D. Zhevakhov and Protopriest V. Vostokov, and then, more profoundly, in the works of Archbishop Seraphim (Sobolev), Professor M.V. Zyzykin, Archimandrite Constantine Zaitsev, V.N. Voejkov and N.P. Kusakov.”

The strongly monarchist tone of the Karlovtsy Council marks an important step in the spiritual recovery of the Russian Church. St. John of Kronstadt had said that Russia without a Tsar would be “a stinking corpse”. But this truth had been largely lost in the chaos and confusion of the revolution. As we have seen, the Holy Synod in February, 1917 had done little, if anything, to protect the monarchy. And the Councils that took place during the Civil War shied clear of any commitment to monarchism.

As A.A. Kostriukov writes: “Both the Stavropol Council and the HTCA created by it tried to adopt a restrained political position. While speaking out against the Bolshevik dictatorship, the leadership of the Church in the south of Russia distanced itself from the monarchy and tried to stand on democratic principles. So as not to destroy the fragile peace between the representatives of various parties represented in the White armies.

“Recalling this period, Protopriest Vladimir Vostokov wrote in 1922: ‘In May, 1919 the South Russian Council in Stavropol under the presidency of Archbishop Metrophanes, and through the exceptional participation of Protopriest [George] Shavelsky, who at that time was working in agreement with the chief of staff General Romanovsky, did not allow those members to speak who tried to express themselves definitively in relation to ‘socialism’ and ‘the internationalist executioners’. And the word ‘Tsar’ was feared at the Council like fire.’

“According to the witness of Protopriest Vladimir Vostokov, even the open condemnation of regicide and the appeal to the people to repent of this sin dates to the period when the HTCA of the South-East of Russia was already in the Crimea. However, ‘not even the Crimean Church administration resolved on appealing’ for the reestablishment of the monarchy’.”[[725]](#footnote-725)

Now, however, a return to the pre-revolutionary spirit was manifest. The humbling experience of defeat in the Civil War and subsequent exile inspired the Karlovtsy Council to speak openly for the restoration of the monarchy. The Russian Church in Exile (that is, the one that is not in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate) continues to this day to preserve the traditions of Russian Orthodox monarchism.

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Probably the last open and free manifestation of old, Holy, Monarchist Russia on Russian soil was the *Zemsky Sobor* that took place in Vladivostok from July 23 to August 10, 1922. It had 207 delegates, including several bishops. Patriarch Tikhon was elected honorary president of the Council.[[726]](#footnote-726)

“It recognized the cause of the revolution to be the sins of the Russian people and called for repentance, proclaiming the only path of salvation for Russia to be the restoration of a lawful Orthodox monarchy. The Council resolved that ‘the right to establish Supreme power in Russia belongs to the dynasty of the House of Romanov’. That is, the Council recognized the Romanov Dynasty to be still reigning in spite of the troubles, and for a short time re-established the Fundamental laws of the Russian empire in the Amur district (until the final conquest of the region by the Reds).

“Accordingly it was decided that the Amur State formation free from the Bolsheviks should be headed by a representative of the Dynasty. For the transitional period General Michael Konstantinovich Diterichs was elected as Ruler. Patriarch Tikhon, who was in Moscow, was unanimously elected as the honourable president of the Council. The widowed Empress Maria Fyodorovna wrote a welcoming telegram to the Sobor in reply.

“In order no. 1 dated August 8, 1922 Lieutenant-General Diterichs wrote: ‘For our sins against the Anointed of God, Emperor Nicholas II, who was martyred with the whole of his Family by Soviet power, a terrible time of troubles has struck the Russian people and Holy Rus’ has been subjected to the greatest destruction, pillaging, torment and slavery by atheist Russians and thieves and robbers of other races, led by infidels of Jewish race who have even renounced their Jewish faith…

“’Here, at the edge of the Russian land, in the Amur region, the Lord has placed a single thought and faith into the hearts and minds of everyone gathered at the *Zemsky Sobor*: there can be no Great Russia without a Sovereign, without an Anointed of God of inherited succession. And here in the Amur region, as we, the last people of the Russian land, are gathered in a small body, but one strong in faith and national spirit, we are set the task and the duty and the good intention of directing all our service to preparing the way for him – our future God-seer.’

“And here are the words of the last order of General Diterichs of October 17, 1922 before his departure from Russia under the pressure of the Reds: ‘I believe that Russia will return to the Russia of Christ, the Russia of the Anointed of God, but I believe that we were unworthy of this mercy from the Supreme Creator…’”[[727]](#footnote-727)

## **87. THE LAST OF THE PATRIARCHS**

With the murder of the Tsar, and the defeat of the Whites in the Civil War, the last pre-revolutionary Russian leader left alive in Russia was Patriarch Tikhon. He now took upon himself the whole crushing burden of leading the Russian people in the greatest trial in their history… He faced two enemies: the Bolsheviks and the renovationists, a pro-Soviet schism that was aimed at removing him and taking his place. The idea of splitting the Church hierarchy by promoting Bolshevik “agents in cassocks” originated in 1921 with Lunacharsky, who since the early 1900s had been instrumental in developing a more subtle, less physically confrontational approach to the problem of eradicating religion.[[728]](#footnote-728) The idea was taken up by Trotsky: “Let those popes who are ready to cooperate with us become leaders in the Church and carry out all our instructions, calling on the believers to serve Soviet power.”[[729]](#footnote-729)

In 1921 a terrible famine struck the Volga region. The patriarch immediately authorized that the Church send aid to the starving, and in August appealed to foreign Christian leaders for help. The West responded, especially the Americans, who for the next 12 months fed 10 million Russians.[[730]](#footnote-730) But the Bolsheviks saw in this tragedy an opportunity to oppress the Church even further, and letters began appearing in the press accusing the Church of greed and demanding that all the Church's wealth should be used to feed the hungry. In February, 1922, they the local soviets were ordered to seize all the valuables from the churches, which the Bolsheviks then sold without giving anything substantial to the starving. The compulsory nature of this decree on the requisitioning of valuables put the Orthodox in the position of accessories to sacrilege, and there were many bloody clashes between the local soviets and believers. Many Orthodox were imprisoned, and many suffered martyrdom, including Metropolitan Benjamin of Petrograd.

On February 28, in order to resolve the perplexities of the faithful, the Patriarch decreed: “… In view of the exceptionally difficult circumstances, we have admitted the possibility of offering church objects that have not been consecrated and are not used in Divine services. Now again we call on the faithful children of the Church to make such offerings, desiring only that these offerings should be the response of a loving heart to the needs of his neighbour, if only they can provide some real help to our suffering brothers. But we cannot approve of the requisitioning from the churches, even as a voluntary offering, of consecrated objects, whose use for purposes other than Divine services is forbidden by the canons of the Ecumenical Church and is punished by Her as sacrilege – laymen by excommunication from Her, and clergy by defrocking (Apostolic Canon 73; Canon 10 of the First-Second Council).”[[731]](#footnote-731)

Some approved of this decree, but others regarded it as a major concession made by the Church to Soviet power. Thus no less an authority than the holy Elder Nektary of Optina said: “You see now, the patriarch gave the order to give up all valuables from the churches. But they belonged to the Church!”[[732]](#footnote-732) However, the patriarch’s compromise did not help him. On May 6 he was placed under house arrest, being accused of “resistance to the requisitioning of church valuables” under articles 62 and 119 of the criminal code.

Among the less principled critics of the Patriarch on the question of church valuables was a group of renovationist clergy who created the so-called "Living Church"[[733]](#footnote-733), which, in the words of Metropolitan Philaret of New York, “had the character of a Church tied to a Protestant-Communist reformation”.[[734]](#footnote-734) Taking advantage of the Patriarch's transfer to the Donskoy monastery, they seized control of the Church's central administration. Soon they were attacking several of the basic dogmas of the Church and introducing modernist innovations such as the new calendar and married bishops. They adopted a vigorously pro-Soviet and anti-patriarchal policy. The GPU supported them while imprisoning those clergy who remained loyal to the Patriarch. Soon most of the churches in Moscow and about a third of those in the whole country were in their hands. However, the masses of the people remained faithful to the Patriarch, who in April, 1922 was cast into the Taganka prison pending his trial.

At their second council, which met in Moscow in April, 1923, the renovationists first heaped praises both on the revolution, which they called a "Christian creation", on the Soviet government, which they said was the first government in the world that strove to realize "the ideal of the Kingdom of God", and on Lenin: "First of all, we must turn with words of deep gratitude to the government of our state, which, in spite of the slanders of foreign informers, does not persecute the Church... The word of gratitude and welcome must be expressed by us to the only state in the world which performs, without believing, that work of love which we, believers, do not fulfil, and also to the leader of Soviet Russia, V.I. Lenin, who must be dear also to church people..."

The council tried Patriarch Tikhon *in absentia*, and deprived him not only of his clerical orders but also of his monasticism, calling him thenceforth "layman Basil Bellavin". 46 "bishops" out of the 73 who attended the council signed the decree condemning the Patriarch under the direct threat of being sent to prison if they did not. Then the patriarchate itself was abolished, its restoration being called a counter-revolutionary act. Finally, some further resolutions were adopted allowing white clergy to become bishops, and priests to remarry, and introducing the Gregorian calendar. When the decisions of the council were taken to the Patriarch for his signature, he calmly wrote: "Read. The council did not summon me, I do not know its competence and for that reason cannot consider its decision lawful." [[735]](#footnote-735)

Forty-six out of the seventy-three bishops who attended the council signed the decree condemning the Patriarch. One of them, Joasaph (Shishkovsky), told Fr. Basil Vinogradov how this happened. “The leaders of the council Krasnitsky and Vvedensky gathered all those present at the ‘council’ of bishops for this meeting. When several direct and indirect objections to these leaders’ proposal to defrock the Patriarch began to be expressed, Krasnitsky quite openly declared to all present: ‘He who does not immediately sign this resolution will only leave this room straight for the prison.’ The terrorized bishops (including Joasaph himself) did not find the courage to resist in the face of the threat of a new prison sentence and forced labour in a concentration camp and… signed, although almost all were against the resolution. None of the church people had any doubt that the ‘council’s’ sentence was the direct work of Soviet power and that now a criminal trial and bloody reprisal against the Patriarch was to be expected at any time.”[[736]](#footnote-736)

The pressures on the Patriarch were mounting inexorably, with daily visits from the GPU agent Tuchkov, who made blackmail threats to force him to make concessions to the State (Tikhon called him "an angel of Satan".) In April, the government announced that the Patriarch was about to go on trial on charges arising from the trials of the 54 in Moscow and of Metropolitan Benjamin in Petrograd the previous year. However, partly because the authorities wanted to give the renovationist council the opportunity to condemn him first, and partly, later, as the result of an ultimatum issued by the British foreign minister Lord Curzon, which was supported by an outcry in the British and American press, the trial was postponed to June 17.

At the beginning of June, the Patriarch fell ill, and was transferred from the Donskoy monastery to the Taganka prison. There he was able to receive only official Soviet newspaper accounts of the Church struggle, which greatly exaggerated the successes of the renovationists. But the newspapers said otherwise – and the Patriarch was deceived. As he said: “Reading the newspapers in prison, with each passing day I was more and more horrified that the renovationists were taking the Church into their hands. If I had known that their successes were so meagre and that the people was not following them, I would never have come out of prison.”[[737]](#footnote-737)

Feeling that his presence at the helm of the Church was absolutely necessary, and that the renovationists were even more dangerous than the Bolsheviks, the Patriarch decided to make concessions to the government in order to be released. Thus on June 16 and again on July 1 he issued his famous “confession” to the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, in which he repented of all his anti-Soviet acts (including the anathema against the Bolsheviks), and “finally and decisively” set himself apart “from both the foreign and the internal monarchist White-guard counter-revolutionaries”, saying that from now on he was “not an enemy of Soviet power”.[[738]](#footnote-738)

Tikhon was released on June 27, 1923, and his appearance in public – he had aged terribly in prison – was enough to send the Living Church into a sharp and irreversible decline. They remained dangerous as long as they retained the favour of the authorities; but by 1926 the authorities were already turning to others (the Gregorians, then Metropolitan Sergius) as better suited for the task of destroying the Church. And by the end of the Second World War the last remaining renovationists had been absorbed into the neo-renovationist Soviet Moscow Patriarchate.

Although some have criticized the patriarch’s declaration as in effect the beginning of what became known as “sergianism”, the policy of submission in all things to the will of the Communists, the great majority of the church people understood that it was issued under duress in order to take pressure off the Church. Besides, it was issued only in the patriarch’s name, not in the name of the Church. Moreover, as Archbishop Nicon (Rklitsky) writes: 1) it did not annul the anathema in the name of the Russian Orthodox Church on Soviet power, 2) he did not declare himself a friend of Soviet power and its co-worker, 3) it did not invoke God’s blessing on it, 4) it did not call on the Russian people to obey this power as God-established, 5) it did not condemn the movement for the re-establishment of the monarchy in Russia, and 6) it did not condemn the Whites’ struggle to overthrow Soviet power. By his declaration Patriarch Tikhon only pointed to the way of acting which he had chosen for the further defence and preservation of the Russian Orthodox Church. How expedient this way of acting was is another question,… but in any case Patriarch Tikhon did not cross that boundary which had to separate him, as head of the Russian Orthodox Church, from the godless power.”[[739]](#footnote-739)

In his defence, the patriarch said: “I wrote that from now on I was not an enemy of Soviet power. But I did not write that I was a friend of Soviet power…”[[740]](#footnote-740) Moreover, he managed to write to Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky), first-hierarch of ROCOR, as it were replying to the perplexities elicited by his “walling himself off” from ROCOR’s “counter-revolution”: “I wrote this for the authorities, but you sit and work.”[[741]](#footnote-741) In other words, the Church was not to take his words seriously…

On July 15, the Patriarch anathematised the Living Church: “They have separated themselves from the body of the Ecumenical Church and deprived themselves of God’s favour, which resides only in the Church of Christ. Consequently, all arrangements made during our absence by those ruling the Church, since they had neither legal right nor canonical authority, are non-valid and void, and all actions and sacraments performed by bishops and clergymen who have forsaken the Church are devoid of God’s grace and power; the faithful taking part in such prayers and sacraments shall receive no sanctification thereby, and are subject to condemnation for participating in their sin…”[[742]](#footnote-742)

Large numbers of parishes, especially in such important urban centres as Petrograd (through Bishop Manuel (Lemeshevsky)) and Voronezh (through Archbishop Peter (Zverev)), now renounced renovationism, and influential renovationist hierarchs such as Metropolitan Sergius hastened (and yet not very quickly, as Hieromartyr Bishop Damascene of Glukhov pointed out) to make public confessions to the Patriarch.

Ironically, as Fr. Aidan Nichols writes, the renovationists came “to resemble the pre-Revolutionary establishment in their spirit of subordination to the State.”[[743]](#footnote-743) The Patriarchal Church, however, gained in spiritual authority through its courageous stance against the antichristian state. For the view was current that the faithful were living, in the Patriarch’s words, “in the years of the triumph of Satan and of the power of the Antichrist”.

So the “Living Church”, in coming to terms with Soviet power, was, as the Patriarch said, “an institution of the Antichrist”.[[744]](#footnote-744) The Patriarchal Church, on the other hand, was like the woman fleeing into the wilderness from the red dragon (Revelation 12). And it was still to her that the faithful children of the Church clung…

The authorities then tried to make the Patriarch introduce several of the innovations which the renovationists had adopted. One of these was the new Grigorian calendar, which the Moscow Council had rejected in 1918. For a short time, the Patriarch was in favour of it, thinking that the other Orthodox Churches had accepted the new calendar. However, the people were against it, and when he received a telegram from Constantinople from Archbishop Anastasy of Kishinev, the future first-hierarch of the Russian Church Abroad, saying that the other Orthodox Churches had not accepted the new calendar, the Patriarch reversed his decision. He informed the authorities about this, and noted with some irony that he did not quite understand why the secular authorities should be interested in changing to the new style...

The Bolsheviks changed tactics. Instead of trying to remove the Patriarch, whose popularity was too solidly entrenched, they dropped the case against him and tried to force him into accepting legalization by the state on terms that involved more-or-less total submission to them. To this end they applied blackmail - the threat of shooting several bishops. Under this terrible moral torture, the Patriarch's health began to deteriorate... Nevertheless, on December 7, 1924, he wrote: "Whoever was in the administration of the Living Church in the HCA cannot take up any further administrative position in our Church. And not only can he not be an administrator: he cannot have a vote during a Council." This was an important decree, because it disqualified the man who eventually became “patriarch” after Patriarch Tikhon, Metropolitan Sergius of Nizhni-Novgorod, who had been a member of the HCA.

Shortly before his death, the Patriarch confided to his personal physician and friend, Michael Zhizhilenko, that he felt that the unceasing pressure of the government would one day force the leadership of the Church to concede more than was right, and that the true Church would then have to descend into the catacombs like the Roman Christians of old if it was to remain faithful to Christ and retain the Grace of the Holy Spirit. And he counselled his friend, who was a widower, that when that time came, he should seek the monastic tonsure and episcopal consecration.[[745]](#footnote-745) That time came in 1927 with the notorious pro-Soviet declaration of Metropolitan Sergius, the founder of the present-day Moscow Patriarchate; and Michael Zhizhilenko, following the advice of the holy patriarch, then became the first man to be consecrated as an underground bishop, taking the name of Maximus. He was shot on Solovki in 1931…

Following his example and in accordance with the holy patriarch’s will, the best hierarchs of the Russian Church descended into the catacombs. There by their sufferings and death they deposited the seed for the eventual resurrection of Holy Rus’…[[746]](#footnote-746)

The idea that the Russian Church might have to descend into the catacombs, in imitation of the Christians in early Rome, had been suggested as early as 1909 by the future head of that Catacomb Church and one of her greatest martyrs, Metropolitan Joseph (Petrovykh) of Petrograd (+1937): “Now many are complaining about the hard times for the Church… Remembering the words of the Saviour with complete accuracy, we must expect still worse times for the Church… Without any exaggeration, she must truly live through a condition close to complete destruction and her being overcome by the gates of hell. Perhaps with us, exactly as in the land of freedom, America, they will drive the Name of Christ out of the schools. They will adapt prayer assemblies into ordinary meetings permitted by the police, as in that other land of freedom, France, and will convert the heritage of the Church, together with the very right of faith, into the property of the state. Perhaps the faith of Christ will again hide in the woods, the deserts, the catacombs, and the confession of the faith will be only in secret, while immoral and blasphemous presentations will come out into the open. All this may happen! The struggle against Christ will be waged with desperation, with the exertion of the last drop of human and hellish energy, and only then, perhaps, will it be given to hell and to mankind to assure us with complete obviousness of the unfailing power and might of the priceless promise of Christ: ‘I will build My Church, and the gates of hell will not prevail against her’ (Matthew 16.18).”[[747]](#footnote-747)

On March 25 / April 7, 1925, the feast of the Annunciation, Patriarch Tikhon died. It is almost certain that he was poisoned. According to his cell-attendant, Constantine Pashkovich, his next to last words, uttered with an unusual severity, were: “Now I shall go to sleep deeply and for a long time. The night will be long, and very dark…”[[748]](#footnote-748)

## **EPILOGUE: FROM LENIN TO PUTIN: THE CONTINUITY OF SOVIET POWER**

Most Orthodox Christians agree that the State founded by Lenin in October, 1917 was the most evil in history to this date. A regime that was openly and officially antichristian overthrew the greatest Christian empire in history and proceeded to try and destroy everything and everyone that in any way retained any kind of loyalty or similarity to the pre-revolutionary past. Recalling the French revolution, but much more radical, the Russian revolution killed, according to some estimates, over one hundred million of its own, Soviet citizens[[749]](#footnote-749), and many millions more in other countries, blanketing, at its greatest extent, the whole land mass from Berlin to Vladivostok in a nightmare of militant atheism that caused those who were under threat of being returned to it to commit suicide in droves…

However, there is much less agreement on whether the present-day regime of Vladimir Putin is a continuation and resurrection of the Leninist regime or not. This is an important question; for in 1918, at her last genuine Local Council, the Russian Orthodox Church led by Martyr-Patriarch Tikhon anathematized the Soviet regime forbidding her members to have anything whatsoever to do with these “outcasts of humanity”. (Only against the regimes of Julian the Apostate and Napoleon has the Orthodox Church ever issued similar decrees.) This “decree of irreconcilability” has never been rescinded, so if the Putinist regime is truly the successor of the Leninist one, our attitude to it must be similarly irreconcilable. The question therefore is: is the present-day Putinist regime Leninist in essence?

In order to answer this question we have to separate what is essential to Leninism from what is not, and ask whether Putin retains that essence even if in many other ways his regime may be very different… Our thesis is that the essence of Leninism is *loyalty to Lenin himself*, and that while many things have changed since 1917, devotion to Lenin, and a refusal to condemn him or his reincarnation, Stalin, remains the bond binding together all the epochs of Soviet and post-Soviet history to the present day, as witnessed above all by the continuing worship of his body in the mausoleum on Red Square. Lenin’s teachings are no longer believed in, his party no longer holds power, even his vitriolic hatred of God and Christianity has gone. But he himself remains alive and well in the hearts of the majority of the Russian people. And it is this psychological and spiritual bond, more powerful than any ideological sympathy or antipathy, that makes Leninism a continuing force. Moreover, it is a force that any succeeding leader like Putin can tap into – so long as the idol still remains in place.

And why does the idol still remain in place? Because neither in 1991 nor at any other time has there been any thoroughgoing *repentance* for the sins of the Soviet past or formal renunciation of Lenin…

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Let us briefly summarize the main stages of Russian history since 1917:-

1. **1917-21.** The first three-and-a-half years of Soviet power present us with all the familiar signs of Leninism: theft, murder, blasphemy, sexual depravity, civil and international war – all on an industrial, unprecedented scale. Before the revolution, revolutionaries like Stalin robbed banks and post offices. After the revolution, they robbed whole classes and provinces – and then raped and murdered the inhabitants. “War communism” established the principle that nothing, nothing whatsoever is holy – and especially not the Holy Church. However, in March, 1921, the Tenth Party Congress established that “factionalism”, i.e. dissent, is forbidden, and that one thing after all *is* holy – the will of the Party as expressed in the will of Lenin. This decree on the “dictatorship of the Party”, which was in fact the dictatorship of Lenin, formalized the essence of Leninism.
2. **1921-28.** Having established the essence of the system as being his own infallibility as the Vicar of History, Lenin could afford to relax on other, less important principles of communism. Thus the New Economic Policy, the reintroduction of a limited degree of capitalism and private property and a certain let-up in religious persecution was allowed… However, the death of Lenin in January, 1924 raised the question: how to preserve the essence of Leninism without Lenin himself? The answer was: the preservation of the body of Lenin, and the institution of its worship. Now even while leaders might change, and policies might change, Lenin himself remained – unchanging and eternal.[[750]](#footnote-750)
3. **1928-39.** Nevertheless, the need for a single infallible *will* remained, and Lenin could no longer express that will from beyond the grave. So his successor, the new Lenin, has to be found. After much political infighting, Stalin won the battle for recognition as the new Lenin, and proceeded to re-establish the absolute unity of will by eliminating all his opponents, actual and potential. This involved, among other things, killing 14 million Ukrainians by famine, driving the True Church into the underground, and eliminating all the Old Bolsheviks who remembered that Stalin was not Lenin.
4. **1939-45.** In Germany, however, there emerged another infallible will whom even Stalin could not destroy. And so, searching as ever for new means of consolidating his rule, Stalin decided to borrow certain things from Hitler (just as Hitler, by his own admission, borrowed certain things from Stalin). The internationalism of world revolution was now dropped (together with its main advocate, Trotsky), and in its place came “socialism in one country”. Instead of denigrating the whole of Russian history, certain aspects of it (especially the despotism of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great) were recalled with pride. Patriotism ceased to be a dirty word, and the official church was now used as a vehicle for stirring it up in believers – only its object now was not Orthodox Russia, but anti-Orthodox Russia. And these new emotional resources proved to be invaluable when Hitler invaded Russia; with their aid, the unnatural situation of two infallible popes was corrected by Stalin’s victory over the anti-pope.
5. **1945-53.** Now, however, Stalin reverted to type. The nationalist deviation, permissible during the struggle against Hitler, was corrected as the revolution again recovered its internationalist direction. (At the same time, the newest member of the Leninist club, Mao’s China, was made to feel in no uncertain terms that it was a very junior partner to Soviet Russia.) The main external enemy, again, was Anglo-Saxon capitalism; Orthodoxy was again repressed, unless it was expressed in support of the infallible leader; and the numbers of those in the camps surpassed even their pre-war peak.
6. **1953-91.** With the death of Stalin, the struggle to find the new Lenin began again. In 1956, one of the contenders, Khruschev, exposed the sins of Stalin at a secret meeting of the Party. But this was like a Roman cardinal saying that the Pope was not infallible – Khruschev was found insufficiently Leninist and fell from power. However, none of his successors – Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko and Gorbachev – was able to plug the credibility gap that now opened up, and as the inferiority of the Soviet system to its capitalist rival became more and more evident the desperate attempt of Gorbachev to import some western flexibility and freedom into social and economic life led to the collapse of the Soviet empire and the break-up of the Union itself.
7. **1991-2000.** The 1990s, the period of Yeltsin’s presidency, represented the moment when it looked to many as if Leninism were finally doomed. Something resembling real democracy and the free market was introduced. But the market reforms were so radical and sudden – introduced by Chicago-school advocates of “shock therapy” as the only method of changing communism into capitalism - that millions found themselves plunged into poverty, while a few clever entrepreneurs with links to the government – the so-called “oligarchs” – made vast fortunes through rigged privatisations. The result: capitalism was discredited in the minds of the people. Again, when the supposed democrat Yeltsin, determined to push through his reforms come what may, defied the sentence of the Constitutional Court and sent the tanks against the elected delegates of the Duma, the result was the discrediting also of democracy in the minds of the people.[[751]](#footnote-751) But still more serious was the “acquitting” of the Communist Party in a quasi-trial in 1992, the failure of the True Russian Church to oust the Sovietized Moscow Patriarchate (whose bishops remain are now, as in Soviet times, KGB agents) and above all, the failure to remove Lenin from the mausoleum. So the essence of Leninism remained intact…

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When Putin came to power on the first day of the new millennium, he soon demonstrated his political sympathies. The fall of the Soviet Union, he said, had been “a geopolitical tragedy”. Such, perhaps, was only to be expected of a former KGB agent who had been appointed head of the KGB-FSB only a few years before. Unfortunately, however, most of the western world, and even the Orthodox world, chose to ignore these facts. They were determined to believe that Putin’s regime represented, not a KGB-staged coup and the beginning of a gradual return to Sovietism, but a continuation of the Yeltsin regime, albeit at a slower pace of political and economic change.

Of course, the *pretence* of continuity with the Yeltsin regime was preserved: Yeltsin himself handed over power to (the unelected) Putin, and multi-party elections to the Duma remained in existence. However, in the course of time the largest parties (including the communists) turned out to be suspiciously close to Putin in their views, failing to form a real opposition; his own elections were manifestly rigged, and the system changed to enable him to rule virtually uninterruptedly until the present; and the last vestiges of democracy at the local, provincial level were eliminated. Moreover, Putin evolved a doctrine of “sovereign democracy” which meant, in effect, that Russia was a “democracy” but with himself as sovereign. Thus, as Roger Bootle writes, “In place of the tired and rotten value system of Communism, the prime value and objective of the modern Russian state is quite simply *pro bono Putino…*”[[752]](#footnote-752)

But this, too, is quintessentially communist; for in the last analysis Lenin and Stalin did not rule for the benefit of anyone other than themselves…

A deeper and more sinister continuity was that the stripping of Russia’s natural resources continued… When considering the Putinist mafia state’s pillaging of the national assets, we must remember that Leninism and banditism have existed in the closest symbiosis ever since Stalin robbed the Tbilisi bank and the Sochi post office to provide Lenin with funds for revolutionary terror in the early 1900s. The victims in the 1920s were the nobles, the industrialists and the Church, in the 1930s - the peasants, the generals and the Old Bolsheviks, in the 1940s - the Germans, the Crimean Tatars and other conquered peoples, and in the 1990s - all small-time investors and account-holders. In the 2000s it was the oligarchs’ turn: in true Leninist style, Putin “expropriated the expropriators”.

However, far from Putin “cleaning up” the country after the oligarchs’ excesses in the 1990s, which is what he claimed to be doing, he simply replaced one clan of bandits with another, sharing out the proceeds among those who recognized his power as the chief thief. Now Putin was free to become the godfather of all godfathers; he and his cronies made fabulous gains, most of which were spirited abroad; and Putin himself, according to the *Sunday Times*, became the world’s richest man… Taking advantage of the high prices for oil and gas, Putin was able to distribute some of the profits to the middle classes, keeping them happy for the time being. (There were murmurings from them in 2012, but these were comparatively easily suppressed.) Moreover, he increased the numbers of bureaucrats, 78% of whom are now KGB[[753]](#footnote-753), and fattened their pay packets - in this way he guaranteed their support, a tactic he borrowed from the Bolsheviks in the Civil War period…

But the poor remained poor, and the gap between the richest and the poorest became the highest in the world except in some Caribbean islands. State institutions and services, such as education and health, were starved of funds. The only notable exceptions were the armed forces and the security services, which received vast increases reminiscent of Hitler’s rearming in the 1930s.

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Like all Soviet leaders, Putin has shown a marked obsession with, and hostility towards the West, and a steadfast conviction that his country is morally superior to the West. The problem is: the extreme moral degradation of contemporary Russian society is plain for all to see. The most obvious explanation for this is the many decades of Soviet rule, when religious faith was persecuted and morality was equated with what was beneficial for the revolution. However, Putin deals with this problem by putting the blame exclusively on the Yeltsin period (because that was the most westernizing). Before Yeltsin, he argued in 2012 in a speech to the Federal Assembly, Soviet society had been distinguished by “charity, compassion and sympathy” (!) “Today,” however, “Russian society has an obvious deficit in spiritual bonds, a deficit in everything that made us at all times stronger, more powerful, in which we always prided ourselves – that is, such phenomena as charity, compassion and sympathy… The situation that has been created is a consequence of the fact that some 15 to 20 years ago ‘the ideological stamps of the former epoch’ were rejected… Unfortunately, at that time many moral signposts were lost…”

The following year, however, at the Valdai forum at which many westerners were present, Putin felt able to boast that, in spite of this “obvious deficit in spiritual bonds”, Russia under his rule preserved “Christian values” better than the West: “We see that many Euro-Atlantic countries have de facto gone down the path of the rejection of… Christian values. Moral principles are being denied… What could be a greater witness of the moral crisis of the human socium than the loss of the capacity for self-reproduction. But today practically all developed countries can no longer reproduce themselves. Without the values laid down in Christianity and other world religions, without the norms of ethics and morality formed in the course of millennia, people inevitably lose their human dignity. And we consider it natural and right to defend these values.”[[754]](#footnote-754)

The strange thing about this extraordinarily hypocritical statement is that Putin pretends to be entirely unconscious of the fact that with regard to the “Christian value” that he specifically cites here, “self-reproduction”, Russia performs worse than any western country. Thus even after taking migration into account, the twenty-eight countries of the European Union have a natural growth in population that is twice as high as Russia’s! And if he is referring not to the balance between the birth rate and the death rate, but to *homosexuality* as a factor that by definition inhibits reproduction, then the situation is little better in Russia than in the West.

For in spite of Putin’s much-vaunted ban on pro-gay propaganda to minors, the unnatural vice remains legal among adults. Thus a marriage between two women was recently registered officially in Moscow.[[755]](#footnote-755) Homosexuality even flourishes in places from which it should have been banished first of all. Thus among the three hundred bishops of the Moscow Patriarchate, 50 according to one estimate (Fr. Andrei Kuraev) and 250 according to another (Fr. Gleb Yakunin) are homosexuals…

In other spheres relating to morality, Russia, according to United Nations statistics, occupies the following positions in the world league tables:

**1st** in suicides of adults, children and adolescents;

**1st** in numbers of children born out of wedlock;

**1st** in children abandoned by parents;

**1st** in absolute decline in population;

**1st** in consumption of spirits and spirit-based drinks;

**1st** in consumption of strong alcohol;

**1st** in tobacco sales;

**1st** in deaths from alcohol and tobacco;

**1st** in deaths from cardiovascular diseases;

**2nd** in fake medicine sales;

**1st** in heroin consumption (21st in world production).

These statistics show that Russia, far from leading the world in the practice of Christian virtue, is perhaps the most corrupt country of all. As regards general criminality, theft, corruption and murder (including abortion), Russia is very near the top of the league, and this not least because the government itself has taken the lead in these activities, making Russia into a mafia state run by and for a small clique of fantastically rich criminals. Thus the general picture is one of *extreme moral degradation.*

Moral degradation within the country is matched by cruelty and hatred to those outside… The most important of Putin’s decisions in the early years was his re-starting of the war against the Chechens, which he carried out with extreme brutality. The KGB provided the justification for the war by blowing up an apartment block in Ryazan, killing four hundred people, and blaming the atrocity on Chechen terrorists… Whistle-blowers and truth-seekers were found who exposed these crimes, such as the journalist Anna Politkovskaya and the former agent Litvinenko. But they were simply murdered (Litvinenko through a mini-atomic bomb). [[756]](#footnote-756)

Having imposed a pro-Russian puppet government on the Chechens, Putin now turned to other “troublemakers”. But not before declaring, at Munich in 2007, that Russia reserved the right of first strike in a nuclear war – a right that not even the Soviet Union had ever claimed. Although the world appeared not to notice, Russia appeared not simply to have recommenced the Cold War, but to be preparing for a hot, thermonuclear one…

Then, in the next year Russia invaded Georgia, punishing them for their “Orange” revolution in favour of the West and annexing Abkhazia and South Ossetia. “Moreover,” writes Armando Marques Guedes, “the Russian Administration signalled it was set for a sort of repeat performance. Toward the end of December 2008, the Kremlin announced an upgrade and an unexpected large-scale restructuring of its Armed Forces, along with a change in its military doctrine. All of this – as was later explained by the Russian Minister of Defence – was engaged in so that her Armed Forces would be ready to fight on ‘three fronts simultaneously in local and regional conflicts such as that of Georgia’. He thereafter defined the ‘post-Soviet space’ as the preferred location for such interventions, which he envisioned as coming to pass ‘during the year’ of 2009…”[[757]](#footnote-757)

This actually came to pass a little later, in 2014, with the annexation of Crimea and military intervention in the Donbass, where Putin’s actions resembled those of Milosevic in the former Yugoslavia.[[758]](#footnote-758) In both cases, the strategy was to rebuild a failed communist empire-state by artificially stirring up ethnic conflicts in neighbouring states that have separated from the empire. Then troops are sent in on the pretence of “liberating” co-ethnics (Russians and Serbs) from their supposedly “fascist” oppressors (West Ukrainian “Banderites” and Croats).

However, the most striking parallel to Putin’s actions in the Ukraine comes from the truly fascist state of Nazi Germany in 1938, when Hitler carved up Czechoslovakia on the pretence of rescuing the Sudeten Germans from their Czech oppressors. Nor is this the only similarity between the regimes of Putin and Hitler.[[759]](#footnote-759) These similarities are the result not only of the general close similarity between the “twin totalitarianisms” of communism and fascism, but also of the fact that Russia never underwent a “decommunization” programme in 1991 comparable to that undergone by Germany in 1945.

Indeed, a good way of seeing how little modern Russia has been truly “decommunized” is to imagine that Germany in 1945 had not been thoroughly crushed militarily and “denazified” politically and culturally, but had been allowed to develop in the way that Russia has been allowed to develop under Putin. According to this imagined scenario, Germany was allowed to retain almost all its Nazis cadres with no trial of any Nazi war criminals. Some changes had been made in its political system, but the SS remained in place and the Nazi party continued in existence and continued to do well in the polls with many members in the Reichstag. The party seemed to be on excellent terms with the president, and its leader was given awards by the official church, which remained pro-Nazi and was headed by a member of the SS. The army had been much reduced, but vast sums were being poured into its modernization, including the latest weapons of mass destruction, and the swastika had been restored. One neighbouring country had been invaded by the Wehrmacht, and another had been undermined by Nazi propaganda and undercover agents, together with large shipments of tanks and artillery. The Jews were again being reviled in public, and the West was being threatened with nuclear annihilation on television. Hitler’s Berlin bunker, over which a mausoleum had been constructed, was greatly honoured and his military victories were being feted and his political repressions and murders justified. A cult of personality of the new leader was being encouraged, a modernized version of the Hitler youth movement had been started, and genetically pure Aryan boys and girls were being encouraged to get together and bear children for the Reich. One female member of parliament even suggested that “material” from the genius leader should be sent to women around the country so that they could give birth to his genius offspring.[[760]](#footnote-760) Journalists and political opponents were being killed, and anti-Nazi churches were being deprived of their property on various quasi-legal excuses. A close relationship existed between the government and organized crime, corruption was at all-time record levels, and Germany was at the top of the list on various indices of social degeneration (abortion, drug-dealing, child mortality, suicide, etc.) issued by the United Nations.[[761]](#footnote-761)

If this were happening in Germany today, we can imagine the uproar, the calls from all sides to uproot the neo-Nazi menace. But although something very similar is happening in Russia today in reality and not in imagination, the response of the world has been much more muted. There are few who see this as a resurrection of Leninism or Sovietism, although this is clearly what is happening in fact…

Although the Soviet victory over fascism in 1945 is now celebrated as the greatest festival on the Russian Federation’s calendar, and any criticism of the Red Army’s (extremely cruel) conquest of the Third Reich is now a criminal offence, the most striking aspect of today’s Russia is what can only be called its *fascism*. Of course, Putin accuses the Ukrainian regime of being fascist. But as so often with totalitarian regimes (whether fascist or communist), the truth is the exact opposite of the propaganda: Russia is now what it accuses Ukraine of being - a fascist state in all but name.

Moreover, it is Fascism tinged with the most abominable *blasphemy*: KGB Patriarch Cyril Gundiaev (codename “Mikhailov”) declared in 2009 that the atheist Red Army’s victory in 1945 was not only holy, but also that Stalin had thereby redeemed all the sins of the 1930s and had even “trampled down death by death”…[[762]](#footnote-762) He repeated the blasphemy in 2015.[[763]](#footnote-763)

One of the clearest proofs that Russia is returning to Sovietism is in the use of Soviet symbolism. Already in the early years of Putin’s reign the Red Army was given back its red flag and Soviet anthem (the music, if not the words), and “ecclesiastical Stalinism” in the former of icons of Stalin and hagiographies of the great leader became commonplace. More recently, and especially since the invasion of the Crimea, statues of Lenin have been re-erected, and the hammer-and-sickle and other communist symbolism again feature in many places (even in conjunction with the Cross of Christ!). Patriarch Cyril has even given an award to the communist leader Ziuganov.

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Now, as in 1991, the relationship between Russia and Ukraine is critical to the futures of both state. The contrast between the two is striking. From 1991 until 2014, in spite of abortive attempts to free itself from its Soviet past, such as the 2004 “Orange” revolution, Ukraine remained in the grip of the Russian KGB, which did not hesitate to use force in order to impose its will on its satellite and retain its control over Ukraine’s army and secret services.[[764]](#footnote-764) However, when the last Putin-style bandit President, Yanukovich, was ejected by the popular rebellion of Euromaidan in February, 2014, a remarkable transformation began to take place. Statues of Lenin were torn down all over the country, genuine elections were held, and most recently and significantly the President Poroshenko and the Ukrainian parliament have passed legislation whose aim is the final decommunization of Ukraine.[[765]](#footnote-765)

The legislation consists of four bills. The first acknowledges a long list of movements and organizations that fought for a Ukraine independent of the Soviets. The “taboo” on these organizations is now lifted, and their deeds can be openly and freely analyzed by historians and others without fear of reprisals. The second bill opens the secret police archives, thereby making possible impartial historiography and the prosecution of communist criminals. The third bill says that Second World War began in 1939 with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, rather than in 1941 with the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. The fourth bill prohibits the “propaganda of the Communist and/or National Socialist totalitarian regimes” in Ukraine. “In addition,” writes Alexander Motyl, “to advocating the removal of Communist monuments and public symbols and the renaming of streets and cities, the bill attempts to distinguish between materials that promote Communist and Nazi regimes, which is prohibited, and those that express pro-regime views, which would not be deemed illegal… The assumption underlying the [four] bills is that since communism and Nazism were equally evil ideologies, condemnation of one necessarily entails, both logically and morally, condemnation of the other. If de-Nazification is crucial, so too is decommunization.”[[766]](#footnote-766)

Of course, legislation is one thing, and its full implementation is another; and it must be admitted that the influence of the robber-barons is still strongly felt in Ukraine, and not only in the occupied areas.[[767]](#footnote-767) In particular, there is evidence that the Russian KGB still has strong influence in the Ukrainian armed forces.[[768]](#footnote-768) Nevertheless, these bills are precisely the kind of legislation that provides proof that a country is serious about decommunizing itself.

Russia, in stark contrast with Ukraine, has not only not started to decommunize herself in this way: she is actively “re-communizing” herself. And it is precisely this fact that, at a deeper psychological level, motivates many Russians (but by no means all) to hate the Ukraine, as Cain hated Abel. As Sergei Yekelchyk writes: "The Ukrainian revolution of 2014 threatens the ideology of Putin’s regime. It questions Russia’s identity. It challenges Russia’s plan to restore its influence in the region. It also shows that a Putinite regime can be destroyed by a popular revolution. No wonder Russia has recalled its ambassador from Ukraine and refuses to recognize the country’s new government..."[[769]](#footnote-769)

There are some aspects of Soviet history that have not yet repeated themselves during Putin’s reign. One of these is the large-scale imprisoning of dissidents in the Gulag (although large extra prisons are being built). Another is the open persecution of the Orthodox Faith (although True Orthodox (that is, anti-Soviet) Christians get no favours from this government). However, the fact that not all the aspects of Leninism have been restored is small comfort when so much *is* being restored. Just as cancer remains dangerous and life-threatening even when only a few cancerous cells remain in the body, so the present incipient recommunization can quickly develop into something that threatens the whole world. As Metropolitan Anastasy, first-hierarch of the Russian Church Abroad, wrote in 1938: “There is nothing more dangerous than if Russia were to want to assimilate anything from the sad inheritance left by degenerate Bolshevism: everything that its corrupting atheist hand has touched threatens to infect us again with the old leprosy.”

The metropolitan’s words have proved to be prophetic. When the Soviet Union fell in 1991, there were many who rejoiced in the supposed fall of Bolshevism. But there was no root-and-branch purge, and so communism has revived. Above all, Lenin still lies in the mausoleum, enjoying that immunity from prosecution (and corruption) that only Egyptian Pharaohs and Roman Popes can enjoy, and clearly demonstrating that the Russian revolution is still alive. Indeed, it may be entering its last and most dangerous phase now. “For the devil has come down to you, having great wrath, because he knows that he has only a short time left” (Revelation 12.12).

## **CONCLUSION**

St. Anatoly of Optina said that Russia without the tsar would be “a stinking corpse”. Today, the corpse of Soviet Russia continues to stink. And nobody in power is trying to take it out of the room…

Nearly a century after the revolution, and with the neo-Soviet regime of Vladimir Putin and its anti-western, “Eurasian” ideology seemingly firmly entrenched, the hopes of the exiles and all truly Orthodox Christians still remain unfulfilled. However, while there is life there is hope. Many of the holy prophets and elders of Russia prophesied that the Russian people after enormous and prolonged sufferings would repent, the revolution would be destroyed and Holy Russia would be resurrected through the prayers of the Holy New Martyrs and Confessors.

In one of those prophecies, the Holy Nun-Martyr and Great Princess Elizabeth Fyodorovna declared: “If we look deep into the life of every human being, we discover that it is full of miracles. You will say, 'Of terror and death, as well.' Yes, that also. But we do not clearly see why the blood of these victims must flow. There, in the heavens, they understand everything and, no doubt, have found calm and the True Homeland - a Heavenly Homeland. We on this earth must look to that Heavenly Homeland with understanding and say with resignation, 'Thy will be done.' Great Russia is completely destroyed, but Holy Russia and the Orthodox Church, which ‘the gates of hell cannot overcome’, exists and exists more than ever. And those who believe and who do not doubt for one moment will see ‘the inner sun’ which enlightens the darkness during the thundering storm… I am only convinced that the Lord Who punishes is also the same Lord Who loves… Even though all the powers of hell may be set loose, Holy Russia and the Orthodox Church will remain unconquered. Some day, in this ghastly struggle, Virtue will triumph over Evil. Those who keep their faith will see the Powers of Light vanquish the powers of darkness. God both punishes and pardons…”[[770]](#footnote-770)

Another saint who died in 1918 was Elder Aristocles of Moscow. In 1911 he said: "An evil will shortly take Russia, and wherever this evil goes, rivers of blood will flow. It is not the Russian soul, but an imposition on the Russian soul. It is not an ideology, nor a philosophy, but a spirit from hell. In the last days Germany will be divided. France will be just nothing. Italy will be judged by natural disasters. Britain will lose her empire and all her colonies and will come to almost total ruin, but will be saved by praying enthroned women. America will feed the world, but will finally collapse. Russia and China will destroy each other. Finally, Russia will be free and from her believers will go forth and turn many from the nations to God."[[771]](#footnote-771)

"Now we are undergoing the times before the Antichrist. But Russia will yet be delivered. There will be much suffering, much torture. The whole of Russia will become a prison, and one must greatly entreat the Lord for forgiveness. One must repent of one's sins and fear to do even the least sin, but strive to do good, even the smallest. For even the wing of a fly has weight, and God's scales are exact. And when even the smallest of good in the cup tips the balance, then will God reveal His mercy upon Russia."

"The end will come through China. There will be an extraordinary outburst and a miracle of God will be manifested. And there will be an entirely different life, but all this will not be for long."

"God will remove all leaders, so that Russian people should look only at Him. Everyone will reject Russia, other states will renounce her, delivering her to herself – this is so that Russian people should hope on the help of the Lord. You will hear that in other countries disorders have begun similar to those in Russia. You will hear of war, and there will be wars. But wait until the Germans take up arms, for they are chosen as God’s weapon to punish Russia – but also as a weapon of deliverance later. The Cross of Christ will shine over the whole world and our Homeland will be magnified and will become as a lighthouse in the darkness for all."[[772]](#footnote-772)

Also in 1918, shortly before his martyric death, Archbishop Andronicus of Perm said: “Believe me, Father, all this atheism and robbery is an assault of the enemy, a foul abuse of the good and God-fearing Russian soul. For the time being, because of their violation of their oath [to the tsar], God has removed the people’s reason and will, until they repent… But when they do repent, at first gradually, then they will completely their spiritual sight, will feel their strength and like Ilya Muromets will cast off this horror which has enshrouded the whole of our country… Perhaps I will no longer be in this world, but I will never abandon the hope and certainty that Russia will be resurrected and will return to God… The soul of the people will be resurrected - and its body, our healthy statehood, will also be resurrected.”

Again, before the revolution Archbishop Theophan of Poltava received the following revelation from the elders of Valaam. “I do not speak from myself,” he said. “But that which I have heard from the God-inspired elders, that I have passed on…

“The Lord will have mercy on Russia for the sake of the small remnant of true believers. In Russia, the elders said, in accordance with the will of the people, the Monarchy, Autocratic power, will be re-established. The Lord has forechosen the future Tsar. He will be a man of fiery faith, having the mind of a genius and a will of iron. First of all he will introduce order into the Orthodox Church, removing all the untrue, heretical and lukewarm hierarchs. And many, very many – with few exceptions, all – will be deposed, and new, true, unshakeable hierarchs will take their place. He will be of the family of the Romanovs according to the female line. Russia will be a powerful state, but only for ‘a short time’… And then the Antichrist will come into the world, with all the horrors of the end as described in the Apocalypse…”[[773]](#footnote-773)

Finally, let us recall St. John of Kronstadt, who prophesied both the revolution, and the martyrs it would create, and the resurrection of Holy Rus’ on the foundation of their blood: “I foresee the restoration of a powerful Russia, still stronger and mightier than before. On the bones of these martyrs, remember, as on a strong foundation, will the new Russia we built - according to the old model; strong in her faith in Christ God and in the Holy Trinity! And there will be, in accordance with the covenant of the holy Prince Vladimir, a single Church! Russian people have ceased to understand what Rus’ is: it is the footstool of the Lord’s Throne! The Russian person must understand this and thank God that he is Russian.”[[774]](#footnote-774)

“The Church will remain unshaken to the end of the age, and a Monarch of Russia, if he remains faithful to the Orthodox Church, will be established on the Throne of Russia until the end of the age.”[[775]](#footnote-775)

*Give peace to Thy commonwealth in time of battle and strengthen the Orthodox kings whom Thou hast loved, O Thou Who alone lovest mankind!*[[776]](#footnote-776)

1. S.S. Oldenburg, *Tsarstvovanie Imperatora Nikolaia II,* Belgrade, 1939, vol. I, p. 337. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Douglas Smith, *Former People: The Last Days of the Russian Aristocracy*, London: Macmillan, 2012, p. 58. Fr. Raphael Johnston writes: “Alexander III came to the throne over the corpse of his father. The revolutionaries, emboldened, as they always are, by liberal pacification, the communist and other far left groups were becoming increasingly violent. From the reign of Alexander II to 1905, the total number of people — both innocent civilians and government officials (including lowly bureaucratic clerks) — murdered by the Herzenian “New Men” came roughly to 12,000. From 1906-1908, it rose by 4,742 additional, with 9,424 attempts to murder. On the other hand, the Russian government’s attitude towards the “New Men” was mixed. Generally, the monarchy was lenient. Exile to Siberia was often not a punishment. Siberia is not entirely a massive, frozen wasteland, but is possessed of great natural beauty, mountains and rivers. It is cold, but it is not the locale of the popular imagination. Local people, not knowing who the deportees were, received them with hospitality; they became part of town life, and the deportees were given much personal freedom. This sort of ‘imprisonment’ was far superior to the American penal system, which can be — at its maximum security level — considered merely a gang war between various minority groups.” (The Third Rome) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. I.P. Yakovi, *Imperator Nikolaj II i revoliutsia* (Emperor Nicholas II and the Revolution), Moscow, 2009 (first published in 1931), pp. 76-77. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Oldenburg, op. cit., p. 349. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Oldenburg, op. cit., p. 355. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Lieven, *Towards the Flame,* London: Allen Lane, 2015, p. 190. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. *Svod Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii* (The Collection of the Laws of the Russian Empire), 3rd series, vol. 1, pt. 1. St Petersburg, 1912, pp. 5-26. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. S. Anikin, “Buduschee prinadlezhit trezvym natsiam” (The Future Belongs to Sober Nations), *Vernost’*, 142, March, 2010, <http://metanthonymemorial.org/VernostNo142.html>) (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Plokhy, *Lost Kingdom,* London: Allen Lane, 2017, p. 169. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. See Fomin & Fomina, *Rossia pered Vtorym Prishesviem*(Russia before the Second Coming), Moscow, 1994, pp. 391-392; M.B. Danilushkin (ed.), *Istoria Russkoj Tserkvi ot Vosstanovlenia Patriarshestva do nashikh dnej*(A History of the Russian Church from the Restoration of the Patriarchate to our Days), vol. I, St. Petersburg, 1997, pp. 78-80, 771-783; Nadieszda Kizenko, *A Prodigal Saint: Father John of Kronstadt and the Russian People,*Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000, chapter 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Monk Anempodist writes: “Metropolitan Vladimir went on to take part in the movement of the right conservative forces of Russia that was being formed. Thus in 1907 he took part in the work of the All-Russian congress of ‘The Union of the Russian People’. In 1909, while taking part in the work of the First Monarchist congress of Russian People, Metropolitan Vladimir was counted worthy of the honour of passing on a greeting to the congress from his Majesty the Emperor Nicholas II in the following telegram:

    “’To his Eminence Vladimir, Metropolitan of Moscow. I entrust to you, Vladyko, to pass on to all those assembled in the first capital at the congress of Russian people and members of the Moscow Patriotic Union My gratitude for their loyal feelings. I know their readiness faithfully and honourably to serve Me and the homeland, in strict observance of lawfulness and order. St. Petersburg. 30 September. Nicholas.’” Riasophor-Monk Anempodist, “Sviaschennomuchenik mitropolit Vladimir (Bogoiavlenskij) i bor’ba s revoliutsii” (Hieromartyr Metropolitan Vladimir (Bogoiavlensky) and the struggle against the revolution), *Pravoslavnaia Zhizn’* (Orthodox Life), 53, N 1 (636), January, 2003, pp. 2-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Vostorgov, in Valentina Sologub (ed.), *Kto Gospoden’ – ko mne!* (He who is of the Lord – to me!)*,* Moscow, 2007, p. 115. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Tatiana Groyan, *Tsariu Nebesnomu i Zemnomu Vernij* (Faithful to the Heavenly and Earthly Kings), Moscow, 1996, p. CXI. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Vostorgov, in Fomin & Fomina, op. cit., p. 400. My italics (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Oldenburg, op. cit., vol. II, p. 60. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Bishop Andronicus, “Russkij grazhdanskij stroj zhizni pered sudom khristianina” (The Russian civil order before the judgement of the Christian), Fryazino, 1995, pp. 24-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Bishop Nikon (Rklitsky), *Zhizneopisanie Blazhenneishago Antonia, Mitropolita Kievskago i Galitskago*, vol. 2, pp. 173, 175-177. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Alferev, *Imperator Nikolaj II kak Chelovek Sil’noj Voli* (Emperor Nicholas II as a Man of Strong Will)*,* Jordanville: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1983, pp. 92-92. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. *Suggestions of the Diocesan Hierarchs on the Reform of the Church,* St. Petersburg, 1906, vol. 3, p. 443. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. See Anonymous, *V ob’iatiakh semiglavago zmiia* (In the Embrace of the Seven-Headed Serpent)*,* Montreal, 1984, p. 14. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Alexander Bogolepov, *Church Reforms in Russia 1905-1918,* Bridgeport, Conn.: Publications Committee of the Metropolitan Council of the Russian Orthodox Church of America, 1966, pp. 21-36. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Bishop Nikon (Rklitsky), *Zhizneopisanie Blazhennejshego Antonia, Mitropolita Kievskago i Galitskago,* vol. III, New York, oo. 232-233 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. *Journals and Protocols of the sessions of the Preconciliar Convention Established by His Majesty*, volume 3. On the second section on Georgia. St. Petersburg, 1907, pp. 55-58. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Professor M.G. Kovalnitsky, *On the Significance of the National Element in the Historical Development of Christianity*, Kiev, 1880, pp. 3-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. *Journals and Protocols*, p. 56. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Eugene Pavlenko, “The Heresy of Phyletism: History and the Present”, *Vertograd-Inform*, September, 1999. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Ariadna Tyrkova-Wiliams, “Na Putiakh k Svobode”, in *Petr Stolypin,* Moscow, 1998, p. 221. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Bokhanov, *Imperator Nicholaj II*, Moscow, 1998, p. 272. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Montefiore, *The Romanovs,* pp. 542-543. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Oldenburg, op. cit., pp. 365-366. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Zelnik, “Revolutionary Russia 1890-1914”, in Frazee (ed). *Russia. A History,* London: Constable, 2001, p. 258.op. cit., p. 259. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Lieven, *Towards the Flame,* p. 59. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Smith, *The Russian Revolution. A Very Short Introduction,* Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Bokhanov, op. cit., pp. 273-273. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Lebedev, *Velikorossia* (Great Russia), St. Petersburg, 1999, pp. 403-405. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Lebedev, op. cit., p. 406. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Yakobi, *Imperator Nikolaj II i revoliutsia* (Emperor Nicholas II and the Revolution), Moscow, 2010, p. 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Lieven, *Nicholas II,* p. 175. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Tikhomirov, “Poslednee pis’mo Stolypinu”, in *Petr Stolypin,* Moscow, 1998, pp. 235-237. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Oldenburg, op. cit., vol. II, p. 76. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Lieven, *Nicholas II,* pp. 172-173. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Plokhy, op. cit., p. 170. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Solonevich, “Puti, Oshibki i Itogi” (Ways, Mistakes and Conclusions), in *Rossia i Revoliutsia* (Russia and the Revolution), Moscow, 2007, p. 98. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Margaret Macmillan, *The War that Ended Peace,* London: Profile, 2014, chapter 2. See also Niall Ferguson, *The Pity of War. 1914-1918*, London: Penguin, 1999, pp. 45-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Of the three royal cousins – Tsar Nicholas of Russia, Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany and King George of England – the first two were both forced to abdicate by their generals, who betrayed their oaths to their sovereigns. Only King George survived with his crown intact – because, as a constitutional monarch he left politics to the politicians… [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914,* London: Penguin, 2013, p. 158. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. This Anglo-Russian rapprochement at the highest level was aided by the fact that Tsar Nicholas’ mother and King Edward’s wife were Danish sister-queens who both hated Germany (the Germans had conquered the Danish provinces of Shleswig and Holstein in 1864), and consequently worked hard to unite their adopted countries against Germany. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Welch, “A Last Fraught Encounter”, *The Oldie,* N 325, August, 2015, pp. 24-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Macmillan, op. cit., pp. 185, 196. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Carter, *The Three Emperors,* London: Penguin, 2010, p. 401. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Hastings, *Catastrophe: Europe goes to War 1914,* London: William Collins, 2014, p. 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Carter, op. cit., p. 402. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. As regards freedom, it is a paradoxical but true fact that Russia in the last decades before the revolution was one of the freest countries in the world. Thus Duma deputy Baron A.D. Meyendorff admitted: “The Russian Empire was the most democratic monarchy in the world” (Lebedev, *Velikorossia,* St. Petersburg*,* 1999, p. 405). This view was echoed by foreign observers, such as Sir Maurice Baring: “There is no country in the world, where the individual enjoys so great a measure of personal liberty, where the ‘*liberté de moeurs’* is so great, as in Russia; where the individual man can do as he pleases with so little interference or criticism on the part of his neighbours, where there is so little moral censorship, where liberty of abstract thought or aesthetic production is so great.” (in Eugene Lyons*, Our Secret Allies*, 1953). [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Clark, op. cit., pp. 166-167. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Lieven, *Towards the Flame. Empire, War and the End of Tsarist Russia,* London: Allen Lane, 2015, pp. 140-141. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Frank, “Etika nigilizma” (The Ethics of Nihilism), in *Vekhi* (Landmarks),Moscow, 1909, pp. 183-185. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Tikhomirov, “Bor’ba veka” (The Struggle of the Century), in *Kritika Demokratii* (A Critique of Democracy)*,* Moscow, 1997, pp. 189-190, 191, 192, 195-196; “Pochemu ia perestal byt’ revoliutsionerom” (Why I ceased to be a Revolutionary), *Pravoslavnaia Rus’* (Orthodox Russia), N 7 (1412), April 1/14, 1990. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Frank, "Religioznoe-Istoricheskoe Znachenie Russkoj Revoliutsii" (The religio-historical significance of the Russian revolution), *Po Tu Storonu i Po Pravu*, Paris: YMCA Press, 1972. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Oldenburg, op. cit., vol. II, 121, 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Rosamund Bartlett, *Tolstoy. A Russian Life,* Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011, p. 409. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Bartlett, op. cit., p. 424. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. I.M. Kontzevich, *Optina Pustyn' i ee Vremia* (Optina Desert and its Era), Jordanville: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1970, pp. 372-73. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. On this trial see M.V. Danilushkin, *Istoria Russkoj Pravoslavnoj Tserkvi, 1917-70* (A History of the Russian Orthodox Church, 1917-70, St. Petersburg, 1997, vol. 1, pp. 784-793; Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *Dvesti let vmeste* (Two Hundred Years Together) (1795-1995), part 1, Moscow: “Russkij Put’”, 2001, pp. 444-451. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. “Let us remember,” writes Solzhenitsyn: “the legal restrictions on the Jews in Russia were never racial [as they were in Western Europe]. They were applied neither to the Karaites [who rejected the Talmud], nor to the mountain Jews, nor to the Central Asian Jews.” (op. cit., p. 292). [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Fitzlyon and Browning, *Russia Before the Revolution*, London: Penguin books, 1977, p. 46. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. *Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weitzmann*, New York: Harper, 1949. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Massie, *Nicolas and Alexandra*, London: Book Club Associates, 1967, p. 229. On leaving Kiev after the murder, the Tsar said to the local governor “that he would not allow a pogrom against the Jews on any pretext whatsoever” (Helen Rappoport, *Four Sisters,* London: Pan Books, 2014, p. 152). [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Vostorgov, in Fomin and Fomina, *Rossia pered Vtorym Prishestviem* (Russia before the Second Coming), Sergiev Posad, 1993, vol. II, p. 624. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. <http://www.revisionisthistory.org/page10.page10.html>. Lisa Palmieri-Billig (“Historian gives credence to blood libel”, *The Jerusalem Post*, February 7 and 8, 2007) writes: “An Israeli historian of Italian origin has revived ‘blood libel’ in an historical study set to hit Italian bookstores on Thursday. Ariel Toaff, son of Rabbi Elio Toaff, claims that there is some historic truth in the accusation that for centuries provided incentives for pogroms against Jews throughout Europe.

    “Toaff’s tome, *Bloody Passovers: The Jews of Europe of Ritual Murders*, received high praise from another Italian Jewish historian, Sergio Luzzatto, in an article in the *Corriere della Serra* entitled ‘Those Bloody Passovers’.

    “Luzzatto describes Toaff’s work as a ‘magnificent book of history… Toaff holds that from 1100 to about 1500… several crucifixions of Christian children really happened, bringing about retaliations against entire Jewish communities – punitive massacres of men, women, children. Neither in Trent in 1475 nor in other areas of Europe in the late Middle Ages were Jews always innocent victims.’

    “’A minority of fundamentalist Ashkenazis… carried out human sacrifices,’ Luzzatto continued.

    “Toaff offers as an example the case of Saint Simonino of Trent in March 1475, shortly after a child’s body was found in a canal near the Jewish area of Trent, the city’s Jews were accused of murdering Simonino and using his blood to make mazot.

    “After a medieval trial in which confessions were extracted by torture, 16 members of Trent’s Jewish community were hanged.

    “Toaff reveals that the accusations against the Jews of Trent ‘might have been true’.

    “Toaff refers to kabbalistic descriptions of the therapeutic uses of blood and asserts that ‘a black market flourished on both sides of the Alps, with Jewish merchants selling human blood, complete with rabbinic certification of the product – kosher blood.’” [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. S.V. Bulgakov, *Nastol’naia Kniga dlia Svyashchenno-Tserkovno-Sluzhitelia* (Handbook for Church Servers), Kharkov, 1900, p. 143. It is significant that in 1919 the Bolsheviks banned the chanting of hymns to the Child-Martyr Gabriel, whose relics reposed in the church of St. Basil the Blessed on Red Square (Vladimir Rusak, *Pir Satany* (Satan’s Feast), London, Ontario: Zarya, 1991, p. 13).

    For ritual murders demonstrated in court, see Dal’, V. *Rozyskanie o ubiyenii evreev khristianskikh mladentsev i upotreblenii krovi ikh* (Investigation into the Killing by Jews of Christian Children and the Use of their Blood), St. Petersburg, 1844; Rozanov, V. *Oboniatel’noe i osyazatel’noe otnoshenie evreev k krovi* (The Senses of Smell and Touch of the Jews towards Blood), St. Petersburg, 1913; O. Platonov, *Ternovij venets Rossii* (Russia’s Crown of Thorns), Moscow, 1998. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Uspensky, in Fomin and Fomina, op. cit., vol. II, p. 632. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Archbishop Anthony, in *Zhizn’ Volynii* (The Life of Volhynia), N 221, 2 September, 1913. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Burrow, *The Crisis of Reason: European Thought, 1848-1914,* Yale University Press, 2000, p. 223. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian\_Symbolism. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander\_Scriabin. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian\_Symbolism. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Thomas Schipperges, *Prokofiev,* London: Haus Publishing, 2003, p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Bartlett, *Tolstoy. A Russian Life,* Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011, p. 374. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Marinetti, in Margaret Macmillan, *The War that Ended Peace,* London: Profile, 2014, p. 247. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Berdiaev, *The Russian Revolution*, Ann Arbor, 1966, p. 58; quoted in Michael Burleigh, *Sacred Causes,* London: Harper Perennial, 2007, p. 41. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Florovsky, "Metafizicheskie predposylki utopizma" (The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Utopianism), *Put'* (The Way), June-July, 1926, p. 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Futurism. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Exactly 100 years later, the Mariinsky Theatre Ballet under Valery Gergiev recreated Nijinsky’s notorious production of 1913 in the same location, Paris. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BryIQ9QpXwI. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Figes, *Natasha’s Dance,* op. cit., pp. 279, 280-282. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. John Etty, “Serbian Nationalism and the Great War”, *History Today,* February 27, 2014. For a description of the murder, and the circumstances leading up to it, see Christopher Clark, *Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914,* London: Penguin, 2013, pp. 7-13. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. Clark, op. cit., pp. 13-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon,* Edinburgh: Canongate, 2006, p. 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. Evidence of this irredentist, revanchist mood is provided by Edith Durham, who records the following conversation among her companions in a railway carriage in December, 1903. Her companions "were all Serbs, young and aflame with patriotism... Talk all ran on unredeemed Serbia and King Peter who is to realise the national ideal. 'Now we have a King who is as good as yours,' they said, 'and Serbia will have her own again'." (*The Burden of the Balkans,* London, 1905, p. 86). [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Ulrick Loring and James Page, *Yugoslavia's Royal Dynasty,* London: The Monarchist Press Association, 1976, p. 60. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Loring and Page, op. cit., p. 62. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Clark, op. cit., p. 82. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. Clark, op. cit., p. 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Brigit Farley, "Aleksandar Karadjordjevic and the Royal Dictatorship in Yugoslavia", in Berndt J. Fischer, *Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and Authoritarian Strongmen of South Eastern Europe,* London: Hurst & Company, 2006, p. 55. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Akçam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility*, London: Constable, 2007, p. 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. Glenny, *The Balkans. 1804-1999*, London, p. 215. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. Akçam, op. cit., p. 39. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. Glenny, op. cit., p. 216. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. Glenny, op. cit., p. 218. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. Glenny, op. cit., pp. 218-219. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Oldenburg, *Tsarstvovanie Imperatora Nikolaia II* (The Reign of Emperor Nicholas II), Belgrade, 1939, vol. 2, pp. 36-37. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History,* London: Papermac, 1994, p. 150. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. Clark, op. cit., p. 84. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Alexander Yanov writes that Miliukov’s “interaction with young Serbian soldiers allowed him to come to two crucial conclusions. First, ‘these young people show complete disregard toward Russian diplomacy.’ Second, ‘the expectations of an imminent war with Austria evolved into the sense of anxious willingness to get into the fight; while the prospect of victory seemed easy and apparent to achieve. This morale appeared so pervasive and undeniable that trying to debate these events would have been absolutely hopeless.’ In other words, the Serbs needed Russia as leverage in their attempt to bring down the dual Austro-Hungarian Empire and establish their own mini-state.” (“The Lessons of the First World War, or Why Putin’s Regime is Doomed”, Institute of Modern Russia, September 5, 2014, <http://www.imrussia.org/en/analysis/nation/800-the-lessons-of-the-first-world-war-or-why-putins-regime-is-doomed>. (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Clark, op. cit., pp. 34-35. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. Malcolm, op. cit., p. 150. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. Macmillan, op. cit., p. 405. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. Dominic Lieven, *Towards the Flame. Empire, War and the End of Tsarist Russia,* 2015, p. 224. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. Malcolm, op. cit., p. 151. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. Clark, op. cit., pp. 38-39, 41. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. Macmillan, op. cit., p. 410. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. Lieven, *Nicholas II*, pp. 191-192 [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. The Serbs bought French arms, and the Bulgarian – German ones. Both nations fell deeply into debt as a result of these purchases. They also made several bilateral agreements amongst themselves – first of all, the Serb-Bulgarian alliance of March, 1912. (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. Montefiore, *The Romanovs,* pp. 556-557. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. Macmillan, op. cit., pp. 439-440. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. Macmillan, op. cit., p. 441. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. Radzinsky, *The Last Tsar*, London: Hodder, 1992, p. 188. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. Lieven, *Twards the Flame. Empire, War and the End of Tsarist Russia,* London: Allen Lane, 2015*,* pp. 253-256. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. Bokhanov, *Imperator Nikolaj II,* Moscow, 1998, pp. 319-320. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. Glenny, op. cit., pp. 233-234. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. Lieven, *Towards the Flame,* pp. 256-258. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. Strachan, *The First World War,* London: Pocket Books, 2006, p. 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. Radzinsky, op. cit., p. 189. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. Lieven, *Towards the Flame,* p. 263. [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. Barbara Tuchman writes that at the funeral of King Edward VII in 1910 Ferdinand had “annoyed his fellow sovereigns by calling himself Czar and kept in a chest a Byzantine Emperor’s full regalia, acquired from a theatrical costumer, against the day when he should reassemble the Byzantine dominions beneath his sceptre” (*The Guns of August,* New York: Ballantine Books, 1962, 1994, p. 3). [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. Cooper, “Balkan Ghosts”, *New Statesman,* October 4-10, 2013, p. 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. Judah, *The Serbs,* pp. 85-86. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. Judah, op. cit., pp. 84-85. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. Bokhanov, op. cit., p. 321. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. Ferguson, *The War of the World,* London: Penguin, 2007, pp. 76-77. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. Clark, op. cit., p. 298. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. Macmillan, op. cit., p. 444. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. Clark, op. cit., p. 288. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. Hastings, *Catastrophe: Europe goes to War 1914,* London: William Collins, 2014, p. 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. Glenny, op. cit., pp. 225-226. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. Clark, op. cit., p. 218. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. Clark, op. cit., pp. 271-282. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. Lieven, *Towards the Flame*, pp. 142-143. [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. Lieven, op. cit., pp. 143-144. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. Plokhy, *Lost Kingdom,* London: Allen Lane, 2017, pp. 161-163. [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. Lieven, *Towards the Flame,* pp. 51-53. [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. Figes, *A People’s Tragedy*, London: Pimlico, 1996, p. 74. [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. Voeikov, *So Tsarem i Bez Tsaria* (With and Without the Tsar), Moscow, 1995, p. 41. [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. *Holy New Hieromartyr Maximus Sandovich*, Liberty, Tennessee: St. John of Kronstadt Press, 1998, pp. 48-50. [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. Millar, *Grand Duchess Elizabeth of Russia,* Richfield Springs, N.Y.: Nikodemos Orthodox Publication Society, 1993, pp. 203, 206. [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. Millar, op. cit., p. 212. [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. Lieven, “Russia, Europe and World War I, in Edward Acton, Vladimir Cherniaev, William Rosenberg (eds.), *A Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution, 1914-1921*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997, p. 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. Macmillan, op. cit., p. 506. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. Clark, op. cit., pp. 112-114. [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. Selishchev, “Chto neset Pravoslaviu proekt ‘Velikoj Albanii’?”, *Pravoslavnaia Rus’*, N 2 (1787), January 15/28, 2005, p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. Smith, *Former People: The Last Days of the Russian Aristocracy,* London: Macmillan, 2012, p. 59. [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. Montefiore, *The Romanovs,* p. 560. [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. House, in Macmillan, op. cit., p. 509. [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. She went on: “This will be a monstrous, improbable struggle; humanity will have to pass through heavy trials” (Baroness Sophia Buksgeden, *Ventsenosnaia Muchenitsa* (The Crown-Bearing Martyr), Moscow, 2020, pp. 302-303). [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
154. Clark, op. cit., pp. 214-215. [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
155. Tuchman, *The Guns of August,* New York: Ballantine Books, 1962, 1994, p. 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
156. Strachan, op. cit., p. 14. [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
157. Oldenburg, op. cit., vol. II, p. 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
158. Voeikov, op. cit., p. 62. [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
159. Macmillan, op. cit., p. 215. [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
160. Clark, op. cit., pp. 322-325. [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
161. Clark, op. cit., pp. 338-345. [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
162. <http://novaonline.nvcc.edu/eli/evans/his242/documents/Durnovo.pdf>. See also Professor Paul Robinson, “How Russia might have stopped World War I”, *The American Conservative,* February 4, 2014, [http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/how-russia-might-have-stopped-world-war-i/](http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/how-russia-might-have-stopped-world-war-i/" \t "_blank) [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
163. Clark, op. cit., p. 355. [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
164. Lieven, *Towards the Flame,* p. 366. [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
165. Carter, op. cit., p. 372. Again, the memory of the Bosnian crisis appears to have been important in this connection. For, as Prime Minister Herbert Asquith said: after Bosnia’s annexation, “incredible as it might seem, the Government could form no theory of German policy which fitted all the known facts, except that they wanted war…” [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
166. Montefiore, *The Romanovs,* p. 566. [↑](#footnote-ref-166)
167. Clark, op. cit., p. 345. [↑](#footnote-ref-167)
168. Platonov, *Ternovij Venets Rossii* (Russia’s Crown of Thorns), Moscow, 1998, p. 344. “In the course of the investigation into the case of the murder of the Archduke Ferdinand it emerged that the assassins Princip and Gabrilovich were Masons. The plan of the assassination was worked out by the political organization, ‘The People’s Defence’. Later, already in 1926, a representative of the Masonic circles of Serbia, Lazarevich, at a masonic banquet in the House of the Serbian Guard in Belgrade, officially recognized that ‘Masonry and “The People’s Defence” are one and the same’” (op. cit., p. 344). See also V.F. Ivanov, *Russkaia Intelligentsia i Masonstvo ot Petra I do nashikh dnej* (The Russian Intelligentsia and Masonry from Peter I to our days)*,* Moscow, 1997, pp. 395-398. [↑](#footnote-ref-168)
169. “Skrytaia Byl’” (A Hidden Story), *Prizyv’* (Summons), N 50, Spring, 1920; in F. Vinberg, *Krestnij Put’* (The Way of the Cross), Munich, 1920, St. Petersburg, 1997, pp. 167-168. [↑](#footnote-ref-169)
170. In this connection, it is important to take into account a conversation that the Tsar had with a member of the Rothschild banking family at a ceremonial dinner in Dunkirk in 1901. “The billionaire Rothschild suggested that the Russian debt to France could be written off in exchange for the Jews being given equal rights in Russia. The Tsar refused, saying that the Russian people was very trusting, and in conditions of equal rights would quickly fall into the Jewish cabal. On leaving Rothschild the Tsar said: ‘Now I have signed my death sentence.’” (Reminiscence of E.I. Balabin, an officer of a Cossack light-guards regiment. See https://sergedid.livejournal.com/417307.html?utm\_source=fbsharing&utm\_medium=social) [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
171. Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History,* London: Papermac, 1996, p. 155. [↑](#footnote-ref-171)
172. Clark, *Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went to War in 1914,* London: Penguin, 2013, pp. 368-369. [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
173. Lieven, *Towards the Flame. Empire, War and the End of Tsarist Russia,* London: Allen Lane, 2015, p. 316. [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
174. Stevenson, *1914-1918: The History of the First World War,* London: Penguin, 2005, pp. 10-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
175. Hastings, *Catastrophe: Europe goes to War 1914,* Lonson: William Collins, 2014, p. xxxv. [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
176. West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*, Edinburgh: Canongate, 2006, p. 369. [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
177. Stevenson, op. cit., p. 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
178. Hastings, op. cit., p. xxxvi. [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
179. Macmillan, *The War that Ended Peace*, London: Profile, 2014, p. 515. [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
180. Malcolm, op. cit., pp. 156-157. [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
181. Stevenson, op. cit., p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-181)
182. Stevenson, op. cit., pp. 12-13. [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
183. Glover, *Humanity. A Moral History of the Twentieth Century,* London: Jonathan Cape, 1999, pp. 179-180. [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
184. Fromkin, *Europe’s Last Summer,* London: Vintage, 2005, pp. 272, 273. [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
185. Malcolm, op. cit., p. 157. [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
186. Roberts, *The Penguin History of Europe,* London: Penguin, 1997, pp. 510-511. [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
187. Lieven, “Russia, Europe and World War I”, in Edward Acton, Vladimir Cherniaev, William Rosenberg (eds.), *A Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution, 1914-1921*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997, pp. 42-43. [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
188. Lieven, *Nicholas II,* p. 190. [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
189. Clark, op. cit., pp. 387-391. [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
190. Clark, op. cit., pp. 407-412. [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
191. Clark, op. cit., pp. 415-423. [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
192. Clark, op. cit., p. 552. [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
193. Clark, op. cit., p. 484. [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
194. Clark, op. cit., p. 557. [↑](#footnote-ref-194)
195. Lieven, *Towards the Flame,* p. 347. [↑](#footnote-ref-195)
196. Montefiore, *The Romanovs,* p. 575. [↑](#footnote-ref-196)
197. Victor Salni and Svetlana Avlasovich, “Net bol’she toj liubvi, kak esli kto polozhit dushu svoiu za drugi svoia” (There is no greater love than that a man should lay down his life for his friend), [http://catacomb.org.ua/modules.php?name=Pages&go=print\_page\*pid=966](http://catacomb.org.ua/modules.php?name=Pages&go=print_page*pid=966). [↑](#footnote-ref-197)
198. Lieven, *Towards the Flame,* p. 333. [↑](#footnote-ref-198)
199. Lieven, *Towards the Flame,* p. 335. [↑](#footnote-ref-199)
200. Tsar Nicholas II became the godfather of the future King Edward VIII at his Anglican baptism (Carter, op. cit., p. 137), and in 1904 Kaiser Wilhelm was invited to be godfather of the Tsarevich Alexis (Niall Ferguson, *The War of the World*, London: Penguin, 2007, p. 100). [↑](#footnote-ref-200)
201. Sophie Gordon, “The Web of Royalty”, *BBC History Magazine,* February, 2012, pp. 16-18. Victoria’s son, Edward VII, reacted against this Germanism by becoming very anti-German. [↑](#footnote-ref-201)
202. Ferguson, *The War of the World,* p. 97. [↑](#footnote-ref-202)
203. However, as Metropolitan Anastasy (Gribanovsky) pointed out, the sisters were more English than German in their tastes and upbringing, taking after their English mother rather than their German father ("Homily on the Seventh Anniversary of the Martyric End of Emperor Nicholas II and the Entire Royal Family", *Orthodox Life*, vol. 31, no. 4, July-August, 1981). [↑](#footnote-ref-203)
204. Carter, *The Three Emperors*, London, 2010, p. 145. As Clark writes, “The European executives were still centred on the thrones and the men or women who sat on them. Ministers in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia were imperial appointees. The three emperors had unlimited access to state papers. They also exercised formal authority over their respective armed forces. Dynastic institutions and networks structured the communications between states. Ambassadors presented their credentials to the sovereign in person and direct communications and meetings between monarchs continued to take place throughout the pre-war years; indeed, they acquired a heightened importance” (op. cit., p. 170). [↑](#footnote-ref-204)
205. Clark, op. cit., p. 521. [↑](#footnote-ref-205)
206. Clark, op. cit., p. 513. As he said to Sazonov on receiving the Kaiser’s telegram: “He is asking the impossible… If I agreed to Germany’s demands now, we should find ourselves unarmed against the Austrian army, which is mobilized already. It would be madness.” (Glover, op. cit., p. 181) [↑](#footnote-ref-206)
207. Lieven, *Towards the Flame,* p. 337. [↑](#footnote-ref-207)
208. Abbot Seraphim, *Martyrs of Christian Duty,* Peking, 1929; quoted in Lyubov Millar, *Grand Duchess Elizabeth of Russia*, Redding, Ca.: Nikodemos Publication Society, 1993, p. 176. [↑](#footnote-ref-208)
209. Millar, op. cit., p. 171. [↑](#footnote-ref-209)
210. Strachan, *The First World War,* London: Pocket Books, 2006, p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-210)
211. Macmillan *The War That Ended Peace*, p. 529. [↑](#footnote-ref-211)
212. Clark, op. cit., p. 558. [↑](#footnote-ref-212)
213. Von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War.* [↑](#footnote-ref-213)
214. Von Hötzendorff, in Strachan, op. cit., pp. 10-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-214)
215. Velimirovich, “The Religious Spirit of the Slavs”, in *Sabrana Dela* (Collected Works), volume 3, 1986, Khimelstir, 1986, pp. 221-222. [↑](#footnote-ref-215)
216. Macmillan, op. cit. , pp. 237-238. [↑](#footnote-ref-216)
217. Velimirovich, “The Agony of the Church”, in *Sabrana Dela* (Collected Works), volume 3, 1986, Khimelstir, pp. 83-84. [↑](#footnote-ref-217)
218. Popovich, *The Orthodox Church and Ecumenism*, Thessaloniki, 1974, translated in *Orthodox Life*, September-October, 1983, pp. 26-27. [↑](#footnote-ref-218)
219. Alexander Kan, “Istorik Lieven: bez Pervoj mirovoj ne bylo by ni Stalina ni Gitlera” (The historian Lieven: If there had been no First World War, there would have been no Stalin or Hitler), *BBC Russkaia Sluzhba,* 2 May, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/russian/society/2016/05/160502\_dominic\_lieven\_interview\_kan?ocid=socialflow\_facebook. [↑](#footnote-ref-219)
220. Tsar Nicholas wrote on October 6, 1915: “Impossible as it has seemed, but treacherously preparing from the very beginning of the war, Bulgaria has betrayed the Slav cause. The Bulgarian army has attacked Our faithful ally Serbia, [which is already] bleeding profusely in a struggle with a strong enemy. Russia and Our allied Great Powers tried to warn Ferdinand of Coburg against this fatal step. The fulfillment of an age-old aspiration of the Bulgar people – union with Macedonia – has [already] been guaranteed to Bulgaria by a means more in accord with the interests of the Slav world. But appeals by the Germans to secret ambitions and fratricidal enmity against the Serbs prevailed. Bulgaria, whose [Orthodox] faith is the same as Ours, who so recently has been liberated from Turkish slavery by the brotherly love and blood of the Russian people, openly took the side of the enemies of the Christian faith, the Slav world and of Russia. The Russian people react with bitterness to the treachery of a Bulgaria which was so close to them until recently, and draw their swords against her with heavy hearts, leaving the fate of these traitors to the Slav world to God’s just retribution.” (http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1915/nickbulg.html) [↑](#footnote-ref-220)
221. Engels, in M.J. Cohen and John Major, *History in Quotations*, London: Cassell, 2004, p. 707. [↑](#footnote-ref-221)
222. Edvard Radzinsky, interview with Vladimir Posner, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0waA2YwhLnw. [↑](#footnote-ref-222)
223. Khrapovitsky, *The Christian Faith and War,* Jordanville, 2005, pp. 8-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-223)
224. Troitsky, “Bogoslovie i Svoboda Tserkvi” (Theology and the Freedom of the Church), *Bogoslovskij Vestnik* (Theological Herald), September, 1915, vol. 3, Sergiev Posad; reprinted in Kaluga in 2005, p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-224)
225. We can more reliably detect fatalism in the attitude of the German chancellor Bethmann at this time, whose acquiescence to the Austrians Lieven finds “bewildering” (*Towards the Flame,* p. 317). Macmillan writes: “German society, Bethmann felt, was in moral and intellectual decline and the existing political and social order seemed incapable of renewing itself. ‘Everything,’ he said sadly, ‘has become so very old.’” (op. cit., p. 527). And again he said in July, 1914: “*A leap in the dark has its attractions…”* [↑](#footnote-ref-225)
226. Smith, *The Russian Revolution. A Very Short Introduction,* Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 12-13. [↑](#footnote-ref-226)
227. Cherfils, in Arsène de Goulévitch, *Czarism and Revolution,* Hawthorne, Ca.: Omni Publications, 1962, p. 184. Colonel Dupont, French chief of intelligence, asserted: “Let us render to our Allies the homage that is their due, for one of the elements of our victory was their debacle” (in Tuchman, op. cit., pp. 519-520). [↑](#footnote-ref-227)
228. Montefiore, *The Romanovs,* London: Vintage, 2016, p. 581. [↑](#footnote-ref-228)
229. I.P. Yakoby, *Imperator Nikolaj II i Revoliutsia* (Emperor Nicholas II and the Revolution), Moscow, 2010, p. 83. [↑](#footnote-ref-229)
230. Yakoby, op. cit., pp. 86-87. [↑](#footnote-ref-230)
231. Massie, *Nicholas and Alexandra,* London: Indigo, 2000, p. 282. [↑](#footnote-ref-231)
232. Oldenburg, *Tsartstvovanie Imperatora Nikolaia II,* Belgrade, 1939, vol. II, p. 177. [↑](#footnote-ref-232)
233. Viktor Aksiuchits, “Pervaia Mirovaia – neizbezhnaia ili ne nuzhnaia?” (chast’ 2), *Rodina,* August 5, 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-233)
234. Tsar Nicholas, in Lieven, op. cit., p. 215. [↑](#footnote-ref-234)
235. Hindenburg, in Goulévitch, op. cit., p. 189. [↑](#footnote-ref-235)
236. Goulévitch, op. cit., pp. 192-193. [↑](#footnote-ref-236)
237. Tooze, *The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order*, London: Penguin, 2015, p. 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-237)
238. Hindenburg, in Goulévitch, op. cit., p. 194. [↑](#footnote-ref-238)
239. Churchill, *The World Crisis, 1916-1918*, vol. 1, pp. 102-103, London, 1929. [↑](#footnote-ref-239)
240. Grand Duke Sergius, in Lyubov Millar, *Grand Duchess Elizabeth of Russia*, Redding, Ca.: Nikodemos Publication Society, 1993, p. 182. [↑](#footnote-ref-240)
241. Vinberg, *Krestnij Put’* (The Way of the Cross), Munich, 1920, St. Petersburg, 1997, p. 149. [↑](#footnote-ref-241)
242. Stevenson, *1914-1918: The History of the First World War*, London: Penguin, 2005, p. 237. [↑](#footnote-ref-242)
243. Stevenson, op. cit., p. 237. [↑](#footnote-ref-243)
244. Lebedev, *Velikorossia* (Great Russia), St. Petersburg, 1997, p. 465. [↑](#footnote-ref-244)
245. Lieven, “Russia, Europe and World War I”, in Edward Acton, Vladimir Cherniaev, William Rosenberg (eds.), *A Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution, 1914-1921,* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997. [↑](#footnote-ref-245)
246. Weitzmann, *Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weitzmann*, New York: Harper, 1949. [↑](#footnote-ref-246)
247. Heifetz, “Nashi Obschie Uroki”, *22,* 1980, N 14, p. 162; in Solzhenitsyn, op. cit., p. 112. [↑](#footnote-ref-247)
248. *Illustrated Sunday Herald*, February 8, 1920; quoted in Douglas Reed, *The Controversy of Zion*, Durban, S.A.: Dolphin Press, 1978, pp. 272-273. [↑](#footnote-ref-248)
249. Vostorgov, in Fomin, S. and Fomina, T., *Rossia pered vtorym prishestviem* (Russia before the Second Coming),Moscow, 1994, vol. II, p. 624. [↑](#footnote-ref-249)
250. Solzhenitsyn, op. cit., p. 292. [↑](#footnote-ref-250)
251. As Witte recorded in his *Memoirs*: “’Are you right to stand up for the Jews?’ asked Alexander III. In reply Witte asked permission to answer the question with a question: ‘Can we drown all the Russian Jews in the Black Sea? If we can, then I accept that resolution of the Jewish question. If not, the resolution of the Jewish question consists in giving them a chance to live. That is in offering them equal rights and equal laws.’” (Edvard Radzinsky, *The Last Tsar*,London: Arrow, 1993, p. 69). But Witte’s reply misses the point, as if the choice lay between killing all the Jews or giving them complete equality. No State can give *complete* freedom to a section of the population that does not respect the law and endangers the lives or livelihoods of the majority. [↑](#footnote-ref-251)
252. Massie, op. cit., p. 229. [↑](#footnote-ref-252)
253. Preobrazhensky, personal communication, July 26, 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-253)
254. Solonevich, “Rossia, Revoliutsia i Yevrejstvo” (Russia, the Revolution and Jewry), *Rossia i Revoliutsia* (Russia and the Revolution), Moscow, 2007, pp. 26-27. [↑](#footnote-ref-254)
255. Both ‘Cosmos’ and ‘Mount Sinai’ were under the Supreme Council of the Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite, according to the Mason Boris Telepneff, Russian Assistant Consul in Paris in 1922 (*An Outline of the History of Russian Freemasonry*). (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-255)
256. According to George Sprukts, Kerensky also belonged to the “Grand Orient of the Peoples of Russia” and the Scottish Rite (32nd degree) (“Re: [paradosis] Re: White army”, [orthodox-tradition@yahoogroups.com](mailto:orthodox-tradition@yahoogroups.com), June 9, 2004). (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-256)
257. Lebedev, op. cit. “Telepneff reported that two Russian Lodges had been formed in Paris under the auspices of the Grand Lodge of France while a Russian Lodge existed in Berlin, the Northern Star Lodge, under a warrant of the Grand Lodge of the Three Globes.” (Richard Rhoda, “Russian Freemasonry: A New Dawn”, a paper read at the Orient Lodge no. 15 on June 29, 1996, <http://members.aol.com/houltonme/rus/htm>). [↑](#footnote-ref-257)
258. Telepneff, op. cit. [↑](#footnote-ref-258)
259. Telepneff also reported that “an independent lodge of the so-called Martiniste Rite was formed among the entourage of Czar Nicholas II under the name of 'The Cross and the Star',… which suspended its work in 1916.” Perhaps Great Prince Nicholas Mikhailovich Romanov, the Chairman of the Russian History Society, was a member of this lodge. Edvard Radzinsky (*The Last Tsar,* London: Arrow Books, 1993, p. 111) writes that he “was a mystic, a mason, and a freethinker… In the family he was called Monsieur Egalité, as the eighteenth-century liberal, the Duc d’Orléans, was called.” (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-259)
260. “Other Martiniste lodges opened ... 'Apollonius' in St Petersburg (1910), 'St John' in Moscow (1911), 'St Andrew' in Kiev (1912). A very curious lodge existed among the Russian Navy League, calling themselves 'Philaletes'; beside philanthropic and intellectual work, it pursued a political aim in opposition to that of the Grand Orient lodges, namely the support of the monarchy of Nicholas II. Probably this movement arose in connection with the Paris branch of the Swiss Order of the Chevaliers 'Philaletes' which established two lodges in St Petersburg: 'The Pyramid of the North' and 'The Star of the North'. Both pursued studies of mysticism and symbolism.” (Telepneff, quoted in “Russian Freemasonry” by Worshipful Brother Dennis Stocks, Barron Barnett Lodge. <http://www.casebook.org/dissertations/freemasonry/russianfm.html>). (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-260)
261. Nina Berberova, *Liudi i Lozhi: russkie masony XX stoletia*, New York, 1986. (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-261)
262. Lebedev, op. cit., pp. 448-451. [↑](#footnote-ref-262)
263. Sedova, “Byl li masonskij zagovor protiv russkoj monarkhii?” (Was there a masonic plot against the Russian Monarchy?), *Nasha Strana*, November 24, 2006, N 2808, p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-263)
264. <http://rushistory.3dn.ru/forum/4-86-1> [↑](#footnote-ref-264)
265. Voeikov, op. cit., p. 131. [↑](#footnote-ref-265)
266. Sedova, “Byl li masonskij zagovor protiv russkoj monarkhii?” (Was there a masonic plot against the Russian Monarchy?), *Nasha Strana*, November 24, 2006, N 2808, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-266)
267. Yakovlev*, 1 Avgusta, 1914*, Moscow, 1974, p. 13. Tereshchenko, according to Yakobi, was “a colourless young man from the Kievan sugar barons, eaten up with vainglory, who had previously bought for himself, so they said, a ministerial portfolio in the future revolutionary government for his contribution of five million rubles” (op. cit., p. 133). [↑](#footnote-ref-267)
268. <http://rushistory.3dn.ru/forum/4-86-1>. [↑](#footnote-ref-268)
269. Sedova, “Ne Tsar’, a Ego Poddanie Otvetsvenny za Fevral’skij Perevorot 1917 Goda” (Not the Tsar, but his Subjects were Responsible for the Coup of 1917), *Nasha Strana*, N 2864, March 14, 2009, p. 4 [↑](#footnote-ref-269)
270. Sedova, op. cit. [↑](#footnote-ref-270)
271. <http://rushistory.3dn.ru/forum/4-86-1>. [↑](#footnote-ref-271)
272. Sedova, “’Razgovory po dusham’ Fevral’skikh Impotentov” (‘Heart-to-heart Conversation of the February Impotents’), *Nasha Strana* (Our Country), N 2834, December 29, 2007, p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-272)
273. Yakobi, op. cit., p. 128. [↑](#footnote-ref-273)
274. Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Boston, *The Elder Joseph of Optina,* Boston, Mass.: Holy Transfiguration Monastery, 1984, p. 284. [↑](#footnote-ref-274)
275. Fr. Simeon Kholmogorov, *One of the Ancients*, Platina, Ca.: St. Herman of Alaska Brotherhood, 1988, p. 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-275)
276. http://www.pravoslavie.ru/sm/30988.htm. [↑](#footnote-ref-276)
277. St. Barsanuphius, in Fomin & Fomina, op. cit., p. 409. [↑](#footnote-ref-277)
278. The heresy was condemned by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1912 (Charter No. 8522 of Patriarch Joachim III to Mount Athos, dated September 12) and 1913 (Charter No. 758 of Patriarch German V to Mount Athos, dated February 15), and by the Russian Holy Synod in 1913 (Epistle of May 18, and Decree of August 27, No. 7644). See *Ekklesiastiki Alitheeia*, N 16, April 20, 1913, pp. 123-125, N 19, May 11, 1913, pp. 145-146, N 11, N 24, June 15, 1913, pp. 187-191, March 15, 1914, p. 119 (in Greek); “O lzhe-uchenii imiabozhnikov”, *Tserkovnie Vedomosti*, N 20, 1913. [↑](#footnote-ref-278)
279. Gubanov, op. cit., p. 770. [↑](#footnote-ref-279)
280. The best effort was by S. Troitsky in one of the three reports attached by the Russian Holy Synod to their decision of 1913: “Afonskaia Smuta”, *Tserkovnie Vedomosti*, N 20, 1913, pp. 882-909. [↑](#footnote-ref-280)
281. Constantine Papoulides, *Oi Rossoi onomolatroi tou Agiou Orous*, (The Russian Name-Worshippers of Mount Athos), Thessaloniki, 1977 (in Greek). [↑](#footnote-ref-281)
282. "Kratkoe opisanie biografii menie nyedostojnago skhiepiskopa Piotra Ladygina" (MS written in Bishop Peter's own hand, 1948); *Tserkovnaia Zhizn'*, NN 5-6, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 1984; NN 1-2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, 1985. [↑](#footnote-ref-282)
283. Fr. Leonid Kavelin, *Elder Macarius of Optina,* Platina, Ca.: St. Herman of Alaska Brotherhood Press, 1995, pp. 276-277. [↑](#footnote-ref-283)
284. # Hieromonk Simeon (Kalugin), “Optinskaia Smuta 1910-1912 gg. V kontekste istoricheskikh sobytij” (The Optina disturbances of 1910-1912 in the context of historical events), http://cliuchinskaya.blogspot.co.uk/2016/01/1910-1912.html

     [↑](#footnote-ref-284)
285. Johansen, “Lovushka dlia Imperatora” (A Trap for the Emperor), *Kul’tura,* January 8, 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-285)
286. Tolstoy, in A.N. Wilson, *Tolstoy,* London: Atlantic Books, 2012, pp. 362-363. [↑](#footnote-ref-286)
287. Velimirovich, *Homilies*, Birmingham: Lazarica Press, volume 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-287)
288. Edward Roslof, *Red Priests: Renovationism, Russian Orthodoxy, and Revolution, 1905-1946*, Indiana University Press, 2002, p. 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-288)
289. Pipes, op.cit., p. 113. [↑](#footnote-ref-289)
290. Smith, op. cit., pp. 10-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-290)
291. Vinberg, op. cit., p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-291)
292. I.L. Solonevich, *Narodnaia Monarkhia* (The People’s Monarchy),Minsk, 1998, pp. 384, 385. [↑](#footnote-ref-292)
293. *Pis’ma Vladyki Germana* (The Letters of Bishop Herman), Moscow: St. Tikhon Theological Institute, Moscow, 2004, p. 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-293)
294. Merezhkovsiy, *Bylo i Budet* (It was and shall be). [↑](#footnote-ref-294)
295. Bakhmatov, *Pravda o Grigorii Rasputine* (The Truth about Gregory Rasputin), Moscow, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-295)
296. Radzinsky, *Rasputin: The Last Word*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2000. [↑](#footnote-ref-296)
297. Khitrov, “Rasputin-Novykh Grigory Efimovich i kratkaia istoria spornogo voprosa o priznanii v RPTsZ ego oschetserkovnogo pochitania, kak pravoslavnogo startsa” (Gregory Efimovich Rasputin-Novykh and a short history of the controversial question of his recognition in ROCOR of his veneration throughout the Church as an Orthodox elder). [↑](#footnote-ref-297)
298. Maria Carlson, *“No Religion Higher than Truth”: A History of the Theosophical Movement in Russia, 1875-1922*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. [↑](#footnote-ref-298)
299. Carolly Erickson, *Alexandra. The Last Tsarina,* London: Constable, 2001, pp. 96-97. [↑](#footnote-ref-299)
300. In 2013 the Mariinsky ballet under Valery Gergiev recreated Nijinsky’s original 1913 production in its original location, Paris. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BryIQ9QpXwI [↑](#footnote-ref-300)
301. Alexander Bokhanov, Manfred Knodt, Vladimir Oustimenko, Zinaida Peregudova, Lyubov Tyutyunnik, *The Romanovs*, London: Leppi, 1993, p. 233. [↑](#footnote-ref-301)
302. This is the date indicated by Baroness Sophia Buksgevden, lady-in-waiting of the Tsarina, *Ventsenosnaia Muchenitsa* (Crown-bearing Martyr), Moscow, 2010, p. 221. [↑](#footnote-ref-302)
303. *Velikaia Kniaginia Elizaveta Fyodorovna i Imperator Nikolai II* (Great Princess Elizabeth Fyodorovna and Emperor Nicholas II), St. Petersburg: Aleteia, 2009, p. 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-303)
304. Polsky, in Liubov Millar, *Grand Duchess Elizabeth of Russia,* Richfield Springs, N.Y.: Nikodemos Orthodox Publication Society, 2009, p. 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-304)
305. Voeikov, op. cit., pp. 58-59. [↑](#footnote-ref-305)
306. Anashkin, “The Real Rasputin?: A Look at His Admirers’ Revisionist History”, *Orthodox Life*, May 4, 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-306)
307. On this important, but unsung hero of the faith, see Monk Anthony (Chernov), *Vie de Monseigneur Théophane, Archevêque de Poltava et de Pereiaslavl* (The Life of his Eminence Theophan, Archbishop of Poltava and Pereyaslavl), Lavardac: Monastère Orthodoxe St. Michel, 1988; Richard Bettes, Vyacheslav Marchenko, *Dukhovnik Tsarskoj Sem’i* (Spiritual Father of the Royal Family), Moscow: Valaam Society of America, 1994, pp. 60-61; Archbishop Averky (Taushev), *Vysokopreosviashchennij Feofan, Arkhiepiskop Poltavskij i Pereiaslavskij* (His Eminence Theophan, Archbishop of Poltava and Pereyaslavl), Jordanville: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1974 ; Radzinsky, *Rasputin*, op. cit. [↑](#footnote-ref-307)
308. Bakhanov, *Imperator Nikolai II*, Moscow, 1998, p. 294. [↑](#footnote-ref-308)
309. Voeikov, op. cit., pp. 50, 143. [↑](#footnote-ref-309)
310. Bakhanov, *Imperator Nikolai II-ij,* Moscow, 1998, p. 371. [↑](#footnote-ref-310)
311. Khrapovitsky, “Moi Vospominania” (My Reminiscences), *Tserkovnie Vedomosti*, N 450, in Bishop Nikon (Rklitsky), *Zhizneopisanie Blazhennejshago Antonia* (Biography of his Beatitude Anthony), vol. 3, New York, 1957, pp. 8-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-311)
312. Liubov Millar, *Tsarskaia Semia – zhertva temnoj sily* (The Royal Family – victims of the dark forces), Melbourne, 1998, pp. 107-108. [↑](#footnote-ref-312)
313. See Michael Smith, *A History of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service,* London: Dialogue; Annabel Venning, “How Britain’s First Spy Chief Ordered Rasputin’s Murder”, *Daily Mail,* July 22, 2010, pp. 32-33; Montefiore, *The Romanovs,* pp. 606-612. It is also probable, according to Christopher Danziger, that Yusupov had contacts with the SIS through his Oxford friends (“The Prince, the Spy and the Mad Monk”, *Oxford Today,* Michaelmas Term, 2016, p. 33). However, John Penycate writes: “Danzinger quotes an autopsy report saying Rasputin drowned. [However,] Professor Dmitri Kosorotov of the Russian Imperial Military Medical Academy, who carried out Rasputin’s autopsy, wrote that he was killed by a bullet to the forehead. You can see the bullet hole in the photograph of Rasputin’s post-mortem. Kosorotov adds that the three bullets that struck Rasputin came from three different guns. Felix Yusupov and Vladimir Purishkevich, the conspirator who was a member of the Duma, described in their memoirs firing the first two shots. But not the coup de grace. This led to the rumour that Yusupov’s old Oxford friend, the SIS officer Oswald Rayner, shot Rasputin. The former ‘C’ of MI6, Sir John Scarlett (Magdalen, 1966), assured me that he didn’t – the official line now for a century, but probably true” (“Rasputin Disputed”, *Oxford Today,* Trinity term, 2017, p. 6). Considering how Scarlett lied about the supposed weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2003, we are entitled to be skeptical of his testimony… [↑](#footnote-ref-313)
314. Yusupov, *Memuary* (Memoirs), Moscow, 1998, p. 235. [↑](#footnote-ref-314)
315. Yusupov, op. cit., p. 230. [↑](#footnote-ref-315)
316. Alexander Bokhanov, Manfred Knodt, Vladimir Oustimenko, Zinaida Peregudova, Lyubov Tyutyunnik, *The Romanovs*, London: Leppi, 1993, p. 237. [↑](#footnote-ref-316)
317. Montefiore, *The Romanovs,* p. 571. [↑](#footnote-ref-317)
318. Voeikov, op. cit., pp. 50, 143. [↑](#footnote-ref-318)
319. Bakhanov*, Imperator Nikolaj II*, Moscow, 1998, p. 371. [↑](#footnote-ref-319)
320. Radzinsky, *Rasputin*, p. 501. [↑](#footnote-ref-320)
321. Arsène de Goulévitch, *Czarism and Revolution*, Hawthorne, Ca.: Omni Publications, 1962, p. 191; Sergius Vladimirovich Volkov, “Pervaia mirovaia vojna i russkij ofitserskij korpus”, *Nasha Strana*, N 2874, August 29, 2009, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-321)
322. Lebedev, op. cit., pp. 463- 464. [↑](#footnote-ref-322)
323. Oldenburg, *Tsarstvovanie Imperatora Nikolaia II*, Belgrade, 1939, vol. II, p. 210. [↑](#footnote-ref-323)
324. Stevenson, op. cit., p. 218. [↑](#footnote-ref-324)
325. Buksgevden, *Ventsenosnitsa Muchenitsa* (The Crown-Bearing Martyr), Moscow, 2010, p. 372. [↑](#footnote-ref-325)
326. Lebedev, op. cit., p. 430. [↑](#footnote-ref-326)
327. In fact, the Tsar as often as not ignored Rasputin’s advice. See Oldenburg, op. cit., pp. 190-191. [↑](#footnote-ref-327)
328. . This slander can be refuted by many excerpts from the Empress’s diary; and the French ambassador, Maurice Paléologue, wrote: “{The Empress’s] education and upbringing, her mental and moral formaton, are completely English;… the basis of her character is completely Russian … She loves Russia with a burning love…” (*La Russie des Tsars pendant la Grande Guerre* (The Russia of the Tsars during the Great War), vol. V, 1, pp. 249-50.). [↑](#footnote-ref-328)
329. Voeikov, *So Tsarem i Bez Tsaria* (With and Without the Tsar), Moscow, 1995, p. 137. In fact, two months after the February revolution, Miliukov revealed to his colleagues in the Provisional Government that he knew (from whom?) that the revolutionary movement was being financed by the Germans. [↑](#footnote-ref-329)
330. Yakobi, op. cit., p. 123. [↑](#footnote-ref-330)
331. Lebedev, op. cit., pp. 473-475. [↑](#footnote-ref-331)
332. Sedova, “Ne Tsar’, a Ego Poddanie Otvetsvenny za Febral’skij Perevorot 1917 Goda” (Not the Tsar, but his Subjects were Responsible for the Coup of 1917), *Nasha Strana*, N 2864, March 14, 2009, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-332)
333. G. Katkov, *Fevral’skaia Revoliutsia* (The February Revolution), Paris, 1984, pp. 175-82. [↑](#footnote-ref-333)
334. Vinberg, op. cit., p. 151. [↑](#footnote-ref-334)
335. Letter of Sergius Nilus, 6 August, 1917; in V. Gubanov, *Tsar’ Nikolai II-ij i Novie Mucheniki* (Tsar Nicholas II and the New Martyrs), St. Petersburg, 2000, p. 121. [↑](#footnote-ref-335)
336. It is also said that during the siege of the Moscow Kremlin in October, 1917, the Mother of God ordered the “Reigning” icon to be taken in procession seven times round the Kremlin, and then it would be saved. However, it was taken round only once… (Monk Epiphany (Chernov), *Tserkov’ Katakombnaia na Zemle Rossijskoj* (The Catacomb Church in the Russian Land), Old Woking, 1980 (MS), <http://www.vs-radoste.narod.ru/photoalbum09.html>) [↑](#footnote-ref-336)
337. However, both the facts about the appearance of the icon and its theological interpretation are disputed. See M. Babkin, “2 (15) marta 1917 g.: iavlenie ikony ‘Derzhavnoj’ i otrechenie ot prestola imperatora Nikolaia II” (March 2/15, 1917: the appearance of the “Reigning’ icon and Emperor Nicholas II’s abdication from the throne), *Posev,* March, 2009, pp. 21-24. [↑](#footnote-ref-337)
338. Yakovitsky, in S. Fomin (ed.), *Rossia pered Vtorym Prishestviem* (Russian before the Second Coming), Moscow, 2003, p. 235. [↑](#footnote-ref-338)
339. Yakovitsky, “Sergianstvo: mif ili real’nost’”, *Vernost’* (Fidelity), N 100, January, 2008. [↑](#footnote-ref-339)
340. I. Kontsevich, *Optina Pustyn’ i ee Vremia* (Optina Desert and its Time*),* Jordanville, N.Y.: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1977. [↑](#footnote-ref-340)
341. P.N. Miliukov, in Tatyana Groyan, *Tsariu Nebesnomu i Zemnomu Vernij* (Faithful to the Heavenly and Earthly King), Moscow, 1996, p. XCIV. Cf. Armis (a Duma delegate), “Skrytaia Byl’” (The Hidden Story), *Prizyv’* (Summons), N 50, Spring, 1920; in F. Vinberg, *Krestnij Put’* (The Way of the Cross), Munich, 1920, St. Petersburg, 1997, pp. 165-166. [↑](#footnote-ref-341)
342. Paley, *Souvenir de Russie, 1916-1919,* p. 33. [↑](#footnote-ref-342)
343. Oldenburg, op. cit., vol. II, p. 233. [↑](#footnote-ref-343)
344. Sedova, “Ne Tsar…”, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-344)
345. Oldenburg, op. cit., vol. II, p. 233. [↑](#footnote-ref-345)
346. Lieven, *Nicholas II,* p. 231. [↑](#footnote-ref-346)
347. Kerensky, in *Voprosy Istorii* (Questions of History), 1990, N 10, p. 144. Kerensky’s real name was Aaron Kirbits (Voeikov, *So Tsarem i Bez Tsaria* (With and Without the Tsar), Moscow, 1995, p. 260). [↑](#footnote-ref-347)
348. Tatyana Groyan, *Tsariu Nebesnomu i Zemnomu Vernij* (Faithful to the Heavenly and Earthly King), Moscow, 1996, pp. CXX-CXXI. [↑](#footnote-ref-348)
349. Baroness Sophia Buksgevden, *Ventsenosnitsa Muchenitsa* (The Crown-Bearing Martyr), Moscow, 2011, p. 390. [↑](#footnote-ref-349)
350. There is conflicting evidence on this point. Sedova writes: “Later Guchkov said that the coup was planned for March-April, 1917. However his comrades in the plot were more sincere. In Yekaterinoslav, where Rodzyanko’s estate was situated, there came rumours from his, Rodzyanko’s house that the abdication of the Tsar was appointed for December 6, 1917. At the beginning of 1917 Tereshchenko declared in Kiev that the coup, during which the abdication was supposed to take place, was appointed for February 8” (“Ne Tsar’.., p. 3). (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-350)
351. On February 24 the Petrograd commandant Khabalov posted notices on the walls saying there was no need to worry: there was more than half a million pounds of flour in the city, enough to feed it for twelve days, and deliveries were continuing without interruption (Yakobi, op. cit., p. 151). As General Voeikov wrote: “From February 25 the city’s public administration had begun to appoint its representatives to take part in the distribution of food products and to oversee the baking of bread. It became clear that in Petrograd at that time there were enough reserves of flour: in the warehouses of Kalashnikov Birzh therewere over 450,000 pounds of flour, so that fears about a lack of bread were completely unfounded” (op. cit., p. 161). However, already in November, 1917 Prince Vladimir Mikhailovich Volkonsky, former vice-president of the Duma and assistant to the Minister of the Interior Protopopov had told Baroness Sophia Bukstevden that the administration of the transport of food was so bad that there could be hunger riots in the ciry (Bukstevden, op. cit., pp. 387-388). And Lubov Millar writes: “While bread lines in Petrograd got longer, trainloads of wheat and rye stood rotting all along the Great Siberian Railway line; the same was true in the southwestern part of Russia. Even so, there was enough bread to feed the capital” *Grand Duchess Elizabeth of Russia*, Richfield, N.Y.: Nikodemos Orthodox Publication Society, 2009, p. 35). (V.M.). [↑](#footnote-ref-351)
352. This telegram, writes Yakoby, “was very cleverly written. Its jerky, emotional phrases were bound to elicit in the Tsar increasing anxiety, the fear of responsibility and a desire to transfer this responsibility on him whose name was clearly insinuated – Rodzianko himself.

     “However the Duma president himself feared an open rift with legality and preferred to receive power from the hands of the Sovereign rather than ‘by the will of the people’” (op. cit., p. 154) (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-352)
353. At this point, writes Yakoby, “the Duma openly took the side of the rebellion” (op. cit., p. 155) (V.M). [↑](#footnote-ref-353)
354. Michael arrived on the scene at 5 p.m. At 9 Rodzyanko asked him to become dictator. He refused. At 10.30 he telegraphed the Tsar proposing that he make Lvov prime minister. The Tsar refused, confirming Golitsyn as head of the civil administration (Montefiore, *The Romanovs,* p. 619). (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-354)
355. Lebedev, op. cit., pp. 477-481. [↑](#footnote-ref-355)
356. Montefiore, op. cit., p. 618. [↑](#footnote-ref-356)
357. Yakoby, op. cit., pp. 159-160. [↑](#footnote-ref-357)
358. Yakoby, op. cit., p. 173. [↑](#footnote-ref-358)
359. Yakoby, op. cit., p. 180. [↑](#footnote-ref-359)
360. Yakoby, op. cit., pp. 159-160.

     Yakoby, op. cit., p. 170. [↑](#footnote-ref-360)
361. Yakoby, op. cit., p. 166. [↑](#footnote-ref-361)
362. “The plotters had earlier prepared a group to seize the train from among the reserve Guards units in the so-called Arakcheev barracks in Novgorod province. That is why the train had to be stopped nearer these barracks, and not in Pskov” (Sedova, “Ne Tsar…”, p. 4). [↑](#footnote-ref-362)
363. According to Buksgevden, he withdrew his men to Petrograd from the garrison at the Alexandrovsky palace in Tsarskoye Selo, where the Royal Family was, on the morning of March 2 (op. cit., p. 408). (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-363)
364. Lebedev, op. cit., pp. 477-482. [↑](#footnote-ref-364)
365. Buksgevden, op. cit., p. 408. [↑](#footnote-ref-365)
366. “’One must accept the formula ‘the monarch reigns but the government rules’, explained Ruzsky.

     “This, explained the emperor, was incomprehensible to him, and he would need to be differently educated, born again. He could not take decisions against his conscience.” (Montefiore, op. cit., p. 619).

     Thus the Tsar rejected the idea of a constitutional monarchy to the very end. But he was prepared to abdicate in favour of another true autocrat, his successor in the Russian autocracy. (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-366)
367. As we have seen, however, Guchkov claimed that the generals were not initiated into the plot, but acted independently. Sedova agrees with this assessment, as, it would seem, did Oldenburg. (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-367)
368. Montefiore, op. cit., pp. 619-620. The Duma was terrified of the mob. So “the gods of the revolution needed a sacrifice. That sacrifice had to be the Tsar” (Yakobi, p. 174). [↑](#footnote-ref-368)
369. Lebedev, op. cit., pp. 481-486. [↑](#footnote-ref-369)
370. Sedova, “Pochemu Gosudar’ ne mog ne otrech’sa?” (Why his Majesty could not avoid abdication), *Nasha Strana*, March 6, 2010, N 2887, p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-370)
371. Sedova, “Ataka na Gosudaria Sprava” (An Attack on his Majesty from the Right), *Nasha Strana*, September 5, 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-371)
372. Lebedev, op. cit., pp. 486-488; Voeikov, op. cit., p. 212; Mark Steinberg and Vladimir Khrustalev, *The Fall of the Romanovs*, Yale University Press, 1995, pp. 89-90, citing State Archive of the Russian Federation, document f.601, op. 1, d. 2102, 1.1-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-372)
373. Nikolasha was blessed by Metropolitan Platon, Exarch of Georgia to ask the Tsar to abdicate. See N.K. Talberg, “K sorokaletiu pagubnogo evlogianskogo raskola” (On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Destructive Eulogian Schism”), *Pravoslavnij Put’* (The Orthodox Way), Jordanville, 1966, p. 36; Groyan, op. cit., p. CLXI, note. [↑](#footnote-ref-373)
374. Apart from General Khan-Hussein, General Theodore Keller, who was later martyred, was also faithful, as were Adjutant-General Nilov and General Voejkov. [↑](#footnote-ref-374)
375. Oldenburg, op. cit., pp. 641-642. [↑](#footnote-ref-375)
376. Alferov, *Imperator Nikolaj II kak chelovek sil’noj voli* (Emperor Nicholas II as a Man of Strong Will), Jordanville, N.Y.: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1983, 2004, p. 121. [↑](#footnote-ref-376)
377. Katkov, op. cit., p. 236. [↑](#footnote-ref-377)
378. Shulgin wrote: “How pitiful seemed to me the sketch that we had brought him… It is too late to guess whether his Majesty could have not abdicated. Taking into account the position that General Ruzsky and General Alexeyev held, the possibility of resistance was excluded: his Majesty’s orders were no longer passed on, the telegrams of those faithful to him were not communicated to him… In abdicating, his Majesty at least retained the possibility of appealing to the people with his own last word” (in S.S. Oldenburg, *Tsarstvovanie Imperatora Nikolaia II* (The Reign of Emperor Nicholas II), Belgrade, 1939, vol. 2, p. 253). (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-378)
379. Lebedev’s text has been slightly altered to include the whole text of the manifesto (V.M.). For more on the text of the manifesto, and proof that it was written by the Tsar himself, see “Manifest ob otrechenii i oktiabrskij perevorot: Kniaz’ Nikolai Davydovich Zhevakov” (1874-1939)”, http://www.zhevakhov.info/?p=465. [↑](#footnote-ref-379)
380. Lebedev, op. cit., pp. 488-489. [↑](#footnote-ref-380)
381. Voeikov, op. cit., p. 190. [↑](#footnote-ref-381)
382. Montefiore, op cit., p. 623. [↑](#footnote-ref-382)
383. Alferov, op. cit., p. 105. [↑](#footnote-ref-383)
384. Farmborough, *Nurse at the Russian Front. A Diary 1914-18,* London: Book Club Associates, 1974, pp. 271-272. Alexeyev reported the Tsar’s last address to the army to Guchkov, now War Minister. Guchkov forbade the distribution of the speech…(Alferov, p. 108) [↑](#footnote-ref-384)
385. Lebedev, op. cit., p. 491. [↑](#footnote-ref-385)
386. Churchill, *The World Crisis. 1916-18,* vol. I, London, 1927, pp. 223-225. Churchill was a Mason, Master of “Rosemary” lodge no. 2851, since 1902. However, this did not prevent him from being an admirer of the Tsar, and a fierce anti-communist. [↑](#footnote-ref-386)
387. As Lev Alexandrovich Tikhomirov writes: "Without establishing a kingdom, Moses foresaw it and pointed it out in advance to Israel... It was precisely Moses who pointed out in advance the two conditions for the emergence of monarchical power: it was necessary, first, that the people itself should recognize its necessity, and secondly, that the people itself should not elect the king over itself, but should present this to the Lord. Moreover, Moses indicated a leadership for the king himself: 'when he shall sit upon the throne of his kingdom, he must… fulfil all the words of this law'." (*Monarkhicheskaia Gosudarstvennost’* (Monarchical Statehood), St. Petersburg, 1992, pp. 127-129). [↑](#footnote-ref-387)
388. Lopukhin, “Tsar’ i Patriarkh” (Tsar and Patriarch), *Pravoslavnij* *Put’* (The Orthodox Way), Jordanville, 1951, pp. 103-104. [↑](#footnote-ref-388)
389. Nazarov, *Kto Naslednik Rossijskogo Prestola?* (Who is the Heir of the Russian Throne?), Moscow, 1996, pp. 72-73. Italics mine (V.M.). [↑](#footnote-ref-389)
390. N. Gubanov (ed.), *Nikolai II-ij i Novie Mucheniki,* St. Petersburg, 2000, p. 70. [↑](#footnote-ref-390)
391. On hearing the new of the abdication, the Tsar’s earthly bride wrote to him: “I fully understand your action, my own hero… I know that you could not sign against what you swore at your coronation. We know each other through and through – need no words.” [↑](#footnote-ref-391)
392. <http://www.geocities.com/kitezhgrad/prophets/duniushka.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-392)
393. Lebedev, op. cit., p. 489. [↑](#footnote-ref-393)
394. Lebedev, op. cit., p. 491. [↑](#footnote-ref-394)
395. Radzinsky, *The Last Tsar,* p. 173. According to Montefiore, “the ministers tried to intimidate Michael into abdicating. He asked if they could guarantee his safety. ‘I had to answer in the negative,’ said Rodzianko, but Pavel Milyukov, the foreign minister, argued that this ‘frail craft’ – the Provisional Government – would sin in ‘the ocean of national disorder’ without the raft of the monarchy. Kerensky, the only one who could speak for the Soviet, disagreed, threatening chaos: ‘I can’t answer for Your Highness’s life.’

     “Princess Putiatina invited them all for lunch, sitting between the emperor and the prime minister. After a day of negotiations, Michael signed his abdication: ‘I have taken a firm decision to assume the Supreme Power only if such be the will of our great people by universal suffrage through its representatives to the Constituent Assembly.’ Next day, he sent a note to his wife Natasha: ‘Awfully busy and extremely exhausted. Will tell you many interesting things.’ Among these interesting things, he had been emperor of Russia for a day – and after 304 years the Romanovs had fallen.” (*The Romanovs,* p. 623). [↑](#footnote-ref-395)
396. Lebedev, op. cit., p. 491. [↑](#footnote-ref-396)
397. Babkin, “Sviatejshij Sinod Pravoslavnoj Rossijskoj Tserkvi i Revoliutsionnie Sobytia Fevralia-Marta 1917 g.” (“The Most Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Revolutionary Events of February-March, 1917”), <http://www.monarhist-spb.narod.ru/D-ST/Babkin-1>, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-397)
398. Radzinsky, *The Last Tsar,* p. 172. It has been argued that Tsar Nicholas had also given a certain impulse towards the democratic anarchy when he declared in his manifesto: “We command Our Brother to conduct State affairs fully and in inviolable unity with the representatives of those men who hold legislative office, *upon those principles which they shall establish,* swearing an inviolable oath to that effect.” The principles established by the State Duma were, of course, democratic, not monarchical. And on September 15, 1917, Kerensky even declared, in defiance of the whole aim of the Constituent Assembly as defined by Tsar Michael in his manifesto, that Russia was now a republic… But perhaps the Tsar meant, not a Constituent Assembly, but a *Zemsky Sobor*, of the kind that brought Tsar Michael Romanov to the throne in 1613… [↑](#footnote-ref-398)
399. Buksgevden, op. cit., p. 412. [↑](#footnote-ref-399)
400. Zyzykin, *Tsarskaia Vlast’*, Sophia, 1924. (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-400)
401. Nazarov, op. cit., p. 68. [↑](#footnote-ref-401)
402. Groyan, op. cit., pp. 122, 123. [↑](#footnote-ref-402)
403. Massie, *The Romanovs: The Final Chapter,* London: Arrow, 1995, p.261. [↑](#footnote-ref-403)
404. Massie, op. cit., pp. 267-269. For a detailed assessment, and rejection, of the claims of Cyril and his descendants, see Michael Nazarov, *Kto Naslednik Rossijskogo Prestola?* (Who is the Heir of the Russian Throne?), Moscow, 1996. [↑](#footnote-ref-404)
405. Massie, op. cit., pp. 261-262. [↑](#footnote-ref-405)
406. Evlogy, *Puti moej zhizni* (The Paths of My Life), Paris: YMCA Press, 1947, p. 604. [↑](#footnote-ref-406)
407. Nazarov, op. cit., pp. 69-71. [↑](#footnote-ref-407)
408. St. John Maximovich, *Proiskhozhdenie Zakona o Prestolonasledii v Rossii* (The Origin of the Law of Succession in Russia), quoted in “Nasledstvennost’ ili Vybory?” (“Heredity or Elections?”), *Svecha Pokaiania* (Candle of Repentance), N 4, February, 2000, p. 12. The phrase “multimutinous” is that of Tsar Ivan the Terrible. [↑](#footnote-ref-408)
409. Miranda Carter, *The Three Emperors,* London: Penguin, 2011, p. 177. [↑](#footnote-ref-409)
410. Roy Hattersley, *The Great Outsider: David Lloyd George,* London: Abacus, 2010, p. 472. [↑](#footnote-ref-410)
411. Welch, “A Last Fraught Encounter”, *The Oldie*, N 325, August, 2015, p. 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-411)
412. See the photo on the back cover of Jasper Ridley, *The Freemasons,* London: Constable, 1999. [↑](#footnote-ref-412)
413. Nicholas II, in Fomin & Fomina, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 376. [↑](#footnote-ref-413)
414. Strachan, *The First World War,* London: Pocket Books, 2006, pp. 234-235. [↑](#footnote-ref-414)
415. Lebedev, op. cit., p. 405. [↑](#footnote-ref-415)
416. Solzhenitsyn, *The Red Wheel,* “October, 1916”, uzel 2, Paris: YMCA Press, pp. 401-408. [↑](#footnote-ref-416)
417. A.D. Stepanov, “Mezhdu mirom i monastyrem” (“Between the World and the Monastery”), in *Tajna Bezzakonia* (The Mystery of Iniquity), St. Petersburg, 2002, p. 491. [↑](#footnote-ref-417)
418. “On February 27, when the armies of the capital’s garrison began to go over to the side of the rebels, Over-Procurator N.P. Raev suggested to the Holy Synod that it condemn the revolutionary movement. He drew the attention of the members of the Highest Church Hierarchy to the fact that the leaders of this movement ‘consist of traitors, beginning with the members of the State Duma and ending with the workers’. The Synod declined his suggestion, replying to the over-procurator that it was still not known where the treachery came from – from above or below.” (M.A. Babkin, *Dukhovenstvo Russkoj Pravoslavnoj Tserkvi i Sverzhenie Monarkhii (Nachalo XX v. – Konets 1917 g.)* (The Clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Overthrow of the Monarchy (Beginning of the 20th century – the End of 1917)), Moscow, 2007. [↑](#footnote-ref-418)
419. Lvov was, in the words of Bishop Gregory (Grabbe), “a not completely normal fantasist” ((*Russkaia Tserkov’ pered litsom gospodstvuiushchego zla* (The Russian Church in the Face of Dominant Evil), Jordanville, 1991, p. 4). Grabbe’s estimate of Lvov is supported by Oliver Figes, who writes: “a nobleman of no particular talent or profession, he was convinced of his calling to greatness, yet ended up in the 1920s as a pauper and a madman living on the streets of Paris” (*A People’s Tragedy,* London: Pimlico, 1997, p. 449). (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-419)
420. Babkin, “Sviatejshij Sinod Pravoslavnoj Rossijskoj Tserkvi i Revoliutsionnie Sobytia Fevralia-Marta 1917 g.” (“The Most Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Revolutionary Events of February-March, 1917”), <http://www.monarhist-spb.narod.ru/D-ST/Babkin-1>, pp. 2, 3. Archbishop Nathanael of Vienna (+1985), the son of over-procurator Vladimir Lvov, said that his family used to laugh at the incongruity of wishing “Many Years” to a merely “Provisional” Government (“Neobychnij Ierarkh” (An Unusual Hierarch), *Nasha Strana*, N 2909, February 5, 2011, p. 3). [↑](#footnote-ref-420)
421. This is also now generally accepted even by western historians. Thus Tsuyoshi Hasegawa writes: “Five members, Kerensky, N.V. Nekrasov, A.I. Konovalov, M.I. Tereshchenko and I.N. Efremov are known to have belonged to the secret political Masonic organization” (“The February Revolution”, in Edward Acton, Vladimir Cherniaev, William Rosenberg (eds.), *Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution 1914-1921*, Bloomington and Indianopolis: Indiana University Press, 1997, p. 59). [↑](#footnote-ref-421)
422. As Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky) testified, “already in 1917 he [Sergius] was dreaming of combining Orthodox Church life with the subjection of the Russian land to Soviet power…” (“Preemstvennost’ Grekha” (The Heritage of Sin), Tsaritsyn, p. 7). [↑](#footnote-ref-422)
423. See Mikhail V. Shkarovskii, “The Russian Orthodox Church”, in Acton, Cherniaev and Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 417; “K 80-letiu Izbrania Sv. Patriarkha Tikhona na Sviashchennom Sobore Rossijskoj Tserkvi 1917-18gg.” (Towards the Election of his Holiness Patriarch Tikhon at the Sacred Council of the Russian Church, 1917-18), *Suzdal’skie Eparkhial’nie Vedomosti* (Suzdal Diocesan News), N 2, November, 1997, p. 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-423)
424. Babkin, op. cit., pp. 3-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-424)
425. Babkin, *Dukhovenstvo*, pp. 195-198. [↑](#footnote-ref-425)
426. Metropolitan Macarius, in Groyan, op. cit., pp. 183-184. [↑](#footnote-ref-426)
427. Groyan, op. cit., p. 142. Italics mine (V.M.). [↑](#footnote-ref-427)
428. St. John Maximovich, “Homily before a Memorial Service for the Tsar-Martyr”, in *Man of God*, p. 133. Cf. Archbishop Seraphim (Sobolev): "There is no need to say how terrible a 'touching' of the Anointed of God is the overthrow of the tsar by his subjects. Here the transgression of the given command of God reaches the highest degree of criminality, which is why it drags after it the destruction of the state itself" (*Russkaia Ideologia* (The Russian Ideology), St. Petersburg, 1992, pp. 50-51). And so, insofar as it was the disobedience of the people that compelled the Tsar to abdicate, leading inexorably to his death, "we all," in the words of Archbishop Averky, "Orthodox Russian people, in one way or another, to a greater or lesser degree, are guilty of allowing this terrible evil to be committed on our Russian land" (*Istinnoe Pravoslavie i Sovremennij Mir* (True Orthodoxy and the Contemporary World), Jordanville, N.Y.: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1971, p. 166). [↑](#footnote-ref-428)
429. St. John Maximovich, “The Nineteenth Anniversary of the Repose of His Beatitude Metropolitan Anthony”, *Pravoslavnaia Rus’*, N 19, 1955, pp. 3-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-429)
430. I.A. Ilyin, *Sobranie Sochinenij* (Collected Works), Moscow, 1994, volume 4, p. 7; in Valentina D. Sologub, *Kto Gospoden’ – Ko Mne!* (He who is the Lord’s – to me!), Moscow, 2007, p. 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-430)
431. According to I.M. Andreyev, “the whole of the Synod had decided to go into retirement. Archbishop Sergius had taken part in this resolution. But when all the members of the Synod, together with Archbishop Sergius, actually came to give in their retirement, the Over-Procurator, who had set about organizing a new Synod, drew Archbishop Sergius to this. And he took an active part in the new Synod” (*Kratkij Obzor Istorii Russkoj Tserkvi ot revoliutsii do nashikh dnej* (A Short Review of the History of the Russian Church from the Revolution to our Days), Jordanville, 1952, p. 74. Bishop Gregory (Grabbe) wrote: “I can remember the opinions of those who knew him and who considered him to be a careerist and the complaints of hierarchs that he promised to retire with other members of the Synod in protest against Lvov, then he changed his mind and became head of the Synod” (Letter of April 23 / May 6, 1992 to Nicholas Churilov, *Church News*, April, 2003, p. 9). [↑](#footnote-ref-431)
432. V. Egorov, *K istorii provozglashenia gruzinami avtokefalii svoej Tserkvi v 1917 godu* (Towards a History of the Proclamation by the Georgians of the Autocephaly of their Church in 1917), Moscow, 1917, p. 9; in Monk Benjamin (Gomareteli), *Letopis’ tserkovnykh sobytij Pravoslavnoj Tserkvi nachinaia s 1917 goda* (Chronicle of Church Events, beginning from 1917), [www.zlatoust.ws/letopis.htm](http://www.zlatoust.ws/letopis.htm), p. 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-432)
433. Monk Benjamin, op. cit., p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-433)
434. Monk Benjamin, op. cit., p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-434)
435. Figes, op. cit., p. 350. [↑](#footnote-ref-435)
436. Shkarovskii, op. cit., p. 418. [↑](#footnote-ref-436)
437. Groyan, op. cit., pp. CXXII-CXXIII. [↑](#footnote-ref-437)
438. Bishop Diomedes, Address of November 21 / December 4, 2008, <http://www.russia-talk.com/otkliki/ot-601.htm>. [↑](#footnote-ref-438)
439. Babkin, *Dukhoventstvo,* p. 210. [↑](#footnote-ref-439)
440. Sokolov, L.A. *Episkop Ignatij Brianchaninov* (Bishop Ignaty Brianchaninov)*,* Kiev, 1915, vol. 2, p. 250. [↑](#footnote-ref-440)
441. Grabbe, op. cit., p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-441)
442. St. John, “Homily before a Memorial Service for the Tsar-Martyr”, in *Man of God: Saint John of Shanghai and San Francisco,* Richfield Springs, N.Y, 1994, p. 133. Archbishop Averky of Syracuse continues the theme: “It is small consolation for us that the Royal Family was killed directly by non-Russian hands, non-Orthodox hands and non-Russian people. Although that is so, *the whole Russian people* is guilty of this terrible, unprecedented evil deed, insofar as it did not resist or stand against it, but behaved itself in such a way that the evil deed appeared as the natural expression of that mood which by that time had matured in the minds and hearts of the undoubted majority of the unfortunate misguided Russian people, beginning with the ‘lowers’ and ending with the very ‘tops’, the upper aristocracy” (Religiozno-misticheskij smysl ubienia Tsarkoj Sem’i” (The Religious-Mystical Meaning of the Killing of the Royal Family), http://www.ispovednik.org/fullest.php?nid=59&binn\_rubrik\_pl\_news=132. [↑](#footnote-ref-442)
443. Smith, *The Russian Revolution. A Very Short Introduction,* Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 18-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-443)
444. Solonevich, in “Ot Ipatievskogo Monastyria do Doma Ipatievskogo” (From the Ipatiev Monastery to the Ipatiev House), *Pravoslavnie Monastyri* (Orthodox Monasteries), 29, 2009, p. 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-444)
445. Many years later Miliukov wrote: “They ask me: ‘Who elected you?’ Nobody elected us, for if we had begun to wait for the people’s election, we sould not have been able to tear power out of the hands of the enemy…” Who did he mean as the “enemy” here if not the Tsar?! He continued: “We were not ‘elected’ by the Duma. Nor were we elected by Lvov in accordance with the tsar’s order prepared at Headquarters, of which we could not have been informed. All these sources for the succession of power we ourselves had consciously cast out. There remained only one reply, the clearest and most convincing. I replied: ‘The Russian revolution has elected us!’ This simple reference to the historical process that brought us to power shut the mouths of the most radical opponents.” (cf. G. Katkov, *Fevral’skaia Revoliutsia* (The February Revolution), Paris: YMCA Press, 1977, p. 3700. [↑](#footnote-ref-445)
446. Darby, “Kerensky in Hindsight”, *History Today,* July, 2017, p. 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-446)
447. Novgorodtsev, “Vostanovlenie svyatyn" (“The Restoration of the Holy Things”), *Put'* (The Way), N 4, June-July, 1926, p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-447)
448. Farmboroush, *Nurse at the Russian Front. A Diary 1914-1918,* London: Blue Club Associates, 1974, p. 260 [↑](#footnote-ref-448)
449. Farmborough, op. cit., p. 261. [↑](#footnote-ref-449)
450. Farmborough, op. cit., pp. 269-270. [↑](#footnote-ref-450)
451. Farmborough, op. cit., pp. 309-311. [↑](#footnote-ref-451)
452. Orlando Figes, *A People’s Tragedy,* London: Pimlico, 1997, p. 408. [↑](#footnote-ref-452)
453. Ferguson, *The Pity of War, 1914-1918,* London: Penguin Books, 1999, p. 368. Prisoners of war as a percentage of total casualties in the war were 51.8% for Russia, as opposed to 9.0% for Germany and 6.7% for Britain (op. cit., p. 369). [↑](#footnote-ref-453)
454. Lieven, *Nicholas II,* p. 236. [↑](#footnote-ref-454)
455. Tooze, “265 Days that Shook the World”, *Prospect*, January, 2017, pp. 26-27. [↑](#footnote-ref-455)
456. Smith, *Former Persons: The Last Days of the Russian Aristocracy*, London: Macmillan, 2012, p. 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-456)
457. Figes, op. cit., p. 400. [↑](#footnote-ref-457)
458. Mglinsky, “Grekhi russkoj intelligentsii” (The Sins of the Russian Intelligentsia), *Staroe Vremia* (Old Times), December 18/31,1923. [↑](#footnote-ref-458)
459. Zhevakov, *Vospominania* (Reminiscences),Moscow, 1993. [↑](#footnote-ref-459)
460. “Archbishop Vitaly Maximenko”, *Orthodox Life,* March-April, 2010, p. 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-460)
461. Figes, op. cit., pp. 347-348. [↑](#footnote-ref-461)
462. In *What is to be Done?* (1902), Lenin argued that in the conditions of Tsarist Russia it was impossible for the party to live openly among the people, but had to be an underground organization with strictly limited membership. “In an autocratic state the more we *confine* the membership of such a party to people who are professionally engaged in revolutionary activity and who have been professionally trained in the art of combating the political police, the more difficult it will be to wipe out such an organization” (in Cohen and Major, op. cit., p. 678). [↑](#footnote-ref-462)
463. Figes, *A People’s Tragedy*, London: Pimlico, 1997, p. 386. [↑](#footnote-ref-463)
464. Sebastyen, in Natalia Golitsyna, “Biurokrat, dictator, liubovnik” (Bureaucrat, dictator, lover), *Radio Svoboda,* April 1, 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-464)
465. “Marx after Communism”, *The Economist*, December 19, 2002. [↑](#footnote-ref-465)
466. Goldenburg, in Robert Service, *Lenin*, 2000, p. 267. [↑](#footnote-ref-466)
467. Figes, op. cit., pp. 389, 390, 391. [↑](#footnote-ref-467)
468. See [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TwanvYnzCKE&feature=related](http://www.facebook.com/l/xAQG5FDSc/www.youtube.com/watch?v=TwanvYnzCKE&feature=related). [↑](#footnote-ref-468)
469. Shevtsova, “Russia’s Love Affair with Germany”, http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/08/27/russias-love-affair-with-germany/, *The American Interest,* August 27, 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-469)
470. Ferguson, *The Square and the Tower,* London: Penguin, 2018, p. 213, note, 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-470)
471. Strachan, op. cit., p. 256. According to Catherine Merridale (*Lenin on the Train,* London: Allen Lane, 2016), it was an Estonian called Alexander Keskula who first suggested the idea. [↑](#footnote-ref-471)
472. Brockdorff-Rantzau, in Cohen and Major, *History in Quotations*, London: Cassell, p. 726. [↑](#footnote-ref-472)
473. *Istoki Zla* (The Sources of Evil)*,* pp. 35-36. [↑](#footnote-ref-473)
474. *The Economist,* October 8-14, 2016, p. 80. [↑](#footnote-ref-474)
475. Piers Brendon, *The Dark Valley. A Panorama of the 1930s,* London: Pimlico, 2010, p. 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-475)
476. Smith, *Former People: The Last Days of the Russian Aristocracy,* London: Macmillan, 2012, p. 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-476)
477. Tooze, *The Deluge,* London: Penguin, 2014, p. 69. [↑](#footnote-ref-477)
478. Smith, *Former Persons: The Last Days of the Russian Aristocracy,* London: Macmillan, 2012, p. 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-478)
479. Orlando Figes, *A People’s Tragedy*, London: Pimlico, 1997, p. 400. [↑](#footnote-ref-479)
480. Farmborough, op. cit., pp. 269-270. [↑](#footnote-ref-480)
481. Farmborough, op. cit., pp. 309-311. [↑](#footnote-ref-481)
482. Orlando Figes, op. cit., p. 408. [↑](#footnote-ref-482)
483. Ferguson, *The Pity of War, 1914-1918,* London:Penguin Books, 1999, p. 368. Prisoners of war as a percentage of total casualties in the war were 51.8% for Russia, as opposed to 9.0% for Germany and 6.7% for Britain (op. cit., p. 369). [↑](#footnote-ref-483)
484. Lieven, *Nicholas II,* p. 236. [↑](#footnote-ref-484)
485. Figes, op. cit., p. 436. [↑](#footnote-ref-485)
486. Orlovsky, “Russia in War and Revolution 1914-1921”, in Gregory L. Frazee (ed.). *Russia. A History,* 2009, p. 286. [↑](#footnote-ref-486)
487. Robert Service*, Comrades*, London: Pan Books, 2007, p. 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-487)
488. Kornilov, in Cohen and Major, op. cit., p. 727. [↑](#footnote-ref-488)
489. Orlovsky, op. cit., p. 288. It should be noted that Kornilov, like Alexeyev, Ruzsky and the generals that betrayed the Tsar all died within one or two years of their treason. [↑](#footnote-ref-489)
490. Figes, op. cit., p. 457. [↑](#footnote-ref-490)
491. Figes, op. cit., p. 459. [↑](#footnote-ref-491)
492. Trotsky, *Our Political Tasks* (1904); in Cohen and Major, op. cit., p. 679. [↑](#footnote-ref-492)
493. Lenin, Letter to Alexandra Kollontai, March 15, 1917; in Cohen and Major, op. cit., p. 726. [↑](#footnote-ref-493)
494. Figes, op. cit., pp. 460-461. [↑](#footnote-ref-494)
495. Figes, op. cit., p. 488. [↑](#footnote-ref-495)
496. Figes, op. cit., pp. 489-490. [↑](#footnote-ref-496)
497. Figes, op. cit., p. 492. [↑](#footnote-ref-497)
498. As just one example of how the Bolsheviks were prepared to destroy even the most important and essential leaders of the nation, we may consider the beating to death by revolutionary soldiers of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, Nikolai Nikolaievich Dukhonin, on December 3, 1917, in Mogilev. The lynching was watched with indifference by Krylenko, who the previous had announced that he was taking Dukhonin’s place and that Dukhonin was to be sent to Petrograd at the disposal of the Council of People’s Commissars. The body was mocked and mutilated, and it was not until two years later that Dukhonin’s wife was able to obtain it for burial… (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-498)
499. Erickson, *Alexandra the Last Tsarina,* London: Constable, 2001, pp. 311-312. [↑](#footnote-ref-499)
500. Tooze, op. cit., p. 84. [↑](#footnote-ref-500)
501. Tooze, op. cit., p. 85; Pipes, op. cit., pp. 5, 149. [↑](#footnote-ref-501)
502. Solzhenitsyn, *Dvesti let vmeste* (Two Hundred Years Together), Moscow, 2001, p. 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-502)
503. Norman Davies, *Europe*, London: Pimlico, 1996, p. 921. [↑](#footnote-ref-503)
504. Pipes, *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, 1919-*1924, London: Fontana, 1995, p. 499. [↑](#footnote-ref-504)
505. Orlovsky, op. cit., pp. 293, 294. [↑](#footnote-ref-505)
506. Babeuf, in Martin Crook, *Napoleon Comes to Power,* 1998, pp. 106, 107. [↑](#footnote-ref-506)
507. Chernov, “Lenin”, in *Foreign Affairs,* January-February, 2012, pp. 10-12. [↑](#footnote-ref-507)
508. Lenin, *Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenij,* vol. 41, p. 80. [↑](#footnote-ref-508)
509. Lebedev, *Velikorossia* (Great Russia), St. Petersburg, 1997, pp. 445-447. [↑](#footnote-ref-509)
510. Shafarevich, *Sotsializm kak iavlenie mirovoj istorii* (Socialism as a phenomenon of world history), Paris: YMCA Press, 1977, pp. 284-286. [↑](#footnote-ref-510)
511. Soloviev, *Masonstvo v mirovoj politike XX veka* (Masonry in 20th century World Politics), Moscow: Rosspen, 1998, p. 81. [↑](#footnote-ref-511)
512. Ilyin, “O Sovietskoj Tserkvi” (On the Soviet Church), *Russkij Sigor*, 2010, N 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-512)
513. Niall Ferguson, *The War of the World,* London: Penguin, 2007, pp. 150, 148. [↑](#footnote-ref-513)
514. Zinoviev, in Smith, op. cit., p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-514)
515. Nicholas Werth, “A State against its People”, in Stéphane Courtois, Nicolas Werth, Jean-Louis Panné, Andrzej Packowski, Karel Bartošek, Jean-Louis Margolin, *The Black Book of Communism*, London: Harvard University Press, 1999, p. 102. [↑](#footnote-ref-515)
516. I.P. Goldenberg saw Lenin as the successor of Bakunin, not Marx, and his tactics those of “the universal apostle of destruction” (in Robert Service, *Lenin*, 2000, p. 267). [↑](#footnote-ref-516)
517. Lebedev, op. cit., p. 429. [↑](#footnote-ref-517)
518. Lebedev, “Sovmestimost’ Khrista i Veliara – k 70-letiu ‘sergianstva’”, *Russkij Pastyr’*, 28-29, 1997, pp. 174-175. [↑](#footnote-ref-518)
519. Official figures for those condemned for counter-revolution and other serious political crimes between 1921 and 1953 come to only a little more than four million, of whom only about 800,000 were shot. This, of course, excludes those killed in the Civil War and other armed uprisings, and in the great famines in Ukraine and elsewhere. See GARF, *Kollektsia dokumentov*; Popov, V.P. *Gosudarstvennij terror v sovietskoj Rossii. 1923-1953 gg.*; istochniki i ikh interpretatsia, *Otechestvennie arkhivy*, 1992, N 2. p. 28. For commentaries on these figures, see http://mitr.livejournal.com/227089.html; <http://community.livejournal.com/idu_shagayu/2052449.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-519)
520. St. John of Damascus, *Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*, IV, 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-520)
521. Popovich, *Interpretation of the Epistles of St. John the Theologian*, Munich, 2000, pp. 36, 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-521)
522. St. John Maximovich, “Homily before a Memorial Service for the Tsar-Martyr”, in *Man of God: Saint John of Shanghai and San Francisco,* Redding, Ca., 1994, p. 133. [↑](#footnote-ref-522)
523. Pipes, *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime*, p. 241. [↑](#footnote-ref-523)
524. Solzhenitsyn, *Dvesti Let Vmeste* (Two Hundred Years Together), vol. 2, Moscow, 2002, pp. 41, 43. [↑](#footnote-ref-524)
525. Solzhenitsyn, op. cit., p. 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-525)
526. Rayfield, *Stalin and his Hangmen*, London: Viking, 2004, p. 74. [↑](#footnote-ref-526)
527. Reed, *The Recompense of Zion,* Durban, 1978, p. 274. The most detailed analysis of the ethnic composition of the Soviet government was provided by Vinberg, *Krestnij Put’,* Munich, 1920. [↑](#footnote-ref-527)
528. Pipes, *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, 1919-1924,* London: Fontana, 1995, pp. 112-13. [↑](#footnote-ref-528)
529. Reed, op. cit., p. 276. [↑](#footnote-ref-529)
530. Vladimir Kozyreff, “[paradosis] Re: A New One”, [orthodox-tradition@yahoogroups.com](mailto:orthodox-tradition@yahoogroups.com), June 11, 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-530)
531. Piers Brendon, *The Dark Valley. A Panorama of the 1930s,* London: Pimlico, 2001, p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-531)
532. Rayfield, op. cit., p. 72. [↑](#footnote-ref-532)
533. Yurovsky, in Radzinsky, op. cit., p. 177. [↑](#footnote-ref-533)
534. See *Leningradskaia Panorama* (Leningrad Panorama), N 10, 1990, p. 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-534)
535. M. Nazarov, “Presledovania Tserkvi i dukhovnaia sut’ bol’shevizma” (The Persecutions of the Church and the spiritual essence of Bolshevism), in *Vozhdiu Tret’ego Rima* (To the Leader of the Third Rome), chapter 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-535)
536. Tikhomirov, *Religiozno-filosofskie Osnovy Istorii* (The Religio-Historical Foundations of History), Moscow, 1997, pp. 379, 380. [↑](#footnote-ref-536)
537. Marx, *Eleven Theses on Feuerbach,* 1845. [↑](#footnote-ref-537)
538. Pipes, op. cit., pp. 501-502. [↑](#footnote-ref-538)
539. Tikhon, in Archimandrite Luke, “Nationalism, Russia, and the Restoration of the Patriarchate”, *Orthodox Life*, vol. 51, N 6, November-December, 2001, pp. 30-31. [↑](#footnote-ref-539)
540. N.V. Urusova, *Materinskij Plach Sviatoj Rusi* (The Maternal Lament of Holy Russia), Moscow, 2006, p. 109. [↑](#footnote-ref-540)
541. Kusakov, in *Pravoslavnij Tsar-Muchenik* (The Orthodox Tsar-Martyr), Moscow, 1997, pp. 727-728. [↑](#footnote-ref-541)
542. Nicholas Zernov, "The 1917 Council of the Russian Orthodox Church", *Religion in Communist Lands*, vol. 6, N 1, 1978, p. 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-542)
543. Hilarion, quoted in John Shelton, *Church and State in Russia: The Last Years of the Empire 1900-1917*, New York: Octagon Books, 1965, p. 260. [↑](#footnote-ref-543)
544. Archimandrite Luke, “Nationalism, Russia and the Restoration of the Patriarchate”, *Orthodox Life*, November-December, 2001, p. 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-544)
545. Firsov, *Russkaia Tserkov’ nakanune Peremen (konets 1890-x – 1918 gg.)* (The Russian Church on the eve of the Changes (end of the 1890s to 1918), Moscow, 2002, p. 542. [↑](#footnote-ref-545)
546. Monk Benjamin, op. cit., p. 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-546)
547. Lev Regelson, *Tragedia Russkoj Tserkvi, 1917-1945* (The Tragedy of the Russian Church, 1917-1945), Paris: YMCA Press, 1977, p. 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-547)
548. Nicholas Zernov, "The 1917 Council of the Russian Orthodox Church", *Religion in Communist Lands*, vol. 6, N 1, 1978. On the same day, however, the Council decreed that those killed on *both* sides in the conflict should be given Christian burials. [↑](#footnote-ref-548)
549. <http://www.ispovednik.org/fullst.php?nid=31&binn_rubrik_pl_news=136>. [↑](#footnote-ref-549)
550. M. Babkin, “Pomestnij Sobor 1917-1918 gg.: ‘O Prisyage pravitel’stvu voobsche i byvshemu imperatoru Nikolaius II v chastnosti” (The Local Council of 1917-1918: On the Oath to the Government in general and to the former Emperor Nicholas II in particular), <http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/print.php?act=lib&id=2704>. [↑](#footnote-ref-550)
551. Pipes, op. cit., p. 343. According to Regelson (op. cit., p. 226), this took place on January 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-551)
552. Figes, *A People’s Tragedy*, London: Pimlico, 1997, p. 528; Archpriest Michael Polsky, *The New Martyrs of Russia*, new edition, Wildwood, Alberta: Monastery Press, 2000, pp. 91-92. [↑](#footnote-ref-552)
553. Professor Ivan Andreyev, "The Catacomb Church in the Soviet Union", *Orthodox Life*, March-April, 1951. For details of the destruction wrought against the Church in these years, see Vladimir Rusak, *Pir Satany* (Satan’s Feast), London, Canada: Zarya, 1991. [↑](#footnote-ref-553)
554. Mazyrin, “Legalizing the Moscow Patriarchate in 1927: The Secret Aims of the Authorities”, *Social Sciences: A Quarterly Journal of the Russian Academy of Sciences,* No 1, 2009, p. 28. This article was first published in Russian in *Otechestvennaia Istoria* (Fatherland History), N 4, 2008. [↑](#footnote-ref-554)
555. “When they asked the holy Patriarch why he had issued his epistle on the eve of the Council’s Sitting, Vladyka replied that he did not want to put the Council under the hammer and preferred to take it on himself alone” (Andreyev, op. cit., p. 9). [↑](#footnote-ref-555)
556. Russian text in M.E. Gubonin, *Akty Sviateishego Patriarkha Tikhona* (The Acts of His Holiness Patriarch Tikhon), Moscow: St. Tikhon's Theological Institute, 1994, pp. 82-85; *Deiania Sviaschennogo Sobora Pravoslavnoj Rossijskoj Tserkvi* (The Acts of the Sacred Council of the Russian Orthodox Church), *1917-1918*, Moscow, 1918, 1996, vol. 6, pp. 4-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-556)
557. In a letter to Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky) that was captured by the Bolsheviks, the Patriarch called the Bolsheviks “oprichniki” – that is, he compared them to the murderous henchmen of Ivan the Terrible (*Za Khrista Postradavshie* (They Suffered for Christ), Moscow, 1997, vol. 1, p. 426). [↑](#footnote-ref-557)
558. On January 1, 1970 the Russian Church Abroad under Metropolitan Philaret of New York confirmed this anathema and added one of its own against “Vladimir Lenin and the other persecutors of the Church of Christ, dishonourable apostates who have raised their hands against the Anointed of God, killing clergymen, trampling on holy things, destroying the churches of God, tormenting our brothers and defiling our Fatherland” (http://catacomb.org.ua/modules.php?name=Pages&go=print\_page&pid=1775) [↑](#footnote-ref-558)
559. Gubonin, op. cit., pp. 280, 296. [↑](#footnote-ref-559)
560. Gubonin, op. cit., p. 151. [↑](#footnote-ref-560)
561. *Deiania*, op. cit., vol. 6, p. 7; quoted in A.G. Yakovitsky, “Sergianstvo: mif ili real’nost? (Sergianism: myth or reality?), *Vernost’*, 100, January, 2008. [↑](#footnote-ref-561)
562. *Deiania*, op. cit., vol. 6, p. 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-562)
563. "Iz sobrania Tsentral'nogo gosudarstvennogo arkhiva OktIabr'skoj revoliutsii: listovka bez vykhodnykh dannykh, pod N 1011" (From the collection of the Central State Archive of the October Revolution: pamphlet without dates, under N 1011, *Nauka i Religia* (Science and Religion), 1989, N 4; partly translated in Arfed Gustavson, *The Catacomb Church*, Jordanville, N.Y.: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1960, p. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-563)
564. *Deiania*, op. cit., vol. 6, p. 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-564)
565. *Deiania,* op. cit., vol. 6, p. 40; Yakovitsky, op. cit. [↑](#footnote-ref-565)
566. *Deiania,* op. cit.,vol. 6, pp. 41-43. [↑](#footnote-ref-566)
567. Shambarov, “Vosstanovit’ prervannuiu pravoslavnuiu traditsiu!” (Restore an interrupted Orthodox tradition), February 28, 1917, http://zavtra.ru/blogs/vosstanovit\_prervannuyu\_pravoslavnuyu\_traditciyu. [↑](#footnote-ref-567)
568. *Deiania,* op. cit., p. 159. [↑](#footnote-ref-568)
569. Gustavson, op. cit.; John Sheldon Curtiss, *The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917-1950,* Boston, 1953, pp. 125-127. Curtiss refers to pages 177 to 179 of the *Acts* of the Local Council. [↑](#footnote-ref-569)
570. *Bogoslovskij Vestnik* (The Theological Herald), N 1, 1993, p. 217. [↑](#footnote-ref-570)
571. V.A. Konovalov, *Otnoshenie khristianstva k sovietskoj vlasti* (The Relationship of Christianity to Soviet Power), Montreal, 1936, p. 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-571)
572. Protopriest Benjamin Zhukov, *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ na Rodine i za Rubezhom* (The Russian Orthodox Church in the Homeland and Abroad), Paris, 2005, p. 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-572)
573. Konovalov, op. cit., p. 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-573)
574. Grabbe, *Pis’ma* (Letters), Moscow, 1998, p. 85. [↑](#footnote-ref-574)
575. Alexis Rufimsky, “Biografia sviaschennomuchenika Nikolaia (Parfenova), episkopa Atkarskago, radi Khrista yurodivago ‘malenkago batiushki’” (A Biography of Hieromartyr Nicholas (Parthenov), Bishop of Aktar, fool for Christ, ‘the little batyushka’), *Pravoslavnaia Rus’*, N 17 (1782), September 1/14, 2005, p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-575)
576. Shkarvoskii, “The Russian Orthodox Church”, op. cit., pp. 420-421. [↑](#footnote-ref-576)
577. Barmenkov, in Alexander Mikhalchenkov, “Tserkov’ v ogne” (The Church in the Fire), *Pravoslavnij Vestnik* (The Orthodox Herald) (Canada), June-July, 1989, p. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-577)
578. Cunningham, “Reform Projects of the Russian Orthodox Church at the Beginning of the XXth Century”, in J. Breck, J. Meyendorff and E. Silk (eds.), *The Legacy of St Vladimir*, Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1990, p. 134. [↑](#footnote-ref-578)
579. Sokolov, “Put’ Russkoj Pravoslavnoj Tserkvi v Rossii-SSSR (1916-1961)” (The Path of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia and the USSR (1916-1961), in *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ v SSSR: Sbornik* (The Russian Orthodox Church in the USSR: a Collection), Munich, 1962, p. 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-579)
580. Smith, op. cit., p. 63. [↑](#footnote-ref-580)
581. Tooze, *The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order,* London: Penguin, 2010, pp. 120-122. [↑](#footnote-ref-581)
582. Even after smuggling Lenin and his men into Russia in the sealed train, the Germans continued to pay him vast sums of money. Thus a “top secret” document of the Reichsbank in Berlin dated January 8, 1918 informed the Foreign Affairs Commissar that 50 million rubles were to be sent to the Sovnarkom (*Istoki Zla*, op. cit., p. 39). [↑](#footnote-ref-582)
583. Tooze, op. cit., p. 145. [↑](#footnote-ref-583)
584. Tooze, op. cit., pp. 150-151. [↑](#footnote-ref-584)
585. Tooze, op. cit., p. 155. [↑](#footnote-ref-585)
586. Alan Bullock writes: “One of the most celebrated Okhrana agents, Roman Malinovski, became Lenin’s trusted chief agent in Russia and led the Bolshevik deputies in the Fourth Duma. In 1908-10, four out of five members of the Bolsheviks’ St. Petersburg Committee were Okhrana agents. Persistent rumours that Stalin was one as well have never been confirmed…” (*Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives,* London: HarperCollins, 1991, p. 435, note) However, in 1956 NKVD General Alexander Orlov published an article in *Life Magazine*, and in 1973 a book containing his evidence that Stalin was indeed an agent. See Emilia & Arye Shomero, “Stalin: Papka Vissarionova”, *Newrezume. Org,* June 13, 2016, http://newrezume.org/news/2016-06-13-14891. [↑](#footnote-ref-586)
587. Smith, *The Russian Revolution. A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 49-51. [↑](#footnote-ref-587)
588. Smith, op. cit., p. 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-588)
589. Trotsky, in Edvard Radzinsky, *The Last Tsar*, London: Arrow Books, 1993, p. 297. [↑](#footnote-ref-589)
590. It has been claimed that the murders were Cabbalistic and ritualistic. Strange cabbalistic symbols were supposedly found on the walls of the room where the crime took place which have been deciphered to mean: "Here, by order of the secret powers, the Tsar was offered as a sacrifice for the destruction of the state. Let all peoples be informed of this." See Nikolai Kozlov, *Krestnij Put'* (The Way of the Cross), Moscow, 1993; Enel, "Zhertva" (Sacrifice*), Kolokol'* (Bell), Moscow, 1990, N 5, pp. 17-37, and Michael Orlov, "Ekaterinburgskaia Golgofa" (The Golgotha of Yekaterinburg), *Kolokol'* (Bell), 1990, N 5, pp. 37-55; Lebedev, op. cit., p. 519; Prince Felix Yusupov, *Memuary* (Memoirs), Moscow, 1998, p. 249. However, doubt is cast on the ritual murder hypothesis by the fact that when Sokolov’s archive was sold at Sotheby’s in 1990, the critical piece of evidence – the symbols on the wall-paper – were missing (Bishop Ambrose of Methone, personal communication, /June 4, 2010). Other problems with the ritual murder hypothesis are discussed in Dmitri Lyskov, “U Versii o Ritual’nom ubijstve tsarskoj sem’i est’ serieznie problem” *Vzgliad,* December 8, 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-590)
591. Radzinsky, op. cit., p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-591)
592. M.E. Gubonin, *Akty Sviatejshego Patriarkh Tikhona*, Moscow, 1994, p. 143. [↑](#footnote-ref-592)
593. Smith, op. cit., p. 63. [↑](#footnote-ref-593)
594. http://bessmertnybarak.ru/article/postanovlenie\_o\_krasnom\_terrore/. [↑](#footnote-ref-594)
595. Christopher Andrew and Vasily Mitrokin, *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West,* London: Allen Lane 1999, p. 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-595)
596. Andrew and Mitrokhin, op. cit., pp. 37, 38. The Cheka in 1918 outnumbered the old Police departments by a factor of 20; later they were 200 times larger, later still – 1000 times. KGB numbers reached one million. Their informants numbered three to five million. (Sergei Fedulov, "А razve v tsarskoj Rossii ne bylo analoga KGB?” (Was there really no analogue to the KGB in Tsarist Russia?)) [↑](#footnote-ref-596)
597. Sergei Fedulov, "А razve v tsarskoj Rossii ne bylo analoga KGB?” (Was there really no analogue to the KGB in Tsarist Russia?) [↑](#footnote-ref-597)
598. Smith, op. cit., p. 63. [↑](#footnote-ref-598)
599. Smith, *The Russian Revolution. A Very Short Introduction,* Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 26-27, 55. [↑](#footnote-ref-599)
600. Mankoff, “Russia’s Latest Land Grab”, *Foreign Affairs,* May/June, 2014, pp. 61-62. [↑](#footnote-ref-600)
601. Tooze, op. cit., p. 150. [↑](#footnote-ref-601)
602. Smith, op. cit., pp. 55-62. [↑](#footnote-ref-602)
603. Revel, *How Democracies Perish,* pp. 61-62. [↑](#footnote-ref-603)
604. Monk Benjamin, op. cit., p. 58. According to another version, Lipkovsky was “consecrated” by placing his hand on the head of St. Clement, Pope of Rome. See M.V. Shkarovsky, *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ pri Staline i Khruscheve* (The Russian Orthodox Church under Stalin and Khruschev), Moscow, 2005, p. 175, footnote 2; Archbishop Leontius (Filippovich), “Tserkovnij shovinizm i samosviatstvo na Ukraine. K Istorii vozniknovenia UAPTs v 20-e gody XX st.” (Church Chauvinism and self-consecration in Uktraine. Towards a history of the appearance of the UAOC in the 20s of the 20th century”, <http://catacomb.org.ua/php?name=Pages&go=print_page&pid=821>. [↑](#footnote-ref-604)
605. "Spravka o Priniatii v Obschenie Episkopa Seraphima (Lyade)" (Document on the Reception of Bishop Seraphim (Lyade) into Communion), *Tserkovnaia Zhizn'* (Church Life), N 12, 1937. [↑](#footnote-ref-605)
606. See Archbishop Leonty (Philippovich), "Ukrainskie shovinsity i samosvyaty" (Ukrainian Chauvinists and Self-Consecrators), *Russkij Pastyr* (Russian Pastor), II-III, 1995, pp. 154-187; J.-F. Meyer, *Réligions et sécurité internationale* (Religions and International Security), Berne: Office Centrale de la Defense, 1995, p. 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-606)
607. This statement needs to be qualified. From the middle of the nineteenth century some Romanophobia began to develop among Russians in Bessarabia. For example, Bishop Seraphim (Chichagov), who ruled the Kishineve diocese from 1908 to 1914, forbade the use of the Romanian language in his services. (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-607)
608. B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Cambridge University Press, 1983, volume 2, pp. 158-159. [↑](#footnote-ref-608)
609. Monk Benjamin, op. cit., pp. 17, 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-609)
610. Gubonin, op. cit., p. 155; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., pp. 24-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-610)
611. Monk Benjamin, op. cit., p. 41. [↑](#footnote-ref-611)
612. This is not to say that there had not been Romanophobic actions on the Russian side from pre-revolutionary times. Thus before 1914 Bishop Seraphim (Chichagov) of Kishinev had forbidden the use of the Romanian language in the services of his diocese, [↑](#footnote-ref-612)
613. Glazkov, “Istoricheskie prichiny niekotorykh sobitij v istorii Rumynskoj Pravoslavnoj Tserkvi do II Mirovoj vojny” (The Historical Reasons for some Events in the History of the Romanian Orthodox Church before the Second World War), *Tserkovnaia Zhizn’* (Church Life), NN 3-4, May-August, 2000, pp. 46-48. [↑](#footnote-ref-613)
614. Kontorer, “Ultima Thule”, <http://yaqir-mamlal.livejournal.com/121209.html?view=4676729#t4676729>. [↑](#footnote-ref-614)
615. Revel, *How Democracies Perish,* London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983, p. 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-615)
616. Catholicos Leonid to Patriarch Tikhon, August 5, 1919; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., p. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-616)
617. Georgia, he wrote, had united with Russia more than a century before, and from that time the highest ecclesiastical authority in Georgia had belonged to the Holy Synod. However, when, in 1905, an attempt was made to restore the autocephaly of the Georgian Church, the Holy Synod in 1906 decreed that this question should be handed over for discussion at the All-Russian Council, the decisions of which the Georgian hierarchs were obliged to wait for. “According to canon law, the agreement and permission of the Mother [*kiriarkhal’noj]* Church to the autocephaly of the other Local Church which before was subject to her jurisdiction is required. Usually the Church which is seeking independence addresses the Mother Church with her request, and, on the basis of data of a political and ecclesiastical character, seeks her agreement to the reception of autocephaly. The request is directed in the name of both the ecclesiastical and civil authorities of the country, and also of the people; it must be a clearly expressed declaration concerning the general and unanimous desire to receive ecclesiastical independence. That is how it was in Greece, in Serbia and in Romania, but it was not like that in Bulgaria, where the well-known schism arose. And it was also not like that, unfortunately, in the Transcaucasus in 1917… In pointing out your errors and mistakes, we suggest to you, Most Reverend Bishops, that you submit to the demand of the ecclesiastical canons and, following the canonical order, appear at the All-Russian Sacred Council, and, recognising your errors, convey your desire concerning the autocephaly of the Georgian Church to the court of the whole All-Russian Council, so that you may not be subjected to the judgement of the canons and not fall into the great and terrible sin of alienation from the Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church…” (Gubonin, op. cit., pp. 71-75; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., p. 14) [↑](#footnote-ref-617)
618. K.D. Kafafov, “Vospominania o vnutrennykh delakh Rossijskoj imperii” (Reminiscences of the Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire), *Voprosy Istorii* (Historical Questions), N 7, 2005, p. 93. [↑](#footnote-ref-618)
619. However, this fact was covered up, and on July 7 he was given a triumphant burial in the Zion cathedral (<http://www.pstbi.ru/bin/code.exe/frames/m/ind_oem.html?/ans/>; Archimandrite Seraphim, “Russkie sviaschennomucheniki i mucheniki v Gruzii”, *Pravoslavnij Put’,* 1965, pp. 23-32). [↑](#footnote-ref-619)
620. Kontorer, op. cit. [↑](#footnote-ref-620)
621. Melia, "The Orthodox Church of Georgia", *A Sign of God: Orthodoxy 1964*, Athens: Zoe, 1964, pp. 112-113. According to Slava Katamidze, the number of victims was “enormous”, but “the real figure has never been published” (*Loyal Comrades, Ruthless Killers*, Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2003, p. 39). [↑](#footnote-ref-621)
622. Pipes, *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, 1919-1924,* London: Fontana, 1995, p. 60. [↑](#footnote-ref-622)
623. Smith, op. cit., pp. 53-54. [↑](#footnote-ref-623)
624. *Udivitel’nij Moskovskij Podvizhnik i Tselitel’ Starets Aristoklij* (The Wonderful Moscow Ascetic and Healer, Elder Aristocles), Moscow, 1997. [↑](#footnote-ref-624)
625. Yusupov, *Memuary* (Memoirs), Moscow, 1998, p. 250. [↑](#footnote-ref-625)
626. Thus Protodeacon German Ivanov-Trinadtsaty writes: “Even if the White Army officially supported the principle of ‘non-pre-determination’ in relation to the future political order of Russia, according to the witness of General P.N. Wrangel, 90% of his Russian Army was composed of monarchists, and set itself only one task – the overthrow of the Bolshevik yoke.” (“90 let Velikogo Rossijskogo Iskhoda” (90 Years of the Great Russian Exodus), *Nasha Strana*, N 2905, December 4, 2010, p. 2). [↑](#footnote-ref-626)
627. Denikin, *Kto spas Sovetskuiu vlast’ ot gibeli?* (Who Saved Soviet Power from Destruction?), Paris, 1937, in A.I. Denikin and A.A. von Lampe, *Tragedia Beloj Armii* (The Tragedy of the White Army), Moscow, 1991, p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-627)
628. Shambarov, *Belogvardeischina* (Whiteguardism), Moscow, 2002. [↑](#footnote-ref-628)
629. Anthony Lockley, “Propaganda and the First Cold War in North Russia, 1918-1919”, *History Today*, vol. 53 (9), September, 2003, pp. 46-53. As Michael Nazarov points out, “there sat in the White governments at that time activists like, for example, the head of the Archangel government Tchaikovsky, who gave to the West as an explanation of the Bolshevik savageries the idea that ‘we put up with the destructive autocratic regime for too long,… our people were less educated politically than the other allied peoples’?” (*Tajna Rossii* (The Mystery of Russia), Moscow: “Russkaia Idea”, 1999, pp. 85-86) [↑](#footnote-ref-629)
630. St. John Maximovich, according to the witness of Protopriest Michael Ardov. [↑](#footnote-ref-630)
631. Pipes, op. cit., pp. 109-110. [↑](#footnote-ref-631)
632. Ferguson, *The Pity of War,* p. 392. [↑](#footnote-ref-632)
633. Pipes, op. cit., pp. 110, 111. [↑](#footnote-ref-633)
634. Von Lampe, “Prichiny neudachi vooruzhennogo vystuplenia belykh” (The Reasons for the Failure of the Whites’ Armed Intervention), Berlin, 1929, in Denikin and von Lampe, op. cit., pp. 28-30. [↑](#footnote-ref-634)
635. Reserve Colonel S. Porokhin, «Delo nakhlynulo sovsem inoe – bor’ba antikhristianskaia…’ Pokaianie Alekseia Brusilova” (The Repentance of Alexei Brusilov), *Pobeda, pobedivshaia mir* (The Victory that has Conquered the World), № 7/35, 2005 , р. 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-635)
636. Tooze, *The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order,* London: Penguin, 2010, pp. 411-412. [↑](#footnote-ref-636)
637. Zamoyski, *Warsaw 1920,* London: Harper Press, 2008, pp. 133-134. [↑](#footnote-ref-637)
638. Brendon, *The Dark Valley. A Panorama of the 1930s,* London: Pimlico, 2001, pp. 11-12. [↑](#footnote-ref-638)
639. Brendon, op. cit., p. 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-639)
640. Ferguson, *The Pity of War. 1914-1918,* London: Penguin, 1999, p. 392. [↑](#footnote-ref-640)
641. Montefiore, *Titans of History,* London: Quercius, 2012, p. 441. [↑](#footnote-ref-641)
642. Pipes, op. cit., p. 509. [↑](#footnote-ref-642)
643. Alexandrov, “Stalin i sovremennaia Rossia: vybor istoricheskikh otsenik ili vybor buduschego?” (Stalin and contemporary Russia: a choice of historical estimates or a choice of the future?), report read at the Russian Centre, San Francisco, February 3, 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-643)
644. Archbishop Andrew, “The Restoration of the Orthodox Way of Life”, *The Orthodox Word,* July-August, 1975, p. 171. [↑](#footnote-ref-644)
645. De Maistre, *On God and Society*; in Fr. Seraphim Rose, *Nihilism*, Platina, Ca.: St. Herman of Alaska Brotherhood Press, 1994, p. 69. [↑](#footnote-ref-645)
646. Lebedev, *Velikorossia* (Great Russia), St. Petersburg, 1999. [↑](#footnote-ref-646)
647. Regelson, *Tragedia Russkoj Tserkvi* (The Tragedy of the Russian Church), Paris: YMCA Press, 1977, p. 52; [↑](#footnote-ref-647)
648. Bulgakov, *Sotsializm i Khristianstvo* (Socialism and Christianity), Moscow, 1917. [↑](#footnote-ref-648)
649. Shafarevich, "Sotsializm", in Solzhenitsyn, A. (ed.) *Iz-pod Glyb* (From Under the Rubble), Paris: YMCA Press, 1974; *Sotsializm kak Iavlenie Mirovoj Istorii* (Socialism as a Phenomenon of World History), Paris: YMCA Press, 1977, p. 265. [↑](#footnote-ref-649)
650. Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The KGB and the World,* London: Penguin, 2006, pp. 1-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-650)
651. Pipes, *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, 1919-1924,* London: Fontana, 1995, p. 494. [↑](#footnote-ref-651)
652. Farmborough, *Nurse at the Russian Front. A Diary 1914-1918,* London: Blue Club Associates, 1974, pp. 384-385. [↑](#footnote-ref-652)
653. Figes, *The Whisperers*, London, 2007, pp. 7-10. Figes continues: “In the early years of Soviet power, family breakdown was so common among revolutionary activists that it almost constituted an occupational hazard. Casual relationships were practically the norm in Bolshevik circles during the Civil War, when any comrade could be sent at a moment’s notice to some distant sector of the front. Such relaxed attitudes remained common through the 1920s, as Party activists and their young emulators in the Komsomol [Communist Youth League] were taught to put their commitment to the proletariat before romantic love or family. Sexual promiscuity was more pronounced in the Party’s youthful ranks than among Soviet youth in general. Many Bolsheviks regarded sexual licence as a form of liberation from bourgeois moral conventions and as a sign of ‘Soviet modernity’. Some even advocated promiscuity as a way to counteract the formation of coupling relationships that separated lovers from the collective and detracted from their loyalty to the Party.

     “It was a commonplace that the Bolshevik made a bad husband and father because the demands of the Party took him away from the home. ‘We Communists don’t know our own families,’ remarked one Moscow Bolshevik. ‘You leave early and come home late. You seldom see your wife and almost never your children.’ At Party congresses, where the issue was discussed throughout the 1920s, it was recognized that Bolsheviks were far more likely than non-Party husbands to abandon wives and families, and that this had much to do with the primacy of Party loyalties over sexual fidelity. But in fact the problem of absent wives and mothers was almost as acute in Party circles, as indeed it was in the broader circle of the Soviet intelligentsia, where most women were involved in the public sphere.

     “Trotsky argued that the Bolsheviks were more affected than others by domestic breakdown because they were ‘most exposed to the influence of new conditions’. As pioneers of a modern way of life, Trotsky wrote in 1923, the ‘Communist vanguard merely passes sooner and more violently through what is inevitable’ for the population as a whole. In many Party households there was certainly a sense of pioneering a new type of family – one that liberated both parents for public activities – albeit at the cost of intimate involvement with their children.” (pp. 10-11) [↑](#footnote-ref-653)
654. Pipes, op. cit., pp. 330, 331-332, 333. [↑](#footnote-ref-654)
655. Lenin, Letter to Gorky (1913), *Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenij* (Collected Works) (second edition, 1926-1932), vol. 17, pp. 81-86. Cf. S.G. Pushkarev, *Lenin i Rossia* (Lenin and Russia), Frankfurt: Possev-Verlag, 1986, introduction; R. Wurmbrand, *Was Karl Marx a Satanist?*, Diane books, 1978. [↑](#footnote-ref-655)
656. Liberman, S.I. “Narodnij komisar Krasin” (The People’s Commissar Krasin), *Novij zhurnal* (The New Journal), N 7, 1944, p. 309; quoted in Volkogonov, D. *Lenin*, London: Harper Collins, 1994, p. 372. [↑](#footnote-ref-656)
657. Latsis, *Ezhenedel’nik ChK* (Cheka Weekly), N 1, November 1, 1918; in Priest Vladimir Dmitriev, *Simbirskaia Golgofa* (Simbirsk’s Golgotha), Moscow, 1997, p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-657)
658. V. Karpov, *Generalissimus,* Kaliningrad, 2004, p. 79. [↑](#footnote-ref-658)
659. Lenin, *Collected Works,* volume 41, p. 309. [↑](#footnote-ref-659)
660. Solzhenitsyn, *Arkhipelag GULag* (The GULag Archipelago), Paris: YMCA Press, volume 2, p. 602. [↑](#footnote-ref-660)
661. Solzhenitsyn, Acceptance Speech, Templeton Prize for Progress in Religion, 1983; *Russkaia Mysl'* (Russian Thought), N 3465, 19 May, 1983, p. 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-661)
662. Tikhon, in *Vestnik Russkogo Khristianskogo Dvizhenia* (Herald of the Russian Christian Movement), 1968, NN 89-90, pp. 19-23. [↑](#footnote-ref-662)
663. Pipes, op. cit.,pp. 367-368. [↑](#footnote-ref-663)
664. Monk Benjamin, op. cit., pp. 35-36. [↑](#footnote-ref-664)
665. Monk Benjamin, op. cit., pp. 30-31. [↑](#footnote-ref-665)
666. Kniazev, V.V. *Zhizn’ za vsekh i smert’ za vsekh* (Life for all and death for all), Jordanville: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1971, pp. 20-23; S. Volkov, *Admiral Aleksandr Vasilievich Kolchak*, Moscow, 1991, pp. 70-81; Fr. Stefan Krasovitsky, "Otvet apologetu kommunisticheskoj ideologii" (Reply to an Apologist of the Communist Ideology), *Pravoslavnaia Rus'* (Orthodox Russia), N 1553, February 15/28, 1996, p. 15. According to another source, the Patriarch sent Bishop Nestor with the icon of St. Nicholas to Kolchak in Omsk with the instruction: “Tell the people that if they do not unite and take Moscow again by armed force, then we will perish and Holy Rus’ will perish with us” (Gubanov, op. cit., p. 131). [↑](#footnote-ref-666)
667. Regelson, op. cit., p. 237; Sokolov, op. cit., p. 16; Shkarovskii, “The Russian Orthodox Church”, op. cit., p. 423; Monk Benjamin, op. cit., pp. 38-39; Zhukov, op. cit, p. 92. [↑](#footnote-ref-667)
668. *Izvestia*, October 22, 1919; in Zhukov, op. cit., pp. 92-93, footnote 50. [↑](#footnote-ref-668)
669. The campaign was counter-productive from the Bolsheviks’ point of view because the relics of the saints were often found to be incorrupt. Thus “St. Sergius of Radonezh was said to have been found perfectly preserved, to the rapturous joy of the onlookers and the consternation of the monastery’s communist custodian, who was subsequently beaten up by the crowd.” (Richard Overy, *The Dictators,* London: Penguin, 2005, p. 274). The relics of St. Theodosius of Chernigov were also found to be incorrupt (see photograph opposite page 182 in I.M. Andreyev, *Russia’s Catacomb Saints,* Platina, Ca.: St. Herman of Alaska Press, 1982. (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-669)
670. Shkarovskii, “The Russian Orthodox Church”, op. cit., pp. 422, 423. [↑](#footnote-ref-670)
671. *Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov’ i kommunisticheskoe gosudarstvo, 1917-1941* (The Russian Orthodox Church and the Communist State, 1917-1941), Moscow: Terra, 1996, p. 69. [↑](#footnote-ref-671)
672. Roslof, *Red Priests*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002, p. 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-672)
673. Gustavson, op. cit., p. 34. In Petrograd alone 550 clergy and monks of all ranks were shot in the period 1917-1922 (Anatoly Latyshev, "Provesti besposhadnij Massovij Terror Protiv Popov" (The Conducting of Ruthless Mass Terror against the Priests), *Argumenty i Fakty* (Arguments and Facts), N 26, 1996). [↑](#footnote-ref-673)
674. Rusak, *Pir Satany*, op. cit. [↑](#footnote-ref-674)
675. Shkarovskii, op. cit., pp. 423-424. [↑](#footnote-ref-675)
676. It should be remembered that at this stage this was exclusively an anti-Orthodox rather than an anti-religious struggle; for Lenin viewed Islam as an ally in spreading world revolution to the countries of the East, and he did not persecute the Catholics or Protestants. [↑](#footnote-ref-676)
677. Alexandrov, “Stalin i sovremennaia Rossia: vybor istoricheskikh otsenok ili vybor buduschego?” (Stalin and contemporary Russia: a choice of historical estimates or a choice of the future?), report read at the Russian Centre, San Francisco, February 3, 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-677)
678. One indication of the scale of the suffering is the fact that in Western Siberia, the scene of one of the largest peasant rebellions, more priests were killed in 1921 than in any other year – a pattern not found in any other region. Nearly one hundred priests were shot in the Tobolsk area alone. (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-678)
679. Pipes, op. cit., pp. 371-373. [↑](#footnote-ref-679)
680. Oliver Figes, *Peasant Russia, Civil War,* Oxford, 1989, pp. 322-323; quoted in Pipes, p. 375. [↑](#footnote-ref-680)
681. Pipes, op. cit., pp. 383-384. [↑](#footnote-ref-681)
682. Pipes, op. cit., pp. 389-391, 392. [↑](#footnote-ref-682)
683. Pipes, op. cit., p. 395. [↑](#footnote-ref-683)
684. Pipes, op. cit., pp. 451-453, 454, 455. [↑](#footnote-ref-684)
685. Ferguson, *The War of the World*, pp. 158-159. [↑](#footnote-ref-685)
686. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes,* London: Abacus, 1994, pp. 379-380. [↑](#footnote-ref-686)
687. Richard Overy, *The Dictators,* London: Penguin Books, 2005, p. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-687)
688. Bazhanov, “Stalin Closely Observed”, in G. Urban (ed.), *Stalinism,* Maurice Temple Smith, 1982; Deutscher, *The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky: 1929-1940*, Oxford University Press, 1963. [↑](#footnote-ref-688)
689. Jonathan Fenby, *Alliance,* London: Pocket Books, 2006, p. 16. [↑](#footnote-ref-689)
690. According to Overy, “in the 1930s his library counted 40,000 volumes. He wrote extensively both before 1917 and in the 1920s, works and speeches that ran to thirteen volumes when they were published” (op. cit., p. 9). [↑](#footnote-ref-690)
691. Montefiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar,* London: Phoenix, 2004*,* p. 50. [↑](#footnote-ref-691)
692. Davies, *Europe,* London: Pimlico, 1997, p. 960. [↑](#footnote-ref-692)
693. Montefiore, *Young Stalin,* London: Phoenix, 2007, pp. 333-334. [↑](#footnote-ref-693)
694. Wilson, *To the Finland Station,* London: Fontana, 1940. [↑](#footnote-ref-694)
695. Bertram Wolff, *Three Who Made a Revolution.* [↑](#footnote-ref-695)
696. Montefiore, *Young Stalin*, p. 305. [↑](#footnote-ref-696)
697. Daniel T. Orlovsky, “Russia in War and Revolution 1914-1921”, in Gregory L. Frazee (ed.). *Russia. A History,* Oxford University Press, 2—9, pp. 294-295. [↑](#footnote-ref-697)
698. Service, *Stalin,* London: Pan, 2004, p. 247. [↑](#footnote-ref-698)
699. Montefiore, *Young Stalin*, p. 309. [↑](#footnote-ref-699)
700. Stalin took a great interest in Eisenstein's film "Ivan the Terrible". Once he said to Molotov about it: "Ivan the Terrible was very cruel. You can show that he was cruel, but it is necessary to show why it was necessary to be cruel. One of Ivan the Terrible's mistakes was that he did cut off the five big feudal families. If he had annihilated these five feudal families, there would have been no Time of Troubles. But Ivan the Terrible would kill someone and then spent a long time repenting and praying about it. God hindered him in this matter... It was necessary to be more decisive." (*Rossijskaia Gazeta* (The Russian Newspaper), January 25, 2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-700)
701. Bullock, op. cit., pp. 10-12, 401. [↑](#footnote-ref-701)
702. Rayfield, “A Georgian Caliban”, Review of *Stalin, vol. I: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928* by Stephen Kotkin, *Literary Review,* November, 2014, p. 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-702)
703. Montefiore, *Stalin,* p. 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-703)
704. Deutscher, *The Prophet Outcast*, p. 455. [↑](#footnote-ref-704)
705. Deutscher, *Stalin: A Political Biography,* Oxford University Press, 1949, p. 524. This spite may have been linked with the defeat that the Poles inflicted on the Red Army near Warsaw in 1920, for which Stalin bore a definite responsibility. [↑](#footnote-ref-705)
706. It appears that the Politburo had banned Lenin from working more than ten minutes a day, which led to the quarrel with Krupskaya and then with Lenin himself. “Stalin’s row with Lenin’s wife, Krupskaya, outraged Lenin’s bourgeois sentiments. But Stalin thought it was entirely consistent with Party culture. ‘Why should I stand on my hindlegs for her? To sleep with Lenin does not mean you understand Marxism-Leninism. Just because she used the same toilet as Lenin…‘ This led to some classic Stalin jokes, in which he warned Krupskaya that if she did not obey, the Central Committee would appoint someone else as Lenin’s wife. That is a very Bolshevik concept. His disrespect for Krupskaya was probably not helped by her complaints about Lenin’s flirtations with his assistants, including Yelena Stasova, the one whom Stalin threatened to promote to ‘wife’” (Montefiore, *Stalin,* p. 37). [↑](#footnote-ref-706)
707. Deutscher, *Stalin,* pp. 252-253. [↑](#footnote-ref-707)
708. Alexandrov, “Stalin i sovremennaia Rossia: vybor istoricheskikh otsenok ili vybor buduschego?” (Stalin and contemporary Russia: a choice of historical estimates or a choice of the future?), report read at the Russian Centre, San Francisco, February 3, 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-708)
709. Alexandrov, op. cit. [↑](#footnote-ref-709)
710. Berezhkov, “Memoirs”, chapter 6, in *Voennaia Literatura, http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/berezhkov\_vm/06.html.* [↑](#footnote-ref-710)
711. Dvorkin, *Ocherki po Istorii Vselenskoj Pravoslavnoj Tserkvi* (Sketches on the History of the Universal Orthodox Church), Nizhni-Novgorod, 2006, p. 439. [↑](#footnote-ref-711)
712. Montefiore, *The Romanovs,* London: Vintage, 2016, pp. 654-655. [↑](#footnote-ref-712)
713. Smith, op. cit., pp. 207-208. [↑](#footnote-ref-713)
714. For more details on this Council, see Andrej Alexandrovich Kostriukov, “Stavropol’skij Sobor 1919 g. i nachalo nezavisimoj tserkovnoj organizatsii na iuge Rossii” (The Stavropol Council of 1919 and the beginning of independent church organization in the south of Russia), *Ural’skij istoricheskij vestnik,* 2008, N 4 (21), pp. 71-75; *Pravoslavnaia Zhizn’*, N 5 (685), May, 2009, pp. 1-11. (V.M.) [↑](#footnote-ref-714)
715. Before being evacuated, while still in Yekaterinodar, Metropolitan Anthony came out of the cathedral, accompanied by all the clergy, and addressed the thousands of faithful, asking them – for one knows, he said, that “the voice of the people is the voice of God” - whether they should leave with the White Army or stay in Russia and suffer for the faith. The crowd replied that they should leave (Monk Anthony (Chernov), *Archvêque Theophane de Poltava* (Archbishop Theophan of Poltava), Lavardac: Monastère de St. Michael, 1988, p. 73) (V.M.). [↑](#footnote-ref-715)
716. On that day more than 125 ships arrived in Constantinople with about 150,000 people on board (Zhukov, op. cit., p. 67). The session of the HCA took place on board the steamer *Great Prince Alexander Mikhailovich.* In it took part Metropolitan Anthony of Kiev, Metropolitan Plato of Odessa, Archbishop Theophan of Poltava and Bishop Benjamin of Sebastopol. It was decided to continue the prerogatives of the members of the HCA, and discussed all aspects of the Church life of the refugees and soldiers in all states having relations with the Ecumenical Patriarch (Monk Benjamin, op. cit., pp. 47-48). (V.M.)

     At the second session, on November 22, it was decided to include Archbishop Anastasy of Kishinev, who was already living in Constantinople, in the HCA (Zhukov, op. cit., p. 69) [↑](#footnote-ref-716)
717. Traskovsky, "Istoria Russkoj Zarubezhnoj Tserkvi, 1921-1939 gg." (A History of the Russian Church Abroad, 1921-1939), *Pravoslavnij Put'* (The Orthodox Way), Jordanville, N.Y.: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1995, pp. 20-24. [↑](#footnote-ref-717)
718. Victor Salni and Svetlana Avlasovich, “Net bol’she toj liubvi, kak esli kto polozhit dushu svoiu za drugi svoia” (There is no greater love than that a man should lay down his life for his friend), [http://catacomb.org.ua/modules.php?name=Pages&go=print\_page\*pid=966](http://catacomb.org.ua/modules.php?name=Pages&go=print_page*pid=966) . [↑](#footnote-ref-718)
719. Monk Benjamin, op. cit., p. 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-719)
720. However, A.A. Kotstriukov writes that this resolution did not reach ROCOR (“Russkaia Zarubezhnaia Tserkov’: sozdanie, vzaimootnoshenia s moskovskoj tserkovnoj vlastiu i vnutrennie razdelenia v 1920-1938 gg.” (The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad: creation, relations with the Moscow ecclesiastical authorities and internal divisions from 1920 to 1938)), Dissertation, 2012, <http://www.dissercat.com/content/russkaya-zarubezhnaya-tserkov-sozdanie-vzaimootnosheniya-s-moskovskoi-tserkovnoi-vlastyu-i-v#ixzz3HwE4FtaB> [↑](#footnote-ref-720)
721. According to Ross (op. cit., pp. 50-51), all Russian bishops in exile, and all former members of the Moscow Council of 1917-18 were automatically members of the Council. There were about 150 delegates, of whom only 109 had full voting powers. [↑](#footnote-ref-721)
722. Ivan Snegarov, *Otnosheniata mezhdu B’lgarskata ts’rkva i drugite pravoslavni ts’rkvi sled prov’zglasiavaneto na skhizmata* (Relations between the Bulgarian Church and other Orthodox Churches following the declaration of the schism); Monk Benjamin, op. cit., p. 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-722)
723. Ross, op. cit., p. 54. [↑](#footnote-ref-723)
724. Protodeacon German Ivanov-Trinadtsaty, “Aktual’nost’ Pervogo Vsezarubezhnogo Sobora” (The Contemporary Relevance of the First All-Abroad Council), *Nasha Strana* (Our Country), N 2929, December 3, 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-724)
725. Kostriukov, op. cit., pp. 9-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-725)
726. A. Yu. Bushin, “90 let Priamurskomu Zemskomu Sobory” (90 Years since the Amur Council of the Land), August 8, 2012, *Pereklichka,* http://pereklichka.livejournal.com/178232.html. [↑](#footnote-ref-726)
727. Anton Ter-Grigorian, “Priamurskij zemskij sobor (kontsa 1922-ogo goda)”, [http://anton-tg.livejournal.com/307585.html](http://antoon-tg.livejournal.com/307585.html), July 24, 2006. See also Demetrius Anakshin, “Poslednij zemskij sobor”, *Pravoslavnaia Rus’*, N 21 (1594), November 1/14, 1997, pp. 10-11, 15, and Danilushkin, op. cit., chapter 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-727)
728. Pipes, *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, 1919-1924*, p. 338. [↑](#footnote-ref-728)
729. Protopriest Benjamin Zhukov, *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ na Rodine i za Rubezhom* (The Russian Orthodox Church in the Homeland and Abroad), Paris, 2005, p. 33, footnote 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-729)
730. Tooze, op. cit., p. 425. [↑](#footnote-ref-730)
731. Gubonin, op. cit., p. 190. [↑](#footnote-ref-731)
732. Matushka Evgenia Grigorievna Rymarenko, "Remembrances of Optina Staretz Hieroschemamonk Nektary", *Orthodox Life*, vol. 36, № 3, May-June, 1986, p. 39.

     One concession to the Antichrist invariably leads to others. Thus on February 24, 1923 the GPU agent Jacob Savlovich Agranov forced the Patriarch to make further concessions on this issue. “From the point of view of the Bolsheviks,” writes N. Krivova, “Tikhon’s epistle of February 28, 1922 was incorrect juridically speaking, for according to the decree of 1918 on the separation of the Church from the State Church property passed to the State and was declared the heritage of the State. Tikhon testified that in the Church canons there are no indications to the effect that State power in the event of the confiscation of Church valuables during popular disturbances should turn to the Church authorities for agreement. Although of course the Patriarch very well understood that the valuables taken from the Church would not be used for aid to the starving. And nevertheless he declared that the Soviet government need not turn to the Patriarch for agreement to the requisitioning. They managed to get an analogous testimony from the Patriarch’s closest colleague, Archbishop Nicander (Fenomenov). “Thus the GPU obtained a most important testimony from the Patriarch to the effect that he was guilty in issuing an appeal with regard to the requisitioning of Church valuables, that the use of the Church valuables for the needs of the starving was not sacrilege and did not contradict the Church canons” (*Vlast’ i Tserkov’ v 1922-1925gg.* (The Authorities and the Church in 1922-1925), Moscow, 1997). [↑](#footnote-ref-732)
733. Walters, “The Living Church 1922-1946”, *Religion in Communion Lands*, vol. 6, № 4, Winter, 1978, pp. 235-236. [↑](#footnote-ref-733)
734. St. Philaret, *Open Epistle to All Orthodox Bishops and All Those Who Hold the Russian Church Dea*r, 1965. [↑](#footnote-ref-734)
735. Gubonin, op. cit., p. 224. [↑](#footnote-ref-735)
736. Archbishop Nikon (Rklitsky), *Zhizneopisanie blazhenneishago Antonia*, New York, 1963, vol. VI,p. 114. [↑](#footnote-ref-736)
737. Protopresbyter Michael Polsky, *Polozhenie Tserkvi v Sovietskoj Rossii* (The Situation of the Church in Soviet Russia), Jerusalem, 1931. [↑](#footnote-ref-737)
738. Gubonin, op. cit., pp. 280, 286. There is some evidence that Patriarch Tikhon's release from prison was linked with the fact that in June, 1923 the Bolsheviks finally accepted that Lenin was too ill to return to politics. A. Rykov took over from Lenin as president of the Sovnarkom, and on entering office immediately received the Patriarch and promised to reduce the pressure on religious organizations, reduce the taxes on the clergy and churches and release some hierarchs from prison – a promise that he kept. [↑](#footnote-ref-738)
739. Archbishop Nikon, op. cit., pp. 151-152. [↑](#footnote-ref-739)
740. Sergius Shumilo, *V Katakombakh*, Lutsk, 2011, p. 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-740)
741. *Izvestia*, June 12, 1924; Lebedev, *Velikorossia*, p. 577. [↑](#footnote-ref-741)
742. Regelson, op. cit., p. 347; Gubonin, op. cit., p. 291. [↑](#footnote-ref-742)
743. Nichols, *Theology in the Russian Diaspora*, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-743)
744. Regelson, op. cit., p. 313. [↑](#footnote-ref-744)
745. I.M. Andreyev, *Russia's Catacomb Saints*, Platina, Ca.: St. Herman Brotherhood Press, 1982, p. 56. [↑](#footnote-ref-745)
746. V. Moss, *The Russian Golgotha,* Alberta, Canada: Monastery Press, 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-746)
747. Archimandrite Joseph, *Kormchij,* 23 May, 1909; quoted in Sergius and Tamara Fomin, *Rossia pered vtorym prishestviem* (Russia before the Second Coming), Moscow: Rodnik, 1994, vol. I, p. 413. [↑](#footnote-ref-747)
748. Quoted in M.B. Danilushkin (ed.), *Istoria Russkoj Tserkvi ot Vosstanovlenia Patriarshestva do nashikh dnej* (A History of the Russian Church from the Reestablishment of the Patriarchate to our Days), vol.I, St. Petersburg, 1997, p. 201. [↑](#footnote-ref-748)
749. The demographer I.A. Kurganov calculated that 110 million lives had been destroyed by the Bolsheviks between 1917 and 1959. See Mikhail Nalimov, “110 млн. жизней загублено большевиками с 1917-1959 г.г. (Научное обоснование)”, http://nalimov-michael.livejournal.com/108228.html. [↑](#footnote-ref-749)
750. Alexei Yurchak, “Bodies of Lenin: The Hidden Science of Communist Sovereignty”, *Representations,* Winter, 2015, pp. 116-157. [↑](#footnote-ref-750)
751. Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine,* London: Penguin, 2007, chapters 11 and 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-751)
752. Bootle, *The Trouble with Europe,* London: Nicholas Brealy Publishing, 2015, p. 215. [↑](#footnote-ref-752)
753. Alexander Podrabinek, “Chekisty na marshe. Vlast’ i Tserkov’, *Radio Svoboda,* May 29, 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-753)
754. Andrei Movchan, “Rossia i Zapad: kto moral’nee?” (Russia and the West: who is more moral?”), <http://slon.ru/russia/rossiya_i_zapad_kto_moralnee-1114248.xhtml>, June 17, 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-754)
755. “V Moskve pozhenili dvukh nevest” (In Moscow two brides were married), http://www.kp.ru/daily/26270/3148680/ [↑](#footnote-ref-755)
756. Edward Lucas, *The New Cold War,* London: Bloomsbury, 2008, pp. 105-107. [↑](#footnote-ref-756)
757. Guedes, “The ‘Five Day War’, The Invasion of Georgia by the Russian Federation”, pp. 9-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-757)
758. Vera Mironova and Maria Snegovaya, “Putin is behaving in Ukraine like Milosevic did in Serbia”, *New Republic,* June 19, 2014, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118260/putin-behaving-ukraine-milosevic-did-serbia. [↑](#footnote-ref-758)
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760. “Mizulina predlagaiet rossiankam rozhat’ ot Putina, poluchaia ‘material’ pochtoj – SMI”, October 6, 2014, http://www.trust.ua/news/101335-mizulina-predlagaet-rossiyankam-rozhat-ot-putina-poluchaya-material-pochtoj---smi.html. [↑](#footnote-ref-760)
761. Andrei Movchan, “Rossia i Zapad: kto moral’nee?”, <http://slon.ru/russia/rossiya_i_zapad_kto_moralnee-1114248.xhtml>, June 17, 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-761)
762. Vladimir Moss, “1945 and the ‘theology of victory’ in the Moscow Patriarchate”, https://www.academia.edu/ [↑](#footnote-ref-762)
763. Hannah Gais, “Putin, Stalin and the Church”, *First Things,* May 28, 2015, http://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2015/05/putins-taking-his-cues-on-religion-from-an-unlikely-source. [↑](#footnote-ref-763)
764. Andrei Illarionov, “Boevoj put’ FSB v Ukraine”, *Online Kiev*, June 10, 2014, <http://kiev-online.net.ua/politika/andrei-illarionov-boevoi-put-fsb-v-ukrai.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-764)
765. “Poroshenko podpisal zakony o dekommunizatsii Ukrainy”, March 20, 2015, http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2015/05/15/n\_7199737.shtml. [↑](#footnote-ref-765)
766. Alexander J. Motyl, “Kiev’s Purge. Behind the New Legislation to Decommunize Ukraine”, *Foreign Affairs,* **April 28, 2015.** [↑](#footnote-ref-766)
767. “Poroshenko vredit Ukraine bol’she, chem Putin – Gribauskajte” (Poroshenko is harming the Ukraine more than Putin – Gribuskajte), http://zvamynews.blogspot.com/2016/12/blog-post\_27.html. [↑](#footnote-ref-767)
768. Matthew Fisher, “Russian infiltration of Ukrainian military complicates Canadian training mission”, *National Post,* April 14, 2015, http://www.nationalpost.com/m/wp/blog.html?b=news.nationalpost.com%2F%2Fnews%2Fworld%2Frussian-infiltration-of-ukrainian-military-complicates-canadian-training-mission. [↑](#footnote-ref-768)
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770. Millar, *Grand Duchess Elizabeth of Russia,* Redding, Ca.: Nikodemos Orthodox Publication Society, 1993, pp. 200-201*;* Felix Yusupov, *Memuary* (Memoirs), Moscow, 1998, p. 230. [↑](#footnote-ref-770)
771. Schema-Monk Epiphany (Chernov), personal communication, from the words of the elder’s disciple, Abbess Barbara of St. Mary Magdalene monastery, Jerusalem. [↑](#footnote-ref-771)
772. Elder Aristocles, in Fr. Seraphim Rose, "The Future of Russia and the End of the World", *The Orthodox Word*, 1981, vol. 17, nos. 100-101, p. 211. Most of Fr. Seraphim's quotations were taken from *Pravoslavnaia Rus’* (Orthodox Russia), N 21, 1969. See also S. Fomin & T. Fomina, *Rossia pered Vtorym Prishestviem* (Russia before the Second Coming), Sergiev Posad, 1998, third edition, p. 435; "To the Memory of Abbess Barbara", *Orthodox Life*, vol. 33, no. 4, July-August, 1983, and I.K. Sursky, *Otets Ioann Kronshtadstky* (Fr. John of Kronstadt), Belgrade, 1941, p. 325. St. John of Kronstadt prophesied that the deliverance of Russia would come from the East (Sursky, op. cit., vol. 2, Belgrade, 1941, p. 24), as did Elder Theodosius of Minvody (Schema-Monk Epiphanius (Chernov), *Tserkov’ Katakombnaia na Zemle Rossijskoj* (The Catacomb Church in the Russian Land) (typescript, Mayford, 1980)). [↑](#footnote-ref-772)
773. According to a slightly different version of this prophecy passed on by Archbishop Theophan’s cell-attendant, Schema-Monk Epiphany (Chernov), the future Tsar will not be a Romanov himself but will be related to the Romanovs on the maternal line, perhaps through marriage (*Tserkov’ Katakombnaia na Zemle Rossijskoj,* op. cit.). [↑](#footnote-ref-773)
774. St. John of Kronstadt, in Fomin and Fomina, vol. II, op. cit., p. 331. [↑](#footnote-ref-774)
775. St. John of Kronstadt, in Fomin and Fomina, vol. II, op. cit., p. 338. [↑](#footnote-ref-775)
776. Kontakion, *Festal Menaion,* Feast of the Meeting of the Lord in the Temple. [↑](#footnote-ref-776)